Volume 1

Planning After the GamesOlympic Case Studies

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CPLN 703 | SPRING 2013POST-OLYMPIC PLANNING

TEAM RIO DE JANEIROLidia BardhiDanielle BordenJingkun FangRebecca FischmanLaura JangMegan KnowlesKaren MartinJuell StewartChristopher WhitenhillXiwei ZhangJun Zhou

TEAM BEIJINGAnnie BidgoodMercedes HaXinlin HuangRachel WatsonLeah WhitesideAlan YuCory ZimmermanHasan Zuhairy

Studio Instructors: Evan Rose + Stefan Al

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In our analysis of these ten Olympic host cities’ wide-ranging investments, we have identified three common motivations for hosting the Games. First, there are cities that have leveraged the

Olympics to complete modernization or regeneration projects unrelated to the Olympics. Funding and attention on the cities as a result of the Games act as a catalyst to complete projects that the city had not been able to complete before. Seoul, Barcelona, Sydney, and London fall under this category, as each city had a distinct set of goals for the city’s development that it had planned prior to the Olympics. Second, many cities have used the Olympics as an announcement of the city’s and country’s modernization on the world stage. Seoul and Barcelona also fall under this category, as do Munich and Montreal. Third are the cities that have focused on the sports aspect of the Games, rather than using investments to spur redevelopment in the city. Los Angeles and Atlanta are strong examples of this approach.

Each of these approaches has its merits. The Olympics offer an incredible opportunity for developing cities or countries to increase the quality of life for its residents. But this is an incredibly expensive undertaking. Spending on the Olympic Games, including the full range of costs for construction of venues, infrastructure upgrades, and any other goals, have increased with each host, reaching an all-time high with Beijing in 2008. Whether these massive investments are worthwhile depends on the city’s goals, and requires a nuanced evaluation of the outcomes.

On the opposite end of the scale are those cities that spend nothing on upgrading the city, but focus on spending as little as possible on the Games themselves by leveraging funding sources. Would Los Angeles have been better served by investments in its public transportation system, which would have reduced car use and attendant air pollution? Or was it the right choice for the city to avoid large public debt in favor of investing the profit gained from the Games in community programming?

While it is difficult to judge the answers to these questions, what we have gleaned from the case studies presented within is that the Olympics are an expensive investment for the host city, and no matter the motivations for putting in a bid to host or the goals of the final investments, there are important lessons from past Olympics that future host cities should take into account. In the following analysis of ten host cities’ investments, goals, and outcomes, we explore the positive and negative lessons for hosts to follow. This volume is a companion to a Spring 2013 interdisciplinary City Planning studio at the University of Pennsylvania that examined the role of the Olympics in shaping two cities: Beijing, China and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

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THE OLYMPICSas a Catalyst for Urban Regeneration

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Olympic Park Size Competitors

Sports Represented Profit/Loss

OLYMPIC CITIES By the Numbers

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Olympic Host CitiesMUNICH

1972

MONTREAL1976

LA1984

ATLANTA1996

SYDNEY 2000

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Olympic Host CitiesSEOUL

1988BARCELONA

1992

ATHENS 2004

LONDON 2012

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As cities have become increasingly competitive to use international sporting events like the Olympics for urban transformation, development has taken several distinct spatial forms. The resources that go into hosting the Olympics—facilities, transportation and housing—have influenced urban planning and design. After the Olympics, integration into the existing urban fabric is key. The DECENTRALIZED model spreads the facilities across a region, using both old and new venues. INNER-CITY CLUSTERING has been used as tools for mitigating the effects of urban sprawl and inner-city deterioration. These two forms can help integrate public spaces into a central area. PERIPHERY CLUSTERING balances population growth and expanding development pressures and demands. The JOINT CLUSTERING model uses co-location to guide strategic

Olympic Village Existing Venue New Venue

Decentralized Inner-City Mono Inner-City Poly

Periphery Satellite Joint

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Beijing, China [2008]

Spreading Olympic activity across four zones throughout the city to meet specific strategic development goals, Rio de Janeiro is an example of INNER-CITY POLY

Rio de Janeiro [2016]

Showcasing new venues like Beijing National Stadium concentrated in the Olympic Green and repurposing existing university facilities around the city, Beijing used INNER-CITY MONO CLUSTERING to build a strong Olympic identity.

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MUNICHGermany | 1972

Munich first hosted the Olympic Games in 1936 under the Nazi regime, a Games that are remembered as a showcase for Nazi propaganda and promotion of the Third Reich. In hosting the Games again in 1972, Munich was attempting to change the image of the Games in their city, to showcase the new West German democracy, and to distance itself from the socialist East Germany. The Games presented a unified and democratic West Germany to the world with the motto of “The Happy Games.”

The Munich Games cost the German state $7.46 billion (2012 USD). Venues were concentrated on the Olympic Park, located 4 miles northwest of downtown Munich, with only five venues scattered within a 4-mile

radius of the downtown. Munich is thus an example of the inner-city mono-clustering spatial pattern. The Olympic Park’s location is based on Munich’s desire to remediate and repurpose a defunct airfield into a complex that would continue to serve as a public asset in the years following the Games.

Not only did Munich invest in venues, but the city also used the Olympics as impetus to expand its public transportation and roadway networks. Two subway lines with 360 kilometers of track were added to the S-Bahn network. Three new expressways totaling 145 kilometers were added to the city, and the Bahn network was expanded by 16 kilometers. This expansion has since changed the city’s physical form, fueling sprawl

outward from the historic core.

Munich planned well for the reuse of its venues post-Games. Today, the Stadium Complex remains a well-landscaped, well-maintained, and popular park in which public sporting and concert events are regularly held. The Athletes Village was purposefully reused post-Games to provide 1,650 affordable and market-rate apartment units, with the remainin 3,000 units sold as condominiums. Munich was successful in its post-Games management of the Park because it planned for how the site would become a public asset, and chose architects who were able to design buildings that fit well into the landscape even after the Games were over.

Steve “Pre” Prefontaine sprinting to victory in his legendary 5000 meter race in Munich.

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MONTREALCanada | 1976

fiscal deficit was only recently paid off in full in 2006. Due to major planning and construction mismanagement by the city, the Quebec provincial government was forced to step in to ensure that the project was completed in time for the Games. Even so, construction was barely completed in time to host the Games, with the main stadium still under construction during the opening ceremonies. The largest of the city’s investments were the sports facilities. Venues were dispersed throughout the region and as far as Toronto, although the main Olympic Park was located in the northeastern segment of the city at Maisonneuve Park. The area had already been identified for redevelopment into a sports district, so siting the main venues here was in line with existing plans.

Placing the venues in an existing park also meant that there was little disturbance to existing neighborhoods. A single subway line was expanded to link Maisonneuve Park and downtown Montreal, but this was the extent of infrastructure investments. The Olympic Games thus had little impact on the physical development of the city.

Montreal had no pre-determined plan for post-Olympics use of the stadiums or the district, yet siting them in a park in a sense made their reuse simpler. Since 1976, the Olympic Stadium has continued to host expositions and sports games for Montreal, while the Velodrome was converted into a Biome and continues to function as the main tourist attraction at the site. The Athletes Village was converted into 980 market-

rate residential suites, and 25 acres of landscaped parkland were added to the city’s inventory.

This case study offers a number of lessons for Olympic cities. Montreal took advantage of expressways and hotels constructed for Expo ’76, and so minimal subway investments were required to connect the Olympic Park to the rest of the city. Few disturbances were made to the local neighborhood, since the site was already designated as a recreation destination. However, project management during construction was poor; allowing complete control of development by a single Mayor with no provincial or federal oversight resulted in massive public deficits with few lasting assets to show for the investment.

Montreal was the first Canadian city to host the Olympic Games, and the first in North America to host since 1932. The award of the bid to Montreal was largely political. The IOC has explained its selection of Montreal over competing world super-powers as an attempt to avoid exacerbating Cold War tensions. Hosting the 1976 Olympic Games was a personal ambition of Mayor Jean Drapeau. Inspired by the success of Montreal’s Expo ’76, Drapeau envisioned the Games as a way to show off Montreal and his own work as mayor to the world.

However, the legacy of the 1976 Games is largely negative. The final costs of all Olympics-related construction exceeded the original budget by almost three times – while Drapeau originally projected that the Games would be self-financed through the sale of commemorative coins, the actual $1 billion Montreal’s Olympic Stadium, the main venue for the 1976

Games.

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LOS ANGELESUnited States | 1984

Los Angeles dedicated $223 million of its profit from the Games to the LA84 foundation to fund youth sports organizations in southern California. The foundation has since served 3 million youth and 1,100 organizations, including the Paul Ziffren Sports Resource Center, the largest sports research library in North America.

The Los Angeles case presents a few key lessons for future host cities. First, it is possible to host the Olympic Games successfully in a simple and sincere way, with emphasis placed on the sports and athletes, without spending significant amounts of public money on cultural exhibition or urban regeneration, as did many host cities that followed. Second, strong leadership

and partnerships with existing organizations are imperative for managing the cost and schedule of hosting the Olympic Games. Peter Ueberroth’s vision for a profitable, sports-focused Games allowed the city to reinvest in its communities after the Games. By partnering with local universities, the organizing committee ensured that venues would be well-used and maintained after the Games. Finally, Los Angeles demonstrated the value of investing in long-term infrastructure improvements, although sustaining the successful but transit system would have furthered the impact that investments for the Games had on the physical infrastructure of the city.

In hosting the 1984 summer Olympic Games, Los Angeles focused purely on the sports aspect of the Games and on generating a profit to reinvest in the local community. The committee’s goal was to prioritize sports without burdening the community.

Using corporate sponsorships, the city became the first host to turn a profit on the Games. The surplus was earmarked for specific foundations that would support youth sports programs.

Among the ten case studies in this collection, the city of Los Angeles spent the least on Olympic investments. Only six sports venues were constructed or renovated, all of which were already owned and managed by local universities, who continued to use the venues regularly post-Games. Apart from venues, the city spent $700 million to expand the LAX airport. Finally, Los Angeles

spent $13.5 million on a 550-bus fleet that provided temporary bus service to the many venues scattered throughout the city. For 16 days the buses ran on 24 dedicated routes, transporting 40% of spectators to the Game events, and tangibly improved the city’s notoriously poor air quality. Bus fare revenues covered 88% of the Games’ operating costs. Unfortunately, this successful transit program was discontinued after the Games.

To finance the remainder of the Games, the city raised revenue through corporate sponsorships, a method that was so successful that the city generated a $250 million profit. In total there were 34 official sponsors, 64 purchased supplier rights, and 65 licensees. ABC paid $225 million for television rights, the largest sum ever paid for a single television event. Other major sponsors included Coca-Cola and Anheuser-Busch, and McDonald’s.

The Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum is the only venue to have hosted two Olympics (1932 and 1984).

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SEOULSouth Korea | 1988

In 1988, South Korea was on the verge of modernization following democratic presidential elections and a series of massacres and student protests. Seoul leveraged their award of the Olympic bid to improve infrastructure in an under-developed area of the city, to spur additional development to modernize the entire city, and used the Games as an opportunity to present Seoul and South Korea as a modern city and country.

Seoul’s investments for the Olympic Games far surpassed the simple construction of stadiums to host the events. A site on the south side of the Han River and to the southeast of the CBD was chosen to house the Olympic Park. The southern side of the city lacked modern infrastructure and services, and so inserting the Olympic Park into the area required significant water and sewer, road, and transportation improvements. To prepare for both the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics, a slum clearance and upgrading program was implemented beginning in 1983, through which 48,000 buildings housing 720,000 people were demolished between 1983 and 1988. Demolished units were replaced at a far higher density than the traditional housing, made possible by urban redevelopment Law #3646, which relaxed limits on building height and size. In addition, 54.5 kilometers of pipeline were installed as part of a new sewage system. In the public realm, palaces and historic monuments were rehabilitated, and new museums, cultural facilities, and economic centers were added. 389 new parks were created and 152 existing parks were refurbished. The subway network was expanded significantly from only three lines in 1980 to four lines in 1988, and further investments through 2012 have added another 13 lines. The Han River running through the center of the city was deepened and widened to improve navigability for trade, eight new wharves were added, and bridges were modernized, making the river a

key part of the city’s economy. Environmental remediation of the riverside and the addition of 13 new parks along also turned the river into a public amenity. Since the Games, population growth south of the Han River has increased to match growth rates on the north side, an effect of infrastructure improvements and the higher quality of life created by the Olympic investments.

Not only were investments made within the city, but South Korea used the Games as an opportunity to invest in the country. Stadiums were constructed in multiple cities, and a new National Museum was added in Cheongju. One million trees were planted, and access to national parks was improved. Over 25 new lines were added to the Korean National Railroad, improving transit connections throughout the country. Finally, hygienic standards were implemented in restaurants throughout the country, improving public health.

The Olympics were one part of a very planned transformation of the city and the country. Seoul’s case is a success story of how to use this international event to showcase a large-scale, federal government-led modernization project.

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BARCELONASpain | 1992

Barcelona’s $11.4 (2012 USD) investment in the Olympic Games was a catalyst for modernization and development within a city that had been lagging behind its peers in updates to infrastructure and general upkeep of the city. Barcelona used its Olympic investments to complete a dramatic makeover of the city’s physical landscape, laying the infrastructural foundation for Barcelona to become a leading European and global city. Barcelona rebranded itself through the 1992 Olympic Games.

Olympic venues were strategically placed within a 2.5-mile radius of the city center, with four target areas: Vall d’Hebron, Diagonal, Montjuic, and Parc de Mar. But the majority of Barcelona’s investments went not to venues, but to investments in infrastructure upgrades that would have a lasting impact. The city expanded its ring road network by 15%, and increased water and sewer infrastructure by 17%. The airport was expanded to accommodate higher volumes of traffic, and five new office districts were established. Recognizing that to position the city globally it would need to be able to compete in the new information age, the city added telecommunications infrastructure throughout, which became an important asset for attracting businesses. Most importantly, Barcelona focused

heavily on the redevelopment of the waterfront. This formerly industrial area was transformed into a recreational waterfront zone that today is one of the city’s main public assets.

While Barcelona did not form a detailed post-Olympics plan, the city did adhere to overall planning goals before and during the Olympics. The venues have been well used by their communities, with many repurposed as sports centers that host daily classes and events, and many offering rentable space for surrounding residents. The city dedicates €25 annually to maintain the venues, which continue to bring in large revenues for the city.

Barcelona’s lessons for Olympic cities lie in the two things it did best. It branded itself well by framing important Game events with Barcelona’s most recognizable monuments in the background to make a memorable impression of the city as people watched the Olympics. Barcelona used the Games well to promote city identity and recognition globally, and in doing so also fostered local civic pride. Finally, rather than investing in the Games themselves, Barcelona spent most of their investments on physical improvements that would long outlast the Games.

Situated on top of Montjuic hill, Barcelona’s Municipal de Montjuic boasted spectacular panoramas of the city during diving events for the 1992 Olympics.

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United States | 1996Post-Games, private development sprung up around Olympic Park, but there was a long delay before the city put together a cohesive plan for the area. Proposed developments have included the National Center for Civil and Human Rights, and further sports stadiums. Olympic Park has been turned into a museum district, although for the most part the area is filled with hospitality and tourism industries mixed in with housing and mixed-use developments.

Yet perhaps the strongest legacy of the 1996 Games was Atlanta’s failure to use the Olympic investments to address income and racial segregation in the city. Atlanta also ignored the real need for affordable housing throughout the city, and did not replace the public units it demolished in preparation for the Games. Martin Luther King, III remarked in 1993 that “Greed, exclusivity and elitism have become the symbols of Atlanta’s Olympic movement…the rich and affluent on one side, the poor and helpless on the other.” Despite the fact that the Games were successfully financed using corporate sponsorships, they are still remembered negatively for the transportation mishaps and lack of investment in housing and community needs. Much like Los Angeles, the city certainly saved money, but in spending little on investments with long-term benefits for the city, Atlanta also lost what for other cities has been a key opportunity to change the physical, social, or environmental course of the city for the future benefit of its citizens.

The 1996 Atlanta Games offered this southern city the opportunity to put itself on the world stage, and to represent the renaissance of the new south. Yet the Games succeeded mainly in highlighting the existing social and economic disparities evident within this traditional southern city. One Atlanta city planner remarked in 1992, “It doesn’t take a genius to figure out what the story’s going to be in 1996. The splendor of the Olympics amid the squalor of Southern poverty.”

The Games were funded entirely privately through a sponsorship by Coca-Cola, the headquarters of which are located in the city. Revenues from the Games reached $1.67 billion through the sale of television broadcast rights, while expenses reached $1.71 billion, and a further $74 million was paid to the city and federal governments for neighborhood redevelopment and housing.

The primary Olympic site was located in downtown Atlanta at the former railroad yards, where there was an existing convention center and other sports facilities. The city took advantage of one existing and five renovated venues, but constructed seven new venues. In preparing sites for new construction, the city demolished a significant number of public housing units. Rather than turning over the Athletes Village to the private sector following the Games, Atlanta partnered with Georgia State University and turned the buildings over to them for use as dormitories.

Transportation and security issues plagued the 1996 Games. Atlanta’s large fleet of buses was manned by untrained drivers, resulting in buses getting lost on the way to the stadiums, and massive traffic congestion delayed both visitors and athletes in their arrival at events.

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SYDNEYAustralia | 2000

Sydney’s theme for the 2000 Olympic Games was the “Green Games,” a motto that well reflects the positive environmental legacy the Games left behind in this city. Sydney successfully leveraged the Olympic Games to implement a large-scale remediation project that the government had planned for over thirty years.

The Games took place throughout the Sydney metro area, with venues extending from the downtown core to the western suburb of Penrith Lakes. The majority of facilities investments were made at the main Olympic Park at Homebush Bay. In total, Sydney spent was $6.5 billion Australian dollars on the Games, of which 68% was spent on facilities construction and Games operation; 30% on infrastructure; and 2% on the remediation of Homebush Bay. The New South Wales (NSW) state government paid the largest share of the costs at 2.3 billion, while the private sector paid an almost equal share through public-private partnerships for financing, construction and post-Games operation of the main stadiums.

Homebush Bay was the centerpiece of the Sydney bid. This site, about 8 miles from the city center, housed the State Brickworks, State Abattoir, and State Armaments Depot from 1907 to 1988. Industrial and household chemical and trash dumping occurred on the site throughout those years, leading the NSW government to identify it in the 1970s as a key target area for remediation. The Olympic bid provided an opportunity to carry out these plans. The remediation process restored the natural ecosystem, recreated wetlands and mangroves into habitats for endangered plants and species, and turned the former Brickworks quarry into a habitat for the endangered Green and Golden Bell Frog. The green theme was continued in redevelopment of the site, as systems for grey and stormwater collection, treatment, and use of recycled water were incorporated into all Olympic Park and Village buildings. All new development on the site must tap into the recycled water system.

The Olympic Park today is an attractive and dynamic suburban neighborhood, a result of long-term planning for reuse of the venues, park, and parklands post-Games. Park ownership was transferred in 2001 to the Sydney Olympic Park Authority (SOPA), which manages the park and controls all development on the site in accordance with its Master Plan 2030 vision of the Olympic Park as a high-density commercial and residential hub with accessible public spaces, educational, and recreational opportunities. The Athletes Village, developed under a public-private partnership agreement, was immediately turned over to the private sector for sale, and now forms a key part of what is now the official suburb of Olympic Park.

Outside of venues, the extension of rail and bus lines for the Games has spurred increased densities at key suburban transit nodes. To the east of the airport train line, there has been extensive residential construction, and to the west of Olympic Park, rail lines to the suburb of Paramatta have spurred construction of residential towers and commercial buildings. Sydney presents important lessons for Olympic host cities. From the start of the Olympic bid process, Sydney used the Games as leverage to achieve a remediation and regeneration goal that it had wanted to reach for 30 years, successfully transforming a former industrial dumping ground into popular public parklands, recreational spaces, and a restored wildlife habitat. Creating a management entity solely dedicated to planning for the Park’s continued development was key to Sydney’s success in repurposing the venues and in integrating the Park into the city. A strong and continuing planning process led by SOPA will ensure that the Park continues its transformation into a high-density commercial and residential center.

Country | 19(LOGO)

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The iconic Sydney Opera House, illuminated by fireworks during the 2000 Olympics Opening Ceremony.

Spectators watch a track and field event in a Sydney stadium.

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Venues around Athens show signs of disrepair after the Olympics.

Once the site of a vibrant celebration of sport, the beach volleyball arena is now abandoned.

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Venues around Athens show signs of disrepair after the Olympics.

Once the site of a vibrant celebration of sport, the beach volleyball arena is now abandoned.

Athens’ bid to host the modern Olympic Games was controversial from the start, and is remembered largely as a financial failure. The city was heavily favored for the 1996 Centennial Olympics because of its historical significance, but ultimately Atlanta won the bid. In 1995 the Athens Organizing Committee (ATHOC) petitioned the IOC to honorarily award it the 2008 Games instead. Again the IOC declined. Later that year Athens compiled a last-minute bid for the 2004 Games, finally winning the bid in 1997.

In the seven years between the bid award and the 2004 Games, much changed in Athens. Greece joined the Eurozone in 2001 and suddenly became flush with cheap public debt. This enabled Athens to spend $14 billion on the Games, a figure which appears reasonable when compared to the $9 billion spent by Sydney in 2000 and $40 billion by Beijing in 2008 (all in 2012 dollars). Yet on a national per capita basis, Greece spent $1,300 per person, compared to $420 per person in Australia and $30 per person in China. Furthermore, these investments amounted to a staggering 5% of the gross domestic product, while the prior and following hosts spent roughly 0.5% of their respective GDPs.

In 2004, Athens projected an initial cost of €4.5 billion, but the final cost nearly doubled to €8.9 billion. To cover costs, ATHOC raised €1.7 billion and the national government contributed €7.2 billion.

The largest investment as a portion of total costs, €2.8 billion, was on infrastructure. Eight new subway lines connected the central business district to suburban areas, and a tram network, commuter rail, and a new motorway were also added.

Athens spent another €2.1 billion on venues and other facilities that were clustered in decentralized locations that took advantage of the expanded subway system. But most of these venues have since fallen into disuse and disrepair. Many permanent facilities built for the Games are for sports that are unpopular among local residents. The government has

also failed to pursue sports teams to reuse the spaces. Venues such as the beach volleyball, baseball, and softball stadiums all remain completely unused.

The Athletes village was originally intended to provide affordable housing units for the surrounding community, and many units were pre-sold for immediate occupation after the Games. However, the program was largely unsuccessful because the Village is so far from the city core and lacks access to public transit. Athanasios Alevras, former deputy minister of culture, stated, “We had some very good plans. The idea was to build sites that could be then converted to benefit the lives of Atheneans afterwards ... We promised infrastructure and facilities that weren’t delivered ... Basically, it’s a disaster.”

The case of Athens provides important lessons for managing public spending and investment on Olympic Games. The city and national government overextended financial resources, a problem which has been exacerbated by the global financial crisis. Greek public debt reached €360 billion before it was reduced in 2011 to €280 billion in the largest private-sector debt restructuring deal in history. However, if a host city were to leverage significant public debt for the Olympics, Athens’ experience does illustrate how those investments should be prioritized. Investments in the highway system were intended to link suburban populations to the metropolitan core, and are generally considered to be the most positive legacy of the Games. Yet there is fear that highways constructed on steep slopes or ecologically sensitive areas will only encouraging sprawling development in areas that should be maintained for wildlife. More emphasis could have been placed on creating a successful affordable housing program using the Athletes Village, especially considering the need for affordable units following the debt crisis. Finally, Athens should have considered using temporary venues to host some sports, rather than building permanent structures that have been impossible to repurpose or maintain.

ATHENSGreece | 2004

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The city of London has hosted the Olympic Games on three separate occasions – in 1908, 1948, and 2012. The first Games were relocated suddenly from Rome after the original host was hit by a volcanic eruption. The second occasion came after a 12-year hiatus from the Olympics during World War II. These were known as the “Austerity Games,” since no new venues were built. The most recent Games, however, are a prime example of how a host city can use large-scale investment and legacy planning to achieve urban regeneration.

London won the bid for the Olympics in 2005. The organizing committee, LOCOG, designated a 73-acre brownfield site in East London for the Olympic Park. Stratford was a former industrial settlement that had experienced decades of disinvestment and high unemployment, but with a prime location at the intersection of five major

transit lines connecting it to Greater London. The site was also a component in two major ecological features of London: the Thames River Gateway and the London Greenbelt. The site had already been designated as an area for urban regeneration, and LOCOG felt that Olympic infrastructure development would catalyze future investment.

From the beginning, LOCOG identified environmental sustainability, local economic development, and long-term planning as top priorities for the Olympic Park. All plans included three phases: “Games Mode,” “Transformation,” and “Legacy.” To better fit the region’s needs after the Games, some venues, including the main stadium and aquatics center, were designed so that seating capacity could be reduced post-Games. Others, such as the basketball arena, were temporary venues that were removed completely after the Games. During

LONDONUnited Kingdom | 2012

London’s 200-hectare (500 acre) Olympic Park redevelopment site. Intended to serve as a model for post-Olympic economic regeneration, the park has been transformed into one of Europe’s largest public parks, and it will also house the new East London

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London Bridge welcomes visitors to the 2012 Summer Olympic Games.

construction, London employed many innovative construction programs, such as new concrete mixes and certified sustainable timber. Over 90% of construction waste was recycled or re-used. LOCOG also organized an apprenticeship program to train residents in construction techniques, reducing local unemployment.

The total cost of the Games escalated from an estimated $4.6 billion to $17.9 billion, although 75% of all costs went towards the regeneration of East London. The largest contingencies were linked to site cleanup and improved public transportation infrastructure. 82% of the total budget was funded by various levels of government, with the remainder covered by the IOC, corporate sponsorships, and ticket sales.

In April 2012, three months before the opening ceremony, the independent Legacy Development Authority was formally established to manage the Olympic Park’s transformation after the Games. This process includes reducing permanent venues and removing temporary venues, increasing the park’s connections to surrounding neighborhoods, and converting the athletes

village to market-rate and affordable housing. The LDA is also responsible for directing new investment around infrastructure improvements.

Jacques Rogge, president of the IOC, declared, “London has raised the bar on how to deliver a lasting legacy by incorporating long-range planning in every aspect of the 2012 Games.” For the first time, a host city had elevated local needs above short-term considerations for the Olympic Games. Although it is still soon to determine how successful some of LOCOG’s programs were, the case of London offers many lessons on how a host city can leverage Olympic investments to catalyze regeneration of an economically depressed area. As shown in earlier case studies, the greatest returns on investment will most likely be seen in long-term infrastructure projects such as site renewal, transportation, and housing. LOCOG also recognized early on the risk of extra capacity in certain venues, and planned ahead for their reduction or removal. Last, London has strived to show through targeted programs and careful long-term planning that the Olympic Games can be an environmentally sustainable event.

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VANCOUVER*Canada | 2010

*Winter Olympics

As a host of the Winter Olympics, Vancouver diverts from the other case studies in this volume, as the investments the city was forced to make in preparation for the 2010 Games differed from the major investments required for Summer Games host cities. Vancouver invested $2.1 billion in sports facilities and event venues, in sports programming, Games operation, and infrastructure improvements.

Requirements for Winter Games differ significantly from those of Summer. First, the weather must support snow-based sports, limiting the host city options. Second, there must be natural slopes to accommodate sports such as skiing and snowboarding. The facilities must include ski jumps and bobsled tracks, which have limited usage outside international competitions, presenting a challenge for repurposing these unique venues. Overall, the Winter Games contain fewer events, requiring fewer venues. Within the past 50 years, however, even the Winter Games have been used increasingly as a tool for regional development, particularly around transportation and Olympic Villages that are reused as housing. Safe transportation between venues in winter months has led to the creation of multiple small, satellite Olympic Villages and hotel accommodations being constructed close to scattered event sites,

presenting opportunities yet also challenges for repurposing more than a single Village. Because a steep terrain is required, Vancouver was required to invest in transportation options to bring visitors from the city to Whistler. Record numbers of people walked, biked, or took transit to the Games via the new Canada Line that provided rapid transit from the airport to downtown. Shuttle bus routes also delivered people from city to venues. Yet the Games also spurred investments in the city itself. Four kilometers of pedestrian streets were added to the downtown, and 400 kilometers of bike lanes installed.

Vancouver has reused its Olympic venues well, and was able to meet its goals for hosting a green Olympic Games. The green Games further inspired Vancouver to plan in a more environmentally sound manner by increasing alternate modes of transportation for residents – the Games proved that residents were interested in using public transit. Venues were given over to community use post-Games, and residents can access multiple sport activities within the main stadium complex. While the impacts of the Vancouver Olympics are not as visible as cities hosting the Summer Games, Vancouver successfully leveraged its Olympic investments to advance sustainability and community goals post-Games.

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PASSING THE TORCH Strategies for Successful Post-Olympic Development

From the case studies presented in this book, there are several lessons for future host cities. First, cities should plan carefully for the full cost of the games. Los Angeles and Atlanta both leveraged corporate sponsorships to reduce the financial burden on taxpayers. On the other end, Montreal and Athens overborrowed, the latter especially in relation to cost per capita and cost in relation to GDP. Host cities should also plan for future costs, including the schedule operation and maintenance of permanent venues.

The second lesson from these case studies is the enormous value in infrastructure investments. There are two ways to maximize the benefits to host cities: type of infrastructure, and location.

Nearly all of the host cities who invested in transportation infrastructure realized immediate benefits (Munich, Seoul, and Barcelona to name a few). Housing was another valuable investment to make, especially in the case of Seoul. These types of long-term, permanent investments can catalyze a larger redevelopment program across the city.

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DROPPING THE BALLLearning from Missed Opportunities

Equally important as the type of investment is the location. Based on Athens’ experience, it is important to consider the larger context to ensure that housing is well connected to other assets in the city. Other host cities, such as Sydney and London, use the opportunity of Olympic investments to target suburban areas that had seen significant decline. Brownfield sites are particularly well-suited for this because of their size. Also the land reclamation required would not seem as costly when incorporated into the total price tag for hosting.

Failure to target investments in priority areas can have significant consequences. In the case of Los Angeles and Atlanta, this meant exacerbating a long history of racial segregation. For Athens, it meant that major venues and housing developments were left vacant after the Games.

The last lesson from these case studies is the importance of legacy planning. This trend has only become prevalent in recent years, notably in Sydney and London. However implementing these large-scale physical investments in a city requires long-term planning to ensure they are properly capitalized for future generations. Planning should include the distinction between temporary versus permanent investments, strengthening connections to other city assets, and identifying qualified entities to finance and manage investments in perpetuity.

Using these lessons, future Olympic hosts can leverage Olympic investments however large or small, to make a significant positive impact on their cities. Going forward the challenge is to prove that the Olympics can be profitable, enjoyable and, most of all, sustainable.

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CPLN 703: POST-OLYMPIC PLANNING | SPRING 2013

TEAM RIO DE JANEIROLidia BardhiDanielle BordenJingkun FangRebecca FischmanLaura JangMegan KnowlesKaren MartinJuell StewartChristopher WhitenhillXiwei ZhangJun Zhou

TEAM BEIJINGAnnie BidgoodMercedes HaXinlin HuangRachel WatsonLeah WhitesideAlan YuCory ZimmermanHasan Zuhairy

Studio Instructors: Evan Rose + Stefan Al