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Alignment theory andinterrelated threats: Jordanand the Persian Gulf crisisRichard J. Harknett a & Jeffrey A. VanDenBerg ba Assistant professor of international relations inthe department of political science , University ofCincinnatib Doctoral fellow in the department of politicalscience , University of CincinnatiPublished online: 24 Dec 2007.

To cite this article: Richard J. Harknett & Jeffrey A. VanDenBerg (1997) Alignmenttheory and interrelated threats: Jordan and the Persian Gulf crisis, Security Studies,6:3, 112-153, DOI: 10.1080/09636419708429316

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ALIGNMENT THEORY AND INTERRELATED THREATS:

JORDAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

RICHARD J. HARKNETT AND JEFFREY A. VANDENBERG

ONE OF THE DISTINGUISHING characteristics of the cold war was thefascination held by its leading states with international alignment.The United States and the Soviet Union were concerned consis-

tendy with the security alignment of clients no matter how small or remote.Bodi superpowers created formal security commitments to clients throughbilateral and multilateral instruments. The dominant imagery at the timewas of two great competing camps.1 With the collapse of the Soviet bloc inthe early 1990s, the potential for a dramatic realignment of security rela-tions world wide emerged. Over at least the next decade, the internationalsystem is likely to experience a period of significant transformation of se-curity cooperation and coordination among states.

If policymakers are to influence this dynamic change effectively, correctidentification of the underlying motivations that drive states to align theirsecurity policies with one another must be discerned. Thus, critical inspec-tion of current theoretical understanding is essential. This article examines aset of conditions and motivations that are underdeveloped in the literatureon state security behavior. In developing an alternative approach to align-ment analysis, this article seeks to enhance die academic debate over thedeterminants of security cooperation and coordination.

Richard J. Harknett is assistant professor of international relations in the department of po-litical science at the University of Cincinnati. Jeffrey A. VanDenBerg is a doctoral fellow inthe department of political science at the University of Cincinnati.

The authors thank Steven David, Wasif Abboushi, Ann Mosley Lesch, and Kathryn Harknettfor their reviews of earlier drafts, and the rigorous comments of the anonymous reviewers ofSecurity Studies. A USIA/NMERTP fellowship at the American Center of Oriental Research inAmman, Jordan and a Charles Phelps Taft grant supported this research.

1. The concern over alignment is somewhat surprising given the nuclear balance. On thewide-ranging impact of nuclear weapons on international security see T. V. Paul, Richard J.Harknett, and James J. Wlrtz, eds., The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Weapons and theEmerging World Order (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997).

SECURITY STUDIES 6, no 3 (spring 1997): 112-53Published by Frank Cass, London.

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Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats 113

The evaluation of state security alignment should be broken down intotwo steps: first, determine the appropriate level and unit of analysis; second,determine the actual dynamic driving the alignment. Alignment theorieshave divided into two broad categories on both of diese steps. Systemicapproaches, like those of Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt, argue that theprimary explanatory variable is found in the distribution of capabilitiesand/or threats across the international system.2 Alignment policy is drivenprimarily by factors external to the state. Society- and state-centered ap-proaches, such as proposed by Peter Katzenstein and G. John Ikenberry,focus on the importance of domestic structures and politics as explanatoryvariables.3 Alignment policy is driven primarily by internal factors. Much ofthe debate over alignment theory has been focused on determining whetherexternal or internal factors provide greater explanatory power.4 Aldioughthere have been calls to move to an integrated approach, little progress hasbeen made.

The assessment of the actual dynamic behind a state's alignment is dis-tinct from die determination of die appropriate level of analysis. Hereagain, two possibilities have garnered the most attention in alignment re-search. In general, states tend either to balance away from or bandwagontoward power and/or threats. In diis article, we adopt the perspective diatdie current literature on alignment meory fails to capture a particular set ofalignment determinants that may, in fact, become more prevalent as thepost—cold war international order emerges. Specifically, we argue matalignment may be driven by a reaction not to die presence of an externalthreat, nor by domestic political compromise, but by die presence of bom

2. See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987);Walt, "Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs," SecurityStudies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 448-82; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (NewYork: Random House, 1979); Eric J. Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?" Security Studies 1,no. 3 (spring 1992): 383-416; and Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringingthe Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 72-107.

3. For a strong overview of this literature see David Skidmore and Valerie Hudson, eds.,The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation (Boulder: Westview,1993), 1-22; Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986);G. John Ikenberry, "The State and Strategies of International Adjustment," World Politics 39,no. 1 (fall 1986): 53-77; Peter Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Struc-tures," International Organisation 30, no. 1 (winter 1976): 1-45.

4. Some recent work that reexamines systemic theories in the context of domestic influ-ences include: Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett, "Alliance Formation, Domestic PoliticalEconomy, and Third World Security," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 14, no. 4(December 1992): 19-40; Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon? AlignmentDecisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 417-47; and Laurie A.Brand, "Economics and Shifting Alliances: Jordan's Relations with Syria and Iraq, 1975-1981," International Journal of Middle East Studies 26 (summer 1994): 393-413.

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114 SECURITY STUDIES 6, no. 3

external and internal security challenges that reinforce each other. Whensuch an interrelated threat exists the international alignment is best under-stood as a strategy of combined response to internal and external factors.Additionally, we argue that in certain cases alignment may reflect a directresponse to an internal threat rather than a reaction to external stimuli. Thepresence of internal or interrelated threats makes explanation of alignmentsmore complex and difficult. It is possible that the alignment outcome willnot correspond to the alignment dynamic. A state may align with an exter-nal power that poses a long-term challenge for the purpose of balancingagainst an immediate internal threat (thus alignment is really being drivenby a balancing dynamic even though the alignment appears to be band-wagoning). It is the dynamic behind the behavior, not the apparent direc-tion of alignment, that demands explanation. This is this article's focus.

The article is divided into three primary sections. First, an overview ofthe theoretical literature on alignment is offered. In this section, we developa framework which emphasizes the conditional nature of alignment dynam-ics and we explain how a focus on internal and interrelated threats can pro-duce explanations superior to systemic, state- and society-centered ap-proaches in certain cases. Second, an in-depth case study of Jordanianalignment strategy during the Persian Gulf conflict of 1990-91 is devel-oped. This case is offered in order to illustrate how the presence of interre-lated threats can affect alignment in a way not previously examined in thealignment literature. The case also highlights the very real connection be-tween theoretical assumptions about alignment and foreign policy deci-sions. Based on interviews with both high-ranking Bush administration andJordanian officials, we show how American recognition of the threats fac-ing King Hussein led to an implicitly coordinated set of policies by bothJordan and the United States that would not have been pursued if tradi-tional assumptions about alignment had dominated decision making in ei-ther capital.5 Third, a brief summation is offered concerning the relation-

5. Part of the research for this case study was conducted during a field trip to Jordan inthe spring of 1996. This fieldwork included personal interviews with elite policymakers inJordan as well as informed Jordanian academics, journalists, and political activists. The casestudy also relies on a mail questionnaire on state alignment behavior sent to high-rankingBush administration officials and members of Congress who were involved in the policy-making process during the Gulf crisis. The survey was sent to seventy-four policymakers andwe received fifteen responses. For a copy of the survey please contact the authors. This re-search also included follow-up telephone interviews with some respondents. All telephoneinterviews were conducted with administration officials of the highest rank, who were guar-anteed confidentiality because of issues concerning the administration's report to Congress inOctober 1990. Therefore, direct attribution of American policymakers is omitted.

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Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats 115

ship between theory and policy and the research possibilities for focusingon interrelated threats.

ALIGNMENT THEORY

WHAT DRIVES states to adopt a common posture toward a security issue,leading them to engage in cooperative and coordinated security be-

havior? 6 Two broad sets of research have focused on the effects of externaland internal factors on alignment. Systemic explanations suggest that theprimary determinant of alignment is a state's assessment of its relative po-sition to other states across the international system. The most traditionalof these explanations has concentrated on the distribution of capabilities asthe critical variable.7 It is argued that the primary alignment response is tobalance against the potential or actual constellation of power (be it one stateor group of states). Balance of power theory holds that states will, in theface of an external preponderance of power, join with other states in orderto balance against the rising power. States align in this way because of thefear that a failure to confront would place them in danger of domination ordestruction at the hands of the rising power. The determinants of align-ment stem from the anarchical structure of the international system whichnecessitates that states resist any actual or potential external threats to theirsurvival. The primary motivation is to secure the state's continued exis-tence. According to Kenneth Waltz, most states find greater securitythrough balancing against power.8

6. For a sample of the definitions of alignment and alliance in the literature, see GeorgeModelski, "The Study of Alliances: A Review," in Alliance in International Politics, ed. JulienFriedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), 63-75;Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 11-14; Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 17-21; Roger V. Dingman, "Theories of,and Approaches to, Alliance Politics," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in Theory, History, andPolicy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979); Robert L. Rothstein, Alliancesand Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 46-64; and Charles W.Kegley Jr. and Gregory Raymond, A Multipolar Peace?: Great Power Politics in the 21st Century(New York: St. Martin's, 1994), 89. Steven David's definition of alignment is also useful: "Inbroad terms, a state has aligned when it brings its policies into close cooperation with thoseof another state." Choosing Sides, 29. David uses two criteria for alignment: security coopera-tion and dependency on a superpower for arms. Our definition concurs with David's withthe exception of the latter criterion.

7. For a sample of the classic balance of power literature, see Hans J. Morgenthau, PoliticsAmong Nations, 6th ed., ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: Knopf, 1985); Edward VoseGulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (New York: Norton, 1955); Waltz, Theory of Interna-tional Politics; also see discussions in George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdepend-ence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); and Walt, The Origins of Alliances.

8. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 126.

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Under rare conditions, the distribution of power may be such that a statewill choose to move toward the greater power. Bandwagoning theory pre-dicts that states will join with the stronger side in the hope of escaping ordiverting a rising power's animosity, or to share in the aggressor state'sspoils of victory.9

As a refinement of balance of power explanations, Walt has offered thenotion that states tend to react against several kinds of threats, rather thanagainst power alone.10 Proceeding from a systemic level of analysis, he ar-gues that alignment is determined by the distribution of threats, which canbe assessed through a focus on the combination of capabilities, geographicproximity, offensive power, and intentions. Similar to Waltz's judgmentconcerning power, Walt finds that the greater tendency among states is tobalance away from threats rather than bandwagon toward them. In assess-ing this balancing tendency, however, Walt departs from the Waltzian per-spective by concluding that states tended to balance not against the mostpowerful state, but against the "state they perceived as most threatening."11

Balance of power and balance of threat explanations (along with theirbandwagoning versions) emphasize the constraints and opportunities thatexist external to the state. Such approaches have been countered by a sec-ond set of explanations that center on the importance of domestic politicsand structures in explaining state foreign policy.12 The literature includingsociety- and state-centered explanations, dominated primarily by pluralistand institutionalist arguments, is extensive.13 Society-centered explanations,in the tradition of Robert Dahl,14 view policy behavior as a reflection of the

9. Bandwagoning as a form of appeasement or capitulation is discussed in Walt, Origins ofAlliances, 19-21. Alignment behavior based on the desire to reap the benefits of a revisioniststate's aggression is forwarded in Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit." See also RobertJervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competi-tion in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and Arnold Wolfers,Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1962), 205-16.

10. Stephen M. Walt, "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of SoutheastAsia," International Organisation 42, no. 2 (spring 1988): 277; Walt, "Alliance Formation andthe Balance of World Power," International Security 9, no. 4 (spring 1985): 3-43.

11. Walt, "Testing Theories," 311.12. Waltz contends that balance of power politics "prevail wherever two, and only two,

requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing tosurvive" (Theory of International Politics, 121). Waltz distinguishes between a theory of interna-tional politics and theories of foreign policy. Domestic source explanations of alignmentwould fall under the latter. For the significance behind this distinction see Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics, 121-22.

13. This brief overview is drawn from G. John Ikenberry, David Lake, and Michael Mas-tanduno, "Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy,International Organisation 42, no. 1 (winter 1988): 1-14.

14. Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).

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preferences of dominant groups or actors, who struggle against othergroups or actors in order to influence the policy-making process. This ap-proach would explain alignment as an outcome based on an actor's orgroup's ability to organize effectively within the policy arena so that theirinterests have prominence over others. State-centered explanations placegreater emphasis on the persistence of institutional arrangements. PeterKatzenstein and G. John Ikenberry see state structure as an important vari-able that produces both constraints and opportunities for competing actorsin the policy-making process.15 State structures are important interveningvariables in the policy process. Both society- and state-centered approachesview alignment decisions as being primarily driven by internal political in-centives and risks.16

The work of Steven David stands out as one bridge between the theo-rists who focus on external factors and those who emphasize internal vari-ables.17 In an expansion of Stephen Walt's argument, David agrees thatstates are more concerned with threats than power alone, but argues thatsevere threats to security may not come only from outside a state's borders.Internal threats can require states to adopt specific external alignments.

David, however, does not view the presence of internal threats in isola-tion. He recognizes that in an anarchic international system the presence ofexternal threats to state survival can never be dismissed. Thus, according toDavid, it is the interaction between the distribution of systemic and do-mestic threats that will determine a state's international alignment behavior.David adopts an argument in line with the findings of Waltz and Walt andconcludes that the natural tendency of states will be to balance away fromthe primary threat they face. David expects that when the primary threat isinternal (coup, revolution, insurgency), the current leadership of a state will

15. "Institutional structures mediate the interests and capacities of the groups and indi-viduals within them...organizational structures of state and society shape and constrain theinterests that actors come to embrace and the resources they wield" (G. John Ikenberry,"Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Economic Policy," InternationalOrganisation 42, no. 1 [winter 1988]: 219-43).

16. Although there have been calls for an integrative approach, little has been done withregard to explaining state security alignment behavior in a comprehensive fashion. Ikenberryhas argued that in terms of approaches to foreign economic policy, explanation would beenhanced "by focusing more explicitly and positively... [on how] the state serves as an impor-tant independent or intervening variable between social and international forces." Althoughthis may be true, in practice this amounts to a state-centered approach that acknowledges thepresence of other factors. See his contributions to the special issue, International Organisation42, no. 1 (winter 1988).

17. See Steven David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics 43, no. 20anuary 1991): 233-57; and Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).

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seek an international alignment that will protect it from this menace even ifit means aligning with a state it considers an external, yet secondary, threat.

David's argument makes a number of advances over previous ap-proaches. First, it recognizes that a large percentage of conflict that threat-ens to change state borders or regimes comes from within.18 In certain re-gions and types of states, this form of conflict is much more prevalent thanassaults by foreign troops across borders. States must react to this realityand consider it in their calculations over international alignment. Systemicapproaches like balance of power or balance of threat do not capture suchcalculations. Second, David's work recognizes that in many countries thepolitical process lacks legitimacy for a majority of the population. Most plu-ralist or institutionalist models assume that domestic competition takesplace through and/or within some accepted policy arena. The process ofinfluencing decision making is routinized (perhaps bureaucratized) and le-gitimized. This, however, is not the case in many states, where the policy-making process remains unsettled. Even where democratic institutions areemerging, disagreements over executive and legislative power still have asmuch chance of being resolved by assaulting parliament with tanks asthrough the ballot box.19 In such circumstances, domestic "politics" takeson a very different character. Pluralist and institutional approaches (muchof which are derived from studies of foreign economic policy) do not cap-ture the intensity of threat that coups, insurgencies, secessions and revolu-tions convey. A domestic environment in which the potential for internalsecurity threats is high produces a very distinctive form of politics fromthat found in a domestic context in which security is not an issue. If secu-rity is scarce, the domestic environment will take on the structural charac-teristics and imperatives associated with international anarchy. One needonly think of Liberia, Somalia, and Bosnia in the 1990s. Such an environ-ment requires different assumptions than those built into traditional do-mestic politics and institutional approaches.

David revises Stephen Walt's observation that security cooperation isdriven by a reaction to the most threatening state by acknowledging the

18. Looking just at ethnopolitical conflicts, Ted Gurr notes that in 1994 eighteen out oftwenty-three wars were based on internal communal challenges to states, producing nearlytwenty-seven million refugees. Eight out of thirteen UN peacekeeping missions were dealingwith civil conflict. See Gurr, "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and theChanging World System," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 350.

19. Loss of political office does not always lead to increased speaking royalties and booktours, but to imprisonment or worse. These concerns manifest themselves even in advancingdemocracies like South Korea as the indictments of former presidents Chun and Roh illus-trate.

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Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats 119

purview of the domestic realm. Alignment is driven by a reaction to themost pressing threat, be it externally or internally generated. David illus-trates how an external alignment against or toward another state can be theresult of a desire to balance against and defeat a domestic threat. What,however, if a domestic threat clearly is the most pressing, but cannot bebalanced against? If an external alignment can be used to defeat an internalthreat, might it not also be used to appease it?

David's work is an appropriate extension of the theoretical debate overdeterminants of alignment. If states respond to several different kinds ofthreats, as Walt suggests, reality tells us that many of those security threatsare internally generated. David's argument, however, requires refinementand expansion. If alignment behavior can be a reaction to internal threats,the specific dynamic does not have to be one of balancing. A regime mayseek an international alignment in order to appease a direct and immediateinternal security challenge. Alignment can be the product of internal balanc-ing or internal bandwagoning dynamics.

The inclusion of primary internal threats as an explanatory variable is animportant advance. Reactions to interrelated threats, however, are analyti-cally distinct from responses to primary external or primary internal threats.Responses to interrelated threats require what we call omnialignments—international alignments that use a combined strategy to deal with internaland external security challenges that feed off one another. We assume thatalignment is driven by a reaction to the most pressing threat—external, in-ternal, or interrelated—facing the security of a country or regime with twodynamics most prevalent—balancing or bandwagoning.20 We use the prefix"omni" to distinguish reactions against or toward interrelated threats fromalignments produced as responses to external or internal threats alone.21

20 An omnialignment framework does not preclude international neutrality or "hiding"as an alignment outcome that flows from balancing or bandwagoning dynamics. On hidingsee Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality versus Neo-Realist Theory," International Security19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 117-18. On neutrality as an alignment outcome see Efraim Karsh,Neutrality and Small States (London: Routledge, 1988).

21. David's use of the term interrelated threat was accurate descriptively, but it was notdistinct analytically. He argued that alignment is explained by reference to a primary threat(internal or external). Therefore, his discussion of secondary threats adds to the descriptiveunderstanding of a case, but does not change the explanation. We consider interrelatedthreats distinct. The combined strategy they require is different than alignment strategiesresponding to internal or external primary threats. The prefix "omni" captures the sense ofreactions to multiple challenges and thus is useful in highlighting alignments against interre-lated threats. We will use the terms internal balancing and internal bandwagoning to addressalignment responses to internal threats.

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OMNIALIGNMENT

Although both balance of power and bandwagoning theories predict differ-ent reactions, it is important to note that the unit and level of analysis forboth explanations are the same.22 Balancing and bandwagoning theoriesassume that alignment behavior is determined by the distribution of powerin die international system and the emergence of a perceived externalthreat. The decision on whether to balance against or bandwagon with anexternal threat will depend, in particular, on the relative strength of thestates involved and the availability of allies. The adoption of the state as aunit of analysis with power distribution and external direats as the level ofanalysis provides a basis for explanation of alignment behavior. It does not,however, capture the prevailing reasons for alignment under all conditions.

The study of alignment should begin with an examination of both theproper unit and level of analysis. Our approach to alignment analysis isstructured around an emphasis on the conditional nature of alignment be-havior and die consideration of multiple levels of direat to regime as well asstate security. Alignments may be determined by die need to react to inter-nal threats to a particular regime's continued leadership rather dian externaldireats to a state's territorial integrity. It is also possible that external andinternal direats become so entangled diat a policy response to just one willprove inadequate. In diis case, policymakers will view internal and externalchallenges as a single integrated direat requiring a complex policy response.When external direats to state security predominate, systemic theories willprovide sufficient explanatory power. The end of die cold war, however,has increased the importance of internal and interrelated direats to regimeand state security. Analysis of alignment behavior must be extended to in-clude diis complexity. The evaluation of alignment behavior must proceedfrom an examination, not an assumption, of die proper unit and level ofanalysis. This reorientation is more dian a dieoretical nuance for it suggestsa critical new level for policy analysis and formulation.

Leaders will align widi die outside power diat can provide securityagainst die primary direat facing diem, whether it be internal, external orinterrelated. The critical determinant of alignment dien is die relative in-tensity of die direats to a regime. Under certain circumstances, direats todie personal survival of a leadership may represent die predominant factormotivating alignment behavior. Leaders will "sometimes protect themselves

22. For a brief comparison see Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances: Balancing and Band-wagoning," in International Politics, 3rd ed., ed. Robert I. Art and Robert Jervis (New York:HarperCollins, 1992), 70-78.

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Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats 121

at the expense of promoting the long-term security of the state and thegeneral welfare of its inhabitants."23 When leaders are faced with significantinternal opposition, they will adopt an international alignment that will as-sist them in dealing with this primary threat, even if that entails aligningwith an outside power that constitutes a potential threat as well.24 This is asignificant point to note, for in such a case, traditional systemic explana-tions would read the international alignment as an instance of band-wagoning. The argument would be presented that the weaker state soughtsecurity by appeasing the stronger state. A bandwagoning interpretationwould miss the fact that the underlying motivation was to deal with an in-ternal threat.25

We propose that analysis of alignment behavior should be extended be-yond a focus on systemic factors when internal or interrelated threats arepresent.26 Three conditions contribute to the presence of internal threats:27

1. Competing allegiances—national populations have loyalties other thanto a perceived consensus "national interest";

23. David, Choosing Sides, 7.24. David conceptualized omnibalancing as alignment with or against the cold war super-

powers. We contend that regional powers, and their interrelationship with internal sources ofthreat, also may lead to omnialignment behavior. For more on the importance of regionalpowers in international relations see W. Howard Wriggins, ed., Dynamics of Regional Politics(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); and Richard J. Harknett, "Searching for Con-ceptual Clarity: A Review Essay," Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 20, no. 2 (1994): 171-76.

25. Laurie Brand has posited that alignment behavior is driven more by internal economicconcerns than traditional external security threats. Brand makes a persuasive argument for"budget security" as the predominate dynamic underlying international alignment in theThird World, characterizing it as a form of "economic omnibalancing." Our conception ofomnialignment would not exclude economic threats to elite/leadership, but emphasizes thatin many countries that fit the conditions discussed below, regime security often means thephysical survival of the leadership rather than simply budgetary solvency. Moreover, as Branddiscusses, budget security does not explain fully alignment decisions when there is an imme-diate pressing threat as was the case for Jordan. See Brand, "Economics and Shifting Alli-ances"; Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making (New York:Columbia University Press, 1994), 15-38; 284-95; and Brand, "Liberalization and ChangingPolitical Coalitions: The Bases of Jordan's 1990-91 Gulf Crisis Policy," Jerusalem Journal ofInternational Relations 13, no. 4 (1991):l-46.

26. At a recent conference on NATO expansion, the Rumanian ambassador to the UnitedStates noted an internal bandwagoning dynamic working in Bucharest. He remarked that thebest way to ensure that democratic leaders remained in power was to allow Romania to joinNATO. He cautioned that reformist leaders, in order to stay in power and check oppositionforces, would have quickly to change course and move toward an alignment with Russia iffaced with a NATO rebuff. The Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington Discus-sion Series Conference, 19 June 1995, Washington, D.C. (author's notes).

27. These conditions are based on David's discussion of the general characteristics ofThird World states in chap. 1 of Choosing Sides. It is our contention that these characteristicscan usefully serve more than just a descriptive purpose. They delineate the set of conditionsunder which internal threats are more likely to be present. For the conditions associated withthe traditional theories of balance of power and bandwagoning, see Walt, Origins of Alliances,28-33.

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2. Lack of legitimacy—the leadership's power base is narrowly definedand thus legitimacy at the national level is questionable;

3. State power—the predominant source of power and wealth in societyis found in actual control of the state apparatus;

Interrelated threats are likely when the above three conditions are pres-ent along with an external power that represents an immediate securitychallenge. This creates a fourth distinct condition in which both interna-tional and domestic factors contribute to the creation and potential sup-pression of threats.28

The politics of ethnicity, language, and religion are increasingly prevalentin the international system. The artificiality of most of the states in theThird World and the unleashing of traditional rivalries in the former com-munist world after years of forced suppression are manifesting themselvesin challenges to die coherency of many multiethnic, linguistic, and religiousstates. From Chechnya to Chiapas, from Bosnia to Kurdish Iraq, examplesabound of states diat cannot command the allegiance of sizable portions oftheir population. Instead, populations have loyalties to narrower group in-terests. As such, "rather than transcending the differences among thesedifferent groups, the state is often simply the representative of the groupthat holds power in the capital."29

Closely tied to the problem of competing allegiances is a lack of leader-ship legitimacy. The absence of a unifying national identity often meansthat regimes must use force to stay in power, and that the political institu-tions, history, and legal structures of the state do not serve as sources ofregime legitimacy. Where there is disagreement on die fundamental natureof the state, the foundations upon which the regime rules will be weak and,relying solely on power and coercion, overthrow is a constant possibility.

In addition to competing allegiances and a lack of legitimacy, the tenuousnature of some regimes is exacerbated by die centrality of the state as thesource of power, influence, and wealth in many political systems. Becausepolitical and economic institutions dedicated to providing access and influ-ence for non-state actors are lacking, control of the state becomes a highlysought-after prrze, one that is often competed for with violence. These firstdiree conditions raise an interesting conceptual issue. David has argued thatsome leaders equate meir personal interest widi the national interest and actas if the latter is in line with the former (consider Ceaucescu in Rumania,

28. David, Choosing Sides, 14. David lists all four as conditions for his theory of omnibal-ancing. We see the fourth condition, in conjunction with the other three, as the basis for thedistinct form of interrelated (as opposed to internal) threat.

29. David, Choosing Sides, 12.

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Kim II Sung in North Korea, and at times even Yeltsin in Russia). This al-lows David to use the logic of realpolitik in his analysis. In a number ofcases in the 1990s, the fall of a particular regime has indeed threatened thevery survival of the state itself. The secession and civil conflict in Yugosla-via is one type of example; the chaos of Liberia and Somalia another. Theinternal threat that challenged the Somali government led to an internalthreat to the survival of Somalia itself, rendering it a territorial state in nameonly. Thus, equating regime survival and state survival may not simplycapture the perceptual mindset of a leader, but objective reality as well.When these first three conditions combine, a focus on internal threat as anexplanatory variable for international behavior becomes important.

When the fourth condition arises, alignment must deal with multiplethreats from different quarters. Leaders must concern diemselves with boththe security of the state in an anarchic international system and with intensedomestic menace. These threats are often connected, with external rivalsfomenting internal opposition or aiding domestic insurrection. Omnialign-ment, therefore, is not a domestic-source explanation of internationalalignment. Rather, it holds that the interrelated nature of threats to regimesurvival requires leaders to be aware of a variety of challenges, and to viewalignment as a combined response to internal and external challenges.

In short, in states where die population has only indirect influence onpolicy making, institutions dedicated to aggregating group interests into anational consciousness are lacking, and state power is really die only power,alignment might be best explained by looking at narrow elites rather thanstates. Many Third World as well as emerging postcommunist states fitthese conditions.30 Analysis of alignment behavior should rest on the as-sumption that security cooperation and coordination results from a reac-tion to the most immediate and substantial threat facing a particular regime.The goal is to choose an international alignment that provides the mostsecurity. Under this framework, three broad types of threats are distin-guishable: external, internal, and interrelated.

Systemic theories adequately explain the first type, ignore the second,and may misrepresent the third.31 The work of David recognizes the po-tential need to react to internal threats and thus expands the scope of ex-

30. It is possible to hypothesize that even the Russian Republic, or more specifically, theYeltsin government is engaged in internal balancing against a nationalist-communist opposi-tion. Coordination with the West seems to be driven by the assessment of whether or notsuch aid can protect against the dual internal threats of economic collapse and political ex-tremism.

31. Domestic source approaches tend to ignore the first and assume a degree of domesticlegitimacy and order that precludes examination of the second.

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planation beyond systemic theories. We would add to David's analysis thenotion that internal threats either can be resisted or appeased through inter-national alignments. Omnialignment highlights that interrelated threats re-quire leaders to keep an eye on bodi external and internal forces. There aretwo basic responses to all three types of threat: balancing is alignment drivenby the desire to find security in resisting or defeating one's most pressingthreat; bandwagoning is alignment driven by the desire to find security in ap-peasing one's most pressing threat.32

The combination of the three types of threat and balancing and band-wagoning responses creates eight distinct alignment dynamics (alignmentreactions to threat). The first two dynamics are those assumed by systemictheories—external threats produce alignment outcomes. In the case of thenext two, an alignment is explained as an attempt to seek external assistanceto balance against or to appease an internal threat.33 The external environ-ment may be relatively nonthreatening and thus play little role in the deci-sion to align. Alternatively, an alignment might be a reaction to interrelatedthreats. Omnialignments can take four distinguishable forms: double bal-ancing, double bandwagoning, balance-bandwagon, and bandwagon-balance. Earlier published case study work covers seven of the eight dynam-ics. In the interests of space these dynamics are only briefly mentioned be-low.34 The eighdi dynamic (double bandwagoning) will be the subject ofour case study.

After coming to power in 1969, Jaafar Nimeiri intensified Sudan's align-ment with the Soviet Union primarily to defeat the resistance to his rule byIslamic religious political groups and a rebellion in the southern part of the

32. Internal balancing, internal bandwagoning and omnialignments require an in-depthstudy of the preferences and relative strengths of internal threats along the same lines thatWalt suggests studying the intentions and capabilities of external foes. We should expectinternal bandwagoning under conditions similar to those which promote external band-wagoning; that is, the absence of a balancing ally, the relative weakness of a regime to with-stand a threat alone, and when the intentions of the domestic opposition allow for appease-ment. Our decision to use omnialignment to distinguish interrelated threats was aided bycomments offered by Karl Mueller.

33. Although an external alignment may help appease an internal threat, the domesticopposition's demands may or may not voice a preference for a particular alignment. It is theassistance an alignment brings, rather than the alignment itself that may be important. Seediscussion of Sadat and Siad Barre below.

34. For the detailed case studies see David, Choosing Sides, chaps. 3, 4, and 5; and Walt,Origins of Alliances, 50-146, 287-88. Because of the traditional predominance of systemictheories, there are countless case studies of strategic balancing and bandwagoning and weneed not repeat them here. The formation of NATO is a good example of strategic balancingand the case of Finland's relationship with the Soviet Union is classic strategic band-wagoning. Two of David's cases discussed here are refined by applying an omnialignmentexplanation. In correspondence with the author, David agreed.

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country. At the time Sudan was not facing any intense external threat;rather the alignment was driven by an internal balance dynamic. By themid-1970s, however, the source of the internal threats had shifted and, ac-cording to Nimeiri, they were being fomented by the Soviet Union. In or-der to balance against the potential for another military coup and balanceagainst an increasingly antagonistic Soviet Union, Nimeiri chose to alignhimself with the United States. Nimeiri was facing an interrelated threat,which he solved through an omnialignment (double balance).

DYNAMICS DRIVING INTERNATIONAL ALIGNMENT OUTCOMES

Strategic Balance International alignment resists an external threat

Strategic Bandwagon International alignment appeases an external threat

Internal Balance International alignment resists an internal threat

Internal Bandwagon International alignment appeases an internal threat

Omnialignment International alignment resists external-internal(double balance) forces

Omnialignment International alignment appeases external-internal(double bandwagon) forces

Omnialignment International alignment resists external, appeases(balance-bandwagon) internal forces

Omnialignment International alignment appeases external, resists(bandwagon-balance) internal forces

Mengistu Haile Mariam's rule over Ethiopia is another example of howinterrelated threats can affect alignment. Despite the fact that the SovietUnion was one of the supporters of a rebellion in the Eritrea province ofEthiopia and was the main arms supplier of Somalia, Ethiopia's enemy, theneed to consolidate his power primarily against intense internal threats ledMengistu to break with the United States and align closely with Moscow in1977. What externally appeared as a simple case of strategic bandwagoningwas driven actually by a more complex reaction that addressed the need tobalance against a pressing internal threat. Mengistu's omnialignment(bandwagon-balance) appeased the external side of his interrelated threat,while allowing for resistance of internal forces.

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David offers two other cases in which alignment was driven as a reactionto an internal threat. From 1969 to 1974, Siad Barre locked Somalia into astrong security relationship with the Soviet Union. As David noted,"although Somalia faced no threats, Siad did."35 Siad's hold on power re-quired the continuing support of Somalia's clan leaders, who demanded theregaining of Ethiopian-held territory populated by ethnic Somalis. Withoutthe support of the clans, internal conflict was likely. Siad, therefore, soughtan international alignment for the expressed purpose of obtaining the nec-essary military support to seize the Ogaden region. Although David cor-recdy notes that the impetus for the alignment was a reaction to an internalthreat, the dynamic was one of internal bandwagoning rather than internalbalancing. Siad sought security in an international alignment that providedthe means to appease his most pressing threat, which was internal. Thescope of this internal threat was experienced by Somalia in the 1990s.

During the early 1970s domestic support for Anwar Sadat, particularlyamong military and political leaders, required the Egyptian president to endIsraeli occupation of the Sinai, which he attempted to do through force ofarms in the 1973 October war. The failure of the Egyptian offensive onlyled to an intensification of these domestic demands, which carried withthem the prospect of a coup or revolt. Israel, of course, remained the prin-cipal external threat. Sadat chose an international alignment with the UnitedStates in order to appease the demands of his internal threat, while hemaintained resistance to his principal external direat.36 Sadat was principallymotivated in aligning with the United States by his desire to survive his in-ternal threat, which could only be done by appeasing it. Cooperating withthe United States (and fully abandoning the Soviets) in order to leverageIsrael to return the Sinai was the only option open to Sadat (in essence, hechose to defeat Israel diplomatically since he could not do it militarily).Thus, the alignment was driven by a bandwagoning dynamic even as Sadatcontinued to pressure and resist his external threat. Sadat chose to alignwith the only state that could simultaneously release pressure on the inter-nal (most threatening) front and increase pressure on his external threat.Sadat's omnialignment (balance-bandwagon) combined continued externalbalancing against Israel with an appeasement of internal forces formingagainst him. It was not the alignment that the people demanded (most

35. David, Choosing Sides, 101.36. The unwillingness of the USSR to support Sadat further narrowed the options he had

available for dealing with the growing internal menace. Beyond this, there were reports thatby the mid-1970s the Soviets were looking to support an overthrow of Sadat. Thus, thealignment with the United States can be seen as a balance against an indirect external threatas well.

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Egyptians were not pro-American at the time), but the results they wanted,which the alignment could produce.

OMNIALIGNMENT IN THE PRESENCE OF INTERRELATED THREATS

Balance (internal) Bandwagon (internal)

Balance Nimeiri's Sudan with U.S. Sadat's Egypt with U.S.(external)

Bandwagon Mengistu's Ethiopia with King Hussein's Jordan(external) USSR with Iraq, 1990

One alignment dynamic, yet to be examined, is a double bandwagoningtoward external and internal facets of an interrelated threat. This type ofalignment is missed by policymakers relying on systemic theories. If a stateis vulnerable to external bandwagoning pressures, a country interested ingaining an alignment with that state should increase its power or sense ofthreat. If, however, the reason for a state's apparent bandwagoning behav-ior in the past was because it was too weak to balance against a more seri-ous internal component of an interrelated threat, manipulating the externaldistribution of power or threats may prove inconsequential.

Alignment theory should start with an examination of the unit and levelof analysis. The potential threats leaders/states face when alignment deci-sions are made must be determined. In order to develop a better under-standing of how such an approach can be applied, the following case studyis offered. The detailed case on the alignment behavior of Jordan and theforeign policy of the United States toward the Hashemite kingdom duringthe Persian Gulf conflict of 1990-91 reveals that not only did King Husseinadopt an omnialignment strategy, but the Bush administration correctlyidentified Amman's approach and adjusted its policy along omnialignmentlines. The case offers a contribution to theory development by introducinga new alignment dynamic (double bandwagoning). More importandy, it il-lustrates how the introduction of interrelated threats into alignment analysiscan alter, and, in certain cases improve, explanation. The case also high-lights how closely linked theoretical assumptions about alignment are topolicy determinations and the important policy consequences such as-sumptions can have. Simply put, King Hussein would have either beenousted from the throne or so damaged internationally that his role in the

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subsequent peace process may have been undermined had the Bush ad-ministration's policy toward Jordan been informed by either a systemic bal-ance of threat or bandwagoning perspective. The presence of internal orinterrelated threats necessitates a more complex set of assumptions.

JORDAN AND ITS INTERRELATED THREAT

DURING THE AUTUMN of 1990 the governments of Egypt, Syria, and theGulf Cooperation Council aligned with die United States to balance

against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Jordan stands out as an important Arabplayer that chose to distance itself from the UN Coalition. The systemicdistribution of power and threats were similar enough for Amman that onewould have expected King Hussein to have balanced as the rest of the re-gion had done. Aldiough a weak state relative to Iraq, the presence of astrong potential ally in the United States-led Coalition should have allevi-ated any external pressure the king may have felt to bandwagon. The prob-lem for the king, however, was not primarily external.

An omnialignment explanation rests on die premise that, under certainconditions, leaders must conduct foreign policy with an eye on direats frombodi internal and external sources. In the case of Jordan, continuedHashemite reign requires a sophisticated high-wire act against powerfulneighbors and a restive population. From its inception, the viability of Jor-dan as a state and the security of its ruling family have been in doubt:"Created by accident and lacking the economic and political conditions re-quired for statehood, die state of Jordan [can] disappear as suddenly as itappeared."37 Jordan's monarchical form of government carries with it theimplication that forestalling disappearance must be considered not only anational objective, but a personal one for King Hussein. In the case of Jor-dan, state and personal survival can be equated.38

When one examines die four conditions under which omnialignmenttendencies will surface—competing allegiances, questionable legitimacy,

37. Wasif Abboushi, Political Systems of the Middle East in the 20th Century (New York: Dodd,Mead, 1970), 267.

38. In his autobiography, the king often seems to associate his survival with the continuedexistence of Jordan as a state. Hussein, for example, characterizes the tumultuous three-yearperiod between 1955 and 1958 as a time in which "Jordan as a country nearly perished"(Hussein, King of Jordan, Uneasy Lies the Head [London: Heinemann, 1962], 83). Actually, itwould be more accurate to say that King Hussein or the monarchy nearly perished, for it wasHussein who was the primary focus of the civil unrest and the personal target of a failedcoup d'etat attempt led by his chief of staff and a former prime minister.

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concentrated state power, and interrelated threats—-Jordan is a strongmatch. The competing allegiances of Jordan's population are largely a productof its creation as a political unit in 1921. The Emirate of Transjordan, as itwas known before 1949, was arbitrarily drawn by the British to serve theirgeopolitical interests in the region. There were no historical, ethnic or geo-graphical divisions between the area created as Transjordan and its peopleand surroundings to the north, east, and south. In fact, the only physicalboundary was the narrow and often dry Jordan river to the west. In theSykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, the British reached an accommodationwith the French to subdivide the region between them. This meant that theprevious British promise to King Hussein's great-grandfather SharifHussein of an Arab state in the whole of the region went unfulfilled. In-stead, Sharif Hussein's son, Abdullah, was offered a piece of barren andsparsely populated territory east of the Jordan river, by secretary of state forthe colonies Winston Churchill, as a way of preventing Abdullah's impend-ing invasion of French-held Damascus. The establishment of the mandateover Transjordan meant that London would retain effective control overthe corridor between British-held Palestine and Iraq.39

The result of this deal-making was an artificial state without a nation, for"the establishment of the Jordanian state was not the outcome of national-istic demands for an independent political entity. The people of Jordanwere not conscious of any Jordanian identity."40 During the early mandateperiod, the population of Transjordan was nearly 50 percent nomadic tribeswho owed allegiance only to Islam and their clan, and who traditionallytraveled through the region unobstructed by national boundaries.41 Arabnationalism superseded the narrower affiliation to the newly created Jorda-nian state among the more politically sophisticated population. Any"Jordanian" affinity that existed was personal loyalty to the Hashemites,themselves from the Hijaz in the Arabian peninsula, rather than an identifi-cation with the state.

The problem of competing allegiances was greatly exacerbated after Ab-dullah incorporated the West Bank into Jordan following the 1948 Arab-

39. For more on the creation and early history of Transjordan, see Kamal Salibi, The Mod-ern History of Jordan (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993); Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and theMaking of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Ann Dearden, Jordan(London: Robert Hale, 1958); Robert B. Sadoff, From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Uriel Dann, Studies in the History of Transjordan1920-1949: The Making of a State (Boulder: Westview, 1984); and Ma'an Abu Nowar, TheHistory of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan, vol. 1 (Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1989).

40. Abboushi, Political Systems of the Middle East in the 20th Century, 267. In this regard, theborders of many African countries are similar.

41. Dearden, Jordan, 56.

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Israeli war. The military achievements of the Arab Legion against Israelbrought with it an educated and politically active Palestinian population thatwas numerically larger than that of the East Bank. Although Jordan lost theWest Bank in 1967, the flood of refugees left it with a population that iscurrendy estimated at near 60 percent Palestinian.42 Despite dieHashemites' extension of citizenship to these displaced Palestinians livingwidiin Jordan's borders, most have never thought of diemselves as perma-nent residents of the kingdom. Instead, many consider themselves tempo-rary refugees from dieir occupied homeland, and as such have not exhibitedmuch fidelity to the state of Jordan. Nearly one fourdi of the 826,128 regis-tered refugees in Jordan were still living in camps in 1986.43 A state wherethe majority of its citizens feel mat they are visitors is inherendy problem-atic, as has been evidenced by Jordan's chronic instability. Indeed, the proc-ess of building a Jordanian national identity has been a long, painful, andstill incomplete one for die Hashemites.44

Closely related to the omnialignment assumption of competing alle-giances is the presumption of a questionable degree of state legitimacy. To under-stand fully the domestic politics of Jordan, King Hussein's concern for le-gitimacy, particularly as it relates to his large Palestinian population, must berecognized. As one scholar asserts, "nowhere are the paradoxes of Arablegitimacy more apparent tfian in Jordan. Every positive legitimizing assetcasts a shadow of negativism."45 King Hussein is a direct descendant of dieProphet Muhammad. His family was at the forefront of Arab nationalismduring the First World War. He has survived on the throne for over fortyyears and has brought some measure of prosperity to his kingdom. Yet,

42. For the purposes of this study, the term "Jordanians" will refer to all those who live inthe post-June 1967 borders of Jordan, including both Palestinians and East Bankers. OfficialJordanian censuses do not distinguish demographically between "Jordanians" and"Palestinians." One reliable American source writes that "the exact number of Palestiniansliving on the East Bank was unknown. Estimates usually ranged from 60 to 70 percent of thetotal population." Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Jordan: A Country Study (Washington: FederalResearch Division of the Library of Congress, 1991), 73. Other authors employ general esti-mates such as "Palestinians make up a little more than half the population of Jordan today."Arthur Day, East Bank/West Bank: Jordan and the Prospects for Peace (New York: Council onForeign Relations, 1986), 56. The return of a large number of Palestinians from Kuwait afterIraq's invasion may have elevated the figure up to 70 percent.

43. United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) statistics cited in Metz, Jordan: ACountry Study, 90.

44. For more on the problem of competing allegiances in Jordan, see Clinton Bailey, Jor-dan's Palestinian Challenge, 1948-1983: A Political History (Boulder: Westview, 1984); UrielDann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan 1955-1967 (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1989); Robert B. Satloff, Troubles on the East Bank (New York: Praeger,1986); and Arthur Day, East Bank/West Bank.

45. Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1977), 210.

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despite these legitimizing assets, the Hashemites have been the constanttargets of both internal and external animosity, subterfuge, and subversion.

For many Palestinians, the state of Jordan and the Hashemite monarchyare tangible reminders of foreign imperialism, anachronisms whose exis-tence conflict with the principles of self-determination. The close relation-ship that Abdullah and his grandson have had with Great Britain and theUnited States—"the midwives of Israel"—has been interpreted as tanta-mount to recognition of Jordan's neighbor to the west.46 The 1970 civil warin Jordan between the Jordanian army and the Palestine Liberation Organi-zation (PLO), dubbed "Black September" by the Palestinians, was a bloodymanifestation of the lack of legitimacy held by the Jordanian monarch withthe Palestinian community.47 King Hussein's decision not to join withEgypt and Syria in the 1973 attack on the Jewish state further underminedhis stature with this population.

From a very early age Hussein learned that the Palestinians linked hisfamily with the injustices brought upon them by the West, and that theywould violendy act out their frustrations. When he was just sixteen,Hussein witnessed the assassination of his grandfather Abdullah in Jerusa-lem by a Palestinian, barely escaping widi his own life.48 For many yearsvarious Palestinian leaders have called for the overthrow of the king, whohas survived numerous assassination attempts and coup plots. He has alsoseen the assassinations of his cousin, King Faisal II of Iraq, and close col-leagues such as Prime Minister Hazza Majali in 1960.

Another important condition that supports an omnialignment environ-ment in Jordan is die concentration of power in the state. The state is the ultimatesource of power in Jordan, and in turn the monarchy dominates state deci-sion making. King Hussein has "wide powers over the executive, legislative

46. One of the consequences of King Hussein's Persian Gulf crisis policies was that hewas able to use his increased measure of legitimacy with his own population, particularlyamong Palestinians, to reach a peace agreement with Israel. It is unlikely that the post-Gulfwar environment would have been as propitious for peace negotiations had the king fol-lowed an alignment strategy dominated by traditional balance of power considerations.

47. For more on Black September, see Bailey, Jordan's Palestinian Challenge; Peter Snow,Hussein: A Biography (Washington: Robert B. Luce, 1972); Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan;and James Lunt, Hussein of Jordan (New York: Morrow, 1989).

48. As the king relays the story in his autobiography, his grandfather had insisted thatHussein wear his military uniform to the Haram al-Sharif that fateful day. After the assailantshot Abdullah, he turned and fired at Hussein, striking him in the chest. The bullet, however,ricocheted off a medal on his uniform, saving his life. A relative of the Palestinian Mufti ofJerusalem was found guilty of the murder of Abdullah and hanged. In Uneasy Lies the Head, 1 -20. See also Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, and Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan: KingAbdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1988).

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and judicial branches of the government."49 In such a system, advancementin government institutions such as the military and the bureaucracy de-pends on the acquiescence of the throne, and King Hussein carefully allo-cates important positions of authority. Even the Jordanian parliament,which in 1989 saw its first elections in twenty-two years, is subservient tothe palace, where most important national legislation and all foreign policydecisions are initiated. Political parties had been banned from 1957 until1992 and political dissent monitored by numerous security agencies and theking's secret police, the mukhabarat.50 The upper echelons of the Jordanianarmy are staffed by the intensely loyal Bedouin. Minorities such as the Cir-cassians and Arab Christians are also relied upon heavily by the king. Al-though Palestinians have become prominent in business and education,their presence in positions of power in the military and government havebeen largely nominal, temporary, and infrequent. In short, the majority ofJordan's population has been systematically excluded from the real sourcesof privilege and influence. The political implication of this highly central-ized power is that control of the state is a much-desired prize for the op-position, providing a constant rationale for threatening the monarchy.51

The final condition that promotes omnialignment is met by Jordan's ex-treme vulnerability to outside influences and the interrelationship between inter-nal and external threats. In Jordan, there is a "fine line between the domesticand external [which is] almost nonexistent at times."52 The powerful re-gional force of Arab nationalism has occasionally captivated the fealty ofJordanians from both banks of the Jordan river at the expense of the mon-archy. The devotion of most of the Arab world to President Gamal AbdelNasser of Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s nearly cost Hussein his king-dom and his life. Since the PLO was forced out in the early 1970s, a majorityof Jordan's population has looked to Beirut, later Tunis, and most recentlyGa2a, rather than Amman for its leadership and guidance.

Although Jordan may fit the four descriptive conditions of omnialign-ment, the critical question is whether the king recognized this situation andacted upon it. The difference in which he managed the Persian Gulf con-flict and an earlier crisis indicates that he may indeed have been cognizantof the need to double bandwagon in 1990.

49. Raphael Patai, The Kingdom of Jordan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 90.50. In the fall of 1993, the king allowed political parties to participate openly in parliamen-

tary elections for the first time in twenty-six years.51. As Uriel Dann argues, the Hashemites have been a "target to be hunted down and

destroyed" by the "popular forces of the age at all times." Dann, King Hussein's Strategy ofSurvival (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992), 2.

52. Day, East Bank/West Bank, 157.

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BAGHDAD 1955 AND 1990

King Hussein encountered the significant interplay between external andinternal factors in 1955, when he considered joining the Baghdad Pact. Thepact was a security arrangement initiated by Iraq, Turkey and Britain as aresponse to a perceived emerging Soviet menace. It was strongly con-demned, however, by the rising star in the region—Nasser of Egypt. Nas-ser was advocating his own security pact at the time, one based on theprinciples of Arab nationalism and anti-Western sentiment. He viewed theBaghdad Pact as a British attempt to reexert its influence and as a directchallenge to his own regional designs. Egypt launched a vigorous propa-ganda campaign against the Baghdad Pact over Cairo Radio. At first thevenom was directed at King Faisal II of Iraq, but it eventually focused itsanimosity on Amman and King Hussein, labeling him a "Western puppet,"and criticizing his British-run Arab Legion, headed by John Bagot Glubb.

The September 1955 Egyptian-Soviet-Czechoslovakian arms deal furtherenhanced Nasser's popularity in Jordan, for most Jordanians considered it a"slap in the face for the West."53 Combined with his virulent condemna-tions of Israel, the Egyptian arms deal strengthened the devotion of muchof the Arab world to Nasser. The rise of the Egyptian president, however,was unwelcome by King Hussein, a conservative monarch who felt threat-ened by the forces of communism and Arab nationalism sweeping the re-gion.54 In November Hussein decided that he would join the Baghdad Pactin order to secure greater arms and economic assistance for Jordan and togive the free world "an enormous moral victory."55 The decision was drivenprimarily by his view of the external threats to the region. The alignment,however, heightened opposition within Jordan. Within a month of the de-cision, the prime minister and four Palestinian cabinet members resignedand Cairo Radio stepped up its campaign against Jordan. Hussein namedHazza Majali, who was an open proponent of the Baghdad Pact, primeminister, and his appointment caused violent riots throughout the kingdom.

Majali's government lasted only five days before the civil unrest forcedKing Hussein to dismiss him and dissolve the parliament. The SupremeCourt, however, ruled that the king's dissolution of parliament had beenunconstitutional and further violence and rioting ensued.56 Finally Husseincalled out the Arab Legion to quell the unrest, but the internal threats

53. Snow, Hussein: A Biography, 74.54. King Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, 83-93.55. Ibid., 89.56. In the king's words, "...all hell broke loose. Riots such as we had never seen be-

fore. . .disrupted the entire country." Ibid., 92.

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forced the king to cancel Jordan's admission into the Baghdad Pact. Con-cern for his domestic survival was so great that Hussein acquiesced to thedemands of die newly elected Arab nationalist government of SuleimanNabulsi and agreed to join with his external enemy Nasser in the Arab Soli-darity Pact of 1957. The king appeased his internal opponents with thisalignment, even though he knew Nasser had been inflaming Jordan's civilunrest.57 King Hussein also dismissed Glubb Pasha in response to domesticpressure.58 The crisis of 1955—57 revealed to the king mat his own popula-tion's receptiveness to Arab nationalism could be manipulated by externalopponents to the point of threatening the monarchy. This experienceshowed how his external alignments had to be calibrated with die interre-lated nature of threats to his dirone in mind.59

The parallels between 1955 and the autumn of 1990 are intriguing. Aswas the case during the Baghdad Pact riots, the Persian Gulf crisis wit-nessed a Jordanian population stirred into action by the appeal of an exter-nal leader. Like Nasser before him, Saddam Hussein enjoyed great popular-ity widiin Jordan because of his promulgation of Arab nationalism, his vit-riolic stance against the West, and his militant rhetoric toward Israel. AnnMosely Lesch has detailed die multifaceted appeal of Saddam Hussein tomany in the Arab world, including both Palestinians and East Bankers inJordan.60 First, die Iraqi president represented a radical alternative toEgypt's Hosni Mubarak who was advocating patient and peaceful negotia-tion as a strategy to end Israel's occupation of die West Bank and Gaza.

57. This alliance placed Jordan's armed forces under Egyptian control in case of a waragainst Israel. The other signatories were Syria and Saudi Arabia. For more on the Arab Soli-darity Pact, see George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 4th ed. (Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press, 1980), 483-85, and Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism,39-52.

58. Walt lists Jordan's behavior as bandwagoning toward the increased power of Egypt.The locus of his analysis is on the growing strength of Nasser. He notes the vulnerability ofJordan to Nasser's intimidation. The Origins of Alliances, 60-66. From an omnialignment per-spective, it was the danger to King Hussein posed by the interrelated threats of Egyptianstrength and domestic opposition that precipitated Jordanian alignment. Without an internalsource of threat to manipulate, Nasser would not have had sufficient leverage. It was notuntil internal instability, flamed by Nasser, became intense that Jordan began shifting towardEgypt. The king's response was a counteraction to both sets of threats. This case also high-lights the importance of focusing on elite leadership rather than the state as the unit ofanalysis.

59. The problem of interrelated threats, of course, is a constant one for the Hashemites.In June of 1996 it was reported that Jordanian security had thwarted thirty-six terrorist at-tempts in three months, including an assassination attempt on Crown Prince Hassan. Officialsources disclosed that the threats were supported by Syria. The Star (Amman), 6 June 1996and 27 June 1996.

60. Ann Mosely Lesch, "Contrasting Reactions to the Persian Gulf Crisis: Egypt, Syria,Jordan, and the Palestinians," Middle East Journal 45 (winter 1991): 31-50.

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Saddam's policy of building up a powerful Arab military force to intimidateIsrael and deter any aggression resonated with the Palestinians who be-lieved that Israel only respected strength. Saddam's announcements that hewould "incinerate half of Israel" if they attacked Iraq and that his countrywould come to the assistance of any Arab fighting Israel were welcomed byPalestinians as words of liberation.61 Second, the Iraqi president found anapproving audience with the Palestinians when he linked the resolution ofhis conflict with Kuwait to an end of Israel's occupation, raising hopes thata regional conference to address issues of occupation would result. Finally,Saddam "touched the chord of widespread resentment toward the oil-richstates in the Arabian peninsula," a resentment that was particularly high inJordan, by arguing that the Gulf states were Western sycophants who weredenying assistance to fellow Arabs.62 Saddam Hussein not only gained theaffection of Jordanians, but he also was able to arouse their latent animosi-ties toward the rich Gulf monarchies and the West.

The internal challenge to the king was made even more serious by thefact that East Bank Jordanians were largely pro-Saddam. The traditionalcommunal divide between Palestinian and East Banker was suddenlybridged after 2 August as the two groups united in support of Iraq's inva-sion of Kuwait and, later, in condemnation of the U.S. military response.63

The popular sentiment of Jordanians—Palestinian and East Banker alike—manifested itself almost immediately after the invasion in massive demon-strations, protests, and occasional violence, creating a dangerously unstabledomestic situation for King Hussein. He was left with the options of eitherlooking after the long-term interests of the state of Jordan by siding withthe Arab-American Coalition or protecting his throne from the immediatechallenge that would have erupted had he aligned against Iraq. As long-timecabinet member and current member of the upper house Dr. Sa'id al-Tellput it, "had Jordan been looking out for only Jordan, it would have joinedthe U.S."64

61 "Iraq Threat Counters Israeli One," Jerusalem Post, 6 April 1990, news section.62. Lesch, "Contrasting Reactions to the Persian Gulf Crisis: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the

Palestinians," 33. Lesch frames the alignment behavior of King Hussein in traditional balanceof power terms despite providing convincing support for an omnialignment approach. Shewrites, for example, that "Jordan was cornered strategically and economically. Caught be-tween Iraq and Israel, it feared being crushed in a war between two behemoths" (ibid., 45).She concludes that "the king's internal popularity was at its height just as he faced the great-est external challenge in his 38-year reign" (ibid., 46). His popularity, however, was in largepart a result of the king's successful decision to double bandwagon toward the external threatand with one of the greatest internal challenges of his long tenure.

63. Brand, "Liberalization and Changing Political Coalitions," 32-35.64. Interview with VanDenBerg, Amman, 6 May 1996.

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Saddam's invocation of Arab nationalism and his refusal to acquiesce toWestern pressures made him a heroic figure to many in Jordan. The exam-ples of Jordanian outpouring of sympathy for Iraq were numerous. Picturesof the Iraqi president sprang up all over Jordan, in taxi windows, barbershops, private homes, and even on the walls of government buildings. Theselling of Saddam paraphernalia became a profitable business.65 One T-shirtsold in the market read in Arabic script "Write down that I am an Arab,born on Aug. 2."66

As early as 9 August, four thousand Jordanians had volunteered to join apeople's army to "help the peoples of Kuwait and Iraq defend themselvesagainst outside aggression."67 The number of volunteers had reportedlyescalated to eighty thousand by mid-August.68 At a demonstration on 10August, protesters burned U.S., British, and Israeli flags and shouted "Deathto America."69 Two days later ten thousand people marched through thestreets of Madaba denouncing the American intervention in the Gulf andraising pictures of Saddam Hussein.70 In the northern Jordanian town ofMafraq the next day, a rally in support of the policies of Saddam was at-tended by fifteen thousand people. During the rally, demonstrators chant-ing anti-American, anti-Saudi, and anti-Egyptian slogans clashed with thelocal police. With the crowd yelling "we sacrifice our blood for you Sad-dam" in the background, a member of parliament, Muhammad Fans al-Tarawinah, suggested war with the United States, saying "Let's hit America,let's hit the reactionary American regime."71 On 25 August twenty-fivethousand Iraqis gathered at Zarqa, the scene of a failed coup d'etat attemptagainst the king in 1957, to express allegiance to the Iraqi president.72

The demonstrations continued unabated throughout the months ofAugust and September, creating an internal climate that had the potentialfor massive unrest. Many Jordanian policymakers, academics, and journal-ists have commented on the fragility of the king's position at the time, be-

65. New York Times, 21 October 1990.66. Sana Atiyeh, "Observers: Jordanians resigned to war in region," UPI, 31 December

1990.67. Reported in Jordan Times, in FBIS-NES, 9 August 1990. Mohammad al-Rashdan, secre-

tary general of the Jordanian Committee for Support of Kuwait (a pro-Iraqi organization),said that he expected "up to ten thousand tomorrow...the popular response has been over-whelming. One man called in today and said tomorrow I am bringing in passports of hun-dreds of relatives of mine."

68. Brand, "Liberalization and Changing Political Coalitions," 34.69. Daniel Williams, "Angry Jordan Arabs Demonstrate Against Bush as Another Cru-

sader," Los Angeles Times, 11 August 1990.70. Amman Petra-JNA, 12 August, as reported in FBIS-NES, 13 August 1990.71. Quoted in Jordan Times, as reported in FBIS-NES, 13 August 1990.72. Paris AFP 16 August, as reported in FBIS-NES, 17 August 1990.

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lieving that the throne was in jeopardy due to the pro-Saddam and anti-American sentiments that had been unleashed. Taher al-Masri, the deputyprime minister during the crisis, is quite frank on this point: "There wouldhave been a revolution against the king had he sided with the United States.There would have been a popular uprising against him."73 Member of Par-liament Abdul Raouf al-Rawabedeh concurs with al-Masri. He concludedthat it would have been "detrimental to the regime itself to have goneagainst the wishes of the population.74 In this environment, "the domesticpressure was great, too great for the king to ignore. The security of the re-gime was the number one issue and the domestic threat could have costhim his throne."75 The actions of other countries support this perception.The Egyptian embassy in Amman was sufficiently concerned about thedemonstrations to request that Jordanian riot police be deployed to guardit. The situation was so volatile that the U.S. State Department urged Ameri-cans in Jordan to leave the country, and allowed its own personnel to moveout on a voluntary basis. Israeli Prime Minister Shamir's communicationsadviser Avi Pazner warned that Hussein's regime was in danger, and LaborKnesset member Binyamin Ben-Eli'ezer said in an interview, "If you askme, the king is finished, in long-range terms. He is at present in a situationof no return."76

Saddam's popularity was not limited to the citizens on the streets of Jor-dan, for the newly elected parliament was also fully supporting SaddamHussein. In a meeting on 16 August, the MPS said that they preferred deathto the "shame" of opposing Iraq.77 The head of the Jordanian-Americanfriendship society, Senate member Muhammad Kamal, decided to dissolvethe organization on 18 August. The Muslim Brotherhood, which in 1989won twenty-two out of eighty seats in the lower house of Jordan's parlia-

73. Interview with VanDenBerg, Amman, 7 May 1996.74. Interview with VanDenBerg, Amman, 7 May 1996.75. Dr. Jawad Anani, former minister of state for prime ministry affairs, interview with

VanDenBerg, Amman, 20 May 1996.76. Pazner paraphrased in Jerusalem Post, 14 August, as reported in FBIS-NES, 15 August

1990. Ben-Eli'ezer's quotation from an interview on the Israel Television Network August14, as reported in FBIS-NES, 15 August 1990. Ben-Eli'ezer also stated that "As things look inthe present, the king has totally lost control over events in Jordan. I cannot recall any otherperiod in which the king has made so many mistakes as he has in this very brief period. Hehas allowed demonstrations; he has allowed the opening of offices where Jordanians arerecruited for Iraq. He has in fact become Jordan's [as heard] agent and propaganda minister."On Egyptian and U.S. embassy actions see Wafa Amr, "Foreign Women in Jordan Appealfor Peaceful Resolution of Crisis," Los Angeles Times, 21 August 1990, international section;"Saddam Supporters Demonstrate, Enlist in Iraqi Army," United Press International, BC cycle,13 August 1990.

77. Quoted in Paris AFP 16 August, as reported in FBIS-NES, 17 August 1990.

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ment, also backed Saddam Hussein. The Brotherhood was vehement aboutthe unacceptability of foreign troops in the Arabian peninsula and sup-ported the Iraqi president's call for a jihad against the outsiders. They heldrallies throughout the crisis to condemn Western intervention, including aseventy thousand-strong demonstration in Amman on 10 September and aspeech rally in Irbid attended by forty thousand citizens on 28 September.78

Moreover, the prime minister at the outbreak of the crisis was MudarBadran, who "loved Saddam just like the people did."79 Badran was adominant figure, a strong prime minister who the king had to take into ac-count. He was popular with the people and had the backing of the parlia-ment, which, emboldened by the recently held elections and new politicalfreedoms, was active in pressing its foreign policy demands to the govern-ment and the palace. As such, according to the deputy prime minister at thetime, "Badran would not have allowed, nor would public opinion have al-lowed, the king to side with the U.S."80 What is important to recognize isthat the opposition to such an alignment would have been manifestedthrough revolutionary, not parliamentary, measures. The process of politi-cal liberalization begun by the regime in 1989 allowed for greater expressionby the population, but it did not meaningfully democratize or institutional-ize the decision-making process. In contrast to the expectations of pluralistmodels of foreign policy, parliamentary influence in Jordan could bewielded only through an ability to rouse "the street" into decidedly danger-ous forms of opposition for the monarchy. The source of popular influ-ence, if you will, was the threat of violence and insurrection rather thanelectoral accountability.

Despite the massive unrest in Jordan during the early part of the crisis,King Hussein did not call out the military to suppress the protests anddemonstrations as he did in 1955. This can be explained in part by the factthat Jordan had just gone through five days of rioting in April 1989 that lefteight people dead and fifty injured. This violence in the southern part ofthe country included participation by the king's normally loyal Bedouin. Asa result of the upheaval, which was precipitated by a government increasein the prices of bread, fuel, cigarettes, telephone services, and electricity,King Hussein had eased political restrictions and had held the first parlia-

78. The 10 September rally reported in Amatzia Baram, "Baathi Iraq and Hashemite Jor-dan: From Hostility to Alignment," Middle East Journal 45 (winter 1991): 68. Irbid demon-stration on Jordan Television Network, 28 September, as reported in FBIS-NES, 3 October1990.

79. Quotation from Deputy Prime Minister Taher al-Masri, interview with VanDenBerg,Amman, 7 May 1996.

80. Interview with VanDenBerg, Amman, 7 May 1996.

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mentary elections in twenty-two years.81 The greater political freedoms,freedom of the press, and a popularly elected parliament created a starkchoice for the king. If he had wanted to clamp down on pro-Saddam sen-timent and align with the Arab-American Coalition, he would also have hadto return to press censorship and confront the parliament, for both weredecidedly sympathetic with Iraq. The memory of the riots set off in 1955after the illegal dissolution of parliament and the fundamental role thatmembers of parliament played in fanning public outrage against Jordan'smembership in the Baghdad Pact could not have been lost on the king inthe fall of 1990. Additionally, there was some evidence that "even the gen-erals in the military were pro-Saddam."82 King Hussein was therefore con-fronted with a tenuous domestic situation, one with the potential for ex-plosion against the monarchy had the king sided with Iraq's opponents.Learning the lessons from his confrontation with Nasser in 1955, the kingrecognized that the only way to ensure his survival was to align away fromthe Arab-American Coalition.

In analyzing Jordan's alignment with Iraq, it is first necessary to askwhether Jordan engaged in any alignment at all, for throughout the crisisKing Hussein and his inner circle of advisers portrayed their country'sstance as neutral.83 Although Jordan abstained or boycotted all of the ArabLeague resolutions condemning the invasion of Kuwait, it officially statedthat it did not recognize Iraq's annexation of the emirate and publicly for-warded its belief that peace would not return to the region until Iraq'sforces withdrew from Kuwait.84 King Hussein claimed that he was an im-partial mediator and peace-maker and, in support of his stated objective ofa nonmilitary resolution, undertook a shuttle diplomacy that carried himmore than fifty thousand miles for meetings with fifteen world leaders inthe first two months of the crisis.85

81. Stanley Reed, "Jordan and the Gulf Crisis," Foreign Affairs 69 (winter 1990): 28. Seealso Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations, 291.

82. Quotation from Deputy Prime Minister Taher al-Masri. Interview with VanDenBerg,Amman, 7 May 1996.

83. For a detailed explication of the king's proclaimed crisis policy and its rationale, re-leased in August 1991, see the Jordanian government's white paper: Jordan and the Gulf Crisis,August 1990-March 1991.

84. In the words of King Hussein's younger brother Crown Prince Hassan, "Let me makeit explicitly dear that Jordan does not recognize or condone the annexation of Kuwait byIraq." In the same editorial, however, Hassan goes on to say that "no useful purpose wouldbe served by severing contact with or isolating Baghdad." Washington Post, 2 September 1990.

85. Judith Miller, "King Hussein on Kuwait and Dashed Hopes," New York Times, 16October 1990.

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A more careful examination, however, reveals that King Hussein did en-gage in a limited alignment with Iraq. He adopted a common stance to theregion's security problems and pursued direct security cooperation in a fewinstances. Jordan's alignment with Iraq manifested itself in a number ofways, one of which was Jordanian violation of the UN-mandated embargoagainst Iraq. For the first three months of the crisis it was widely reportedthat Jordan continued to export its products to Iraq and allowed delivery ofgoods from other countries to Iraq through the port of Aqaba. On 15August foreign journalists were barred by Jordanian authorities from enter-ing the normally open port complex. In an interview, the Aqaba port direc-tor 'Awad al-Tall reported that "he had not received to date any instruc-tions from the Jordanian government to implement the UN sanctions."86

Although Crown Prince Hassan declared on 17 August that Jordan hadaccepted the sanctions mandated by the UN,87 trucks loaded with frozenmeat, cotton and other goods left the port of Aqaba for Iraq two days laterand the port's authorities said that they were loading and unloading asnormal.88 On 26 October U.S. State Department spokesman RichardBoucher announced Jordanian compliance with the embargo, saying that"we believe Jordan's compliance warrants generous support in the expecta-tion that Jordan will continue to meet its obligations to enforce UN-mandated sanctions."89

It is now known, however, that Jordan continued to violate the UN em-bargo well after this statement of compliance by the U.S. State Department.In an investigative report prepared by the General Accounting Office (GAO)in September of 1992, based in part on classified Defense Departmentdocuments, it was discovered that

while prior administration officials were officially testifying that Jordanwas in compliance with UN sanctions except for oil imports from Iraq,there is sufficient evidence in the DOD documentation we reviewed toquestion this assertion.90

86. Paris AFP, as reported in FBIS-NES, 15 August 1990, 37.87. London Press Association, as reported in FBIS-NES, 20 August 1990, 27.88. Paris AFP, as reported in FBIS-NES, 20 August 1990, 27.89. Quoted in Reuters AM Cycle, 26 October 1990.90. Quotations from House Report 103-25, "Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and

Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 1994," 10 June 1993.

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Additionally, Jordan assisted Baghdad by helping it hide in the Central Bankof Jordan over a billion dollars that might otherwise have been frozen byAmerican action.91

King Hussein also provided Saddam Hussein with a degree of diplomaticsupport at a time when Iraq was isolated from the international community.In an interview on Jordanian television two days after the invasion, KingHussein described the Iraqi leader as "an Arab patriot, a person who be-lieves in this nation, and in its future, and in its basing its relations withothers on the basis of mutual respect."92 At the emergency Arab Leaguemeeting in Cairo on 11 August, King Hussein expressed considerable sym-pathy for Saddam Hussein, declaring that "the [Arab] nation is indebted toIraq after the latter spent eight years defending it and its Arab system andoffering martyrs for it."93 The Jordanian monarch welcomed Iraq's linkageof its withdrawal from Kuwait with Israel's occupation of the West Bankand the Gaza Strip, Syria's control over Lebanon, and Iraq's territorial dis-putes with Iran.94 In public speeches and in negotiations with the UnitedStates and other Coalition partners, King Hussein was often a proponent ofIraq's position, urging the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Arabianpeninsula and proposing peace plans that would have allowed territorialconcessions to Iraq. Finally, King Hussein made it explicidy clear through-out the crisis that his government viewed the foreign military intrusion intothe Muslim holy land as more problematic than Iraq's invasion of Kuwait,saying, for example, that "no real Arab can approve the entry of Americanforces on Arab soil because this goes against Arabism and Islam."95

Most significant, however, is the fact that Jordan also provided militaryassistance to Saddam Hussein. During the crisis there were several reportsfrom Israeli sources that Jordan's air force had been absorbed by Iraq and

91. Hearing on H.R. 4803, "The Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction andRegulatory Improvement Act of 1992," Serial No. 102-21.

92. Interview on Jordan Television Network, 4 August 1990, as reported in FBIS-NES, 6August 1990, 54.

93. Quoted in Amman Domestic Service, 12 August 1990, as reported in FBIS-NES, 14August 1990. 1-2.

94. In a speech on Baghdad radio, Saddam Hussein argued that Israel's withdrawal from"the oldest occupation" should take place first and that "all issues of occupation...be re-solved in accordance with the same principles...set by the UN Security Council." Quoted inLesch, "Contrasting Reactions to the Persian Gulf Crisis," 37-38.

95. Quote from King Hussein's speech at the emergency Arab League meeting in Cairoby Paris AFP, 12 August, as reported in FBIS-NES, 12 August 1990, 64. The difference in thisstance and King Hussein's 1996 policy turn against Iraq, including allowing American sol-diers in Jordan, illustrates the forceful internal pressure that existed during the gulf crisis of1990. For more see Jeffrey A. VanDenBerg, "Democratization and Foreign Policy in theMiddle East: A Comparative Study of Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt," (Ph.D. diss., Universityof Cincinnati, forthcoming).

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142 SECURITY STUDIES 6, no. 3

was flying reconnaissance missions for Saddam along the Jordanian-Saudiborder.96 Moreover, in a classified military annex to the GAO report men-tioned above, it was found that

U.S. intelligence services verified four types of Jordanian and Iraqi mili-tary cooperation during the Gulf crisis. These activities included jointtraining exercises with Iraq, two cases of providing access to UnitedStates technology, one case of purchasing spare parts, and one casedealing with the sharing of Coalition and Israeli intelligence informa-tion.97

This combination of military cooperation, violation of die economic em-bargo, and diplomatic support for Saddam places die relationship betweenJordan and Iraq well within the definition of alignment.

King Hussein's alignment behavior, however, was not widiout potentiallygrave dangers. A primary tenet of realist theory is that states operate in ananarchical international system under a hierarchy of issues, the foremost ofwhich is security.98 It is exacdy this concern for security and stability thatprecipitated the balancing alignment behavior against Iraq by Egypt, Syria,and Saudi Arabia. As Inis Claude writes in his discussion of balance ofpower as policy, "stability, survival, protection of national rights and inter-ests demand that power be neutralized by equivalent power."99 The reactionof diese states can be explained by balance of power dieory. The potentialpreponderance of Iraqi power along with two recent examples of Iraqi in-vasion of neighbors, according to balance of power expectations, shouldhave led Jordan to balance as well.

Balance of threat expectations would also have led to a prediction ofJordanian alignment widi Saudi Arabia, itself facing the most immediatethreat. Saddam Hussein represented a clear threat to both the stability ofthe region and to Jordan itself, as Iraq possessed all four of the factors thatStephen Walt describes as constituting a threat: aggregate power, geo-graphic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions.100 Iraq had

96. See for example, Boston Globe, 1 September; Los Angeles Times, 11 September; and WallStreet Journal, 24 August. Although Israel may have had motives for presenting disinforma-tion, U.S. intelligence reports of other military cooperation and the prewar relationship be-tween the airforces of Jordan and Iraq seem in accord with the Israeli information.

97. The declassified military annex to the GAO report is cited in House Report, 103-25.98. Kenneth Waltz, "The New World Order," Millennium: The Journal of International Studies

22, no. 2 (1993): 187-95.99. Inis L. Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), 18.100. Walt, Origins of Alliances, 22-26. Saddam had an offensive missile capability to destroy

Amman. Given his past willingness to hit an enemy's capital (Teheran) this offensive powerhad to be taken seriously. This threat was backed up by the sheer size of his ground forceseven though at the time they were deployed to the south. A decision to defy Saddam had to

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one of the largest armies in the world and was in possession of chemicalweapons, which it had previously employed against Iran as well as againstits own population. Saddam had demonstrated his willingness to use forceagainst Iraq's neighbors to achieve his international objectives in the warwith Iran and in his invasion of Kuwait.

Balancing against this threat was possible given readily available allies.The United States had been a long-time ally of Jordan and supporter ofKing Hussein as a moderate presence in the Middle East. Alignment withthe Arab-American Coalition against Iraq could have provided severalbenefits for the state of Jordan, the most important of which was militarysecurity from Baghdad. The presence of the UN Coalition should have un-dermined any bandwagoning tendencies. The United States, Saudi Arabia,and other countries such as Germany and Japan were also promising sig-nificant amounts of economic aid to help countries hurt by their enforce-ment of the UN embargo against Iraq. This form of aid would have easedsome of the strains on the Jordanian economy. Finally, because of the par-ticipation of the Arab League, including its neighbors Egypt, Syria, andSaudi Arabia, Jordan could have been provided with a measure of diplo-matic and political cover from critics of Arab cooperation with the UnitedStates. A strong case can be made that balancing against Iraq should havebeen the choice, given Iraq's recent aggressive actions, Jordan's relativemilitary weakness, the presence of a powerful and available ally, and thepromise of economic benefits.

In addition, King Hussein must have known that movement toward Iraqraised the potential of significant costs for his country beyond the immedi-ate situation. Jordan has always relied on foreign aid as an integral compo-nent of its economy, and diree of the largest contributors before August1990 were the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Jordan risked al-ienating its strongest diplomatic and financial supporters at the very time itneeded them the most.101 The king was also risking the provocation of hisneighbors Israel and Syria. Yet, despite all the potential benefits for thestate of Jordan in aligning with the Arab-American Coalition and possibledire consequences for not joining with these allies, King Hussein alignedwith Iraq. The close economic relationship that Jordan and Iraq had sharedprior to the invasion of Kuwait, by itself, is an insufficient explanation for

consider his ability to hold a grudge (as he revealed with the Kuwaitis) and therefore theimmediate threat of offensive action may not have been as important as the mere possibilityof such an attack over time.

101. It is important to note that aid from all three sources had been reduced in 1989 and1990. This made the decision even more critical since alignment with the coalition wouldhave likely reversed this trend.

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Jordan's moves toward Baghdad after 2 August, for the dramatic securityrealignment in the region and the imposition of UN economic sanctionsagainst Iraq undercut the previous benefits received by Jordan. The criticalpoint to recognize is that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait changed the securitydynamics in die region. Prior to 2 August 1990, Egypt, Jordan and SaudiArabia were considered supporters of Baghdad. As die others chose to bal-ance away from Iraq, Jordan did not. Aldiough previous cooperative rela-tions is not a sufficient explanation of eidier why Jordan continued to co-operate or why Jordan denied that it was doing so, the close economic, bu-reaucratic, and military relationship that Jordan and Iraq shared prior to theinvasion of Kuwait did give Saddam leverage mat could have been useddirecdy against die king.

Jordan's alignment behavior was motivated by the predominant personaldesire of King Hussein to remain on the throne. As omnialignment pre-dicts, "Hussein's will to survive is indeed the persisting prime mover thatdetermines his behavior."102 Pursuing survival in 1990 did not require aconcentration on systemic distributions of power and threats, because dieimmediate direat to the king during die Gulf crisis was his own population.

King Hussein's alignment options were narrow. Joining with die Arab-American Coalition would have inflamed his population and placed diemonarchy in jeopardy of an overthrow. Given die king's traditional tieswith Washington, Riyadh, and Kuwait, and the potential benefits of aligningwith the Coalition, it is likely that

the king would have preferred to side with the Coalition and perhapseven contribute forces to evict Saddam Hussein, but the internal threatprecluded this possibility. Had he sided with the United States, it wouldhave endangered his throne and threatened to tear apart the country.103

Furthermore, even strict neutrality was dangerous for die king. SaddamHussein's popularity in Jordan was so great diat King Hussein could notrisk alienating the Baadii leader out of the fear that Saddam might focus hisinvective on die Hashemites, encouraging Jordanians to rise up against diemonarchy as Nasser had done in 1955-56. Enhancing Saddam's powerwith the Jordanian populace was the Iraqi secret police, which was, accord-ing to one informed Bush administration official, "quite active in Jordanand causing some difficulties"104 for the king during the crisis. The neces-

102. Dann, King Hussein's Strategy of Survival, 3.103. University of Jordan political scientist Nasir Tahboub. Interview with VanDenBerg

Amman, 28 March 1996.104. Quotation from response to our state alignment behavior survey by an official in-

volved in the Bush administration's Jordan policy during the Gulf crisis.

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sity of dealing with the threat from within, while keeping an eye on the ex-ternal threat, dictated the alignment decisions of King Hussein.

There is clear evidence that the king understood this predicament andacted according to omnialignment expectations. One such example lies inthe differences found in the king's public addresses. There was a sharp dis-tinction between King Hussein's public comments aimed at foreign audi-ences versus speeches and interviews for domestic consumption.105 Al-though the king, his brother and his wife painted a friendly face on Jordan'salignment behavior to the United States and its Coalition partners,Hussein's addresses to the parliament, for example, were nothing short ofcondemnations of those same countries. In a speech to parliament twoweeks after the invasion, King Hussein bemoaned that "the industrializednations are determined to reshape the map of our region, which containstwo-thirds of the world's oil, in a manner that would only serve their inter-ests." He went on to argue that "foreign ambitions in this region serve thepurposes of the enemies of the Arab nation and are designed to helpachieve die enemy's objectives through depriving the Arabs of their wealthnow and in the future."106 Just a few days after diis tough anti-West speechto the Jordanian parliament, however, King Hussein was in Kennebunkportfor a meeting with President George Bush. After the meeting the king gavean interview decidedly less vitriolic toward the United States, saying, forexample, that "I came to the United States with the purpose of seeing andmeeting personally with an old friend of mine, Bush. I feel very happy withthe warmth with which I was received and also with the opportunity that Ihad to have this meeting at this very, very crucial time."107

Hussein returned to anti-West rhetoric in a speech to parliament on 17November, repeating many of the charges of the 14 August diatribe andadding that the international community held a "double-standard policy indealing widi the Palestine question and die Gulf crisis."108 Yet just a monthlater, in an interview with the French press, Hussein made statements thatwere considerably less damning. In response to a question on America's

105. Although it is commonplace for politicians to vary the emphases of public commentswith different audiences, in a time of international crisis and war, speeches and interviewscarry heightened international ramifications. In this case, the king was aware that his anti-Coalition rhetoric at home would have negative consequences for Jordan's foreign relations.The expulsion of Jordanian diplomats from Saudi Arabia and the cut-off of Saudi oil to Jor-dan following the king's 14 August speech to parliament was one significant example of theinternational importance of public discourse at the time.

106. Daniel Williams, "Jordan Shifts Closer to Iraq, Denounces Western Presence," LosAngeles Times, 14 August 1990.

107. Jordan Television Network, 16 August, as reported in FBIS-NES, 17 August 1990.108. Full text of King Hussein's speech in FBIS-NES, 19 November 1990.

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146 SECURITY STUDIES 6, no. 3

intentions in the Gulf crisis, the king replied, "I have no idea. I have noidea. I hope it is for peace and for the resolution of problems in this re-gion."109 This "I don't know" quotation stands in stark contrast to theking's charges to parliament that "the industrialized nations are determinedto reshape the map of our region," and diat the West holds a "double-standard policy."

The king showed his cognizance of the importance of symbolism forstrengthening domestic legitimacy by asking the parliament on 14 August toaddress him as Sharif, a title used by his great-grandfather Hussein that re-fers to his family's lineage from the Prophet. In doing so, Hussein down-played his monarchical status at a time when Saddam Hussein was employ-ing scathing rhetoric against the kingdoms of the Gulf. In addition, the factdiat the king's great-grandfather was die ruler of Mecca who led the greatArab revolt of 1916 subdy demonstrated his determination to oppose for-eign intervention in the Arabian peninsula.110

Another dramatic example of King Hussein's focus on die challengeposed by his population during die crisis was a three-day meeting of leftistpan-Arabs in Amman called to denounce the Western military buildup indie Gulf. What was notable about die mid-September conference was notdiat die delegates supported Saddam Hussein's call for a holy war againstthe West or that "strikes against American interests everywhere and by allmeans at die same moment an American military attack is launched againstIraq" were agreed upon. Radier, it was die participation of two men, NayefHawatmeh and George Habash, diat gave an indication of "the lengths thatKing Hussein is willing to go to keep up with public sentiment in favor ofIraq."111 Habash, leader of the Popular Front for die Liberation of Palestine(PFLP), and Hawatmeh, head of the Democratic Front for die Liberation ofPalestine (DFLP), had been banished from Jordan since 1970. For most ofthe past twenty years, diese two had advocated die overthrow of KingHussein and were once die government's two most wanted oudaws.

Aldiough the king did not address the conference, the speaker of theJordanian parliament read a message on Hussein's behalf and he later metwitii Habash and Hawatmeh. The public reconciliation of the king widi thetwo anti-Western radicals achieved its intended goal of creating the percep-

109. Jordan Television Network, 17 December, as reported in FBIS-NES, 18 December1990.

110. Lamis Andoni, "Jordan's Hussein Balances Nationalist, U.S. Pressures," ChristianScience Monitor, 16 August 1990. Hussein's revival of the term Sharif also angered the Saudis,since it relates to the Hashemite's historical claim to the Hijaz region of Saudi Arabia.

111. Quoted in Daniel Williams, "2 PLO Radicals Join in Threat to 'Strike U.S. Interests,"'Los Angeles Times, 18 September 1990.

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Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats 147

tion internally that Amman was distancing itself from the Arab-AmericanCoalition. It was also convincing enough to precipitate retaliatory actionsfrom the Saudis. It is interesting that although the meeting betweenHussein and his former rivals was publici2ed in Jordan, the pro-Iraq con-ference was not reported in the Jordanian press. This indicates that at thesame time the king was distancing himself from Iraq's opponents, he wasalso trying to avoid whipping his own population into a pro-Saddam frenzy.

King Hussein tunneled some of his population's desire for war with theWest and Israel by mobilizing and training a militia, for there was an acuteneed to satiate a population that was "ready to fight anyone, kill anyone—Israelis, Americans."112 The People's Army, as the militia was called, had nomission and few weapons, but, as the former chief of staff of the JordanianArmy noted, "It was just an emotional thing. Of course, these people don'treally have any understanding of the military balance."113 The creation ofthe People's Army was announced by Prime Minister Mudar Badran with-out his specifying its purpose, and a joint parliamentary committee simply"stressed the importance of expanding the People's Army's activities andarming the Jordanian people so as to confront dangers and deal with theZionist challenge."114 It seems that tensions were so high because of theGulf crisis and the 8 October killing by Israeli police of about 20 Palestini-ans at the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem that the government did not evenfeel compelled to come up with a substantive "official" mission for thePeople's Army. The militia provided a release of this emotion, which wasless threatening to the king than violent protests on Amman's streets.

Finally, the most convincing evidence that King Hussein was placingconcerns for domestic stability at the forefront of his international align-ment decisions comes from subsequent statements made by the king him-self. When asked, for example, about the ramifications of quieting hispopulation, or even arguing with them publicly during the crisis, the kingresponded, "I believe there would have been an eruption. We would havehad a very difficult time."115 It is certain that if the king believed he wouldhave had an eruption on his hands for simply debating alignment policy, hemust have perceived a high probability for an even more dangerous threathad he provoked Saddam Hussein's ire, and in turn his own subject's wrath,by siding with the Arab-American Coalition or remaining neutral.

112. Quotation by a young female militia member, Selwa Farhan, in Joel Brinkley,"Divided Loyalties." New York Times Magazine, 16 December 1990, 38.

113. Ibid., 38.114. Quoted in Jordan Times, as reported in FBIS-NES, 12 October 1990.115. Brinkley, "Divided Loyalties," 108.

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148 SECURITY STUDIES 6, no. 3

THE BUSH RESPONSE

WHILE HIS ALIGNMENT with Iraq may have appeased any potential do-mestic threat, the king's policy could have proven disastrous interna-

tionally given Iraq's defeat had the West explicitly treated Jordan as an en-emy. King Hussein's successful omnialignment approach required a Bushadministration willing to allow for it.

From the beginning of the Persian Gulf crisis, the Bush administrationwas aware of the nature and seriousness of the threats facing King Husseinand formulated its foreign policies toward Amman accordingly. This as-sessment by Washington of King Hussein's tenuous domestic situationcame in part from the king himself. According to an assistant speaking onbehalf of a senior administration official, in various communications andmeetings "the king explained the situation he was in domestically and theBush response was Ve understand'."116 The fundamental objective of theWhite House with regard to Jordan was to ensure that the king, one ofWashington's most important Arab allies, remained on the throne.117 TheUnited States undoubtedly had the military and diplomatic capacity to pre-vent Jordanian violations of the economic embargo and to punish the king-dom for its security cooperation with Iraq. Instead, based on the realizationthat retaliatory policies would have undermined the long-term goal of re-taining a valuable strategic friend in the Middle East, the Bush administra-tion silently acquiesced to Jordan's alignment with Iraq.

The pressure on the White House to take a hard line with Jordan was

present from very early on in the Gulf crisis. There was general indignation

with King Hussein when, in an interview broadcast on American television,

he characterized Saddam as an "Arab patriot."118 Questions about Jorda-

nian compliance with the UN sanctions against Iraq surfaced soon after the

passage of Security Council resolution 661 on 6 August as television cam-

eras captured ships in Aqaba unloading Iraqi-bound goods and trucks

crossing the border.119 Headlines such as "Jordan Shifts Closer to Iraq, De-

116. Telephone conversation with an assistant to a senior Bush administration official, on

the condition of anonymity, 14 February 1995 (author's notes).117. Without exception, the respondents to our state alignment behavior survey agreed

with the statement that "the continued reign of King Hussein in Jordan was considered bythe Bush administration to be in the national interest of the United States."

118. Interview with the king on NBC television, 5 August, as reported in FBIS-NES, 7August 1990.

119. For a complete listing of all UN Security Council resolutions and statements dealingwith the Persian Gulf conflict, see Karel C. Wellens, ed., 'Resolutions and Statements of the UnitedNations Security Council (1946-1992): A Thematic Guide (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publish-ers, 1993), 507-77.

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nounces Western Presence,"120 and "Hussein's Support of Iraq May RiskKingdom's Stability, but it has Popular Backing"121 proliferated in Ameri-can newspapers, emphasizing the alignment between Amman and Baghdad.

Most importantly, many members of Congress were calling for theelimination of economic and military aid to Jordan. Representative StephenJ. Solarz (D-N.Y.) told reporters in Amman, after a visit with King Hussein,"We would not be prepared to maintain relations as they are if Jordanseemed to be subverting sanctions designed to bring Iraq's aggression to anend."122 Congress's perception of Jordanian alignment behavior at that timewas summed up by an advisor to a leading Senate Republican: "Regardlessof the abstract rationale for the position the Jordanians are taking.. .CapitolHill feels no great sympathy for Jordan's dilemma when you juxtapose thecourageous stands taken by [Egyptian President Hosni] Mubarak in oppos-ing Saddam."123

In response to this pressure, the Bush administration announced in pub-lic interviews and congressional testimony that it was freezing economic aidand military shipments to Jordan. The investigation by the GAO, however,concluded that despite the announced ban, more than $550,000 in militaryequipment was transferred to Jordan between 2 August 1990 and 6 Febru-ary 1991, including spare parts for c-130 transports, F-5 fighters, and HAWK

missiles. In addition, the Department of Defense initiated twelve newequipment orders totaling more than $5,000,000 which included ammuni-tion and Cobra missile repair parts.124 It is clear that the Bush administra-tion purposefully avoided treating Jordan as an enemy and continued tosupply Jordan with military equipment covertly.

The administration also actively sought to prevent Congress from for-mally ending aid to Jordan by falsely reassuring it and the public that Jordanwas not cooperating with Baghdad or breaking the UN embargo againstIraq. On 26 October the State Department announced that Jordan was incompliance with UN resolutions. In subsequent press inquiries about theJordanian-Iraqi relationship department spokespersons remained diplo-matically evasive. In response to the question, "Do you know which col-umn to put him [King Hussein] in right now so far as supporting or notsupporting," for example, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher

120. Los Angeles Times, 14 August 1990.121. Washington Post, 21 September 1990.122. Los Angeles Times, 14 August 1990.123. Quoted by Carol Giacomo in Reuters, 2 October 1990.124. Findings in "Jordan: Suspension of U.S. Military Assistance During Gulf Crisis," U.S.

General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Requesters, September, 1992.

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replied that, "I don't have any classifications of foreign leaders." Whenasked whether or not Jordan was observing the embargo, Boucher avoidedthe issue, saying "We've expressed ourselves before on that issue in termsof technical compliance and the amount of leakage and things like that."125

On 7 February 1991, James Baker testified before the House Foreign Af-fairs Committee, in response to a question about Jordan violating the em-bargo against Iraq, that he had no knowledge of Jordanian infractions: "AsI told you, except for the oil coming into Jordan, we think Jordan's compli-ance with the economic sanctions has been really quite good."126

On the whole, the messages coming from the executive branch werenotably restrained toward a state that it knew had aligned itself with Wash-ington's adversary. Public rebukes of Jordan were limited to mild expres-sions of disapproval such as "we're disappointed in the conduct of thatcountry so far."127 In response to a virulent anti-American speech by KingHussein delivered after Desert Storm began, in which he condemned the"savage and large-scale war against brotherly Iraq,"128 Bush initially reactedby saying that he understood "the pressure that King Hussein is un-der. . .You have to listen to the rhetoric and understand why it's being usedout in that part of the world."129 As congressional pressure mounted for ahard-line denunciation of the king's speech, however, the White House an-nounced that it was reviewing its financial relationship with Amman. Yet,even as Secretary Baker was enunciating this policy in testimony before theSenate, he cautioned against a complete break with Jordan, warning that theHashemites needed American support and that the alternatives to their rulein Jordan was not "a particularly pretty picture."130 In addition, although theWhite House told Congress that on 6 February 1991 they had suspended alllicenses for the sale of U.S. defense items to Jordan, "the order to stop mili-tary transfers did not take place until March 4, 1991 after the war wasover."131 Only three days after the order to discontinue military shipmentsto Jordan had finally been given, deliveries of equipment resumed.

The Bush administration commitment to a policy of flexible latitude to-ward Jordan continued after the war was over when it battled with theSenate over Congress's decision to cut all economic and military aid to Jor-

125. State Department briefing reported by the Federal News Service, 19 November 1990.126. Quoted in Los Angeles Times, 29 November 1992.127. Quotation of White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater in Reuters, 2 October 1990.128. Quoted in Richard Benedetto, "U.S.-Jordan Relations OK," Gannett News Service, 12

February 1991.129. Quoted in Los Angeles Times, 9 February 1991.130. Quotation m Jerusalem Post, 10 February 1991.131. House Report, 103-25.

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dan. Secretary of State James Baker lobbied the Senate and Bush sent a let-ter to Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole, arguing that "we must not let ourdisappointment with Jordan's behavior during the Persian Gulf crisis un-necessarily constrain our postwar diplomacy."132 Congress eventually cameup with a compromise that cut aid to Jordan, but allowed for renewal at thepresident's discretion when he deemed it in the "national interest."

The Bush administration's strategy of silently acquiescing to the Jorda-nian-Iraqi alignment entailed substantial risks for both the White Houseand King Hussein. The administration knew that the military equipment itwas providing to Jordan contradicted its assurances to Congress and to thepublic that it had cut off military aid to the kingdom. For his part, KingHussein seemingly was placing in jeopardy Jordan's traditional relationshipswith the West and with its Arab allies, and risking embroiling his country ina military conflict. Jordanian alignment behavior and American acquies-cence, however, should not be viewed as uncoordinated happenstance.

The Bush administration and the Hashemites were in implicit agreementduring the Gulf crisis concerning the stance that each would take. At sev-eral key junctures in the crisis the two parties were in contact with eachother. The day after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Bush was on the telephonewith King Hussein.133 Two weeks later the king flew to Kennebunkport fora private conference with Bush. According to several high-ranking admini-stration policymakers, who responded to our inquiries with a promise ofanonymity, in these meetings and conversations King Hussein explained hisplight to the Bush administration and received its implicit acceptance of alimited Jordanian alignment with Iraq. The White House's response to theking's explanation of the multifaceted threats facing him was, in the wordsof an assistant to a senior administration official, "we understand your do-mestic situation and therefore we won't push you on it as long as you donot do anything to hinder U.S. coalition building or our overall crisis policy.Do your best, we know you will pay the price either way."134 Shortly afterthe war began on 16 January, Bush dispatched special envoy Richard Ar-mitage to consult with the king to redefine the limits of Jordanian-Iraqisecurity cooperation that the White House was willing to tolerate, including

132. Los Angeles Times, 21 March 1991.133. Information from a CBS interview with King Hussein, as reported in FBIS-NES, 6

August 1990.134. Telephone interview on condition of anonymity, 14 February 1995 (author's notes).

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persuading the king to refrain from firing on Israeli jets if they overflewJordan in retaliatory strikes against Iraq for its Scud attacks on Israel.135

In sum, as the empirical evidence indicates and the responses to our mailquestionnaires and telephone conversations with senior administration andcongressional officials confirm, the White House followed a policy in-formed by omnialignment considerations. Had the Bush administration notrecognized the interrelated nature of the threats facing King Hussein in thefall of 1990, Jordan would not have come out as relatively unscathed as itdid. As well, the subsequent progress of Jordanian and PLO peace with Is-rael may not have occurred. A policy based on a balance of power or threatperspective, which many in Congress tended to support, would have beendisastrous. Pressuring Jordan to align against Baghdad would have pro-duced civil strife against which Coalition forces could not have intervened.A balance of power policy would have exacerbated the primary threat fac-ing King Hussein, while raising a specter of potential domestic problems inother Arab states.

Equally problematic would have been an American approach which as-sumed mat the king was motivated by a desire to bandwagon with thestronger power.136 Such an assumption might have led to a policy of in-creased UN sanction and general isolation of Jordan, which would not onlyhave increased die economic difficulties facing Amman, but would havegready hindered die Arab-Israeli peace process diat emerged in the wake ofdie fighting in which Jordan's role was vital. It would have done nodiing toease the internal threat. The Bush administration recognized die interre-lated nature of the direats facing Jordan. By allowing King Hussein to alignwidi Iraq, die administration simultaneously defused both the powderkegof domestic opposition in Jordan and die potential for action by Saddamagainst die king, skillfully managing a delicate diplomatic situation.

The critical nexus of alignment dieory and policy is highlighted by thiscase. From die point of dieory development, it is clear diat a focus exclu-sively on external direats to explain Jordan's international security align-ment behavior during die Persian Gulf crisis is inadequate. From a policyprescription perspective, such a focus would have been ruinous. To haveformulated policy as if Jordan was susceptible to die dynamics of eidier

135. Information from several administration officials in survey responses. See also RickAtkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993),

136. In fact, some observers have assumed that Jordan's alignment behavior during thePersian Gulf crisis was dominated by an systemic bandwagoning dynamic. Eric Labs, forexample, wrote that "in the most recent case available, Jordan bandwagoned with the MiddleEast's 1990 aggressor, Iraq." Eric J. Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?" 386.

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balance of power/threat or systemic bandwagoning would have led to avery different post—Gulf War environment, one less hospitable to Arab-Israeli peace negotiations and American interests.

THEORY AND POLICY: BROADENING THE DEBATE

IN EVALUATING THE political situation in the Middle East in the aftermathof the Persian Gulf War, Richard Herrmann argued that "threats are

more likely to come from inside Arab and Islamic societies and be targetedat the local elites that sustain the U.S. relationship."137 The Bush foreignpolicy team recognized the idea that state elites will be motivated to alignwith powers that are best suited to protect them from their primary threats.In the Jordanian case, the interrelated threat could only be handled by analignment away from the United States. The king survived by double band-wagoning with both internal and external challenges because there was nobalancing option available. Although the UN Coalition could have protectedhim from Iraq, it could not have suppressed a civil uprising, which wouldhave occurred if he balanced externally. The king was too weak to balanceon his own and his population was open to appeasement. By band-wagoning both ways, he neutralized his population and Saddam.

This case illustrates the need for greater debate within academic andpolicy circles about what drives security alignments. This is borne out bythe fact that the Bush administration settled on an adept and successfulforeign policy approach, which required for its success that Congress andthe public be inadequately (if not entirely mis-) informed. If a wider under-standing of how leaders at times have to omnialign in reaction to internal orinterrelated threats had been in place in 1990—91, the administration wouldhave been able to conduct its policy toward Jordan more openly.

The approach of the United States to the realignment of internationalpolitics into the twenty-first century must keep open the possibility thatthere are at least eight alignment dynamics that need to be considered in aninternational environment ripe with security threats. The case of Jordanillustrates that when interrelated threats are present more complex analysisis required. The key for successful policy (as well as theoretical explanation)will rest on the correct determination of which threats—external, internal,or interrelated—are driving alignment dynamics.

137. Richard K. Herrmann, "The Middle East and the New World Order: Rethinking U.S.Political Strategy After the Gulf War," International Security 16 (fall 1991): 43.

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