Linnaeus University DissertationsNo 313/2018

Tigran Babajan

Oligarchs, State Power and Mass Opinion  – A Study of the Role of Oligarchs in Post-Soviet Pseudo-democracies

linnaeus university press

Lnu.seISBN: 978-91-88761-39-2 (print), 978-91-88761-40-8 (pdf )

Oligarchs, State Pow

er and Mass O

pinion  – A Study of the R

ole of Oligarchs in Post-Soviet Pseudo-dem

ocraciesTigran B

abajan

Oligarchs, State Power and Mass Opinion

– A Study of the Role of Oligarchs in Post-Soviet Pseudo-democracies

Linnaeus University Dissertations

No 313/2018

OLIGARCHS, STATE POWER AND MASS OPINION – A Study of the Role of Oligarchs in Post-Soviet Pseudo-democracies

TIGRAN BABAJAN

LINNAEUS UNIVERSITY PRESS

Linnaeus University Dissertations

No 313/2018

OLIGARCHS, STATE POWER AND MASS OPINION – A Study of the Role of Oligarchs in Post-Soviet Pseudo-democracies

TIGRAN BABAJAN

LINNAEUS UNIVERSITY PRESS

Abstract Babajan, Tigran (2018). Oligarchs, State Power and Mass Opinion – A Study of the Role of Oligarchs in Post-Soviet Pseudo-democracies, Linnaeus University Dissertations No 313/2018, ISBN: 978-91-88761-39-2 (print), 978-91-88761-40-8 (pdf). Written in English. This thesis attempts to understand the role of oligarchs in post-Soviet pseudo-democratic regime trajectories. The two dominant, competing streams of prior work have emphasized either the importance of state power or that of mass opinion in these processes in order to explain why some regimes successfully maintain their grip on power, while others make gradual steps towards democratization. However, the role of oligarchs has been largely overlooked; a gap filled by this study. It employs both widely accepted, as well as unique data to approach the research problem. The work presented in this thesis involves large-N surveys, analyses of media reports and an in-depth case study. There are three key findings: First, for an overwhelming majority of citizens in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, oligarchs’ actual, negative influence on the political system as well as popular perceptions of unfair wealth concentration are conducive to beliefs that a non-democratic regime is what is needed in order to set things right in their country. Second, the findings from Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine demonstrate that four politically motivated, rival oligarchs focused on enhancing their reputation and organizational capacity in their struggles for power. In all four countries, regimes used their state power to counter the rival oligarchs. Evidence from Armenia and Russia provides a nuanced understanding of these interactions. In particular, incumbents in these countries used their state power to manipulate public opinion in order to damage the reputation and credibility of the rival oligarchs. This thesis suggests that the main regime leaders do so in order to portray themselves as more trustworthy than their oligarch rivals. Third, a survey analysis of Kyiv university students shows that they view most oligarchs as corrupt and harmful to their political system. According to the survey results, oligarchs’ concentration of wealth appears to disqualify them from being legitimate political players. Yet, further evidence from this thesis suggests that people differentiate between oligarchs as a group and as individuals, which allows at least some oligarchs to enhance their reputation by using their vast material wealth. I conclude this thesis by discussing possible policy and societal implication of the results and by setting out some new venues of future research. Keywords: oligarchs; post-Soviet pseudo-democracies; state power abuse; mass opinion

Oligarchs, State Power and Mass Opinion – A Study of the Role of Oligarchs in Post-Soviet Pseudo-democracies Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Linnaeus University, Växjö, 2018 ISBN: 978-91-88761-39-2 (print), 978-91-88761-40-8 (pdf). Published by: Linnaeus University Press, 351 95 Växjö Printed by: DanagårdLiTHO, 2018

Abstract Babajan, Tigran (2018). Oligarchs, State Power and Mass Opinion – A Study of the Role of Oligarchs in Post-Soviet Pseudo-democracies, Linnaeus University Dissertations No 313/2018, ISBN: 978-91-88761-39-2 (print), 978-91-88761-40-8 (pdf). Written in English. This thesis attempts to understand the role of oligarchs in post-Soviet pseudo-democratic regime trajectories. The two dominant, competing streams of prior work have emphasized either the importance of state power or that of mass opinion in these processes in order to explain why some regimes successfully maintain their grip on power, while others make gradual steps towards democratization. However, the role of oligarchs has been largely overlooked; a gap filled by this study. It employs both widely accepted, as well as unique data to approach the research problem. The work presented in this thesis involves large-N surveys, analyses of media reports and an in-depth case study. There are three key findings: First, for an overwhelming majority of citizens in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, oligarchs’ actual, negative influence on the political system as well as popular perceptions of unfair wealth concentration are conducive to beliefs that a non-democratic regime is what is needed in order to set things right in their country. Second, the findings from Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine demonstrate that four politically motivated, rival oligarchs focused on enhancing their reputation and organizational capacity in their struggles for power. In all four countries, regimes used their state power to counter the rival oligarchs. Evidence from Armenia and Russia provides a nuanced understanding of these interactions. In particular, incumbents in these countries used their state power to manipulate public opinion in order to damage the reputation and credibility of the rival oligarchs. This thesis suggests that the main regime leaders do so in order to portray themselves as more trustworthy than their oligarch rivals. Third, a survey analysis of Kyiv university students shows that they view most oligarchs as corrupt and harmful to their political system. According to the survey results, oligarchs’ concentration of wealth appears to disqualify them from being legitimate political players. Yet, further evidence from this thesis suggests that people differentiate between oligarchs as a group and as individuals, which allows at least some oligarchs to enhance their reputation by using their vast material wealth. I conclude this thesis by discussing possible policy and societal implication of the results and by setting out some new venues of future research. Keywords: oligarchs; post-Soviet pseudo-democracies; state power abuse; mass opinion

Oligarchs, State Power and Mass Opinion – A Study of the Role of Oligarchs in Post-Soviet Pseudo-democracies Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Linnaeus University, Växjö, 2018 ISBN: 978-91-88761-39-2 (print), 978-91-88761-40-8 (pdf). Published by: Linnaeus University Press, 351 95 Växjö Printed by: DanagårdLiTHO, 2018

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my special appreciation and thanks to my advisors Staffan Andersson, Torbjörn Bergman and Karl Loxbo. I am thankful for your guidance, encouraging of my research and dedication. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to my fellow PhD students and friends at Linnaeus University for their true friendship and professional collaboration. Sara Fransson, Mattias Gunnarsson and Emma Ricknell— thank you for inspiring me to strive towards my goal! A special word of thanks also goes to Thomas Sedelius, Magnus Hagevi, Per Strömblad, Martin Nilsson, Johanna Jormfeldt, Stefan Höjelid, Helena Ekelund and Daniel Silander—thank you for all your professional advices and comments on my drafts! Greatest appreciation is due to Linnaeus University, Helge Ax:son Johnsons stiftelse and the Swedish Network for European Studies in Political Science (SNES) for making my research possible through awards to undergo advanced method studies in Ann Arbor and to conduct fieldwork in Ukraine. A very special gratitude goes out to my family. Words cannot express how grateful I am to my parents for all of the sacrifices they have made on my behalf. I am also profoundly thankful to my two younger brothers for offering me great support and always willing to be beside me. At the end, I would like to express appreciation to my life partner Hemik and my son Areg for spending sleepless nights with me and being my support in the moments when no one else was around.

Stockholm, February 2018

Tigran Babajan

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my special appreciation and thanks to my advisors Staffan Andersson, Torbjörn Bergman and Karl Loxbo. I am thankful for your guidance, encouraging of my research and dedication. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to my fellow PhD students and friends at Linnaeus University for their true friendship and professional collaboration. Sara Fransson, Mattias Gunnarsson and Emma Ricknell— thank you for inspiring me to strive towards my goal! A special word of thanks also goes to Thomas Sedelius, Magnus Hagevi, Per Strömblad, Martin Nilsson, Johanna Jormfeldt, Stefan Höjelid, Helena Ekelund and Daniel Silander—thank you for all your professional advices and comments on my drafts! Greatest appreciation is due to Linnaeus University, Helge Ax:son Johnsons stiftelse and the Swedish Network for European Studies in Political Science (SNES) for making my research possible through awards to undergo advanced method studies in Ann Arbor and to conduct fieldwork in Ukraine. A very special gratitude goes out to my family. Words cannot express how grateful I am to my parents for all of the sacrifices they have made on my behalf. I am also profoundly thankful to my two younger brothers for offering me great support and always willing to be beside me. At the end, I would like to express appreciation to my life partner Hemik and my son Areg for spending sleepless nights with me and being my support in the moments when no one else was around.

Stockholm, February 2018

Tigran Babajan

Georgia .................................................................................................. 104 Russia .................................................................................................... 106 Ukraine .................................................................................................. 108

Four oligarchs and their political struggle against the incumbent regime .. 111 Gagik Tsarukyan in Armenia ................................................................ 112 Bidzina Ivanishvili in Georgia ............................................................... 117 Mikhail Prokhorov in Russia ................................................................. 120 Petro Poroshenko in Ukraine ................................................................. 125 Summary and a comparative analysis of the results .............................. 130 Appendix ............................................................................................... 133

Chapter six. Oligarchs, mass opinion and struggles for political ascendancy during two color revolutions in Ukraine .......................................................... 135

Struggles for power and mass opinion about the oligarchs in Ukraine ....... 137 Ukrainian politics and oligarchs during the 2004 Orange Revolution .. 137

Ukrainian politics and oligarchs during and after the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution ................................................................................................... 140 Mapping out student attitudes towards oligarchs in Ukraine ...................... 143 The determinants of support for oligarchs among Ukrainian students ....... 148 Summary of the results ............................................................................... 153 Appendix ..................................................................................................... 156

Questionnaire ......................................................................................... 156 Chapter seven. Conclusions: Oligarchs, state power and mass opinion ........... 163

Results ......................................................................................................... 164 Discussion of the results and the implication of the findings ..................... 168 Areas for future research ............................................................................. 173

References ........................................................................................................ 175

Table of Contents

Chapter one. Introduction: Oligarchs and pseudo-democratic regimes ................ 7 Aim and research questions .......................................................................... 10 A brief background on post-Soviet pseudo-democracies .............................. 13 Overview of the thesis ................................................................................... 18

Chapter two: Setting the stage for the thesis ...................................................... 19 Who is an oligarch? ....................................................................................... 19 What is a pseudo-democratic regime? .......................................................... 22 What this thesis refers to by regime trajectories ........................................... 24 Previous literature ......................................................................................... 27

Oligarchs and pseudo-democratic regime trajectories ............................. 27 Explanations for different regime trajectories in pseudo-democracies .... 29

The analytical framework and hypotheses .................................................... 36 The relationship between oligarchs, their political power and popular support for democracy in principle .......................................................... 37 How key, rival oligarchs perform their bid for power against the ruling leadership by emulating the regime’s state power and efforts to manipulate mass opinion ......................................................................... 40

Chapter three: Research design, method, material and operationalization of hypotheses .......................................................................................................... 47

Mixed-method research design ..................................................................... 47 First empirical chapter: Case selection, research material, operationalization of hypotheses and method ............................................... 50 Second empirical chapter: Case selection, research material, operationalization of hypotheses and method ............................................... 55 Third empirical chapter: Case selection, research material, operationalization of key variables and method ............................................ 61

Chapter four: Oligarchs and normative support for democracy ......................... 67 Support for democracy in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies over time ......... 67 A general description of post-Soviet oligarchs as a group ............................ 69 Political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs, unfair wealth distribution and normative support for democracy ........................................................... 72

Control variables ...................................................................................... 72 Model ....................................................................................................... 73 Results ..................................................................................................... 74 Robustness checks ................................................................................... 82 Summary of the results ............................................................................ 85 Appendix ................................................................................................. 86

Chapter five: Four oligarchs and their quest for power in four pseudo-democracies ........................................................................................................ 99

A description of four post-Soviet pseudo-democracies .............................. 101 Armenia ................................................................................................. 101

Georgia .................................................................................................. 104 Russia .................................................................................................... 106 Ukraine .................................................................................................. 108

Four oligarchs and their political struggle against the incumbent regime .. 111 Gagik Tsarukyan in Armenia ................................................................ 112 Bidzina Ivanishvili in Georgia ............................................................... 117 Mikhail Prokhorov in Russia ................................................................. 120 Petro Poroshenko in Ukraine ................................................................. 125 Summary and a comparative analysis of the results .............................. 130 Appendix ............................................................................................... 133

Chapter six. Oligarchs, mass opinion and struggles for political ascendancy during two color revolutions in Ukraine .......................................................... 135

Struggles for power and mass opinion about the oligarchs in Ukraine ....... 137 Ukrainian politics and oligarchs during the 2004 Orange Revolution .. 137

Ukrainian politics and oligarchs during and after the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution ................................................................................................... 140 Mapping out student attitudes towards oligarchs in Ukraine ...................... 143 The determinants of support for oligarchs among Ukrainian students ....... 148 Summary of the results ............................................................................... 153 Appendix ..................................................................................................... 156

Questionnaire ......................................................................................... 156 Chapter seven. Conclusions: Oligarchs, state power and mass opinion ........... 163

Results ......................................................................................................... 164 Discussion of the results and the implication of the findings ..................... 168 Areas for future research ............................................................................. 173

References ........................................................................................................ 175

Table of Contents

Chapter one. Introduction: Oligarchs and pseudo-democratic regimes ................ 7 Aim and research questions .......................................................................... 10 A brief background on post-Soviet pseudo-democracies .............................. 13 Overview of the thesis ................................................................................... 18

Chapter two: Setting the stage for the thesis ...................................................... 19 Who is an oligarch? ....................................................................................... 19 What is a pseudo-democratic regime? .......................................................... 22 What this thesis refers to by regime trajectories ........................................... 24 Previous literature ......................................................................................... 27

Oligarchs and pseudo-democratic regime trajectories ............................. 27 Explanations for different regime trajectories in pseudo-democracies .... 29

The analytical framework and hypotheses .................................................... 36 The relationship between oligarchs, their political power and popular support for democracy in principle .......................................................... 37 How key, rival oligarchs perform their bid for power against the ruling leadership by emulating the regime’s state power and efforts to manipulate mass opinion ......................................................................... 40

Chapter three: Research design, method, material and operationalization of hypotheses .......................................................................................................... 47

Mixed-method research design ..................................................................... 47 First empirical chapter: Case selection, research material, operationalization of hypotheses and method ............................................... 50 Second empirical chapter: Case selection, research material, operationalization of hypotheses and method ............................................... 55 Third empirical chapter: Case selection, research material, operationalization of key variables and method ............................................ 61

Chapter four: Oligarchs and normative support for democracy ......................... 67 Support for democracy in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies over time ......... 67 A general description of post-Soviet oligarchs as a group ............................ 69 Political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs, unfair wealth distribution and normative support for democracy ........................................................... 72

Control variables ...................................................................................... 72 Model ....................................................................................................... 73 Results ..................................................................................................... 74 Robustness checks ................................................................................... 82 Summary of the results ............................................................................ 85 Appendix ................................................................................................. 86

Chapter five: Four oligarchs and their quest for power in four pseudo-democracies ........................................................................................................ 99

A description of four post-Soviet pseudo-democracies .............................. 101 Armenia ................................................................................................. 101

Table of Tables Table 1. Coding scheme for measuring relevant indicators ............................ 58 Table 2. Key variables from the Kyiv university student survey .................... 63 Table 3. Having a democratic political system ............................................... 76 Table 4. Having a strong leader....................................................................... 76 Table 5. The determinants of normative support for democracy..................... 78 Table 6. The determinants of normative support for democracy. Robustness checks .............................................................................................................. 83 Table 7. The variables and summary statistics ................................................ 89 Table 8. Question wordings and original scales of WVS variables ................ 90 Table 9. Pairwise correlations between the dependent and independent variables .......................................................................................................... 97 Table 10. Countries and years included in the analysis ................................... 98 Table 11. Reliability check for coding of a key variable............................... 133 Table 12. Attitudes towards oligarchs as a group and individuals ................ 143 Table 13. Attitudes about the political participation of the oligarchs (in %) 145 Table 14. Determinants of student opinion about the oligarchs as a group and individuals ..................................................................................................... 148 Table 15. Summary statistics of the variables in the Kyiv university student survey ............................................................................................................ 160

Table of Figures

Figure A. Level of democracy (Freedom House/Polity) ................................. 14 Figure B. GDP per capita (current prices in USD) .......................................... 16 Figure C. Economic (income) inequality in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies 17 Figure D. Mean democracy approval .............................................................. 68 Figure E. The level of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies ..................................................................... 74 Figure F. The average (median) level of perceived unfair distribution of wealth in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies .............................................. 75 Figure G. Random variation of normative democratic support in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies ........................................................................................ 81 Figure H. Predicted effects of political inequality on normative support for democracy ....................................................................................................... 86 Figure I. Predicted effects of attitudes about unfair wealth distribution on normative support for democracy .................................................................... 87 Figure J. Predicted interaction effects of political inequality and attitudes about unfair wealth distribution on normative support for democracy ........... 88 Figure K. The quality of the electoral process and democratic rights in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine since 2010 ....................................... 100 Figure L. Tsarukyan’s path to exiting politics ............................................... 112 Figure M. Ivanishvili’s successful ascent to power ....................................... 117 Figure N. Prokhorov’s path to withdrawing from politics ............................ 120 Figure O. Poroshenko’s successful way to becoming the president of Ukraine ....................................................................................................................... 125 Figure P. Comparison of the struggle for power by the four oligarchs ......... 131

Table of Tables Table 1. Coding scheme for measuring relevant indicators ............................ 58 Table 2. Key variables from the Kyiv university student survey .................... 63 Table 3. Having a democratic political system ............................................... 76 Table 4. Having a strong leader....................................................................... 76 Table 5. The determinants of normative support for democracy..................... 78 Table 6. The determinants of normative support for democracy. Robustness checks .............................................................................................................. 83 Table 7. The variables and summary statistics ................................................ 89 Table 8. Question wordings and original scales of WVS variables ................ 90 Table 9. Pairwise correlations between the dependent and independent variables .......................................................................................................... 97 Table 10. Countries and years included in the analysis ................................... 98 Table 11. Reliability check for coding of a key variable............................... 133 Table 12. Attitudes towards oligarchs as a group and individuals ................ 143 Table 13. Attitudes about the political participation of the oligarchs (in %) 145 Table 14. Determinants of student opinion about the oligarchs as a group and individuals ..................................................................................................... 148 Table 15. Summary statistics of the variables in the Kyiv university student survey ............................................................................................................ 160

Table of Figures

Figure A. Level of democracy (Freedom House/Polity) ................................. 14 Figure B. GDP per capita (current prices in USD) .......................................... 16 Figure C. Economic (income) inequality in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies 17 Figure D. Mean democracy approval .............................................................. 68 Figure E. The level of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies ..................................................................... 74 Figure F. The average (median) level of perceived unfair distribution of wealth in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies .............................................. 75 Figure G. Random variation of normative democratic support in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies ........................................................................................ 81 Figure H. Predicted effects of political inequality on normative support for democracy ....................................................................................................... 86 Figure I. Predicted effects of attitudes about unfair wealth distribution on normative support for democracy .................................................................... 87 Figure J. Predicted interaction effects of political inequality and attitudes about unfair wealth distribution on normative support for democracy ........... 88 Figure K. The quality of the electoral process and democratic rights in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine since 2010 ....................................... 100 Figure L. Tsarukyan’s path to exiting politics ............................................... 112 Figure M. Ivanishvili’s successful ascent to power ....................................... 117 Figure N. Prokhorov’s path to withdrawing from politics ............................ 120 Figure O. Poroshenko’s successful way to becoming the president of Ukraine ....................................................................................................................... 125 Figure P. Comparison of the struggle for power by the four oligarchs ......... 131

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Chapter one. Introduction: Oligarchs and pseudo-democratic regimes

The overall topic of interest for this thesis is how oligarchs1 influence regime survival or drifts to democratization in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Prior research on the importance of oligarchs for regime trajectories2 is scant, but burgeoning. This literature has offered contradictory findings about the role of oligarchs in these processes.3 While one branch of this literature has maintained that oligarchs enable or deliberately do not obstruct pseudo-democratic regimes to maintain their grip on power (Zudin, 2000; Kuzio, 2003; Shlapentokh, 2004; Matuszak, 2012; Junisbai, 2012: 898), another stream of research has stressed that oligarchs both help to overturn pseudo-democracies (Radnitz, 2006b, 2010, 2012; Areshidze, 2007; Pleines, 2009) and enable their countries to take gradual, but important steps towards democratization (Åslund, 2008, 2009). Yet and as will be clarified in more detail subsequently, two dominant explanations in the literature trying to understand these processes and differing regime trajectories in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies put emphasis either on mass opinion about the regime and its leader or state power concentration in the hands of the regime. Surprisingly, the literature on the role of oligarchs has largely overlooked the need to study the importance of oligarchs in the framework of these two dominant explanations. This inattention is unfortunate because oligarchs have been powerful players in the post-Soviet context and have played a key role, for instance, in ousting pseudo-democratic regimes by force in connection

1 By oligarchs, I refer to very wealthy businesspersons that hold a substantial economic and political sway over many key sectors in a society. Oligarchs are businesspersons who have a huge wealth that can be instantly parlayed into substantial political power. I discuss previous definitions of an oligarch in more detail in the chapter that follows this introduction. 2 By this term, this thesis refers primarily to successful maintenance of pseudo-democratic status quo or gradual drifts towards democratization. For further discussion of this concept, see subsequent chapter. 3 See Junisbai (2012: 898) for an engaging account of this literature.

7

Chapter one. Introduction: Oligarchs and pseudo-democratic regimes

The overall topic of interest for this thesis is how oligarchs1 influence regime survival or drifts to democratization in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Prior research on the importance of oligarchs for regime trajectories2 is scant, but burgeoning. This literature has offered contradictory findings about the role of oligarchs in these processes.3 While one branch of this literature has maintained that oligarchs enable or deliberately do not obstruct pseudo-democratic regimes to maintain their grip on power (Zudin, 2000; Kuzio, 2003; Shlapentokh, 2004; Matuszak, 2012; Junisbai, 2012: 898), another stream of research has stressed that oligarchs both help to overturn pseudo-democracies (Radnitz, 2006b, 2010, 2012; Areshidze, 2007; Pleines, 2009) and enable their countries to take gradual, but important steps towards democratization (Åslund, 2008, 2009). Yet and as will be clarified in more detail subsequently, two dominant explanations in the literature trying to understand these processes and differing regime trajectories in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies put emphasis either on mass opinion about the regime and its leader or state power concentration in the hands of the regime. Surprisingly, the literature on the role of oligarchs has largely overlooked the need to study the importance of oligarchs in the framework of these two dominant explanations. This inattention is unfortunate because oligarchs have been powerful players in the post-Soviet context and have played a key role, for instance, in ousting pseudo-democratic regimes by force in connection

1 By oligarchs, I refer to very wealthy businesspersons that hold a substantial economic and political sway over many key sectors in a society. Oligarchs are businesspersons who have a huge wealth that can be instantly parlayed into substantial political power. I discuss previous definitions of an oligarch in more detail in the chapter that follows this introduction. 2 By this term, this thesis refers primarily to successful maintenance of pseudo-democratic status quo or gradual drifts towards democratization. For further discussion of this concept, see subsequent chapter. 3 See Junisbai (2012: 898) for an engaging account of this literature.

9

regime leaders are, the more likely that the pseudo-democratic regime will succeed in surviving political challenges against the regime (Frye et al., 2016; Hale, McFaul & Colton, 2004; Dimitrov, 2009). In addition, several studies evidence that lower public support for democracy as an alternative to authoritarian forms of rule is associated with successful regime maintenance in pseudo-democracies (Nodia, 1996; Kuzio, 2006a; Simon, 2009: 16; Ekman, 2009: 25-26; Pietsch, 2015; Karp & Milazzo, 2015).

Despite this vast body of research on regime trajectories in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies, a substantial drawback in this literature is that the main emphasis has been placed either on factors that relate to regime strategies and country-level factors or on mass opinion. However, this is only one side of the coin if we are to understand different regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. The flip side is that big money plays an enormous political role in most countries in general (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999; Faccio, 2006; Fukuoka, 2013; Gilens & Page, 2014), and in pseudo-democracies in particular (Johnston, 2005, 2014; Winters, 2011). In fact, the presence of vast capital holders such as the oligarchs has been shown to affect the entire political life in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (Zudin, 2000; Pleines, 2008, 2009; Åslund, 2015). Oligarchs have been influential players in the post-Soviet context since their emergence in the wake of the Soviet Union’s breakdown. They gained substantial profits from the disastrous neoliberal “shock therapy” reforms during the 1990s and acquired vast assets in the energy sector, manufacturing, banking, telecommunications, transport, food and beverages production as well as trade and real estate (Hellman, 1998; Åslund, 2005; Treisman, 2016). All of this provided them with a central role in the economy of their respective countries. Most scholars, however, tend to agree that they could not have reached such successes without their formal and informal political connections that are crucially important for the protection of their wealth and businesses (Zudin, 2000; Frye, 2003, 2002; Åslund et al., 2007). Moreover, the involvement of oligarchs in politics and factors related to this presence such as wealth concentration in the hands of the few, corruption, patronage and clientelism are serious political problems in the post-Soviet context (Goldman, 2004; Stefes, 2007; Åslund, 2015; Shlapentokh, 2013). Their participation also has devastating effects on business competition between them and the rest of the citizenry (Black, Kraakman & Tarassova, 2000; Puglisi, 2003; Fortescue, 2006; Åslund, 2015). Moreover, evidence is mounting that their direct or behind-the-scene engagement in politics brings with it political inequality to the detriment of the public at large (Pleines, 2016, 2008; Winters, 2011; Johnston, 2014; Puglisi, 2003). Thus, there are indications in prior research that oligarchs’ political participation is menacing for the strategic interest of the public with regard to economic, social and democratic development (Åslund, 2015; Hoffman, 2011; Hoff & Stiglitz, 2004; Stiglitz, 2002; Shlapentokh, 2004; Black, Kraakman & Tarassova, 2000). These are all

8

with popular uprisings (Radnitz, 2006a, 2010). In this regard, focusing more closely on the role of oligarchs is also justified due to the more recent evidence in prior work suggesting that political changes towards democratization follow partly from forcing pseudo-democratic leaders out of power, who, in most cases, desperately cling to it at whatever cost (Przeworski, 2015: 104).

Pseudo-democracies have constituted the plurality of the Soviet successor states. The Soviet Union lasted for almost seven decades and was a key political, economic and military superpower during its existence. All of its fifteen former member republics declared independence one after another as the union began to crumble in 1991. Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine have all been caught somewhere between being autocracies and electoral democracies. To describe this category of countries “in the gray zone” (Carothers, 2002), existing scholarship has come up with a multitude of labels that differ in their emphasis on the proximity of these countries to either the authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2002; Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2015) or democracy (Case, 1993; Diamond, 1996; Zakaria, 1997; Cammack, 1998; Colton & McFaul, 2003; Karatnycky, 1999) poles of the political system classification scale. This thesis refers to this category of countries as pseudo-democracies.

There is a massive body of knowledge concerning regime maintenance and regime change in pseudo-democracies (Hellman, 1994; Karl, 1995; Diamond, 2002; Brownlee, 2002, 2009; Boix, 2003; Lust-Okar, 2005; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Svolik, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Bunce & Wolchik, 2011; Svolik, 2012; Berglund et al., 2013; Treisman, 2015; Escribà-Folch, 2016). We know a lot about the factors and mechanisms that drive such regime trajectories and why they differ across countries of this context (Bunce & Wolchik, 2006, 2011; Hale, 2016a). Regime trajectories vary across the pseudo-democracies of this context because the ruling elites of these countries have varying levels of state power and other important leverages that help them to pro-actively discourage and split their opposition (Way, 2012; Silitski, 2009; Hale, 2005). Existing research shows that the more overlap of political and economic power in the hands of the ruling regime’s main leader (Fish, 2000; Colton, 1995; Hale, 2005, 2015), the more unequal is the political playing field and the more stable is the regime’s grip on power (Levitsky & Way, 2002; 2010a; Way, 2012). We also know that public opinion about the regime is crucial for regime maintenance or its downfall (Huntington, 1991b; Gibson, 1996; Colton & McFaul, 2002; Kuzio, 2008; Person, 2010; Gel'man, 2010; Korosteleva, 2012; Gill, 2015). In particular, public opinion about the main regime leader (Magaloni, 2006; Colton & Hale, 2009; Bunce & Wolchik, 2009; Fairbanks Jr, 2009; Koesel & Bunce, 2012; Petrov, Lipman & Hale, 2014; Hutcheson & Petersson, 2016) and the expectations about his political future (Hale, 2015) explain why some regimes are better than others in maintaining their grip on power. More specifically, the more popular main

9

regime leaders are, the more likely that the pseudo-democratic regime will succeed in surviving political challenges against the regime (Frye et al., 2016; Hale, McFaul & Colton, 2004; Dimitrov, 2009). In addition, several studies evidence that lower public support for democracy as an alternative to authoritarian forms of rule is associated with successful regime maintenance in pseudo-democracies (Nodia, 1996; Kuzio, 2006a; Simon, 2009: 16; Ekman, 2009: 25-26; Pietsch, 2015; Karp & Milazzo, 2015).

Despite this vast body of research on regime trajectories in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies, a substantial drawback in this literature is that the main emphasis has been placed either on factors that relate to regime strategies and country-level factors or on mass opinion. However, this is only one side of the coin if we are to understand different regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. The flip side is that big money plays an enormous political role in most countries in general (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999; Faccio, 2006; Fukuoka, 2013; Gilens & Page, 2014), and in pseudo-democracies in particular (Johnston, 2005, 2014; Winters, 2011). In fact, the presence of vast capital holders such as the oligarchs has been shown to affect the entire political life in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (Zudin, 2000; Pleines, 2008, 2009; Åslund, 2015). Oligarchs have been influential players in the post-Soviet context since their emergence in the wake of the Soviet Union’s breakdown. They gained substantial profits from the disastrous neoliberal “shock therapy” reforms during the 1990s and acquired vast assets in the energy sector, manufacturing, banking, telecommunications, transport, food and beverages production as well as trade and real estate (Hellman, 1998; Åslund, 2005; Treisman, 2016). All of this provided them with a central role in the economy of their respective countries. Most scholars, however, tend to agree that they could not have reached such successes without their formal and informal political connections that are crucially important for the protection of their wealth and businesses (Zudin, 2000; Frye, 2003, 2002; Åslund et al., 2007). Moreover, the involvement of oligarchs in politics and factors related to this presence such as wealth concentration in the hands of the few, corruption, patronage and clientelism are serious political problems in the post-Soviet context (Goldman, 2004; Stefes, 2007; Åslund, 2015; Shlapentokh, 2013). Their participation also has devastating effects on business competition between them and the rest of the citizenry (Black, Kraakman & Tarassova, 2000; Puglisi, 2003; Fortescue, 2006; Åslund, 2015). Moreover, evidence is mounting that their direct or behind-the-scene engagement in politics brings with it political inequality to the detriment of the public at large (Pleines, 2016, 2008; Winters, 2011; Johnston, 2014; Puglisi, 2003). Thus, there are indications in prior research that oligarchs’ political participation is menacing for the strategic interest of the public with regard to economic, social and democratic development (Åslund, 2015; Hoffman, 2011; Hoff & Stiglitz, 2004; Stiglitz, 2002; Shlapentokh, 2004; Black, Kraakman & Tarassova, 2000). These are all

8

with popular uprisings (Radnitz, 2006a, 2010). In this regard, focusing more closely on the role of oligarchs is also justified due to the more recent evidence in prior work suggesting that political changes towards democratization follow partly from forcing pseudo-democratic leaders out of power, who, in most cases, desperately cling to it at whatever cost (Przeworski, 2015: 104).

Pseudo-democracies have constituted the plurality of the Soviet successor states. The Soviet Union lasted for almost seven decades and was a key political, economic and military superpower during its existence. All of its fifteen former member republics declared independence one after another as the union began to crumble in 1991. Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine have all been caught somewhere between being autocracies and electoral democracies. To describe this category of countries “in the gray zone” (Carothers, 2002), existing scholarship has come up with a multitude of labels that differ in their emphasis on the proximity of these countries to either the authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2002; Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2015) or democracy (Case, 1993; Diamond, 1996; Zakaria, 1997; Cammack, 1998; Colton & McFaul, 2003; Karatnycky, 1999) poles of the political system classification scale. This thesis refers to this category of countries as pseudo-democracies.

There is a massive body of knowledge concerning regime maintenance and regime change in pseudo-democracies (Hellman, 1994; Karl, 1995; Diamond, 2002; Brownlee, 2002, 2009; Boix, 2003; Lust-Okar, 2005; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Svolik, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Bunce & Wolchik, 2011; Svolik, 2012; Berglund et al., 2013; Treisman, 2015; Escribà-Folch, 2016). We know a lot about the factors and mechanisms that drive such regime trajectories and why they differ across countries of this context (Bunce & Wolchik, 2006, 2011; Hale, 2016a). Regime trajectories vary across the pseudo-democracies of this context because the ruling elites of these countries have varying levels of state power and other important leverages that help them to pro-actively discourage and split their opposition (Way, 2012; Silitski, 2009; Hale, 2005). Existing research shows that the more overlap of political and economic power in the hands of the ruling regime’s main leader (Fish, 2000; Colton, 1995; Hale, 2005, 2015), the more unequal is the political playing field and the more stable is the regime’s grip on power (Levitsky & Way, 2002; 2010a; Way, 2012). We also know that public opinion about the regime is crucial for regime maintenance or its downfall (Huntington, 1991b; Gibson, 1996; Colton & McFaul, 2002; Kuzio, 2008; Person, 2010; Gel'man, 2010; Korosteleva, 2012; Gill, 2015). In particular, public opinion about the main regime leader (Magaloni, 2006; Colton & Hale, 2009; Bunce & Wolchik, 2009; Fairbanks Jr, 2009; Koesel & Bunce, 2012; Petrov, Lipman & Hale, 2014; Hutcheson & Petersson, 2016) and the expectations about his political future (Hale, 2015) explain why some regimes are better than others in maintaining their grip on power. More specifically, the more popular main

11

very briefly how I will study these specific questions in addition to how my empirical studies that address these questions will help me to answer this thesis’s overall research aim.

The first research question is addressed through systematic, statistical analyses of normative regime support for democracy in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) in Chapter four. It is worth repeating that six countries in total constitute the entire population of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, the remaining country being Kyrgyzstan. Using widely employed comparative datasets, this thesis will examine how actual political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair distribution of wealth influence people’s support for democracy as a regime in principle. Thus, answering the first research question provides the basis for gaining a better understanding of how the political role of oligarchs is linked with preconditions for attitudinal democratization.7

The second research question is mainly addressed in Chapter five through a detailed comparative case study of the interactions between four rival oligarchs and the regimes in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine, respectively. Throughout this thesis, I will use the concept of interaction between individual oligarchs and incumbents to refer to what these players do in their quest for ascending to power or staying in power respectively in the framework of such key factors as mass opinion and state power abuse. All justifications for choosing these four countries are presented in the research design chapter. Yet, it is worth stating here that these countries were selected mainly due to their differences in state power concentration in the hands of their regimes, but also because of social and cultural similarities.8 The four oligarchs of study are Gagik Tsarukyan (Armenia), Bidzina Ivanishvili (Georgia), Mikhail Prokhorov (Russia) and Petro Poroshenko (Ukraine). I offer a reasoned justification for choosing these oligarchs in the research design chapter. In short, I justify this selection of oligarchs due to these oligarchs’ systematic quest for political power by opposing the incumbent regime’s main leader. In other words, choosing these oligarchs is primarily justified by their similar struggle for the ultimate political power9 through their own political parties or by leadership in key political alliances. By using original qualitative data based on reports from news media outlets, I study how these four oligarchs interact with the incumbents in the framework of such central factors as mass opinion and state power. Hence, of key interest is how rival oligarchs struggle for power against the incumbent regime and its 7 I provide a thorough definition of attitudinal democratization in the subsequent chapter. 8 For instance, there are striking cultural similarities between Armenia and Georgia as is the case between Russia and Ukraine. 9 I am referring here to becoming the main regime leader, which pertains mainly to becoming president or prime minister.

10

aspects with an immediate relevance to the linkage between oligarchs and regime trajectories in the framework of such key aspects as mass opinion and state power concentration in the hands of the ruling regime. Surprisingly, prior work on regime maintenance or gradual democratization has largely disregarded this plausible bond.

Aim and research questions This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature on pseudo-democracies, democratization and oligarchs and its understanding of pseudo-democratic regime trajectories in the post-Soviet context. As already mentioned, one important body of literature explains autocratic regime maintenance or democratization with mass opinion (towards the main regime leader and the regime in abstract), while another competing body of literature stresses the importance of concentration of state power in the hands of the regime. My aim is to study and understand the role of oligarchs in these processes in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies. For this purpose, this thesis addresses three specific research questions:

• What is the relationship between oligarchs, their political power4 and

popular support for democracy in principle? • Given that dominant theories point either to mass opinion or to state

power as the dominant factors in understanding regime maintenance or change, how do oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion?

• How does the aforementioned interaction between incumbents and oligarchs play out in situations where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change?

Although the primary focus of these guiding research questions is on the behavior of oligarchs and ruling elites given the centrality of state power and mass opinion, the discussion of prior work in the theory chapter will also involve system-level5 factors since the boundaries between powerful elites and the political regime are blurry in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies.6 In addition, the selection of cases, material and methods will be justified in full detail in the research design chapter. However, I now present 4 In this thesis, I refer to the political power of oligarchs as their actual political influence (both visible and behind-the-scene) that gives their strategic interests, with a particular focus on their wealth accumulation and protection, an overarching priority in relation to that of the broad masses. I offer a much more detailed discussion on this in the theory chapter. 5 I refer to factors that are primarily related to state-level developments (hence, a level above individual leaders or elite groups). 6 See subchapter “What is a pseudo-democratic regime?” for further details.

11

very briefly how I will study these specific questions in addition to how my empirical studies that address these questions will help me to answer this thesis’s overall research aim.

The first research question is addressed through systematic, statistical analyses of normative regime support for democracy in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) in Chapter four. It is worth repeating that six countries in total constitute the entire population of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, the remaining country being Kyrgyzstan. Using widely employed comparative datasets, this thesis will examine how actual political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair distribution of wealth influence people’s support for democracy as a regime in principle. Thus, answering the first research question provides the basis for gaining a better understanding of how the political role of oligarchs is linked with preconditions for attitudinal democratization.7

The second research question is mainly addressed in Chapter five through a detailed comparative case study of the interactions between four rival oligarchs and the regimes in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine, respectively. Throughout this thesis, I will use the concept of interaction between individual oligarchs and incumbents to refer to what these players do in their quest for ascending to power or staying in power respectively in the framework of such key factors as mass opinion and state power abuse. All justifications for choosing these four countries are presented in the research design chapter. Yet, it is worth stating here that these countries were selected mainly due to their differences in state power concentration in the hands of their regimes, but also because of social and cultural similarities.8 The four oligarchs of study are Gagik Tsarukyan (Armenia), Bidzina Ivanishvili (Georgia), Mikhail Prokhorov (Russia) and Petro Poroshenko (Ukraine). I offer a reasoned justification for choosing these oligarchs in the research design chapter. In short, I justify this selection of oligarchs due to these oligarchs’ systematic quest for political power by opposing the incumbent regime’s main leader. In other words, choosing these oligarchs is primarily justified by their similar struggle for the ultimate political power9 through their own political parties or by leadership in key political alliances. By using original qualitative data based on reports from news media outlets, I study how these four oligarchs interact with the incumbents in the framework of such central factors as mass opinion and state power. Hence, of key interest is how rival oligarchs struggle for power against the incumbent regime and its 7 I provide a thorough definition of attitudinal democratization in the subsequent chapter. 8 For instance, there are striking cultural similarities between Armenia and Georgia as is the case between Russia and Ukraine. 9 I am referring here to becoming the main regime leader, which pertains mainly to becoming president or prime minister.

10

aspects with an immediate relevance to the linkage between oligarchs and regime trajectories in the framework of such key aspects as mass opinion and state power concentration in the hands of the ruling regime. Surprisingly, prior work on regime maintenance or gradual democratization has largely disregarded this plausible bond.

Aim and research questions This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature on pseudo-democracies, democratization and oligarchs and its understanding of pseudo-democratic regime trajectories in the post-Soviet context. As already mentioned, one important body of literature explains autocratic regime maintenance or democratization with mass opinion (towards the main regime leader and the regime in abstract), while another competing body of literature stresses the importance of concentration of state power in the hands of the regime. My aim is to study and understand the role of oligarchs in these processes in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies. For this purpose, this thesis addresses three specific research questions:

• What is the relationship between oligarchs, their political power4 and

popular support for democracy in principle? • Given that dominant theories point either to mass opinion or to state

power as the dominant factors in understanding regime maintenance or change, how do oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion?

• How does the aforementioned interaction between incumbents and oligarchs play out in situations where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change?

Although the primary focus of these guiding research questions is on the behavior of oligarchs and ruling elites given the centrality of state power and mass opinion, the discussion of prior work in the theory chapter will also involve system-level5 factors since the boundaries between powerful elites and the political regime are blurry in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies.6 In addition, the selection of cases, material and methods will be justified in full detail in the research design chapter. However, I now present 4 In this thesis, I refer to the political power of oligarchs as their actual political influence (both visible and behind-the-scene) that gives their strategic interests, with a particular focus on their wealth accumulation and protection, an overarching priority in relation to that of the broad masses. I offer a much more detailed discussion on this in the theory chapter. 5 I refer to factors that are primarily related to state-level developments (hence, a level above individual leaders or elite groups). 6 See subchapter “What is a pseudo-democratic regime?” for further details.

13

oligarchs make their bid for power in contexts where their participation as a group is related to greater support for authoritarian rule among the public. The chapter seeks to provide a better understanding of how rival oligarchs’ interaction with the incumbent regime may be seen as a key regime maintenance tool in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies with higher state power. In addition, Chapter six complements the earlier findings by digging further into what specific dimensions of oligarchs’ political role are most crucial for understanding mass opinion about them as a group and individuals. It also further highlights how the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs plays out in situations of critical political event and in a context of oligarchs being very prominent for regime change. Through these intermediate links, this thesis aims to offer a nuanced understanding about the importance of oligarchs for regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies within the framework of such central factors as mass opinion and state power.

A brief background on post-Soviet pseudo-democracies The section provides a brief outline of the level of democracy, economic growth and income inequality over time in the six post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. This overview is meant to provide a brief background on the broad country-level settings of these six countries.

The entire post-Soviet region consists of 15 former Soviet member states. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania gained independence and progressively developed into settled democracies. At the same time, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan moved in the opposite direction towards authoritarianism. However, six remaining countries of this context—Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine—have more or less developed into pseudo-democracies. This post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies is of exclusive interest for this thesis. The following section offers a general background on these six post-Soviet pseudo-democracies although this thesis in later analyses only focuses on five of them for reasons clarified in the research design chapter.

Nearly 200 million people live in the six post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Russia is the largest country by both territory (nearly 17.1 million square kilometers) and population (almost 144 million inhabitants). Russia has been a dominant player both during and after the Soviet era. Figure A below depicts the level of democracy in this context of pseudo-democracies:

12

abuse of state power by focusing on developing their personal reputation, organizational resources and credibility as a rival. Thus, by answering this research question this thesis seeks to enhance our understanding about the role of oligarchs in the regime trajectories of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies given the two dominant, competing explanations with focus on either mass opinion or state power. In a region where politics is person-centered, this analysis will help us gain a better understanding of the role of oligarchs in these processes.

I investigate the third research question through an explorative study on Ukraine in Chapter six. Ukraine is a country where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change. The major focus is on how the aforementioned interaction played out in connection with the two color revolutions in Ukraine (The Orange (2004) and Euromaidan (2014) Revolutions). The first part of this chapter examines the triggers and consequences of the two color revolutions with the primary aim of understanding the role of oligarchs in these processes. Based on this initial part of the chapter, I then examine a unique survey of Kyiv university students to explore how such interactions (as perceived by a well-informed group of citizens in Ukraine) are reflected in mass opinion about oligarchs as a group and individuals. As for the latter, I refer to Rinat Akhmetov, Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Petro Poroshenko who have all been crucial oligarchs during the post-Soviet era of Ukrainian politics.10

In addition, I also provide a systematic overview of the evolution of politics in the four countries, the role of oligarchs and briefly discuss the levels of regime support in principle in all post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. This will provide a necessary background to the respective sections where I address each of the three aforementioned research questions.

Thus, what is the interlinkage between these three empirical chapters (four, five and six) as to how they help this thesis to achieve the overall aim? Chapter four provides a broad basis for understanding the role of oligarchs in regime maintenance or democratization given the centrality of mass opinion about regime in principle as a key to maintaining the regime or bringing about gradual change. Chapter five provides a basis for understanding how rival oligarchs make their quest for power against the incumbent regime in the framework of such key aspects as the regime’s state power abuse and the centrality of mass opinion. Chapter six delves deeper into how these interactions played out in a country where oligarchs have been most important for regime change in addition to exploring how this role is mirrored in mass opinion about them among university students. Thus, Chapter four mainly provides an understanding about how oligarchs’ actual power is related to ordinary citizens’ deep-seated attitudes towards the best form of government. Chapter five is linked with Chapter four in terms of showing how rival 10 See further details about the oligarchs in the chapter on Ukraine.

13

oligarchs make their bid for power in contexts where their participation as a group is related to greater support for authoritarian rule among the public. The chapter seeks to provide a better understanding of how rival oligarchs’ interaction with the incumbent regime may be seen as a key regime maintenance tool in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies with higher state power. In addition, Chapter six complements the earlier findings by digging further into what specific dimensions of oligarchs’ political role are most crucial for understanding mass opinion about them as a group and individuals. It also further highlights how the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs plays out in situations of critical political event and in a context of oligarchs being very prominent for regime change. Through these intermediate links, this thesis aims to offer a nuanced understanding about the importance of oligarchs for regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies within the framework of such central factors as mass opinion and state power.

A brief background on post-Soviet pseudo-democracies The section provides a brief outline of the level of democracy, economic growth and income inequality over time in the six post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. This overview is meant to provide a brief background on the broad country-level settings of these six countries.

The entire post-Soviet region consists of 15 former Soviet member states. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania gained independence and progressively developed into settled democracies. At the same time, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan moved in the opposite direction towards authoritarianism. However, six remaining countries of this context—Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine—have more or less developed into pseudo-democracies. This post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies is of exclusive interest for this thesis. The following section offers a general background on these six post-Soviet pseudo-democracies although this thesis in later analyses only focuses on five of them for reasons clarified in the research design chapter.

Nearly 200 million people live in the six post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Russia is the largest country by both territory (nearly 17.1 million square kilometers) and population (almost 144 million inhabitants). Russia has been a dominant player both during and after the Soviet era. Figure A below depicts the level of democracy in this context of pseudo-democracies:

12

abuse of state power by focusing on developing their personal reputation, organizational resources and credibility as a rival. Thus, by answering this research question this thesis seeks to enhance our understanding about the role of oligarchs in the regime trajectories of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies given the two dominant, competing explanations with focus on either mass opinion or state power. In a region where politics is person-centered, this analysis will help us gain a better understanding of the role of oligarchs in these processes.

I investigate the third research question through an explorative study on Ukraine in Chapter six. Ukraine is a country where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change. The major focus is on how the aforementioned interaction played out in connection with the two color revolutions in Ukraine (The Orange (2004) and Euromaidan (2014) Revolutions). The first part of this chapter examines the triggers and consequences of the two color revolutions with the primary aim of understanding the role of oligarchs in these processes. Based on this initial part of the chapter, I then examine a unique survey of Kyiv university students to explore how such interactions (as perceived by a well-informed group of citizens in Ukraine) are reflected in mass opinion about oligarchs as a group and individuals. As for the latter, I refer to Rinat Akhmetov, Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Petro Poroshenko who have all been crucial oligarchs during the post-Soviet era of Ukrainian politics.10

In addition, I also provide a systematic overview of the evolution of politics in the four countries, the role of oligarchs and briefly discuss the levels of regime support in principle in all post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. This will provide a necessary background to the respective sections where I address each of the three aforementioned research questions.

Thus, what is the interlinkage between these three empirical chapters (four, five and six) as to how they help this thesis to achieve the overall aim? Chapter four provides a broad basis for understanding the role of oligarchs in regime maintenance or democratization given the centrality of mass opinion about regime in principle as a key to maintaining the regime or bringing about gradual change. Chapter five provides a basis for understanding how rival oligarchs make their quest for power against the incumbent regime in the framework of such key aspects as the regime’s state power abuse and the centrality of mass opinion. Chapter six delves deeper into how these interactions played out in a country where oligarchs have been most important for regime change in addition to exploring how this role is mirrored in mass opinion about them among university students. Thus, Chapter four mainly provides an understanding about how oligarchs’ actual power is related to ordinary citizens’ deep-seated attitudes towards the best form of government. Chapter five is linked with Chapter four in terms of showing how rival 10 See further details about the oligarchs in the chapter on Ukraine.

15

real opposition is allowed to compete” (Hale, 2010: 35). Indeed, Putin has incrementally consolidated the power in his own hands, but has not been able or willing to eliminate all the threats against his regime by resorting to brutal repression because his regime has been extremely eager to promote the popularity of Putin as the primary tool of regime maintenance (Hale, 2010: 38). This strategy has involved both benefits and risks to the regime because the latter has been able to use the regime leader’s popularity to strengthen its hold on power. However, the primary risk with such a strategy is that a potent rival may be able to trigger popular outrage against the incumbents if he/she succeeds in gaining more popularity than the incumbent regime’s main leader (Petrov, Lipman & Hale, 2014: 2). In fact, we have more recently seen clear indications of such perils in the case of the regime critic Alexei Navalny’s struggle against Putin, which has been largely supported by the crowds of mostly young Russians (Higgins, 2017).

Turning to the level of economic growth in these six countries, data from the World Bank displays in Figure B that the Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (current prices in USD) was well below $5,000 for the better part of the 1990s in all of these countries except Russia. This is not that surprising as Russia has been one of the world’s most important petroleum industries with a particular focus on the export of natural gas. As we further observe in Figure B, Russia’s GDP per capita soared starting from the 2000s, which contributed to the popularity of Putin and his regime (Treisman, 2014). Although not by the same magnitude as in Russia, the GDP per capita has also risen steadily in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The economic growth in Kyrgyzstan, however, has not been that robust.

14

Figure A. Level of democracy (Freedom House/Polity)

Notes: The variable fh_polity2 emanates from the QoG dataset (Teorell et al., 2016). This indicator is measured by the average of the Freedom House’s (fh_pr and fh_cl) and Polity’s (p_polity2) measures for level of democracy in contrast to dictatorship. The variable ranges from 0 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic). As can be read from Figure A, the level of democracy has varied over time in all the six countries. We can see that the level of democracy has been slightly higher in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as compared with Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. One can also see that Russia has been moving somewhat towards the pole of least democracy following Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in the 2000s. These trends corroborate the view of most scholars in prior studies agreeing that Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Ukraine are pseudo-democracies that have generally been neither dictatorships nor full democracies (Beichelt, 2012: 17, 23). However, views have differed on how to classify Russia on the same scale (Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Ekman, 2009: 10; Motyl, 2012). Although this thesis recognizes that Russia under the Putin era has moved somewhat in the direction of the dictatorship pole, I still consider Putin’s Russia as a pseudo-democratic regime. In doing so, I entirely subscribe to the arguments of Henry Hale (2010) and Nikolay Petrov et al. (2014) who maintain that the reason why Putin’s Russia should be viewed as a hybrid regime (i.e. a pseudo-democracy in this thesis’s conceptualization) instead of a consolidated authoritarian regime (Freedom House, 2017) is due to the presence and substantial role of regular elections where “at least some

Least democratic123456789

Most democratic

Least democratic123456789

Most democratic

1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

Armenia Georgia Kyrgyzstan

Moldova Russia Ukraine

Year

15

real opposition is allowed to compete” (Hale, 2010: 35). Indeed, Putin has incrementally consolidated the power in his own hands, but has not been able or willing to eliminate all the threats against his regime by resorting to brutal repression because his regime has been extremely eager to promote the popularity of Putin as the primary tool of regime maintenance (Hale, 2010: 38). This strategy has involved both benefits and risks to the regime because the latter has been able to use the regime leader’s popularity to strengthen its hold on power. However, the primary risk with such a strategy is that a potent rival may be able to trigger popular outrage against the incumbents if he/she succeeds in gaining more popularity than the incumbent regime’s main leader (Petrov, Lipman & Hale, 2014: 2). In fact, we have more recently seen clear indications of such perils in the case of the regime critic Alexei Navalny’s struggle against Putin, which has been largely supported by the crowds of mostly young Russians (Higgins, 2017).

Turning to the level of economic growth in these six countries, data from the World Bank displays in Figure B that the Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (current prices in USD) was well below $5,000 for the better part of the 1990s in all of these countries except Russia. This is not that surprising as Russia has been one of the world’s most important petroleum industries with a particular focus on the export of natural gas. As we further observe in Figure B, Russia’s GDP per capita soared starting from the 2000s, which contributed to the popularity of Putin and his regime (Treisman, 2014). Although not by the same magnitude as in Russia, the GDP per capita has also risen steadily in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The economic growth in Kyrgyzstan, however, has not been that robust.

14

Figure A. Level of democracy (Freedom House/Polity)

Notes: The variable fh_polity2 emanates from the QoG dataset (Teorell et al., 2016). This indicator is measured by the average of the Freedom House’s (fh_pr and fh_cl) and Polity’s (p_polity2) measures for level of democracy in contrast to dictatorship. The variable ranges from 0 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic). As can be read from Figure A, the level of democracy has varied over time in all the six countries. We can see that the level of democracy has been slightly higher in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as compared with Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. One can also see that Russia has been moving somewhat towards the pole of least democracy following Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in the 2000s. These trends corroborate the view of most scholars in prior studies agreeing that Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Ukraine are pseudo-democracies that have generally been neither dictatorships nor full democracies (Beichelt, 2012: 17, 23). However, views have differed on how to classify Russia on the same scale (Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Ekman, 2009: 10; Motyl, 2012). Although this thesis recognizes that Russia under the Putin era has moved somewhat in the direction of the dictatorship pole, I still consider Putin’s Russia as a pseudo-democratic regime. In doing so, I entirely subscribe to the arguments of Henry Hale (2010) and Nikolay Petrov et al. (2014) who maintain that the reason why Putin’s Russia should be viewed as a hybrid regime (i.e. a pseudo-democracy in this thesis’s conceptualization) instead of a consolidated authoritarian regime (Freedom House, 2017) is due to the presence and substantial role of regular elections where “at least some

Least democratic123456789

Most democratic

Least democratic123456789

Most democratic

1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

Armenia Georgia Kyrgyzstan

Moldova Russia Ukraine

Year

17

Figure C. Economic (income) inequality in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies

Notes: The variable Gini emanates from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID3.4) (United Nations University, 2017). This variable measures the distribution of income in a society. A Gini coefficient of zero suggests perfect income equality, while that of 100 percent indicates extreme income inequality (concentration of all income in a society in the hands of one person). The Gini coefficient measures the distribution of income in the hands of the population in each country. The highest level of income inequality has been observed in Georgia and Russia (over 40). We can furthermore see a clear downward trend of income inequality in Moldova (going from 45 to 25) in contrast to Armenia (movements within the ranges of 30 and 40) and Kyrgyzstan (ranging from 30 to 25). In addition, there appears to be a very cautious downward trend in Ukraine (going towards 29) Yet, the Gini coefficient available for post-Soviet countries does not clearly measure the distribution of net wealth among the segments of the populace of these countries. In fact, Gini has generally been criticized for not being able to capture concentration of wealth, which, as Piketty (2014) has shown, has been much more decisive for the growing inequality (wealth polarization) in the world.11 11 Unfortunately, we still lack access to freely available measures for actual wealth inequality in this context of pseudo-democracies despite the emergence of some promising projects such as the World Wealth and Income Database (Alvaredo et al., 2017) and the more recently established Palma index

20

30

40

50

20

30

40

50

1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

Armenia Georgia Kyrgyzstan

Moldova Russia Ukraine

Year

16

Figure B. GDP per capita (current prices in USD)

Notes: The variable gle_cgdpc emanates from the QoG dataset (Teorell et al., 2016). This variable measures the value (current prices in USD) of all goods and services produced in a country in a given year divided by its total population. There is no doubt that economic growth plays an important role in the development processes of most countries. However, equally important is reducing economic inequality in a country that strives to maintain socio-political order (Boix, 2015; Phillips, 2016). Figure C depicts the major trends of income inequality in the six post-Soviet states.

0

5000

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15000

20000

0

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15000

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1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

Armenia Georgia Kyrgyzstan

Moldova Russia Ukraine

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Figure C. Economic (income) inequality in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies

Notes: The variable Gini emanates from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID3.4) (United Nations University, 2017). This variable measures the distribution of income in a society. A Gini coefficient of zero suggests perfect income equality, while that of 100 percent indicates extreme income inequality (concentration of all income in a society in the hands of one person). The Gini coefficient measures the distribution of income in the hands of the population in each country. The highest level of income inequality has been observed in Georgia and Russia (over 40). We can furthermore see a clear downward trend of income inequality in Moldova (going from 45 to 25) in contrast to Armenia (movements within the ranges of 30 and 40) and Kyrgyzstan (ranging from 30 to 25). In addition, there appears to be a very cautious downward trend in Ukraine (going towards 29) Yet, the Gini coefficient available for post-Soviet countries does not clearly measure the distribution of net wealth among the segments of the populace of these countries. In fact, Gini has generally been criticized for not being able to capture concentration of wealth, which, as Piketty (2014) has shown, has been much more decisive for the growing inequality (wealth polarization) in the world.11 11 Unfortunately, we still lack access to freely available measures for actual wealth inequality in this context of pseudo-democracies despite the emergence of some promising projects such as the World Wealth and Income Database (Alvaredo et al., 2017) and the more recently established Palma index

20

30

40

50

20

30

40

50

1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

Armenia Georgia Kyrgyzstan

Moldova Russia Ukraine

Year

16

Figure B. GDP per capita (current prices in USD)

Notes: The variable gle_cgdpc emanates from the QoG dataset (Teorell et al., 2016). This variable measures the value (current prices in USD) of all goods and services produced in a country in a given year divided by its total population. There is no doubt that economic growth plays an important role in the development processes of most countries. However, equally important is reducing economic inequality in a country that strives to maintain socio-political order (Boix, 2015; Phillips, 2016). Figure C depicts the major trends of income inequality in the six post-Soviet states.

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

Armenia Georgia Kyrgyzstan

Moldova Russia Ukraine

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19

Chapter two: Setting the stage for the thesis

In this part of the thesis, I provide the definitions of an oligarch, a pseudo-democratic regime and regime trajectories. The rationale for discussing these theoretical concepts in a separate section is twofold. First, this chapter’s specific goal is to devote particular attention to clarifying what this thesis refers to by these central concepts. Doing so is necessary in order to prevent any risk of misconception arising from confusion surrounding some of the key terms in this thesis. Second, the goal of this chapter is also to justify the choice and conceptualization of the broad dependent variable that the discussions in prior literature on post-Soviet pseudo-democracies revolve around. Overall, this focus is indispensable due to the still ongoing conflicting debates associated with different conceptions of movements from pseudo-democratic status quo towards democratization—crucial aspects in the conceptualization of regime trajectories in this thesis.

A systematic review of prior literature on regime trajectories and the presentation of an analytical framework and the hypotheses of this thesis will follow the subsections on definitions of the key terms. With these clarifications at hand, we can now turn to the discussion of the key concepts of this thesis.

Who is an oligarch? Over centuries, people across the world have invented many new labels for mega-rich people. Landlords, proprietors, barons, industrialists, moguls or tycoons are but some examples of these epithets. What all these concepts have in common is the primary focus on huge capital and personal enrichment through large-scale entrepreneurship or ownership. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, people and experts have reinvented the ancient Greek term “oligarch” in order to clearly identify a new group of extremely wealthy and politically connected businesspersons in the post-Soviet space.

18

Overview of the thesis The remaining part of the thesis involves six chapters. Chapter two offers the definitions of key concepts and discusses prior research. It concludes with developing the analytical framework and hypotheses guiding the thesis. Chapter three outlines the research design of this study, reviews the strengths and limits of the thesis with regard to data collection and modes of analysis. It also operationalizes the key variables and hypotheses. Chapter four first provides a brief account of normative regime support in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies. This chapter then goes on to study the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and people’s normative support for democracy in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Chapter five starts by looking at the evolution of politics in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine with a particular focus on incumbent regime strategies and tools for persistence. It then moves on to see how four rival oligarchs have carried out their bid for the ultimate power in their respective countries. A central aspect in this chapter is how the oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion in the framework of state power abuse by the incumbents as a key tool for regime maintenance. Chapter six begins by examining how this interaction played out before and after the two color revolutions in Ukraine. The chapter then moves towards a descriptive and explanatory analysis of Kyiv university student attitudes towards the oligarchs as a group and individuals. This opinion is key to understanding how oligarchs have interacted with the incumbent regimes and mass opinion in a country where they have been most prominent for regime change. This thesis concludes with a summary and discussion of its key findings, the implications for and the contribution to the scholarship on post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, oligarchs and regime trajectories. It finally offers suggestions on some venues for future research.

(Cobham, Schlögl & Sumner, 2016) for measuring economic inequality. The reason is that these projects either do not provide any or as extensive data coverage on the post-Soviet context at the time of writing.

19

Chapter two: Setting the stage for the thesis

In this part of the thesis, I provide the definitions of an oligarch, a pseudo-democratic regime and regime trajectories. The rationale for discussing these theoretical concepts in a separate section is twofold. First, this chapter’s specific goal is to devote particular attention to clarifying what this thesis refers to by these central concepts. Doing so is necessary in order to prevent any risk of misconception arising from confusion surrounding some of the key terms in this thesis. Second, the goal of this chapter is also to justify the choice and conceptualization of the broad dependent variable that the discussions in prior literature on post-Soviet pseudo-democracies revolve around. Overall, this focus is indispensable due to the still ongoing conflicting debates associated with different conceptions of movements from pseudo-democratic status quo towards democratization—crucial aspects in the conceptualization of regime trajectories in this thesis.

A systematic review of prior literature on regime trajectories and the presentation of an analytical framework and the hypotheses of this thesis will follow the subsections on definitions of the key terms. With these clarifications at hand, we can now turn to the discussion of the key concepts of this thesis.

Who is an oligarch? Over centuries, people across the world have invented many new labels for mega-rich people. Landlords, proprietors, barons, industrialists, moguls or tycoons are but some examples of these epithets. What all these concepts have in common is the primary focus on huge capital and personal enrichment through large-scale entrepreneurship or ownership. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, people and experts have reinvented the ancient Greek term “oligarch” in order to clearly identify a new group of extremely wealthy and politically connected businesspersons in the post-Soviet space.

18

Overview of the thesis The remaining part of the thesis involves six chapters. Chapter two offers the definitions of key concepts and discusses prior research. It concludes with developing the analytical framework and hypotheses guiding the thesis. Chapter three outlines the research design of this study, reviews the strengths and limits of the thesis with regard to data collection and modes of analysis. It also operationalizes the key variables and hypotheses. Chapter four first provides a brief account of normative regime support in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies. This chapter then goes on to study the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and people’s normative support for democracy in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Chapter five starts by looking at the evolution of politics in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine with a particular focus on incumbent regime strategies and tools for persistence. It then moves on to see how four rival oligarchs have carried out their bid for the ultimate power in their respective countries. A central aspect in this chapter is how the oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion in the framework of state power abuse by the incumbents as a key tool for regime maintenance. Chapter six begins by examining how this interaction played out before and after the two color revolutions in Ukraine. The chapter then moves towards a descriptive and explanatory analysis of Kyiv university student attitudes towards the oligarchs as a group and individuals. This opinion is key to understanding how oligarchs have interacted with the incumbent regimes and mass opinion in a country where they have been most prominent for regime change. This thesis concludes with a summary and discussion of its key findings, the implications for and the contribution to the scholarship on post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, oligarchs and regime trajectories. It finally offers suggestions on some venues for future research.

(Cobham, Schlögl & Sumner, 2016) for measuring economic inequality. The reason is that these projects either do not provide any or as extensive data coverage on the post-Soviet context at the time of writing.

21

may employ them through their conglomerates since these are seen as “potential instruments of oligarchs” (Winters, 2011: xvi).14

Unfortunately, prior work on oligarchs in the post-Soviet context has been predominantly qualitative. This has resulted in considerable obstacles to providing an account of adequate statistical measures for the distribution and total number of oligarchs in this region of pseudo-democracies. Yet, what we know for certain is that by individual oligarchs (holding huge fortunes) prominent scholars in the comparative literature on oligarchs generally refer to those at the top 1 percent of the wealthiest population (Winters & Page, 2009). Part of the difficulty for pinning down the entire population of oligarchs in the post-Soviet context is the fact that most oligarchs generally prefer not to be visible in media or in formal political life (Winters, 2011). Moreover, neither is their wealth that easily traced by investigative journalists or researchers as the oligarchs have professional staff that helps them to dodge taxes by moving it to other countries or transferring it to other people (relatives, cronies etc.) (Sarukhanyan & Tchobanov, 2017). These are the main reasons why the analyses of this thesis, consistent with most prior work on oligarchs’ political importance, primarily will be informed by rather qualitative accounts of oligarchs and their total “population” given by renowned country experts.

Undoubtedly, prior research has faced major challenges in clarifying the thin theoretical boundaries between oligarchs and other well-off elites. Although I throughout this thesis largely follow Winter’s definition of an oligarch, I consider it important to complement this definition by clarifying that a person is an oligarch if and only if he15 amassed his vast wealth while not serving in public or elected office. Thus, oligarchs are only those mega-wealthy players who come to the political sphere from the private sector and employ their wealth to gain either direct or behind-the-scenes political power. Are there more recent and widely known examples of oligarchs and non-oligarchs from a comparative perspective? While current U.S. President Donald Trump, former Prime Minister of Italy Silvio Berlusconi and present Czech Prime Minister Andrey Babiš are the archetype of an oligarch for having amassed their vast wealth prior to their service in elected office, neither Russian President Vladimir Putin nor his Congolese colleague Denis Sassou Nguesso are oligarchs according to the definition as they made their huge fortunes while serving in public office.16 However, it is also worth keeping in mind that the term oligarch may have some other and slightly varying dimensions in the eyes of the broad masses in general and among the populace 14 Gessen (2017), for instance, has dubbed such players as “stooges” of oligarchs. 15 Due to the fact that the absolute majority of oligarchs are men, I will refer to them as such throughout this thesis. 16 In fact, the Hungarian political scientist Balínt Magyar (2016) would define them as “Poligarchs”, i.e. political oligarchs who made their vast capital solely due to their political power and not the other way round. See also Masha Gessen’s interesting piece on the issue in the New Yorker (Gessen, 2017).

20

Oxford Online Dictionary defines an oligarch as “a ruler in an oligarchy” or “a very rich businessman with a great deal of political influence” (Oxford Online Dictionary, 2014). Åslund (2013: 202) argues that oligarchs in Russia, Ukraine and Latin America are reminiscent of the robber barons in the United States12 since they all rationally reacted to the political, economic and legal settings within which they made their efforts to gain large profits. In this thesis, by the term oligarch I refer to wealthy entrepreneurs that wield a significant economic as well as political influence on many or rather specific sectors of a society. Oligarchs are firmly rooted in the economic circles of a country’s elite.13 In many studies, the political side of their elite membership is considered as auxiliary in order for them to sustain the political influence needed for unconstrained capital accumulation (see Worth, 2005: 105; Åslund, 2007b: 256-257; Pleines, 2009: 116). However, some argue that several distinctions exist between elite cartels and oligarchs. In particular, Johnston (2005: 135) contends that oligarchs, in contrast to elite cartels, are not occupied with governing a whole country, less subject to regular investigations and they are to a much lesser degree exposed to international shocks and domestic rivalries. I claim that such conceptualization of oligarchs disregards evidence from the post-Soviet context. In fact, the experience from this region clearly shows that oligarchs are exposed to systematic investigations as part of their conflicts with other oligarchs or due to their political disloyalty to the ruling regime (Shlapentokh, 2004). We should, however, be mindful that Johnston (2014: 17), in a more recent book, concedes that his earlier stance on the distinctions in question was certainly debatable, and that the differences are at times of a qualitative type rather than “matters of degree”.

A relatively more accurate conceptualization of an oligarch, proposed by Winters (2011), states that oligarchs can also possess elite forms of power (organizational, political etc., my remark). Yet, elites are not oligarchs if they are not personally holding a huge amount of material power (Winters, 2011: 9). Hence, what constitutes the ultimate distinction between the two ideal types is a considerable personal wealth that is instantly accessible for achieving political purposes. This is why many top-level managers, bureaucrats and other similar players fall outside the scope of this definition of an oligarch. However, such players can bolster the power of oligarchs who

12 Robber barons were 19th century American businessmen who were strongly questioned for their rapacious practices of wealth accumulation. See Josephson (1962) and Jones (1968). 13 Several definitions of the concept of elite are found in literature (e.g. Mosca, 1939; Schattschneider, 1960; Pareto, 1968). In this thesis, I refer to elites as a set of individuals who make decisions or have a significant impact on the decisions involving profound implications for a large number of citizens (The so called "Power Elite". See Mills, [1956] 2000: 3-4).

21

may employ them through their conglomerates since these are seen as “potential instruments of oligarchs” (Winters, 2011: xvi).14

Unfortunately, prior work on oligarchs in the post-Soviet context has been predominantly qualitative. This has resulted in considerable obstacles to providing an account of adequate statistical measures for the distribution and total number of oligarchs in this region of pseudo-democracies. Yet, what we know for certain is that by individual oligarchs (holding huge fortunes) prominent scholars in the comparative literature on oligarchs generally refer to those at the top 1 percent of the wealthiest population (Winters & Page, 2009). Part of the difficulty for pinning down the entire population of oligarchs in the post-Soviet context is the fact that most oligarchs generally prefer not to be visible in media or in formal political life (Winters, 2011). Moreover, neither is their wealth that easily traced by investigative journalists or researchers as the oligarchs have professional staff that helps them to dodge taxes by moving it to other countries or transferring it to other people (relatives, cronies etc.) (Sarukhanyan & Tchobanov, 2017). These are the main reasons why the analyses of this thesis, consistent with most prior work on oligarchs’ political importance, primarily will be informed by rather qualitative accounts of oligarchs and their total “population” given by renowned country experts.

Undoubtedly, prior research has faced major challenges in clarifying the thin theoretical boundaries between oligarchs and other well-off elites. Although I throughout this thesis largely follow Winter’s definition of an oligarch, I consider it important to complement this definition by clarifying that a person is an oligarch if and only if he15 amassed his vast wealth while not serving in public or elected office. Thus, oligarchs are only those mega-wealthy players who come to the political sphere from the private sector and employ their wealth to gain either direct or behind-the-scenes political power. Are there more recent and widely known examples of oligarchs and non-oligarchs from a comparative perspective? While current U.S. President Donald Trump, former Prime Minister of Italy Silvio Berlusconi and present Czech Prime Minister Andrey Babiš are the archetype of an oligarch for having amassed their vast wealth prior to their service in elected office, neither Russian President Vladimir Putin nor his Congolese colleague Denis Sassou Nguesso are oligarchs according to the definition as they made their huge fortunes while serving in public office.16 However, it is also worth keeping in mind that the term oligarch may have some other and slightly varying dimensions in the eyes of the broad masses in general and among the populace 14 Gessen (2017), for instance, has dubbed such players as “stooges” of oligarchs. 15 Due to the fact that the absolute majority of oligarchs are men, I will refer to them as such throughout this thesis. 16 In fact, the Hungarian political scientist Balínt Magyar (2016) would define them as “Poligarchs”, i.e. political oligarchs who made their vast capital solely due to their political power and not the other way round. See also Masha Gessen’s interesting piece on the issue in the New Yorker (Gessen, 2017).

20

Oxford Online Dictionary defines an oligarch as “a ruler in an oligarchy” or “a very rich businessman with a great deal of political influence” (Oxford Online Dictionary, 2014). Åslund (2013: 202) argues that oligarchs in Russia, Ukraine and Latin America are reminiscent of the robber barons in the United States12 since they all rationally reacted to the political, economic and legal settings within which they made their efforts to gain large profits. In this thesis, by the term oligarch I refer to wealthy entrepreneurs that wield a significant economic as well as political influence on many or rather specific sectors of a society. Oligarchs are firmly rooted in the economic circles of a country’s elite.13 In many studies, the political side of their elite membership is considered as auxiliary in order for them to sustain the political influence needed for unconstrained capital accumulation (see Worth, 2005: 105; Åslund, 2007b: 256-257; Pleines, 2009: 116). However, some argue that several distinctions exist between elite cartels and oligarchs. In particular, Johnston (2005: 135) contends that oligarchs, in contrast to elite cartels, are not occupied with governing a whole country, less subject to regular investigations and they are to a much lesser degree exposed to international shocks and domestic rivalries. I claim that such conceptualization of oligarchs disregards evidence from the post-Soviet context. In fact, the experience from this region clearly shows that oligarchs are exposed to systematic investigations as part of their conflicts with other oligarchs or due to their political disloyalty to the ruling regime (Shlapentokh, 2004). We should, however, be mindful that Johnston (2014: 17), in a more recent book, concedes that his earlier stance on the distinctions in question was certainly debatable, and that the differences are at times of a qualitative type rather than “matters of degree”.

A relatively more accurate conceptualization of an oligarch, proposed by Winters (2011), states that oligarchs can also possess elite forms of power (organizational, political etc., my remark). Yet, elites are not oligarchs if they are not personally holding a huge amount of material power (Winters, 2011: 9). Hence, what constitutes the ultimate distinction between the two ideal types is a considerable personal wealth that is instantly accessible for achieving political purposes. This is why many top-level managers, bureaucrats and other similar players fall outside the scope of this definition of an oligarch. However, such players can bolster the power of oligarchs who

12 Robber barons were 19th century American businessmen who were strongly questioned for their rapacious practices of wealth accumulation. See Josephson (1962) and Jones (1968). 13 Several definitions of the concept of elite are found in literature (e.g. Mosca, 1939; Schattschneider, 1960; Pareto, 1968). In this thesis, I refer to elites as a set of individuals who make decisions or have a significant impact on the decisions involving profound implications for a large number of citizens (The so called "Power Elite". See Mills, [1956] 2000: 3-4).

23

power in a country. Hence, I emphasize the crucial role of dominant actors17 of flesh and blood along with the institutional dimensions of a regime. This argument derives credence from more recent studies showing that the preferences of persons in dominant positions of the ultimate political power are superior to existing institutional constraints in pseudo-democracies (Murillo & Levitsky, 2014). In fact, ruling elites in such regimes face little hurdles in adjusting the key formal institutions of the state when it really counts (Lust-Okar, 2004, 2005). Their sway over formal political institutions is more pronounced in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies due to the prevalence of patronal politics revolving around powerful political patrons with extensive political, economic and executive powers (Hale, 2005, 2010, 2016b). Now, let us turn our attention to defining the concept of pseudo-democratic regime.

A plethora of definitions exists of countries that are neither electoral democracies nor dictatorships (Case, 1993; Diamond, 1996, 2002; Zakaria, 1997; Cammack, 1998; Karatnycky, 1999; Levitsky & Way, 2002; Colton & McFaul, 2003; Schedler, 2015). Pseudo-democracy is an umbrella term that covers most key features found in the earlier cited definitions of pseudo-democracies. Important among these characteristics are the toleration of political pluralism in the form of independent opposition parties, civil society and regular national elections. Personalistic politics in pseudo-democracies prevails in the interrelations of elites as well as between them and the masses. Moreover, the incumbents employ their state power to discourage and weaken all effective opposition to them (Diamond, 1996: 25). A question that naturally springs to mind is why then such countries are undemocratic in spite of exhibiting many seemingly democratic facets?

Influential scholars of this field provide a few reasons for why pseudo-democracies simply are not democracies. First, pseudo-democratic rulers, much more often than not, refuse to abandon their power even when losing in national elections. Second, pseudo-democratic rulers nearly always determine the outcomes of legislative processes, and if needed, undo them. Third, pseudo-democracies are not constrained by formal institutions (Przeworski, 1991; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006: 21-22).18 Fourth, pseudo-democracies are not democracies because they can circumvent electoral rules and civil liberties even without employing repression (Svolik, 2012: 16). Such regimes eliminate any possibility of fair conditions for democratic political competition through which the opposition can ultimately throw them out of power (Diamond, 1996: 25).

17 Following Gel’man (2015: 6), I refer to the core leaders of the ruling groups or the authoritarian leaders. 18 Institutions are straightforwardly ignored, manipulated or altered on fateful occasions in such regimes (Way, 2015). Hence, they only serve as another tool in a pseudo-democratic regime’s adaptive toolbox needed to remain in power.

22

in the post-Soviet context in particular. Still, we as researchers always benefit from making certain that our conceptual tools are justified and clarified theoretically.

What is a pseudo-democratic regime? What is a political regime in contemporary terms? Answering this question before defining the term pseudo-democracy is inevitable. Neither in classical nor in contemporary work has there been any consensus on what should definitely be conceived of as a political regime. The classical work on social and political thought tended to disagree on whether it was important to focus on the number of people who ruled (Aristotle & Ackrill, 1987), the group characteristics of people who ruled (Marx, 1919 [1867]) or the way they ruled (Montesquieu, 1750) in defining a political regime. Divisions along related lines appear also in contemporary studies (Wahman, Teorell & Hadenius, 2013; O’Donnell, 2001). Yet, the major cause of disagreement in the more recent scholarship is whether we should put emphasis on the institutions of rule/governance (Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 2014: 314) or rulers of flesh and blood (Toktomushev, 2017: 1968; Shama, 2014: 14). I do not intend to engage in this stimulating theoretical discussion, but rather strive to find a practical definition of a political regime that focuses on both the people who rule and the institutions that undergird this rule. Thus, my main goal is to find a feasible compromise between these different points of view.

Many definitions of regime in empirical studies contain several elements of Fishman’s (1990: 428) definition of political regime as:

“…The formal and informal organization of the center of political power, and its relations with the broader society. A regime determines who has access to political power, and how those who are in power deal with those who are not.”

Moreover, Fishman places the regime as the intermediate layer between a state and a specific government. Yet, a widely shared argument is that the boundaries between these three layers are typically blurred in non-democratic countries, to put it mildly (Jackson & Rosberg, 1986). My definition of a regime is inspired by a classical understanding of a regime in pseudo-democracies (Schmitter, 1975: 20), which is also reflected in a more recent and related study by Gel’man (2015: 4-5). I use the term political regime to refer to a set of individuals and institutions that control the ultimate political

23

power in a country. Hence, I emphasize the crucial role of dominant actors17 of flesh and blood along with the institutional dimensions of a regime. This argument derives credence from more recent studies showing that the preferences of persons in dominant positions of the ultimate political power are superior to existing institutional constraints in pseudo-democracies (Murillo & Levitsky, 2014). In fact, ruling elites in such regimes face little hurdles in adjusting the key formal institutions of the state when it really counts (Lust-Okar, 2004, 2005). Their sway over formal political institutions is more pronounced in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies due to the prevalence of patronal politics revolving around powerful political patrons with extensive political, economic and executive powers (Hale, 2005, 2010, 2016b). Now, let us turn our attention to defining the concept of pseudo-democratic regime.

A plethora of definitions exists of countries that are neither electoral democracies nor dictatorships (Case, 1993; Diamond, 1996, 2002; Zakaria, 1997; Cammack, 1998; Karatnycky, 1999; Levitsky & Way, 2002; Colton & McFaul, 2003; Schedler, 2015). Pseudo-democracy is an umbrella term that covers most key features found in the earlier cited definitions of pseudo-democracies. Important among these characteristics are the toleration of political pluralism in the form of independent opposition parties, civil society and regular national elections. Personalistic politics in pseudo-democracies prevails in the interrelations of elites as well as between them and the masses. Moreover, the incumbents employ their state power to discourage and weaken all effective opposition to them (Diamond, 1996: 25). A question that naturally springs to mind is why then such countries are undemocratic in spite of exhibiting many seemingly democratic facets?

Influential scholars of this field provide a few reasons for why pseudo-democracies simply are not democracies. First, pseudo-democratic rulers, much more often than not, refuse to abandon their power even when losing in national elections. Second, pseudo-democratic rulers nearly always determine the outcomes of legislative processes, and if needed, undo them. Third, pseudo-democracies are not constrained by formal institutions (Przeworski, 1991; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006: 21-22).18 Fourth, pseudo-democracies are not democracies because they can circumvent electoral rules and civil liberties even without employing repression (Svolik, 2012: 16). Such regimes eliminate any possibility of fair conditions for democratic political competition through which the opposition can ultimately throw them out of power (Diamond, 1996: 25).

17 Following Gel’man (2015: 6), I refer to the core leaders of the ruling groups or the authoritarian leaders. 18 Institutions are straightforwardly ignored, manipulated or altered on fateful occasions in such regimes (Way, 2015). Hence, they only serve as another tool in a pseudo-democratic regime’s adaptive toolbox needed to remain in power.

22

in the post-Soviet context in particular. Still, we as researchers always benefit from making certain that our conceptual tools are justified and clarified theoretically.

What is a pseudo-democratic regime? What is a political regime in contemporary terms? Answering this question before defining the term pseudo-democracy is inevitable. Neither in classical nor in contemporary work has there been any consensus on what should definitely be conceived of as a political regime. The classical work on social and political thought tended to disagree on whether it was important to focus on the number of people who ruled (Aristotle & Ackrill, 1987), the group characteristics of people who ruled (Marx, 1919 [1867]) or the way they ruled (Montesquieu, 1750) in defining a political regime. Divisions along related lines appear also in contemporary studies (Wahman, Teorell & Hadenius, 2013; O’Donnell, 2001). Yet, the major cause of disagreement in the more recent scholarship is whether we should put emphasis on the institutions of rule/governance (Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 2014: 314) or rulers of flesh and blood (Toktomushev, 2017: 1968; Shama, 2014: 14). I do not intend to engage in this stimulating theoretical discussion, but rather strive to find a practical definition of a political regime that focuses on both the people who rule and the institutions that undergird this rule. Thus, my main goal is to find a feasible compromise between these different points of view.

Many definitions of regime in empirical studies contain several elements of Fishman’s (1990: 428) definition of political regime as:

“…The formal and informal organization of the center of political power, and its relations with the broader society. A regime determines who has access to political power, and how those who are in power deal with those who are not.”

Moreover, Fishman places the regime as the intermediate layer between a state and a specific government. Yet, a widely shared argument is that the boundaries between these three layers are typically blurred in non-democratic countries, to put it mildly (Jackson & Rosberg, 1986). My definition of a regime is inspired by a classical understanding of a regime in pseudo-democracies (Schmitter, 1975: 20), which is also reflected in a more recent and related study by Gel’man (2015: 4-5). I use the term political regime to refer to a set of individuals and institutions that control the ultimate political

25

I use democratization interchangeably with democratic advancement or progression in this study. I assume that democratization consists of, at least, two underlying processes—political and attitudinal democratization. To explain what democratization is, one has to clarify what one refers to by democracy. Earlier writings are replete with various definitions of democracy (e.g. Sartori, 1987; Dahl, 1989, 2005; Schumpeter, 2003 [1943]: 269; Schattschneider, 1960: 135). A widely used contemporary empirical definition of democracy is provided by Freedom House (2012). It considers a country to be an “electoral democracy” if 1) the political system is multiparty and competitive, 2) universal adult suffrage is implemented (unless justifiably restricted because of criminal offenses), 3) regular and competitive elections that represent the public will and are characterized by ballot secrecy and security, as well as the absence of massive electoral fraud, 4) major political parties are ensured significant public access to the electorate by means of media and political campaigning. Broadly speaking, this definition is reminiscent of the one advanced by Schumpeter (2003 [1943]: 269) that is worded as “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”. This definition of democracy has been used by many scholars and experts in the research on democratization (Beetham et al., 1994; Manin, 1997; Zakaria, 1997; Karatnycky, 1999; Lindberg, 2006; Gerring, Teorell & Zarecki, 2013).

My conceptualization of political democratization accounts for the most important components of the above minimalist definition. In particular, gradual democratization is taking place whenever rivals of pseudo-democratic incumbents come to power through democratic elections. This is in line with the views of Howard & Roessler (2006) and Donno (2013) who stress that a further step towards more democracy occurs whenever leaders come to power by free and liberalizing elections. I also maintain that it is part of democratization, when no other viable means are available, that people and the opposition successfully unseat pseudo-democratic rulers who refuse to resign in the face of broad popular uprisings. Contested national election results and authoritarian rulers refusing to deliver on key campaign promises generally trigger such broad mass protests (Robertson, 2013; Tucker, 2007). When pseudo-democratic regimes simply refuse to hand over their power, the only solution is to force them out of office in order to be able to organize democratic elections. In fact, a more recent work by Adam Przeworski (2015) lends additional empirical support to such conceptualization of political democratization by showing that single experiences of regime change by means of competitive elections are conducive to democratization in the long run. In particular, Przeworski (2015: 104) shows that most transitions to democracy follow from removing pseudo-democratic leaders by force. He also stresses that alternations through competitive elections are a prerequisite of democracy. Moreover, Przeworski (2015: 121) provides substantial evidence

24

In a more recent and very ambitious study concerned with bridging together disparate definitions of pseudo-democracy, Cassani (2014: 550) shows that all authors in the extant literature on pseudo-democracies observe two broad democratic and authoritarian regime features. The democratic facet found by all studies is that the opposition is represented in multi-party parliaments that are formed by regular elections. In contrast, the typical authoritarian attributes they find are the heavy concentration of arbitrary executive power in the hands of the chief executive and widespread violations of the political as well as civil rights of the populace. These common observations fit well with the general intuition about how and why pseudo-democratic incumbents, which I interchangeably use with the term authoritarian leaders throughout this thesis, abuse their state power to deny the opposition access to crucial resources. Key among these resources are media, finances and law, whose absence seriously harms the ability of the opposition to pose credible challenges against the regime in national elections (Greene, 2007; Levitsky & Way, 2010b: 57-58).

What this thesis refers to by regime trajectories The use of the term regime trajectories in this thesis should not be mistaken for cyclical regime dynamics over time. I use the concept of regime trajectories more specifically to refer to the successful maintenance of pseudo-democratic status quo or gradual qualitative changes towards democratization. Hence, the primary emphasis is on the qualitative characteristics of these changes or successful pseudo-democratic regime persistence. The question of how such changes ought to be conceptualized has stimulated much scholarly debate following the end of the Cold War. This unsettled debate revolves mainly around the stability of the direction and the pace of democratization. As for the former, while many earlier studies regarded democratization as a unidirectional movement towards full democratization (see further discussion in Herbst, 2001; Carothers, 2002), relatively more recent studies expect back and forth movements during democratic advancement (Howard & Roessler, 2006; Teorell, 2010; Donno, 2013). As for the pace of democratization, prior research provides conflicting views on whether democratization happens randomly (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997; Przeworski et al., 2000), at critical junctures in history (Acemoglu et al., 2009), in sudden waves (Huntington, 1991b, 1991a) or rather takes place gradually and fragmentarily without predetermined time and course stability (O'Donell, 1994; Tilly, 2007; Kuzio, 2005c; Svolik, 2015; Przeworski, 2015; Teorell & Wahman, 2017). Reconciling these conflicting views is not an easy task. Part of the difficulty is that the cited studies adopt substantially different definitions of democratization.

25

I use democratization interchangeably with democratic advancement or progression in this study. I assume that democratization consists of, at least, two underlying processes—political and attitudinal democratization. To explain what democratization is, one has to clarify what one refers to by democracy. Earlier writings are replete with various definitions of democracy (e.g. Sartori, 1987; Dahl, 1989, 2005; Schumpeter, 2003 [1943]: 269; Schattschneider, 1960: 135). A widely used contemporary empirical definition of democracy is provided by Freedom House (2012). It considers a country to be an “electoral democracy” if 1) the political system is multiparty and competitive, 2) universal adult suffrage is implemented (unless justifiably restricted because of criminal offenses), 3) regular and competitive elections that represent the public will and are characterized by ballot secrecy and security, as well as the absence of massive electoral fraud, 4) major political parties are ensured significant public access to the electorate by means of media and political campaigning. Broadly speaking, this definition is reminiscent of the one advanced by Schumpeter (2003 [1943]: 269) that is worded as “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”. This definition of democracy has been used by many scholars and experts in the research on democratization (Beetham et al., 1994; Manin, 1997; Zakaria, 1997; Karatnycky, 1999; Lindberg, 2006; Gerring, Teorell & Zarecki, 2013).

My conceptualization of political democratization accounts for the most important components of the above minimalist definition. In particular, gradual democratization is taking place whenever rivals of pseudo-democratic incumbents come to power through democratic elections. This is in line with the views of Howard & Roessler (2006) and Donno (2013) who stress that a further step towards more democracy occurs whenever leaders come to power by free and liberalizing elections. I also maintain that it is part of democratization, when no other viable means are available, that people and the opposition successfully unseat pseudo-democratic rulers who refuse to resign in the face of broad popular uprisings. Contested national election results and authoritarian rulers refusing to deliver on key campaign promises generally trigger such broad mass protests (Robertson, 2013; Tucker, 2007). When pseudo-democratic regimes simply refuse to hand over their power, the only solution is to force them out of office in order to be able to organize democratic elections. In fact, a more recent work by Adam Przeworski (2015) lends additional empirical support to such conceptualization of political democratization by showing that single experiences of regime change by means of competitive elections are conducive to democratization in the long run. In particular, Przeworski (2015: 104) shows that most transitions to democracy follow from removing pseudo-democratic leaders by force. He also stresses that alternations through competitive elections are a prerequisite of democracy. Moreover, Przeworski (2015: 121) provides substantial evidence

24

In a more recent and very ambitious study concerned with bridging together disparate definitions of pseudo-democracy, Cassani (2014: 550) shows that all authors in the extant literature on pseudo-democracies observe two broad democratic and authoritarian regime features. The democratic facet found by all studies is that the opposition is represented in multi-party parliaments that are formed by regular elections. In contrast, the typical authoritarian attributes they find are the heavy concentration of arbitrary executive power in the hands of the chief executive and widespread violations of the political as well as civil rights of the populace. These common observations fit well with the general intuition about how and why pseudo-democratic incumbents, which I interchangeably use with the term authoritarian leaders throughout this thesis, abuse their state power to deny the opposition access to crucial resources. Key among these resources are media, finances and law, whose absence seriously harms the ability of the opposition to pose credible challenges against the regime in national elections (Greene, 2007; Levitsky & Way, 2010b: 57-58).

What this thesis refers to by regime trajectories The use of the term regime trajectories in this thesis should not be mistaken for cyclical regime dynamics over time. I use the concept of regime trajectories more specifically to refer to the successful maintenance of pseudo-democratic status quo or gradual qualitative changes towards democratization. Hence, the primary emphasis is on the qualitative characteristics of these changes or successful pseudo-democratic regime persistence. The question of how such changes ought to be conceptualized has stimulated much scholarly debate following the end of the Cold War. This unsettled debate revolves mainly around the stability of the direction and the pace of democratization. As for the former, while many earlier studies regarded democratization as a unidirectional movement towards full democratization (see further discussion in Herbst, 2001; Carothers, 2002), relatively more recent studies expect back and forth movements during democratic advancement (Howard & Roessler, 2006; Teorell, 2010; Donno, 2013). As for the pace of democratization, prior research provides conflicting views on whether democratization happens randomly (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997; Przeworski et al., 2000), at critical junctures in history (Acemoglu et al., 2009), in sudden waves (Huntington, 1991b, 1991a) or rather takes place gradually and fragmentarily without predetermined time and course stability (O'Donell, 1994; Tilly, 2007; Kuzio, 2005c; Svolik, 2015; Przeworski, 2015; Teorell & Wahman, 2017). Reconciling these conflicting views is not an easy task. Part of the difficulty is that the cited studies adopt substantially different definitions of democratization.

27

Previous literature Oligarchs and pseudo-democratic regime trajectories As previously stated, there is a growing body of literature on oligarchs’ prominence in pseudo-democracies with regard to the social, economic and political spheres of society. However and surprisingly, the role of oligarchs for regime maintenance or gradual democratization remains unexplored as to the more specific ways in which oligarchs’ importance is reflected through such crucial factors as mass opinion and regime maintenance strategies by means of state power abuse. An important aspect in this regard is the fact that oligarchs have been of key importance for toppling many post-Soviet pseudo-democratic regimes by force, which, in turn, is of key importance for gradual drifts towards political democratization (Przeworski, 2015). Accordingly, I offer a detailed account of several seemingly disconnected branches of the scholarship that attributes differing regime trajectories in pseudo-democracies to the primacy of oligarchs, ruling elite strategies for regime maintenance and mass opinion, correspondingly. This overview will help to bring the whole theoretical gap to a head and to highlight the rationale for putting forward a more coherent theoretical framework for understanding the role of oligarchs (as a group and individuals) in the aforementioned key processes. The review of prior work starts with the discussion of previous studies that draw a connection between the strategic choices of oligarchs and differing regime trajectories in pseudo-democracies.

The first stream of the literature claims that oligarchs help pseudo-democratic regimes to maintain their hold on power by supporting the regime through the entire electoral cycle. A crucial factor in this respect is their monetary assets. In many post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, for instance Russia and Ukraine, oligarchs have been engaged in the control and trade of lucrative goods, commodities and services. In fact, the oligarchs have been prominent employers, producers and merchants in these (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005; Åslund, 2015) and several other post-Soviet states (Stefes, 2008; Radnitz, 2012; Junisbai, 2012). These activities generate huge wealth that is parlayed into substantial political power (Barnes, 2003). Furthermore, many oligarchs are integral parts of influential patronage networks that the ruling regime employs throughout the entire electoral cycle to secure a convincing victory in elections. Such evidence has been observed in many post-Soviet pseudo-democracies where pro-regime oligarchs’ financial resources have been funneled into vote-buying and other forms of expensive vote manipulation that are crucial for regime maintenance (Puglisi, 2003; Kuzio, 2005b; Stefes, 2006; Way, 2012; Radnitz, 2012). Some observers have suggested that many incumbents in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies have more often than not engaged oligarchs in piling up and hiding their financial resources from the

26

that such alternations have historically been favorable to the reduction of political violence as a means for political players to maintain their hold onto power or implement coup d’états. Hence, if oligarchs can contribute to or impede the removal of pseudo-democratic regimes, they, thereby, can play a key role in regime trajectories (But see Migranyan, 2015: 15).

Arguably, collaboration between elites and ordinary people for enabling free and fair elections is crucial for the political dimension of democratization. The foremost reason for this is that such actions contribute to increasing competitiveness (political pluralism) and inclusiveness (liberalization of the masses through their direct participation in critical political processes such as popular uprisings). Both political competitiveness and inclusiveness are key components of democratization (Sorensen, 2008; Teorell & Wahman, 2017; but see Carothers, 2002).

Yet, several scholars maintain that substantial democratization also requires attitudinal democratization, which implies that ordinary people support democracy as the best form of government regardless of short-term regime performance (Simon, 2009: 16; Welzel & Inglehart, 2008: 127; Diamond, 1999, 2008; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Almond & Verba, 1963). The main reason is that positive attitudes towards democracy make people more willing to struggle for the establishment and consolidation of democratic institutions (Welzel & Inglehart, 2008: 136; but see Qi & Shin, 2011). Still, how do the two dimensions of democratization (the political and attitudinal facets) interact? Many prior studies have uncovered strong evidence in support of the argument that both elites and ordinary people “learn” to love and accept democracy over the course of its gradual successes through alternations by competitive elections (Przeworski, 2015; Svolik, 2013; Mattes & Bratton, 2007). Hence, as democracy gradually becomes the “only game in town” among the elites, it simultaneously influences the public’s acknowledgment of the superiority of the democratic method of arriving at government or key political decisions. It is fully plausible to theorize that solid mass attitudes can in return incite the political elites to accept the superiority of democracy. Next, I provide a review of the literature related to oligarchs and regime trajectories in pseudo-democracies.

27

Previous literature Oligarchs and pseudo-democratic regime trajectories As previously stated, there is a growing body of literature on oligarchs’ prominence in pseudo-democracies with regard to the social, economic and political spheres of society. However and surprisingly, the role of oligarchs for regime maintenance or gradual democratization remains unexplored as to the more specific ways in which oligarchs’ importance is reflected through such crucial factors as mass opinion and regime maintenance strategies by means of state power abuse. An important aspect in this regard is the fact that oligarchs have been of key importance for toppling many post-Soviet pseudo-democratic regimes by force, which, in turn, is of key importance for gradual drifts towards political democratization (Przeworski, 2015). Accordingly, I offer a detailed account of several seemingly disconnected branches of the scholarship that attributes differing regime trajectories in pseudo-democracies to the primacy of oligarchs, ruling elite strategies for regime maintenance and mass opinion, correspondingly. This overview will help to bring the whole theoretical gap to a head and to highlight the rationale for putting forward a more coherent theoretical framework for understanding the role of oligarchs (as a group and individuals) in the aforementioned key processes. The review of prior work starts with the discussion of previous studies that draw a connection between the strategic choices of oligarchs and differing regime trajectories in pseudo-democracies.

The first stream of the literature claims that oligarchs help pseudo-democratic regimes to maintain their hold on power by supporting the regime through the entire electoral cycle. A crucial factor in this respect is their monetary assets. In many post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, for instance Russia and Ukraine, oligarchs have been engaged in the control and trade of lucrative goods, commodities and services. In fact, the oligarchs have been prominent employers, producers and merchants in these (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005; Åslund, 2015) and several other post-Soviet states (Stefes, 2008; Radnitz, 2012; Junisbai, 2012). These activities generate huge wealth that is parlayed into substantial political power (Barnes, 2003). Furthermore, many oligarchs are integral parts of influential patronage networks that the ruling regime employs throughout the entire electoral cycle to secure a convincing victory in elections. Such evidence has been observed in many post-Soviet pseudo-democracies where pro-regime oligarchs’ financial resources have been funneled into vote-buying and other forms of expensive vote manipulation that are crucial for regime maintenance (Puglisi, 2003; Kuzio, 2005b; Stefes, 2006; Way, 2012; Radnitz, 2012). Some observers have suggested that many incumbents in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies have more often than not engaged oligarchs in piling up and hiding their financial resources from the

26

that such alternations have historically been favorable to the reduction of political violence as a means for political players to maintain their hold onto power or implement coup d’états. Hence, if oligarchs can contribute to or impede the removal of pseudo-democratic regimes, they, thereby, can play a key role in regime trajectories (But see Migranyan, 2015: 15).

Arguably, collaboration between elites and ordinary people for enabling free and fair elections is crucial for the political dimension of democratization. The foremost reason for this is that such actions contribute to increasing competitiveness (political pluralism) and inclusiveness (liberalization of the masses through their direct participation in critical political processes such as popular uprisings). Both political competitiveness and inclusiveness are key components of democratization (Sorensen, 2008; Teorell & Wahman, 2017; but see Carothers, 2002).

Yet, several scholars maintain that substantial democratization also requires attitudinal democratization, which implies that ordinary people support democracy as the best form of government regardless of short-term regime performance (Simon, 2009: 16; Welzel & Inglehart, 2008: 127; Diamond, 1999, 2008; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Almond & Verba, 1963). The main reason is that positive attitudes towards democracy make people more willing to struggle for the establishment and consolidation of democratic institutions (Welzel & Inglehart, 2008: 136; but see Qi & Shin, 2011). Still, how do the two dimensions of democratization (the political and attitudinal facets) interact? Many prior studies have uncovered strong evidence in support of the argument that both elites and ordinary people “learn” to love and accept democracy over the course of its gradual successes through alternations by competitive elections (Przeworski, 2015; Svolik, 2013; Mattes & Bratton, 2007). Hence, as democracy gradually becomes the “only game in town” among the elites, it simultaneously influences the public’s acknowledgment of the superiority of the democratic method of arriving at government or key political decisions. It is fully plausible to theorize that solid mass attitudes can in return incite the political elites to accept the superiority of democracy. Next, I provide a review of the literature related to oligarchs and regime trajectories in pseudo-democracies.

29

2005). Scholars suggest that such country differences may emanate from different levels of oligarchic autonomy from the state (Radnitz, 2010, 2012; Pepinsky, 2009).

The above review of prior research points to different directions. We have studies claiming that oligarchs back pseudo-democratic regimes due to their fear of losing their wealth to either rivals or the masses, whereas others emphasize their importance for toppling pseudo-democratic regimes and facilitating democratization when they perceive threats to their capital from ruling elites. This contrast, in my view, points to two particular limitations in this scholarship. The first one is the neglected focus on the importance of mass attitudes towards the fairness of oligarchs’ wealth accumulation for people’s regime support in principle. In particular, the major argument in the literature on oligarchs is that they are primarily concerned with defending their huge material wealth, something that puts them at odds with the strategic interests of the broad masses (Winters, 2011). Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the unduly concentration of wealth and political power in the hands of oligarchs is of significant political importance for pseudo-democratic regime maintenance, democratization and popular regime support. The second limitation is the literature’s disregard of the actual level of oligarchs’ political power that may vary between countries. Undoubtedly, the reviewed studies differ considerably with regard to their case selections and generalization ambitions. Yet, what all the studies point to is the fact that oligarchs act differently in different countries. The difference in their choices of action is associated with varying country settings. Thus, there are important contextual differences for reasons I explore next.

Explanations for different regime trajectories in pseudo-democracies In contrast to the burgeoning literature on the nexus between oligarchs and regime trajectories, we have many established studies on pseudo-democratic regime maintenance and gradual democratization. This scholarship explains why pseudo-democratic regimes stay in power or lose their grip by centering primarily on two broad categories of explanations that revolve around external and domestic factors. As for the former, studies have argued that powerful authoritarian (black knights) and democratic (white knights) countries play a considerable role for the survival or collapse of pseudo-democratic regimes (Tolstrup, 2009, 2014; Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Risse & Babayan, 2015). More precisely, influential countries like Russia can leverage their resources and core competencies to support pseudo-democratic leaderships in their satellite states in coping with critical military, economic and political problems (Silitski, 2010b; Bader, Grävingholt & Kästner, 2010; Bader, 2015; Ambrosio, 2016). In contrast, the European Union (EU) and individual powerful democracies in the West can influence pseudo-democratic regimes

28

public (Petrosyan, 2010; Kasparov, 2014). Such undertakings help the ruling regime leaders to deflect public attention from their vast capital and to avoid provoking public opinion (Chernykh, 2008). For instance, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s formal annual salary was $150,000 in 2014, but according to Bill Browder, once the largest foreign investor in Russia, Putin owns more than $200 billion in hidden wealth (Spinella, 2015).

Another argument for why oligarchs help pseudo-democratic regimes to endure centers on the incompatibility of oligarchs’ strategic interests with those of the average citizen (Winters, 2011; Winters, 2013; Pleines, 2009; Singh, 2000). In particular, the argument is that oligarchs help such regimes to survive due to their fear of wealth redistribution (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). At the heart of this fear is the assumption that the toppling of pseudo-democratic regimes and democratization would most likely entail expropriation or redistribution of their vast wealth to the poor (Boix, 2003). This major concern of possible redistribution of their wealth generates political conformism among vested oligarchs as to the interests of the ruling leadership to stay in power and stymie democratization (Winters, 2011; Boix, 2003; cf. Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001). This claim finds support in studies of politics in Latin American (Albertus, 2015) and Southeast Asian countries (Winters, 2013).

The opposing argument in prior studies is that oligarchs can help the masses to overturn pseudo-democratic regimes and facilitate gradual steps towards democratization. The claim is that oligarchs are inclined to contribute to the aforementioned processes and challenge ruling elite if the latter seriously endanger their wealth or wealth accumulation (Zudin, 2000; Matuszak, 2012; Sidel, 2008; Shlapentokh, 2004; Radnitz, 2012). Although the majority of oligarchs are indifferent to political regimes, many of them tend to unite around a core set of shared strategic interests and similarly perceived threats from the regime against their material wealth (Åslund, 2015; Graham, 1999). In such settings, oligarchs have successfully helped to oust, for instance, General Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan (2008) (Albertus & Gay, 2016: 13) or Rojas Pinilla in Colombia (1957) (Palacios, 2007). A case in point from the post-Soviet context is the Orange Revolution in Ukraine that led to the departure of President Leonid Kuchma from office in 2005. Thousands of small entrepreneurs and several significant oligarchs backed his opponent Viktor Yushchenko although the three most powerful oligarchic groups provided major backing to Kuchma (McFaul, 2006: 168). An additional example from this context is the toppling of Askar Akayev in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 by popular protests supported by influential regional oligarchs who succeeded in their objective by appealing to the sympathies of the masses (Radnitz, 2006b). However, a contrasting example is found in Russia where several prominent oligarchs, among whom the then influential oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, failed in their attempt to revolt against Vladimir Putin in 2003 (Shlapentokh, 2004; Shlykov, 2004; Gudkov & Dubin,

29

2005). Scholars suggest that such country differences may emanate from different levels of oligarchic autonomy from the state (Radnitz, 2010, 2012; Pepinsky, 2009).

The above review of prior research points to different directions. We have studies claiming that oligarchs back pseudo-democratic regimes due to their fear of losing their wealth to either rivals or the masses, whereas others emphasize their importance for toppling pseudo-democratic regimes and facilitating democratization when they perceive threats to their capital from ruling elites. This contrast, in my view, points to two particular limitations in this scholarship. The first one is the neglected focus on the importance of mass attitudes towards the fairness of oligarchs’ wealth accumulation for people’s regime support in principle. In particular, the major argument in the literature on oligarchs is that they are primarily concerned with defending their huge material wealth, something that puts them at odds with the strategic interests of the broad masses (Winters, 2011). Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the unduly concentration of wealth and political power in the hands of oligarchs is of significant political importance for pseudo-democratic regime maintenance, democratization and popular regime support. The second limitation is the literature’s disregard of the actual level of oligarchs’ political power that may vary between countries. Undoubtedly, the reviewed studies differ considerably with regard to their case selections and generalization ambitions. Yet, what all the studies point to is the fact that oligarchs act differently in different countries. The difference in their choices of action is associated with varying country settings. Thus, there are important contextual differences for reasons I explore next.

Explanations for different regime trajectories in pseudo-democracies In contrast to the burgeoning literature on the nexus between oligarchs and regime trajectories, we have many established studies on pseudo-democratic regime maintenance and gradual democratization. This scholarship explains why pseudo-democratic regimes stay in power or lose their grip by centering primarily on two broad categories of explanations that revolve around external and domestic factors. As for the former, studies have argued that powerful authoritarian (black knights) and democratic (white knights) countries play a considerable role for the survival or collapse of pseudo-democratic regimes (Tolstrup, 2009, 2014; Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Risse & Babayan, 2015). More precisely, influential countries like Russia can leverage their resources and core competencies to support pseudo-democratic leaderships in their satellite states in coping with critical military, economic and political problems (Silitski, 2010b; Bader, Grävingholt & Kästner, 2010; Bader, 2015; Ambrosio, 2016). In contrast, the European Union (EU) and individual powerful democracies in the West can influence pseudo-democratic regimes

28

public (Petrosyan, 2010; Kasparov, 2014). Such undertakings help the ruling regime leaders to deflect public attention from their vast capital and to avoid provoking public opinion (Chernykh, 2008). For instance, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s formal annual salary was $150,000 in 2014, but according to Bill Browder, once the largest foreign investor in Russia, Putin owns more than $200 billion in hidden wealth (Spinella, 2015).

Another argument for why oligarchs help pseudo-democratic regimes to endure centers on the incompatibility of oligarchs’ strategic interests with those of the average citizen (Winters, 2011; Winters, 2013; Pleines, 2009; Singh, 2000). In particular, the argument is that oligarchs help such regimes to survive due to their fear of wealth redistribution (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). At the heart of this fear is the assumption that the toppling of pseudo-democratic regimes and democratization would most likely entail expropriation or redistribution of their vast wealth to the poor (Boix, 2003). This major concern of possible redistribution of their wealth generates political conformism among vested oligarchs as to the interests of the ruling leadership to stay in power and stymie democratization (Winters, 2011; Boix, 2003; cf. Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001). This claim finds support in studies of politics in Latin American (Albertus, 2015) and Southeast Asian countries (Winters, 2013).

The opposing argument in prior studies is that oligarchs can help the masses to overturn pseudo-democratic regimes and facilitate gradual steps towards democratization. The claim is that oligarchs are inclined to contribute to the aforementioned processes and challenge ruling elite if the latter seriously endanger their wealth or wealth accumulation (Zudin, 2000; Matuszak, 2012; Sidel, 2008; Shlapentokh, 2004; Radnitz, 2012). Although the majority of oligarchs are indifferent to political regimes, many of them tend to unite around a core set of shared strategic interests and similarly perceived threats from the regime against their material wealth (Åslund, 2015; Graham, 1999). In such settings, oligarchs have successfully helped to oust, for instance, General Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan (2008) (Albertus & Gay, 2016: 13) or Rojas Pinilla in Colombia (1957) (Palacios, 2007). A case in point from the post-Soviet context is the Orange Revolution in Ukraine that led to the departure of President Leonid Kuchma from office in 2005. Thousands of small entrepreneurs and several significant oligarchs backed his opponent Viktor Yushchenko although the three most powerful oligarchic groups provided major backing to Kuchma (McFaul, 2006: 168). An additional example from this context is the toppling of Askar Akayev in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 by popular protests supported by influential regional oligarchs who succeeded in their objective by appealing to the sympathies of the masses (Radnitz, 2006b). However, a contrasting example is found in Russia where several prominent oligarchs, among whom the then influential oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, failed in their attempt to revolt against Vladimir Putin in 2003 (Shlapentokh, 2004; Shlykov, 2004; Gudkov & Dubin,

31

credibly challenge the ruling authoritarian leadership’s firm grip on power (McFaul, 2005; Bunce & Wolchik, 2006; Beissinger, 2007). Hence, although not necessarily democratic as to its value system, a strong and united opposition is worrisome for pseudo-democratic rulers as it may capably strike at the heart of the regime’s top-down command structure and conduce to deposing pseudo-democratic regimes (Kuzio, 2005b). The case of the Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia that resulted in the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević in the autumn of 2000 is a prime example (Bieber, 2003; Birch, 2002; Bunce & Wolchik, 2009). However, evidence from other countries such as Armenia (2008), Azerbaijan (2003) and Belarus (2001) suggests that the opposition, despite its unity, was still unable to unseat the incumbent regimes. Scholars ascribed this inability to the ruling elites’ long-term, preemptive manipulation of the political scene. In fact, the main objective of pseudo-democratic incumbents is to drive a deep wedge within the opposition as well as between the opposition and the broad masses (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010: 63, 74).

A second stream of research on elite-level explanations for different regime trajectories claims that the ruling elites of pseudo-democracies create and institutionalize some key pro-active mechanisms that enable them to sustain themselves in power. Instant measures to counteract their opposition mainly involve impulsive, brutal repression or cooptation of rivals. However, a major risk associated with suppression is that it can provoke massive protests or international repudiation (Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Escribà-Folch, 2013; Escribá-Folch & Wright, 2015). In the same way, the peril of the cooptation strategy is that not all forces can be voluntarily contained and even if contained, they may pose a further risk to intra-elite conflicts (Magaloni, 2008). Therefore and to avoid provoking public opinion, incumbents in pseudo-democracies may resort to establishing fake (pocket) opposition parties to manipulate the political scene by diverting or channeling opposition votes (Hale, 2011b: 36; Wilson, 2005; Solinger, 2001). In this respect, incumbent elites in Russia have been an exemplary role model for establishing new or transforming old parties to pocket opposition (March, 2009, 2012). Most authoritarian leaders, yet, opt for creating lasting formal institutions that enable them to divide and discourage opposition at earlier stages and rule more consistently (Lust-Okar, 2004).

The ruling elites employ durable, preemptive mechanisms of domination to deter elite defection, fragment their political opposition and demobilize the public (Finkel & Brudny, 2012; Bunce & Wolchik, 2010; Silitski, 2010a, 2009). Among several of such mechanisms, one can distinguish the idea of an uneven playing field (UPF) that enables the regimes to wear down their opposition. The rich body of work that Lucan Way and Steven Levitsky have produced has been a major source for understanding pseudo-democratic regime trajectories across the world in general and the post-Soviet context in particular (Way, 2005a, 2005b, 2009, 2015, 2016; Levitsky & Way, 2002;

30

by conditioning their aid to these countries not only on long-term macroeconomic stability, but also on important political factors conducive to democratization (Levitsky & Way, 2010a). Although structural linkages to both democratic and authoritarian regional powers are important to account for, domestic factors still play a much greater role in determining the level of success for pseudo-democratic regime maintenance—especially in the post-Soviet region (Way, 2008; Gel'man, 2010). The major reason is that domestic background conditions make some political outcomes more likely and others rather impossible even given external regime backing or pressure (Solonenko, 2009; Simão, 2012; but see Tansey, Koehler & Schmotz, 2016; Brownlee, 2017).

The literature concerned with domestic factors has been more fruitful as its branches have focused on three major categories of explanations. The first is elite-level explanations with greater focus on the political opposition and ruling elite strategies. The second is mass-level explanations with an emphasis on mass opinion about specific regime leaders and the public’s normative support for regimes. Finally, a third group of explanations interlinks the elite and mass-level explanatory frameworks by focusing on the interplay between the elites and masses in the framework of patronal politics. Next, I offer a more detailed account of these branches in prior work and conclude with a clear rationale for why we instead need to study how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion in order to gain a better understanding of their importance for regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Thus and as will be discussed in more detail later, the theoretical framework of this thesis theorizes about the role of oligarchs by expanding on dominant explanations for regime trajectories with a particular emphasis on mass opinion and the degree of state power in the hands of the regime. Now, I provide a thorough review of these three major branches of explanations in the previous literature.

The proponents of elite-level explanations first accentuate the role of political opposition in accounting for different regime trajectories. Confronting a legitimate, strong and unified political opposition against their regime is one of the worst political evils from the perspective of ruling state elites in pseudo-democracies (Bunce & Wolchik, 2011; Tucker, 2007; Albrecht, 2005; McFaul, 2005). There are three main reasons for this. First, such an opposition is more likely to successfully push for important political reforms when the opportunity arises (Lust-Okar, 2004). By this opportunity, scholars conceive of economic and political crises driven by severe structural and institutional problems or elite-level struggles within pseudo-democracies (McFaul, 2005; Gould & Sickner, 2008; March, 2009; Lust-Okar, 2004; Reuter & Gandhi, 2011). Second, a strong opposition is more likely to win the support of the regime’s bureaucracy and cause elite defection due to its pronounced strength (Tolstrup, 2015a: 676). Finally, evidence is mounting that this kind of opposition is more successful in mobilizing masses in order to

31

credibly challenge the ruling authoritarian leadership’s firm grip on power (McFaul, 2005; Bunce & Wolchik, 2006; Beissinger, 2007). Hence, although not necessarily democratic as to its value system, a strong and united opposition is worrisome for pseudo-democratic rulers as it may capably strike at the heart of the regime’s top-down command structure and conduce to deposing pseudo-democratic regimes (Kuzio, 2005b). The case of the Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia that resulted in the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević in the autumn of 2000 is a prime example (Bieber, 2003; Birch, 2002; Bunce & Wolchik, 2009). However, evidence from other countries such as Armenia (2008), Azerbaijan (2003) and Belarus (2001) suggests that the opposition, despite its unity, was still unable to unseat the incumbent regimes. Scholars ascribed this inability to the ruling elites’ long-term, preemptive manipulation of the political scene. In fact, the main objective of pseudo-democratic incumbents is to drive a deep wedge within the opposition as well as between the opposition and the broad masses (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010: 63, 74).

A second stream of research on elite-level explanations for different regime trajectories claims that the ruling elites of pseudo-democracies create and institutionalize some key pro-active mechanisms that enable them to sustain themselves in power. Instant measures to counteract their opposition mainly involve impulsive, brutal repression or cooptation of rivals. However, a major risk associated with suppression is that it can provoke massive protests or international repudiation (Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Escribà-Folch, 2013; Escribá-Folch & Wright, 2015). In the same way, the peril of the cooptation strategy is that not all forces can be voluntarily contained and even if contained, they may pose a further risk to intra-elite conflicts (Magaloni, 2008). Therefore and to avoid provoking public opinion, incumbents in pseudo-democracies may resort to establishing fake (pocket) opposition parties to manipulate the political scene by diverting or channeling opposition votes (Hale, 2011b: 36; Wilson, 2005; Solinger, 2001). In this respect, incumbent elites in Russia have been an exemplary role model for establishing new or transforming old parties to pocket opposition (March, 2009, 2012). Most authoritarian leaders, yet, opt for creating lasting formal institutions that enable them to divide and discourage opposition at earlier stages and rule more consistently (Lust-Okar, 2004).

The ruling elites employ durable, preemptive mechanisms of domination to deter elite defection, fragment their political opposition and demobilize the public (Finkel & Brudny, 2012; Bunce & Wolchik, 2010; Silitski, 2010a, 2009). Among several of such mechanisms, one can distinguish the idea of an uneven playing field (UPF) that enables the regimes to wear down their opposition. The rich body of work that Lucan Way and Steven Levitsky have produced has been a major source for understanding pseudo-democratic regime trajectories across the world in general and the post-Soviet context in particular (Way, 2005a, 2005b, 2009, 2015, 2016; Levitsky & Way, 2002;

30

by conditioning their aid to these countries not only on long-term macroeconomic stability, but also on important political factors conducive to democratization (Levitsky & Way, 2010a). Although structural linkages to both democratic and authoritarian regional powers are important to account for, domestic factors still play a much greater role in determining the level of success for pseudo-democratic regime maintenance—especially in the post-Soviet region (Way, 2008; Gel'man, 2010). The major reason is that domestic background conditions make some political outcomes more likely and others rather impossible even given external regime backing or pressure (Solonenko, 2009; Simão, 2012; but see Tansey, Koehler & Schmotz, 2016; Brownlee, 2017).

The literature concerned with domestic factors has been more fruitful as its branches have focused on three major categories of explanations. The first is elite-level explanations with greater focus on the political opposition and ruling elite strategies. The second is mass-level explanations with an emphasis on mass opinion about specific regime leaders and the public’s normative support for regimes. Finally, a third group of explanations interlinks the elite and mass-level explanatory frameworks by focusing on the interplay between the elites and masses in the framework of patronal politics. Next, I offer a more detailed account of these branches in prior work and conclude with a clear rationale for why we instead need to study how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion in order to gain a better understanding of their importance for regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Thus and as will be discussed in more detail later, the theoretical framework of this thesis theorizes about the role of oligarchs by expanding on dominant explanations for regime trajectories with a particular emphasis on mass opinion and the degree of state power in the hands of the regime. Now, I provide a thorough review of these three major branches of explanations in the previous literature.

The proponents of elite-level explanations first accentuate the role of political opposition in accounting for different regime trajectories. Confronting a legitimate, strong and unified political opposition against their regime is one of the worst political evils from the perspective of ruling state elites in pseudo-democracies (Bunce & Wolchik, 2011; Tucker, 2007; Albrecht, 2005; McFaul, 2005). There are three main reasons for this. First, such an opposition is more likely to successfully push for important political reforms when the opportunity arises (Lust-Okar, 2004). By this opportunity, scholars conceive of economic and political crises driven by severe structural and institutional problems or elite-level struggles within pseudo-democracies (McFaul, 2005; Gould & Sickner, 2008; March, 2009; Lust-Okar, 2004; Reuter & Gandhi, 2011). Second, a strong opposition is more likely to win the support of the regime’s bureaucracy and cause elite defection due to its pronounced strength (Tolstrup, 2015a: 676). Finally, evidence is mounting that this kind of opposition is more successful in mobilizing masses in order to

33

the people (the period of study is 1990-2010). Unsurprisingly, they then used the very same support to establish and maintain an UPF to discourage opposition. Esen and Gumuscu (2016) find similar evidence in their examination of Turkey’s turn to pseudo-democratic rule in the wake of Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s and his ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) rise to power. Another fine example is Putin’s emergence to power and his regime’s survival (Dimitrov, 2009).

The other line of research on mass-level explanations centers on lasting mass value orientations in explaining different regime trajectories in pseudo-democracies (Kuzio, 2006b; Bauer & Bell, 2009; Gill, 2015; Karp & Milazzo, 2015; McAllister & White, 2015; Pietsch, 2015). Studies claim that the reason why some post-communist countries have experienced democratic breakthroughs, while others have remained in status quo or relapsed to more authoritarianism have depended broadly on differing citizen preferences for democratic ideals and political support for democratic political forces (Kuzio, 2008; Gill, 2015). Indeed, normative support for democracy is a major driving force for ordinary people across the world to enhance their awareness of their political rights irrespective of the severity of social, economic or political crises (Easton, 1975; Geddes & Zaller, 1989; Huang, Chang & Chu, 2008). In this respect, studies have shown recurrently that democratic support among ordinary people is a necessary precondition for democratic consolidation (Linz & Stepan, 1996; Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Diamond, 1999, 2008; Haerpfer, 2008: 423). Other observations suggest that support for authoritarianism fosters mass and elite consolidation around the chief leaders of pseudo-democracies (Stevens, Bishin & Barr, 2006; Chaisty & Whitefield, 2013: 399). In related fashion, a more recent study shows that higher support for authoritarian values is associated with lower levels of voter participation in East European elections (Karp & Milazzo, 2015). What is more, evidence from Russia (2012) suggests that authoritarian attitudes among the citizenry also depress individual proclivity to participate in anti-governmental protests (Gill, 2015). In fact, Ekman (2009: 25-26) argues that the sustainability of pseudo-democratic regimes is associated with popular support for authoritarian forms of power, which, in turn, is related to citizens’ political disillusionment and demobilization—two conditions that are much coveted by authoritarian leaderships (Koesel & Bunce, 2012: 406-407; King, Pan & Roberts, 2013; LaPorte, 2015: 347).

A third category of explanations for different regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies rests on a broad societal framework that draws a more immediate connection between elite- and mass-level processes (Hale, 2005, 2013, 2016b; Bunce & Wolchik, 2011). A cornerstone in Henry Hale’s analytical framework is that pseudo-democratic regimes of this region are a corollary of the underlying patronal societies. Two important aspects distinguish this type of society from others. One is that people pursue political and economic power primarily through broad networks of personal

32

Way & Levitsky, 2006; Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Levitsky & Way, 2015). Levitsky and Way (2002; 2010a) argue that authoritarian leaders maintain their hold onto power by establishing and nurturing an UPF. This skewed platform rests on extremely politicized state institutions, uneven access to public and private resources as well as media to the detriment of the opposition (Levitsky & Way, 2010a: 368). However, as they further maintain, UPF must be clearly separated from general incumbent advantage, also present in mature democracies (Diamond, 2002: 28), as UPF harms most preconditions of democratic advancement. In stark contrast to routine incumbent advantage, UPF entails the abuse of incumbents’ state power for narrow political reasons. The arbitrary use of state power blatantly retards the opposition’s ability to organize and compete for power (Levitsky & Way, 2010b: 58). UPF has been emphasized in many studies explaining regime maintenance (McFaul & Petrov, 2004; Puddington, 2009; Zimmerman, 2014; Kuzio, 2015b) and divergent regime trajectories in the post-Soviet context (Bader, 2010; Stewart et al., 2012). An informative example of this literature is Way’s (2012) comparative study of Armenia and Georgia. He shows that pseudo-democratic regime maintenance has been more successful in Armenia than in Georgia owing to the presence of relatively stronger state institutions and UPF in the former. UPF and its three essential elements of resource inequality, unequal access to media and the law wield an immediate adverse effect on the necessary conditions for meaningful and viable political competition (Levitsky & Way, 2010b: 58). Moreover, the long-term effect is that they produce a politically disengaged society when regimes recurrently manage to stifle their opposition (LaPorte, 2015: 347-349).

The research stream of mass-level explanations focuses primarily on the popularity of the regime leader as a key dimension of public opinion about the regime (Bunce & Wolchik, 2009; Fairbanks Jr, 2009; Koesel & Bunce, 2012; Petrov, Lipman & Hale, 2014; Frye et al., 2016). Scholars in this branch of mass-level explanations have stressed the importance of the main regime leader’s real popularity or the impression thereof among ordinary people for the survival of pseudo-democracies (Magaloni, 2006; Dimitrov, 2009; Hale, 2015). Although studies do not deny the significance of the degree of state power concentration for understanding regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, they view it as epiphenomenal to popular support for the chief regime leader (Hale, 2015: 448-449). Vast popular support for the main regime leader rests on the leader’s economic performance. The support grows when there are higher levels of social spending, increases in salary or decreasing levels of poverty and economic disparity (Dimitrov, 2009: 78-79). The main regime leader’s popularity allows him to consolidate his own power to the detriment of the opposition. Two related studies of pseudo-democracies illustrate this point well. Levitsky and Loxton (2013) show, for instance, that populist leaders in Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador credibly opposed and defeated powerful ruling elites mainly by seeking a direct mandate from

33

the people (the period of study is 1990-2010). Unsurprisingly, they then used the very same support to establish and maintain an UPF to discourage opposition. Esen and Gumuscu (2016) find similar evidence in their examination of Turkey’s turn to pseudo-democratic rule in the wake of Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s and his ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) rise to power. Another fine example is Putin’s emergence to power and his regime’s survival (Dimitrov, 2009).

The other line of research on mass-level explanations centers on lasting mass value orientations in explaining different regime trajectories in pseudo-democracies (Kuzio, 2006b; Bauer & Bell, 2009; Gill, 2015; Karp & Milazzo, 2015; McAllister & White, 2015; Pietsch, 2015). Studies claim that the reason why some post-communist countries have experienced democratic breakthroughs, while others have remained in status quo or relapsed to more authoritarianism have depended broadly on differing citizen preferences for democratic ideals and political support for democratic political forces (Kuzio, 2008; Gill, 2015). Indeed, normative support for democracy is a major driving force for ordinary people across the world to enhance their awareness of their political rights irrespective of the severity of social, economic or political crises (Easton, 1975; Geddes & Zaller, 1989; Huang, Chang & Chu, 2008). In this respect, studies have shown recurrently that democratic support among ordinary people is a necessary precondition for democratic consolidation (Linz & Stepan, 1996; Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Diamond, 1999, 2008; Haerpfer, 2008: 423). Other observations suggest that support for authoritarianism fosters mass and elite consolidation around the chief leaders of pseudo-democracies (Stevens, Bishin & Barr, 2006; Chaisty & Whitefield, 2013: 399). In related fashion, a more recent study shows that higher support for authoritarian values is associated with lower levels of voter participation in East European elections (Karp & Milazzo, 2015). What is more, evidence from Russia (2012) suggests that authoritarian attitudes among the citizenry also depress individual proclivity to participate in anti-governmental protests (Gill, 2015). In fact, Ekman (2009: 25-26) argues that the sustainability of pseudo-democratic regimes is associated with popular support for authoritarian forms of power, which, in turn, is related to citizens’ political disillusionment and demobilization—two conditions that are much coveted by authoritarian leaderships (Koesel & Bunce, 2012: 406-407; King, Pan & Roberts, 2013; LaPorte, 2015: 347).

A third category of explanations for different regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies rests on a broad societal framework that draws a more immediate connection between elite- and mass-level processes (Hale, 2005, 2013, 2016b; Bunce & Wolchik, 2011). A cornerstone in Henry Hale’s analytical framework is that pseudo-democratic regimes of this region are a corollary of the underlying patronal societies. Two important aspects distinguish this type of society from others. One is that people pursue political and economic power primarily through broad networks of personal

32

Way & Levitsky, 2006; Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Levitsky & Way, 2015). Levitsky and Way (2002; 2010a) argue that authoritarian leaders maintain their hold onto power by establishing and nurturing an UPF. This skewed platform rests on extremely politicized state institutions, uneven access to public and private resources as well as media to the detriment of the opposition (Levitsky & Way, 2010a: 368). However, as they further maintain, UPF must be clearly separated from general incumbent advantage, also present in mature democracies (Diamond, 2002: 28), as UPF harms most preconditions of democratic advancement. In stark contrast to routine incumbent advantage, UPF entails the abuse of incumbents’ state power for narrow political reasons. The arbitrary use of state power blatantly retards the opposition’s ability to organize and compete for power (Levitsky & Way, 2010b: 58). UPF has been emphasized in many studies explaining regime maintenance (McFaul & Petrov, 2004; Puddington, 2009; Zimmerman, 2014; Kuzio, 2015b) and divergent regime trajectories in the post-Soviet context (Bader, 2010; Stewart et al., 2012). An informative example of this literature is Way’s (2012) comparative study of Armenia and Georgia. He shows that pseudo-democratic regime maintenance has been more successful in Armenia than in Georgia owing to the presence of relatively stronger state institutions and UPF in the former. UPF and its three essential elements of resource inequality, unequal access to media and the law wield an immediate adverse effect on the necessary conditions for meaningful and viable political competition (Levitsky & Way, 2010b: 58). Moreover, the long-term effect is that they produce a politically disengaged society when regimes recurrently manage to stifle their opposition (LaPorte, 2015: 347-349).

The research stream of mass-level explanations focuses primarily on the popularity of the regime leader as a key dimension of public opinion about the regime (Bunce & Wolchik, 2009; Fairbanks Jr, 2009; Koesel & Bunce, 2012; Petrov, Lipman & Hale, 2014; Frye et al., 2016). Scholars in this branch of mass-level explanations have stressed the importance of the main regime leader’s real popularity or the impression thereof among ordinary people for the survival of pseudo-democracies (Magaloni, 2006; Dimitrov, 2009; Hale, 2015). Although studies do not deny the significance of the degree of state power concentration for understanding regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, they view it as epiphenomenal to popular support for the chief regime leader (Hale, 2015: 448-449). Vast popular support for the main regime leader rests on the leader’s economic performance. The support grows when there are higher levels of social spending, increases in salary or decreasing levels of poverty and economic disparity (Dimitrov, 2009: 78-79). The main regime leader’s popularity allows him to consolidate his own power to the detriment of the opposition. Two related studies of pseudo-democracies illustrate this point well. Levitsky and Loxton (2013) show, for instance, that populist leaders in Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador credibly opposed and defeated powerful ruling elites mainly by seeking a direct mandate from

35

regime trajectories within the framework of mass opinion and state power concentration in the hands of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies.

34

acquaintances. For that reason, sticks and carrots used to induce behavior are directed towards specific individuals (Hale, 2015: 423). The second aspect that sets patronal societies apart from other societies is that single patronal leaders are extremely important due not only to their formal powers, but also to their popularity that enables them to attract key individuals into their power pyramid even in the absence of formal position of power or authority. (Hale, 2015: 424). This is partly why it is no wonder that politics in patronal societies, such as those in the Soviet successor pseudo-democracies, are marked by greatly personalized struggles for power rather than through political parties (Hale, 2006). It is, also, in this light that political players do not treat formal constitutions of such countries as sacred principles of government (Way, 2017: 580). At the same time, constitutions are neither irrelevant nor superfluous as incumbent elites carefully amend them on fateful occasions. Constitutions serve as credible power-sharing mechanisms between the chief leader and his key allies within the ruling elite (Albertus & Menaldo, 2012). In fact, ruling state elites in pseudo-democracies use constitutions to facilitate their legal and illegal behavior, consolidate their influence around one or multiple chief leaders and to signal their confidence in their own political supremacy to everyone (Hale, 2016a: 31-32).

Despite the huge literature on why post-Soviet pseudo-democracies have experienced different regime trajectories, only a handful have focused on the role of oligarchs in these processes. In particular, and to the best of my knowledge, there remains a paucity of evidence on how rival oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion in the framework of state power abuse by the incumbents who do their utmost to stay in power. This thesis offers a systematic understanding of the role of oligarchs in post-Soviet pseudo-democratic regime trajectories by first focusing on the relationship between oligarchs’ actual political power and people’s normative support for either authoritarian forms of rule or democratic regime support. Second, the detailed review of prior explanations, with particular emphasis on the centrality of mass opinion and state power concentration and abuse, suggests that we still know very little about how rival oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion in the broad processes of regime maintenance or gradual drifts towards democratization. Finally and taken together, we need to focus on how the interaction between oligarchs and incumbents plays out in circumstances where the former have been most prominent for regime change. The main justification for doing so is the overlooked need to explore and understand how oligarchs as a powerful group and individual players may converge with mass opinion given the central importance of public opinion for regime trajectories. Next, I set out the theoretical framework for this study. While this analytical framework partly draws from the previous discussion of prior work, this thesis seeks to contribute to the broad scholarship by providing a coherent framework for understanding the largely undisclosed role of oligarchs for

35

regime trajectories within the framework of mass opinion and state power concentration in the hands of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies.

34

acquaintances. For that reason, sticks and carrots used to induce behavior are directed towards specific individuals (Hale, 2015: 423). The second aspect that sets patronal societies apart from other societies is that single patronal leaders are extremely important due not only to their formal powers, but also to their popularity that enables them to attract key individuals into their power pyramid even in the absence of formal position of power or authority. (Hale, 2015: 424). This is partly why it is no wonder that politics in patronal societies, such as those in the Soviet successor pseudo-democracies, are marked by greatly personalized struggles for power rather than through political parties (Hale, 2006). It is, also, in this light that political players do not treat formal constitutions of such countries as sacred principles of government (Way, 2017: 580). At the same time, constitutions are neither irrelevant nor superfluous as incumbent elites carefully amend them on fateful occasions. Constitutions serve as credible power-sharing mechanisms between the chief leader and his key allies within the ruling elite (Albertus & Menaldo, 2012). In fact, ruling state elites in pseudo-democracies use constitutions to facilitate their legal and illegal behavior, consolidate their influence around one or multiple chief leaders and to signal their confidence in their own political supremacy to everyone (Hale, 2016a: 31-32).

Despite the huge literature on why post-Soviet pseudo-democracies have experienced different regime trajectories, only a handful have focused on the role of oligarchs in these processes. In particular, and to the best of my knowledge, there remains a paucity of evidence on how rival oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion in the framework of state power abuse by the incumbents who do their utmost to stay in power. This thesis offers a systematic understanding of the role of oligarchs in post-Soviet pseudo-democratic regime trajectories by first focusing on the relationship between oligarchs’ actual political power and people’s normative support for either authoritarian forms of rule or democratic regime support. Second, the detailed review of prior explanations, with particular emphasis on the centrality of mass opinion and state power concentration and abuse, suggests that we still know very little about how rival oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion in the broad processes of regime maintenance or gradual drifts towards democratization. Finally and taken together, we need to focus on how the interaction between oligarchs and incumbents plays out in circumstances where the former have been most prominent for regime change. The main justification for doing so is the overlooked need to explore and understand how oligarchs as a powerful group and individual players may converge with mass opinion given the central importance of public opinion for regime trajectories. Next, I set out the theoretical framework for this study. While this analytical framework partly draws from the previous discussion of prior work, this thesis seeks to contribute to the broad scholarship by providing a coherent framework for understanding the largely undisclosed role of oligarchs for

37

democracies, the authorities will do their utmost to demonstrate to the public that the oligarchs will unlikely be able to surpass the regime’s main leader in their quest for power. Hence, this thesis seeks to contribute to the literature by offering a more nuanced understanding of the role of oligarchs in the framework of such important explanatory factors for regime trajectories as mass opinion and the ruling elite’s abuses of state power.

Before turning our attention to the analytical framework of this thesis, I want to clarify that I am well aware of the fact that there are influential oligarchs and coalitions of oligarchs both at the local and regional levels in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Yet, I do not consider them as politically motivated rivals to the incumbents as long as they do not systematically and visibly organize (perform) their political struggle against the incumbent regime and its main leader. In other words, although I do not dispute the fact that there may be other politically motivated oligarchs who are not entirely satisfied with the regime and the main leader, I have opted not to place too much theoretical emphasis on their role as long as they do not personally and visibly choose to challenge the regime’s hold on political power. This delimitation follows in particular from this thesis’s aim to study the importance of oligarchs in the framework of the central importance of state power and mass opinion for regime trajectories. Thus, this delimitation is justified theoretically as it enables us to focus on how rival oligarchs manifestly perform their political struggle for power against the regime as well as on the latter’s abuse of state power to avert such threats. With these key clarifications at hand, let us now turn to the presentation of the major components of the analytical framework.

The relationship between oligarchs, their political power and popular support for democracy in principle In a seminal work, Easton (1975) argued that regime support has two main forms—specific and diffuse19 regime support. While the former pertains to a more immediate understanding and evaluation of the government’s and political elites’ performance, the latter refers to a general, long-term evaluation of what a regime is or represents (Easton, 1975: 444). He (1975: 447) further argued that diffuse regime support very seldom veers from one extreme to another since it is not affected by government failures to provide both political and economic goods20 in the short run. However, persistently bad regime performance, as perceived by people, affects diffuse support for 19 Following past studies (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer, 1998; Norris, 1999), this thesis uses diffuse, normative and regime support in abstract or in principle synonymously. 20 By political goods, I refer to political trust, the rule of law, respect for civil rights, democratic representation, electoral institutions, control of corruption and political competition. What of economic goods? Scholars conceive of economic goods as monetary and other such resources that people desire to own a lot of even though these are not critical for their physical survival (Huo, 2002: 539).

36

The analytical framework and hypotheses As discussed at length previously, several institutional factors and the significance of institutional frameworks have been emphasized in prior research (e.g. Gel'man, 2008a; Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Silitski, 2010a) as important aspects to account for in understanding varying regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. While this thesis acknowledges the important contribution of the aforementioned branch of research, the emphasis here is rather on the importance of the actor-level perspective in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies. Thus, this thesis adheres to the branch of extant research that focuses on the understudied role of person-centered processes within the framework of dominant players’ political game of either maintaining or ascending to power in the post-Soviet context (Hale, 2015).

Given the above review of the extant literature, it ought to be reasonable to believe that the rationale for oligarchs to challenge the regime differs in countries with different levels of state power in the hands of incumbents. As discussed above, this variation in state power suggests different preconditions for political opposition to compete for power and play a greater role in influencing public opinion. This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature on regime trajectories by assessing the role of oligarchs in post-Soviet regime trajectories with regard to how they interact with incumbents in the framework of the latter’s state power abuse and efforts to manipulate mass opinion. In contrast to prior studies (Levitsky & Way, 2010a), my study also digs deeper into how rulers with greater state power (and thereby greater coercive capacity) still seek to manipulate public opinion about their rival oligarchs in order to ensure the sustainability of their regime. This will help the thesis to illustrate in more detail how mass opinion and state power mutually reinforce each other in crucial struggles for political ascendancy between rival oligarchs and incumbents in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies.

This thesis departs from prior studies in assuming that the level of state power as well as mass opinion are equally important factors for our understanding of different regime trajectories. As will be made clear subsequently, I believe that pseudo-democratic regimes reinforce their state power primarily not by openly repressing their opponents, but rather by showing that the rival oligarchs are unpredictable and untrustworthy challengers of the regime’s chief leader. Obviously, pseudo-democratic regimes with greater state power stand a better chance of succeeding in their efforts to tarnish the reputation of their rival oligarchs. However, it is worth recalling that scholars categorize pseudo-democracies precisely as such because all these regimes fundamentally undermine their opposition’s ability to compete for power. This is valid for all pseudo-democracies—irrespective of the level of state power concentrated in the hands of the incumbent elite. I, therefore, assume that while the politically motivated rival oligarchs will seek to develop their reputation and their organizational capacity in all pseudo-

37

democracies, the authorities will do their utmost to demonstrate to the public that the oligarchs will unlikely be able to surpass the regime’s main leader in their quest for power. Hence, this thesis seeks to contribute to the literature by offering a more nuanced understanding of the role of oligarchs in the framework of such important explanatory factors for regime trajectories as mass opinion and the ruling elite’s abuses of state power.

Before turning our attention to the analytical framework of this thesis, I want to clarify that I am well aware of the fact that there are influential oligarchs and coalitions of oligarchs both at the local and regional levels in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Yet, I do not consider them as politically motivated rivals to the incumbents as long as they do not systematically and visibly organize (perform) their political struggle against the incumbent regime and its main leader. In other words, although I do not dispute the fact that there may be other politically motivated oligarchs who are not entirely satisfied with the regime and the main leader, I have opted not to place too much theoretical emphasis on their role as long as they do not personally and visibly choose to challenge the regime’s hold on political power. This delimitation follows in particular from this thesis’s aim to study the importance of oligarchs in the framework of the central importance of state power and mass opinion for regime trajectories. Thus, this delimitation is justified theoretically as it enables us to focus on how rival oligarchs manifestly perform their political struggle for power against the regime as well as on the latter’s abuse of state power to avert such threats. With these key clarifications at hand, let us now turn to the presentation of the major components of the analytical framework.

The relationship between oligarchs, their political power and popular support for democracy in principle In a seminal work, Easton (1975) argued that regime support has two main forms—specific and diffuse19 regime support. While the former pertains to a more immediate understanding and evaluation of the government’s and political elites’ performance, the latter refers to a general, long-term evaluation of what a regime is or represents (Easton, 1975: 444). He (1975: 447) further argued that diffuse regime support very seldom veers from one extreme to another since it is not affected by government failures to provide both political and economic goods20 in the short run. However, persistently bad regime performance, as perceived by people, affects diffuse support for 19 Following past studies (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer, 1998; Norris, 1999), this thesis uses diffuse, normative and regime support in abstract or in principle synonymously. 20 By political goods, I refer to political trust, the rule of law, respect for civil rights, democratic representation, electoral institutions, control of corruption and political competition. What of economic goods? Scholars conceive of economic goods as monetary and other such resources that people desire to own a lot of even though these are not critical for their physical survival (Huo, 2002: 539).

36

The analytical framework and hypotheses As discussed at length previously, several institutional factors and the significance of institutional frameworks have been emphasized in prior research (e.g. Gel'man, 2008a; Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Silitski, 2010a) as important aspects to account for in understanding varying regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. While this thesis acknowledges the important contribution of the aforementioned branch of research, the emphasis here is rather on the importance of the actor-level perspective in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies. Thus, this thesis adheres to the branch of extant research that focuses on the understudied role of person-centered processes within the framework of dominant players’ political game of either maintaining or ascending to power in the post-Soviet context (Hale, 2015).

Given the above review of the extant literature, it ought to be reasonable to believe that the rationale for oligarchs to challenge the regime differs in countries with different levels of state power in the hands of incumbents. As discussed above, this variation in state power suggests different preconditions for political opposition to compete for power and play a greater role in influencing public opinion. This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature on regime trajectories by assessing the role of oligarchs in post-Soviet regime trajectories with regard to how they interact with incumbents in the framework of the latter’s state power abuse and efforts to manipulate mass opinion. In contrast to prior studies (Levitsky & Way, 2010a), my study also digs deeper into how rulers with greater state power (and thereby greater coercive capacity) still seek to manipulate public opinion about their rival oligarchs in order to ensure the sustainability of their regime. This will help the thesis to illustrate in more detail how mass opinion and state power mutually reinforce each other in crucial struggles for political ascendancy between rival oligarchs and incumbents in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies.

This thesis departs from prior studies in assuming that the level of state power as well as mass opinion are equally important factors for our understanding of different regime trajectories. As will be made clear subsequently, I believe that pseudo-democratic regimes reinforce their state power primarily not by openly repressing their opponents, but rather by showing that the rival oligarchs are unpredictable and untrustworthy challengers of the regime’s chief leader. Obviously, pseudo-democratic regimes with greater state power stand a better chance of succeeding in their efforts to tarnish the reputation of their rival oligarchs. However, it is worth recalling that scholars categorize pseudo-democracies precisely as such because all these regimes fundamentally undermine their opposition’s ability to compete for power. This is valid for all pseudo-democracies—irrespective of the level of state power concentrated in the hands of the incumbent elite. I, therefore, assume that while the politically motivated rival oligarchs will seek to develop their reputation and their organizational capacity in all pseudo-

39

between the two (Whitefield & Loveless, 2013; Loveless & Whitefield, 2011). We, however, know that multiple facets of economic inequality result primarily from how well a government formulates and implements its policies of great relevance to the distribution of wealth (Uslaner, 2008; Piketty, 2014; Davies et al., 2009). The rise and large success of oligarchs as a group in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies occurred simultaneously with the trauma of the 1990s resulting from political and economic reforms associated with the shock therapy (Stiglitz, 2002; Puglisi, 2003; Short Rennie, 2013: 33). The concentration of wealth has gradually risen in this context in parallel with ordinary people experiencing deteriorating life standards and worsening economic outlook (Wegren, 2014; Alexeev, 1999; Remington, 2011; Åslund, 2015). Moreover, evidence suggests that many key oligarchs usually outperformed main regime leaders with regard to maintaining political influence behind the scenes (Matuszak, 2012; Åslund, 2015; Kostiuchenko, 2011). Growing evidence also suggests that the citizenry harbors hostile attitudes towards the oligarchs as a group (Gudkov & Dubin, 2005; Zudin, 2000; Pleines, 2009). The public’s disfavor of oligarchs as a group is attributed to oligarchs’ shady past of wealth accumulation, a widely shared belief of an unfair redistribution of wealth to the oligarchs and state capture by kleptocratic oligarchic interests since the initial phases of the post-Soviet era (Shlapentokh, 2004, 2008; Shlapentokh & Arutunyan, 2013; Kuzio, 2016b). Accordingly, the broad masses regard the oligarchs and the shock therapy reforms with distaste, holding both responsible for the initial chaos during the 1990s and subsequent widespread deficiencies in their political system (Shlapentokh, 2004). Against this background, the first hypothesis to be tested in this study reads as follows:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution are negatively associated with normative support for democracy across all post-Soviet pseudo-democracies.

However, past studies suggest that some pseudo-democratic regimes manage better than others to exploit the linkage stated in H1 to strengthen their own legitimacy and people’s support for more authoritarian rule in contrast to support for democracy in principle. Some scholars argue that, for instance, Vladimir Putin gained much public support for his authoritarian forms of rule and the concentration of state power in his own hands precisely by demonizing the oligarchs in the eyes of the broad public with regard to their shady past of wealth accumulation during the nominally democratic market reform programs in the 1990s (Goldman, 2004; Sakwa, 2008a). In fact, some observers stress that Russians essentially do not reject the idea of democracy, but rather want an elected, strong-handed leader to whom they can delegate the powers needed to put their country and political life in order after what

38

democracy (Easton, 1975: 444-445). Milan Svolik (2013), in related fashion, suggests that the trap of pessimistic expectations provides potent explanations for why pseudo-democracies emerge and thrive. He argues that poorly performing politicians develop negative reputation and contribute to public cynicism as well as political distrust. This generates popular perceptions of most politicians as crooks since people generally tend to paint all politicians with the same brush. Many sincere politicians that are well aware of this fact start to engage in irregularities. Thus, this vicious spiral of distrust and cynicism leads to the trap of pessimistic expectations affecting the polity as a whole (Svolik, 2013: 686).

Perceived bad political and economic performance of the political system ought to affect normative support for either of the regime alternatives. I suppose that two key epitomes of these two lasting patterns of bad performance are political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and unfair wealth distribution, respectively. I conceive of political inequality as the extent to which decision makers disregard the preferences and interests of all citizens (Verba, 2003: 663). However, due to the elusiveness of this concept, Robert Dahl argued that our best strategy is to resort to subjective, ordinal measures of the degree of political inequality (Dahl, 2006: 74). As for the term unfair wealth distribution, I refer to the unequal distribution of assets within a population. Yet, it is worth emphasizing that I am primarily interested in citizens’ subjective evaluation of the fairness of the distribution of wealth in their society.

As already clarified in the introduction of this thesis, I conceive of oligarchs’ political power as their political influence that is visible or taking place behind the scenes. This influence enables them to sway the politics in a way that ensures that their fundamental strategic interests of defending and increasing their accumulated wealth are placed above the general interests of the broad public (these interests are in conflict as to the actual occurrence of wealth polarization in society). What, then, are the more detailed mechanisms that drive the relationship between normative regime support and political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs in addition to perceptions of unfair wealth distribution in the post-Soviet region? Scholars have repeatedly shown that policy implementation in this context has been largely contingent on a strict power hierarchy between the political leadership and the administrative and judicial power (Gel'man, 2004, 2008b, 2015; Hale, 2011a, 2016b). However, the oligarchs have exerted considerable influence on the implementation of policy even though they have not necessarily been represented as such in the formal political system (Åslund, 2007a, 2014, 2015; Hale, 2015). What is more, past research shows that there are clear distributional and strategic interest conflicts between the oligarchs as a group and the people at large (Åslund, 2015; Shlapentokh, 2004; Zudin, 2000). Surprisingly, studies in the scant literature on perceived inequality and regime support in the post-Soviet context have not found any significant linkages

39

between the two (Whitefield & Loveless, 2013; Loveless & Whitefield, 2011). We, however, know that multiple facets of economic inequality result primarily from how well a government formulates and implements its policies of great relevance to the distribution of wealth (Uslaner, 2008; Piketty, 2014; Davies et al., 2009). The rise and large success of oligarchs as a group in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies occurred simultaneously with the trauma of the 1990s resulting from political and economic reforms associated with the shock therapy (Stiglitz, 2002; Puglisi, 2003; Short Rennie, 2013: 33). The concentration of wealth has gradually risen in this context in parallel with ordinary people experiencing deteriorating life standards and worsening economic outlook (Wegren, 2014; Alexeev, 1999; Remington, 2011; Åslund, 2015). Moreover, evidence suggests that many key oligarchs usually outperformed main regime leaders with regard to maintaining political influence behind the scenes (Matuszak, 2012; Åslund, 2015; Kostiuchenko, 2011). Growing evidence also suggests that the citizenry harbors hostile attitudes towards the oligarchs as a group (Gudkov & Dubin, 2005; Zudin, 2000; Pleines, 2009). The public’s disfavor of oligarchs as a group is attributed to oligarchs’ shady past of wealth accumulation, a widely shared belief of an unfair redistribution of wealth to the oligarchs and state capture by kleptocratic oligarchic interests since the initial phases of the post-Soviet era (Shlapentokh, 2004, 2008; Shlapentokh & Arutunyan, 2013; Kuzio, 2016b). Accordingly, the broad masses regard the oligarchs and the shock therapy reforms with distaste, holding both responsible for the initial chaos during the 1990s and subsequent widespread deficiencies in their political system (Shlapentokh, 2004). Against this background, the first hypothesis to be tested in this study reads as follows:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution are negatively associated with normative support for democracy across all post-Soviet pseudo-democracies.

However, past studies suggest that some pseudo-democratic regimes manage better than others to exploit the linkage stated in H1 to strengthen their own legitimacy and people’s support for more authoritarian rule in contrast to support for democracy in principle. Some scholars argue that, for instance, Vladimir Putin gained much public support for his authoritarian forms of rule and the concentration of state power in his own hands precisely by demonizing the oligarchs in the eyes of the broad public with regard to their shady past of wealth accumulation during the nominally democratic market reform programs in the 1990s (Goldman, 2004; Sakwa, 2008a). In fact, some observers stress that Russians essentially do not reject the idea of democracy, but rather want an elected, strong-handed leader to whom they can delegate the powers needed to put their country and political life in order after what

38

democracy (Easton, 1975: 444-445). Milan Svolik (2013), in related fashion, suggests that the trap of pessimistic expectations provides potent explanations for why pseudo-democracies emerge and thrive. He argues that poorly performing politicians develop negative reputation and contribute to public cynicism as well as political distrust. This generates popular perceptions of most politicians as crooks since people generally tend to paint all politicians with the same brush. Many sincere politicians that are well aware of this fact start to engage in irregularities. Thus, this vicious spiral of distrust and cynicism leads to the trap of pessimistic expectations affecting the polity as a whole (Svolik, 2013: 686).

Perceived bad political and economic performance of the political system ought to affect normative support for either of the regime alternatives. I suppose that two key epitomes of these two lasting patterns of bad performance are political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and unfair wealth distribution, respectively. I conceive of political inequality as the extent to which decision makers disregard the preferences and interests of all citizens (Verba, 2003: 663). However, due to the elusiveness of this concept, Robert Dahl argued that our best strategy is to resort to subjective, ordinal measures of the degree of political inequality (Dahl, 2006: 74). As for the term unfair wealth distribution, I refer to the unequal distribution of assets within a population. Yet, it is worth emphasizing that I am primarily interested in citizens’ subjective evaluation of the fairness of the distribution of wealth in their society.

As already clarified in the introduction of this thesis, I conceive of oligarchs’ political power as their political influence that is visible or taking place behind the scenes. This influence enables them to sway the politics in a way that ensures that their fundamental strategic interests of defending and increasing their accumulated wealth are placed above the general interests of the broad public (these interests are in conflict as to the actual occurrence of wealth polarization in society). What, then, are the more detailed mechanisms that drive the relationship between normative regime support and political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs in addition to perceptions of unfair wealth distribution in the post-Soviet region? Scholars have repeatedly shown that policy implementation in this context has been largely contingent on a strict power hierarchy between the political leadership and the administrative and judicial power (Gel'man, 2004, 2008b, 2015; Hale, 2011a, 2016b). However, the oligarchs have exerted considerable influence on the implementation of policy even though they have not necessarily been represented as such in the formal political system (Åslund, 2007a, 2014, 2015; Hale, 2015). What is more, past research shows that there are clear distributional and strategic interest conflicts between the oligarchs as a group and the people at large (Åslund, 2015; Shlapentokh, 2004; Zudin, 2000). Surprisingly, studies in the scant literature on perceived inequality and regime support in the post-Soviet context have not found any significant linkages

41

regime. Furthermore, the degree of the regime’s state power shapes not only its ability to counteract all these efforts by rival oligarchs, but also provides the regime a largely overlooked, yet perfect opportunity to manipulate mass opinion by showing the superiority of the main regime leader over wealthy and powerful rival oligarchs. I believe that this is a crucial maintenance tool because struggles for power revolve primarily around influential individuals in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. This thesis underlines that this overlooked tool is of key importance for improving our understanding about how pseudo-democratic regimes use their state power to manipulate mass opinion in order to stay in power and the oligarchs’ crucial role in these processes.

As briefly noted previously, one central component in a quest for power is establishing and maintaining an effective organizational capacity. Unfortunately, the meaning of organizational capacity for political purposes remains poorly defined across political science research (Anderson & Jones, 1998; Burnell, 2000; Bunce, McFaul & Stoner-Weiss, 2010; Carnes, 2014). However, such a capacity, in my view, consists of four major pillars of organizational resources—monetary, human, administrative and media resources. Monetary/financial resources are the liquid funds for financing goods and services for the political struggle. Wealth obviously plays one of the most important roles in enhancing one’s organizational capacity. One example in point is Ukraine where wealthy oligarchs paid nearly $5 million to buy a seat for their entourage in the Ukrainian parliament (Rada) during Viktor Yanukovych’s tenure (Åslund, 2014: 67). Another example is from Russia where the then influential oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky reportedly offered two oppositions parties $100 million to join him in opposing Putin and his party of power (Goldman, 2004: 37). Another key pillar in organizational capacity is human resources. This pillar refers to the people oligarchs employ to work in their political team in their quest for power. Such resources involve, but are not limited to, creating or joining a political party or party alliance, the successful recruitment of skilled and respectable persons to the political team, having cronies appointed to political commissions, ministries or other offices alike (also in the legislative body). The pillar of administrative resources refers to the oligarch’s ability to use his official positions in his quest for political power. Important examples of such positions include ministerial and other formal positions within the state administration or other prominent influential organizations (Hale, 2005: 145; Allina-Pisano, 2010: 374). Finally, the media resources pillar pertains to traditional TV channels, radio stations, traditional and online news agencies that are crucial for carrying out political campaigns. In particular, direct access or possession of media resources helps the candidate to spread the political word and mobilize the masses, which are central to the improvement of the overall political and organizational strength. For instance, studies suggest that oligarchs in many parts of the post-Soviet context have enhanced their media coverage by acquiring popular newspapers, websites and TV channels (Nemtsov, 1999; Pleines, 2009).

40

they experienced during the allegedly more democracy-friendly direction of the pre-Putin era (Hale, McFaul & Colton, 2004). Relatedly, other scholars assume that similar mechanisms successfully shape support for authoritarian rule even elsewhere as most people generally loathe political, social and economic insecurity and disorder (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Inglehart & Baker, 2000). This is why I believe that successful regime strategies to communicate clear connections between the experienced disorder in the 1990s and oligarchic influence on the political system help to construct a negative image of democracy as the best form of government. I expect all post-Soviet pseudo-democratic regimes with greater state power concentration to be more successful in strengthening the negative image of oligarchs. The reason is that a greater degree of state power entails the ruling elite’s effective control of most economic, political and administrative levers, which altogether help the regime to augment the negative relationship formulated in H1. Thus, a complementary hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 1a (H1a): The negative effect of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution on normative support for democracy will be more pronounced in countries with a greater degree of state power concentration in the hands of the regime.

How key, rival oligarchs perform their bid for power against the ruling leadership by emulating the regime’s state power and efforts to manipulate mass opinion Following from the discussion of the previous literature on post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, this thesis has hitherto highlighted two dominant explanations that center on either the crucial importance of mass opinion or state power concentration for understanding regime trajectories in this context. The more specific research question that this thesis asks is how such crucial actors as rival oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion given the importance of the latter and state power for understanding regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. I assume that politically motivated rival oligarchs organize their struggle for political power against the incumbent regime mainly by emulating the regime’s strategies to maintain power. The broad pattern in this struggle, in my view, is that oligarchs strive to match or surpass the regime’s state power by developing their own organizational capacity. In addition, they devote significant resources to increasing their reputation and credibility as a rival among the public (hence, striving to sway mass opinion). As for oligarchs’ bid for power against the regime, I assume that they make primary efforts to: a) increase their organizational capacity, b) develop their personal reputation and c) perform a credible opposition to the

41

regime. Furthermore, the degree of the regime’s state power shapes not only its ability to counteract all these efforts by rival oligarchs, but also provides the regime a largely overlooked, yet perfect opportunity to manipulate mass opinion by showing the superiority of the main regime leader over wealthy and powerful rival oligarchs. I believe that this is a crucial maintenance tool because struggles for power revolve primarily around influential individuals in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. This thesis underlines that this overlooked tool is of key importance for improving our understanding about how pseudo-democratic regimes use their state power to manipulate mass opinion in order to stay in power and the oligarchs’ crucial role in these processes.

As briefly noted previously, one central component in a quest for power is establishing and maintaining an effective organizational capacity. Unfortunately, the meaning of organizational capacity for political purposes remains poorly defined across political science research (Anderson & Jones, 1998; Burnell, 2000; Bunce, McFaul & Stoner-Weiss, 2010; Carnes, 2014). However, such a capacity, in my view, consists of four major pillars of organizational resources—monetary, human, administrative and media resources. Monetary/financial resources are the liquid funds for financing goods and services for the political struggle. Wealth obviously plays one of the most important roles in enhancing one’s organizational capacity. One example in point is Ukraine where wealthy oligarchs paid nearly $5 million to buy a seat for their entourage in the Ukrainian parliament (Rada) during Viktor Yanukovych’s tenure (Åslund, 2014: 67). Another example is from Russia where the then influential oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky reportedly offered two oppositions parties $100 million to join him in opposing Putin and his party of power (Goldman, 2004: 37). Another key pillar in organizational capacity is human resources. This pillar refers to the people oligarchs employ to work in their political team in their quest for power. Such resources involve, but are not limited to, creating or joining a political party or party alliance, the successful recruitment of skilled and respectable persons to the political team, having cronies appointed to political commissions, ministries or other offices alike (also in the legislative body). The pillar of administrative resources refers to the oligarch’s ability to use his official positions in his quest for political power. Important examples of such positions include ministerial and other formal positions within the state administration or other prominent influential organizations (Hale, 2005: 145; Allina-Pisano, 2010: 374). Finally, the media resources pillar pertains to traditional TV channels, radio stations, traditional and online news agencies that are crucial for carrying out political campaigns. In particular, direct access or possession of media resources helps the candidate to spread the political word and mobilize the masses, which are central to the improvement of the overall political and organizational strength. For instance, studies suggest that oligarchs in many parts of the post-Soviet context have enhanced their media coverage by acquiring popular newspapers, websites and TV channels (Nemtsov, 1999; Pleines, 2009).

40

they experienced during the allegedly more democracy-friendly direction of the pre-Putin era (Hale, McFaul & Colton, 2004). Relatedly, other scholars assume that similar mechanisms successfully shape support for authoritarian rule even elsewhere as most people generally loathe political, social and economic insecurity and disorder (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Inglehart & Baker, 2000). This is why I believe that successful regime strategies to communicate clear connections between the experienced disorder in the 1990s and oligarchic influence on the political system help to construct a negative image of democracy as the best form of government. I expect all post-Soviet pseudo-democratic regimes with greater state power concentration to be more successful in strengthening the negative image of oligarchs. The reason is that a greater degree of state power entails the ruling elite’s effective control of most economic, political and administrative levers, which altogether help the regime to augment the negative relationship formulated in H1. Thus, a complementary hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 1a (H1a): The negative effect of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution on normative support for democracy will be more pronounced in countries with a greater degree of state power concentration in the hands of the regime.

How key, rival oligarchs perform their bid for power against the ruling leadership by emulating the regime’s state power and efforts to manipulate mass opinion Following from the discussion of the previous literature on post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, this thesis has hitherto highlighted two dominant explanations that center on either the crucial importance of mass opinion or state power concentration for understanding regime trajectories in this context. The more specific research question that this thesis asks is how such crucial actors as rival oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion given the importance of the latter and state power for understanding regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. I assume that politically motivated rival oligarchs organize their struggle for political power against the incumbent regime mainly by emulating the regime’s strategies to maintain power. The broad pattern in this struggle, in my view, is that oligarchs strive to match or surpass the regime’s state power by developing their own organizational capacity. In addition, they devote significant resources to increasing their reputation and credibility as a rival among the public (hence, striving to sway mass opinion). As for oligarchs’ bid for power against the regime, I assume that they make primary efforts to: a) increase their organizational capacity, b) develop their personal reputation and c) perform a credible opposition to the

43

scholarship to students and grants aimed at covering the health expenses of the poor (Frye, 2004; Radnitz, 2006a; Antonyan, 2015).21

Oligarchs can also aim at receiving the endorsement of famous people. Celebrities receive recognition and attention from the public. Boorstin (1962: 57) argued that a celebrity “is a person who is known for his well-known-ness”. Celebrity status is typically accorded to several categories of famous people, including, but not limited to, actors, singers, talk show hosts, famous athletes, religious leaders and other widely known persons (Kurzman et al., 2007). However, what all modern celebrities have in common is that they are integral parts of an entertaining celebrity culture that prevails in and through mass media (Jackson, 2007: 77; Kurzman et al., 2007). Ruling incumbents in the post-Soviet context have engaged pop artists (mass concerts and other forms of mass entertainment) to entice the public during times of severe political threats against their regime (Korosteleva, 2012: 45). In general, the scholarship on the effects of celebrity endorsement suggests that politicians mainly hope that their endorsement by superstars can help them reach even broader groups of voters. Still, the primary objective is to persuade more voters that the politician is reputable and enjoys considerable credibility (Marsh, Hart & Tindall, 2010). However, while evidence shows that Oprah’s endorsement of Barack Obama in the 2008 U.S. presidential election positively contributed to his electoral success, we more recently could witness that the widespread celebrity endorsement of Hillary Clinton was not enough for her to defeat Donald Trump22 who enjoyed much lesser support among American superstars (Bryant, 2016). I, however, find it reasonable to expect that oligarchs will make substantial efforts to receive celebrity endorsement in their struggle for power. The major rationale is twofold. On the one side, studies have yet to show how decisive Trump’s own celebrity status was for his victory. This is something we can generalize to other politically motivated business elites who have the resources to increase positive media coverage about them. On the other hand, since influential politicians seek to boost their election campaigns and the main leader’s popularity by recurrently deploying celebrities (Street, 2012; Amos, Holmes & Strutton, 2008; Jackson, 2007; Garthwaite & Moore, 2008), we should also observe that the political struggle between a wealthy rival oligarch and a pseudo-democratic regime will include

21 The skeptical reader might argue that such charities are pure articulations of clientelism. However, Hicken (2011) maintains that four factors separate clientelism from other forms of social relationships. Clientelism is characterized by 1) personal relationships between individuals and the patrons or their brokers, 2) exchanges of services and goods in patron-client relationships that are contingent on the promises of or the immediate delivery of beneficial services or goods, 3) personal exchanges marked by a clear hierarchical order between the patron and his clients and 4) clientelistic exchanges that are always iterative. Finally yet importantly, Hicken further asserts that these four factors tend to overlap. 22 Trump fits well into the typical definition of an oligarch discussed in this study.

42

I assume that all the four pillars are interrelated and mutually sustaining for an oligarch’s mobilization for political purposes. Moreover, successful management and improvements in each of these pillars may contribute to the public appearance of an oligarch as a strong and credible rival. Hence, I make the assumption that organizational capacity is closely linked to oligarchs’ efforts to enhance their reputation. Overall, gaining a potent organizational capacity ought to be necessary in efforts to influence elite and mass expectations about the rival oligarch’s capacity to organize and steer dominant networks of power in case the main regime leader is dislodged. The basic assumption here is very simple; people and elites alike generally dislike crises and unpredicted political developments as these are perceived as more likely to deteriorate their life conditions (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni & Weingast, 2007). A potential rival oligarch needs to build this organizational capacity on his own and under active monitoring by or interference from the authorities. The rival’s organizational capacity is not only central to developing a solid reputation among the public, but also in inducing elite desertion by incumbent elite members (Bunce, McFaul & Stoner-Weiss, 2010). Indeed, elites tend to defect or disobey orders if they sense their patron’s weakness and growing organizational strength of the rival (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010; Reuter & Gandhi, 2011). Scholars have observed several examples of such developments in many post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, including Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, during the color revolutions (Fairbanks, 2004: 119; Way, 2005a: 237-238; Hess, 2010). In Ukraine, for instance, the Mayor of Kyiv, Oleksandr Omelchenko, disobeyed the orders of President Kuchma to disperse the protesters camped out in tents in central Kyiv (D’Anieri, 2006: 344). He also provided the crowds of the Orange Revolution with necessary assistance and resources for them to prop up their uprising against Kuchma (Kuzio, 2005a: 35).

Another vital factor in struggles for power is the personal reputation of those who compete for power (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010). Politicians derive their popularity from their charisma (Weber, 1965), decent economic performance (Treisman, 2011) and media manipulation (Dimitrov, 2009). But what determines the credibility and reputation of an oligarch in opposition among the bulk of the populace? Undoubtedly, charisma and popular perceptions about the skills of the rival play important role in political struggles as has been shown in several cases of regime changes across the Third World (Solinger, 2001). The scholarship on business elites provides several additional clues on the sources of oligarchs’ solid reputation (Payne, 1994; Shlapentokh, 2004). In particular, oligarchs generally establish and maintain their own charity organizations to serve the common good. Recurrent examples of such philanthropic activities by oligarchs include the building and refurbishment of places of worship for believers, schools and kindergartens,

43

scholarship to students and grants aimed at covering the health expenses of the poor (Frye, 2004; Radnitz, 2006a; Antonyan, 2015).21

Oligarchs can also aim at receiving the endorsement of famous people. Celebrities receive recognition and attention from the public. Boorstin (1962: 57) argued that a celebrity “is a person who is known for his well-known-ness”. Celebrity status is typically accorded to several categories of famous people, including, but not limited to, actors, singers, talk show hosts, famous athletes, religious leaders and other widely known persons (Kurzman et al., 2007). However, what all modern celebrities have in common is that they are integral parts of an entertaining celebrity culture that prevails in and through mass media (Jackson, 2007: 77; Kurzman et al., 2007). Ruling incumbents in the post-Soviet context have engaged pop artists (mass concerts and other forms of mass entertainment) to entice the public during times of severe political threats against their regime (Korosteleva, 2012: 45). In general, the scholarship on the effects of celebrity endorsement suggests that politicians mainly hope that their endorsement by superstars can help them reach even broader groups of voters. Still, the primary objective is to persuade more voters that the politician is reputable and enjoys considerable credibility (Marsh, Hart & Tindall, 2010). However, while evidence shows that Oprah’s endorsement of Barack Obama in the 2008 U.S. presidential election positively contributed to his electoral success, we more recently could witness that the widespread celebrity endorsement of Hillary Clinton was not enough for her to defeat Donald Trump22 who enjoyed much lesser support among American superstars (Bryant, 2016). I, however, find it reasonable to expect that oligarchs will make substantial efforts to receive celebrity endorsement in their struggle for power. The major rationale is twofold. On the one side, studies have yet to show how decisive Trump’s own celebrity status was for his victory. This is something we can generalize to other politically motivated business elites who have the resources to increase positive media coverage about them. On the other hand, since influential politicians seek to boost their election campaigns and the main leader’s popularity by recurrently deploying celebrities (Street, 2012; Amos, Holmes & Strutton, 2008; Jackson, 2007; Garthwaite & Moore, 2008), we should also observe that the political struggle between a wealthy rival oligarch and a pseudo-democratic regime will include

21 The skeptical reader might argue that such charities are pure articulations of clientelism. However, Hicken (2011) maintains that four factors separate clientelism from other forms of social relationships. Clientelism is characterized by 1) personal relationships between individuals and the patrons or their brokers, 2) exchanges of services and goods in patron-client relationships that are contingent on the promises of or the immediate delivery of beneficial services or goods, 3) personal exchanges marked by a clear hierarchical order between the patron and his clients and 4) clientelistic exchanges that are always iterative. Finally yet importantly, Hicken further asserts that these four factors tend to overlap. 22 Trump fits well into the typical definition of an oligarch discussed in this study.

42

I assume that all the four pillars are interrelated and mutually sustaining for an oligarch’s mobilization for political purposes. Moreover, successful management and improvements in each of these pillars may contribute to the public appearance of an oligarch as a strong and credible rival. Hence, I make the assumption that organizational capacity is closely linked to oligarchs’ efforts to enhance their reputation. Overall, gaining a potent organizational capacity ought to be necessary in efforts to influence elite and mass expectations about the rival oligarch’s capacity to organize and steer dominant networks of power in case the main regime leader is dislodged. The basic assumption here is very simple; people and elites alike generally dislike crises and unpredicted political developments as these are perceived as more likely to deteriorate their life conditions (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni & Weingast, 2007). A potential rival oligarch needs to build this organizational capacity on his own and under active monitoring by or interference from the authorities. The rival’s organizational capacity is not only central to developing a solid reputation among the public, but also in inducing elite desertion by incumbent elite members (Bunce, McFaul & Stoner-Weiss, 2010). Indeed, elites tend to defect or disobey orders if they sense their patron’s weakness and growing organizational strength of the rival (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010; Reuter & Gandhi, 2011). Scholars have observed several examples of such developments in many post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, including Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, during the color revolutions (Fairbanks, 2004: 119; Way, 2005a: 237-238; Hess, 2010). In Ukraine, for instance, the Mayor of Kyiv, Oleksandr Omelchenko, disobeyed the orders of President Kuchma to disperse the protesters camped out in tents in central Kyiv (D’Anieri, 2006: 344). He also provided the crowds of the Orange Revolution with necessary assistance and resources for them to prop up their uprising against Kuchma (Kuzio, 2005a: 35).

Another vital factor in struggles for power is the personal reputation of those who compete for power (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010). Politicians derive their popularity from their charisma (Weber, 1965), decent economic performance (Treisman, 2011) and media manipulation (Dimitrov, 2009). But what determines the credibility and reputation of an oligarch in opposition among the bulk of the populace? Undoubtedly, charisma and popular perceptions about the skills of the rival play important role in political struggles as has been shown in several cases of regime changes across the Third World (Solinger, 2001). The scholarship on business elites provides several additional clues on the sources of oligarchs’ solid reputation (Payne, 1994; Shlapentokh, 2004). In particular, oligarchs generally establish and maintain their own charity organizations to serve the common good. Recurrent examples of such philanthropic activities by oligarchs include the building and refurbishment of places of worship for believers, schools and kindergartens,

45

of the appearances and realities that regime actors constantly shape to secure their stay in power (Schedler, 2013: 49). Overall, I believe that performing a credible opposition to the regime is about developing an organizational capacity and reputation that appear to outperform the rival ruling leader’s state power and efforts to ensure popularity and elite cohesion. I, hence, assume that the struggle for popular support is reciprocal: when one side works to enhance its credibility, the rival needs to counteract these efforts. In other words, neither the incumbents nor the politically determined rival oligarchs can desist from undertaking countermeasures to the rival’s performance of opposition or power, respectively.

The acts of regime domination or rival actors’ opposition are performed and emitted to multiple addressees in pseudo-democracies. These communicated performances always tell us something about the actors and their interaction with others (Schedler & Hoffmann, 2016; Schedler, 2013). Media, as already hinted, is one of the most important tools in such political struggles over shaping the reality. In particular, media provides shortcuts to massive values of information (Cialdini, 2009). Access to media helps to enhance a politician’s reputation and with favorable coverage politicians can mobilize the large masses for a common cause (Dimitrov, 2009: 80). I therefore suppose that oligarchs are most likely to exploit the full potential of their own media resources or other media outlets to disseminate their performance of opposition to the regime aside from elevating themselves above their competitors. Given the theoretical discussion on the centrality of mass opinion in oligarchs’ and incumbent elites’ political strategies, the second hypothesis to be tested in this thesis reads:

Hypothesis 2 (H2): All individual, politically motivated rival oligarchs operate with the intention of enhancing public opinion about themselves by developing their personal reputation, organizational capacity and by performing a credible opposition to the regime.

Furthermore, I theorize how politically motivated, rival oligarchs can conduct such performances of opposition in contexts with differing levels of autonomy from the state. In particular, I hypothesize that the mechanism of state interference with oligarchs’ bid for power through their primary aim at public opinion, as expressed in the aforementioned three key components, differs slightly due to varying degrees of state power of ruling pseudo-democratic regimes. As already hinted earlier, we should expect less oligarchic autonomy from the state in countries with relatively stronger state power and UPF. In such contexts, where the overlap of politics and economy is more common (Hanson & Teague, 2005), the regime will be more successful in counteracting rival oligarchs. However, the more nuanced perspective of this thesis is to look at these supposed differences in light of the slightly different incentives

44

efforts to receive celebrity endorsements as part of their efforts to sway mass opinion given common practices of state power abuse by the incumbents.

A third central factor in oligarchs’ bid for power by enhancing public opinion about them is the importance of performing a credible opposition to the regime. How can rival oligarchs develop the reputation of a credible challenger in their quest for the highest political power? The pertinent literature on oligarchs’ political quest is virtually silent on this issue, which is why I derive my inspiration for this argument from Andreas Schedler’s (2013) recognized and much praised work on pseudo-democratic regime maintenance and breakdown. The major focus in his explanatory framework is on the importance of performing acts of power dominance by the regime and opposition by its rivals. More specifically, Schedler (2013) points out that pseudo-democratic regimes use their power and resources to shape political realities and appearances. These need to be emitted to the masses since a distinguishing characteristic of pseudo-democracies is a substantial lack of reliable information about the true state of affairs in the regime. What also characterizes pseudo-democracies is the substantial lack of trustworthy communication owing to the fact that the political life is uncertain and distorted. Therefore, everything pseudo-democratic authorities do means something if these performances are communicated to audiences. The same goes for challengers. Their acts of opposition are of importance mainly as performances of opposition (if these are displayed to multiple audiences). Showing strength, mobilizing or rather remaining inactive always says something about the relations between the opposition actor and the regime (Schedler, 2013: 44).

To sustain themselves in power or to minimize the risk of ouster from office, incumbents in pseudo-democracies need to stage several important factors “in the authoritarian theatre of politics” (Schedler, 2013). The first is performing elite cohesion. Factionalism and elite struggles are inherent in all countries (Schedler & Hoffmann, 2012; Geddes, 1999: 121) and harmless for pseudo-democratic regime survival unless being displayed publicly. Strong state and coercive capacity deters such articulation of elite fissures (Schedler, 2013: 47). The second key factor is staging public support or compliance with the domination of ruling state elites. Pseudo-democratic governments generate believable signs of such support and obedience by resorting to persuasion or intimidation in the framework of their state power (Schedler, 2013: 49). What is more, I assume that pseudo-democratic regimes demonstrate the organizational strength of their state power against their political rivals to shape a reality of their invincibility and the absence of formidable and credible challengers. It therefore comes as no surprise that such performances of power are most intensive close to national elections (Simpser, 2013) that serve as a crucial focal point for the manifestation of the regime’s capacity and political dominance (Blaydes, 2011: 239). Correspondingly, the recipe for a credible rival’s success is to provide a competing performance that shows the opposite

45

of the appearances and realities that regime actors constantly shape to secure their stay in power (Schedler, 2013: 49). Overall, I believe that performing a credible opposition to the regime is about developing an organizational capacity and reputation that appear to outperform the rival ruling leader’s state power and efforts to ensure popularity and elite cohesion. I, hence, assume that the struggle for popular support is reciprocal: when one side works to enhance its credibility, the rival needs to counteract these efforts. In other words, neither the incumbents nor the politically determined rival oligarchs can desist from undertaking countermeasures to the rival’s performance of opposition or power, respectively.

The acts of regime domination or rival actors’ opposition are performed and emitted to multiple addressees in pseudo-democracies. These communicated performances always tell us something about the actors and their interaction with others (Schedler & Hoffmann, 2016; Schedler, 2013). Media, as already hinted, is one of the most important tools in such political struggles over shaping the reality. In particular, media provides shortcuts to massive values of information (Cialdini, 2009). Access to media helps to enhance a politician’s reputation and with favorable coverage politicians can mobilize the large masses for a common cause (Dimitrov, 2009: 80). I therefore suppose that oligarchs are most likely to exploit the full potential of their own media resources or other media outlets to disseminate their performance of opposition to the regime aside from elevating themselves above their competitors. Given the theoretical discussion on the centrality of mass opinion in oligarchs’ and incumbent elites’ political strategies, the second hypothesis to be tested in this thesis reads:

Hypothesis 2 (H2): All individual, politically motivated rival oligarchs operate with the intention of enhancing public opinion about themselves by developing their personal reputation, organizational capacity and by performing a credible opposition to the regime.

Furthermore, I theorize how politically motivated, rival oligarchs can conduct such performances of opposition in contexts with differing levels of autonomy from the state. In particular, I hypothesize that the mechanism of state interference with oligarchs’ bid for power through their primary aim at public opinion, as expressed in the aforementioned three key components, differs slightly due to varying degrees of state power of ruling pseudo-democratic regimes. As already hinted earlier, we should expect less oligarchic autonomy from the state in countries with relatively stronger state power and UPF. In such contexts, where the overlap of politics and economy is more common (Hanson & Teague, 2005), the regime will be more successful in counteracting rival oligarchs. However, the more nuanced perspective of this thesis is to look at these supposed differences in light of the slightly different incentives

44

efforts to receive celebrity endorsements as part of their efforts to sway mass opinion given common practices of state power abuse by the incumbents.

A third central factor in oligarchs’ bid for power by enhancing public opinion about them is the importance of performing a credible opposition to the regime. How can rival oligarchs develop the reputation of a credible challenger in their quest for the highest political power? The pertinent literature on oligarchs’ political quest is virtually silent on this issue, which is why I derive my inspiration for this argument from Andreas Schedler’s (2013) recognized and much praised work on pseudo-democratic regime maintenance and breakdown. The major focus in his explanatory framework is on the importance of performing acts of power dominance by the regime and opposition by its rivals. More specifically, Schedler (2013) points out that pseudo-democratic regimes use their power and resources to shape political realities and appearances. These need to be emitted to the masses since a distinguishing characteristic of pseudo-democracies is a substantial lack of reliable information about the true state of affairs in the regime. What also characterizes pseudo-democracies is the substantial lack of trustworthy communication owing to the fact that the political life is uncertain and distorted. Therefore, everything pseudo-democratic authorities do means something if these performances are communicated to audiences. The same goes for challengers. Their acts of opposition are of importance mainly as performances of opposition (if these are displayed to multiple audiences). Showing strength, mobilizing or rather remaining inactive always says something about the relations between the opposition actor and the regime (Schedler, 2013: 44).

To sustain themselves in power or to minimize the risk of ouster from office, incumbents in pseudo-democracies need to stage several important factors “in the authoritarian theatre of politics” (Schedler, 2013). The first is performing elite cohesion. Factionalism and elite struggles are inherent in all countries (Schedler & Hoffmann, 2012; Geddes, 1999: 121) and harmless for pseudo-democratic regime survival unless being displayed publicly. Strong state and coercive capacity deters such articulation of elite fissures (Schedler, 2013: 47). The second key factor is staging public support or compliance with the domination of ruling state elites. Pseudo-democratic governments generate believable signs of such support and obedience by resorting to persuasion or intimidation in the framework of their state power (Schedler, 2013: 49). What is more, I assume that pseudo-democratic regimes demonstrate the organizational strength of their state power against their political rivals to shape a reality of their invincibility and the absence of formidable and credible challengers. It therefore comes as no surprise that such performances of power are most intensive close to national elections (Simpser, 2013) that serve as a crucial focal point for the manifestation of the regime’s capacity and political dominance (Blaydes, 2011: 239). Correspondingly, the recipe for a credible rival’s success is to provide a competing performance that shows the opposite

47

Chapter three: Research design, method, material and operationalization of hypotheses

This chapter is divided into several sections. The subsequent part introduces the main rationale for choosing mixed methods as the research design of this thesis. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I discuss at length the processes of collecting and analyzing data for the empirical chapters of this study. This discussion will focus on the operationalization of key variables and hypotheses as well as on methodological considerations with regard to the more specific research questions of this study. I will also focus on discussing the rationale behind the selection of cases that constitute the subunits of study interest.

Mixed-method research design The study design is a key blueprint of all scientific inquiry. Research design is generally defined as the framework of methods and procedures that instruct the researcher in how to organize data gathering and the analysis of variables based on the theoretical framework of the study (Creswell, 2013). Thus, important aspects that the current section of the thesis needs to pay particular attention to are defining the study type of this thesis, data collection approaches and the plan for analyzing the data (Philliber, Schwab & Sloss, 1980). Last, but not least, all these crucial components of the research design need to be discussed in relation to the more specific research questions of this thesis.

This thesis rests on a mixed-method research design involving both qualitative case studies as well quantitative analyses. The choice of mixed-method design was indispensable as the research questions this thesis addresses necessitate both qualitative and statistical analyses in order to gain a better understanding of the role of oligarchs in the multifaceted framework of

46

of incumbent elites with stronger state power. In particular, I believe that these incumbents’ major aim ought to be to show the regime’s absolute dominance and the lack of credible rivals capable of ousting or outperforming them. Thus, it is not primarily about repressing the rivals by means of greater state power, but about manipulating mass opinion about their rival oligarchs. I thus assume that we should expect that the oligarchs competing for power in countries with stronger state power and UPF would display unpredictability and wavering in their opposition to the regime by yielding to incumbent elites’ demands in critical circumstances. It is therefore more likely that we will observe the two aforementioned patterns close to national elections and in the wake of collective challenges against the regime. Put differently, although we should expect the authorities in all pseudo-democracies would abuse their state power to prevent oligarchs from developing their organizational capacity, reputation and credibility, we are more likely to observe that oligarchs essentially fail in these undertakings as well as in struggles for power in pseudo-democracies where the regime has greater state power and UPF. This key assumption forms the basis for the last hypothesis to be tested:

Hypothesis 2a (H2a): We should expect that all pseudo-democratic regimes abuse their state power against their rival oligarch. However, a stronger state power enables the authorities to damage the credibility of the rival oligarch primarily by making him appear unpredictable and unreliable in the eyes of the public (H2a). This enables the main regime leader to elevate himself above key, rival oligarchs and thereby improve the prospects for regime maintenance.

47

Chapter three: Research design, method, material and operationalization of hypotheses

This chapter is divided into several sections. The subsequent part introduces the main rationale for choosing mixed methods as the research design of this thesis. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I discuss at length the processes of collecting and analyzing data for the empirical chapters of this study. This discussion will focus on the operationalization of key variables and hypotheses as well as on methodological considerations with regard to the more specific research questions of this study. I will also focus on discussing the rationale behind the selection of cases that constitute the subunits of study interest.

Mixed-method research design The study design is a key blueprint of all scientific inquiry. Research design is generally defined as the framework of methods and procedures that instruct the researcher in how to organize data gathering and the analysis of variables based on the theoretical framework of the study (Creswell, 2013). Thus, important aspects that the current section of the thesis needs to pay particular attention to are defining the study type of this thesis, data collection approaches and the plan for analyzing the data (Philliber, Schwab & Sloss, 1980). Last, but not least, all these crucial components of the research design need to be discussed in relation to the more specific research questions of this thesis.

This thesis rests on a mixed-method research design involving both qualitative case studies as well quantitative analyses. The choice of mixed-method design was indispensable as the research questions this thesis addresses necessitate both qualitative and statistical analyses in order to gain a better understanding of the role of oligarchs in the multifaceted framework of

46

of incumbent elites with stronger state power. In particular, I believe that these incumbents’ major aim ought to be to show the regime’s absolute dominance and the lack of credible rivals capable of ousting or outperforming them. Thus, it is not primarily about repressing the rivals by means of greater state power, but about manipulating mass opinion about their rival oligarchs. I thus assume that we should expect that the oligarchs competing for power in countries with stronger state power and UPF would display unpredictability and wavering in their opposition to the regime by yielding to incumbent elites’ demands in critical circumstances. It is therefore more likely that we will observe the two aforementioned patterns close to national elections and in the wake of collective challenges against the regime. Put differently, although we should expect the authorities in all pseudo-democracies would abuse their state power to prevent oligarchs from developing their organizational capacity, reputation and credibility, we are more likely to observe that oligarchs essentially fail in these undertakings as well as in struggles for power in pseudo-democracies where the regime has greater state power and UPF. This key assumption forms the basis for the last hypothesis to be tested:

Hypothesis 2a (H2a): We should expect that all pseudo-democratic regimes abuse their state power against their rival oligarch. However, a stronger state power enables the authorities to damage the credibility of the rival oligarch primarily by making him appear unpredictable and unreliable in the eyes of the public (H2a). This enables the main regime leader to elevate himself above key, rival oligarchs and thereby improve the prospects for regime maintenance.

49

An important aspect in the framework of the case study research within a mixed-method design is the extension of research findings to the population. In such a research design, there are two approaches to generalization of results. The first one refers to statistical generalization. Scholars apply statistical models to a sample of cases from the entire population of cases in order to make statistical inferences about the population (Agresti & Finlay, 2014). In contrast to statistical methods, replication refers to a common approach in qualitative methods to reproduce the results of prior studies. The replication in this respect implies that previously developed theories are used as an analytical framework to interpret the empirical results of the case study (Yin, 2003: 32-33). In other words, while in purely statistical studies scholars are able to refer to generalization of the results in their sample, in case studies scholars should rather speak of successfully replicating prior results and suggestions in the framework of analytical generalization (Yin, 2003: 33). This thesis subscribes to the discussed arguments by carrying out mixed-methods studies in a framework of both single-unit as well as cross-unit modes of analysis. In addition, it also follows the recommendations about the differences in generalization approaches.

There is a large variety of case study types (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003; Goodrick, 2014). However, most case study research deals with describing and explaining bounded (in time and space) phenomena and activities (Gerring, 2004; Sprinz & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2004; Bennett, 2004). Descriptive case studies aim at presenting a thorough description of a phenomenon or activity within its context. Explanatory case studies seek to establish causes and effects that illustrate how some events occur and influence particular outcomes (Hancock & Algozzine, 2011: 33). This thesis combines these two types in order to gain a better understanding of the principal unit as well as the subunits of analysis in this study.

Thus, the foundation of this thesis is a mixed-method research design with a particular focus on case study research. Yin argues that case studies focus on a single unit of analysis, which can have multiple subunits (Yin, 2003: 45). Yin further argues that an analysis of subunits can provide the reader with better insights into the primary unit of analysis. In addition, he stresses that scholars should reorient their analytical attention back to the main unit of analysis. However, a greater shift of the focus to the subunits is justified if it can be shown to improve the understanding of the theorized relationship (Yin, 2003: 45-46). Against this background, the subunits of this thesis are as follows: 1) the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and ordinary people’s normative support for democracy in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine), 2) four individual rival oligarchs’ bid for power with respect to how they interact with incumbents and mass opinion in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine, respectively and 3) a focused, single subunit case study of the aforementioned interaction in Ukraine—a country where oligarchs have been most prominent

48

mass opinion and state power concentration with regard to regime trajectories. Next, I spell out the components of this research design in more detail.

Scholars have proffered various definitions for case study (Stake, 1995; Hancock & Algozzine, 2011: 15; Yin, 2003; Baxter & Jack, 2008). In this thesis, I refer to the case study research as a thorough examination of an event, situation, activity or organizations and individuals within their natural context for the purpose of understanding a broader group of similar units (Gerring, 2004: 342; Hancock & Algozzine, 2011: 15). A central concept hierarchy in case study research is composed of four key terms—the population, unit, case and observation. Gerring stresses that a population is composed of the studied (a sample) and unexamined cases. The sample, in turn, is comprised of one or more units that we observe at distinct points in time, which represent the term “cases”. Finally, the cases built upon relevant variables that are represented by “observations” (Gerring, 2004: 342). The primary unit of analysis in my thesis is an activity or spatially and periodically bounded phenomenon—the role of oligarchs in regime trajectories in the framework of such key processes as mass opinion and state power concentration and abuse in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. This unit of analysis is composed of several cases that represent different instances of the previously mentioned aspect in a number of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Hence, the immediate population that this thesis primarily draws inferences to is to be found in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies. Above this level, we can more cautiously also attempt to infer to the comparable interrelationship in the remaining (omitted from the sample) pseudo-democracies of the world. In other words, this hierarchical logic resembles the substantial design of a nested Russian doll because every nested level is crucial for understanding the entirety. Gerring further argues that social science research is concerned with multiple levels of analysis. This implies that the definitions of the discussed terms in the hierarchical conceptual apparatus of case study research may differ due to alternative specifications of the research question. Nevertheless, all the mentioned nested concepts have distinct meanings in the context of a single research proposition by helping the researcher to define the principal unit of analysis (Gerring, 2004: 342).

A growing number of scholars have stressed that separating single case study research from cross-unit, comparative case studies is indefensible (Yin, 2003: 46; Gerring, 2004; Hancock & Algozzine, 2011: 33). The reason is that these modes of analysis are epistemologically interrelated. In particular, cross-unit research draws on case study work and, conversely, single-unit studies typically make comparisons to broader groups of cases. Thus, the single-unit and comparative cross-unit study frameworks are inescapably intertwined (Gerring, 2004: 353; Bennett, 2004: 21). In addition, the case study research is perfectly compatible with the inclusion of qualitative and quantitative methods. In fact, scholars recommend using mixed methods since it enables the study to profit from various sources of evidence (Yin, 2003: 13-14).

49

An important aspect in the framework of the case study research within a mixed-method design is the extension of research findings to the population. In such a research design, there are two approaches to generalization of results. The first one refers to statistical generalization. Scholars apply statistical models to a sample of cases from the entire population of cases in order to make statistical inferences about the population (Agresti & Finlay, 2014). In contrast to statistical methods, replication refers to a common approach in qualitative methods to reproduce the results of prior studies. The replication in this respect implies that previously developed theories are used as an analytical framework to interpret the empirical results of the case study (Yin, 2003: 32-33). In other words, while in purely statistical studies scholars are able to refer to generalization of the results in their sample, in case studies scholars should rather speak of successfully replicating prior results and suggestions in the framework of analytical generalization (Yin, 2003: 33). This thesis subscribes to the discussed arguments by carrying out mixed-methods studies in a framework of both single-unit as well as cross-unit modes of analysis. In addition, it also follows the recommendations about the differences in generalization approaches.

There is a large variety of case study types (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003; Goodrick, 2014). However, most case study research deals with describing and explaining bounded (in time and space) phenomena and activities (Gerring, 2004; Sprinz & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2004; Bennett, 2004). Descriptive case studies aim at presenting a thorough description of a phenomenon or activity within its context. Explanatory case studies seek to establish causes and effects that illustrate how some events occur and influence particular outcomes (Hancock & Algozzine, 2011: 33). This thesis combines these two types in order to gain a better understanding of the principal unit as well as the subunits of analysis in this study.

Thus, the foundation of this thesis is a mixed-method research design with a particular focus on case study research. Yin argues that case studies focus on a single unit of analysis, which can have multiple subunits (Yin, 2003: 45). Yin further argues that an analysis of subunits can provide the reader with better insights into the primary unit of analysis. In addition, he stresses that scholars should reorient their analytical attention back to the main unit of analysis. However, a greater shift of the focus to the subunits is justified if it can be shown to improve the understanding of the theorized relationship (Yin, 2003: 45-46). Against this background, the subunits of this thesis are as follows: 1) the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and ordinary people’s normative support for democracy in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine), 2) four individual rival oligarchs’ bid for power with respect to how they interact with incumbents and mass opinion in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine, respectively and 3) a focused, single subunit case study of the aforementioned interaction in Ukraine—a country where oligarchs have been most prominent

48

mass opinion and state power concentration with regard to regime trajectories. Next, I spell out the components of this research design in more detail.

Scholars have proffered various definitions for case study (Stake, 1995; Hancock & Algozzine, 2011: 15; Yin, 2003; Baxter & Jack, 2008). In this thesis, I refer to the case study research as a thorough examination of an event, situation, activity or organizations and individuals within their natural context for the purpose of understanding a broader group of similar units (Gerring, 2004: 342; Hancock & Algozzine, 2011: 15). A central concept hierarchy in case study research is composed of four key terms—the population, unit, case and observation. Gerring stresses that a population is composed of the studied (a sample) and unexamined cases. The sample, in turn, is comprised of one or more units that we observe at distinct points in time, which represent the term “cases”. Finally, the cases built upon relevant variables that are represented by “observations” (Gerring, 2004: 342). The primary unit of analysis in my thesis is an activity or spatially and periodically bounded phenomenon—the role of oligarchs in regime trajectories in the framework of such key processes as mass opinion and state power concentration and abuse in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. This unit of analysis is composed of several cases that represent different instances of the previously mentioned aspect in a number of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Hence, the immediate population that this thesis primarily draws inferences to is to be found in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies. Above this level, we can more cautiously also attempt to infer to the comparable interrelationship in the remaining (omitted from the sample) pseudo-democracies of the world. In other words, this hierarchical logic resembles the substantial design of a nested Russian doll because every nested level is crucial for understanding the entirety. Gerring further argues that social science research is concerned with multiple levels of analysis. This implies that the definitions of the discussed terms in the hierarchical conceptual apparatus of case study research may differ due to alternative specifications of the research question. Nevertheless, all the mentioned nested concepts have distinct meanings in the context of a single research proposition by helping the researcher to define the principal unit of analysis (Gerring, 2004: 342).

A growing number of scholars have stressed that separating single case study research from cross-unit, comparative case studies is indefensible (Yin, 2003: 46; Gerring, 2004; Hancock & Algozzine, 2011: 33). The reason is that these modes of analysis are epistemologically interrelated. In particular, cross-unit research draws on case study work and, conversely, single-unit studies typically make comparisons to broader groups of cases. Thus, the single-unit and comparative cross-unit study frameworks are inescapably intertwined (Gerring, 2004: 353; Bennett, 2004: 21). In addition, the case study research is perfectly compatible with the inclusion of qualitative and quantitative methods. In fact, scholars recommend using mixed methods since it enables the study to profit from various sources of evidence (Yin, 2003: 13-14).

51

The chapter employs quantitative data that are publicly available. I use key variables from such established data sources as the World Values Survey (WVS), the Quality of Government (QOG) and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) projects. Since the support for democracy is studied at the individual level and the hypotheses H1 and H1a involve contextual elements, we need to resort to such statistical models that enable us to measure the effects (rather than controlling for them by fixed effects) from these different categories of variables. Before presenting the choice and rationale for choosing multi-level mixed methods, I operationalize the key variables and hypotheses guiding the first empirical chapter.

This study has been largely guided by prior research in operationalizing the dependent variable. More specifically, there has been a long discussion about what variables are most relevant in capturing support for democracy in the abstract. One important argument supported by many prior studies is that several parameters need to be estimated as to measuring democratic support (Diamond, 1999; Krieckhaus et al., 2013). Magalhães (2014) shows that some specific dimensions of democratic support can be discerned in the WVS dataset. Following the conventional wisdom in prior research (Magalhães, 2014: 82), I constructed an additive index variable quantifying normative democratic support among the public. It is here, again, worth noting that past literature on democratic support has interchangeably used such labels as abstract or diffuse support to refer to normative support for democracy (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer, 1998; Norris, 1999). Normative support for democracy is in this thesis measured by an additive index of the WVS variables e117 “Political system: having a democratic political system” and e123 “Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government”. This composite variable23 was further transformed to a scale ranging from 0 to 10 so that higher values reflect increasing support for democracy. Descriptive statistics for all variables of the first empirical chapter are provided in the Appendix to the first empirical chapter.

It is important to employ a variable that focuses on general mass attitudes towards wealth concentration in their society as the relationship between oligarchs and their political power (as discussed in length in the theory chapter) revolves primarily around the key incentive of oligarchs to accumulate a vast wealth and ensure a lasting protection against possible attacks by rivals and the broad masses. Moreover, it is necessary that such a variable also measures the level of fairness as to the concentration of wealth. 23 Cronbach’s alpha for this composite variable is 0.5938 and Pearson’s r is 0.4491 (significant at the 95 % level). Following the discussion of the Cronbach’s alpha value of the exactly same composite variable in Magalhães (2014: 94), I similarly opt for justifying the use of this composite measure as Cronbach’s alpha has been criticized for underestimating true reliability (Sijtsma, 2008) and mean item inter-correlation when the number of original variables it is constructed on is low—in this case, only two variables (Iacobucci & Duhachek, 2003).

50

for regime change. All these choices of subunits correspond to the three respective research questions of this thesis, through which it aims to gain a better understanding of the role of oligarchs in key processes for regime trajectories with respect to mass opinion and state power abuse by the ruling leadership. In the remaining part of this chapter, I provide the rationales for the selection of cases, materials, methods as well focus on the operationalization of key variables and hypotheses in this thesis.

First empirical chapter: Case selection, research material, operationalization of hypotheses and method What is the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and popular support for democracy in principle? This is the research question that guides the first empirical chapter (Chapter four). Two hypotheses have been proposed earlier in order to address the question: H1—we should expect that actual political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution are negatively associated with normative support for democracy across all post-Soviet pseudo-democracies; H1a—the negative effect of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution on normative support for democracy will be more pronounced in countries with a greater degree of state power concentration in the hands of the regime. The chapter builds upon the following selection of pseudo-democracies in this region: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. There are three important reasons for focusing on these countries. First, they have characteristics closely resembling each other with regard to social, cultural and political aspects (Ishiyama & Kennedy, 2001; Hess, 2010: 30). An additional reason for opting for these countries is data availability. Unfortunately, there are many difficulties in finding openly available comparative data for most Central Asian countries such as Kyrgyzstan. There have indeed been several important case studies of Kyrgyzstan and the evolution of its politics. However, we still lack reliable and openly available comparative data from this region. This is of course unfortunate for our field, but it constitutes an externally imposed limitation the overcoming of which calls for improving data sharing incentives among social scientists. The third reason for selecting these five countries is the variation in their degree of proximity to Europe—the cradle of modern democracy. In particular, many scholars have repeatedly stressed that democratization and cultural influences travel more easily between neighboring regions (Huntington, 1991b; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Gleditsch & Ward, 2006; Brinks & Coppedge, 2006). Hence, by studying this set of countries we should also be able to take into account such key aspects important for regime trajectories.

51

The chapter employs quantitative data that are publicly available. I use key variables from such established data sources as the World Values Survey (WVS), the Quality of Government (QOG) and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) projects. Since the support for democracy is studied at the individual level and the hypotheses H1 and H1a involve contextual elements, we need to resort to such statistical models that enable us to measure the effects (rather than controlling for them by fixed effects) from these different categories of variables. Before presenting the choice and rationale for choosing multi-level mixed methods, I operationalize the key variables and hypotheses guiding the first empirical chapter.

This study has been largely guided by prior research in operationalizing the dependent variable. More specifically, there has been a long discussion about what variables are most relevant in capturing support for democracy in the abstract. One important argument supported by many prior studies is that several parameters need to be estimated as to measuring democratic support (Diamond, 1999; Krieckhaus et al., 2013). Magalhães (2014) shows that some specific dimensions of democratic support can be discerned in the WVS dataset. Following the conventional wisdom in prior research (Magalhães, 2014: 82), I constructed an additive index variable quantifying normative democratic support among the public. It is here, again, worth noting that past literature on democratic support has interchangeably used such labels as abstract or diffuse support to refer to normative support for democracy (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer, 1998; Norris, 1999). Normative support for democracy is in this thesis measured by an additive index of the WVS variables e117 “Political system: having a democratic political system” and e123 “Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government”. This composite variable23 was further transformed to a scale ranging from 0 to 10 so that higher values reflect increasing support for democracy. Descriptive statistics for all variables of the first empirical chapter are provided in the Appendix to the first empirical chapter.

It is important to employ a variable that focuses on general mass attitudes towards wealth concentration in their society as the relationship between oligarchs and their political power (as discussed in length in the theory chapter) revolves primarily around the key incentive of oligarchs to accumulate a vast wealth and ensure a lasting protection against possible attacks by rivals and the broad masses. Moreover, it is necessary that such a variable also measures the level of fairness as to the concentration of wealth. 23 Cronbach’s alpha for this composite variable is 0.5938 and Pearson’s r is 0.4491 (significant at the 95 % level). Following the discussion of the Cronbach’s alpha value of the exactly same composite variable in Magalhães (2014: 94), I similarly opt for justifying the use of this composite measure as Cronbach’s alpha has been criticized for underestimating true reliability (Sijtsma, 2008) and mean item inter-correlation when the number of original variables it is constructed on is low—in this case, only two variables (Iacobucci & Duhachek, 2003).

50

for regime change. All these choices of subunits correspond to the three respective research questions of this thesis, through which it aims to gain a better understanding of the role of oligarchs in key processes for regime trajectories with respect to mass opinion and state power abuse by the ruling leadership. In the remaining part of this chapter, I provide the rationales for the selection of cases, materials, methods as well focus on the operationalization of key variables and hypotheses in this thesis.

First empirical chapter: Case selection, research material, operationalization of hypotheses and method What is the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and popular support for democracy in principle? This is the research question that guides the first empirical chapter (Chapter four). Two hypotheses have been proposed earlier in order to address the question: H1—we should expect that actual political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution are negatively associated with normative support for democracy across all post-Soviet pseudo-democracies; H1a—the negative effect of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution on normative support for democracy will be more pronounced in countries with a greater degree of state power concentration in the hands of the regime. The chapter builds upon the following selection of pseudo-democracies in this region: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. There are three important reasons for focusing on these countries. First, they have characteristics closely resembling each other with regard to social, cultural and political aspects (Ishiyama & Kennedy, 2001; Hess, 2010: 30). An additional reason for opting for these countries is data availability. Unfortunately, there are many difficulties in finding openly available comparative data for most Central Asian countries such as Kyrgyzstan. There have indeed been several important case studies of Kyrgyzstan and the evolution of its politics. However, we still lack reliable and openly available comparative data from this region. This is of course unfortunate for our field, but it constitutes an externally imposed limitation the overcoming of which calls for improving data sharing incentives among social scientists. The third reason for selecting these five countries is the variation in their degree of proximity to Europe—the cradle of modern democracy. In particular, many scholars have repeatedly stressed that democratization and cultural influences travel more easily between neighboring regions (Huntington, 1991b; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Gleditsch & Ward, 2006; Brinks & Coppedge, 2006). Hence, by studying this set of countries we should also be able to take into account such key aspects important for regime trajectories.

53

I have recoded the original variable into three new categories: 1 (the old values 0 and 1), 2 (the same old value 2) and 3 (the old values 3 to 4) for the purposes of this thesis. The above variable is based on the evaluations of a large number of country experts and, to my knowledge, is the best available proxy for domination of oligarchs as a group with the wealth component at the center. Moreover, the original creators of this variable emphasize this variable as a measure of political inequality based on the prominence of wealth (Coppedge et al., 2016b). Since my operational definition of an oligarch rests primarily on the possession of huge wealth and its importance for political influence, using this proxy in my study is motivated in the absence of more specific variables mentioning the concept of oligarchs in the original question. In addition, using this variable as a proxy for oligarchs’ political power is justified since it focuses primarily on the role of wealth and not political office for political power and dominance. Taken together, I expect that the variables v2pepwrses_ord (proxy for political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs) and e041 (mass attitudes towards an unfair wealth distribution) are negatively associated with my composite variable (consisting of the WVS variables e117 and e123) for normative democratic support (hence, hypothesis H1).

The hypothesis H1a expects that the negative effect of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution on normative support for democracy will be stronger in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies with a higher level of state power concentration in the hands of the regime. For this purpose, I employ an original, combined measure of state power and UPF provided in Levitsky and Way (2010a). The composite variable rests on several key components: state coercive capacity, the strength of the ruling party and discretionary state control of the economy. The first and second components involve both the scope and cohesion of the security apparatus and the ruling party, respectively. The third component includes measures that take into account the level of privatization and overlap of economic and political power. Overall, the composite measure of a state’s organizational power ranges from 0 (low power) to 8 (high power) (Levitsky & Way, 2010a: 376-379). I believe that using this measure in my study is justified for two main reasons. First, this is the variable used in most established studies of pseudo-democracies of this context. Second, this measure neatly incorporates both state power and the most important components of an UPF. Thus and based on H1a, I assume that the state power and UPF variable significantly and negatively amplifies the linkages tested in H1. Put differently, the negative relationship formulated in H1 will be much stronger in countries with higher state power in the hands of the regime. Now, I turn to discussing the statistical method employed in the analyses of the first empirical chapter.

A growingly popular quantitative approach in the pertinent literature on democratic support is mixed regression models that cover both fixed and random effects (Magalhães, 2014; Dahlberg, Linde & Holmberg, 2014). Fixed

52

In these respects, the WVS variable e041 taps into citizens’ attitudes as to the extent to which wealth accumulation in their society is considered to be taking place at the expense of others. This individual-level variable has been demeaned by country and year to make sure that it is relative to the context of each respondent (this is a necessary condition for the statistical models used in the first empirical chapter) (Scott, Simonoff & Marx, 2013). The variable measuring attitudes towards unfair wealth distribution is central to the empirical models below since many scholars have argued that the significance of economic inequality is conditioned on whether it is viewed as unjust (Bollen & Jackman, 1985: 440). Furthermore, this empirical indicator is consistent with the theoretical concept of wealth distribution unfairness as it measures both people’s attitudes to the wealth distribution in the society and their evaluation of the general underlying mechanisms that shape that same distribution. As I discussed in more detail in the theory chapter, oligarchs are the most prominent group that has profited greatly from the post-Soviet economy and concentrated huge wealth in its hands to the detriment of the public at large. I, therefore, assume that this variable provides an important complementary basis for the theorized mechanism (see the theory chapter) that drives the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and mass support for regime in principle in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies.

A key explanatory variable at the context level originates from the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al., 2016a). The original variable v2pepwrses_ord (labeled as political inequality in the regression models of the first empirical chapter) is based on the following question:

“Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position? Clarification: All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translates into political power. Responses: 0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence. 1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence. 2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people. 3: Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power. 4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups.”

53

I have recoded the original variable into three new categories: 1 (the old values 0 and 1), 2 (the same old value 2) and 3 (the old values 3 to 4) for the purposes of this thesis. The above variable is based on the evaluations of a large number of country experts and, to my knowledge, is the best available proxy for domination of oligarchs as a group with the wealth component at the center. Moreover, the original creators of this variable emphasize this variable as a measure of political inequality based on the prominence of wealth (Coppedge et al., 2016b). Since my operational definition of an oligarch rests primarily on the possession of huge wealth and its importance for political influence, using this proxy in my study is motivated in the absence of more specific variables mentioning the concept of oligarchs in the original question. In addition, using this variable as a proxy for oligarchs’ political power is justified since it focuses primarily on the role of wealth and not political office for political power and dominance. Taken together, I expect that the variables v2pepwrses_ord (proxy for political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs) and e041 (mass attitudes towards an unfair wealth distribution) are negatively associated with my composite variable (consisting of the WVS variables e117 and e123) for normative democratic support (hence, hypothesis H1).

The hypothesis H1a expects that the negative effect of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution on normative support for democracy will be stronger in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies with a higher level of state power concentration in the hands of the regime. For this purpose, I employ an original, combined measure of state power and UPF provided in Levitsky and Way (2010a). The composite variable rests on several key components: state coercive capacity, the strength of the ruling party and discretionary state control of the economy. The first and second components involve both the scope and cohesion of the security apparatus and the ruling party, respectively. The third component includes measures that take into account the level of privatization and overlap of economic and political power. Overall, the composite measure of a state’s organizational power ranges from 0 (low power) to 8 (high power) (Levitsky & Way, 2010a: 376-379). I believe that using this measure in my study is justified for two main reasons. First, this is the variable used in most established studies of pseudo-democracies of this context. Second, this measure neatly incorporates both state power and the most important components of an UPF. Thus and based on H1a, I assume that the state power and UPF variable significantly and negatively amplifies the linkages tested in H1. Put differently, the negative relationship formulated in H1 will be much stronger in countries with higher state power in the hands of the regime. Now, I turn to discussing the statistical method employed in the analyses of the first empirical chapter.

A growingly popular quantitative approach in the pertinent literature on democratic support is mixed regression models that cover both fixed and random effects (Magalhães, 2014; Dahlberg, Linde & Holmberg, 2014). Fixed

52

In these respects, the WVS variable e041 taps into citizens’ attitudes as to the extent to which wealth accumulation in their society is considered to be taking place at the expense of others. This individual-level variable has been demeaned by country and year to make sure that it is relative to the context of each respondent (this is a necessary condition for the statistical models used in the first empirical chapter) (Scott, Simonoff & Marx, 2013). The variable measuring attitudes towards unfair wealth distribution is central to the empirical models below since many scholars have argued that the significance of economic inequality is conditioned on whether it is viewed as unjust (Bollen & Jackman, 1985: 440). Furthermore, this empirical indicator is consistent with the theoretical concept of wealth distribution unfairness as it measures both people’s attitudes to the wealth distribution in the society and their evaluation of the general underlying mechanisms that shape that same distribution. As I discussed in more detail in the theory chapter, oligarchs are the most prominent group that has profited greatly from the post-Soviet economy and concentrated huge wealth in its hands to the detriment of the public at large. I, therefore, assume that this variable provides an important complementary basis for the theorized mechanism (see the theory chapter) that drives the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and mass support for regime in principle in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies.

A key explanatory variable at the context level originates from the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al., 2016a). The original variable v2pepwrses_ord (labeled as political inequality in the regression models of the first empirical chapter) is based on the following question:

“Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position? Clarification: All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translates into political power. Responses: 0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence. 1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence. 2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people. 3: Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power. 4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups.”

55

Second empirical chapter: Case selection, research material, operationalization of hypotheses and method The second empirical chapter (Chapter five) of this thesis is guided by the research question that asks how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion given that dominant explanations of regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies accentuate the crucial role of either mass opinion or state power concentration in the hands of the regime. Two essentially qualitative hypotheses are proposed to answer this question. First, we should expect that all individual, politically motivated rival oligarchs operate with the intention of enhancing public opinion about themselves by developing their personal reputation, organizational capacity and by performing a credible opposition to the regime (H2). Second, although we should expect the authorities in all pseudo-democracies would counteract rival oligarchs’ efforts to develop their organizational capacity, reputation and credibility, we are more likely to observe that oligarchs essentially fail in these undertakings as well as in struggles for power in pseudo-democracies where the regime has greater state power and UPF. Thus, the stronger state power enables the authorities to damage the credibility of the rival oligarch primarily by making him appear unpredictable and unreliable in the eyes of the public (H2a).

As already noted earlier, this will be primarily studied by exploring the political struggle of four rival oligarchs who vied for the ultimate political power in Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine and Russia. There are several important reasons justifying the choice of these countries. The primary reason relates to methodological considerations. Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine and Russia comprise an interesting set of countries that are similar as group, but also have a significant variation within the group. In particular, Armenia and Georgia, on the one side, and Russia and Ukraine, on the other, share similar cultural identities, respectively. However and as already discussed earlier, Armenia and Russia have been recognized as countries with higher state power concentration in the hands of the incumbent regime in contrast to Georgia and Ukraine. The current discussion is intended to emphasize the fact that although post-Soviet pseudo-democracies as a group are more similar to each other in contrast to other pseudo-democracies in the world, they also have a significant variation within the group. Thus, the main reason for choosing this set of countries relates to the objective of finding a design that offers a broader perspective on how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion given the centrality of mass opinion and state power abuse in the regime trajectories of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. In this regard, Peters argues that the “most different design”, which is the closest prototype with regard to the comparison of this set of four countries, enables us to investigate whether the assumed relationship in H2 also holds in different contexts (the level of state power and

54

effects regressions remove the omitted variable bias by looking at the effect of a specific independent variable on the outcome variable within each case. Random effects models, in contrast, estimate the mean of a distribution of effects. This implies that each case in the random effects model is allowed to contribute equally with information about the effects of each case irrespective of its impact on the dependent variable (Scott, Simonoff & Marx, 2013). Mixed regression models overcome most drawbacks of fixed and random effects models by merging them into a joint regression model. This regression model estimates the fixed effects (analogous to standard regression coefficients) as well as provides us with the random effects that estimate variances and covariances. Multilevel mixed models, in their turn, enable us to account for the random effects at different levels of a nested system (Goldstein, 2011). The random part of these models involves both random intercepts and random slope. Random intercept models enable us to both control for and measure variation in the dependent variable due to the contextual level of study interest. In particular, such a model estimates separate intercepts for the group variable in question. Random slope models, instead, enable the explanatory variable to have a different slope (different effect for each group) (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). More plainly, the main advantages of mixed model regression are that it enables the researcher to measure what proportion of the variation in the dependent variable is due to the context of interest (such as the country) in addition to estimating the impact of the independent variable on the outcome variable by controlling for the nested structure of the data (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2006; Bickel, 2007; Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012; Snijders & Bosker, 2012). Following the current stream of contemporary research on regime support, this thesis likewise employs this statistical model in studying the pertinent hypotheses of this thesis. It is still worth emphasizing that because only five country-contexts (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) are employed in the random parts of the mixed multilevel models, drawing inferences from results to all other pseudo-democracies in the world requires extreme caution. However, it is at the same time worth noting that the use of this method is greatly justified as the main empirical focus of this thesis is to infer to the population of six post-Soviet pseudo-democracies of which five are part of the analysis, and because it enables us to measure between-country variations in contrast to simply controlling for them by country dummy variables (fixed effects).

55

Second empirical chapter: Case selection, research material, operationalization of hypotheses and method The second empirical chapter (Chapter five) of this thesis is guided by the research question that asks how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion given that dominant explanations of regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies accentuate the crucial role of either mass opinion or state power concentration in the hands of the regime. Two essentially qualitative hypotheses are proposed to answer this question. First, we should expect that all individual, politically motivated rival oligarchs operate with the intention of enhancing public opinion about themselves by developing their personal reputation, organizational capacity and by performing a credible opposition to the regime (H2). Second, although we should expect the authorities in all pseudo-democracies would counteract rival oligarchs’ efforts to develop their organizational capacity, reputation and credibility, we are more likely to observe that oligarchs essentially fail in these undertakings as well as in struggles for power in pseudo-democracies where the regime has greater state power and UPF. Thus, the stronger state power enables the authorities to damage the credibility of the rival oligarch primarily by making him appear unpredictable and unreliable in the eyes of the public (H2a).

As already noted earlier, this will be primarily studied by exploring the political struggle of four rival oligarchs who vied for the ultimate political power in Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine and Russia. There are several important reasons justifying the choice of these countries. The primary reason relates to methodological considerations. Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine and Russia comprise an interesting set of countries that are similar as group, but also have a significant variation within the group. In particular, Armenia and Georgia, on the one side, and Russia and Ukraine, on the other, share similar cultural identities, respectively. However and as already discussed earlier, Armenia and Russia have been recognized as countries with higher state power concentration in the hands of the incumbent regime in contrast to Georgia and Ukraine. The current discussion is intended to emphasize the fact that although post-Soviet pseudo-democracies as a group are more similar to each other in contrast to other pseudo-democracies in the world, they also have a significant variation within the group. Thus, the main reason for choosing this set of countries relates to the objective of finding a design that offers a broader perspective on how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion given the centrality of mass opinion and state power abuse in the regime trajectories of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. In this regard, Peters argues that the “most different design”, which is the closest prototype with regard to the comparison of this set of four countries, enables us to investigate whether the assumed relationship in H2 also holds in different contexts (the level of state power and

54

effects regressions remove the omitted variable bias by looking at the effect of a specific independent variable on the outcome variable within each case. Random effects models, in contrast, estimate the mean of a distribution of effects. This implies that each case in the random effects model is allowed to contribute equally with information about the effects of each case irrespective of its impact on the dependent variable (Scott, Simonoff & Marx, 2013). Mixed regression models overcome most drawbacks of fixed and random effects models by merging them into a joint regression model. This regression model estimates the fixed effects (analogous to standard regression coefficients) as well as provides us with the random effects that estimate variances and covariances. Multilevel mixed models, in their turn, enable us to account for the random effects at different levels of a nested system (Goldstein, 2011). The random part of these models involves both random intercepts and random slope. Random intercept models enable us to both control for and measure variation in the dependent variable due to the contextual level of study interest. In particular, such a model estimates separate intercepts for the group variable in question. Random slope models, instead, enable the explanatory variable to have a different slope (different effect for each group) (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). More plainly, the main advantages of mixed model regression are that it enables the researcher to measure what proportion of the variation in the dependent variable is due to the context of interest (such as the country) in addition to estimating the impact of the independent variable on the outcome variable by controlling for the nested structure of the data (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2006; Bickel, 2007; Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012; Snijders & Bosker, 2012). Following the current stream of contemporary research on regime support, this thesis likewise employs this statistical model in studying the pertinent hypotheses of this thesis. It is still worth emphasizing that because only five country-contexts (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) are employed in the random parts of the mixed multilevel models, drawing inferences from results to all other pseudo-democracies in the world requires extreme caution. However, it is at the same time worth noting that the use of this method is greatly justified as the main empirical focus of this thesis is to infer to the population of six post-Soviet pseudo-democracies of which five are part of the analysis, and because it enables us to measure between-country variations in contrast to simply controlling for them by country dummy variables (fixed effects).

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specifically, scholars with expertise in case study research (Baxter & Jack, 2008: 546-547) stress that we need to place clear boundaries on our selection of cases based on considerations of time and space (Creswell, 2013), time and activity (Stake, 1995) and by definition and context (Miles & Huberman, 1994). In my view, my previously outlined justifications for choosing these four oligarchs correspond well with these guidelines on binding the cases of study interest.

Chapter five is mainly a qualitative comparative study that employs unique data gathered from four online media outlets in Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine and Russia. News reports are essential resources as they provide evidence of patterns, sequences and detailed accounts of processes, events and activities (Beach & Pedersen, 2011: 143). In the same vein and for all the four countries, I used the local versions of the most widely used search engines such as Google or Bing to search for the names of the four oligarchs. By going through more than a dozen news media outlets, I chose only those that offered the largest coverage of articles on these oligarchs. In the case of Armenia, I chose the Armenian version of the very popular Azatutyun.am, Radio Liberty Armenia’s official website. This media resource has been one of the most established news media agencies in Armenia with great coverage of political issues. In the case of Georgia, I used Sputnik-Georgia.ru for the greatest coverage of political news in Georgia. It is here worth mentioning that Sputnik has more recently given rise to considerable public concerns with regard to it being an unspoken outlet of Kremlin propaganda. This information was not available at the time of the author’s data collection. However, it is worth mentioning that special care was given to all original articles from this source with regard to its potential to report fake news or exaggerated facts. Fortunately, no such occurrences have been found in Sputnik-Georgia.ru for the period studied in this thesis (a sample of articles was crosschecked by the author against articles in other media reports). I collected reports from Ria-Novosti.ru in order to follow Prokhorov’s political path. This resource is an established media outlet with great coverage of the Russian political life. Finally, I used news reports from Censor.net.ua to gather information about Poroshenko in Ukraine. I used the Russian version of the website, which has almost as good coverage of Ukrainian politics as the Ukrainian version. Overall, I searched for and pulled out every media report about the four oligarchs from these media outlets.

I coded 13 indicators of relevance to my study and this was primarily based on the research question and hypotheses that guide Chapter five. Let us have a closer look at the criteria for coding schemes in Table 1 below:

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UPF is of particular importance in H2a). The most different design, thus, offers a greater degree of confidence in that the linkage in question is not driven by omitted variable bias that is much greater in relatively similar contexts (Peters, 1998: 40). It is here also worth repeating that this thesis does not intend to explain regime trajectories, but rather seeks to contribute to the pertinent literature by assessing the role of oligarchs in regime trajectories within the framework of such central factors as mass opinion and state power abuse for understanding regime trajectories. In other words and as clarified earlier, the main aim of this thesis is to study how the role of oligarchs plays out in the aforementioned dimensions underlying regime trajectories.

There are a number of additional reasons why I chose these countries and opted for focusing on the four oligarchs Gagik Tsarukyan (Armenia), Bidzina Ivanishvili (Georgia), Mikhail Prokhorov (Russia) and Petro Poroshenko (Ukraine). First, these oligarchs have made their very similar bids for power more recently, which can be seen from the perspective of certain waves in oligarchs’ concerted efforts to take over the ultimate power. Although this thesis has no intentions to provide more details about any possible diffusion effect, I still want to particularly mention that as in the case of democratic waves I assume that political ideas travel from one country to another in such tightly interwoven geo-political regions as the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies. To provide just one example, as will be shown later key players referred to the actions of Tsarukyan in light of Ivanishvili’s political path to power. Second and relatedly, all these countries gained their independence almost concurrently and mainly followed similar political development. Therefore, such important regime maintenance tools as the abuse of state power and manipulation of mass opinion have been key factors in the regime trajectories of all four countries. Third and from a more practical and applied point of view, qualitative data collection from e-sources has been relatively easier in these four countries in contrast to a larger set of countries for reasons of availability of resources with respect to periods of time of interest and the author’s proficiency in the original languages of sources. While being fluent in every of the main languages in these four countries would have been a great advantage, the author only has a good command of Armenian and Russian. My knowledge of Russian has been a necessary precondition for being able to gather qualitative data from web-based news agencies in Georgia, Ukraine and Russia. The same is valid for Armenian. Indeed, Gerring contends that the collection of data is typically easier and coding schemes are more reliable if the researcher has a good command of the language of the data material (Gerring, 2004: 353). Finally, these prominent oligarchs created their own parties or party alliances, and invested substantial resources in their political struggle for power against the incumbent elites of these four countries who abused their state power to maintain their regime. In sum, the justification for choosing this set of oligarchs is in line with the recommendations of case study research that instructs us to bind the cases that are studied. More

57

specifically, scholars with expertise in case study research (Baxter & Jack, 2008: 546-547) stress that we need to place clear boundaries on our selection of cases based on considerations of time and space (Creswell, 2013), time and activity (Stake, 1995) and by definition and context (Miles & Huberman, 1994). In my view, my previously outlined justifications for choosing these four oligarchs correspond well with these guidelines on binding the cases of study interest.

Chapter five is mainly a qualitative comparative study that employs unique data gathered from four online media outlets in Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine and Russia. News reports are essential resources as they provide evidence of patterns, sequences and detailed accounts of processes, events and activities (Beach & Pedersen, 2011: 143). In the same vein and for all the four countries, I used the local versions of the most widely used search engines such as Google or Bing to search for the names of the four oligarchs. By going through more than a dozen news media outlets, I chose only those that offered the largest coverage of articles on these oligarchs. In the case of Armenia, I chose the Armenian version of the very popular Azatutyun.am, Radio Liberty Armenia’s official website. This media resource has been one of the most established news media agencies in Armenia with great coverage of political issues. In the case of Georgia, I used Sputnik-Georgia.ru for the greatest coverage of political news in Georgia. It is here worth mentioning that Sputnik has more recently given rise to considerable public concerns with regard to it being an unspoken outlet of Kremlin propaganda. This information was not available at the time of the author’s data collection. However, it is worth mentioning that special care was given to all original articles from this source with regard to its potential to report fake news or exaggerated facts. Fortunately, no such occurrences have been found in Sputnik-Georgia.ru for the period studied in this thesis (a sample of articles was crosschecked by the author against articles in other media reports). I collected reports from Ria-Novosti.ru in order to follow Prokhorov’s political path. This resource is an established media outlet with great coverage of the Russian political life. Finally, I used news reports from Censor.net.ua to gather information about Poroshenko in Ukraine. I used the Russian version of the website, which has almost as good coverage of Ukrainian politics as the Ukrainian version. Overall, I searched for and pulled out every media report about the four oligarchs from these media outlets.

I coded 13 indicators of relevance to my study and this was primarily based on the research question and hypotheses that guide Chapter five. Let us have a closer look at the criteria for coding schemes in Table 1 below:

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UPF is of particular importance in H2a). The most different design, thus, offers a greater degree of confidence in that the linkage in question is not driven by omitted variable bias that is much greater in relatively similar contexts (Peters, 1998: 40). It is here also worth repeating that this thesis does not intend to explain regime trajectories, but rather seeks to contribute to the pertinent literature by assessing the role of oligarchs in regime trajectories within the framework of such central factors as mass opinion and state power abuse for understanding regime trajectories. In other words and as clarified earlier, the main aim of this thesis is to study how the role of oligarchs plays out in the aforementioned dimensions underlying regime trajectories.

There are a number of additional reasons why I chose these countries and opted for focusing on the four oligarchs Gagik Tsarukyan (Armenia), Bidzina Ivanishvili (Georgia), Mikhail Prokhorov (Russia) and Petro Poroshenko (Ukraine). First, these oligarchs have made their very similar bids for power more recently, which can be seen from the perspective of certain waves in oligarchs’ concerted efforts to take over the ultimate power. Although this thesis has no intentions to provide more details about any possible diffusion effect, I still want to particularly mention that as in the case of democratic waves I assume that political ideas travel from one country to another in such tightly interwoven geo-political regions as the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies. To provide just one example, as will be shown later key players referred to the actions of Tsarukyan in light of Ivanishvili’s political path to power. Second and relatedly, all these countries gained their independence almost concurrently and mainly followed similar political development. Therefore, such important regime maintenance tools as the abuse of state power and manipulation of mass opinion have been key factors in the regime trajectories of all four countries. Third and from a more practical and applied point of view, qualitative data collection from e-sources has been relatively easier in these four countries in contrast to a larger set of countries for reasons of availability of resources with respect to periods of time of interest and the author’s proficiency in the original languages of sources. While being fluent in every of the main languages in these four countries would have been a great advantage, the author only has a good command of Armenian and Russian. My knowledge of Russian has been a necessary precondition for being able to gather qualitative data from web-based news agencies in Georgia, Ukraine and Russia. The same is valid for Armenian. Indeed, Gerring contends that the collection of data is typically easier and coding schemes are more reliable if the researcher has a good command of the language of the data material (Gerring, 2004: 353). Finally, these prominent oligarchs created their own parties or party alliances, and invested substantial resources in their political struggle for power against the incumbent elites of these four countries who abused their state power to maintain their regime. In sum, the justification for choosing this set of oligarchs is in line with the recommendations of case study research that instructs us to bind the cases that are studied. More

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analysis calls for clear identification and coding of theoretical themes and concepts derived from the theoretical discussion (hence the hypotheses) of this thesis. Following concrete recommendations in the pertinent literature (Hancock & Algozzine, 2011: 59), my thesis quantified qualitative data by reading through media reports and by establishing analytical categories that are guided by the discussion in prior work and the theory chapter. I later counted the number of entries in each category for descriptive statistics to be able to demonstrate the patterns in the empirical data. The analysis in the second empirical chapter starts by focusing on the political path of the four oligarchs to either a successful rise to power or a failure in this struggle. All four oligarchs’ political struggle is presented as a narrative that follows the chain of events in news reporting. The chapter will then conclude with a synthesizing analysis by focusing on the common findings from all the four cases (Hancock & Algozzine, 2011: 56; Goodrick, 2014: 2-7). Next, I operationalize the key variables and hypotheses that guide the analysis of the oligarchs’ struggle against the regime in the framework of mass opinion and state power abuse.

Based on the discussion of this thesis’s analytical framework for understanding how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion in the framework of state power abuse, I first coded four variables that capture the development of oligarchs’ organizational capacity. Variables 2 to 5 in Table 1 are coded as 1 correspondingly if the criteria for increases in the specific components of organizational capacity are met. In particular, I coded as increase in financial resources if the oligarch in question received gains in his business resources or wealth (based on the earlier, more specific discussion in the theory chapter). Additional increase in media resources was coded whenever the oligarch purchased TV and radio channels, traditional and digital newspapers etc. The variable “increase in his human resources” was coded as 1 if the media reports showed that the oligarch founded or joined a political party or alliance, recruited key individuals to serve in his staff/party or if his close relatives were appointed to key political commissions, offices or organizations. I coded as increase in his administrative resources if the oligarch was appointed to ministerial and other formal position within the state administration or some other influential organization since these factors improve his ability to use his official position in his bid for power. An additional key variable is No. 1 that is coded as efforts to increase his reputation whenever media reports showed that he made charity, recruited or got support from various celebrities and politicians.

As already discussed earlier, prior work has emphasized the centrality of collective challenges against incumbent regimes in pseudo-democracies (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010). I therefore coded two additional variables: No. 12 and No. 13 that capture whether or not the oligarchs contributed to collective challenges against the regime. These variables were coded partly as measures for performing credible opposition to the regime. Contribution to collective

58

Table 1. Coding scheme for measuring relevant indicators 1. Efforts to increase his reputation

IF: Charity, recruitment of/ support for (from) popular athletes, superstars, religious leaders or current/former elected officials etc.

2. Increase in financial resources

IF: increase in business resources or wealth.

3. Increase in media resources

IF: purchase of such media resources as TV and radio channels, traditional and digital newspapers etc.

4. Increase in his human resources

IF: establishing a party; joining a political alliance or party; employment of important persons in his staff or party; he or his closest relatives are being appointed to political commissions/ ministries / offices alike.

5. Increase in his administrative resources

IF: Important examples of such positions include ministerial and other formal positions within the state administration or other prominent influential organizations.

6. Attack against his reputation

IF: negative statements about the oligarch (general rumors are excluded) made by his political opponents.

7. Attack against his media resources

IF: attacks by the authorities against his own or other broadcasters/outlets that favor him and his political agenda.

8. Attack against his human resources

IF: attacks/investigations against his staff, party, foundation, affiliated ministries /commissions

9. Attack against his financial resources

IF: attacks against factors mentioned in (2) above.

10. Russian attack against his financial resources

IF: (9) is made by Russian authorities.

11. Politically motivated discrimination against him

IF: specific legal obstacles posed by the authorities to prevent him from standing in elections or serving in an elected office.

12. Contribution to collective action

IF: contributes to joint opposition challenges against the incumbents. Such contributions involve being among the leaders of demonstrations or being part of a collective monitoring of electoral procedures.

13. No contribution to collective action

IF: he or his representatives / staff do not contribute to (12).

Notes: IF: means that at least one of the listed criteria should be met in order to score 1. I applied the above criteria to all media reports in coding the indicators presented in Table 1. Multiple variables were coded from one and the same news media report in those cases where more than one of the above criteria were met during my reading of the original source. In addition, I made every possible effort to avoid coding the same “event” as additional events due to repetitive news reporting or a summary of previous events in the end of some news media articles.

Chapter five employs mixed methods in analyzing news media reports. In particular, I quantified qualitative data from the media reports in order to make a brief quantitative content analysis (see Table 1 for the variables). Such an

59

analysis calls for clear identification and coding of theoretical themes and concepts derived from the theoretical discussion (hence the hypotheses) of this thesis. Following concrete recommendations in the pertinent literature (Hancock & Algozzine, 2011: 59), my thesis quantified qualitative data by reading through media reports and by establishing analytical categories that are guided by the discussion in prior work and the theory chapter. I later counted the number of entries in each category for descriptive statistics to be able to demonstrate the patterns in the empirical data. The analysis in the second empirical chapter starts by focusing on the political path of the four oligarchs to either a successful rise to power or a failure in this struggle. All four oligarchs’ political struggle is presented as a narrative that follows the chain of events in news reporting. The chapter will then conclude with a synthesizing analysis by focusing on the common findings from all the four cases (Hancock & Algozzine, 2011: 56; Goodrick, 2014: 2-7). Next, I operationalize the key variables and hypotheses that guide the analysis of the oligarchs’ struggle against the regime in the framework of mass opinion and state power abuse.

Based on the discussion of this thesis’s analytical framework for understanding how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion in the framework of state power abuse, I first coded four variables that capture the development of oligarchs’ organizational capacity. Variables 2 to 5 in Table 1 are coded as 1 correspondingly if the criteria for increases in the specific components of organizational capacity are met. In particular, I coded as increase in financial resources if the oligarch in question received gains in his business resources or wealth (based on the earlier, more specific discussion in the theory chapter). Additional increase in media resources was coded whenever the oligarch purchased TV and radio channels, traditional and digital newspapers etc. The variable “increase in his human resources” was coded as 1 if the media reports showed that the oligarch founded or joined a political party or alliance, recruited key individuals to serve in his staff/party or if his close relatives were appointed to key political commissions, offices or organizations. I coded as increase in his administrative resources if the oligarch was appointed to ministerial and other formal position within the state administration or some other influential organization since these factors improve his ability to use his official position in his bid for power. An additional key variable is No. 1 that is coded as efforts to increase his reputation whenever media reports showed that he made charity, recruited or got support from various celebrities and politicians.

As already discussed earlier, prior work has emphasized the centrality of collective challenges against incumbent regimes in pseudo-democracies (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010). I therefore coded two additional variables: No. 12 and No. 13 that capture whether or not the oligarchs contributed to collective challenges against the regime. These variables were coded partly as measures for performing credible opposition to the regime. Contribution to collective

58

Table 1. Coding scheme for measuring relevant indicators 1. Efforts to increase his reputation

IF: Charity, recruitment of/ support for (from) popular athletes, superstars, religious leaders or current/former elected officials etc.

2. Increase in financial resources

IF: increase in business resources or wealth.

3. Increase in media resources

IF: purchase of such media resources as TV and radio channels, traditional and digital newspapers etc.

4. Increase in his human resources

IF: establishing a party; joining a political alliance or party; employment of important persons in his staff or party; he or his closest relatives are being appointed to political commissions/ ministries / offices alike.

5. Increase in his administrative resources

IF: Important examples of such positions include ministerial and other formal positions within the state administration or other prominent influential organizations.

6. Attack against his reputation

IF: negative statements about the oligarch (general rumors are excluded) made by his political opponents.

7. Attack against his media resources

IF: attacks by the authorities against his own or other broadcasters/outlets that favor him and his political agenda.

8. Attack against his human resources

IF: attacks/investigations against his staff, party, foundation, affiliated ministries /commissions

9. Attack against his financial resources

IF: attacks against factors mentioned in (2) above.

10. Russian attack against his financial resources

IF: (9) is made by Russian authorities.

11. Politically motivated discrimination against him

IF: specific legal obstacles posed by the authorities to prevent him from standing in elections or serving in an elected office.

12. Contribution to collective action

IF: contributes to joint opposition challenges against the incumbents. Such contributions involve being among the leaders of demonstrations or being part of a collective monitoring of electoral procedures.

13. No contribution to collective action

IF: he or his representatives / staff do not contribute to (12).

Notes: IF: means that at least one of the listed criteria should be met in order to score 1. I applied the above criteria to all media reports in coding the indicators presented in Table 1. Multiple variables were coded from one and the same news media report in those cases where more than one of the above criteria were met during my reading of the original source. In addition, I made every possible effort to avoid coding the same “event” as additional events due to repetitive news reporting or a summary of previous events in the end of some news media articles.

Chapter five employs mixed methods in analyzing news media reports. In particular, I quantified qualitative data from the media reports in order to make a brief quantitative content analysis (see Table 1 for the variables). Such an

61

Finally, I want to devote some space to discussing the reliability of the measures I coded from qualitative resources. In particular, in coding this material I was greatly inspired by the coding concept used by Levitsky and Way (2010a: 376-379) who produced quantitative measures of UPF and state power concentration from their subjective evaluation of qualitative phenomena simply by departing from specific criteria to be met in order to code a given variable as 1. Moreover, such method of coding has been rather common in prior studies of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (Hale, 2015). It is by definition not possible to conduct inter-coder reliability tests since only one person (the author himself) was involved in coding the variables of the author’s unique compilation of media reports on the four oligarchs. However, the Appendix to the second empirical chapter contains a sample of web links to news media reports about oligarchs’ efforts to increase their reputation (a key variable in this study). The reader is welcome to verify the reliability of my coding by visiting the web links and evaluating the information. As clarified in more detail in Table 11, I used 12345 as the seed value for subsampling to make the selection of links for replication entirely random (to ensure impartiality in the selection of the subsample), but still replicable for the interested reader.24

Third empirical chapter: Case selection, research material, operationalization of key variables and method The final empirical chapter (Chapter six) is a single case study of Ukraine. The specific research question that guides this chapter is how the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs in the framework of mass opinion and state power plays out in situations where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change. Ukraine is of primary study interest in this chapter as it has gone through the so-called color revolutions twice—as of yet. Moreover, Ukraine has been the only post-Soviet country with a very high level of oligarchic political domination (Åslund, 2015). In addition to these two major reasons, a third rationale for focusing on Ukraine alone is that this country stands on the brink of an extremely difficult turning point due to the severe war with Russia and its proxy army. Since Ukraine was an influential member country in the former Soviet Union (Solovei, 2015: 87), its cultural, political and economic impact on the rest of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies ought to be of great magnitude whether it successfully progresses towards more

24 Unfortunately, the entire contents of all media reports cannot be presented in this thesis due both to copyright issues and for reasons of space. However, the reader is welcome to contact the author to have access to the data for further checking.

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action against the incumbent regime (No. 12) was coded as 1 whenever media reported that he personally or his team contributed to joint opposition by being among the leaders of protests or by participating in the opposition’s collective monitoring of elections. As to No. 13, it is coded as 1 if he or his representatives were expected or asked to contribute to collective action, but remained neutral or refused (this is the main difference between the variables No. 12 and No. 13). Taken together, all the discussed variables are empirical measures for oligarchs’ organizational capacity, efforts to develop their reputation and performance of a credible opposition to the regime as proposed is H2. Yet, it is worth stressing that performing credible opposition is more than joining or desisting from participation in collective challenges against the regime. For this reason, the qualitative analysis of the four oligarchs’ political bid for power will focus on additional qualitative measures such as not standing for crucial elections or being an unreliable rival to the president.

Variables 6 to 11 measure the regime’s actions and reactions to the oligarchs’ political struggle. As attack against oligarchs’ reputation (No. 6) were coded 1 whenever media reported negative statements about the oligarchs made by his political opponents (for instance, politicians from regime-loyal parties). Variables 7 to 9 and 11 were coded as 1 correspondingly whenever the regime attacked his media resources, human resources, financial resources or when the regime discriminated him personally by posing legal obstacles in order to prevent him from standing in elections or serving in an elected office (No. 11). According to H2a, we should expect media reports about such attacks in all pseudo-democracies in question (thus, occurrence of state power abuses). Yet, H2a also hypothesizes in rather qualitative terms that in countries with greater state power (such as Armenia or Russia), we will observe that the incumbent regime will make its best to damage the rival oligarch’s credibility by making him appear unpredictable and unreliable in the eyes of the broad masses. This will occur in crucial circumstances, such as collective challenges against the regime or ahead of key elections (Simpser, 2013), and will help the main regime leader to elevate himself above the rival oligarch.

I also coded variable No. 10 that indicates whether the Kremlin attacked the rival oligarch’s financial resources. As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, Russia has been the black knight in the post-Soviet context by playing a considerable role for the survival of pseudo-democratic regimes. This variable controls for such external influence. However, it is here worth emphasizing once more that this thesis follows those branches in prior research that attribute decisive importance to domestic factors rather than influence from external factors and actors in understanding regime trajectories. In other words, what happens in domestic politics is much more important than external influence on the polities in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies.

61

Finally, I want to devote some space to discussing the reliability of the measures I coded from qualitative resources. In particular, in coding this material I was greatly inspired by the coding concept used by Levitsky and Way (2010a: 376-379) who produced quantitative measures of UPF and state power concentration from their subjective evaluation of qualitative phenomena simply by departing from specific criteria to be met in order to code a given variable as 1. Moreover, such method of coding has been rather common in prior studies of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (Hale, 2015). It is by definition not possible to conduct inter-coder reliability tests since only one person (the author himself) was involved in coding the variables of the author’s unique compilation of media reports on the four oligarchs. However, the Appendix to the second empirical chapter contains a sample of web links to news media reports about oligarchs’ efforts to increase their reputation (a key variable in this study). The reader is welcome to verify the reliability of my coding by visiting the web links and evaluating the information. As clarified in more detail in Table 11, I used 12345 as the seed value for subsampling to make the selection of links for replication entirely random (to ensure impartiality in the selection of the subsample), but still replicable for the interested reader.24

Third empirical chapter: Case selection, research material, operationalization of key variables and method The final empirical chapter (Chapter six) is a single case study of Ukraine. The specific research question that guides this chapter is how the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs in the framework of mass opinion and state power plays out in situations where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change. Ukraine is of primary study interest in this chapter as it has gone through the so-called color revolutions twice—as of yet. Moreover, Ukraine has been the only post-Soviet country with a very high level of oligarchic political domination (Åslund, 2015). In addition to these two major reasons, a third rationale for focusing on Ukraine alone is that this country stands on the brink of an extremely difficult turning point due to the severe war with Russia and its proxy army. Since Ukraine was an influential member country in the former Soviet Union (Solovei, 2015: 87), its cultural, political and economic impact on the rest of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies ought to be of great magnitude whether it successfully progresses towards more

24 Unfortunately, the entire contents of all media reports cannot be presented in this thesis due both to copyright issues and for reasons of space. However, the reader is welcome to contact the author to have access to the data for further checking.

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action against the incumbent regime (No. 12) was coded as 1 whenever media reported that he personally or his team contributed to joint opposition by being among the leaders of protests or by participating in the opposition’s collective monitoring of elections. As to No. 13, it is coded as 1 if he or his representatives were expected or asked to contribute to collective action, but remained neutral or refused (this is the main difference between the variables No. 12 and No. 13). Taken together, all the discussed variables are empirical measures for oligarchs’ organizational capacity, efforts to develop their reputation and performance of a credible opposition to the regime as proposed is H2. Yet, it is worth stressing that performing credible opposition is more than joining or desisting from participation in collective challenges against the regime. For this reason, the qualitative analysis of the four oligarchs’ political bid for power will focus on additional qualitative measures such as not standing for crucial elections or being an unreliable rival to the president.

Variables 6 to 11 measure the regime’s actions and reactions to the oligarchs’ political struggle. As attack against oligarchs’ reputation (No. 6) were coded 1 whenever media reported negative statements about the oligarchs made by his political opponents (for instance, politicians from regime-loyal parties). Variables 7 to 9 and 11 were coded as 1 correspondingly whenever the regime attacked his media resources, human resources, financial resources or when the regime discriminated him personally by posing legal obstacles in order to prevent him from standing in elections or serving in an elected office (No. 11). According to H2a, we should expect media reports about such attacks in all pseudo-democracies in question (thus, occurrence of state power abuses). Yet, H2a also hypothesizes in rather qualitative terms that in countries with greater state power (such as Armenia or Russia), we will observe that the incumbent regime will make its best to damage the rival oligarch’s credibility by making him appear unpredictable and unreliable in the eyes of the broad masses. This will occur in crucial circumstances, such as collective challenges against the regime or ahead of key elections (Simpser, 2013), and will help the main regime leader to elevate himself above the rival oligarch.

I also coded variable No. 10 that indicates whether the Kremlin attacked the rival oligarch’s financial resources. As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, Russia has been the black knight in the post-Soviet context by playing a considerable role for the survival of pseudo-democratic regimes. This variable controls for such external influence. However, it is here worth emphasizing once more that this thesis follows those branches in prior research that attribute decisive importance to domestic factors rather than influence from external factors and actors in understanding regime trajectories. In other words, what happens in domestic politics is much more important than external influence on the polities in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies.

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opinion in a country where they have played a central role in regime change (the toppling of prior pseudo-democratic regimes by two color revolutions).

Chapter six then moves on to examine what shapes Kyiv students’ opinion towards oligarchs as a group and individuals. In particular, this chapter explores in more detail how more specific perceptions of oligarchs’ political role are related to mass opinion about them as a group and individuals. The entire survey questionnaire is provided in the Appendix to the Chapter six. Yet, here it can be stated that the survey asked the respondents the questions about oligarchs according to a number of broad dimensions presented in the form of statements below: Table 2. Key variables from the Kyiv university student survey Experience of oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation

I personally or someone in my family received material support from an oligarch’s charity foundation (Q10b).

Perceptions about the political role of oligarchs

I trust political parties that have oligarchs in leading positions (Q11c). The oligarchs are an integral part of our current political system; expecting some positive political changes is too naïve (Q13c). Our president is an oligarch (Q13b).

Perceptions about their influence on the political system

All oligarchs in our country are corrupt and promote corruption in the public administration (Q10c). Bureaucrats should stop working for oligarchs (Q14a). Only pro-Western oligarchs are conducive to democratic development in our country (Q11a). Only those oligarchs who are disloyal to our political leadership contribute to democratization (Q11b) By means of their political parties, oligarchs contribute to increasing political competition in our country (Q9c).

Perceptions about the true incentives for oligarchs’ involvement in politics

Oligarchs are in politics due to narrow material interests (Q9a). Oligarchs are in politics to ensure their own and their families’ survival and prosperity (Q9b). Some oligarchs are prepared to оr capable of actively combating corruption (Q13a).

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democracy or remains in pseudo-democratic status quo. These reasons for choosing Ukraine as a case for closer study tally with the rationales offered in the case study research. In particular, it represents a critical test of existing theory, a unique circumstance or is revelatory (Yin, 2003: 45-46). Accordingly, the main reason why no additional hypotheses have been formulated earlier for this chapter is that the case of Ukraine offers a valuable opportunity to look closely at and discuss the role of oligarchs in regime trajectories in the framework of such central factors as mass attitudes and state power abuse. Specifically, the first part of the chapter focuses on the role of oligarchs in regime trajectories of Ukraine given their importance in the crucial framework of public opinion and state power abuse. In particular, oligarchs’ political influence and mass opinion about them was important in struggles for power that took place in Ukraine in connection with the two color revolutions. I attempt to reveal the preferences of incumbents and oligarchs in Ukraine by focusing on reports of their behavior described in prior studies. The main rationale for this exploratory approach is to offer a better understanding of how the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs plays out in these critical situations where oligarchs have been key players for regime change.

The second part of the Ukraine chapter maps out and examines university student attitudes in Kyiv about oligarchs as a group and individuals. The chapter employs unique student survey data that was collected by the author in the spring of 2017 in Kyiv. The main reason for opting for surveying this group of citizens is that young people and university students in Ukraine were the particular driving force of the two color revolutions in Ukraine (Nikolayenko, 2007; Shveda & Park, 2016). They were the primary group of protesters and contributed to the expansion of the number of protesters by providing essential logistical support to the popular uprisings (McFaul, 2005; Diuk, 2014).

The major background for understanding the justification for the specific questions asked in the original survey derives its support mainly from the first part of the chapter. More specifically, in constructing the original survey, the author was guided by two major considerations. First, we need to learn more about university student attitudes towards the role of oligarchs in the political system and regime trajectories due to their crucial importance in the two color revolutions in Ukraine (a further motivation is provided in the empirical chapter). This is why I initially offer descriptive statistics on Kyiv students’ perceptions about the oligarchs’ political participation and its implications for regime trajectories and the political system as a whole. Second, the survey also contains variables measuring university student opinion towards the legitimacy of oligarchs as political players in addition to their perceptions of whether oligarchs’ participation in politics is due to their wealth accumulation incentives. Taken together, all these aspects will help us to gain a better understanding about how oligarchs interact with incumbent regimes and mass

63

opinion in a country where they have played a central role in regime change (the toppling of prior pseudo-democratic regimes by two color revolutions).

Chapter six then moves on to examine what shapes Kyiv students’ opinion towards oligarchs as a group and individuals. In particular, this chapter explores in more detail how more specific perceptions of oligarchs’ political role are related to mass opinion about them as a group and individuals. The entire survey questionnaire is provided in the Appendix to the Chapter six. Yet, here it can be stated that the survey asked the respondents the questions about oligarchs according to a number of broad dimensions presented in the form of statements below: Table 2. Key variables from the Kyiv university student survey Experience of oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation

I personally or someone in my family received material support from an oligarch’s charity foundation (Q10b).

Perceptions about the political role of oligarchs

I trust political parties that have oligarchs in leading positions (Q11c). The oligarchs are an integral part of our current political system; expecting some positive political changes is too naïve (Q13c). Our president is an oligarch (Q13b).

Perceptions about their influence on the political system

All oligarchs in our country are corrupt and promote corruption in the public administration (Q10c). Bureaucrats should stop working for oligarchs (Q14a). Only pro-Western oligarchs are conducive to democratic development in our country (Q11a). Only those oligarchs who are disloyal to our political leadership contribute to democratization (Q11b) By means of their political parties, oligarchs contribute to increasing political competition in our country (Q9c).

Perceptions about the true incentives for oligarchs’ involvement in politics

Oligarchs are in politics due to narrow material interests (Q9a). Oligarchs are in politics to ensure their own and their families’ survival and prosperity (Q9b). Some oligarchs are prepared to оr capable of actively combating corruption (Q13a).

62

democracy or remains in pseudo-democratic status quo. These reasons for choosing Ukraine as a case for closer study tally with the rationales offered in the case study research. In particular, it represents a critical test of existing theory, a unique circumstance or is revelatory (Yin, 2003: 45-46). Accordingly, the main reason why no additional hypotheses have been formulated earlier for this chapter is that the case of Ukraine offers a valuable opportunity to look closely at and discuss the role of oligarchs in regime trajectories in the framework of such central factors as mass attitudes and state power abuse. Specifically, the first part of the chapter focuses on the role of oligarchs in regime trajectories of Ukraine given their importance in the crucial framework of public opinion and state power abuse. In particular, oligarchs’ political influence and mass opinion about them was important in struggles for power that took place in Ukraine in connection with the two color revolutions. I attempt to reveal the preferences of incumbents and oligarchs in Ukraine by focusing on reports of their behavior described in prior studies. The main rationale for this exploratory approach is to offer a better understanding of how the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs plays out in these critical situations where oligarchs have been key players for regime change.

The second part of the Ukraine chapter maps out and examines university student attitudes in Kyiv about oligarchs as a group and individuals. The chapter employs unique student survey data that was collected by the author in the spring of 2017 in Kyiv. The main reason for opting for surveying this group of citizens is that young people and university students in Ukraine were the particular driving force of the two color revolutions in Ukraine (Nikolayenko, 2007; Shveda & Park, 2016). They were the primary group of protesters and contributed to the expansion of the number of protesters by providing essential logistical support to the popular uprisings (McFaul, 2005; Diuk, 2014).

The major background for understanding the justification for the specific questions asked in the original survey derives its support mainly from the first part of the chapter. More specifically, in constructing the original survey, the author was guided by two major considerations. First, we need to learn more about university student attitudes towards the role of oligarchs in the political system and regime trajectories due to their crucial importance in the two color revolutions in Ukraine (a further motivation is provided in the empirical chapter). This is why I initially offer descriptive statistics on Kyiv students’ perceptions about the oligarchs’ political participation and its implications for regime trajectories and the political system as a whole. Second, the survey also contains variables measuring university student opinion towards the legitimacy of oligarchs as political players in addition to their perceptions of whether oligarchs’ participation in politics is due to their wealth accumulation incentives. Taken together, all these aspects will help us to gain a better understanding about how oligarchs interact with incumbent regimes and mass

65

opinion and state power abuse. Departing from an integrated perspective based on the entire theoretical discussion (see the prior research and theory chapter) and findings from the first and second empirical chapters below, I assume that Kyiv university students generally disfavor oligarchs as group and individuals—central explanatory variables being their negative perceptions of oligarchs’ shady past as to wealth accumulation and their behind-the-scene influence on politics. Yet, I believe that individual oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation by means of charity improve their reputation even among Kyiv university students. To be sure, I use this survey mainly to explore how the interaction of oligarchs with incumbents and mass opinion plays out in a context of a higher level of oligarchic influence on the political system and their greater importance for regime trajectories (Åslund, 2015). Below, I provide more technical details about the survey and its collection in Kyiv.

The author received money from The Swedish Network for European Studies in Political Science (SNES) to carry out a survey of university students in Kyiv. Since the survey questions involve sensitive questions, the author consulted with the Regional Ethical Review Board in Linköping, Sweden to ascertain whether the questionnaire called for an ethical review. Although the common approach of the board is not to make preliminary judgments, via phone and email conversations with multiple members of the committee, we could conclude that there was no need put the questionnaire under an ethical review. There were two specific reasons for this. First, Swedish law on ethical review stipulates that it does not apply to data collection outside of Sweden. The second reason is that the author designed the questionnaire and the fieldwork in a way that made it impossible to trace back the answers to a particular individual. Important aspects in this regard are that the author employed only age categories, did not include questions that asked about university affiliations or any other information that could connect the anonymous respondents to any university or student program. The practical data gathering added other important aspects to further securing the anonymity of the respondents. The author employed several smartphones that where equipped with prepaid sim-cards with access to the Internet. The author also distributed the printed versions of the questionnaire in Russian. Thus, every respondent that consented to be part of the questionnaire was offered the choice to provide his/her answer either electronically or in the traditional form. The majority of the respondents chose to provide their answers by taking the questionnaire with them and filling in the questionnaire on the web. All except two respondents who opted for the English version, answered the questionnaire in Russian.

This study used the one-stage cluster sampling method (Pfefferman & Rao, 2009; Hansen, Hurwitz & Madow, 1993) to gather university student data as it was impossible (for the previously discussed ethical considerations) to obtain an exhaustive registry of all Kyiv students that make up the statistical

64

Table 2. Key variables from the Kyiv university student survey (continued) Attitudes towards the political role and legitimacy of oligarchs given their past of wealth accumulation strategies

People will not accept oligarchs’ participation in politics due to their contested methods of wealth accumulation (Q10a). People would accept oligarchs as legitimate political players if they were ready to share their massive wealth with the people to eradicate economic inequality (Q12a).

The dependent variables To what extent do you consider the following persons to be honest and politically credible (Q15)? a) Ihor Kolomoyskyi, b) Petro Poroshenko, c) Rinat Akhmetov. In general, to what degree do you like the oligarchs as a group in your country (Q8)?

Notes: The question numbers in the parentheses above refer to the questionnaire put in the Appendix to the Ukraine chapter (Chapter six).

The entire questionnaire, which also contains important background variables, is available in the Appendix to the empirical chapter on Ukraine. Table 2 displays the key variables from the survey fit into five coarse categories.25 As can be read from the table, the questions asked in the survey tapped into the perceptions and experiences of the respondents with regard to oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation, the political role of oligarchs as to the political system, their incentives for involving in politics and questions about more specific attitudes towards oligarchs’ political legitimacy. In addition, the questionnaire contains specific questions about Kyiv students’ attitudes towards the oligarchs as a group and individuals (see the dependent variable row for the names of three key oligarchs in Ukraine).26 It is also worth stressing that Q11a was included as a proxy variable for attitudes towards the influence of Russia and the West on Ukrainian politics and oligarchs. Using such a (distant) proxy as an alternative to a more direct question about Russia was an inevitable measure in order to reduce the very likely risk of respondents opting out from the survey due to perceived dangers of being exposed to Ukraine’s security services for showing sympathies with Russia that has been in war with Ukraine through its proxy armies in eastern Ukraine.

I have formulated all the specific survey questions in Table 2 to capture how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion in the framework of prior explanations for regime trajectories with particular focus on mass

25 It is worth stressing here that some variables in the table can be fit into more than one dimension. 26 As will be clarified in detail in the first part of the Ukraine chapter, Rinat Akhmetov, Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Petro Poroshenko have been influential oligarchs during the post-Soviet era of Ukraine.

65

opinion and state power abuse. Departing from an integrated perspective based on the entire theoretical discussion (see the prior research and theory chapter) and findings from the first and second empirical chapters below, I assume that Kyiv university students generally disfavor oligarchs as group and individuals—central explanatory variables being their negative perceptions of oligarchs’ shady past as to wealth accumulation and their behind-the-scene influence on politics. Yet, I believe that individual oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation by means of charity improve their reputation even among Kyiv university students. To be sure, I use this survey mainly to explore how the interaction of oligarchs with incumbents and mass opinion plays out in a context of a higher level of oligarchic influence on the political system and their greater importance for regime trajectories (Åslund, 2015). Below, I provide more technical details about the survey and its collection in Kyiv.

The author received money from The Swedish Network for European Studies in Political Science (SNES) to carry out a survey of university students in Kyiv. Since the survey questions involve sensitive questions, the author consulted with the Regional Ethical Review Board in Linköping, Sweden to ascertain whether the questionnaire called for an ethical review. Although the common approach of the board is not to make preliminary judgments, via phone and email conversations with multiple members of the committee, we could conclude that there was no need put the questionnaire under an ethical review. There were two specific reasons for this. First, Swedish law on ethical review stipulates that it does not apply to data collection outside of Sweden. The second reason is that the author designed the questionnaire and the fieldwork in a way that made it impossible to trace back the answers to a particular individual. Important aspects in this regard are that the author employed only age categories, did not include questions that asked about university affiliations or any other information that could connect the anonymous respondents to any university or student program. The practical data gathering added other important aspects to further securing the anonymity of the respondents. The author employed several smartphones that where equipped with prepaid sim-cards with access to the Internet. The author also distributed the printed versions of the questionnaire in Russian. Thus, every respondent that consented to be part of the questionnaire was offered the choice to provide his/her answer either electronically or in the traditional form. The majority of the respondents chose to provide their answers by taking the questionnaire with them and filling in the questionnaire on the web. All except two respondents who opted for the English version, answered the questionnaire in Russian.

This study used the one-stage cluster sampling method (Pfefferman & Rao, 2009; Hansen, Hurwitz & Madow, 1993) to gather university student data as it was impossible (for the previously discussed ethical considerations) to obtain an exhaustive registry of all Kyiv students that make up the statistical

64

Table 2. Key variables from the Kyiv university student survey (continued) Attitudes towards the political role and legitimacy of oligarchs given their past of wealth accumulation strategies

People will not accept oligarchs’ participation in politics due to their contested methods of wealth accumulation (Q10a). People would accept oligarchs as legitimate political players if they were ready to share their massive wealth with the people to eradicate economic inequality (Q12a).

The dependent variables To what extent do you consider the following persons to be honest and politically credible (Q15)? a) Ihor Kolomoyskyi, b) Petro Poroshenko, c) Rinat Akhmetov. In general, to what degree do you like the oligarchs as a group in your country (Q8)?

Notes: The question numbers in the parentheses above refer to the questionnaire put in the Appendix to the Ukraine chapter (Chapter six).

The entire questionnaire, which also contains important background variables, is available in the Appendix to the empirical chapter on Ukraine. Table 2 displays the key variables from the survey fit into five coarse categories.25 As can be read from the table, the questions asked in the survey tapped into the perceptions and experiences of the respondents with regard to oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation, the political role of oligarchs as to the political system, their incentives for involving in politics and questions about more specific attitudes towards oligarchs’ political legitimacy. In addition, the questionnaire contains specific questions about Kyiv students’ attitudes towards the oligarchs as a group and individuals (see the dependent variable row for the names of three key oligarchs in Ukraine).26 It is also worth stressing that Q11a was included as a proxy variable for attitudes towards the influence of Russia and the West on Ukrainian politics and oligarchs. Using such a (distant) proxy as an alternative to a more direct question about Russia was an inevitable measure in order to reduce the very likely risk of respondents opting out from the survey due to perceived dangers of being exposed to Ukraine’s security services for showing sympathies with Russia that has been in war with Ukraine through its proxy armies in eastern Ukraine.

I have formulated all the specific survey questions in Table 2 to capture how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion in the framework of prior explanations for regime trajectories with particular focus on mass

25 It is worth stressing here that some variables in the table can be fit into more than one dimension. 26 As will be clarified in detail in the first part of the Ukraine chapter, Rinat Akhmetov, Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Petro Poroshenko have been influential oligarchs during the post-Soviet era of Ukraine.

67

Chapter four: Oligarchs and normative support for democracy

Support for democracy in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies over time In this part of the thesis, I provide a brief overview of normative democratic support in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies and what meanings people attach to democracy in this context according to prior research. In addition, I offer a brief description of the individual characteristics, group behavior, asset types, political and media resources of post-Soviet oligarchs. These accounts will serve as a necessary background for later statistical analyses centered on the research question about the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and support for democracy.

There has been an interesting body of work on how people conceive of democracy in the post-Soviet region (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer, 1998; Haerpfer, 2008; Person, 2010). Studies have provided considerable evidence about what ordinary people refer to when they think about democracy. An early study on Russia and Ukraine from the 1990s shows that people understood democracy as freedom of speech, freedom of beliefs, individual choice, the rule of law and the power of the people (Miller, Hesli & Reisinger, 1997: 170). Surprisingly for the authors, people conceiving of democracy as equal political opportunities for citizens constituted only a minuscule share of the respondents. What was even more unexpected was that only a few number of individuals perceived democracy as a means for furthering economic opportunities and privatization (Miller, Hesli & Reisinger, 1997: 171). Yet, every seventh citizen expressed negative remarks about democracy. Moreover, scholars have warned that positive attitudes towards democracy appear to be fluctuating from time to time (Miller, Hesli & Reisinger, 1997: 178). The instability in democratic support has been ascribed to the absence of a deep-rooted, ideological structure of democratic values in the political culture (Miller, Hesli & Reisinger, 1997: 187). However, more recent studies on

66

population of this survey. As will be shown in more detail in the empirical chapter on Ukraine, university students in Kyiv were the driving force of the two color revolutions in Ukraine, which justifies the focus of the survey on this segment of population in Kyiv. The author visited the major universities in Kyiv: Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv International University, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Kyiv Law School (part of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine), Kyiv National Economic University, Kyiv National University of Trade and Economics, Kyiv Polytechnic Institute and Kyiv School of Economics. In particular, I drew a simple random sample of university students from the aforementioned cluster of universities. The author asked students outside the university buildings to take part in the survey by handing out printed questionnaires. This was necessary to ensure their anonymity since many universities in Kyiv require visitors to register the reasons for their visit before they are allowed access to university buildings. The author devoted almost two weeks to collecting data. The respondents were current, newly enrolled or recently graduated students. This width of the respondent category was necessary to ensure a substantial variation in the age span of the respondents.

The survey data from Kyiv is analyzed by employing descriptive statistics as well as simple ordinary least square regressions (OLS) with robustness controls. OLS is one of the most established forms of regression used in all social science research. It fits the data of this type well and enables the researcher to examine and draw inferences about linear relationships between the dependent and independent variables (Agresti, 2015). The goal of OLS is to minimize residuals and generate the smallest possible standard errors. By default, OLS grants equal importance to all observations, which increases the risk of the regression estimating misleading results when there are significant disturbances in some observations (Agresti & Finlay, 2014). Robust standard errors are therefore used to downplay the effect of influential observations that cause heteroscedasticity. Ultimately, both descriptive analysis and OLS regressions aid this thesis in digging deeper into what university students in Kyiv think about the oligarchs and what actually drives their opinion about them. The latter is necessary to better understand the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs in the framework of mass opinion and state power abuse in a country where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change.

67

Chapter four: Oligarchs and normative support for democracy

Support for democracy in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies over time In this part of the thesis, I provide a brief overview of normative democratic support in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies and what meanings people attach to democracy in this context according to prior research. In addition, I offer a brief description of the individual characteristics, group behavior, asset types, political and media resources of post-Soviet oligarchs. These accounts will serve as a necessary background for later statistical analyses centered on the research question about the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and support for democracy.

There has been an interesting body of work on how people conceive of democracy in the post-Soviet region (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer, 1998; Haerpfer, 2008; Person, 2010). Studies have provided considerable evidence about what ordinary people refer to when they think about democracy. An early study on Russia and Ukraine from the 1990s shows that people understood democracy as freedom of speech, freedom of beliefs, individual choice, the rule of law and the power of the people (Miller, Hesli & Reisinger, 1997: 170). Surprisingly for the authors, people conceiving of democracy as equal political opportunities for citizens constituted only a minuscule share of the respondents. What was even more unexpected was that only a few number of individuals perceived democracy as a means for furthering economic opportunities and privatization (Miller, Hesli & Reisinger, 1997: 171). Yet, every seventh citizen expressed negative remarks about democracy. Moreover, scholars have warned that positive attitudes towards democracy appear to be fluctuating from time to time (Miller, Hesli & Reisinger, 1997: 178). The instability in democratic support has been ascribed to the absence of a deep-rooted, ideological structure of democratic values in the political culture (Miller, Hesli & Reisinger, 1997: 187). However, more recent studies on

66

population of this survey. As will be shown in more detail in the empirical chapter on Ukraine, university students in Kyiv were the driving force of the two color revolutions in Ukraine, which justifies the focus of the survey on this segment of population in Kyiv. The author visited the major universities in Kyiv: Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv International University, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Kyiv Law School (part of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine), Kyiv National Economic University, Kyiv National University of Trade and Economics, Kyiv Polytechnic Institute and Kyiv School of Economics. In particular, I drew a simple random sample of university students from the aforementioned cluster of universities. The author asked students outside the university buildings to take part in the survey by handing out printed questionnaires. This was necessary to ensure their anonymity since many universities in Kyiv require visitors to register the reasons for their visit before they are allowed access to university buildings. The author devoted almost two weeks to collecting data. The respondents were current, newly enrolled or recently graduated students. This width of the respondent category was necessary to ensure a substantial variation in the age span of the respondents.

The survey data from Kyiv is analyzed by employing descriptive statistics as well as simple ordinary least square regressions (OLS) with robustness controls. OLS is one of the most established forms of regression used in all social science research. It fits the data of this type well and enables the researcher to examine and draw inferences about linear relationships between the dependent and independent variables (Agresti, 2015). The goal of OLS is to minimize residuals and generate the smallest possible standard errors. By default, OLS grants equal importance to all observations, which increases the risk of the regression estimating misleading results when there are significant disturbances in some observations (Agresti & Finlay, 2014). Robust standard errors are therefore used to downplay the effect of influential observations that cause heteroscedasticity. Ultimately, both descriptive analysis and OLS regressions aid this thesis in digging deeper into what university students in Kyiv think about the oligarchs and what actually drives their opinion about them. The latter is necessary to better understand the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs in the framework of mass opinion and state power abuse in a country where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change.

69

patterns of an important dimension of this chapter’s composite dependent variable. However, of much greater importance is focusing on how such attitudes relate to oligarchs’ behavior and political power at the individual level of normative support for democracy. This is what this empirical chapter will analyze a little later. Before turning our focus to these analyses, I provide an overview of the individual characteristics as well as group behavior of post-Soviet oligarchs in addition to the types of their assets and some other key resources.

A general description of post-Soviet oligarchs as a group The main objective of the rapidly implemented economic transition from commanded to market economy during the first half of the 1990’s was to profoundly transform the property structure of the economy in order to break up the old economic elite and promote foreign investment (Böröcz & Rona-Tas, 1995: 752; Johnson, 1997: 337). A major part in these processes was privatization that refers to the transfer of state owned assets and companies into private hands (Braguinsky, 1994: 130). Although the primary goal of privatization was to reduce state dominance in state interactions with firms, the miscarried, partial liberalization of the economy led to the strengthening of late communist era economic elites and the emergence of a new group of oligarchs in the first half of the 1990’s. Moreover, this wave of privatization created a huge wedge between the strategic interests of the oligarchs and the broad social interest. The oligarchs reinforced their newly acquired position in the economy by developing clientelistic ties with politicians through corruption (Hellman, Jones & Kaufmann, 2003). Several scholars have maintained that the oligarchs—the real beneficiaries of these failed reforms—managed to secure their economic achievements by capturing the legal and regulatory structure to the detriment of the broad public (Hellman, 1998; Hellman, Jones & Kaufmann, 2003). Interestingly, some scholars still viewed them as the only convincing group that was both eager and capable of promoting economic growth and developing market institutions in a very unfavorable business environment (Shleifer & Treisman, 2001; Boone & Rodionov, 2002; Åslund, 2004).

In the early stages of the privatization wave (early 1990’s), the typical oligarch was a well-educated professional with a technocratic, nomenklatura background and Soviet era business experience. Over time, however, the archetypal characteristic of an oligarch changed simply to prior business experience (Böröcz & Rona-Tas, 1995: 777). In fact, while the older (insider) group of oligarchs turned their managerial control of state enterprises into personal ownership, the newly emerged post-transition (outsider) group of younger oligarchs generally started from the scratch (Guriev & Rachinsky,

68

regime support in principle in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies found substantial bonds between positive perceptions of economic system performance (Person, 2016), favorable attitudes towards privatization and the free market, on the one hand, and support for democracy on the other (Haerpfer, 2008).

Figure D. Mean democracy approval

Notes: The country-averaged wvs_psdem variable emanates from the QoG 2017. However, the original source of this variable is the World Values Survey. The original WVS question read: “I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country - Having a democratic political system.” The respondents could choose from the following alternative answers: 1. Very bad, 2. Fairly bad, 3. Fairly good, 4. Very good. The author has recoded this variable to range from 0 to 10 so that the max value indicates full normative approval of democracy as the best form of government. As can be read from Figure D, support for democracy has been varying across post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. The figure depicts how general trends in the approval of democracy in principle evolved over time. Normative support for democracy has been relatively higher in Armenia (4-7) and Georgia (5-8). In addition, support for democracy has been fluctuating most in Moldova (4-6), and Ukraine (3-5). The lower degree of support for democracy over time appears to be in Russia (between 0-4) and Kyrgyzstan (3-4). Yet, one can see that it has been a significant upward trend in Russia in contrast to Kyrgyzstan (downward trend). Taken together, Figure D depicts revealing aggregated

02

46

80

24

68

1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010

Armenia Georgia Kyrgyzstan

Moldova Russia Ukraine

Dem

ocra

cy A

ppro

val i

n P

ost-S

ovie

t Pse

udo-

dem

ocra

cies

Year

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patterns of an important dimension of this chapter’s composite dependent variable. However, of much greater importance is focusing on how such attitudes relate to oligarchs’ behavior and political power at the individual level of normative support for democracy. This is what this empirical chapter will analyze a little later. Before turning our focus to these analyses, I provide an overview of the individual characteristics as well as group behavior of post-Soviet oligarchs in addition to the types of their assets and some other key resources.

A general description of post-Soviet oligarchs as a group The main objective of the rapidly implemented economic transition from commanded to market economy during the first half of the 1990’s was to profoundly transform the property structure of the economy in order to break up the old economic elite and promote foreign investment (Böröcz & Rona-Tas, 1995: 752; Johnson, 1997: 337). A major part in these processes was privatization that refers to the transfer of state owned assets and companies into private hands (Braguinsky, 1994: 130). Although the primary goal of privatization was to reduce state dominance in state interactions with firms, the miscarried, partial liberalization of the economy led to the strengthening of late communist era economic elites and the emergence of a new group of oligarchs in the first half of the 1990’s. Moreover, this wave of privatization created a huge wedge between the strategic interests of the oligarchs and the broad social interest. The oligarchs reinforced their newly acquired position in the economy by developing clientelistic ties with politicians through corruption (Hellman, Jones & Kaufmann, 2003). Several scholars have maintained that the oligarchs—the real beneficiaries of these failed reforms—managed to secure their economic achievements by capturing the legal and regulatory structure to the detriment of the broad public (Hellman, 1998; Hellman, Jones & Kaufmann, 2003). Interestingly, some scholars still viewed them as the only convincing group that was both eager and capable of promoting economic growth and developing market institutions in a very unfavorable business environment (Shleifer & Treisman, 2001; Boone & Rodionov, 2002; Åslund, 2004).

In the early stages of the privatization wave (early 1990’s), the typical oligarch was a well-educated professional with a technocratic, nomenklatura background and Soviet era business experience. Over time, however, the archetypal characteristic of an oligarch changed simply to prior business experience (Böröcz & Rona-Tas, 1995: 777). In fact, while the older (insider) group of oligarchs turned their managerial control of state enterprises into personal ownership, the newly emerged post-transition (outsider) group of younger oligarchs generally started from the scratch (Guriev & Rachinsky,

68

regime support in principle in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies found substantial bonds between positive perceptions of economic system performance (Person, 2016), favorable attitudes towards privatization and the free market, on the one hand, and support for democracy on the other (Haerpfer, 2008).

Figure D. Mean democracy approval

Notes: The country-averaged wvs_psdem variable emanates from the QoG 2017. However, the original source of this variable is the World Values Survey. The original WVS question read: “I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country - Having a democratic political system.” The respondents could choose from the following alternative answers: 1. Very bad, 2. Fairly bad, 3. Fairly good, 4. Very good. The author has recoded this variable to range from 0 to 10 so that the max value indicates full normative approval of democracy as the best form of government. As can be read from Figure D, support for democracy has been varying across post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. The figure depicts how general trends in the approval of democracy in principle evolved over time. Normative support for democracy has been relatively higher in Armenia (4-7) and Georgia (5-8). In addition, support for democracy has been fluctuating most in Moldova (4-6), and Ukraine (3-5). The lower degree of support for democracy over time appears to be in Russia (between 0-4) and Kyrgyzstan (3-4). Yet, one can see that it has been a significant upward trend in Russia in contrast to Kyrgyzstan (downward trend). Taken together, Figure D depicts revealing aggregated

02

46

80

24

68

1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010

Armenia Georgia Kyrgyzstan

Moldova Russia Ukraine

Dem

ocra

cy A

ppro

val i

n P

ost-S

ovie

t Pse

udo-

dem

ocra

cies

Year

71

Political connections are equally essential for oligarchs to carry on big business activities in the post-Soviet context. Oligarchs invest time and money in their formal and informal political representation in order to further their business interests. Some of the oligarchs opt for establishing their own political parties (Matuszak, 2012; Junisbai, 2012; Sakwa, 2008a). However the majority of oligarchs appear to stay behind the scenes and rather prefer to engage in immediate exchanges with political and administrative elites informally (Åslund, 2015; Frye, 2002). In this regard, an intriguing study on Russian gubernatorial elections provides important clues to why oligarchs choose formal participation in politics over informal influence. The study suggests that oligarchs prefer to run for public office in regions that are marked by a rather weak institutional environment (low media freedom and government transparency). The authors explain this by arguing that such an institutional environment does not hold elected officials accountable to voters and rather facilitates their reneging on campaign promises (Gehlbach, Sonin & Zhuravskaya, 2010).

Overall, all the discussed group behavior patterns of the oligarchs indicate that the oligarchs as a group have been in constant flux. The Russian experience during its post-Soviet era illustrates this argument well. First, relatively younger oligarchs with important links to President Boris Yeltsin’s family gradually supplanted the initial group of oligarchs with roots in Soviet nomenklatura. Second, the composition of the oligarchs as a group changed to tycoons with ties to president Putin and siloviki (people with roots in the security or military services). Putin’s concerted strategy of taming several defiant, Yeltsin era oligarchs by forcing them out of country or stripping their assets was a key cause of this flux. At present, the Putin era oligarchs are mainly connected to him personally. This is why current EU and American sanctions imposed on Russia have gradually come to involve key oligarchs. What this all implies is that the economic power of oligarchs is tightly interwoven with political influence. Moreover, it appears to be almost an impossible task to be an oligarch and simultaneously be politically unconnected. Those oligarchs who have really been in conflict with the ruling leaders have either lost or gained ground since there is very seldom any intermediate way in the short term. I now turn to quantitative analyses of the determinants of normative support for democracy in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies.

70

2005: 139). The outsider oligarchs made their first capital over the course of Perestroika (the second half of the 1980s) by gaining large profits from the loopholes of the co-existence of regulated and quasi-market prices (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005: 139). The newly emerged oligarchs became billionaires at the age range of 30 to 40 years (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005: 138). Scant evidence from Russia suggests that the oligarchs in the outsider group were predominantly male, better educated and most typically of Jewish descent (Braguinsky, 2009: 315). Another key difference between these two groups of oligarchs was that the annual incomes of the insider, Communist party linked oligarchs were four times higher on average (Braguinsky, 2009: 326).

The oligarchs acquired vast assets from the privatization of state enterprises in several sectors. Important among these were the energy sector, manufacturing, banking, telecommunications, transport, food and beverages production as well as trade and real estate (Hellman, 1998; Åslund, 2005; Treisman, 2016). In resource-rich countries, oligarchs’ pursued their wealth accumulation primarily through buying chemicals, minerals, oil and gas for state-regulated, knockdown prices and by selling them abroad for much higher market prices (Puglisi, 2003: 104-105). There is also plenty of evidence that there has been an incessant transfer of oligarchic wealth to offshore tax havens (Black, Kraakman & Tarassova, 2000; Fortescue, 2006; Åslund, 2015). In fact, many post-Soviet oligarchs have moved an enormous amount of money overseas by purchasing companies, sport clubs and immovable properties (Hay, 2013). Evidence from the UK shows that post-Soviet oligarchs have invested hundreds of millions of pounds in the London housing market alone (Moss, 2014). Such acquisitions have been accompanied by allegations that the oligarchs exploit the host country’s toleration of the secrecy laws of offshore financial centers in moving their capital out of their home countries to make investments (Leigh, Frayman & Ball, 2012).

The presence of oligarchs is also prominent in the post-Soviet media market. Studies from several post-Soviet countries indicate that the oligarchs own popular, nationwide TV channels (Ryabinska, 2014; Berglund, 2014). For instance, key oligarchs in Ukraine own the most popular TV channels and top national dailies. Evidence suggests that these media outlets are very seldom an immediate source of monetary profits, but rather are crucial from a political and social point of view. The major rationale for possessing such media resources is to promote their own reputation and to provide coverage of their products and services (Ryabinska, 2011). A similar situation was going on in pre-Putin era Russia when influential oligarchs owned the most prominent private media outlets. However, these channels were renationalized or restructured in the wake of Putin’s rise to power—of which the most prominent is the case of the then very popular NTV that belonged to the then powerful oligarch and media tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky (Beumers, Hutchings & Rulyova, 2008).

71

Political connections are equally essential for oligarchs to carry on big business activities in the post-Soviet context. Oligarchs invest time and money in their formal and informal political representation in order to further their business interests. Some of the oligarchs opt for establishing their own political parties (Matuszak, 2012; Junisbai, 2012; Sakwa, 2008a). However the majority of oligarchs appear to stay behind the scenes and rather prefer to engage in immediate exchanges with political and administrative elites informally (Åslund, 2015; Frye, 2002). In this regard, an intriguing study on Russian gubernatorial elections provides important clues to why oligarchs choose formal participation in politics over informal influence. The study suggests that oligarchs prefer to run for public office in regions that are marked by a rather weak institutional environment (low media freedom and government transparency). The authors explain this by arguing that such an institutional environment does not hold elected officials accountable to voters and rather facilitates their reneging on campaign promises (Gehlbach, Sonin & Zhuravskaya, 2010).

Overall, all the discussed group behavior patterns of the oligarchs indicate that the oligarchs as a group have been in constant flux. The Russian experience during its post-Soviet era illustrates this argument well. First, relatively younger oligarchs with important links to President Boris Yeltsin’s family gradually supplanted the initial group of oligarchs with roots in Soviet nomenklatura. Second, the composition of the oligarchs as a group changed to tycoons with ties to president Putin and siloviki (people with roots in the security or military services). Putin’s concerted strategy of taming several defiant, Yeltsin era oligarchs by forcing them out of country or stripping their assets was a key cause of this flux. At present, the Putin era oligarchs are mainly connected to him personally. This is why current EU and American sanctions imposed on Russia have gradually come to involve key oligarchs. What this all implies is that the economic power of oligarchs is tightly interwoven with political influence. Moreover, it appears to be almost an impossible task to be an oligarch and simultaneously be politically unconnected. Those oligarchs who have really been in conflict with the ruling leaders have either lost or gained ground since there is very seldom any intermediate way in the short term. I now turn to quantitative analyses of the determinants of normative support for democracy in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies.

70

2005: 139). The outsider oligarchs made their first capital over the course of Perestroika (the second half of the 1980s) by gaining large profits from the loopholes of the co-existence of regulated and quasi-market prices (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005: 139). The newly emerged oligarchs became billionaires at the age range of 30 to 40 years (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005: 138). Scant evidence from Russia suggests that the oligarchs in the outsider group were predominantly male, better educated and most typically of Jewish descent (Braguinsky, 2009: 315). Another key difference between these two groups of oligarchs was that the annual incomes of the insider, Communist party linked oligarchs were four times higher on average (Braguinsky, 2009: 326).

The oligarchs acquired vast assets from the privatization of state enterprises in several sectors. Important among these were the energy sector, manufacturing, banking, telecommunications, transport, food and beverages production as well as trade and real estate (Hellman, 1998; Åslund, 2005; Treisman, 2016). In resource-rich countries, oligarchs’ pursued their wealth accumulation primarily through buying chemicals, minerals, oil and gas for state-regulated, knockdown prices and by selling them abroad for much higher market prices (Puglisi, 2003: 104-105). There is also plenty of evidence that there has been an incessant transfer of oligarchic wealth to offshore tax havens (Black, Kraakman & Tarassova, 2000; Fortescue, 2006; Åslund, 2015). In fact, many post-Soviet oligarchs have moved an enormous amount of money overseas by purchasing companies, sport clubs and immovable properties (Hay, 2013). Evidence from the UK shows that post-Soviet oligarchs have invested hundreds of millions of pounds in the London housing market alone (Moss, 2014). Such acquisitions have been accompanied by allegations that the oligarchs exploit the host country’s toleration of the secrecy laws of offshore financial centers in moving their capital out of their home countries to make investments (Leigh, Frayman & Ball, 2012).

The presence of oligarchs is also prominent in the post-Soviet media market. Studies from several post-Soviet countries indicate that the oligarchs own popular, nationwide TV channels (Ryabinska, 2014; Berglund, 2014). For instance, key oligarchs in Ukraine own the most popular TV channels and top national dailies. Evidence suggests that these media outlets are very seldom an immediate source of monetary profits, but rather are crucial from a political and social point of view. The major rationale for possessing such media resources is to promote their own reputation and to provide coverage of their products and services (Ryabinska, 2011). A similar situation was going on in pre-Putin era Russia when influential oligarchs owned the most prominent private media outlets. However, these channels were renationalized or restructured in the wake of Putin’s rise to power—of which the most prominent is the case of the then very popular NTV that belonged to the then powerful oligarch and media tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky (Beumers, Hutchings & Rulyova, 2008).

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has shown that support for democracy is typically conflated with support for the incumbents (Lipset, 1959; Przeworski, 1991; Svolik, 2013). All these control variables have been demeaned by country and year as in the case of the key variables discussed earlier. It is worth noting here that the exclusive focus of my analysis will be on analyzing the key variables of this study with regard to the hypotheses H1 and H1a. Hence, the aforementioned variables will only be used to control for other prominent explanations for regime support.

Model When comparatively examining multidimensional phenomena such as democratic support, a multi-level approach is necessary to take into account both contextual and individual level factors. In particular, I have in the research design chapter discussed in length that mixed multi-level modelling enables us to make correct estimation of standard errors of regression coefficients by assessing substantive group or contextual-level effects on individual-level variables and by identifying effects due to observed and unobserved group characteristics (Scott, Simonoff & Marx, 2013; Goldstein, 2011). Below, I introduce the structure of the multi-level models used in this study. The subsequent empirical model includes both fixed (given in parentheses) and random effects:

Democratic supportij = b0 + b1j (Political inequality) + b2j (Level of state power and UPF) + b3ij (Gender) + b4ij (Age) + b5ij (Education level) + b6ij (Self-positioning on left-right scale) + b7ij (Income level) + b8ij (General trust in others) + b9ij (Political interest) + b10ij (Religion’s importance in life) + b11ij (Confidence in the government) + b11ij (Attitudes towards the fairness of wealth distribution) + u0j + (u0j×u1ij) + e.

Expressed in words, the above model aims to explain the variation in the dependent variable, which is support for democracy by individual i in country j. In the random part of the above mixed effects model, we, on the one hand, find multiple random intercepts by countries (u0j). On the other hand, we also find random slope coefficients of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs for variation of democratic support in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (u0j×u1ij). Finally, the model also takes into account the remaining residuals at all levels (e). The present thesis primarily departs from the assumption that the residuals are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) from a normal distribution (eijt ∼ N (0,σ2e)). The same applies to the random effects models. The model also includes fixed effects coefficients labeled as b with subscripts.

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Political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs, unfair wealth distribution and normative support for democracy Two major hypotheses guide the present chapter. The first is that normative support for democracy is negatively affected by actual levels of political inequality to the benefit of the oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution (H1). An additional hypothesis is that the aforementioned negative linkage is more pronounced in countries with higher degree of state power and UPF (H1a). The justification for the two hypotheses has been discussed in-depth in the theory chapter. In brief, this investigation seeks to examine the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and the public’s normative support for democracy as oligarchs have been crucial players in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the subsequent sections of this chapter, I introduce the control variables of this study (see the operationalization of the main variables and hypotheses in the research design chapter). Then I introduce the reader to the main statistical model. The section that follows is the results section where the main empirical findings of this analysis are presented. This chapter is concluded with a summary of the main findings and the presentation of supplemental material.

Control variables Consistent with prior studies, several control variables will be considered in the statistical models of this study. The individual level variables were obtained from the WVS.27 The variables age (x003), gender (x001), level of education (x025), scale of incomes (x047) and self-positioning on the left-right scale (e033) are used as control variables in the majority of prior studies. As for the latter, we have strong evidence that ideological preferences profoundly affect people’s evaluation of the political system (Anderson et al., 2005). The variables measuring the importance of religion in life (a006), interest in politics (e023) and general trust in people (a165) have been included to control for the effects proposed by the socio-economic modernization theory (Inglehart, 1997). An additional variable at the individual level is the extent of citizens’ confidence in their government at the given time of survey (e069) included in the WVS. The variable measuring confidence in government is a central control variable in this thesis as prior research on democratic support

27 For question wordings and original variable scales of the WVS variables, see Table 8.

73

has shown that support for democracy is typically conflated with support for the incumbents (Lipset, 1959; Przeworski, 1991; Svolik, 2013). All these control variables have been demeaned by country and year as in the case of the key variables discussed earlier. It is worth noting here that the exclusive focus of my analysis will be on analyzing the key variables of this study with regard to the hypotheses H1 and H1a. Hence, the aforementioned variables will only be used to control for other prominent explanations for regime support.

Model When comparatively examining multidimensional phenomena such as democratic support, a multi-level approach is necessary to take into account both contextual and individual level factors. In particular, I have in the research design chapter discussed in length that mixed multi-level modelling enables us to make correct estimation of standard errors of regression coefficients by assessing substantive group or contextual-level effects on individual-level variables and by identifying effects due to observed and unobserved group characteristics (Scott, Simonoff & Marx, 2013; Goldstein, 2011). Below, I introduce the structure of the multi-level models used in this study. The subsequent empirical model includes both fixed (given in parentheses) and random effects:

Democratic supportij = b0 + b1j (Political inequality) + b2j (Level of state power and UPF) + b3ij (Gender) + b4ij (Age) + b5ij (Education level) + b6ij (Self-positioning on left-right scale) + b7ij (Income level) + b8ij (General trust in others) + b9ij (Political interest) + b10ij (Religion’s importance in life) + b11ij (Confidence in the government) + b11ij (Attitudes towards the fairness of wealth distribution) + u0j + (u0j×u1ij) + e.

Expressed in words, the above model aims to explain the variation in the dependent variable, which is support for democracy by individual i in country j. In the random part of the above mixed effects model, we, on the one hand, find multiple random intercepts by countries (u0j). On the other hand, we also find random slope coefficients of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs for variation of democratic support in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (u0j×u1ij). Finally, the model also takes into account the remaining residuals at all levels (e). The present thesis primarily departs from the assumption that the residuals are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) from a normal distribution (eijt ∼ N (0,σ2e)). The same applies to the random effects models. The model also includes fixed effects coefficients labeled as b with subscripts.

72

Political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs, unfair wealth distribution and normative support for democracy Two major hypotheses guide the present chapter. The first is that normative support for democracy is negatively affected by actual levels of political inequality to the benefit of the oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution (H1). An additional hypothesis is that the aforementioned negative linkage is more pronounced in countries with higher degree of state power and UPF (H1a). The justification for the two hypotheses has been discussed in-depth in the theory chapter. In brief, this investigation seeks to examine the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and the public’s normative support for democracy as oligarchs have been crucial players in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the subsequent sections of this chapter, I introduce the control variables of this study (see the operationalization of the main variables and hypotheses in the research design chapter). Then I introduce the reader to the main statistical model. The section that follows is the results section where the main empirical findings of this analysis are presented. This chapter is concluded with a summary of the main findings and the presentation of supplemental material.

Control variables Consistent with prior studies, several control variables will be considered in the statistical models of this study. The individual level variables were obtained from the WVS.27 The variables age (x003), gender (x001), level of education (x025), scale of incomes (x047) and self-positioning on the left-right scale (e033) are used as control variables in the majority of prior studies. As for the latter, we have strong evidence that ideological preferences profoundly affect people’s evaluation of the political system (Anderson et al., 2005). The variables measuring the importance of religion in life (a006), interest in politics (e023) and general trust in people (a165) have been included to control for the effects proposed by the socio-economic modernization theory (Inglehart, 1997). An additional variable at the individual level is the extent of citizens’ confidence in their government at the given time of survey (e069) included in the WVS. The variable measuring confidence in government is a central control variable in this thesis as prior research on democratic support

27 For question wordings and original variable scales of the WVS variables, see Table 8.

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Now, let us turn our attention to the average level of popular perceptions about unfair wealth distribution in their society in the five pseudo-democracies (another key independent variable in this chapter).

Figure F. The average (median) level of perceived unfair distribution of wealth in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies

Notes: The above graph is based on the WVS variable e041 that taps into citizens’ attitudes as to the extent to which wealth accumulation in their society is considered to be taking place at the expense of others. I have recoded the original variable so that the min value stands for “Wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone” and the max value stands for “People can only get rich at the expense of others”. As discussed in more detail in Chapter three, I operationalized the min value as an indicator for perceptions of an unfair distribution of wealth, whereas the max value stands for its opposite. As can be read from Figure F, the average level of perceived unfairness of wealth distribution has been constant in Armenia (3), varied between 2 and 3 in Georgia, increased from 2 to 4 in Moldova and from 2 to 5 both in Russia and Ukraine over time. These aggregated results corroborate the evidence from prior studies suggesting that people in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies generally agree that wealth accumulation has been more unfair than fair in their societies. The respondents in Russia and Ukraine expressed the most negative perceptions in this regard.

Let us now look at descriptive statistics about what citizens in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies think of democracy and authoritarian forms of rule. Table 3 below is one dimension of the composite dependent variable that

0123456789

0123456789

1990 2000 2015

1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

Armenia Georgia Moldova

Russia Ukraine

Year

74

Results Let us begin by looking at Figure E that displays the level of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs in contrast to that of the broad masses in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (one of the key independent variables in this chapter). The graph shows that there had been an equal or almost equal distribution of political power between oligarchs and the broad masses in Armenia between 1990 and 1995, in Georgia between 1990 and 2012, in Moldova between 1990 and 1992, in Russia only in 1990 and in Ukraine between 1990 and 1994. In addition, we can see that the political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs increased thereafter in all countries. This inequality deteriorated largely both in Armenia and Russia starting in 1996 as well as in Ukraine starting in 1995. Figure E. The level of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies

Notes: The original variable (v2pepwrses_ord) emanates from the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al., 2016a). As discussed in detail in research design chapter, I have recoded the original variable according to the following values: 1 = Equal or almost equal level of political power in the hands of the wealthy people and broad masses; 2 = Wealthy people have more political power when it really matters and 3 = Wealthy people have a strong or dominant hold on political power.

12

31

23

1990 2000 2015

1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

Armenia Georgia Moldova

Russia Ukraine

Year

75

Now, let us turn our attention to the average level of popular perceptions about unfair wealth distribution in their society in the five pseudo-democracies (another key independent variable in this chapter).

Figure F. The average (median) level of perceived unfair distribution of wealth in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies

Notes: The above graph is based on the WVS variable e041 that taps into citizens’ attitudes as to the extent to which wealth accumulation in their society is considered to be taking place at the expense of others. I have recoded the original variable so that the min value stands for “Wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone” and the max value stands for “People can only get rich at the expense of others”. As discussed in more detail in Chapter three, I operationalized the min value as an indicator for perceptions of an unfair distribution of wealth, whereas the max value stands for its opposite. As can be read from Figure F, the average level of perceived unfairness of wealth distribution has been constant in Armenia (3), varied between 2 and 3 in Georgia, increased from 2 to 4 in Moldova and from 2 to 5 both in Russia and Ukraine over time. These aggregated results corroborate the evidence from prior studies suggesting that people in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies generally agree that wealth accumulation has been more unfair than fair in their societies. The respondents in Russia and Ukraine expressed the most negative perceptions in this regard.

Let us now look at descriptive statistics about what citizens in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies think of democracy and authoritarian forms of rule. Table 3 below is one dimension of the composite dependent variable that

0123456789

0123456789

1990 2000 2015

1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

Armenia Georgia Moldova

Russia Ukraine

Year

74

Results Let us begin by looking at Figure E that displays the level of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs in contrast to that of the broad masses in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (one of the key independent variables in this chapter). The graph shows that there had been an equal or almost equal distribution of political power between oligarchs and the broad masses in Armenia between 1990 and 1995, in Georgia between 1990 and 2012, in Moldova between 1990 and 1992, in Russia only in 1990 and in Ukraine between 1990 and 1994. In addition, we can see that the political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs increased thereafter in all countries. This inequality deteriorated largely both in Armenia and Russia starting in 1996 as well as in Ukraine starting in 1995. Figure E. The level of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies

Notes: The original variable (v2pepwrses_ord) emanates from the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al., 2016a). As discussed in detail in research design chapter, I have recoded the original variable according to the following values: 1 = Equal or almost equal level of political power in the hands of the wealthy people and broad masses; 2 = Wealthy people have more political power when it really matters and 3 = Wealthy people have a strong or dominant hold on political power.

12

31

23

1990 2000 2015

1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

Armenia Georgia Moldova

Russia Ukraine

Year

77

percent in Georgia, Moldova and Russia, and 60 percent in Ukraine) accepts this idea as very or fairly good. Overall, both Table 3 and Table 4 suggest that there is a significant level of normative support for democracy, but that we cannot rule out that people in this context are more likely to approve authoritarian forms of rule in some circumstances. Hence, normative regime support appears to be polarizing the citizenry in these countries according to the findings in the two tables. Let us, therefore, turn our attention to the explanatory models for normative support for democracy.

The results of the estimated multi-level regression models are presented in tables and figures below. The hypothesis column indicates which hypothesis the models test and the direction of the expected relationship. When looking in detail at the results displayed in the first model of Table 5, we find that country clusters explain 8.5 percent of variation in normative support (see the value of Intraclass correlation, ICC). This evidence suggests that our data is hierarchically structured and multi-level modelling is necessary to account for the variation due to country-settings. In Figure G, which I will discuss later, I plot the difference of country settings in substantial terms.

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will be employed in regression models below. It is worth noting that the below tables are based on variables that are aggregated at the country level.

Table 3. Having a democratic political system Armenia Georgia Moldova Russia Ukraine Don’t know 3.7 4.2 9.4 10.9 3.6 Very good 36.8 48.9 29.2 17.0 26.8 Fairly good 47.6 40.0 46.1 48.4 52.4 Fairly bad 8.9 5.4 11.4 17.5 12.3 Very bad 2.9 1.7 3.8 6.2 5.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N (2882) (4544) (2952) (6059) (4414) Notes: The original question from the WVS is: (e117) Having a democratic political system. This variable measures the aggregated level of support for democracy based on the following country-years: Armenia (1997 and 2011), Georgia (1996, 2009 and 2014), Moldova (1996, 2002 and 2006), Russia (2006 and 2011) and Ukraine (1996, 2006 and 2011). These limitations are due to data unavailability.

Table 3 suggests that nearly or over 80 percent in Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine and approximately 75 percent in Moldova in addition to 65 percent in Russia support democracy in principle. Thus, the overwhelming majority of the population in these five countries sympathizes with the idea of democracy as a superior form of government. However, the data suggests that there is also a significant share of citizens who find democracy as fairly or very bad across all these countries. Let us have a look at Table 4 that displays what proportion of the citizenry supports the idea of a more authoritarian form of rule.

Table 4. Having a strong leader Armenia Georgia Moldova Russia Ukraine Don’t know 4.9 8.4 8.9 9.5 3.9 Very good 19.8 26.2 23.2 20.7 24.6 Fairly good 33.3 29.7 33.5 35.5 35.3 Bad 25.6 23.6 25.3 24.8 25.4 Very bad 16.4 12.0 9.0 9.5 10.7 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N (2912) (4521) (2956) (6211) (4475) Notes: The original question from the WVS is: (e114) Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections. This variable measures the aggregated level of support for a strong-handed leader based on the following country-years: Armenia (1997 and 2011), Georgia (1996, 2009 and 2014), Moldova (1996, 2002 and 2006), Russia (2006, 2011) and Ukraine (1996, 2006 and 2011). These limitations are due to data unavailability. We can see in Table 4 that a strong authoritarian leadership that does not have to bother with parliament and elections is a popular idea among citizens in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. In particular, in most of the above countries a substantial majority of respondents (55 percent in Armenia, nearly 56

77

percent in Georgia, Moldova and Russia, and 60 percent in Ukraine) accepts this idea as very or fairly good. Overall, both Table 3 and Table 4 suggest that there is a significant level of normative support for democracy, but that we cannot rule out that people in this context are more likely to approve authoritarian forms of rule in some circumstances. Hence, normative regime support appears to be polarizing the citizenry in these countries according to the findings in the two tables. Let us, therefore, turn our attention to the explanatory models for normative support for democracy.

The results of the estimated multi-level regression models are presented in tables and figures below. The hypothesis column indicates which hypothesis the models test and the direction of the expected relationship. When looking in detail at the results displayed in the first model of Table 5, we find that country clusters explain 8.5 percent of variation in normative support (see the value of Intraclass correlation, ICC). This evidence suggests that our data is hierarchically structured and multi-level modelling is necessary to account for the variation due to country-settings. In Figure G, which I will discuss later, I plot the difference of country settings in substantial terms.

76

will be employed in regression models below. It is worth noting that the below tables are based on variables that are aggregated at the country level.

Table 3. Having a democratic political system Armenia Georgia Moldova Russia Ukraine Don’t know 3.7 4.2 9.4 10.9 3.6 Very good 36.8 48.9 29.2 17.0 26.8 Fairly good 47.6 40.0 46.1 48.4 52.4 Fairly bad 8.9 5.4 11.4 17.5 12.3 Very bad 2.9 1.7 3.8 6.2 5.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N (2882) (4544) (2952) (6059) (4414) Notes: The original question from the WVS is: (e117) Having a democratic political system. This variable measures the aggregated level of support for democracy based on the following country-years: Armenia (1997 and 2011), Georgia (1996, 2009 and 2014), Moldova (1996, 2002 and 2006), Russia (2006 and 2011) and Ukraine (1996, 2006 and 2011). These limitations are due to data unavailability.

Table 3 suggests that nearly or over 80 percent in Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine and approximately 75 percent in Moldova in addition to 65 percent in Russia support democracy in principle. Thus, the overwhelming majority of the population in these five countries sympathizes with the idea of democracy as a superior form of government. However, the data suggests that there is also a significant share of citizens who find democracy as fairly or very bad across all these countries. Let us have a look at Table 4 that displays what proportion of the citizenry supports the idea of a more authoritarian form of rule.

Table 4. Having a strong leader Armenia Georgia Moldova Russia Ukraine Don’t know 4.9 8.4 8.9 9.5 3.9 Very good 19.8 26.2 23.2 20.7 24.6 Fairly good 33.3 29.7 33.5 35.5 35.3 Bad 25.6 23.6 25.3 24.8 25.4 Very bad 16.4 12.0 9.0 9.5 10.7 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N (2912) (4521) (2956) (6211) (4475) Notes: The original question from the WVS is: (e114) Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections. This variable measures the aggregated level of support for a strong-handed leader based on the following country-years: Armenia (1997 and 2011), Georgia (1996, 2009 and 2014), Moldova (1996, 2002 and 2006), Russia (2006, 2011) and Ukraine (1996, 2006 and 2011). These limitations are due to data unavailability. We can see in Table 4 that a strong authoritarian leadership that does not have to bother with parliament and elections is a popular idea among citizens in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. In particular, in most of the above countries a substantial majority of respondents (55 percent in Armenia, nearly 56

79

Table 5. The determinants of normative support for democracy (continued)

Hyp

othe

sis

(exp

ecte

d di

rect

ion)

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 3

Mod

el 4

Mod

el 5

Interaction effects pol_ineq_matters*wealth_ineq_unfair

H1 (-)

-0.0811** (0.0248)

pol_ineq_dom*wealth_ineq_unfair

H1 (-)

-0.0468 (0.0327)

pol_ineq_matters*state_power

H1a (-) ---

pol_ineq_dom*state_power

H1a (-) ---

wealth_ineq_unfair*state_power

H1a (-)

0.00638 (0.00469)

Intercept 6.515** (0.248)

7.261** (0.429)

7.264** (0.429)

7.261** (0.429)

7.264** (0.429)

Random-effects Parameters

SD for random intercept by country

0.605* (0.176)

0.420** (0.137)

0.420** (0.137)

0.420** (0.137)

0.420** (0.137)

SD (overall residual)

2.040** (0.0154)

1.945** (0.0200)

1.945** (0.0200)

1.945** (0.0200)

1.943** (0.0200)

AIC 37644.5 19718.8 19719.0 19718.8 19712.0 BIC 37665.7 19822.2 19828.8 19822.2 19828.3 Intraclass correlation (ICC)

0.0809 0.0445 0.0446 0.0445 0.0446

Number of countries

5 5 5 5 5

Number of individuals

8821 4718 4718 4718 4718

Log Pseudolikelihood

-18819.2 -9843.4 -9842.5 -9843.4 -9838.0

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Independent covariance structure between the variance components is assumed since no significant unstructured covariance structure could be observed by preceding, alternative estimations (omitted above). All models were estimated with robust standard errors. Stars indicate * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 significance levels. SD indicates standard deviation. The symbol --- indicates that the variable has been excluded from regression model due to multicollinearity.

78

Table 5. The determinants of normative support for democracy

Hyp

othe

sis

(exp

ecte

d di

rect

ion)

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 3

Mod

el 4

Mod

el 5

Main effects Level of state power and UPF (state_power)

0.0363 (0.0984)

0.0373 (0.0985)

0.0363 (0.0984)

0.0349 (0.0984)

Gender (male=1)

0.148** (0.0582)

0.146** (0.0582)

0.148** (0.0582)

0.150** (0.0581)

Age categories

-0.0276 (0.0241)

-0.0287 (0.0241)

-0.0276 (0.0241)

-0.0257 (0.0241)

Educational level (categories)

0.0870** (0.0161)

0.0867** (0.0161)

0.0870** (0.0161)

0.0873** (0.0161)

Self-positioning on left-right scale

0.0569** (0.0129)

0.0565** (0.0129)

0.0569** (0.0129)

0.0562** (0.0129)

Income level (steps)

0.0406** (0.0140)

0.0404** (0.0140)

0.0406** (0.0140)

0.0392** (0.0140)

General trust in other people

0.172** (0.0671)

0.168** (0.0672)

0.172** (0.0671)

0.174** (0.0671)

Political interest

0.0796** (0.0314)

0.0782** (0.0315)

0.0796** (0.0314)

0.0820** (0.0314)

Religion is important in life

0.138** (0.0312)

0.137** (0.0312)

0.138** (0.0312)

0.140** (0.0312)

Confidence in the government

0.204** (0.0324)

0.208** (0.0325)

0.204** (0.0324)

0.205** (0.0323)

Unfair distribution of wealth (wealth_ineq_unfair)

H1 (-)

-0.0680** (0.0107)

-0.0802** (0.0139)

-0.0680** (0.0107)

-0.0143 (0.0205)

Wealthy people have more political power when it really matters (pol_ineq_matters); Ref.=pol_equal

H1 (-)

-1.279** (0.556)

-1.278** (0.557)

-1.279** (0.556)

-1.281** (0.556)

Wealthy people have a strong or dominant hold on political power (pol_ineq_dom); Ref.=pol_equal

H1 (-)

-1.002 (0.632)

-1.002 (0.633)

-1.002 (0.632)

-1.002 (0.632)

79

Table 5. The determinants of normative support for democracy (continued)

Hyp

othe

sis

(exp

ecte

d di

rect

ion)

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 3

Mod

el 4

Mod

el 5

Interaction effects pol_ineq_matters*wealth_ineq_unfair

H1 (-)

-0.0811** (0.0248)

pol_ineq_dom*wealth_ineq_unfair

H1 (-)

-0.0468 (0.0327)

pol_ineq_matters*state_power

H1a (-) ---

pol_ineq_dom*state_power

H1a (-) ---

wealth_ineq_unfair*state_power

H1a (-)

0.00638 (0.00469)

Intercept 6.515** (0.248)

7.261** (0.429)

7.264** (0.429)

7.261** (0.429)

7.264** (0.429)

Random-effects Parameters

SD for random intercept by country

0.605* (0.176)

0.420** (0.137)

0.420** (0.137)

0.420** (0.137)

0.420** (0.137)

SD (overall residual)

2.040** (0.0154)

1.945** (0.0200)

1.945** (0.0200)

1.945** (0.0200)

1.943** (0.0200)

AIC 37644.5 19718.8 19719.0 19718.8 19712.0 BIC 37665.7 19822.2 19828.8 19822.2 19828.3 Intraclass correlation (ICC)

0.0809 0.0445 0.0446 0.0445 0.0446

Number of countries

5 5 5 5 5

Number of individuals

8821 4718 4718 4718 4718

Log Pseudolikelihood

-18819.2 -9843.4 -9842.5 -9843.4 -9838.0

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Independent covariance structure between the variance components is assumed since no significant unstructured covariance structure could be observed by preceding, alternative estimations (omitted above). All models were estimated with robust standard errors. Stars indicate * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 significance levels. SD indicates standard deviation. The symbol --- indicates that the variable has been excluded from regression model due to multicollinearity.

78

Table 5. The determinants of normative support for democracy

Hyp

othe

sis

(exp

ecte

d di

rect

ion)

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 3

Mod

el 4

Mod

el 5

Main effects Level of state power and UPF (state_power)

0.0363 (0.0984)

0.0373 (0.0985)

0.0363 (0.0984)

0.0349 (0.0984)

Gender (male=1)

0.148** (0.0582)

0.146** (0.0582)

0.148** (0.0582)

0.150** (0.0581)

Age categories

-0.0276 (0.0241)

-0.0287 (0.0241)

-0.0276 (0.0241)

-0.0257 (0.0241)

Educational level (categories)

0.0870** (0.0161)

0.0867** (0.0161)

0.0870** (0.0161)

0.0873** (0.0161)

Self-positioning on left-right scale

0.0569** (0.0129)

0.0565** (0.0129)

0.0569** (0.0129)

0.0562** (0.0129)

Income level (steps)

0.0406** (0.0140)

0.0404** (0.0140)

0.0406** (0.0140)

0.0392** (0.0140)

General trust in other people

0.172** (0.0671)

0.168** (0.0672)

0.172** (0.0671)

0.174** (0.0671)

Political interest

0.0796** (0.0314)

0.0782** (0.0315)

0.0796** (0.0314)

0.0820** (0.0314)

Religion is important in life

0.138** (0.0312)

0.137** (0.0312)

0.138** (0.0312)

0.140** (0.0312)

Confidence in the government

0.204** (0.0324)

0.208** (0.0325)

0.204** (0.0324)

0.205** (0.0323)

Unfair distribution of wealth (wealth_ineq_unfair)

H1 (-)

-0.0680** (0.0107)

-0.0802** (0.0139)

-0.0680** (0.0107)

-0.0143 (0.0205)

Wealthy people have more political power when it really matters (pol_ineq_matters); Ref.=pol_equal

H1 (-)

-1.279** (0.556)

-1.278** (0.557)

-1.279** (0.556)

-1.281** (0.556)

Wealthy people have a strong or dominant hold on political power (pol_ineq_dom); Ref.=pol_equal

H1 (-)

-1.002 (0.632)

-1.002 (0.633)

-1.002 (0.632)

-1.002 (0.632)

81

concentration (and UPF) and political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs on the public’s normative support for democracy. However, I will later employ an alternative measure of political inequality in order to check for the robustness of these results. In addition, it is worth noting that the major findings from Table 5 hold even in simple OLS regressions with clustered standard errors (not reproduced in the above table for reasons of space).

As concerns the substantial effects of random intercepts in above models, Figure G reveals that support for democracy is on average more than one point lower (the range of my dependent variable is 0-10) in Russia at any given level of the remaining independent variables. In contrast, support for democracy is on average up to 0.5 points higher in Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine at any level of the independent variables employed in regressions. In addition, Figure G illustrates that the variation in support for democracy due to country settings is not significant in Moldova. Figure G. Random variation of normative democratic support in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies

Notes: Random intercepts per country with 95 % CI. Next, I employ several robustness checks in order to ensure that my main results are robust to alternative specifications of the key variables.

-1 -.5 0 .5Normative Democratic Support

Ukraine

Russia

Moldova

Georgia

Armenia

Random Intercept by CountryConfidence interval

80

It is worth repeating here that all subsequent interpretations of key variables are on average and with control for all other variables included in the models. Model 2 involves all independent variables in the fixed part of the mixed regression. Turning to the key variables of this study, we can see in the table above that normative support for democracy, as expected in H1, is negatively associated with perceived unfair wealth distribution (see wealth_ineq_unfair, -0.0680**, see also Figure H). Moreover, we also observe that actual political inequality to the benefit of the oligarchs is significantly and negatively associated with democratic support when wealth matters for them on fateful occasions (see pol_ineq_matters, -1.279**; as expected in H1; see also Figure I). However, it is worth noting that the results suggest that normative support for democracy wanes only in contexts where oligarchs have significant political influence on matters that are vital for them (see the differences between pol_ineq_matters and pol_ineq_dom). In addition, the coefficients for pol_ineq_matters and pol_ineq_dom do not change considerably in the subsequent models presented in Table 5. Note that these results are valid in reference to contexts of political equality between the oligarchs and the broad citizenry.

Turning to the results of possible interaction between perceived unfair wealth distribution and actual political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs when it really matters for the latter, we see in Model 5 that people prefer authoritarianism to democracy in principle whenever perceptions of unfair distribution of wealth increase concurrently with that form of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs (see pol_ineq_matters*wealth_ineq_unfair, -0.0811**). Figure J illustrates this interaction effect on normative support for democracy. In fact, the interaction effect of pol_ineq_dom*wealth_ineq_unfair is not significant. Thus, the influence on regime support by oligarchs’ actual total monopoly on political power is not significantly dependent on the extent to which people perceive an unfair distribution of wealth in their country.

Regarding the expectations of H1a, we observe in Table 5 that the level of state power and UPF does not have any significant moderating effect on the negative relationship between perceived unfair wealth distribution and normative support for democracy (see wealth_ineq_unfair*state_power above). As for actual political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs, we, however, see that there are no coefficients presented in Model 4 of Table 5. The reason is that there is a high collinearity between political inequality and state power (see pol_ineq_matters*state_power and pol_ineq_dom*state_power) in Model 4 despite the fact that the bivariate correlation between the variables is fairly low and not statistically significant (r = 0.1726). This indicates that we can hardly separate the effects of these two key variables on normative support for democracy in contexts where they occur simultaneously and at a greater level. In other words, it is difficult to pin down the statistical impact of the increasing co-occurrence of state power

81

concentration (and UPF) and political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs on the public’s normative support for democracy. However, I will later employ an alternative measure of political inequality in order to check for the robustness of these results. In addition, it is worth noting that the major findings from Table 5 hold even in simple OLS regressions with clustered standard errors (not reproduced in the above table for reasons of space).

As concerns the substantial effects of random intercepts in above models, Figure G reveals that support for democracy is on average more than one point lower (the range of my dependent variable is 0-10) in Russia at any given level of the remaining independent variables. In contrast, support for democracy is on average up to 0.5 points higher in Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine at any level of the independent variables employed in regressions. In addition, Figure G illustrates that the variation in support for democracy due to country settings is not significant in Moldova. Figure G. Random variation of normative democratic support in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies

Notes: Random intercepts per country with 95 % CI. Next, I employ several robustness checks in order to ensure that my main results are robust to alternative specifications of the key variables.

-1 -.5 0 .5Normative Democratic Support

Ukraine

Russia

Moldova

Georgia

Armenia

Random Intercept by CountryConfidence interval

80

It is worth repeating here that all subsequent interpretations of key variables are on average and with control for all other variables included in the models. Model 2 involves all independent variables in the fixed part of the mixed regression. Turning to the key variables of this study, we can see in the table above that normative support for democracy, as expected in H1, is negatively associated with perceived unfair wealth distribution (see wealth_ineq_unfair, -0.0680**, see also Figure H). Moreover, we also observe that actual political inequality to the benefit of the oligarchs is significantly and negatively associated with democratic support when wealth matters for them on fateful occasions (see pol_ineq_matters, -1.279**; as expected in H1; see also Figure I). However, it is worth noting that the results suggest that normative support for democracy wanes only in contexts where oligarchs have significant political influence on matters that are vital for them (see the differences between pol_ineq_matters and pol_ineq_dom). In addition, the coefficients for pol_ineq_matters and pol_ineq_dom do not change considerably in the subsequent models presented in Table 5. Note that these results are valid in reference to contexts of political equality between the oligarchs and the broad citizenry.

Turning to the results of possible interaction between perceived unfair wealth distribution and actual political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs when it really matters for the latter, we see in Model 5 that people prefer authoritarianism to democracy in principle whenever perceptions of unfair distribution of wealth increase concurrently with that form of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs (see pol_ineq_matters*wealth_ineq_unfair, -0.0811**). Figure J illustrates this interaction effect on normative support for democracy. In fact, the interaction effect of pol_ineq_dom*wealth_ineq_unfair is not significant. Thus, the influence on regime support by oligarchs’ actual total monopoly on political power is not significantly dependent on the extent to which people perceive an unfair distribution of wealth in their country.

Regarding the expectations of H1a, we observe in Table 5 that the level of state power and UPF does not have any significant moderating effect on the negative relationship between perceived unfair wealth distribution and normative support for democracy (see wealth_ineq_unfair*state_power above). As for actual political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs, we, however, see that there are no coefficients presented in Model 4 of Table 5. The reason is that there is a high collinearity between political inequality and state power (see pol_ineq_matters*state_power and pol_ineq_dom*state_power) in Model 4 despite the fact that the bivariate correlation between the variables is fairly low and not statistically significant (r = 0.1726). This indicates that we can hardly separate the effects of these two key variables on normative support for democracy in contexts where they occur simultaneously and at a greater level. In other words, it is difficult to pin down the statistical impact of the increasing co-occurrence of state power

83

Table 6. The determinants of normative support for democracy. Robustness checks

Hyp

othe

sis

(exp

ecte

d di

rect

ion)

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 3

Mod

el 4

Mod

el 5

Main effects Level of state power and UPF (state_power)

0.0291 (0.109)

0.0309 (0.108)

0.115 (0.124)

0.0313** (0.0117)

0.122 (0.0934)

Gender (male=1) 0.120* (0.0688)

0.118* (0.0699)

0.121* (0.0686)

0.117* (0.0700)

0.121* (0.0687)

Age categories -0.00474 (0.0283)

-0.00635 (0.0279)

-0.00510 (0.0281)

-0.00526 (0.0284)

-0.00403 (0.0286)

Educational level (categories)

0.0892** (0.0306)

0.0885** (0.0302)

0.0898** (0.0310)

0.0888** (0.0304)

0.0901** (0.0312)

Self-positioning on left-right scale

0.0593 (0.0420)

0.0584 (0.0407)

0.0581 (0.0412)

0.0584 (0.0407)

0.0581 (0.0412)

Income level (steps)

0.0375 (0.0337)

0.0370 (0.0343)

0.0369 (0.0334)

0.0387 (0.0350)

0.0386 (0.0341)

General trust in other people

0.108 (0.195)

0.104 (0.193)

0.105 (0.195)

0.103 (0.193)

0.105 (0.196)

Political interest 0.0850* (0.0465)

0.0832* (0.0461)

0.0848* (0.0466)

0.0833* (0.0461)

0.0848* (0.0467)

Religion is important in life

0.103 (0.0687)

0.102 (0.0685)

0.103 (0.0681)

0.102 (0.0683)

0.103 (0.0679)

Confidence in the government

0.176* (0.103)

0.184* (0.104)

0.177* (0.104)

0.184* (0.104)

0.177* (0.104)

Unfair distribution of wealth (wealth_ineq_unfair)

H1 (-) -0.0817** (0.0237)

-0.0967** (0.0325)

-0.0810** (0.0232)

-0.0966** (0.0325)

-0.0809** (0.0231)

Our country is run to the benefit of big interest (big_int)

H1 (-) 0.210 (0.167)

0.199 (0.164)

0.286** (0.108)

0.202 (0.162)

0.292** (0.104)

Wealthy people have more political power when it really matters (pol_ineq_matters); Ref.=pol_equal

H1 (-) -1.258** (0.619)

-1.258** (0.619)

-1.254** (0.619)

82

Robustness checks An additional variable from WVS used in this study is citizens’ perception of whether their country is run by big interest vs. for all people’s benefit (e128). As of yet and to my knowledge, the variable e128 has not been used in any other studies concerned with democratic support. A number of studies, however, have used this variable to measure various, but closely related factors. In particular, it has been used to measure individual (Paxton & Knack, 2012: 177) and political trust (Bean, 2005; Farnsworth, 2003: 28), cynical attitudes towards national affairs (Grammich & Fair, 2007) and internal political efficacy (Mongkuo et al., 2014). However, some other studies have operationalized the variable as perceptions of societal fairness (You, 2012: 714) or as perceptions of state capture by the few (MacCulloch, 2005: 107)—yet, they did not use the language of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs as a group. In a relatively more recent study, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2009) have employed the variable as an indicator of mass perceptions of state capture by business interest groups. Still, they (2009: 301) are well aware that the variable “does not talk about business explicitly but instead mentions ‘big interests’”. I believe that this variable is a tolerable proxy for oligarchic interest domination of the political system (see Pleines, 2009: 114). Hence, this variable will help me to capture ordinary citizens’ perspectives on whether they consider their current political system primarily to serve oligarchic interests in contrast to that of the public at large. I, however, mainly use this variable in below models to check the robustness of my results in general and political inequality in particular.

83

Table 6. The determinants of normative support for democracy. Robustness checks

Hyp

othe

sis

(exp

ecte

d di

rect

ion)

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 3

Mod

el 4

Mod

el 5

Main effects Level of state power and UPF (state_power)

0.0291 (0.109)

0.0309 (0.108)

0.115 (0.124)

0.0313** (0.0117)

0.122 (0.0934)

Gender (male=1) 0.120* (0.0688)

0.118* (0.0699)

0.121* (0.0686)

0.117* (0.0700)

0.121* (0.0687)

Age categories -0.00474 (0.0283)

-0.00635 (0.0279)

-0.00510 (0.0281)

-0.00526 (0.0284)

-0.00403 (0.0286)

Educational level (categories)

0.0892** (0.0306)

0.0885** (0.0302)

0.0898** (0.0310)

0.0888** (0.0304)

0.0901** (0.0312)

Self-positioning on left-right scale

0.0593 (0.0420)

0.0584 (0.0407)

0.0581 (0.0412)

0.0584 (0.0407)

0.0581 (0.0412)

Income level (steps)

0.0375 (0.0337)

0.0370 (0.0343)

0.0369 (0.0334)

0.0387 (0.0350)

0.0386 (0.0341)

General trust in other people

0.108 (0.195)

0.104 (0.193)

0.105 (0.195)

0.103 (0.193)

0.105 (0.196)

Political interest 0.0850* (0.0465)

0.0832* (0.0461)

0.0848* (0.0466)

0.0833* (0.0461)

0.0848* (0.0467)

Religion is important in life

0.103 (0.0687)

0.102 (0.0685)

0.103 (0.0681)

0.102 (0.0683)

0.103 (0.0679)

Confidence in the government

0.176* (0.103)

0.184* (0.104)

0.177* (0.104)

0.184* (0.104)

0.177* (0.104)

Unfair distribution of wealth (wealth_ineq_unfair)

H1 (-) -0.0817** (0.0237)

-0.0967** (0.0325)

-0.0810** (0.0232)

-0.0966** (0.0325)

-0.0809** (0.0231)

Our country is run to the benefit of big interest (big_int)

H1 (-) 0.210 (0.167)

0.199 (0.164)

0.286** (0.108)

0.202 (0.162)

0.292** (0.104)

Wealthy people have more political power when it really matters (pol_ineq_matters); Ref.=pol_equal

H1 (-) -1.258** (0.619)

-1.258** (0.619)

-1.254** (0.619)

82

Robustness checks An additional variable from WVS used in this study is citizens’ perception of whether their country is run by big interest vs. for all people’s benefit (e128). As of yet and to my knowledge, the variable e128 has not been used in any other studies concerned with democratic support. A number of studies, however, have used this variable to measure various, but closely related factors. In particular, it has been used to measure individual (Paxton & Knack, 2012: 177) and political trust (Bean, 2005; Farnsworth, 2003: 28), cynical attitudes towards national affairs (Grammich & Fair, 2007) and internal political efficacy (Mongkuo et al., 2014). However, some other studies have operationalized the variable as perceptions of societal fairness (You, 2012: 714) or as perceptions of state capture by the few (MacCulloch, 2005: 107)—yet, they did not use the language of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs as a group. In a relatively more recent study, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2009) have employed the variable as an indicator of mass perceptions of state capture by business interest groups. Still, they (2009: 301) are well aware that the variable “does not talk about business explicitly but instead mentions ‘big interests’”. I believe that this variable is a tolerable proxy for oligarchic interest domination of the political system (see Pleines, 2009: 114). Hence, this variable will help me to capture ordinary citizens’ perspectives on whether they consider their current political system primarily to serve oligarchic interests in contrast to that of the public at large. I, however, mainly use this variable in below models to check the robustness of my results in general and political inequality in particular.

85

All models above involve the weight variable s109a from WVS at the individual level. Moreover, I have also added the alternative measure of political inequality to all above models. As can be seen in Table 6, all key results of this study are robust to alternative specifications and controls. In particular, evidence lends support to H1, but not to H1a despite employing the alternative measure of political inequality. To put it differently, the degree of state power neither moderates the negative effect of perceived unfair wealth distribution (see wealth_ineq_unfair*state_power above) nor of political inequality (see big_int*state_power above) in contrast to the expectations of H1a. Thus, the levels of state power and UPF neither have any direct nor conditional effects on people’s support for democracy in the abstract. All these results are even robust to controlling for the level of democracy28 and country-year settings (as in Model 4 and 5 presented in Table 6, see the indicator row of country-year fixed effects). In the subsequent Appendix to this chapter, I provide summary statistics for all the regression variables, bivariate correlations and figures illustrating the substantial effects of my key variables on the dependent variable of this study.

Summary of the results What is the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and popular support for democracy in principle? This question guided the above analysis for regime support in principle. The current chapter employed internationally recognized, comparative datasets to study normative support for democracy in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine). Results suggest that actual political inequality to the benefit of the oligarchs as a group (when it really matters for their vital interests) and higher levels of perceived wealth distribution unfairness negatively influence normative support for democracy in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (hence, H1 is supported). Moreover, Russia stands out as a context where people harbor significantly lesser normative support for democracy even when controlling for the most important variables discussed earlier. Thus, we can see that actual levels of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceived unfair distribution of wealth are detrimental to mass opinion about democracy. Interestingly and in contrast to our expectations in H1a, the level of state power and UPF neither had any significant effect on regime support in principle nor on the negative linkage between actual political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceived unfair distribution of wealth, on the one side, and normative support for democracy on the other.

28 I estimated all the models in Table 6 with the help of the variable fh_polity2 used in Figure A, but omitted the results from the table for reasons of space and because country settings have been controlled for in all previous models as well.

84

Table 6. The determinants of normative support for democracy. Robustness checks (continued)

Hyp

othe

sis

(exp

ecte

d di

rect

ion)

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 3

Mod

el 4

Mod

el 5

Wealthy people have a strong or dominant hold on political power (pol_ineq_dom); Ref.=pol_equal

H1 (-) -0.996** (0.237)

-0.997** (0.237)

-1.005** (0.234)

Interaction effects

wealth_ineq_unfair*state_power

H1a (-)

0.00939 (0.00805)

0.00940 (0.00804)

big_int*state_power

H1a (-)

-0.0896 (0.0809)

-0.0925 (0.0834)

Intercept 7.050** (0.0842)

7.066** (0.0957)

6.981** (0.0634)

6.057** (0.0964)

5.954** (0.129)

Random-effects Parameters

SD for random intercept by country

0.432** (0.137)

0.432** (0.137)

0.436** (0.138)

SD (overall residual)

1.934** (0.0355)

1.934** (0.0356)

1.934** (0.0350)

1.932** (0.0354)

1.933** (0.0348)

AIC 15450.0 15446.7 15448.5 15423.8 15425.5 BIC 15482.1 15478.8 15480.6 15455.9 15457.6 Intraclass correlation (ICC)

0.0475 0.0476 0.0484

Number of countries

5 5 5 5 5

Number of individuals

4519 4519 4519 4519 4519

Log Pseudolikelihood

-7720.0 -7718.4 -7719.3 -7706.9 -7707.8

Country-year fixed effects

No No No Yes Yes

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Independent covariance structure between the variance components is assumed since no significant unstructured covariance structure could be observed by preceding, alternative estimations (omitted above). All models were estimated with robust standard errors. Stars indicate * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 significance levels. SD indicates standard deviation.

85

All models above involve the weight variable s109a from WVS at the individual level. Moreover, I have also added the alternative measure of political inequality to all above models. As can be seen in Table 6, all key results of this study are robust to alternative specifications and controls. In particular, evidence lends support to H1, but not to H1a despite employing the alternative measure of political inequality. To put it differently, the degree of state power neither moderates the negative effect of perceived unfair wealth distribution (see wealth_ineq_unfair*state_power above) nor of political inequality (see big_int*state_power above) in contrast to the expectations of H1a. Thus, the levels of state power and UPF neither have any direct nor conditional effects on people’s support for democracy in the abstract. All these results are even robust to controlling for the level of democracy28 and country-year settings (as in Model 4 and 5 presented in Table 6, see the indicator row of country-year fixed effects). In the subsequent Appendix to this chapter, I provide summary statistics for all the regression variables, bivariate correlations and figures illustrating the substantial effects of my key variables on the dependent variable of this study.

Summary of the results What is the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and popular support for democracy in principle? This question guided the above analysis for regime support in principle. The current chapter employed internationally recognized, comparative datasets to study normative support for democracy in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine). Results suggest that actual political inequality to the benefit of the oligarchs as a group (when it really matters for their vital interests) and higher levels of perceived wealth distribution unfairness negatively influence normative support for democracy in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (hence, H1 is supported). Moreover, Russia stands out as a context where people harbor significantly lesser normative support for democracy even when controlling for the most important variables discussed earlier. Thus, we can see that actual levels of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceived unfair distribution of wealth are detrimental to mass opinion about democracy. Interestingly and in contrast to our expectations in H1a, the level of state power and UPF neither had any significant effect on regime support in principle nor on the negative linkage between actual political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceived unfair distribution of wealth, on the one side, and normative support for democracy on the other.

28 I estimated all the models in Table 6 with the help of the variable fh_polity2 used in Figure A, but omitted the results from the table for reasons of space and because country settings have been controlled for in all previous models as well.

84

Table 6. The determinants of normative support for democracy. Robustness checks (continued)

Hyp

othe

sis

(exp

ecte

d di

rect

ion)

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 3

Mod

el 4

Mod

el 5

Wealthy people have a strong or dominant hold on political power (pol_ineq_dom); Ref.=pol_equal

H1 (-) -0.996** (0.237)

-0.997** (0.237)

-1.005** (0.234)

Interaction effects

wealth_ineq_unfair*state_power

H1a (-)

0.00939 (0.00805)

0.00940 (0.00804)

big_int*state_power

H1a (-)

-0.0896 (0.0809)

-0.0925 (0.0834)

Intercept 7.050** (0.0842)

7.066** (0.0957)

6.981** (0.0634)

6.057** (0.0964)

5.954** (0.129)

Random-effects Parameters

SD for random intercept by country

0.432** (0.137)

0.432** (0.137)

0.436** (0.138)

SD (overall residual)

1.934** (0.0355)

1.934** (0.0356)

1.934** (0.0350)

1.932** (0.0354)

1.933** (0.0348)

AIC 15450.0 15446.7 15448.5 15423.8 15425.5 BIC 15482.1 15478.8 15480.6 15455.9 15457.6 Intraclass correlation (ICC)

0.0475 0.0476 0.0484

Number of countries

5 5 5 5 5

Number of individuals

4519 4519 4519 4519 4519

Log Pseudolikelihood

-7720.0 -7718.4 -7719.3 -7706.9 -7707.8

Country-year fixed effects

No No No Yes Yes

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Independent covariance structure between the variance components is assumed since no significant unstructured covariance structure could be observed by preceding, alternative estimations (omitted above). All models were estimated with robust standard errors. Stars indicate * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 significance levels. SD indicates standard deviation.

87

Figure I. Predicted effects of attitudes about unfair wealth distribution on normative support for democracy

Notes: The figure above shows the predicted effects (with 95 % CI) of attitudes towards unfair wealth distribution on people’s normative support for democracy. The effects are calculated from the fixed part of the regression. Following the recommendations by some scholars (Berry, Golder & Milton, 2012), the histogram in the background shows the density of responses for the attitudes towards wealth distribution.

5.5

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86

Appendix Figure H. Predicted effects of political inequality on normative support for democracy

Notes: The figure above shows the predicted effects (with 95 % CI) of political inequality on people’s normative support for democracy. The effects are calculated from the fixed part of the regression. Following the recommendations by some scholars (Berry, Golder & Milton, 2012), the histogram in the background shows the density of responses for the level of political inequality.

56

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Political equality Political inequality whenit really mattersfor the wealthy

Politicalinequality -

power monopolyby the wealthyThe Level of Political Inequality

87

Figure I. Predicted effects of attitudes about unfair wealth distribution on normative support for democracy

Notes: The figure above shows the predicted effects (with 95 % CI) of attitudes towards unfair wealth distribution on people’s normative support for democracy. The effects are calculated from the fixed part of the regression. Following the recommendations by some scholars (Berry, Golder & Milton, 2012), the histogram in the background shows the density of responses for the attitudes towards wealth distribution.

5.5

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WealthAttitudes Towards Wealth Distribution

86

Appendix Figure H. Predicted effects of political inequality on normative support for democracy

Notes: The figure above shows the predicted effects (with 95 % CI) of political inequality on people’s normative support for democracy. The effects are calculated from the fixed part of the regression. Following the recommendations by some scholars (Berry, Golder & Milton, 2012), the histogram in the background shows the density of responses for the level of political inequality.

56

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Politicalinequality -

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89

Table 7. The variables and summary statistics N Mean SD Min Max Political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs as a group (pol_ineq), v2pepwrses_ord (V-Dem)

4519 1.8659 .6591097 1 3

Level of state power and UPF (state_power)

4519 2.089843 2.356812 0 6

Gender (male=1), x001 (WVS)

4519 .4874972 .499899 0 1

Age categories, x003 (WVS)

4519 1.943572 1.237475 0 4

Educational level (categories), x025 (WVS)

4519 .2308679 1.833244 -4.5695 3.505607

Self-positioning on left-right scale, e033 (WVS)

4519 .0322454 2.244753 -4.926617 5.066484

Income level (steps), x047 (WVS)

4519 3.591724 2.228916 1 10

General trust in other people, a165 (WVS)

4519 -.0004975 .421273 -.3097244 .8128624

Political interest, e023 (WVS)

4519 .1034309 .9327362 -1.473873 1.930796

Religion is important in life, a006 (WVS)

4519 -.0255395 .9311407 -2.27309 1.677598

Confidence in the government, e069 (WVS)

4519 .020244 .8913078 -1.362157 2.053034

Unfair wealth distribution (wealth_ineq_unfair), e041 (WVS)

4519 -.1225284 2.709207 -3.32951 6.232307

Our country is run to the benefit of all people v.s. big interest (big_int), e128 (WVS)

4519 .9203364 .2708017 0 1

Normative Democratic Support, e117 and e123 (WVS)

4519 6.685476 2.074616 0 10

Notes: All independent variables are centered at the country-year level except those coded as a dichotomy. For question wordings and original variable scales of the above WVS variables, see Table 8.

88

Figure J. Predicted interaction effects of political inequality and attitudes about unfair wealth distribution on normative support for democracy

Notes: The figure above shows the predicted effects (with 95 % CI) of the interaction between political inequality and attitudes towards unfair wealth distribution on people’s normative support for democracy. The effects are calculated from the fixed part of the regression.

56

78

95

67

89

Fair Distributionof Wealth

Unfair Distributionof Wealth

Fair Distributionof Wealth

Unfair Distributionof Wealth

Equal political powerWealthy people have more power

when it really matters

Wealthy people have a strongor dominant hold on power

Nor

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89

Table 7. The variables and summary statistics N Mean SD Min Max Political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs as a group (pol_ineq), v2pepwrses_ord (V-Dem)

4519 1.8659 .6591097 1 3

Level of state power and UPF (state_power)

4519 2.089843 2.356812 0 6

Gender (male=1), x001 (WVS)

4519 .4874972 .499899 0 1

Age categories, x003 (WVS)

4519 1.943572 1.237475 0 4

Educational level (categories), x025 (WVS)

4519 .2308679 1.833244 -4.5695 3.505607

Self-positioning on left-right scale, e033 (WVS)

4519 .0322454 2.244753 -4.926617 5.066484

Income level (steps), x047 (WVS)

4519 3.591724 2.228916 1 10

General trust in other people, a165 (WVS)

4519 -.0004975 .421273 -.3097244 .8128624

Political interest, e023 (WVS)

4519 .1034309 .9327362 -1.473873 1.930796

Religion is important in life, a006 (WVS)

4519 -.0255395 .9311407 -2.27309 1.677598

Confidence in the government, e069 (WVS)

4519 .020244 .8913078 -1.362157 2.053034

Unfair wealth distribution (wealth_ineq_unfair), e041 (WVS)

4519 -.1225284 2.709207 -3.32951 6.232307

Our country is run to the benefit of all people v.s. big interest (big_int), e128 (WVS)

4519 .9203364 .2708017 0 1

Normative Democratic Support, e117 and e123 (WVS)

4519 6.685476 2.074616 0 10

Notes: All independent variables are centered at the country-year level except those coded as a dichotomy. For question wordings and original variable scales of the above WVS variables, see Table 8.

88

Figure J. Predicted interaction effects of political inequality and attitudes about unfair wealth distribution on normative support for democracy

Notes: The figure above shows the predicted effects (with 95 % CI) of the interaction between political inequality and attitudes towards unfair wealth distribution on people’s normative support for democracy. The effects are calculated from the fixed part of the regression.

56

78

95

67

89

Fair Distributionof Wealth

Unfair Distributionof Wealth

Fair Distributionof Wealth

Unfair Distributionof Wealth

Equal political powerWealthy people have more power

when it really matters

Wealthy people have a strongor dominant hold on power

Nor

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Dem

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Attitudes Towards Wealth Distribution

91

Table 8. Question wordings and original scales of WVS variables (continued) Question

wording Original variable scale

Educational level (categories), x025 (WVS)

What is the highest educational level that you have attained?

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable; No formal education -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Inadequately completed elementary education 2 Completed (compulsory) elementary education 3 Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type/(Compulsory) 4 Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type/Secondary 5 Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type/Secondary 6 Complete secondary: university-preparatory type/Full secondary 7 Some university without degree/Higher education - lower-level 8 University with degree/Higher education - upper-level tertiary

90

Table 8. Question wordings and original scales of WVS variables Question

wording Original variable scale

Gender (male=1), x001 (WVS)

Sex of respondent 0 No answer 1 Male 2 Female

Age categories, x003 (WVS)

Age 18-25 26-36 37-47 48-58 59-69 More than 70 Don’t know (DK)

Educational level (categories), x025 (WVS)

What is the highest educational level that you have attained?

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable; No formal education -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Inadequately completed elementary education 2 Completed (compulsory) elementary education

91

Table 8. Question wordings and original scales of WVS variables (continued) Question

wording Original variable scale

Educational level (categories), x025 (WVS)

What is the highest educational level that you have attained?

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable; No formal education -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Inadequately completed elementary education 2 Completed (compulsory) elementary education 3 Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type/(Compulsory) 4 Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type/Secondary 5 Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type/Secondary 6 Complete secondary: university-preparatory type/Full secondary 7 Some university without degree/Higher education - lower-level 8 University with degree/Higher education - upper-level tertiary

90

Table 8. Question wordings and original scales of WVS variables Question

wording Original variable scale

Gender (male=1), x001 (WVS)

Sex of respondent 0 No answer 1 Male 2 Female

Age categories, x003 (WVS)

Age 18-25 26-36 37-47 48-58 59-69 More than 70 Don’t know (DK)

Educational level (categories), x025 (WVS)

What is the highest educational level that you have attained?

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable; No formal education -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Inadequately completed elementary education 2 Completed (compulsory) elementary education

93

Table 8. Question wordings and original scales of WVS variables (continued) Question

wording Original variable scale

General trust in other people, a165 (WVS)

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Most people can be trusted 2 Can’t be too careful

Political interest, e023 (WVS)

How interested would you say you are in politics?

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Very interested 2 Somewhat interested 3 Not very interested 4 Not at all interested

Religion is important in life, a006 (WVS)

Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life. Would you say it is: Religion

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Very important 2 Rather important 3 Not very important 4 Not at all important

92

Table 8. Question wordings and original scales of WVS variables (continued) Question

wording Original variable scale

Self-positioning on left-right scale, e033 (WVS)

In political matters, people talk of “the left” and “the right”. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Left 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right

Income level (steps), x047 (WVS)

Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of group your household falls into, before taxes and other deductions.

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Lower step 2 Second step 3 Third step 4 Fourth step 5 Fifth step 6 Sixth step 7 Seventh step 8 Eigth step 9 Nineth step 10 Tenth step 11 Highest step

93

Table 8. Question wordings and original scales of WVS variables (continued) Question

wording Original variable scale

General trust in other people, a165 (WVS)

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Most people can be trusted 2 Can’t be too careful

Political interest, e023 (WVS)

How interested would you say you are in politics?

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Very interested 2 Somewhat interested 3 Not very interested 4 Not at all interested

Religion is important in life, a006 (WVS)

Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life. Would you say it is: Religion

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Very important 2 Rather important 3 Not very important 4 Not at all important

92

Table 8. Question wordings and original scales of WVS variables (continued) Question

wording Original variable scale

Self-positioning on left-right scale, e033 (WVS)

In political matters, people talk of “the left” and “the right”. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Left 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right

Income level (steps), x047 (WVS)

Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of group your household falls into, before taxes and other deductions.

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Lower step 2 Second step 3 Third step 4 Fourth step 5 Fifth step 6 Sixth step 7 Seventh step 8 Eigth step 9 Nineth step 10 Tenth step 11 Highest step

95

Table 8. Question wordings and original scales of WVS variables (continued) Question

wording Original variable scale

Our country is run to the benefit of all people v.s. big interest (big_int), e128 (WVS)

Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Run by a few big interests 2 Run for all the people

Normative support for democracy, e117 (WVS)

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Very good 2 Fairly good 3 Fairly bad 4 Very bad

94

Table 8. Question wordings and original scales of WVS variables (continued) Question

wording Original variable scale

Confidence in the government, e069 (WVS)

I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? The national government

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 A great deal 2 Quite a lot 3 Not very much 4 None at all

Unfair wealth distribution (wealth_ineq_unfair), e041 (WVS)

Now I’d like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can chose any number in between.

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 People can only get rich at the expense of others 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone

95

Table 8. Question wordings and original scales of WVS variables (continued) Question

wording Original variable scale

Our country is run to the benefit of all people v.s. big interest (big_int), e128 (WVS)

Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Run by a few big interests 2 Run for all the people

Normative support for democracy, e117 (WVS)

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Very good 2 Fairly good 3 Fairly bad 4 Very bad

94

Table 8. Question wordings and original scales of WVS variables (continued) Question

wording Original variable scale

Confidence in the government, e069 (WVS)

I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? The national government

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 A great deal 2 Quite a lot 3 Not very much 4 None at all

Unfair wealth distribution (wealth_ineq_unfair), e041 (WVS)

Now I’d like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can chose any number in between.

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 People can only get rich at the expense of others 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone

97

Table 9. Pairwise correlations between the dependent and independent variables Normative

Democratic Support

Political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs as a group (pol_ineq), v2pepwrses_ord (V-Dem)

-0.176***

Level of state power and UPF (state_power)

-0.0972***

Gender (male=1), x001 (WVS)

0.0210

Age categories, x003 (WVS)

-0.0454**

Educational level (categories), x025 (WVS)

0.0567***

Self-positioning on left-right scale, e033 (WVS)

0.0784***

Income level (steps), x047 (WVS)

-0.0523***

General trust in other people, a165 (WVS)

0.0360*

Political interest, e023 (WVS)

0.0554***

Religion is important in life, a006 (WVS)

0.0723***

Confidence in the government, e069 (WVS)

0.0993***

Unfair wealth distribution (wealth_ineq_unfair), e041 (WVS)

-0.105***

Our country is run to the benefit of all people v.s. big interest (big_int), e128 (WVS)

0.0165

N 4519 Notes: Significance levels are according to * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Pearson's r.

96

Table 8. Question wordings and original scales of WVS variables (continued) Question

wording Original variable scale

Normative support for democracy, e123 (WVS)

I'm going to read out some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them? Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Agree strongly 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly disagree

Normative support for authoritarian rule, e114 (WVS)

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Very good 2 Fairly good 3 Fairly bad 4 Very bad

97

Table 9. Pairwise correlations between the dependent and independent variables Normative

Democratic Support

Political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs as a group (pol_ineq), v2pepwrses_ord (V-Dem)

-0.176***

Level of state power and UPF (state_power)

-0.0972***

Gender (male=1), x001 (WVS)

0.0210

Age categories, x003 (WVS)

-0.0454**

Educational level (categories), x025 (WVS)

0.0567***

Self-positioning on left-right scale, e033 (WVS)

0.0784***

Income level (steps), x047 (WVS)

-0.0523***

General trust in other people, a165 (WVS)

0.0360*

Political interest, e023 (WVS)

0.0554***

Religion is important in life, a006 (WVS)

0.0723***

Confidence in the government, e069 (WVS)

0.0993***

Unfair wealth distribution (wealth_ineq_unfair), e041 (WVS)

-0.105***

Our country is run to the benefit of all people v.s. big interest (big_int), e128 (WVS)

0.0165

N 4519 Notes: Significance levels are according to * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Pearson's r.

96

Table 8. Question wordings and original scales of WVS variables (continued) Question

wording Original variable scale

Normative support for democracy, e123 (WVS)

I'm going to read out some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them? Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Agree strongly 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly disagree

Normative support for authoritarian rule, e114 (WVS)

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections

-5 Missing; Unknown -4 Not asked in survey -3 Not applicable -2 No answer -1 Don’t know 1 Very good 2 Fairly good 3 Fairly bad 4 Very bad

99

Chapter five: Four oligarchs and their quest for power in four pseudo-democracies

This chapter is guided by a specific research question asking about how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion given that the two most important streams of prior work emphasize the crucial role of either mass opinion or state power in understanding regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. This thesis hypothesizes that we should expect that all individual, politically motivated rival oligarchs operate with the intention of enhancing public opinion about themselves by developing their personal reputation, organizational capacity and performing a credible opposition to the regime (H2). They do so primarily to emulate the incumbent regime’s efforts to maintain its power. Although I expect to find state power abuse against these efforts in all pseudo-democracies, I assume that we will observe that oligarchs in countries with a greater level of state power concentration and UPF essentially will fail in these efforts and, accordingly, in their individual struggles for power. This thesis, thus, hypothesizes that the regime abuses its stronger state power primarily to damage the credibility of the rival oligarch by making him appear unpredictable and unreliable in the eyes of the public (H2a). Thus, I believe that the abuse of state power to damage the political reputation of rivals is a largely overlooked, yet key regime maintenance tool in the hands of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies with higher level of state power. Accordingly, this important mechanism is a crucial factor in advancing our understanding about the interaction between state power, oligarchs and public opinion.

It may be appropriate to center our attention initially on how the quality of the electoral process and democratic rights of citizens changed or remained unaffected in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine in the wake of the four oligarchs’ struggle for power. To be sure, Figure K is not intended to illustrate exhaustive and conclusive causal links between the individual oligarchs’ ascent to power and improvements in the electoral process and democratic

98

Table 10. Countries and years included in the analysis Country Year Armenia 1997

Georgia 1996

Moldova 1996

Russia 1995

Ukraine 1996

99

Chapter five: Four oligarchs and their quest for power in four pseudo-democracies

This chapter is guided by a specific research question asking about how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion given that the two most important streams of prior work emphasize the crucial role of either mass opinion or state power in understanding regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. This thesis hypothesizes that we should expect that all individual, politically motivated rival oligarchs operate with the intention of enhancing public opinion about themselves by developing their personal reputation, organizational capacity and performing a credible opposition to the regime (H2). They do so primarily to emulate the incumbent regime’s efforts to maintain its power. Although I expect to find state power abuse against these efforts in all pseudo-democracies, I assume that we will observe that oligarchs in countries with a greater level of state power concentration and UPF essentially will fail in these efforts and, accordingly, in their individual struggles for power. This thesis, thus, hypothesizes that the regime abuses its stronger state power primarily to damage the credibility of the rival oligarch by making him appear unpredictable and unreliable in the eyes of the public (H2a). Thus, I believe that the abuse of state power to damage the political reputation of rivals is a largely overlooked, yet key regime maintenance tool in the hands of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies with higher level of state power. Accordingly, this important mechanism is a crucial factor in advancing our understanding about the interaction between state power, oligarchs and public opinion.

It may be appropriate to center our attention initially on how the quality of the electoral process and democratic rights of citizens changed or remained unaffected in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine in the wake of the four oligarchs’ struggle for power. To be sure, Figure K is not intended to illustrate exhaustive and conclusive causal links between the individual oligarchs’ ascent to power and improvements in the electoral process and democratic

98

Table 10. Countries and years included in the analysis Country Year Armenia 1997

Georgia 1996

Moldova 1996

Russia 1995

Ukraine 1996

101

Ukraine29 after the two oligarchs successfully rose to power. In contrast, the quality of these rights remained unchanged in Armenia or gradually deteriorated in Russia. Although the figure illustrates key aspects for regime trajectories more recently, I next offer a brief overview of the emergence and evolution of politics during the entire post-Soviet era of these four countries. This overview will serve as a solid background for addressing the more specific research question about how the four oligarchs Gagik Tsarukyan (Armenia), Bidzina Ivanishvili (Georgia), Mikhail Prokhorov (Russia) and Petro Poroshenko (Ukraine) interacted with incumbents and mass opinion in the framework of state power abuse by the incumbent regime.

A description of four post-Soviet pseudo-democracies Armenia Armenia is a landlocked country in South Caucasus. According to official figures, its population is over 3 million, of which more than 93 percent are ethnic Armenians. Armenia declared its independence from the Soviet Union on August 23, 1990. Semi-presidentialism is a system of government where a popularly elected president shares his executive power with the parliament. This system gives the president the right to appoint a prime minister and a cabinet, but the latter two are responsible to the parliament (Sedelius & Berglund, 2012: 23-24).30 This system of government was in effect until 2015. Armenian constitution was amended in the end of 2015 by a referendum. Semi-presidentialism was abandoned and supplanted by a parliamentarian form of government with lots of power vested in the office of the prime minister (Grigoryan, 2015).

Armenia has been at war with neighboring Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh since the late 1980s. The active fighting came close to ending in the April 1994 cease-fire brokered by Russia. However, the most intensive clashes since the 1994 ceasefire broke out during the 2016 April War (between April 1-4), where hundreds of military personnel and civilians were killed on the frontline. Shooting and shelling still claim lives on both sides of the conflict. This conflict has had far-reaching implications for the political development in

29 It is, however, worth emphasizing that on July 26, 2017, President Poroshenko approved the decision of Ukraine’s Citizenship Commission to revoke Mikheil Saakashvili’s citizenship (Al Jazeera, 2017). This politically motivated decision against one of his key political rivals caused substantial harm to the democratic reputation of Poroshenko’s regime. 30 It is worth noting that there are typically two specific subcategories of semi-presidentialism: a) president-parliamentary and b) premier-presidentialist systems. What distinguishes the former from the latter is the greater power in the hands of the president since the government is also accountable to the president in addition to the parliament (Sedelius & Berglund, 2012: 24; Sedelius & Linde, 2017)

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rights. However, the figure indicates that there is at least some substantial coincidence in time between the broad patterns of these specific dimensions of political democratization and the outcomes of the oligarchs’ bid for power. Figure K. The quality of the electoral process and democratic rights in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine since 2010

Notes: The variable fh_ep measuring the electoral process emanates from the QoG 2017. However, the original source of this variable is Freedom House’s expert evaluations of the extent to which the national legislative representatives and the national chief authority are elected through free and fair elections. The countries were graded from 0 (worst) to 12 (best). Measuring associational and organizational rights is the variable fh_aor in the QoG 2017. Similarly, this variable originates from Freedom House’s expert evaluations of the freedom of assembly, demonstrations and open public discussion as well as the freedom for nongovernmental organizations, the freedom for trade unions, peasant organizations and other professional and private organizations. The variable fh_aor ranges from 0 (worst) to 12 (best). In particular, the patterns of the bars in Figure K suggest that the electoral process improved gradually both in Georgia (since 2012) and Ukraine (since 2014) when Ivanishvili and Poroshenko came to power. However, the quality of the electoral process remained at the same level in Armenia and Russia. As for such key democratic rights as those of the freedom of association and organization, Figure K shows that these analogously improved in Georgia and

05

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Armenia Georgia

Russia Ukraine

Electoral Process Associational and Organizational Rights

The

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Ukraine29 after the two oligarchs successfully rose to power. In contrast, the quality of these rights remained unchanged in Armenia or gradually deteriorated in Russia. Although the figure illustrates key aspects for regime trajectories more recently, I next offer a brief overview of the emergence and evolution of politics during the entire post-Soviet era of these four countries. This overview will serve as a solid background for addressing the more specific research question about how the four oligarchs Gagik Tsarukyan (Armenia), Bidzina Ivanishvili (Georgia), Mikhail Prokhorov (Russia) and Petro Poroshenko (Ukraine) interacted with incumbents and mass opinion in the framework of state power abuse by the incumbent regime.

A description of four post-Soviet pseudo-democracies Armenia Armenia is a landlocked country in South Caucasus. According to official figures, its population is over 3 million, of which more than 93 percent are ethnic Armenians. Armenia declared its independence from the Soviet Union on August 23, 1990. Semi-presidentialism is a system of government where a popularly elected president shares his executive power with the parliament. This system gives the president the right to appoint a prime minister and a cabinet, but the latter two are responsible to the parliament (Sedelius & Berglund, 2012: 23-24).30 This system of government was in effect until 2015. Armenian constitution was amended in the end of 2015 by a referendum. Semi-presidentialism was abandoned and supplanted by a parliamentarian form of government with lots of power vested in the office of the prime minister (Grigoryan, 2015).

Armenia has been at war with neighboring Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh since the late 1980s. The active fighting came close to ending in the April 1994 cease-fire brokered by Russia. However, the most intensive clashes since the 1994 ceasefire broke out during the 2016 April War (between April 1-4), where hundreds of military personnel and civilians were killed on the frontline. Shooting and shelling still claim lives on both sides of the conflict. This conflict has had far-reaching implications for the political development in

29 It is, however, worth emphasizing that on July 26, 2017, President Poroshenko approved the decision of Ukraine’s Citizenship Commission to revoke Mikheil Saakashvili’s citizenship (Al Jazeera, 2017). This politically motivated decision against one of his key political rivals caused substantial harm to the democratic reputation of Poroshenko’s regime. 30 It is worth noting that there are typically two specific subcategories of semi-presidentialism: a) president-parliamentary and b) premier-presidentialist systems. What distinguishes the former from the latter is the greater power in the hands of the president since the government is also accountable to the president in addition to the parliament (Sedelius & Berglund, 2012: 24; Sedelius & Linde, 2017)

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rights. However, the figure indicates that there is at least some substantial coincidence in time between the broad patterns of these specific dimensions of political democratization and the outcomes of the oligarchs’ bid for power. Figure K. The quality of the electoral process and democratic rights in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine since 2010

Notes: The variable fh_ep measuring the electoral process emanates from the QoG 2017. However, the original source of this variable is Freedom House’s expert evaluations of the extent to which the national legislative representatives and the national chief authority are elected through free and fair elections. The countries were graded from 0 (worst) to 12 (best). Measuring associational and organizational rights is the variable fh_aor in the QoG 2017. Similarly, this variable originates from Freedom House’s expert evaluations of the freedom of assembly, demonstrations and open public discussion as well as the freedom for nongovernmental organizations, the freedom for trade unions, peasant organizations and other professional and private organizations. The variable fh_aor ranges from 0 (worst) to 12 (best). In particular, the patterns of the bars in Figure K suggest that the electoral process improved gradually both in Georgia (since 2012) and Ukraine (since 2014) when Ivanishvili and Poroshenko came to power. However, the quality of the electoral process remained at the same level in Armenia and Russia. As for such key democratic rights as those of the freedom of association and organization, Figure K shows that these analogously improved in Georgia and

05

100

510

2010 2015 2010 2015

Armenia Georgia

Russia Ukraine

Electoral Process Associational and Organizational Rights

The

Qua

lity

of th

eE

lect

oral

Pro

cess

and

Ass

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However, recurrent attempts to topple the presidents have taken place in post-Soviet Armenia. The opposition made less successful efforts to overthrow the president through mass protests following the presidential elections in 1996, 2003, 2008 and 2013. An even more important and bloody event happened on October 27, 1999, when a group of armed men rushed at the Armenian parliament and killed Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan and Parliament Speaker Karen Demirchian among others. The perpetrators stated that their action was a putsch to liberate Armenia from Vazgen Sargsyan’s despotism (Matsuzato, 2006; Laitin & Ronald Grigor, 1999). Sargsyan was one of the most crucial elite members in post-Soviet Armenia due to his post as minister of defense between July 25, 1995, and June, 11, 1999.

Robert Kocharyan, the second president of Armenia, made new amendments to the constitution by a referendum in 2005. The 2005 constitution gave the president even stronger executive powers. According to that constitution, the president of Armenia was qualified to appoint the prime minister and cabinet as well as granted more ample control over the army, police and national security service. Moreover, most legislation in post-Soviet Armenia has been proposed by the presidential administration and enforced by the ruling party, which has held the effective majority of seats in the parliament (International Crisis Group, 2012: 3). As already noted, the third President Serzh Sargsyan amended the Armenian constitution through referendum in 2015. Many observers have viewed this constitution with vast executive and administrative powers vested in the post of the prime minister as Sargsyan’s plan to remain in power by switching to the prime minister’s seat.

Oligarchs in Armenia are considered powerful and dangerous due to their massive wealth and inclination to resort to violence when dealing with their problems. Powerful oligarchs have been elected to the parliament during the entire post-Soviet era despite a formal constitutional ban on active businessmen becoming members of the parliament (Ishkhanian, 2008). The MP-ship provides elected oligarchs with the coveted legislative immunity and considerable influence on policymaking. Hence, there has been mutual political dependence between the ruling leadership and the oligarchs since the latter have assisted the former in remaining in office by manipulating elections through vote buying, intimidation, ballot stuffing and carousel voting (Stefes, 2006, 2008; Wikileaks, 2009). Yet, presidents in Armenia have typically kept most threats from dissenting political and economic elites at bay due to their effective control of all economic, political and administrative levers (Welt & Bremmer, 1997; Stefes, 2006).

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Armenia. Armenia is currently the only independent country in South Caucasus hosting a Russian military base. The military base was established in 1996 after the formal closure of the Soviet military base in Armenia. Russian military has since been monitoring the Armenian border with Turkey.

To date, Armenia has had three popularly elected presidents. The two more recent of them came to office through fraud-tainted presidential elections. The presidents of Armenia have maintained strong control over the state power in the country (Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Way, 2012). Armenia has been on the decline for much of its post-independence era. The war with Azerbaijan, systematic corruption and a lack of confidence in the future among its citizens has led hundreds of thousands of its citizens to leave the country. The exit option has been the only viable mean for many Armenians to escape war, poverty, corruption and high unemployment. In an interview with the newspaper 168 Hours in 2011, the then Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan inadvertently admitted that the emigration helped the government to avoid successful revolutions that could have been sparked by large critical masses opposing their regime (Epress.am, 2011).

For the better part of the 1990s, the Armenian National Movement (ANM) was the incumbent party. It won the legislative elections in 1995 and formed a ruling coalition (the Republican Bloc, 43.9 percent of the votes) with the help of such minor parties as the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA) (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann, 2001: 329). Since the 1999 parliamentary elections, the RPA, however, has supplanted the ANM as the ruling party in Armenia and formed ruling alliances first with the People’s Party (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann, 2001: 335), then with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) and the Country of Law party (CLP) (following the 2003 parliamentary elections) (Eurasianet.org, 2004). The RPA was in a ruling coalition with the Prosperous Armenia party (PAP) and CLP after the 2007 parliamentary elections (Ademmer, 2016). The ruling alliance with the CLP and the PAP persisted even after the 2012 parliamentary elections, although the PAP left it prematurely. The most recent parliamentary elections in 2017 resulted in a ruling party alliance between the RPA and ARF. It is worth stressing that both in the case of the ANM and RPA, the presidents of Armenia had held a dominant grip on their respective incumbent parties (Hale, 2015: 354-363).

The elites have generally been cohesive in Armenia. While some scholars have attributed this unity to the conflict with Azerbaijan (Way, 2012; Stefes, 2008), others have put emphasis on the importance of the relatively strong state power and the institutions of super-presidentialism (Hale, 2005, 2016b). Armenia belongs to the large group of post-Soviet countries that still have not managed to build legitimate formal institutions and a party system that allows for genuine political competition. Rather, Armenia has been referred to as a country governed by a strong president and his ruling pyramid of power.

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However, recurrent attempts to topple the presidents have taken place in post-Soviet Armenia. The opposition made less successful efforts to overthrow the president through mass protests following the presidential elections in 1996, 2003, 2008 and 2013. An even more important and bloody event happened on October 27, 1999, when a group of armed men rushed at the Armenian parliament and killed Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan and Parliament Speaker Karen Demirchian among others. The perpetrators stated that their action was a putsch to liberate Armenia from Vazgen Sargsyan’s despotism (Matsuzato, 2006; Laitin & Ronald Grigor, 1999). Sargsyan was one of the most crucial elite members in post-Soviet Armenia due to his post as minister of defense between July 25, 1995, and June, 11, 1999.

Robert Kocharyan, the second president of Armenia, made new amendments to the constitution by a referendum in 2005. The 2005 constitution gave the president even stronger executive powers. According to that constitution, the president of Armenia was qualified to appoint the prime minister and cabinet as well as granted more ample control over the army, police and national security service. Moreover, most legislation in post-Soviet Armenia has been proposed by the presidential administration and enforced by the ruling party, which has held the effective majority of seats in the parliament (International Crisis Group, 2012: 3). As already noted, the third President Serzh Sargsyan amended the Armenian constitution through referendum in 2015. Many observers have viewed this constitution with vast executive and administrative powers vested in the post of the prime minister as Sargsyan’s plan to remain in power by switching to the prime minister’s seat.

Oligarchs in Armenia are considered powerful and dangerous due to their massive wealth and inclination to resort to violence when dealing with their problems. Powerful oligarchs have been elected to the parliament during the entire post-Soviet era despite a formal constitutional ban on active businessmen becoming members of the parliament (Ishkhanian, 2008). The MP-ship provides elected oligarchs with the coveted legislative immunity and considerable influence on policymaking. Hence, there has been mutual political dependence between the ruling leadership and the oligarchs since the latter have assisted the former in remaining in office by manipulating elections through vote buying, intimidation, ballot stuffing and carousel voting (Stefes, 2006, 2008; Wikileaks, 2009). Yet, presidents in Armenia have typically kept most threats from dissenting political and economic elites at bay due to their effective control of all economic, political and administrative levers (Welt & Bremmer, 1997; Stefes, 2006).

102

Armenia. Armenia is currently the only independent country in South Caucasus hosting a Russian military base. The military base was established in 1996 after the formal closure of the Soviet military base in Armenia. Russian military has since been monitoring the Armenian border with Turkey.

To date, Armenia has had three popularly elected presidents. The two more recent of them came to office through fraud-tainted presidential elections. The presidents of Armenia have maintained strong control over the state power in the country (Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Way, 2012). Armenia has been on the decline for much of its post-independence era. The war with Azerbaijan, systematic corruption and a lack of confidence in the future among its citizens has led hundreds of thousands of its citizens to leave the country. The exit option has been the only viable mean for many Armenians to escape war, poverty, corruption and high unemployment. In an interview with the newspaper 168 Hours in 2011, the then Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan inadvertently admitted that the emigration helped the government to avoid successful revolutions that could have been sparked by large critical masses opposing their regime (Epress.am, 2011).

For the better part of the 1990s, the Armenian National Movement (ANM) was the incumbent party. It won the legislative elections in 1995 and formed a ruling coalition (the Republican Bloc, 43.9 percent of the votes) with the help of such minor parties as the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA) (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann, 2001: 329). Since the 1999 parliamentary elections, the RPA, however, has supplanted the ANM as the ruling party in Armenia and formed ruling alliances first with the People’s Party (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann, 2001: 335), then with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) and the Country of Law party (CLP) (following the 2003 parliamentary elections) (Eurasianet.org, 2004). The RPA was in a ruling coalition with the Prosperous Armenia party (PAP) and CLP after the 2007 parliamentary elections (Ademmer, 2016). The ruling alliance with the CLP and the PAP persisted even after the 2012 parliamentary elections, although the PAP left it prematurely. The most recent parliamentary elections in 2017 resulted in a ruling party alliance between the RPA and ARF. It is worth stressing that both in the case of the ANM and RPA, the presidents of Armenia had held a dominant grip on their respective incumbent parties (Hale, 2015: 354-363).

The elites have generally been cohesive in Armenia. While some scholars have attributed this unity to the conflict with Azerbaijan (Way, 2012; Stefes, 2008), others have put emphasis on the importance of the relatively strong state power and the institutions of super-presidentialism (Hale, 2005, 2016b). Armenia belongs to the large group of post-Soviet countries that still have not managed to build legitimate formal institutions and a party system that allows for genuine political competition. Rather, Armenia has been referred to as a country governed by a strong president and his ruling pyramid of power.

105

The most important ruling party of the 1990s Georgia was the Union of Citizens of Georgia (UCG) established and headed by President Eduard Shevardnadze since 1995. The UCG garnered nearly 42 percent of the votes in the 1999 parliamentary elections (Hyde & O’Mahony, 2010: 696). The United National Movement (UNM) (established and led by Saakashvili) supplanted the UCG as the main ruling party in the wake of the ouster of Shevardnadze in the end of 2003. The UNM ruled in coalition with the United Democrats (UD) of Nino Burjanadze (Mitchell, 2012). In the 2008 parliamentary elections, Saakashvili’s UNM received the majority of votes (59.18 percent) (Chedia, 2009). However, the UNM lost in the 2012 parliamentary elections to Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream (GD) (Nichol, 2012).

Prior studies on Georgian politics evidence that the patterns of oligarchs’ political behavior and wealth accumulation strategies have been similar to that found elsewhere in the post-Soviet context. Oligarchs in Georgia, likewise, have been in possession of significant political, economic and media resources. For instance, the two Georgian oligarchs Badri Patarkatsishvili and Vano Chkhartishvili owned important media outlets and TV channels. Their channels promoted their owners and their political ideas. The channels were shut down in 2005 by the authorities (Kakabadze, 2005). Interestingly, Patarkatsishvili defected from Shevardnadze to Saakashvili in the wake of the Rose Revolution. His relations with the regime worsened gravely as he began to provide media coverage to President Saakashvili’s political opponents. He also supported anti-governmental rallies against the president. Patarkatsishvili announced in the fall of 2007 that he was going to finance most opposition parties and run for president in January 2008. He, however, escaped the country as the Georgian authorities released video and audio recordings showing that Patarkatsishvili was planning to overthrow Saakashvili by force in connection to the snap 2008 presidential election (Cornell & Nilsson, 2009; Lanskoy & Areshidze, 2008)

Saakashvili vested more powers in the post of president by swiftly amending the constitution in 2004. The president, for instance, was given the power to dismiss the parliament. In the course of his presidency, Saakashvili concentrated more executive, judicial and administrative power in his own hands. Saakashvili not only toppled Shevardnadze and his nomenklatura elite, but also waged a holy war against corruption. He implemented successful reforms that radically reduced the level of public corruption in Georgia. These reforms were praised around the world for being highly effective despite involving harsh authoritarian policies in breaking up well-established, regional networks of corrupt bureaucracies and criminals (Light, 2014; Mitchell, 2009). Saakashvili, once more, amended the constitution in 2010 to convert the Georgian system of government to full parliamentarian. Saakashvili’s main goal with this constitution was to transfer the ultimate power to the parliament and the prime minister (Mootz, 2010: 216-217). Saakashvili and his ruling UNM came to lose their power in the 2012 parliamentary elections to the

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Georgia Georgia is also located in South Caucasus. It became independent from the Soviet Union by a referendum held on March, 31, 1991. The Georgian population amounts to around 3.7 million inhabitants. The populace is mainly composed of 87 percent ethnic Georgians, 6 percent Azerbaijanis and 4.5 percent Armenians. Georgia has been severely hit by wars against its breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and a civil war during the first half of the 1990s. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the first president of Georgia, came to power in the spring of 1991 by popular vote. However, his tenure was short as he was ousted in January 1992 by a coup d’état. Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet minister for foreign affairs, became president of the State Council (a pseudo-parliament) during this tumultuous time in the political history of Georgia. He used this position to consolidate all oppositional forces against the Gamsakhurdian nationalists and ultimately became president of Georgia in late 1995 by reinstituting the presidency in the new constitution (Stefes, 2006: 46).

Corruption was vast and decentralized during Shevardnadze’s tenure. Shevardnadze sat as president of Georgia between 1995 and 2003. His re-election in April 2000 was marred by significant allegations of electoral irregularities. Students of Georgian politics have generally agreed on the divided nature of Georgian elites. In October 2000, Shevardnadze appointed Mikheil Saakashvili as minister of justice. Saakashvili introduced major reforms aimed at fighting corruption in the criminal justice system. Yet, he fell into disfavor of Shevardnadze when he accused the state security minister and Tbilisi police chief of corruption and transgressing the law. Important elites defected from Shevardnadze’s camp. Saakashvili left the cabinet in September 2001. He explained this move by Shevardnadze’s reluctance to combat corruption in the highest echelons of power. Saakashvili gained more confidence and popularity after the resignation. He formed the National Movement opposition party in November 2001.

Mikheil Saakashvili led the Rose Revolution that followed the fraud-tainted parliamentary elections in November 2003. More than a hundred thousand protesters took to the streets of Tbilisi in anti-governmental protests. Shevardnadze seemed to be unmoved by these mass demonstrations and attempted to open the new session of the Georgian parliament on November 22, 2003. The masses led by Saakashvili stormed into the parliament building with roses in their hands and forced Shevardnadze out. State security services and the military refused to obey to the orders from the president who had declared state emergency. In a Russia-brokered meeting between the opposition and Shevardnadze, the latter yielded to the demands of protesters and resigned as president. On January 4, 2004, Saakashvili was elected president by around 96 percent of the vote.

105

The most important ruling party of the 1990s Georgia was the Union of Citizens of Georgia (UCG) established and headed by President Eduard Shevardnadze since 1995. The UCG garnered nearly 42 percent of the votes in the 1999 parliamentary elections (Hyde & O’Mahony, 2010: 696). The United National Movement (UNM) (established and led by Saakashvili) supplanted the UCG as the main ruling party in the wake of the ouster of Shevardnadze in the end of 2003. The UNM ruled in coalition with the United Democrats (UD) of Nino Burjanadze (Mitchell, 2012). In the 2008 parliamentary elections, Saakashvili’s UNM received the majority of votes (59.18 percent) (Chedia, 2009). However, the UNM lost in the 2012 parliamentary elections to Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream (GD) (Nichol, 2012).

Prior studies on Georgian politics evidence that the patterns of oligarchs’ political behavior and wealth accumulation strategies have been similar to that found elsewhere in the post-Soviet context. Oligarchs in Georgia, likewise, have been in possession of significant political, economic and media resources. For instance, the two Georgian oligarchs Badri Patarkatsishvili and Vano Chkhartishvili owned important media outlets and TV channels. Their channels promoted their owners and their political ideas. The channels were shut down in 2005 by the authorities (Kakabadze, 2005). Interestingly, Patarkatsishvili defected from Shevardnadze to Saakashvili in the wake of the Rose Revolution. His relations with the regime worsened gravely as he began to provide media coverage to President Saakashvili’s political opponents. He also supported anti-governmental rallies against the president. Patarkatsishvili announced in the fall of 2007 that he was going to finance most opposition parties and run for president in January 2008. He, however, escaped the country as the Georgian authorities released video and audio recordings showing that Patarkatsishvili was planning to overthrow Saakashvili by force in connection to the snap 2008 presidential election (Cornell & Nilsson, 2009; Lanskoy & Areshidze, 2008)

Saakashvili vested more powers in the post of president by swiftly amending the constitution in 2004. The president, for instance, was given the power to dismiss the parliament. In the course of his presidency, Saakashvili concentrated more executive, judicial and administrative power in his own hands. Saakashvili not only toppled Shevardnadze and his nomenklatura elite, but also waged a holy war against corruption. He implemented successful reforms that radically reduced the level of public corruption in Georgia. These reforms were praised around the world for being highly effective despite involving harsh authoritarian policies in breaking up well-established, regional networks of corrupt bureaucracies and criminals (Light, 2014; Mitchell, 2009). Saakashvili, once more, amended the constitution in 2010 to convert the Georgian system of government to full parliamentarian. Saakashvili’s main goal with this constitution was to transfer the ultimate power to the parliament and the prime minister (Mootz, 2010: 216-217). Saakashvili and his ruling UNM came to lose their power in the 2012 parliamentary elections to the

104

Georgia Georgia is also located in South Caucasus. It became independent from the Soviet Union by a referendum held on March, 31, 1991. The Georgian population amounts to around 3.7 million inhabitants. The populace is mainly composed of 87 percent ethnic Georgians, 6 percent Azerbaijanis and 4.5 percent Armenians. Georgia has been severely hit by wars against its breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and a civil war during the first half of the 1990s. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the first president of Georgia, came to power in the spring of 1991 by popular vote. However, his tenure was short as he was ousted in January 1992 by a coup d’état. Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet minister for foreign affairs, became president of the State Council (a pseudo-parliament) during this tumultuous time in the political history of Georgia. He used this position to consolidate all oppositional forces against the Gamsakhurdian nationalists and ultimately became president of Georgia in late 1995 by reinstituting the presidency in the new constitution (Stefes, 2006: 46).

Corruption was vast and decentralized during Shevardnadze’s tenure. Shevardnadze sat as president of Georgia between 1995 and 2003. His re-election in April 2000 was marred by significant allegations of electoral irregularities. Students of Georgian politics have generally agreed on the divided nature of Georgian elites. In October 2000, Shevardnadze appointed Mikheil Saakashvili as minister of justice. Saakashvili introduced major reforms aimed at fighting corruption in the criminal justice system. Yet, he fell into disfavor of Shevardnadze when he accused the state security minister and Tbilisi police chief of corruption and transgressing the law. Important elites defected from Shevardnadze’s camp. Saakashvili left the cabinet in September 2001. He explained this move by Shevardnadze’s reluctance to combat corruption in the highest echelons of power. Saakashvili gained more confidence and popularity after the resignation. He formed the National Movement opposition party in November 2001.

Mikheil Saakashvili led the Rose Revolution that followed the fraud-tainted parliamentary elections in November 2003. More than a hundred thousand protesters took to the streets of Tbilisi in anti-governmental protests. Shevardnadze seemed to be unmoved by these mass demonstrations and attempted to open the new session of the Georgian parliament on November 22, 2003. The masses led by Saakashvili stormed into the parliament building with roses in their hands and forced Shevardnadze out. State security services and the military refused to obey to the orders from the president who had declared state emergency. In a Russia-brokered meeting between the opposition and Shevardnadze, the latter yielded to the demands of protesters and resigned as president. On January 4, 2004, Saakashvili was elected president by around 96 percent of the vote.

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cabinets are still fresh memories in the minds of average Russians. Moreover, Putin and his regime have employed most traditional state media resources and quasi-independent outlets to endorse and intensify such a narrative. Thus, democracy, free market and decentralization have been promoted as primary threats to the national interests of Russia. Putin’s ruling regime has amplified this narrative by discrediting the color revolutions in the post-Soviet region and by supporting many Eurasian breakaway republics. The foremost goal with the latter is to revenge on or punish the leaders of partitioned countries that maintain a hostile orientation towards the Kremlin for fostering or staging their territorial dismemberment (Tolstrup, 2015b).

Oligarchs played a key role in the Russian economy during 1990s. They capitalized on the structural disorder that characterized the economy during the initial phase of the transition from communism. Prior to Putin’s rise to power, Russian oligarchs made great fortunes in the energy industry, construction, banking, finance, insurance and telecommunication. The Putin era oligarchs have primarily been involved in the same segments of the economy along with real estate, chemicals, transport and manufacturing (Treisman, 2016: 240).

Oligarchs have also been central to key political processes. Oligarchs’ sway over the government has varied during the post-Soviet era. Yeltsin surrendered to key oligarchs in advance of the 1996 presidential election. These oligarchs were publicly known as “the Gang of Seven” (the G7), referring to the then powerful oligarchs Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Vinogradov, Vladimir Gusinsky, Vladimir Potanin, Alexander Smolensky, Mikhail Friedman and Mikhail Khodorkovsky (Fortescue, 2006: 25-28). Yeltsin was no longer popular and the G7 opted for boosting Yeltsin’s presidential campaign as their only feasible option at that moment. The main reason was their fear of the return of the communists since the Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov was expected to win a crushing victory against President Yeltsin (Schroder, 1999; Fortescue, 2006). On 3 July 1996, Yeltsin received 54.4 percent of the votes in the second round and defeated Zyuganov. The presidential elections were marred by serious electoral irregularities.

The power of the G7, viewed as part of the Yeltsin family clan,32 waned when Putin and his siloviki came into power. Putin and his close partners from St. Petersburg gradually deprived the family clan of their access to most important buttons of power in a fierce struggle between the two most powerful 32 The term clan has been used somewhat misleading in the post-Soviet context. The political and sociological literature on the Middle East and Africa refers mainly to kinship-based ties between individuals (De Waal, 2015). In contrast, Christoph Stefes stresses that the term clan in the post-Soviet context mainly refers to a group of individuals who are tied together not necessarily only by kinship, but by shared economic interests. Moreover, membership in these amorphous groups is dynamic and individuals may be part of several such groups at the same time (Stefes, 2006: 93).

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Ivanishvili-linked Georgian Dream coalition. The 2016 Georgian parliamentary elections showed that Georgians still prefer Ivanishvili’s political team to that of Saakashvili.

Russia Russia is the largest territorial state in the world with a multiethnic population estimated at 144 million people in 2017. Russia was the key member country in the Soviet Union due to its population and territorial size as well as military and economic capacities. The constitutional form of government in Russia has been semi-presidentialism with a directly voted president and two chambers of the Russian parliament. The post-Soviet Russian constitution was ratified in December 1993. Many formal and substantial powers have been vested in the post of president of Russia. For instance, Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s first president, was authorized and used to rule Russia by presidential decrees that had the power of law in the entire territory of Russia. This took place in a period when Russia underwent troubled political and socio-economic transformation during Yeltsin’s tenure. The country was strongly affected by major political and economic calamities as well as territorial integrity challenges due to the Chechen wars and the resulting elite fractionalization. Generally, the Russian Duma has acted as the extended arm of the president through an effective majority of the ruling party (Sakwa, 2008b; Remington, 2012). However, the Russian semi-presidential system does not require the president to appoint a prime minister and cabinet from a party majority in the Duma (Remington, 2012: 62).

The office of president implies a position of enormous formal and informal authority. This power has been strengthened and centralized gradually through constitutional amendments. For example, President Vladimir Putin abolished direct elections for governors in 2004 and granted himself the exclusive right to appoint heads of Russia’s regional governments.31 Another example is the 2008 constitutional reform made by the then President Dmitry Medvedev, inter alia, to extend the presidential term of office from four to six years (Remington, 2012).

A major share of the world’s crude oil and dry natural gas is produced in Russia. This resource abundance has generally been a major advantage and key income source for the regime. Putin has frequently used this to stabilize and consolidate his regime in Russia. In particular, some scholars have linked Russia’s natural resource richness to the autocratic turn in Putin’s Russia. In contrast, others have argued that the crises of 1990s’ Russia have discouraged the majority of Russians to believe in the necessity of Russia developing into a democracy (Shlapentokh & Arutunyan, 2013). The failed shock therapy and popular aversion against the rule of the so-called pseudo-liberals in Yeltsin’s 31 However, in 2012 the Kremlin reinstated the direct election of senior officials in the regions.

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cabinets are still fresh memories in the minds of average Russians. Moreover, Putin and his regime have employed most traditional state media resources and quasi-independent outlets to endorse and intensify such a narrative. Thus, democracy, free market and decentralization have been promoted as primary threats to the national interests of Russia. Putin’s ruling regime has amplified this narrative by discrediting the color revolutions in the post-Soviet region and by supporting many Eurasian breakaway republics. The foremost goal with the latter is to revenge on or punish the leaders of partitioned countries that maintain a hostile orientation towards the Kremlin for fostering or staging their territorial dismemberment (Tolstrup, 2015b).

Oligarchs played a key role in the Russian economy during 1990s. They capitalized on the structural disorder that characterized the economy during the initial phase of the transition from communism. Prior to Putin’s rise to power, Russian oligarchs made great fortunes in the energy industry, construction, banking, finance, insurance and telecommunication. The Putin era oligarchs have primarily been involved in the same segments of the economy along with real estate, chemicals, transport and manufacturing (Treisman, 2016: 240).

Oligarchs have also been central to key political processes. Oligarchs’ sway over the government has varied during the post-Soviet era. Yeltsin surrendered to key oligarchs in advance of the 1996 presidential election. These oligarchs were publicly known as “the Gang of Seven” (the G7), referring to the then powerful oligarchs Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Vinogradov, Vladimir Gusinsky, Vladimir Potanin, Alexander Smolensky, Mikhail Friedman and Mikhail Khodorkovsky (Fortescue, 2006: 25-28). Yeltsin was no longer popular and the G7 opted for boosting Yeltsin’s presidential campaign as their only feasible option at that moment. The main reason was their fear of the return of the communists since the Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov was expected to win a crushing victory against President Yeltsin (Schroder, 1999; Fortescue, 2006). On 3 July 1996, Yeltsin received 54.4 percent of the votes in the second round and defeated Zyuganov. The presidential elections were marred by serious electoral irregularities.

The power of the G7, viewed as part of the Yeltsin family clan,32 waned when Putin and his siloviki came into power. Putin and his close partners from St. Petersburg gradually deprived the family clan of their access to most important buttons of power in a fierce struggle between the two most powerful 32 The term clan has been used somewhat misleading in the post-Soviet context. The political and sociological literature on the Middle East and Africa refers mainly to kinship-based ties between individuals (De Waal, 2015). In contrast, Christoph Stefes stresses that the term clan in the post-Soviet context mainly refers to a group of individuals who are tied together not necessarily only by kinship, but by shared economic interests. Moreover, membership in these amorphous groups is dynamic and individuals may be part of several such groups at the same time (Stefes, 2006: 93).

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Ivanishvili-linked Georgian Dream coalition. The 2016 Georgian parliamentary elections showed that Georgians still prefer Ivanishvili’s political team to that of Saakashvili.

Russia Russia is the largest territorial state in the world with a multiethnic population estimated at 144 million people in 2017. Russia was the key member country in the Soviet Union due to its population and territorial size as well as military and economic capacities. The constitutional form of government in Russia has been semi-presidentialism with a directly voted president and two chambers of the Russian parliament. The post-Soviet Russian constitution was ratified in December 1993. Many formal and substantial powers have been vested in the post of president of Russia. For instance, Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s first president, was authorized and used to rule Russia by presidential decrees that had the power of law in the entire territory of Russia. This took place in a period when Russia underwent troubled political and socio-economic transformation during Yeltsin’s tenure. The country was strongly affected by major political and economic calamities as well as territorial integrity challenges due to the Chechen wars and the resulting elite fractionalization. Generally, the Russian Duma has acted as the extended arm of the president through an effective majority of the ruling party (Sakwa, 2008b; Remington, 2012). However, the Russian semi-presidential system does not require the president to appoint a prime minister and cabinet from a party majority in the Duma (Remington, 2012: 62).

The office of president implies a position of enormous formal and informal authority. This power has been strengthened and centralized gradually through constitutional amendments. For example, President Vladimir Putin abolished direct elections for governors in 2004 and granted himself the exclusive right to appoint heads of Russia’s regional governments.31 Another example is the 2008 constitutional reform made by the then President Dmitry Medvedev, inter alia, to extend the presidential term of office from four to six years (Remington, 2012).

A major share of the world’s crude oil and dry natural gas is produced in Russia. This resource abundance has generally been a major advantage and key income source for the regime. Putin has frequently used this to stabilize and consolidate his regime in Russia. In particular, some scholars have linked Russia’s natural resource richness to the autocratic turn in Putin’s Russia. In contrast, others have argued that the crises of 1990s’ Russia have discouraged the majority of Russians to believe in the necessity of Russia developing into a democracy (Shlapentokh & Arutunyan, 2013). The failed shock therapy and popular aversion against the rule of the so-called pseudo-liberals in Yeltsin’s 31 However, in 2012 the Kremlin reinstated the direct election of senior officials in the regions.

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entered into force in June 1996 and considerably strengthened the post of president (D’Anieri, 2007: 85). Using similar tactics, Kuchma attempted to ramrod more super-presidential amendments to the constitution through Rada in 2000. This ultimate attempt failed due to the murder of investigative journalist Heorhiy Gongadze, whose body was found beheaded in November 2000.33 The oppositional Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) released secret audio recordings indicating that Kuchma himself was giving orders to the Ministry of Interior to make Gongadze disappear. The distaste for Kuchma swelled explosively among the political opposition and the broad masses (D’Anieri, 2007: 92-93).

On November 22, 2004, Central Election Commission of Ukraine declared Viktor Yanukovich (the intended successor of Kuchma) the winner of the 2004 presidential election. No one except Russian President Putin was willing to accept this fraud-tainted victory. The Orange Revolution was initiated when hundreds of thousands of people gathered in the Maidan square of Kyiv to show their disenchantment with the tainted elections results. These protests led to elite defection and the further strengthening of the opposition. Another major blow to Yanukovich’s plans to gain presidency was the agreement between president Kuchma and the main rival candidate Viktor Yuschenko to re-run the second round of elections in the end of December 2004. Yuschenko became president by 52 percent of the vote (D’Anieri, 2007: 96-98).

Ukraine is arguably one of the most illustrative countries in the post-Soviet region when it comes to having faced substantial influence by oligarchs on the highest echelons of political and bureaucratic power. In spite of the fact that super-presidential institutions had been in place during a significant part of its post-Soviet era, scholars have generally identified Ukraine as politically pluralistic much due to the observable economic competition between several established networks of rent-seeking oligarchs. Ukrainian oligarchs, similar to their peers in Russia, emerged after the demise of the Soviet empire. When the free market reforms were introduced in Ukraine, a group of businessmen began to engage in trade and financial transactions. They started to reap huge gains from key segments of the Ukrainians economy. Their major fields of activity, include, but are not limited to, metallurgy, media, banking, transport and real estate trade (Matuszak, 2012). The oligarchs in Ukraine have been capable of helping presidents to secure supportive majority in the parliament by their informal influence on oppositional lawmakers (Pleines, 2009: 103). Key oligarchs own media holdings, incorporated in their large conglomerates, 33 Heorhiy Gongadze was an investigative journalist and film director. He disappeared on September, 16, 2000, after receiving documents on grand corruption in Kuchma’s inner circle. His beheaded body was found on November 3, 2000. Oleksandr Moroz made public tape recordings where President Kuchma discussed with his chief of staff and interior minister the importance of getting rid of Gongadze. The Kuchmagate scandal sparked widespread public outrage and substantial political turmoil between the incumbents and the opposition (Kuzio, 2007).

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fractions in the Kremlin (Fortescue, 2006; Shlapentokh, 2004: 137). Putin renationalized big enterprises and regained control over media outlets that were in possession of rival oligarchs. He did so directly or through his proxies. Putin put his siloviki and other allies at the helm of all of these newly acquired organizations.

Overall, the elites in Russia have been rather divided prior to Putin’s rise to power and cohesive afterwards. Underlying the division between elites (that was regarded as some form of political pluralism) was the relative economic freedom of powerful oligarchs linked to different fractions of the ruling elites. Some scholars go so far as to argue that Putin’s arrival at power was endorsed by oligarchs who saw him as the most able person to adjudicate between the diverging interests of influential oligarchic coalitions (Fortescue, 2006). Yet, it is worthwhile noting that Putin struck at the then powerful oligarchs Khodorkovsky, Berezovsky and Gusinsky when consolidating his power. He deprived them of their political, economic and media resources. He jailed Khodorkovsky and forced Berezovsky into exile for their disobedience. Some argue that this attack on and humiliation of oligarchs boosted his popularity among Russians (Shlapentokh, 2004). Putin was able to displace his rivals by strengthening his personal power in putting the control of the “power agencies”, such as Defence and Interior ministries and the Security Council of Russia, directly under the president.

Ukraine Ukraine’s current population amounts to nearly 42.5 million (including Crimea and the two breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk). Ukraine became independent from the Soviet Union in late August 1991. It inherited its first constitution from the late Soviet Union era. The constitution was amended multiple times between 1991 and 1996. Key Soviet bureaucrats and communist elites retained their position throughout the 1990s. During the first half of the 1990s, the executive power in Ukraine was distributed among the prime minister, president, the parliament (Rada) and its speaker (D’Anieri, 2007: 80). Although Rada in the end came to acquiesce in creating the post of president, it purposefully imposed key limitations on the president. Key parliamentary resolutions stipulated that Rada could override presidential vetoes and executive decrees by a simple majority vote, dismiss the entire government or reject the appointment of single ministers (Przeworski, 1991: 87).

Things, however, changed radically during Leonid Kuchma’s presidency (in office 1994-2005). At the outset, he put on the agenda that Ukraine’s divided executive authority was to be blamed for the economic hardship the country faced during his first five-year term as president. Using the extra-constitutional threat to circumvent the parliament by directly organizing a referendum on his proposed amendments to the constitution, Kuchma successfully forced the parliament to enact his proposals. The constitution

109

entered into force in June 1996 and considerably strengthened the post of president (D’Anieri, 2007: 85). Using similar tactics, Kuchma attempted to ramrod more super-presidential amendments to the constitution through Rada in 2000. This ultimate attempt failed due to the murder of investigative journalist Heorhiy Gongadze, whose body was found beheaded in November 2000.33 The oppositional Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) released secret audio recordings indicating that Kuchma himself was giving orders to the Ministry of Interior to make Gongadze disappear. The distaste for Kuchma swelled explosively among the political opposition and the broad masses (D’Anieri, 2007: 92-93).

On November 22, 2004, Central Election Commission of Ukraine declared Viktor Yanukovich (the intended successor of Kuchma) the winner of the 2004 presidential election. No one except Russian President Putin was willing to accept this fraud-tainted victory. The Orange Revolution was initiated when hundreds of thousands of people gathered in the Maidan square of Kyiv to show their disenchantment with the tainted elections results. These protests led to elite defection and the further strengthening of the opposition. Another major blow to Yanukovich’s plans to gain presidency was the agreement between president Kuchma and the main rival candidate Viktor Yuschenko to re-run the second round of elections in the end of December 2004. Yuschenko became president by 52 percent of the vote (D’Anieri, 2007: 96-98).

Ukraine is arguably one of the most illustrative countries in the post-Soviet region when it comes to having faced substantial influence by oligarchs on the highest echelons of political and bureaucratic power. In spite of the fact that super-presidential institutions had been in place during a significant part of its post-Soviet era, scholars have generally identified Ukraine as politically pluralistic much due to the observable economic competition between several established networks of rent-seeking oligarchs. Ukrainian oligarchs, similar to their peers in Russia, emerged after the demise of the Soviet empire. When the free market reforms were introduced in Ukraine, a group of businessmen began to engage in trade and financial transactions. They started to reap huge gains from key segments of the Ukrainians economy. Their major fields of activity, include, but are not limited to, metallurgy, media, banking, transport and real estate trade (Matuszak, 2012). The oligarchs in Ukraine have been capable of helping presidents to secure supportive majority in the parliament by their informal influence on oppositional lawmakers (Pleines, 2009: 103). Key oligarchs own media holdings, incorporated in their large conglomerates, 33 Heorhiy Gongadze was an investigative journalist and film director. He disappeared on September, 16, 2000, after receiving documents on grand corruption in Kuchma’s inner circle. His beheaded body was found on November 3, 2000. Oleksandr Moroz made public tape recordings where President Kuchma discussed with his chief of staff and interior minister the importance of getting rid of Gongadze. The Kuchmagate scandal sparked widespread public outrage and substantial political turmoil between the incumbents and the opposition (Kuzio, 2007).

108

fractions in the Kremlin (Fortescue, 2006; Shlapentokh, 2004: 137). Putin renationalized big enterprises and regained control over media outlets that were in possession of rival oligarchs. He did so directly or through his proxies. Putin put his siloviki and other allies at the helm of all of these newly acquired organizations.

Overall, the elites in Russia have been rather divided prior to Putin’s rise to power and cohesive afterwards. Underlying the division between elites (that was regarded as some form of political pluralism) was the relative economic freedom of powerful oligarchs linked to different fractions of the ruling elites. Some scholars go so far as to argue that Putin’s arrival at power was endorsed by oligarchs who saw him as the most able person to adjudicate between the diverging interests of influential oligarchic coalitions (Fortescue, 2006). Yet, it is worthwhile noting that Putin struck at the then powerful oligarchs Khodorkovsky, Berezovsky and Gusinsky when consolidating his power. He deprived them of their political, economic and media resources. He jailed Khodorkovsky and forced Berezovsky into exile for their disobedience. Some argue that this attack on and humiliation of oligarchs boosted his popularity among Russians (Shlapentokh, 2004). Putin was able to displace his rivals by strengthening his personal power in putting the control of the “power agencies”, such as Defence and Interior ministries and the Security Council of Russia, directly under the president.

Ukraine Ukraine’s current population amounts to nearly 42.5 million (including Crimea and the two breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk). Ukraine became independent from the Soviet Union in late August 1991. It inherited its first constitution from the late Soviet Union era. The constitution was amended multiple times between 1991 and 1996. Key Soviet bureaucrats and communist elites retained their position throughout the 1990s. During the first half of the 1990s, the executive power in Ukraine was distributed among the prime minister, president, the parliament (Rada) and its speaker (D’Anieri, 2007: 80). Although Rada in the end came to acquiesce in creating the post of president, it purposefully imposed key limitations on the president. Key parliamentary resolutions stipulated that Rada could override presidential vetoes and executive decrees by a simple majority vote, dismiss the entire government or reject the appointment of single ministers (Przeworski, 1991: 87).

Things, however, changed radically during Leonid Kuchma’s presidency (in office 1994-2005). At the outset, he put on the agenda that Ukraine’s divided executive authority was to be blamed for the economic hardship the country faced during his first five-year term as president. Using the extra-constitutional threat to circumvent the parliament by directly organizing a referendum on his proposed amendments to the constitution, Kuchma successfully forced the parliament to enact his proposals. The constitution

111

Four oligarchs and their political struggle against the incumbent regime This section of the chapter employs both qualitative and quantitative data as well as mixed methods (as already discussed in the research design chapter) to illustrate how events and situations unfolded over time in the struggle for power of the four rival oligarchs Gagik Tsarukyan (Armenia), Bidzina Ivanishvili (Georgia), Mikhail Prokhorov (Russia) and Petro Poroshenko (Ukraine) against the incumbent regimes in the respective country. To restate, this is done in order understand the role of oligarchs in regime trajectories through their interactions with incumbents and mass opinion given that mass opinion and state power are key for our understanding of regime maintenance or gradual change towards democratization in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies.

It is worth repeating that I have already discussed the operationalization of key variables and hypotheses in detail in the research design chapter. The primary empirical material of this chapter consists of media reports from web-based news agencies. The below narratives and content analyses about each oligarch’s political path are primarily guided by the period of time of available media reports on their political activities34: Gagik Tsarukyan (2004-11-22 to 2015-09-26), Bidzina Ivanishvili (2010-06-18 to 2013-07-03), Mikhail Prokhorov (2007-01-12 to 2015-06-05) and Petro Poroshenko (2007-06-18 to 2014-05-26). However, limiting the reports to the outlined last dates is due to their ascent to power or reported substantial withdrawal from politics. Furthermore, it merits emphasis that it is an uneven distribution of media coverage across the four countries. In particular, the study has a better reporting of data from Russia and Ukraine. While his unexpected and swift path to power naturally explains the relatively smaller number of articles on Ivanishvili, Tsarukyan’s case may be attributed to his primary goal to broadcast his propaganda on his own TV channel. Undoubtedly, media outlets are, to say the least, slightly biased in this context. One way of dealing with this problem is to include only publications of facts that were officially verified by the oligarch or his representatives. For this reason, I opted for entirely disregarding rumors, expert opinions on or third-party interpretations of oligarchs’ actions when coding the data. I coded several indicators of central relevance to my study and the operationalization of these variables has been discussed in length earlier in the research design chapter. Let us now turn our focus to the four oligarchs’ political struggle for power against pseudo-democratic regimes in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine, respectively.

34 See a detailed discussion on the selection of media outlets in the research design chapter.

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which operate popular TV channels, radio stations, print or web-based newspapers and magazines (Pleines, 2009, 2016; Matuszak, 2012; Åslund, 2015).

Many oligarchs in Ukraine have been favorably disposed towards gaining formal political offices in the parliament (Pleines, 2016: 116). Moreover, leading oligarchs have also accepted different presidents’ invitations to become governors or ministers. Ihor Kolomoyskyi, for example, was appointed governor of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in March 2014 (in office until late March 2015). The current president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, was put at the helm of the Trade Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the government of two presidents from conflicting political camps (Yushchenko vs. Yanukovych). The oligarchs in Ukraine have been powerful in their home administrative districts. More often than not, scholars have been able to observe networks of oligarchs driven by the general political and civilizational rift between western and central Ukraine on the one side, and eastern Ukraine on the other (Kuzio, 2006a; Pleines, 2016). This gap is well reflected in the fact that voters in western and central Ukraine have mostly voted for the same presidents and political parties in clear contrast to the electoral preferences of the eastern regions (Kudelia & Kuzio, 2015; Kuzio, 2015a).

During Kuchma’s presidency, the three most significant oligarchic clans were “The Donetsk clan” (Rinat Akhmetov, Serhiy Taruta and Vitaliy Hayduk etc.), “The Dnipropetrovsk clan” (Ihor Kolomoyskyi, Henadiy Boholyubov, Viktor Pinchuk and others) and “the Kyiv clan” (Viktor Medvedchuk and Surkis brothers) (Matuszak, 2012: 14-15). These oligarchic networks reorganized themselves more radically around the regional division after the Orange (2004) (Åslund, 2007a, 2006) and Euromaidan revolutions (2014) (Åslund, 2015). Yet, the key oligarchs Kolomoyskyi and Akhmetov opted for supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity during the recent war. While the former organized and sponsored several battalions to fight the rebels in the breakaway republics, Akhmetov relocated to Kyiv and assumed a much-favorable role of a mediator between Ukraine and the breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. Akhmetov has been capable of maintaining this position due to his holdings in the energy and mining sectors of the breakaway republics. His factories have been exporting their products and energy to Ukraine and the West. This has been beneficial to all parties of the conflict. The Kyiv government has been able to receive continued tax revenues and secure the supply of energy to Ukraine, whereas the two quasi-republics have been able to secure jobs (Associated Press, 2015).

111

Four oligarchs and their political struggle against the incumbent regime This section of the chapter employs both qualitative and quantitative data as well as mixed methods (as already discussed in the research design chapter) to illustrate how events and situations unfolded over time in the struggle for power of the four rival oligarchs Gagik Tsarukyan (Armenia), Bidzina Ivanishvili (Georgia), Mikhail Prokhorov (Russia) and Petro Poroshenko (Ukraine) against the incumbent regimes in the respective country. To restate, this is done in order understand the role of oligarchs in regime trajectories through their interactions with incumbents and mass opinion given that mass opinion and state power are key for our understanding of regime maintenance or gradual change towards democratization in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies.

It is worth repeating that I have already discussed the operationalization of key variables and hypotheses in detail in the research design chapter. The primary empirical material of this chapter consists of media reports from web-based news agencies. The below narratives and content analyses about each oligarch’s political path are primarily guided by the period of time of available media reports on their political activities34: Gagik Tsarukyan (2004-11-22 to 2015-09-26), Bidzina Ivanishvili (2010-06-18 to 2013-07-03), Mikhail Prokhorov (2007-01-12 to 2015-06-05) and Petro Poroshenko (2007-06-18 to 2014-05-26). However, limiting the reports to the outlined last dates is due to their ascent to power or reported substantial withdrawal from politics. Furthermore, it merits emphasis that it is an uneven distribution of media coverage across the four countries. In particular, the study has a better reporting of data from Russia and Ukraine. While his unexpected and swift path to power naturally explains the relatively smaller number of articles on Ivanishvili, Tsarukyan’s case may be attributed to his primary goal to broadcast his propaganda on his own TV channel. Undoubtedly, media outlets are, to say the least, slightly biased in this context. One way of dealing with this problem is to include only publications of facts that were officially verified by the oligarch or his representatives. For this reason, I opted for entirely disregarding rumors, expert opinions on or third-party interpretations of oligarchs’ actions when coding the data. I coded several indicators of central relevance to my study and the operationalization of these variables has been discussed in length earlier in the research design chapter. Let us now turn our focus to the four oligarchs’ political struggle for power against pseudo-democratic regimes in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine, respectively.

34 See a detailed discussion on the selection of media outlets in the research design chapter.

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which operate popular TV channels, radio stations, print or web-based newspapers and magazines (Pleines, 2009, 2016; Matuszak, 2012; Åslund, 2015).

Many oligarchs in Ukraine have been favorably disposed towards gaining formal political offices in the parliament (Pleines, 2016: 116). Moreover, leading oligarchs have also accepted different presidents’ invitations to become governors or ministers. Ihor Kolomoyskyi, for example, was appointed governor of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in March 2014 (in office until late March 2015). The current president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, was put at the helm of the Trade Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the government of two presidents from conflicting political camps (Yushchenko vs. Yanukovych). The oligarchs in Ukraine have been powerful in their home administrative districts. More often than not, scholars have been able to observe networks of oligarchs driven by the general political and civilizational rift between western and central Ukraine on the one side, and eastern Ukraine on the other (Kuzio, 2006a; Pleines, 2016). This gap is well reflected in the fact that voters in western and central Ukraine have mostly voted for the same presidents and political parties in clear contrast to the electoral preferences of the eastern regions (Kudelia & Kuzio, 2015; Kuzio, 2015a).

During Kuchma’s presidency, the three most significant oligarchic clans were “The Donetsk clan” (Rinat Akhmetov, Serhiy Taruta and Vitaliy Hayduk etc.), “The Dnipropetrovsk clan” (Ihor Kolomoyskyi, Henadiy Boholyubov, Viktor Pinchuk and others) and “the Kyiv clan” (Viktor Medvedchuk and Surkis brothers) (Matuszak, 2012: 14-15). These oligarchic networks reorganized themselves more radically around the regional division after the Orange (2004) (Åslund, 2007a, 2006) and Euromaidan revolutions (2014) (Åslund, 2015). Yet, the key oligarchs Kolomoyskyi and Akhmetov opted for supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity during the recent war. While the former organized and sponsored several battalions to fight the rebels in the breakaway republics, Akhmetov relocated to Kyiv and assumed a much-favorable role of a mediator between Ukraine and the breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. Akhmetov has been capable of maintaining this position due to his holdings in the energy and mining sectors of the breakaway republics. His factories have been exporting their products and energy to Ukraine and the West. This has been beneficial to all parties of the conflict. The Kyiv government has been able to receive continued tax revenues and secure the supply of energy to Ukraine, whereas the two quasi-republics have been able to secure jobs (Associated Press, 2015).

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Olympic Committee of Armenia, presidency in the PAP or time in office as MP. In other words, both for Tsarukyan and the remaining oligarchs these figures are offered as an additional tool that aids the reader in visualizing how the rival oligarchs interacted with incumbents over time. However, it is worth noting that my analysis is primarily a qualitative case study that centers on a narrative about this interaction from start to end. Let us now switch our focus to that narrative.

Tsarukyan has been one of the wealthiest oligarchs in post-Soviet Armenia. He has a degree in physical culture from the Armenian State Institute of Physical Culture. In the first half of 1990s, he worked as a teacher of physical education and arm wrestling coach. His conglomerate incorporates more than three dozen diverse enterprises. He also owns Kentron TV – one of the most popular TV channels in Armenia (Antonyan, 2015: 86). Until his withdrawal from active politics in 2015, he used this channel to broadcast daily television programs about his charity, church building and political activities.

Most Armenians know Tsarukyan by his nickname Dodi Gago (idiot’s Gagik). His political career started in 2003 when he was elected member of the parliament. He was re-elected in all subsequent elections to the legislative body. In 2004, Tsarukyan established the PAP and was its only party leader until March 2015.

The PAP rapidly became popular as it came in second in the 2007 parliamentary elections (Ishkhanian, 2008: 43). Analysts have argued that Tsarukyan was merely the proxy of Armenia’s second president, Robert Kocharyan, in the PAP (Petrosyan, 2010: 10).35 They have also described the PAP as a de-ideologized party, whose primary goal has been only to be an alternative to the ruling RPA of President Serzh Sargsyan (Nedolyan, 2013: 10). Note also that Tsarukyan’s son-in-law is a son of Hovik Abrahamyan – former president of the parliament (in office between May 31, 2012, and April 13, 2014) and prime minister of Armenia (in office between April 13, 2014, and September 13, 2016). Abrahamyan had been a key player in the RPA due to his post as the RPA’s Campaign Manager during Sargsyan’s tenures as president (Azatutyun, 2012o).

As displayed in Figure L above, Tsarukyan had a long-term plan to improve his reputation among the public. An important element in this process was his personal charity foundation most active since 2007 (Azatutyun, 2012m). His fund provided free transport and medical care to the poor. It also offered personal scholarship to the best students in state universities (International Crisis Group, 2012: 6). His charity tended to intensify close to

35 This linkage has been inadvertently revealed by Ruben Hayrapetyan, “Nemets Rubo” (German Ruben)—another powerful oligarch (yet, politically passive)—in an interview with a journalist from a French-Armenian newspaper (Azatutyun, 2012k).

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Gagik Tsarukyan in Armenia

Figure L. Tsarukyan’s path to exiting politics

Notes: Data is coded by author based on electronic media reports from Azatutyun.am. There is no inherent hierarchy between the markers. The graph simply depicts the categories of reported activities on a timeline. Dashed lines delineate tenure. Although this chapter will focus more closely on each of the elements in Figure L above in the subsequent narrative on Tsarukyan’s struggle for power against the ruling leadership, the figure is a neat, composite presentation of this interaction in light of such central factors as mass opinion and state power abuse. Hence, the figure is a coherent presentation of the narrative guided by connected events as a sequence of news media reports. Since similar figures will be used for illustrating the remaining oligarchs’ struggle for power, I want to justify the use of such a figure on two grounds. First, it offers a clear illustration of when in time Tsarukyan made his efforts to increase his reputation and human resources according to news media reports. Second, the figure also incorporates how and when the incumbent regime countered him by abusing its state power in order to damage his reputation, attack his financial assets and human resources. More specifically, every specific symbol placed on a separate row in Figure L corresponds to a media report about the coded variable. In addition, the big squares with two dots inside mark the election days for presidential election or general elections to the parliament. Dashed lines delineate Tsarukyan’s tenures as the President of the National

President of the Prosperous Armenia Party

Member of the National Security Council of Armenia

Elected President of the National Olympic Committee of Armenia

: :-

2012 2013 2014 2015

Efforts to increase his reputation

Increase in his human resources

Attack against his reputation

Attack against his financial resourcesPolitically motivated discriminationagainst him personally

Attack against his human resourcesContributes to collectivechallenges against the regimeDoes not contribute tocollective challenges against the regime: Legislative elections :- Presidential election

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Olympic Committee of Armenia, presidency in the PAP or time in office as MP. In other words, both for Tsarukyan and the remaining oligarchs these figures are offered as an additional tool that aids the reader in visualizing how the rival oligarchs interacted with incumbents over time. However, it is worth noting that my analysis is primarily a qualitative case study that centers on a narrative about this interaction from start to end. Let us now switch our focus to that narrative.

Tsarukyan has been one of the wealthiest oligarchs in post-Soviet Armenia. He has a degree in physical culture from the Armenian State Institute of Physical Culture. In the first half of 1990s, he worked as a teacher of physical education and arm wrestling coach. His conglomerate incorporates more than three dozen diverse enterprises. He also owns Kentron TV – one of the most popular TV channels in Armenia (Antonyan, 2015: 86). Until his withdrawal from active politics in 2015, he used this channel to broadcast daily television programs about his charity, church building and political activities.

Most Armenians know Tsarukyan by his nickname Dodi Gago (idiot’s Gagik). His political career started in 2003 when he was elected member of the parliament. He was re-elected in all subsequent elections to the legislative body. In 2004, Tsarukyan established the PAP and was its only party leader until March 2015.

The PAP rapidly became popular as it came in second in the 2007 parliamentary elections (Ishkhanian, 2008: 43). Analysts have argued that Tsarukyan was merely the proxy of Armenia’s second president, Robert Kocharyan, in the PAP (Petrosyan, 2010: 10).35 They have also described the PAP as a de-ideologized party, whose primary goal has been only to be an alternative to the ruling RPA of President Serzh Sargsyan (Nedolyan, 2013: 10). Note also that Tsarukyan’s son-in-law is a son of Hovik Abrahamyan – former president of the parliament (in office between May 31, 2012, and April 13, 2014) and prime minister of Armenia (in office between April 13, 2014, and September 13, 2016). Abrahamyan had been a key player in the RPA due to his post as the RPA’s Campaign Manager during Sargsyan’s tenures as president (Azatutyun, 2012o).

As displayed in Figure L above, Tsarukyan had a long-term plan to improve his reputation among the public. An important element in this process was his personal charity foundation most active since 2007 (Azatutyun, 2012m). His fund provided free transport and medical care to the poor. It also offered personal scholarship to the best students in state universities (International Crisis Group, 2012: 6). His charity tended to intensify close to

35 This linkage has been inadvertently revealed by Ruben Hayrapetyan, “Nemets Rubo” (German Ruben)—another powerful oligarch (yet, politically passive)—in an interview with a journalist from a French-Armenian newspaper (Azatutyun, 2012k).

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Gagik Tsarukyan in Armenia

Figure L. Tsarukyan’s path to exiting politics

Notes: Data is coded by author based on electronic media reports from Azatutyun.am. There is no inherent hierarchy between the markers. The graph simply depicts the categories of reported activities on a timeline. Dashed lines delineate tenure. Although this chapter will focus more closely on each of the elements in Figure L above in the subsequent narrative on Tsarukyan’s struggle for power against the ruling leadership, the figure is a neat, composite presentation of this interaction in light of such central factors as mass opinion and state power abuse. Hence, the figure is a coherent presentation of the narrative guided by connected events as a sequence of news media reports. Since similar figures will be used for illustrating the remaining oligarchs’ struggle for power, I want to justify the use of such a figure on two grounds. First, it offers a clear illustration of when in time Tsarukyan made his efforts to increase his reputation and human resources according to news media reports. Second, the figure also incorporates how and when the incumbent regime countered him by abusing its state power in order to damage his reputation, attack his financial assets and human resources. More specifically, every specific symbol placed on a separate row in Figure L corresponds to a media report about the coded variable. In addition, the big squares with two dots inside mark the election days for presidential election or general elections to the parliament. Dashed lines delineate Tsarukyan’s tenures as the President of the National

President of the Prosperous Armenia Party

Member of the National Security Council of Armenia

Elected President of the National Olympic Committee of Armenia

: :-

2012 2013 2014 2015

Efforts to increase his reputation

Increase in his human resources

Attack against his reputation

Attack against his financial resourcesPolitically motivated discriminationagainst him personally

Attack against his human resourcesContributes to collectivechallenges against the regimeDoes not contribute tocollective challenges against the regime: Legislative elections :- Presidential election

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Armenia’s first president and the leader of the oppositional Armenian National Congress (ANC), used this opportunity to increase the wedge between Tsarukyan and President Sargsyan. Ter-Petrosyan declared that he welcomed the PAP’s steps to become a real opposition party (Azatutyun, 2012q).

President Sargsyan was deeply concerned about such developments ahead of the 2013 presidential election. In October 2012, high-ranking representatives of the PAP complained that the authorities selectively inspected those ministries and enterprises that were affiliated with Tsarukyan and his party (Azatutyun, 2012b). As tensions escalated ahead of the presidential election, Tsarukyan was repeatedly refusing to give a straight answer to journalists whether he was going to stand in the elections or support Sargsyan’s candidacy (Azatutyun, 2012e). However, in early December 2012 Tsarukyan and his party representatives visited high-ranking EU representatives in Brussels and accused the Armenian government of not being honest in their struggle to restrain bribery because the government itself was entangled in corruption (Azatutyun, 2012l). Only a few days after this visit, Tsarukyan’s official representative confirmed that his superior had had an informal meeting with President Sargsyan (Azatutyun, 2012p). On December 12, 2012, Tsarukyan announced his decision not to run for president in the 2013 presidential election (Azatutyun, 2012d). This unexpected move shocked large parts of the polity. The party members of the PAP must have been negatively surprised about this decision as media reports showed a month earlier that most of them were certain that Tsarukyan was going to run for president (Azatutyun, 2012e). In January 2013, a key MP from the PAP explained that Tsarukyan chose not to stand in the presidential election to avoid societal clashes. In other words, President Sargsyan threatened Tsarukyan to use force against him and his party members had he not followed his ultimatum to opt out (Azatutyun, 2013b).

As already shown, the political game in Armenia has involved all the three presidents of Armenia. Ter-Petrosyan spoke highly of Tsarukyan. In the spring of 2014, Tsarukyan met Ter-Petrosyan and the ANC several times (Azatutyun, 2014d). Ter-Petrosyan drew many comparisons between Tsarukyan and Ivanishvili. In fact, he stressed that a “bourgeois democratic revolution” was possible in Armenia should Tsarukyan support it (Nedolyan, 2013). In his turn, Tsarukyan began to denounce the system for not improving the business climate by abolishing the monopolies and favoritism (Azatutyun, 2014a). In May 2014, Tsarukyan vowed that both presidential and legislative elections would be held in the near future, where the incumbent RPA was no longer going to have any chance to win (Azatutyun, 2014b). In December 2014, he convened a meeting with other major opposition parties to discuss the critical situation in Armenia. He announced his readiness to challenge the president personally. Tsarukyan formed an inter-party oppositional headquarter with the aim of confronting President Sargsyan’s regime. However, the then Prime Minister Abrahamyan said to media that Tsarukyan would never oppose

114

elections. This must have worried the ruling party and the president as Armenia’s education minister in the end of 2011 declared these scholarships illegal at universities (Azatutyun, 2011). Remarkably, a later media report showed that the authorities have allowed similar scholarships by a loyal oligarch from the RPA (Azatutyun, 2013a).

Tsarukyan’s PAP was in coalition with the ruling RPA between 2008 and 2012 (Navasardian, 2012). He was a member of the National Security Council of Armenia from 2007 to 2015, appointed by Sargsyan. In February 2012, Vardan Oskanyan, former minister for foreign affairs during Kocharyan’s presidency, joined Tsarukyan’s party (Azatutyun, 2012h). This troubled the ruling regime since the experienced Oskanyan was a welcome addition to Tsarukyan’s organizational resources ahead of the legislative and presidential elections in May 2012 and February 2013, respectively. In early April 2012, Tsarukyan’s PAP signed a joint declaration with other major opposition parties to establish an inter-party electoral headquarter. The core idea was to collectively monitor the elections in order to prevent electoral fraud by the incumbents (Azatutyun, 2012i). However, Tsarukyan stated in a media report in mid-April that he was also collaborating with the government to prevent electoral manipulation (Azatutyun, 2012j). Raffi Hovhanissyan, the opposition Heritage party leader, did not accept this ambiguity and urged Tsarukyan to withdraw from the ruling coalition. Tsarukyan replied with a flat refusal and justified this by stating that the coalition anyway was going to dissolve after the impending legislative elections (Azatutyun, 2012j). In the time that followed, Sargsyan openly expressed that he was fully supporting his coalition partner Tsarukyan’s run for legislative office. Moreover, the president spoke of him as the ruling party’s “own” candidate in Abovyan—Tsarukyan’s home region. President Sargsyan explained that the reason for him not proposing a counter-candidate from the RPA was precisely due to that conviction (Azatutyun, 2012n).

Media reports show that Tsarukyan was generally very careful in his criticism of the government. He mostly avoided criticizing the president personally. Although the PAP was not in coalition with the RPA after the 2012 elections, Tsarukyan labeled the PAP merely as an alternative, rather than opposition to the RPA (Azatutyun, 2012c). However, the situation got trickier when Oskanyan initiated a harsh wave of criticism against the government and the president personally after the 2012 parliamentary elections. When asked about his stance on Oskanyan’s critical statements, Tsarukyan made it clear that it was only Oskanyan’s personal opinion and not that of the PAP (Azatutyun, 2012f). The stakes rose even more when the authorities accused Oskanyan of money laundering and tax evasion on May 25, 2012. This occurred just a day after the PAP declined to become part of a ruling coalition with the ruling RPA (Azatutyun, 2012g). The PAP refuted these accusations and argued that Oskanyan and some other party members were being persecuted politically (Azatutyun, 2012a). Levon Ter-Petrosyan,

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Armenia’s first president and the leader of the oppositional Armenian National Congress (ANC), used this opportunity to increase the wedge between Tsarukyan and President Sargsyan. Ter-Petrosyan declared that he welcomed the PAP’s steps to become a real opposition party (Azatutyun, 2012q).

President Sargsyan was deeply concerned about such developments ahead of the 2013 presidential election. In October 2012, high-ranking representatives of the PAP complained that the authorities selectively inspected those ministries and enterprises that were affiliated with Tsarukyan and his party (Azatutyun, 2012b). As tensions escalated ahead of the presidential election, Tsarukyan was repeatedly refusing to give a straight answer to journalists whether he was going to stand in the elections or support Sargsyan’s candidacy (Azatutyun, 2012e). However, in early December 2012 Tsarukyan and his party representatives visited high-ranking EU representatives in Brussels and accused the Armenian government of not being honest in their struggle to restrain bribery because the government itself was entangled in corruption (Azatutyun, 2012l). Only a few days after this visit, Tsarukyan’s official representative confirmed that his superior had had an informal meeting with President Sargsyan (Azatutyun, 2012p). On December 12, 2012, Tsarukyan announced his decision not to run for president in the 2013 presidential election (Azatutyun, 2012d). This unexpected move shocked large parts of the polity. The party members of the PAP must have been negatively surprised about this decision as media reports showed a month earlier that most of them were certain that Tsarukyan was going to run for president (Azatutyun, 2012e). In January 2013, a key MP from the PAP explained that Tsarukyan chose not to stand in the presidential election to avoid societal clashes. In other words, President Sargsyan threatened Tsarukyan to use force against him and his party members had he not followed his ultimatum to opt out (Azatutyun, 2013b).

As already shown, the political game in Armenia has involved all the three presidents of Armenia. Ter-Petrosyan spoke highly of Tsarukyan. In the spring of 2014, Tsarukyan met Ter-Petrosyan and the ANC several times (Azatutyun, 2014d). Ter-Petrosyan drew many comparisons between Tsarukyan and Ivanishvili. In fact, he stressed that a “bourgeois democratic revolution” was possible in Armenia should Tsarukyan support it (Nedolyan, 2013). In his turn, Tsarukyan began to denounce the system for not improving the business climate by abolishing the monopolies and favoritism (Azatutyun, 2014a). In May 2014, Tsarukyan vowed that both presidential and legislative elections would be held in the near future, where the incumbent RPA was no longer going to have any chance to win (Azatutyun, 2014b). In December 2014, he convened a meeting with other major opposition parties to discuss the critical situation in Armenia. He announced his readiness to challenge the president personally. Tsarukyan formed an inter-party oppositional headquarter with the aim of confronting President Sargsyan’s regime. However, the then Prime Minister Abrahamyan said to media that Tsarukyan would never oppose

114

elections. This must have worried the ruling party and the president as Armenia’s education minister in the end of 2011 declared these scholarships illegal at universities (Azatutyun, 2011). Remarkably, a later media report showed that the authorities have allowed similar scholarships by a loyal oligarch from the RPA (Azatutyun, 2013a).

Tsarukyan’s PAP was in coalition with the ruling RPA between 2008 and 2012 (Navasardian, 2012). He was a member of the National Security Council of Armenia from 2007 to 2015, appointed by Sargsyan. In February 2012, Vardan Oskanyan, former minister for foreign affairs during Kocharyan’s presidency, joined Tsarukyan’s party (Azatutyun, 2012h). This troubled the ruling regime since the experienced Oskanyan was a welcome addition to Tsarukyan’s organizational resources ahead of the legislative and presidential elections in May 2012 and February 2013, respectively. In early April 2012, Tsarukyan’s PAP signed a joint declaration with other major opposition parties to establish an inter-party electoral headquarter. The core idea was to collectively monitor the elections in order to prevent electoral fraud by the incumbents (Azatutyun, 2012i). However, Tsarukyan stated in a media report in mid-April that he was also collaborating with the government to prevent electoral manipulation (Azatutyun, 2012j). Raffi Hovhanissyan, the opposition Heritage party leader, did not accept this ambiguity and urged Tsarukyan to withdraw from the ruling coalition. Tsarukyan replied with a flat refusal and justified this by stating that the coalition anyway was going to dissolve after the impending legislative elections (Azatutyun, 2012j). In the time that followed, Sargsyan openly expressed that he was fully supporting his coalition partner Tsarukyan’s run for legislative office. Moreover, the president spoke of him as the ruling party’s “own” candidate in Abovyan—Tsarukyan’s home region. President Sargsyan explained that the reason for him not proposing a counter-candidate from the RPA was precisely due to that conviction (Azatutyun, 2012n).

Media reports show that Tsarukyan was generally very careful in his criticism of the government. He mostly avoided criticizing the president personally. Although the PAP was not in coalition with the RPA after the 2012 elections, Tsarukyan labeled the PAP merely as an alternative, rather than opposition to the RPA (Azatutyun, 2012c). However, the situation got trickier when Oskanyan initiated a harsh wave of criticism against the government and the president personally after the 2012 parliamentary elections. When asked about his stance on Oskanyan’s critical statements, Tsarukyan made it clear that it was only Oskanyan’s personal opinion and not that of the PAP (Azatutyun, 2012f). The stakes rose even more when the authorities accused Oskanyan of money laundering and tax evasion on May 25, 2012. This occurred just a day after the PAP declined to become part of a ruling coalition with the ruling RPA (Azatutyun, 2012g). The PAP refuted these accusations and argued that Oskanyan and some other party members were being persecuted politically (Azatutyun, 2012a). Levon Ter-Petrosyan,

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Bidzina Ivanishvili in Georgia Ivanishvili holds a PhD in Economics from Moscow State University of Railway Engineering. Ivanishvili earned most of his wealth in Russia during the 1990s (Fairbanks Jr & Gugushvili, 2013: 119). His business has since been largely invested in Russia (Sputnik, 2011c). According to Forbes (2016), his wealth amounts to $4.8 billion.

Figure M. Ivanishvili’s successful ascent to power

Notes: Data is coded by author based on electronic media reports from Sputnik-Georgia.ru. There is no inherent hierarchy between the markers. The graph simply depicts the categories of reported activities on a timeline.

Figure M illustrates interesting facts. In particular, Ivanishvili’s organizational resources were subject to frequent and intensive attacks by the Georgian authorities. The same holds for his financial and media resources. However, Ivanishvili focused specifically on improving his reputation as soon as he entered the Georgian political scene.

In October 2011, Ivanishvili entered national politics to challenge the then President Mikheil Saakashvili and his ruling UNM party (Fairbanks Jr & Gugushvili, 2013: 119). Ivanishvili complained about President Saakashvili’s total hegemony over the media landscape in Georgia and attempted to establish a competing media house in order to thwart his monopoly (Sputnik, 2011b). The authorities responded swiftly to Ivanishvili’s apparent political ambitions (Sputnik, 2011l). Later that same month, they launched inspections

:

* Establishes the Georgian Dream - Democratic Georgia Party

2011 Oct 2012 2013

Efforts to increase his reputation

Attack against his financial resources

Politically motivateddiscrimination againsthim personallyAttack against his media resources

Attack against his human resourcesContributes to collective challengesagainst the regime

: Legislative elections

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Sargsyan. Tsarukyan later replied to a journalist that Abrahamyan never said so and accused journalists of deliberately distorting Abrahamyan’s words (Azatutyun, 2014c).

On February 12, 2015, President Sargsyan assembled a meeting of the RPA’s executive board. He harshly disgraced Tsarukyan by describing him as “a scourge for the country” and that he lacked the basic intelligence, skills and education necessary to rule Armenia. Sargsyan also expressed that he earlier banned his employees and team members from using Tsarukyan’s nickname. Moreover, it was hard for him to imagine how the “illiterate” Tsarukyan was going to represent Armenia, for instance, in the EU. Abrahamyan concurred with Sargsyan’s criticism and threatened to “hit all the slow-witted in the head” to make them understand that amateurs have no place in politics. The president concluded the meeting by commanding Abrahamyan to instruct the state bodies to thoroughly investigate the veracity of unconfirmed reports about Tsarukyan’s large-scale tax evasion (Azatutyun, 2015e). The police subsequently dismissed Tsarukyan’s personal security staff and described these measures solely as part of previously initiated police reforms (Azatutyun, 2015d). Tsarukyan was also excluded from the National Security Council of Armenia.

Media reports show that the conflict between Tsarukyan and President Sargsyan was resolved in a meeting convened by Samvel Karapetyan—a wealthy Armenian oligarch in Russia with close connections to the Kremlin (Azatutyun, 2015a). After that meeting on February 17, 2015, Tsarukyan called off a joint opposition rally planned on February 20 (Azatutyun, 2015g). Two weeks later, he announced his exit from politics (Azatutyun, 2015c). In early April, the government appointed Tsarukyan’s son-in-law as the head of Abovyan region (Azatutyun, 2015b). Moreover, Tsarukyan personally received from Sargsyan a second degree Medal of Honor for his service to the fatherland in late September 2015 (Azatutyun, 2015f). Tsarukyan took a break from politics until the spring of 2017, when he was re-elected as the party leader of the PAP and member of the parliament. He has since substantially retracted his previous opposition to Serzh Sargsyan.

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Bidzina Ivanishvili in Georgia Ivanishvili holds a PhD in Economics from Moscow State University of Railway Engineering. Ivanishvili earned most of his wealth in Russia during the 1990s (Fairbanks Jr & Gugushvili, 2013: 119). His business has since been largely invested in Russia (Sputnik, 2011c). According to Forbes (2016), his wealth amounts to $4.8 billion.

Figure M. Ivanishvili’s successful ascent to power

Notes: Data is coded by author based on electronic media reports from Sputnik-Georgia.ru. There is no inherent hierarchy between the markers. The graph simply depicts the categories of reported activities on a timeline.

Figure M illustrates interesting facts. In particular, Ivanishvili’s organizational resources were subject to frequent and intensive attacks by the Georgian authorities. The same holds for his financial and media resources. However, Ivanishvili focused specifically on improving his reputation as soon as he entered the Georgian political scene.

In October 2011, Ivanishvili entered national politics to challenge the then President Mikheil Saakashvili and his ruling UNM party (Fairbanks Jr & Gugushvili, 2013: 119). Ivanishvili complained about President Saakashvili’s total hegemony over the media landscape in Georgia and attempted to establish a competing media house in order to thwart his monopoly (Sputnik, 2011b). The authorities responded swiftly to Ivanishvili’s apparent political ambitions (Sputnik, 2011l). Later that same month, they launched inspections

:

* Establishes the Georgian Dream - Democratic Georgia Party

2011 Oct 2012 2013

Efforts to increase his reputation

Attack against his financial resources

Politically motivateddiscrimination againsthim personallyAttack against his media resources

Attack against his human resourcesContributes to collective challengesagainst the regime

: Legislative elections

116

Sargsyan. Tsarukyan later replied to a journalist that Abrahamyan never said so and accused journalists of deliberately distorting Abrahamyan’s words (Azatutyun, 2014c).

On February 12, 2015, President Sargsyan assembled a meeting of the RPA’s executive board. He harshly disgraced Tsarukyan by describing him as “a scourge for the country” and that he lacked the basic intelligence, skills and education necessary to rule Armenia. Sargsyan also expressed that he earlier banned his employees and team members from using Tsarukyan’s nickname. Moreover, it was hard for him to imagine how the “illiterate” Tsarukyan was going to represent Armenia, for instance, in the EU. Abrahamyan concurred with Sargsyan’s criticism and threatened to “hit all the slow-witted in the head” to make them understand that amateurs have no place in politics. The president concluded the meeting by commanding Abrahamyan to instruct the state bodies to thoroughly investigate the veracity of unconfirmed reports about Tsarukyan’s large-scale tax evasion (Azatutyun, 2015e). The police subsequently dismissed Tsarukyan’s personal security staff and described these measures solely as part of previously initiated police reforms (Azatutyun, 2015d). Tsarukyan was also excluded from the National Security Council of Armenia.

Media reports show that the conflict between Tsarukyan and President Sargsyan was resolved in a meeting convened by Samvel Karapetyan—a wealthy Armenian oligarch in Russia with close connections to the Kremlin (Azatutyun, 2015a). After that meeting on February 17, 2015, Tsarukyan called off a joint opposition rally planned on February 20 (Azatutyun, 2015g). Two weeks later, he announced his exit from politics (Azatutyun, 2015c). In early April, the government appointed Tsarukyan’s son-in-law as the head of Abovyan region (Azatutyun, 2015b). Moreover, Tsarukyan personally received from Sargsyan a second degree Medal of Honor for his service to the fatherland in late September 2015 (Azatutyun, 2015f). Tsarukyan took a break from politics until the spring of 2017, when he was re-elected as the party leader of the PAP and member of the parliament. He has since substantially retracted his previous opposition to Serzh Sargsyan.

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by multiple means. He and his representatives frequently met with foreign ambassadors to Georgia to denounce the political persecution of the GD by the authorities (Sputnik, 2012f). Media reports show that Ivanishvili paid a lot of money to media outlets both to advertise and cover live broadcasts from the GD’s meetings (Sputnik, 2012w).

Ivanishvili and his associates stepped up their counter-attacks on the authorities and the president personally. They sued the president personally for illegally revoking the citizenship of his wife (Sputnik, 2012s). They similarly sued the authorities for the unlawful confiscation of Cartu Bank’s capital (Sputnik, 2012b). The response of the authorities to Ivanishvili’s bold campaigning was to deter people from supporting the GD financially by various anti-money-laundering regulations (Sputnik, 2012i). Moreover, reports show that they banned the Georgian edition of the much popular Forbes Magazine from writing about Ivanishvili (Sputnik, 2012g). However, Ivanishvili’s movement gained popularity among the public and the majority of Georgians condemned Saakashvili’s decision to strip Ivanishvili of his citizenship (Sputnik, 2012c). In late April 2012, Ivanishvili announced that his intention was to ascend to power only by means of democratic elections (Sputnik, 2012k). By June 2012, Ivanishvili’s political campaign was in full steam. The authorities appeared to be extremely worried by his increasing popularity. They successfully discouraged radio and TV stations from broadcasting Ivanishvili’s political advertisement (Sputnik, 2012q). Ivanishvili’s team responded to this by handing out free satellite dishes to the public, which the authorities deemed to be vote-buying (Sputnik, 2012e). The authorities also arrested Ivanishvili’s shares in two Georgian banks in late June 2012 (Sputnik, 2012d). Moreover, the Prosecutor’s Office addressed a request to arrest the financial resources of the charity foundation KOMAG which authorities considered as part of the GD (Sputnik, 2012o).

On June 19, 2012, Ivanishvili’s alliance offered a helping hand to the government in coping with the natural disaster in Kakheti region (Sputnik, 2012l). The authorities accepted the offer. However, almost two months later the youth association of the GD demanded more details about how the government had spent Ivanishvili’s financial contribution for dealing with the disaster (Sputnik, 2012m). In mid-August, media reported that the GDS TV channel (affiliated with Ivanishvili) was given permission to broadcast over cable (Sputnik, 2012u). However, the political climate became extremely polarized close to the legislative elections in early October 2012. Reports show that the authorities imposed heavy fines on Ivanishvili supporters for donating money to the GD (Sputnik, 2012t). They undertook similar actions against the team members and campaign workers of Ivanishvili (Sputnik, 2012a). Yet, a critical event occurred on September 18, 2012. National TV broadcasted several videos showing how prison officers raped and tortured inmates in Gldani Prison (Sputnik, 2012n). This spawned mass demonstrations against Saakashvili and the government in major cities of Georgia. On

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in Ivanishvili’s Cartu Bank due to accusations of money laundering (Sputnik, 2011a). While Ivanishvili’s official representatives refuted these accusations and regarded them politically motivated (Sputnik, 2011n), state officials disavowed any political motivations (Sputnik, 2011k).

Another major offensive against Ivanishvili’s political path was Saakashvili’s decision to strip Ivanishvili of his Georgian citizenship. This was a politically motivated decision to prevent Ivanishvili from establishing and leading a political party (Sputnik, 2011e). In late October 2011, the authorities detained people close to Ivanishvili on the charges of drug and weapon possession (Sputnik, 2011s). Immediately after this, the regime also disarmed Ivanishvili’s bodyguards on the grounds that Georgian law did not allow foreign citizens to be protected by armed guards (Sputnik, 2011p). In response to this, Ivanishvili convened a meeting with several Western ambassadors and made a call for “lowering the political heat” in Georgia (Sputnik, 2011q).

From the beginning of November 2011, many Georgians began to open bank accounts in Ivanishvili’s Cartu Bank as a sign of their support (Sputnik, 2011r). This exasperated the authorities that attempted to maintain a strong pressure on Ivanishvili by postponing the hearings of the citizenship case by the court (Sputnik, 2011o). Ivanishvili, however, did not surrender and rather continued with his efforts to offset the adverse impact of the authorities’ oppression by improving his credibility among the public. He recruited adherents from different layers of the Georgian society. Among them were famous football, tennis and chess players, producers, musicians and the Patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church (Sputnik, 2011j, 2012v, 2012r, 2012j). On November 13, 2011, the Patriarch asked Saakashvili to restore Ivanishvili’s citizenship, but in vain (Sputnik, 2011d).

Ivanishvili announced the foundation of the GD party on December 11, 2011. He accused the government of elite corruption and condemned its disgraceful attitude towards the Georgian church (Sputnik, 2011f). A day later, the GD arranged its first public meeting and opened its first office in Tbilisi (Sputnik, 2011h, 2011m). By the end of December, the Patriarch once more showed his support for Ivanishvili and urged the authorities to restore his citizenship. A few days later, the authorities restored the citizenship of his wife (Sputnik, 2011g).

On February 21, 2012, Ivanishvili’s GD formed a large oppositional coalition involving the then most influential oppositional forces (Sputnik, 2012p). The incumbents used different obstacles to prevent Ivanishvili from standing for election. The dilemma was that while the Georgian authorities required him to abandon his French citizenship to receive one in Georgia, French law allowed him to do so only if he already had another citizenship (Sputnik, 2011i). Notwithstanding this major legal obstacle, Ivanishvili and his political team made huge efforts ahead of the 2012 legislative elections. Ivanishvili increased his pressure on the authorities and the president himself

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by multiple means. He and his representatives frequently met with foreign ambassadors to Georgia to denounce the political persecution of the GD by the authorities (Sputnik, 2012f). Media reports show that Ivanishvili paid a lot of money to media outlets both to advertise and cover live broadcasts from the GD’s meetings (Sputnik, 2012w).

Ivanishvili and his associates stepped up their counter-attacks on the authorities and the president personally. They sued the president personally for illegally revoking the citizenship of his wife (Sputnik, 2012s). They similarly sued the authorities for the unlawful confiscation of Cartu Bank’s capital (Sputnik, 2012b). The response of the authorities to Ivanishvili’s bold campaigning was to deter people from supporting the GD financially by various anti-money-laundering regulations (Sputnik, 2012i). Moreover, reports show that they banned the Georgian edition of the much popular Forbes Magazine from writing about Ivanishvili (Sputnik, 2012g). However, Ivanishvili’s movement gained popularity among the public and the majority of Georgians condemned Saakashvili’s decision to strip Ivanishvili of his citizenship (Sputnik, 2012c). In late April 2012, Ivanishvili announced that his intention was to ascend to power only by means of democratic elections (Sputnik, 2012k). By June 2012, Ivanishvili’s political campaign was in full steam. The authorities appeared to be extremely worried by his increasing popularity. They successfully discouraged radio and TV stations from broadcasting Ivanishvili’s political advertisement (Sputnik, 2012q). Ivanishvili’s team responded to this by handing out free satellite dishes to the public, which the authorities deemed to be vote-buying (Sputnik, 2012e). The authorities also arrested Ivanishvili’s shares in two Georgian banks in late June 2012 (Sputnik, 2012d). Moreover, the Prosecutor’s Office addressed a request to arrest the financial resources of the charity foundation KOMAG which authorities considered as part of the GD (Sputnik, 2012o).

On June 19, 2012, Ivanishvili’s alliance offered a helping hand to the government in coping with the natural disaster in Kakheti region (Sputnik, 2012l). The authorities accepted the offer. However, almost two months later the youth association of the GD demanded more details about how the government had spent Ivanishvili’s financial contribution for dealing with the disaster (Sputnik, 2012m). In mid-August, media reported that the GDS TV channel (affiliated with Ivanishvili) was given permission to broadcast over cable (Sputnik, 2012u). However, the political climate became extremely polarized close to the legislative elections in early October 2012. Reports show that the authorities imposed heavy fines on Ivanishvili supporters for donating money to the GD (Sputnik, 2012t). They undertook similar actions against the team members and campaign workers of Ivanishvili (Sputnik, 2012a). Yet, a critical event occurred on September 18, 2012. National TV broadcasted several videos showing how prison officers raped and tortured inmates in Gldani Prison (Sputnik, 2012n). This spawned mass demonstrations against Saakashvili and the government in major cities of Georgia. On

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in Ivanishvili’s Cartu Bank due to accusations of money laundering (Sputnik, 2011a). While Ivanishvili’s official representatives refuted these accusations and regarded them politically motivated (Sputnik, 2011n), state officials disavowed any political motivations (Sputnik, 2011k).

Another major offensive against Ivanishvili’s political path was Saakashvili’s decision to strip Ivanishvili of his Georgian citizenship. This was a politically motivated decision to prevent Ivanishvili from establishing and leading a political party (Sputnik, 2011e). In late October 2011, the authorities detained people close to Ivanishvili on the charges of drug and weapon possession (Sputnik, 2011s). Immediately after this, the regime also disarmed Ivanishvili’s bodyguards on the grounds that Georgian law did not allow foreign citizens to be protected by armed guards (Sputnik, 2011p). In response to this, Ivanishvili convened a meeting with several Western ambassadors and made a call for “lowering the political heat” in Georgia (Sputnik, 2011q).

From the beginning of November 2011, many Georgians began to open bank accounts in Ivanishvili’s Cartu Bank as a sign of their support (Sputnik, 2011r). This exasperated the authorities that attempted to maintain a strong pressure on Ivanishvili by postponing the hearings of the citizenship case by the court (Sputnik, 2011o). Ivanishvili, however, did not surrender and rather continued with his efforts to offset the adverse impact of the authorities’ oppression by improving his credibility among the public. He recruited adherents from different layers of the Georgian society. Among them were famous football, tennis and chess players, producers, musicians and the Patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church (Sputnik, 2011j, 2012v, 2012r, 2012j). On November 13, 2011, the Patriarch asked Saakashvili to restore Ivanishvili’s citizenship, but in vain (Sputnik, 2011d).

Ivanishvili announced the foundation of the GD party on December 11, 2011. He accused the government of elite corruption and condemned its disgraceful attitude towards the Georgian church (Sputnik, 2011f). A day later, the GD arranged its first public meeting and opened its first office in Tbilisi (Sputnik, 2011h, 2011m). By the end of December, the Patriarch once more showed his support for Ivanishvili and urged the authorities to restore his citizenship. A few days later, the authorities restored the citizenship of his wife (Sputnik, 2011g).

On February 21, 2012, Ivanishvili’s GD formed a large oppositional coalition involving the then most influential oppositional forces (Sputnik, 2012p). The incumbents used different obstacles to prevent Ivanishvili from standing for election. The dilemma was that while the Georgian authorities required him to abandon his French citizenship to receive one in Georgia, French law allowed him to do so only if he already had another citizenship (Sputnik, 2011i). Notwithstanding this major legal obstacle, Ivanishvili and his political team made huge efforts ahead of the 2012 legislative elections. Ivanishvili increased his pressure on the authorities and the president himself

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resources were attacked ahead of the 2012 legislative elections. Let us now take a closer look at the different phases of Prokhorov’s political pathway.

Prokhorov’s political career may be characterized as vacillating. It oscillated between active and passive phases—big promises and abrupt exits from politics. Media reports show that he on several occasions announced his readiness to leave his business to entirely engage in politics (Ria Novosti, 2013h, 2011a). On June 25, 2011, Prokhorov became the president of the Right Cause party (RCP). Moreover, the RCP’s members voted for abandoning co-chairmanship in the party to fully concentrate the party leadership in his hands (Ria Novosti, 2013c). Prokhorov announced that the ruling United Russia (UR) was the RCP’s main political rival. However, while he spoke critical of the UR, he was more cautious when referring to Putin (Ria Novosti, 2011i). Speaking at the party congress in late June 2011, Prokhorov suggested not using the label “opposition” for the RCP because, according to him, most Russians associated that label with marginalized political forces (Ria Novosti, 2011m).

In July 2011, Prokhorov declared that he completely left his business for engaging fully in politics (Ria Novosti, 2011a). In late August 2011, the RCP published its manifesto in which it vowed to implement important reforms. Two key proposals were the RCP’s plans to cancel MPs’ immunity and introduction of a law enabling parliamentarians to impeach both governors and members of the government. Prokhorov made clear that he regarded many parliamentarians as crooks, which, he further noted, necessarily were to be exposed to criminal investigations (Ria Novosti, 2011k).

In September 2011, his organizational capacity suffered great damage. His rivals in the RCP convened a parallel party congress, chaired by Andrei Dunayev, and voted for ousting Prokhorov. Prokhorov blamed Vladislav Surkov, the then deputy head of the presidential administration, for his removal and urged all his adherents to leave “the puppet” Kremlin party (Shlapentokh & Arutunyan, 2013: 45). Later, he, however, stated that the capture of the RCP was nothing personal against him, but rather the “system’s” resilience to the reforms he aimed to enforce (Ria Novosti, 2011n). In mid-September 2011, Prokhorov left the RCP (Ria Novosti, 2011o) and declared that neither he nor his colleagues were going to stand for or vote in the upcoming legislative elections (Ria Novosti, 2011f). Prokhorov also stated that he was demanding his invested money back from the captured party (Ria Novosti, 2011j).

On December 4, 2011, Russians went to the polls for the State Duma elections. As expected, the incumbent UR party won the majority of legislative seats. On December 10, 2011, the non-systemic opposition organized large-scale protests against the regime, claiming electoral fraud in the election. Meanwhile, media reported that although Prokhorov acknowledged Putin’s popularity, he was critical of the UR and pointed to the urgent need of its reformation (Ria Novosti, 2011h). On December 12, 2011,

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October 1, 2012, Georgians went to the polls. Ivanishvili’s GD won the majority of seats in the parliament and President Saakashvili conceded defeat to the GD (Sputnik, 2012h).

Mikhail Prokhorov in Russia Prokhorov graduated in 1989 from Moscow State Financial institute with a degree in international economic relations. For the better part of the 1990s, Prokhorov’s capital was invested in commercial banks and industrial conglomerates (Ria Novosti, 2008). Prokhorov possessed a controlling interest in RBC Multimedia Holding between 2009 and 2017. The holding has operated the popular RBC TV channel and internet media outlet covering political and business news (Boyd-Barrett, 2012).

Figure N. Prokhorov’s path to withdrawing from politics

Notes: Data is coded by author based on electronic media reports from Ria-Novosti.ru. There is no inherent hierarchy between the markers. The graph simply depicts the categories of reported activities on a timeline. Dashed lines delineate tenure.

Figure N suggests that Prokhorov focused particularly on improving his reputation. Moreover, this behavior was most evident close to elections. It is also apparent that he generally rejected invitations to cooperate with the opposition. In hindsight, it is clear that he was a political loner who generally chose to go his own way. In addition, the figure illustrates that the incumbents threatened neither his media nor financial resources. However, his human

President of the Russian Biathlon Union

President of the Civic Platform Party

President of the Right Cause Party

Member of the Presidential Commission on Innovation

:-:

2009 2011 2012 2013 2015

Efforts to increase his reputation

Increase in financial resources

Increase in human resourcesAttack against his human resources

Contributes to collective challenges against the regimeDoes not contribute tocollective challenges against the regime: Legislative elections :- Presidential election

121

resources were attacked ahead of the 2012 legislative elections. Let us now take a closer look at the different phases of Prokhorov’s political pathway.

Prokhorov’s political career may be characterized as vacillating. It oscillated between active and passive phases—big promises and abrupt exits from politics. Media reports show that he on several occasions announced his readiness to leave his business to entirely engage in politics (Ria Novosti, 2013h, 2011a). On June 25, 2011, Prokhorov became the president of the Right Cause party (RCP). Moreover, the RCP’s members voted for abandoning co-chairmanship in the party to fully concentrate the party leadership in his hands (Ria Novosti, 2013c). Prokhorov announced that the ruling United Russia (UR) was the RCP’s main political rival. However, while he spoke critical of the UR, he was more cautious when referring to Putin (Ria Novosti, 2011i). Speaking at the party congress in late June 2011, Prokhorov suggested not using the label “opposition” for the RCP because, according to him, most Russians associated that label with marginalized political forces (Ria Novosti, 2011m).

In July 2011, Prokhorov declared that he completely left his business for engaging fully in politics (Ria Novosti, 2011a). In late August 2011, the RCP published its manifesto in which it vowed to implement important reforms. Two key proposals were the RCP’s plans to cancel MPs’ immunity and introduction of a law enabling parliamentarians to impeach both governors and members of the government. Prokhorov made clear that he regarded many parliamentarians as crooks, which, he further noted, necessarily were to be exposed to criminal investigations (Ria Novosti, 2011k).

In September 2011, his organizational capacity suffered great damage. His rivals in the RCP convened a parallel party congress, chaired by Andrei Dunayev, and voted for ousting Prokhorov. Prokhorov blamed Vladislav Surkov, the then deputy head of the presidential administration, for his removal and urged all his adherents to leave “the puppet” Kremlin party (Shlapentokh & Arutunyan, 2013: 45). Later, he, however, stated that the capture of the RCP was nothing personal against him, but rather the “system’s” resilience to the reforms he aimed to enforce (Ria Novosti, 2011n). In mid-September 2011, Prokhorov left the RCP (Ria Novosti, 2011o) and declared that neither he nor his colleagues were going to stand for or vote in the upcoming legislative elections (Ria Novosti, 2011f). Prokhorov also stated that he was demanding his invested money back from the captured party (Ria Novosti, 2011j).

On December 4, 2011, Russians went to the polls for the State Duma elections. As expected, the incumbent UR party won the majority of legislative seats. On December 10, 2011, the non-systemic opposition organized large-scale protests against the regime, claiming electoral fraud in the election. Meanwhile, media reported that although Prokhorov acknowledged Putin’s popularity, he was critical of the UR and pointed to the urgent need of its reformation (Ria Novosti, 2011h). On December 12, 2011,

120

October 1, 2012, Georgians went to the polls. Ivanishvili’s GD won the majority of seats in the parliament and President Saakashvili conceded defeat to the GD (Sputnik, 2012h).

Mikhail Prokhorov in Russia Prokhorov graduated in 1989 from Moscow State Financial institute with a degree in international economic relations. For the better part of the 1990s, Prokhorov’s capital was invested in commercial banks and industrial conglomerates (Ria Novosti, 2008). Prokhorov possessed a controlling interest in RBC Multimedia Holding between 2009 and 2017. The holding has operated the popular RBC TV channel and internet media outlet covering political and business news (Boyd-Barrett, 2012).

Figure N. Prokhorov’s path to withdrawing from politics

Notes: Data is coded by author based on electronic media reports from Ria-Novosti.ru. There is no inherent hierarchy between the markers. The graph simply depicts the categories of reported activities on a timeline. Dashed lines delineate tenure.

Figure N suggests that Prokhorov focused particularly on improving his reputation. Moreover, this behavior was most evident close to elections. It is also apparent that he generally rejected invitations to cooperate with the opposition. In hindsight, it is clear that he was a political loner who generally chose to go his own way. In addition, the figure illustrates that the incumbents threatened neither his media nor financial resources. However, his human

President of the Russian Biathlon Union

President of the Civic Platform Party

President of the Right Cause Party

Member of the Presidential Commission on Innovation

:-:

2009 2011 2012 2013 2015

Efforts to increase his reputation

Increase in financial resources

Increase in human resourcesAttack against his human resources

Contributes to collective challenges against the regimeDoes not contribute tocollective challenges against the regime: Legislative elections :- Presidential election

123

personally after the second round of the elections (Ria Novosti, 2012f). Still, only a day later Prokhorov declared that he did not see any prospects for Putin staying in government should he garner the majority of Russian votes in the presidential election (Ria Novosti, 2012g). Putin, who was prime minister at the time, spoke rather highly of Prokhorov for his honesty, contemporaneity and strong desire to develop the Russian economy. Putin also added that some of Prokhorov’s ideas were worth a great deal of attention (Ria Novosti, 2012x). However, Putin personally declined all political debates with the opponents due to a “busy schedule” (The Moscow Times, 2012). In reality, this was a signal to the public that he did not view any of his competitors worth enough for him to devote time for political debates.

In the beginning of February 2012, the opposition was still protesting against the authorities’ electoral manipulations. Prokhorov did not contribute to these collective challenges against the regime, but was again among protesters simply as a compatriot. He defended this decision by asserting that he wanted to avoid debating with “the marionettes of Putin” on stage (Ria Novosti, 2012r). Just a few weeks before the presidential election, Prokhorov intensified his criticism of the government’s policies for the business climate (Ria Novosti, 2012c). He attempted in vain to unite the opposition by introducing the idea of jointly monitoring the elections (Ria Novosti, 2012l). Prokhorov also admitted that Putin was better than he was at using the media to inform the public about his political program. Prokhorov added that he was going to improve his own media strategies (Ria Novosti, 2012d).

In late February 2012, Zyuganov’s confidant urged Prokhorov to suspend his campaign in favor of his superior (Ria Novosti, 2012q). On that very day, Zyuganov did not bother to personally attend a state-run TV debate with Prokhorov but rather sent his confidant to debate him. Prokhorov left the TV studio during the live broadcast as soon as Zyuganov’s decision to abstain became evident (Ria Novosti, 2012j).

Putin won a sweeping victory in the presidential election held on March 4, 2012. Prokhorov received 8 percent of Russian votes. He conceded his defeat to Putin, but announced that he was about to establish a new party and run for president in the future. He added that possible electoral manipulations were due to the flawed political system and not necessarily instructed by Putin. Yet, he ruled out any possibility of him working in Putin’s cabinet (Ria Novosti, 2012e). The radical opposition, however, did not accept the results of the elections as easily. The situation on the streets became more violent as tens of thousands of Russians took to the streets to show their dissatisfaction with the election results. Prokhorov did not join the opposition rallies against Putin. Rather, he called for calm and avoidance of clashes (Ria Novosti, 2012o, 2012u).

In the beginning of June 2012, Prokhorov introduced his new Civic Platform party (CPP). He surprised everybody by not joining the party himself. Initially, he announced that only “professionals” were welcome to

122

Prokhorov announced that he intended to run for president in the 2012 elections (Ria Novosti, 2011d). He declared that he had ties neither to the Kremlin nor to the White House (Ria Novosti, 2011c). Prokhorov also expressed that he would collaborate with the then Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin should he become president in 2012 (Ria Novosti, 2011e). He promised to reduce the presidential term of office to five years and set an upper limit of ten years for the same president. Moreover, he ensured that he would reintroduce popular vote for governors with immediate effect (Ria Novosti, 2011g).

On December 24, 2011, Prokhorov took part in the oppositional protest against the authorities only as a fellow citizen, but expressed criticism of the Kremlin’s alleged electoral fraud (Ria Novosti, 2011l). In mid-January 2012, Prokhorov spoke of the urgent need to reform most state institutions in order to ensure the rule of law and democracy, which he saw as the foremost demand of the Russian protesters (Ria Novosti, 2012a). Close to the 2012 presidential election, a high-ranking official from a systemic opposition party opposed Prokhorov by accusing him of plagiarism in his political program (Ria Novosti, 2012y). A more radical opposition party expressed its intention to request a revision of the Central Election Commission’s (CEC) decision to accept Prokhorov’s candidacy for president (Ria Novosti, 2012b).

Prokhorov countered such attacks by recruiting key figures from Russian show business to his political team of advisers. Alla Pugacheva (one of Russia’s most beloved singers) and other popular actors and athletes led the list (Ria Novosti, 2012w). Moreover, Prokhorov reassured that he was ready to quit his business activities and devote himself entirely to politics if he would be elected president (Ria Novosti, 2012p). Surprisingly, Prokhorov did not rule out the possibility of him working in the cabinet of the other president should he lose in the upcoming presidential election. However, while he did not provide any more specific details on this, he added that his goal was to help or personally implement policies that his team and supporters endorse. Prokhorov also mentioned that he was going to establish a new party after the presidential election on March 4, 2012 (Ria Novosti, 2012m).

In late January 2012, Prokhorov said that he was expecting people disapproving Putin and the Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov to vote for him (Ria Novosti, 2012h). He also criticized CEC for denying the registration of the opposition Yabloko party leader Grigori Yavlinsky’s candidacy for president (Ria Novosti, 2012s). Moreover, Prokhorov opted for not attending a regular meeting in the Presidential Commission of Innovation since his political rival Putin was the chair of the commission. He justified this decision by stating that he wanted to avoid being part of Putin’s presidential campaigning which took place in most state commissions close to the elections (Ria Novosti, 2012i).

Prokhorov was significantly restrained in his criticism of Putin only a month prior to the 2012 presidential election. Yet, he vowed to criticize Putin

123

personally after the second round of the elections (Ria Novosti, 2012f). Still, only a day later Prokhorov declared that he did not see any prospects for Putin staying in government should he garner the majority of Russian votes in the presidential election (Ria Novosti, 2012g). Putin, who was prime minister at the time, spoke rather highly of Prokhorov for his honesty, contemporaneity and strong desire to develop the Russian economy. Putin also added that some of Prokhorov’s ideas were worth a great deal of attention (Ria Novosti, 2012x). However, Putin personally declined all political debates with the opponents due to a “busy schedule” (The Moscow Times, 2012). In reality, this was a signal to the public that he did not view any of his competitors worth enough for him to devote time for political debates.

In the beginning of February 2012, the opposition was still protesting against the authorities’ electoral manipulations. Prokhorov did not contribute to these collective challenges against the regime, but was again among protesters simply as a compatriot. He defended this decision by asserting that he wanted to avoid debating with “the marionettes of Putin” on stage (Ria Novosti, 2012r). Just a few weeks before the presidential election, Prokhorov intensified his criticism of the government’s policies for the business climate (Ria Novosti, 2012c). He attempted in vain to unite the opposition by introducing the idea of jointly monitoring the elections (Ria Novosti, 2012l). Prokhorov also admitted that Putin was better than he was at using the media to inform the public about his political program. Prokhorov added that he was going to improve his own media strategies (Ria Novosti, 2012d).

In late February 2012, Zyuganov’s confidant urged Prokhorov to suspend his campaign in favor of his superior (Ria Novosti, 2012q). On that very day, Zyuganov did not bother to personally attend a state-run TV debate with Prokhorov but rather sent his confidant to debate him. Prokhorov left the TV studio during the live broadcast as soon as Zyuganov’s decision to abstain became evident (Ria Novosti, 2012j).

Putin won a sweeping victory in the presidential election held on March 4, 2012. Prokhorov received 8 percent of Russian votes. He conceded his defeat to Putin, but announced that he was about to establish a new party and run for president in the future. He added that possible electoral manipulations were due to the flawed political system and not necessarily instructed by Putin. Yet, he ruled out any possibility of him working in Putin’s cabinet (Ria Novosti, 2012e). The radical opposition, however, did not accept the results of the elections as easily. The situation on the streets became more violent as tens of thousands of Russians took to the streets to show their dissatisfaction with the election results. Prokhorov did not join the opposition rallies against Putin. Rather, he called for calm and avoidance of clashes (Ria Novosti, 2012o, 2012u).

In the beginning of June 2012, Prokhorov introduced his new Civic Platform party (CPP). He surprised everybody by not joining the party himself. Initially, he announced that only “professionals” were welcome to

122

Prokhorov announced that he intended to run for president in the 2012 elections (Ria Novosti, 2011d). He declared that he had ties neither to the Kremlin nor to the White House (Ria Novosti, 2011c). Prokhorov also expressed that he would collaborate with the then Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin should he become president in 2012 (Ria Novosti, 2011e). He promised to reduce the presidential term of office to five years and set an upper limit of ten years for the same president. Moreover, he ensured that he would reintroduce popular vote for governors with immediate effect (Ria Novosti, 2011g).

On December 24, 2011, Prokhorov took part in the oppositional protest against the authorities only as a fellow citizen, but expressed criticism of the Kremlin’s alleged electoral fraud (Ria Novosti, 2011l). In mid-January 2012, Prokhorov spoke of the urgent need to reform most state institutions in order to ensure the rule of law and democracy, which he saw as the foremost demand of the Russian protesters (Ria Novosti, 2012a). Close to the 2012 presidential election, a high-ranking official from a systemic opposition party opposed Prokhorov by accusing him of plagiarism in his political program (Ria Novosti, 2012y). A more radical opposition party expressed its intention to request a revision of the Central Election Commission’s (CEC) decision to accept Prokhorov’s candidacy for president (Ria Novosti, 2012b).

Prokhorov countered such attacks by recruiting key figures from Russian show business to his political team of advisers. Alla Pugacheva (one of Russia’s most beloved singers) and other popular actors and athletes led the list (Ria Novosti, 2012w). Moreover, Prokhorov reassured that he was ready to quit his business activities and devote himself entirely to politics if he would be elected president (Ria Novosti, 2012p). Surprisingly, Prokhorov did not rule out the possibility of him working in the cabinet of the other president should he lose in the upcoming presidential election. However, while he did not provide any more specific details on this, he added that his goal was to help or personally implement policies that his team and supporters endorse. Prokhorov also mentioned that he was going to establish a new party after the presidential election on March 4, 2012 (Ria Novosti, 2012m).

In late January 2012, Prokhorov said that he was expecting people disapproving Putin and the Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov to vote for him (Ria Novosti, 2012h). He also criticized CEC for denying the registration of the opposition Yabloko party leader Grigori Yavlinsky’s candidacy for president (Ria Novosti, 2012s). Moreover, Prokhorov opted for not attending a regular meeting in the Presidential Commission of Innovation since his political rival Putin was the chair of the commission. He justified this decision by stating that he wanted to avoid being part of Putin’s presidential campaigning which took place in most state commissions close to the elections (Ria Novosti, 2012i).

Prokhorov was significantly restrained in his criticism of Putin only a month prior to the 2012 presidential election. Yet, he vowed to criticize Putin

125

Petro Poroshenko in Ukraine Poroshenko has been one of the most publicly known oligarchs in Ukraine. He has a degree in economics from Kyiv State University. He is the owner of the popular 5 TV Channel in Ukraine (Pleines, 2009). He earned his major capital by supplying cocoa beans to the Soviet Union starting from 1989. Since 1998, the Petro Poroshenko Charity Foundation has provided support for large Ukrainian families and orphans. His fund has also made considerable contributions to social movements and organizations that work for justice, equality and democracy.

Figure O. Poroshenko’s successful way to becoming the president of Ukraine

Notes: Data is coded by author based on electronic media reports from Censor.net.ua. There is no inherent hierarchy between the markers. The graph simply depicts the categories of reported activities on a timeline. Dashed lines delineate tenure.

Figure O illustrates that Poroshenko attached great importance to enhancing his reputation and organizational resources. Similar to previously discussed oligarchs, this behavior intensified close to elections. The figure also shows that Poroshenko has over the years been well entrenched in government since he headed the National Bank of Ukraine, Ministries for Foreign Affairs, and Economic Development and Trade. This is most likely why his organizational resources were not attacked as often as was the case with the three other oligarchs examined in this chapter. However, the figure indicates that Russian attacks against his financial resources in Russia and Crimea took place in the

MP in RadaChairman of the Board of Ukraine's National Bank

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Minister of Economic Development and TradeMember of the National Security and Defense Commission

:

:-:-

:

:-

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Efforts to increase his reputation

Increase in financial resources

Media resources increase

Increase in human resources

Attack against financial resources

Attack against human resources

Russian attack against financial resources

Contributes to collective challenges against the regime

Does not contribute tocollective challenges against the regime

: Legislative elections :- Presidential election

124

become members of the CPP (Ria Novosti, 2012v). However, he later abandoned this idea and attempted to convert the CPP to a more traditional party (Ria Novosti, 2012n). In general, he used his financial resources to improve his reputation and organizational resources during 2012. To this end, he offered $50,000 to each Russian family that wanted to adopt children which Russian law prohibited being adopted by American citizens (Ria Novosti, 2012k). He continued recruiting famous people to his party in order to both improve his human resources and personal reputation (Ria Novosti, 2012t).

In the beginning of 2013, he expressed criticism of the State Duma and the elected opposition as being puppets of the Kremlin. He also heavily criticized President Putin for not being “an initiator and leader of social processes” anymore (Ria Novosti, 2013d). In April 2013, Prokhorov spoke positively of Alexei Navalny—a popular oppositional politician who announced his plans to run for mayor of Moscow. Notwithstanding this, Prokhorov suggested Navalny to form a new party before the elections. He also announced that he and the CPP were going to stand in the Moscow parliament elections (Ria Novosti, 2013e). However, he later reneged on this decision by declaring that neither he nor the CPP would run. A representative of the Just Russia (JR), another systemic opposition party, explained that Prokhorov’s decision was unsurprising because the government had entirely controlled him. The JR’s representative further noted that Prokhorov’s run for mayor would endanger UR candidate Sergey Sobyanin’s chances to be elected as Mayor of Moscow (Ria Novosti, 2013g).

The authorities detained the Mayor of Yaroslavl due to accusations of corruption in August 2013 (Ria Novosti, 2013f). He was a key member in Prokhorov’s political team. In September 2013, Prokhorov regretted that he opted for not standing in the Moscow elections that were held three months earlier (Ria Novosti, 2011b). He alleged the obstacles to transferring his foreign assets to Russia as an excuse for that decision since his conviction had always been to separate politics from business (Ria Novosti, 2013a).

In late December 2013, Prokhorov’s sister Irina Prokhorova became the president of the CPP (Ria Novosti, 2013b). This led to his gradual exit from politics. During 2014, Prokhorov did not appear in media with any controversial political proposals or criticism against incumbents. However, he still announced certain suggestions on how to improve the business climate in Russia, in which he stressed the need of privatization in many inefficient sectors of the economy (Ria Novosti, 2014). In mid-July 2014, his sister left her post in the CPP due to her disagreement with the party leadership’s endorsement of the annexation of Crimea (RBC, 2014). In February 2015, the leadership of the CPP joined pro-Putin rallies against the opposition in Russia. This prompted Prokhorov to quit the party a month later. He also demanded the elimination of the CPP if its name was not changed (Ria Novosti, 2015).

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Petro Poroshenko in Ukraine Poroshenko has been one of the most publicly known oligarchs in Ukraine. He has a degree in economics from Kyiv State University. He is the owner of the popular 5 TV Channel in Ukraine (Pleines, 2009). He earned his major capital by supplying cocoa beans to the Soviet Union starting from 1989. Since 1998, the Petro Poroshenko Charity Foundation has provided support for large Ukrainian families and orphans. His fund has also made considerable contributions to social movements and organizations that work for justice, equality and democracy.

Figure O. Poroshenko’s successful way to becoming the president of Ukraine

Notes: Data is coded by author based on electronic media reports from Censor.net.ua. There is no inherent hierarchy between the markers. The graph simply depicts the categories of reported activities on a timeline. Dashed lines delineate tenure.

Figure O illustrates that Poroshenko attached great importance to enhancing his reputation and organizational resources. Similar to previously discussed oligarchs, this behavior intensified close to elections. The figure also shows that Poroshenko has over the years been well entrenched in government since he headed the National Bank of Ukraine, Ministries for Foreign Affairs, and Economic Development and Trade. This is most likely why his organizational resources were not attacked as often as was the case with the three other oligarchs examined in this chapter. However, the figure indicates that Russian attacks against his financial resources in Russia and Crimea took place in the

MP in RadaChairman of the Board of Ukraine's National Bank

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Minister of Economic Development and TradeMember of the National Security and Defense Commission

:

:-:-

:

:-

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Efforts to increase his reputation

Increase in financial resources

Media resources increase

Increase in human resources

Attack against financial resources

Attack against human resources

Russian attack against financial resources

Contributes to collective challenges against the regime

Does not contribute tocollective challenges against the regime

: Legislative elections :- Presidential election

124

become members of the CPP (Ria Novosti, 2012v). However, he later abandoned this idea and attempted to convert the CPP to a more traditional party (Ria Novosti, 2012n). In general, he used his financial resources to improve his reputation and organizational resources during 2012. To this end, he offered $50,000 to each Russian family that wanted to adopt children which Russian law prohibited being adopted by American citizens (Ria Novosti, 2012k). He continued recruiting famous people to his party in order to both improve his human resources and personal reputation (Ria Novosti, 2012t).

In the beginning of 2013, he expressed criticism of the State Duma and the elected opposition as being puppets of the Kremlin. He also heavily criticized President Putin for not being “an initiator and leader of social processes” anymore (Ria Novosti, 2013d). In April 2013, Prokhorov spoke positively of Alexei Navalny—a popular oppositional politician who announced his plans to run for mayor of Moscow. Notwithstanding this, Prokhorov suggested Navalny to form a new party before the elections. He also announced that he and the CPP were going to stand in the Moscow parliament elections (Ria Novosti, 2013e). However, he later reneged on this decision by declaring that neither he nor the CPP would run. A representative of the Just Russia (JR), another systemic opposition party, explained that Prokhorov’s decision was unsurprising because the government had entirely controlled him. The JR’s representative further noted that Prokhorov’s run for mayor would endanger UR candidate Sergey Sobyanin’s chances to be elected as Mayor of Moscow (Ria Novosti, 2013g).

The authorities detained the Mayor of Yaroslavl due to accusations of corruption in August 2013 (Ria Novosti, 2013f). He was a key member in Prokhorov’s political team. In September 2013, Prokhorov regretted that he opted for not standing in the Moscow elections that were held three months earlier (Ria Novosti, 2011b). He alleged the obstacles to transferring his foreign assets to Russia as an excuse for that decision since his conviction had always been to separate politics from business (Ria Novosti, 2013a).

In late December 2013, Prokhorov’s sister Irina Prokhorova became the president of the CPP (Ria Novosti, 2013b). This led to his gradual exit from politics. During 2014, Prokhorov did not appear in media with any controversial political proposals or criticism against incumbents. However, he still announced certain suggestions on how to improve the business climate in Russia, in which he stressed the need of privatization in many inefficient sectors of the economy (Ria Novosti, 2014). In mid-July 2014, his sister left her post in the CPP due to her disagreement with the party leadership’s endorsement of the annexation of Crimea (RBC, 2014). In February 2015, the leadership of the CPP joined pro-Putin rallies against the opposition in Russia. This prompted Prokhorov to quit the party a month later. He also demanded the elimination of the CPP if its name was not changed (Ria Novosti, 2015).

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November 2010, a large number of owners of small-scale enterprises took to the streets of Kyiv urging the president to cancel the new law implying higher taxation. Poroshenko fully supported these demands (Censor, 2010d).

In 2011, Poroshenko stated that the economic policies of the government were going to generate a new and much harsher popular uprising than was the case in 2004 (Censor, 2011d). Poroshenko further denounced the whole political system and corrupt politicians in Ukraine for performing extremely bad (Censor, 2011a). In early November 2011, Poroshenko also leveled harsh criticism against powerful oligarchs, among them Rinat Akhmetov, for not paying an adequate level of taxes (Censor, 2011e). Later, Poroshenko also pointed out that the gap between the rich and poor in Ukraine must be reduced and that charity alone was not enough to eradicate economic disparity (Censor, 2012d).

In December 2011, Poroshenko declared that he had no plans of running for president (Censor, 2011b). A month earlier, the ruling party proposed important changes in the electoral legislation of Ukraine. Poroshenko considered them hazardous for Ukraine (Censor, 2011c). In February 2012, Yanukovich and his Prime Minister Nikolay Azarov offered Poroshenko to head the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (Censor, 2012b). He assumed the office the following month (Censor, 2012k).

It is worth mentioning that key opposition leaders Yulia Timoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko were sentenced to prison for abuse of office and forgery. In March 2012, Poroshenko urged the authorities to ensure fair legal process in which the democratic rights of the suspects were respected (Censor, 2012o). He also vowed to involve the civil society of Ukraine in monitoring public procurement and render them more effective (Censor, 2012m). Poroshenko stated that he agreed to collaborate with the government of Yanukovich to develop the Ukrainian economy by improving the business climate (Censor, 2012n). He also announced that he intended to stand in the upcoming legislative elections (Censor, 2012e). On March 30, 2012, media reported that he was the richest public official in Ukraine (Censor, 2012i). Poroshenko announced that he gave up his official salary and was going to publish a complete declaration of his assets (Censor, 2012g).

Within the years 2012 to 2013, Poroshenko leveraged his tenure in the Yanukovich government both to strengthen his links with the West and to extend his political influence domestically. In particular, he used the linkages with the West to put pressure on the president and the government as to their policies towards Ukraine’s full integration in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) of the EU. Prior to the parliamentary elections in the end of 2012, he condemned the government for their passivity in implementing the requirements of the EaP (Censor, 2012s). Perhaps coincidentally, Yanukovich appointed Poroshenko’s son Olexiy Poroshenko as deputy consul of Ukraine in China only a week after that criticism (Censor, 2012r).

126

mid of the Ukraine crisis in the spring of 2014. Let us now focus on the details of Poroshenko’s path to becoming president in 2014.

Poroshenko had good relations with Viktor Yuschenko—the second president of Ukraine. Prior to Viktor Yanukovich’s election victory in February 2012, Poroshenko was not as active in politics. In particular, in February 2008, Poroshenko pointed out that he stayed aloof from politics due to his presidency in the National Bank (Censor, 2008). He, however, made several sweeping political statements during this politically more passive period. For instance, Poroshenko stated that Ukrainians were sick of politicians (Censor, 2009f), the presence of Russia’s naval fleet in Crimea was not to be politicized (Censor, 2009d) and Russia was not a threat to Ukraine’s national security (Censor, 2009e).

In October 2009, President Yuschenko appointed Poroshenko as member of the National Security and Defense Commission (Censor, 2009c). Yuschenko described him as an “effective” politician and skilled official when he appointed him as minister for foreign affairs (Censor, 2009a, 2009b). In contrast, the then leader of the Party of Regions (POF) Yanukovich criticized the appointment by remarking that there were more professional candidates for that position (Censor, 2009b).

One of Poroshenko’s foremost tasks in his role as minister for foreign affairs was to improve Ukraine’s relations with both Russia and the West. In late October 2009, Poroshenko declared that the question of Ukraine joining NATO was not on the agenda. He also added that Ukraine’s foreign policies were to pursue pragmatic relations with all partners (Censor, 2009i). By the end of 2009, Poroshenko, however, announced that Ukraine would become member of NATO only if there would be a political and popular consensus on the issue (Censor, 2009j). Poroshenko made every effort to enhance his public image. In late December 2009, he declared that he had been financing all his official journeys as minister with his own money. He justified this decision by pointing to the difficult economic situation of the state economy (Censor, 2009h). In addition, he personally assisted Ukrainian passengers to put pressure on Wizz Air36 to compensate for delayed flights (Censor, 2009g).

Yanukovich became president after garnering the majority of Ukrainian votes in February 2010. During one of his first official visits to Brussels, he was accompanied by Poroshenko (Censor, 2010a). Poroshenko had already developed good relations with the West while he was minister for foreign affairs. Moreover, in March 2010 Poroshenko called on all politicians in Ukraine to unite around the idea of Ukraine’s European integration (Censor, 2010b). Poroshenko kept a steady pressure on the government. He criticized its economic policies and accused it of corruption (Censor, 2010c). In late

36 Wizz Air is currently the largest low cost airline in Central and Eastern Europe. Its head office is located in Budapest, Hungary.

127

November 2010, a large number of owners of small-scale enterprises took to the streets of Kyiv urging the president to cancel the new law implying higher taxation. Poroshenko fully supported these demands (Censor, 2010d).

In 2011, Poroshenko stated that the economic policies of the government were going to generate a new and much harsher popular uprising than was the case in 2004 (Censor, 2011d). Poroshenko further denounced the whole political system and corrupt politicians in Ukraine for performing extremely bad (Censor, 2011a). In early November 2011, Poroshenko also leveled harsh criticism against powerful oligarchs, among them Rinat Akhmetov, for not paying an adequate level of taxes (Censor, 2011e). Later, Poroshenko also pointed out that the gap between the rich and poor in Ukraine must be reduced and that charity alone was not enough to eradicate economic disparity (Censor, 2012d).

In December 2011, Poroshenko declared that he had no plans of running for president (Censor, 2011b). A month earlier, the ruling party proposed important changes in the electoral legislation of Ukraine. Poroshenko considered them hazardous for Ukraine (Censor, 2011c). In February 2012, Yanukovich and his Prime Minister Nikolay Azarov offered Poroshenko to head the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (Censor, 2012b). He assumed the office the following month (Censor, 2012k).

It is worth mentioning that key opposition leaders Yulia Timoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko were sentenced to prison for abuse of office and forgery. In March 2012, Poroshenko urged the authorities to ensure fair legal process in which the democratic rights of the suspects were respected (Censor, 2012o). He also vowed to involve the civil society of Ukraine in monitoring public procurement and render them more effective (Censor, 2012m). Poroshenko stated that he agreed to collaborate with the government of Yanukovich to develop the Ukrainian economy by improving the business climate (Censor, 2012n). He also announced that he intended to stand in the upcoming legislative elections (Censor, 2012e). On March 30, 2012, media reported that he was the richest public official in Ukraine (Censor, 2012i). Poroshenko announced that he gave up his official salary and was going to publish a complete declaration of his assets (Censor, 2012g).

Within the years 2012 to 2013, Poroshenko leveraged his tenure in the Yanukovich government both to strengthen his links with the West and to extend his political influence domestically. In particular, he used the linkages with the West to put pressure on the president and the government as to their policies towards Ukraine’s full integration in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) of the EU. Prior to the parliamentary elections in the end of 2012, he condemned the government for their passivity in implementing the requirements of the EaP (Censor, 2012s). Perhaps coincidentally, Yanukovich appointed Poroshenko’s son Olexiy Poroshenko as deputy consul of Ukraine in China only a week after that criticism (Censor, 2012r).

126

mid of the Ukraine crisis in the spring of 2014. Let us now focus on the details of Poroshenko’s path to becoming president in 2014.

Poroshenko had good relations with Viktor Yuschenko—the second president of Ukraine. Prior to Viktor Yanukovich’s election victory in February 2012, Poroshenko was not as active in politics. In particular, in February 2008, Poroshenko pointed out that he stayed aloof from politics due to his presidency in the National Bank (Censor, 2008). He, however, made several sweeping political statements during this politically more passive period. For instance, Poroshenko stated that Ukrainians were sick of politicians (Censor, 2009f), the presence of Russia’s naval fleet in Crimea was not to be politicized (Censor, 2009d) and Russia was not a threat to Ukraine’s national security (Censor, 2009e).

In October 2009, President Yuschenko appointed Poroshenko as member of the National Security and Defense Commission (Censor, 2009c). Yuschenko described him as an “effective” politician and skilled official when he appointed him as minister for foreign affairs (Censor, 2009a, 2009b). In contrast, the then leader of the Party of Regions (POF) Yanukovich criticized the appointment by remarking that there were more professional candidates for that position (Censor, 2009b).

One of Poroshenko’s foremost tasks in his role as minister for foreign affairs was to improve Ukraine’s relations with both Russia and the West. In late October 2009, Poroshenko declared that the question of Ukraine joining NATO was not on the agenda. He also added that Ukraine’s foreign policies were to pursue pragmatic relations with all partners (Censor, 2009i). By the end of 2009, Poroshenko, however, announced that Ukraine would become member of NATO only if there would be a political and popular consensus on the issue (Censor, 2009j). Poroshenko made every effort to enhance his public image. In late December 2009, he declared that he had been financing all his official journeys as minister with his own money. He justified this decision by pointing to the difficult economic situation of the state economy (Censor, 2009h). In addition, he personally assisted Ukrainian passengers to put pressure on Wizz Air36 to compensate for delayed flights (Censor, 2009g).

Yanukovich became president after garnering the majority of Ukrainian votes in February 2010. During one of his first official visits to Brussels, he was accompanied by Poroshenko (Censor, 2010a). Poroshenko had already developed good relations with the West while he was minister for foreign affairs. Moreover, in March 2010 Poroshenko called on all politicians in Ukraine to unite around the idea of Ukraine’s European integration (Censor, 2010b). Poroshenko kept a steady pressure on the government. He criticized its economic policies and accused it of corruption (Censor, 2010c). In late

36 Wizz Air is currently the largest low cost airline in Central and Eastern Europe. Its head office is located in Budapest, Hungary.

129

President Putin visited Ukraine (EurActiv, 2013). In particular, the Federal Consumer Protection Service of Russia inspected and found toxic contents in Roshen confectionery, which led to the Russian ban on the import of Roshen’s products to Russia (Censor, 2013n). Russian officials announced in mid-August that Roshen could well be back on the Russian market, but that a lot of work remained to be done before it could happen (Censor, 2013e). Later in September, Poroshenko declared that Roshen won the trade war that Russia waged against Ukraine. The reason for this statement was that Roshen’s sales increased despite the Russian attacks against it (Censor, 2013q). In sharp contrast to this, Poroshenko made clear in November that Roshen was compelled to implement mass reductions in staff due to the Russian ban on Roshen (Censor, 2013b). However, he added that the primary threat against Roshen was directed by the government and the security forces of Ukraine (Censor, 2013a). Poroshenko also noted that he was leveraging all his organizational resources and international connections to put pressure on Russia to lift the ban (Censor, 2013r).

In early December 2013, Poroshenko mediated between the police and protesters during the Euromaidan protests (Censor, 2013f). Poroshenko announced that the opposition was ready to negotiate with Yanukovich only after he dismissed the government and signed the Association Agreement (AA) for the EaP (Censor, 2013i). Poroshenko had been very active behind the scenes of the Euromaidan. He made great efforts to coordinate the opposition, Western colleagues and the international business community to put pressure on Yanukovich. For instance, in late January 2014 Poroshenko attended the World Economic Forum in Davos and urged the business community not to collaborate with the Yanukovich government (Censor, 2014j). On January 25, Poroshenko described the situation in Ukraine as a national crisis and called for consolidation against the tyranny of the ruling regime (Censor, 2014f). He announced that the international community did not accept Yanukovich and his criminal regime as the legitimate leaders of Ukraine. He added that they instead considered the legitimacy to lie with the Euromaidan (Censor, 2014l).

On February 2, 2014, Poroshenko expressed his gratitude to the EU and the U.S. Department of State for their support of the Euromaidan (Censor, 2014a). On February 3, media reported that Poroshenko had initiated talks with many MPs from the ruling POF party to urge them to defect to the opposition (Censor, 2014m). Two days later, he also urged president Yanukovych to withdraw all the special forces from Kyiv (Censor, 2014d). The Euromaidan Revolution toppled Yanukovich on February 22, 2014. Poroshenko became the speaker of parliament in late February. In early March, polls showed that Poroshenko was a favorite president candidate prior to the forthcoming presidential election (Censor, 2014e). On March 28, Poroshenko officially announced his candidacy (Censor, 2014h). A day later, Vitali Klitschko withdrew his candidacy to support Poroshenko (Censor, 2014b). He advised Yulia Timoshenko to do the same, which she declined (Censor, 2014c). Many

128

On May 28, 2012, Poroshenko announced his decision to stand in the parliamentary elections in November 2012 (Censor, 2012j). Two days later, media reported that the public prosecutors had launched an investigation into one of his car companies to check whether the company complied with security and construction regulations. Poroshenko’s representatives announced that the authorities’ complaints were groundless (Censor, 2012q). In June 2012, Poroshenko suggested that taxes on luxury should be collected from cabinet ministers in the first place. He further criticized the government for not dealing with rife corruption in Ukraine (Censor, 2012p). Ten days later, the president appointed him as the manager of the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (Censor, 2012a).

Poroshenko was elected MP in November 2012 (Censor, 2012l). In December, he announced that he was going to take a neutral political stance in the parliament (Censor, 2012f), but support the opposition in its struggle for principal causes (Censor, 2012h). He reasserted his condemnation of Yanukovich’s wavering between joining the Russia-led Customs Union (CU) or the EaP. Poroshenko once more made very clear that the CU was not an alternative for Ukraine (Censor, 2012c).

During the spring of 2013, Poroshenko sought to develop his bonds with the opposition. He announced that he had good chances of becoming Mayor of Kyiv. Yet, he stated that he would run for the post only if his candidacy was endorsed by the opposition (Censor, 2013l). Well before the Kyiv mayoral elections in June 2014, Poroshenko showed his support for Vitali Klitschko for that post (Censor, 2013j). In late February 2013, he also urged the authorities to release Yulia Timoshenko (Censor, 2013o). A month later, Poroshenko’s son Olexiy joined the faction of Timoshenko’s oppositional Batkivshchyna (Fatherland) party in the regional council of Vinnitsa—Poroshenko’s home region (Censor, 2013g).

In April 2013, the president of the parliament agreed on the inclusion of Poroshenko in a parliamentary commission for cooperation with the European Parliament (Censor, 2013m). On April 20, 2013, Poroshenko expressed his “forecast” that Russia was going to offer Ukraine the status of observer in the CU, but that President Yanukovich would reject it in favor of the EaP (Censor, 2013c). Poroshenko also declared that a new candidate for the post of prime minister should had been proposed by the opposition which had the majority in the parliament (Censor, 2013h). However, Poroshenko did not attend the parliament on the day the opposition voted for the motion of no-confidence in the government in late April 2013 (Censor, 2013d). Some fractions of the opposition criticized his nonappearance and blamed Poroshenko for not being in “real” opposition to Yanukovich (Censor, 2013s). In late June 2013, Poroshenko again “forecasted” that the president was going to release Timoshenko and send her abroad for medical treatment (Censor, 2013k).

In mid-July, Russian authorities initiated attacks against Poroshenko’s business in Russia (Censor, 2013p). This happened only two days after

129

President Putin visited Ukraine (EurActiv, 2013). In particular, the Federal Consumer Protection Service of Russia inspected and found toxic contents in Roshen confectionery, which led to the Russian ban on the import of Roshen’s products to Russia (Censor, 2013n). Russian officials announced in mid-August that Roshen could well be back on the Russian market, but that a lot of work remained to be done before it could happen (Censor, 2013e). Later in September, Poroshenko declared that Roshen won the trade war that Russia waged against Ukraine. The reason for this statement was that Roshen’s sales increased despite the Russian attacks against it (Censor, 2013q). In sharp contrast to this, Poroshenko made clear in November that Roshen was compelled to implement mass reductions in staff due to the Russian ban on Roshen (Censor, 2013b). However, he added that the primary threat against Roshen was directed by the government and the security forces of Ukraine (Censor, 2013a). Poroshenko also noted that he was leveraging all his organizational resources and international connections to put pressure on Russia to lift the ban (Censor, 2013r).

In early December 2013, Poroshenko mediated between the police and protesters during the Euromaidan protests (Censor, 2013f). Poroshenko announced that the opposition was ready to negotiate with Yanukovich only after he dismissed the government and signed the Association Agreement (AA) for the EaP (Censor, 2013i). Poroshenko had been very active behind the scenes of the Euromaidan. He made great efforts to coordinate the opposition, Western colleagues and the international business community to put pressure on Yanukovich. For instance, in late January 2014 Poroshenko attended the World Economic Forum in Davos and urged the business community not to collaborate with the Yanukovich government (Censor, 2014j). On January 25, Poroshenko described the situation in Ukraine as a national crisis and called for consolidation against the tyranny of the ruling regime (Censor, 2014f). He announced that the international community did not accept Yanukovich and his criminal regime as the legitimate leaders of Ukraine. He added that they instead considered the legitimacy to lie with the Euromaidan (Censor, 2014l).

On February 2, 2014, Poroshenko expressed his gratitude to the EU and the U.S. Department of State for their support of the Euromaidan (Censor, 2014a). On February 3, media reported that Poroshenko had initiated talks with many MPs from the ruling POF party to urge them to defect to the opposition (Censor, 2014m). Two days later, he also urged president Yanukovych to withdraw all the special forces from Kyiv (Censor, 2014d). The Euromaidan Revolution toppled Yanukovich on February 22, 2014. Poroshenko became the speaker of parliament in late February. In early March, polls showed that Poroshenko was a favorite president candidate prior to the forthcoming presidential election (Censor, 2014e). On March 28, Poroshenko officially announced his candidacy (Censor, 2014h). A day later, Vitali Klitschko withdrew his candidacy to support Poroshenko (Censor, 2014b). He advised Yulia Timoshenko to do the same, which she declined (Censor, 2014c). Many

128

On May 28, 2012, Poroshenko announced his decision to stand in the parliamentary elections in November 2012 (Censor, 2012j). Two days later, media reported that the public prosecutors had launched an investigation into one of his car companies to check whether the company complied with security and construction regulations. Poroshenko’s representatives announced that the authorities’ complaints were groundless (Censor, 2012q). In June 2012, Poroshenko suggested that taxes on luxury should be collected from cabinet ministers in the first place. He further criticized the government for not dealing with rife corruption in Ukraine (Censor, 2012p). Ten days later, the president appointed him as the manager of the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (Censor, 2012a).

Poroshenko was elected MP in November 2012 (Censor, 2012l). In December, he announced that he was going to take a neutral political stance in the parliament (Censor, 2012f), but support the opposition in its struggle for principal causes (Censor, 2012h). He reasserted his condemnation of Yanukovich’s wavering between joining the Russia-led Customs Union (CU) or the EaP. Poroshenko once more made very clear that the CU was not an alternative for Ukraine (Censor, 2012c).

During the spring of 2013, Poroshenko sought to develop his bonds with the opposition. He announced that he had good chances of becoming Mayor of Kyiv. Yet, he stated that he would run for the post only if his candidacy was endorsed by the opposition (Censor, 2013l). Well before the Kyiv mayoral elections in June 2014, Poroshenko showed his support for Vitali Klitschko for that post (Censor, 2013j). In late February 2013, he also urged the authorities to release Yulia Timoshenko (Censor, 2013o). A month later, Poroshenko’s son Olexiy joined the faction of Timoshenko’s oppositional Batkivshchyna (Fatherland) party in the regional council of Vinnitsa—Poroshenko’s home region (Censor, 2013g).

In April 2013, the president of the parliament agreed on the inclusion of Poroshenko in a parliamentary commission for cooperation with the European Parliament (Censor, 2013m). On April 20, 2013, Poroshenko expressed his “forecast” that Russia was going to offer Ukraine the status of observer in the CU, but that President Yanukovich would reject it in favor of the EaP (Censor, 2013c). Poroshenko also declared that a new candidate for the post of prime minister should had been proposed by the opposition which had the majority in the parliament (Censor, 2013h). However, Poroshenko did not attend the parliament on the day the opposition voted for the motion of no-confidence in the government in late April 2013 (Censor, 2013d). Some fractions of the opposition criticized his nonappearance and blamed Poroshenko for not being in “real” opposition to Yanukovich (Censor, 2013s). In late June 2013, Poroshenko again “forecasted” that the president was going to release Timoshenko and send her abroad for medical treatment (Censor, 2013k).

In mid-July, Russian authorities initiated attacks against Poroshenko’s business in Russia (Censor, 2013p). This happened only two days after

131

Figure P. Comparison of the struggle for power by the four oligarchs

Notes: The share of each activity in all published media reports about each oligarch. The total number of aggregated reports on each oligarch in order of the appearance above is 46, 84, 41, 22 across multiple years.

Figure P is revealing in several ways. First, it shows that all oligarchs primarily focused on increasing their reputation. Second, oligarchs also paid great attention to improving their organizational resources. Third and relatedly, their rivals attacked these resources to restrain further advances. Fourth, similar attacks were directed towards all but Prokhorov’s financial resources. These results, thus, accord well with the argument of this study emphasizing the importance of studying how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion in the crucial framework of state power as to regime trajectories. In other words, all the four oligarchs were committed to continuously enhancing their reputation and gaining the credibility of a rival in their struggle for power (support for H2). Moreover, the reports showed that two oligarchs (Prokhorov and Poroshenko) announced on multiple occasions their readiness to leave their businesses in order to fully engage in politics. A shared statement by all the four oligarchs was their expressed will to combat corruption in their respective countries. Moreover, most of them faulted the government for a deteriorating business climate and expressed a firm commitment to improve the situation.

0 20 40 60 80 100Percentage (%)

Tsarukyan

Prokhorov

Poroshenko

Ivanishvili

Efforts toincrease his reputationIncrease in hisfinancial resourcesIncrease inhis media resourcesIncrease inhuman resourcesAttack againsthis reputationAttack againsthis media resources

Attack againsthis human resourcesAttack againsthis financial resourcesPolitically motivated discriminationagainst him personallyRussian attackagainst his financial resourcesContributes tocollective challenges against the regimeDoes not contribute tocollective challenges against the regime

130

other oppositional leaders endorsed Poroshenko as the most viable candidate for president (Censor, 2014p). Moreover, the first president of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk announced his support for Poroshenko’s candidacy in late March. He expressed that Poroshenko had always been independent and pragmatic (Censor, 2014q).

In April 2014, Poroshenko stated that he was willing to sell Roshen should he become president (Censor, 2014g). He also added that he did not consider himself as an oligarch since his definition of an oligarch only encompassed those who accumulated their wealth while being in office (Censor, 2014k). On May 15, 2014, media reported that many members of the former ruling party were campaigning for him in his run for president (Censor, 2014n). Poroshenko’s main rival Timoshenko sought to debate with Poroshenko close to the elections, but he avoided it completely (Censor, 2014o). His press service justified this by pointing to Poroshenko’s busy schedule (Censor, 2014i). On May 25, 2014, Poroshenko won the elections garnering nearly 55 percent of the votes.

Summary and a comparative analysis of the results The above analyses were guided by a specific research question asking about how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion given that the two most important streams of prior work emphasize the crucial role of either mass opinion or state power in understanding regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. H2 hypothesized that we should expect that all individual, politically motivated rival oligarchs aim at improving public opinion about them by developing their personal reputation, organizational capacity and performing a credible opposition to the regime. They do so primarily to emulate the incumbent regime’s efforts to maintain its power. H2a hypothesized that we should expect state power abuse against all oligarchs in these interactions. However, the expectation was that oligarchs in countries with a greater level of state power concentration and an uneven playing field (UPF) essentially would fail in all the three areas as well as their concrete struggles for power. The nuanced explanation for such findings that this thesis offers is that the regime abuses its stronger state power primarily to damage the credibility of the rival oligarch by making him appear unpredictable and unreliable in the eyes of the public. Results (as restated below) lend support for these hypotheses.

As a way of summarizing the general findings in the four sections above, what did the four oligarchs undergo in their struggles for political power? Figure P offers a comparative perspective based on a quantitative content analysis of all media reports under the study (see the research design chapter for detailed information and operationalization of the variables used in the figure).

131

Figure P. Comparison of the struggle for power by the four oligarchs

Notes: The share of each activity in all published media reports about each oligarch. The total number of aggregated reports on each oligarch in order of the appearance above is 46, 84, 41, 22 across multiple years.

Figure P is revealing in several ways. First, it shows that all oligarchs primarily focused on increasing their reputation. Second, oligarchs also paid great attention to improving their organizational resources. Third and relatedly, their rivals attacked these resources to restrain further advances. Fourth, similar attacks were directed towards all but Prokhorov’s financial resources. These results, thus, accord well with the argument of this study emphasizing the importance of studying how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion in the crucial framework of state power as to regime trajectories. In other words, all the four oligarchs were committed to continuously enhancing their reputation and gaining the credibility of a rival in their struggle for power (support for H2). Moreover, the reports showed that two oligarchs (Prokhorov and Poroshenko) announced on multiple occasions their readiness to leave their businesses in order to fully engage in politics. A shared statement by all the four oligarchs was their expressed will to combat corruption in their respective countries. Moreover, most of them faulted the government for a deteriorating business climate and expressed a firm commitment to improve the situation.

0 20 40 60 80 100Percentage (%)

Tsarukyan

Prokhorov

Poroshenko

Ivanishvili

Efforts toincrease his reputationIncrease in hisfinancial resourcesIncrease inhis media resourcesIncrease inhuman resourcesAttack againsthis reputationAttack againsthis media resources

Attack againsthis human resourcesAttack againsthis financial resourcesPolitically motivated discriminationagainst him personallyRussian attackagainst his financial resourcesContributes tocollective challenges against the regimeDoes not contribute tocollective challenges against the regime

130

other oppositional leaders endorsed Poroshenko as the most viable candidate for president (Censor, 2014p). Moreover, the first president of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk announced his support for Poroshenko’s candidacy in late March. He expressed that Poroshenko had always been independent and pragmatic (Censor, 2014q).

In April 2014, Poroshenko stated that he was willing to sell Roshen should he become president (Censor, 2014g). He also added that he did not consider himself as an oligarch since his definition of an oligarch only encompassed those who accumulated their wealth while being in office (Censor, 2014k). On May 15, 2014, media reported that many members of the former ruling party were campaigning for him in his run for president (Censor, 2014n). Poroshenko’s main rival Timoshenko sought to debate with Poroshenko close to the elections, but he avoided it completely (Censor, 2014o). His press service justified this by pointing to Poroshenko’s busy schedule (Censor, 2014i). On May 25, 2014, Poroshenko won the elections garnering nearly 55 percent of the votes.

Summary and a comparative analysis of the results The above analyses were guided by a specific research question asking about how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion given that the two most important streams of prior work emphasize the crucial role of either mass opinion or state power in understanding regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. H2 hypothesized that we should expect that all individual, politically motivated rival oligarchs aim at improving public opinion about them by developing their personal reputation, organizational capacity and performing a credible opposition to the regime. They do so primarily to emulate the incumbent regime’s efforts to maintain its power. H2a hypothesized that we should expect state power abuse against all oligarchs in these interactions. However, the expectation was that oligarchs in countries with a greater level of state power concentration and an uneven playing field (UPF) essentially would fail in all the three areas as well as their concrete struggles for power. The nuanced explanation for such findings that this thesis offers is that the regime abuses its stronger state power primarily to damage the credibility of the rival oligarch by making him appear unpredictable and unreliable in the eyes of the public. Results (as restated below) lend support for these hypotheses.

As a way of summarizing the general findings in the four sections above, what did the four oligarchs undergo in their struggles for political power? Figure P offers a comparative perspective based on a quantitative content analysis of all media reports under the study (see the research design chapter for detailed information and operationalization of the variables used in the figure).

133

Appendix Table 11. Reliability check for coding of a key variable

Oligarch Date

Efforts to increase his reputation URL

Poroshenko 2009-12-23 1

https://censor.net.ua/news/108468/poroshenko_ustroit_wizz_air_razbor_poletov_izza_hamskogo_otnosheniya_k_passajiram

Prokhorov 2014-05-14 1 https://ria.ru/sport/20140514/1007795343.html

Prokhorov 2012-03-05 1

https://ria.ru/vybor2012_hod_vyborov/20120305/584957759.html

Prokhorov 2012-03-19 1 https://ria.ru/politics/20120319/599870777.html

Prokhorov 2013-06-22 1 https://ria.ru/society/20130622/945133131.html

Prokhorov 2012-01-21 1 https://ria.ru/politics/20120121/544961443.html

Ivanishvili 2012-01-16 1

https://sputnik-georgia.ru/society/20120116/214572764.html

Ivanishvili 2011-12-11 1

https://sputnik-georgia.ru/sport/20111211/214443187.html

Poroshenko 2014-03-29 1

https://censor.net.ua/news/278367/tyagnibok_podderjivaet_reshenie_klichko_o_vydvijenii_kandidatury_poroshenko_na_vybory

Prokhorov 2013-06-25 1 https://ria.ru/society/20130625/945629348.html

Notes: Using Stata’s seed function and the seed value 12345, I created a sample of 10 articles at random as to reports about oligarchs’ efforts to increase their reputation. This procedure ensures that my subsampling (the selection of articles to report above) has been entirely random. The seed number of subsampling enables the reader to replicate the selection procedure.

132

What did incumbent regimes do against their rival oligarchs in their struggle for power? In all four countries, authoritarian leaders employed their state power to attack the oligarchs’ organizational resources to prevent them from gaining organizational strength and reputation as a trustworthy rival. It was particularly evident in situations when oligarchs had decent opportunities to mount collective resistance against the regime. However, Tsarukyan and Prokhorov generally demonstrated hesitancy to inciting or joining substantial collective actions against their rivals in Armenia and Russia, respectively. This pattern is in line with H2a. Moreover, the two oligarchs did not stand in crucial elections when it really counted. Therefore, they appeared untrustworthy in the eyes of the people, which paved an easy way for Sargsyan in Armenia and Putin in Russia to neutralize them politically. In contrast, Ivanishvili and Poroshenko articulated a much more clear and credible opposition to their main rivals in Georgia and Ukraine, respectively. Ivanishvili’s organizational resources were subject to frequent and intensive attacks by the Georgian government. However, Ivanishvili focused specifically on improving his personal reputation and credibility of a rival as soon as he entered the Georgian political scene. Similarly, Poroshenko made substantial efforts to enhance his reputation and organizational resources. Similar to previously discussed oligarchs, these efforts occurred at a greater level ahead of elections. The analysis above also shows that Poroshenko has over time been well entrenched in the government since he headed the National Bank of Ukraine, Ministries for Foreign Affairs, and Economic Development and Trade. This is most likely why his organizational resources were not subject to attacks by the incumbent regime as often as was the case with the three other oligarchs. Yet, reports showed that the Kremlin, which arguably early figured out his political goal to gain the ultimate political power, attempted to persuade him to get Ukraine back in the Russian sphere of influence. To that end, the Russian authorities blocked his business in Russia due to accusations of selling tainted products. Moreover, his businesses were eventually seized or forced to shut down in Crimea and Russia. Next empirical chapter switches our attention to the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs in Ukraine where they have been most prominent for regime change in connection with the two color revolutions.

133

Appendix Table 11. Reliability check for coding of a key variable

Oligarch Date

Efforts to increase his reputation URL

Poroshenko 2009-12-23 1

https://censor.net.ua/news/108468/poroshenko_ustroit_wizz_air_razbor_poletov_izza_hamskogo_otnosheniya_k_passajiram

Prokhorov 2014-05-14 1 https://ria.ru/sport/20140514/1007795343.html

Prokhorov 2012-03-05 1

https://ria.ru/vybor2012_hod_vyborov/20120305/584957759.html

Prokhorov 2012-03-19 1 https://ria.ru/politics/20120319/599870777.html

Prokhorov 2013-06-22 1 https://ria.ru/society/20130622/945133131.html

Prokhorov 2012-01-21 1 https://ria.ru/politics/20120121/544961443.html

Ivanishvili 2012-01-16 1

https://sputnik-georgia.ru/society/20120116/214572764.html

Ivanishvili 2011-12-11 1

https://sputnik-georgia.ru/sport/20111211/214443187.html

Poroshenko 2014-03-29 1

https://censor.net.ua/news/278367/tyagnibok_podderjivaet_reshenie_klichko_o_vydvijenii_kandidatury_poroshenko_na_vybory

Prokhorov 2013-06-25 1 https://ria.ru/society/20130625/945629348.html

Notes: Using Stata’s seed function and the seed value 12345, I created a sample of 10 articles at random as to reports about oligarchs’ efforts to increase their reputation. This procedure ensures that my subsampling (the selection of articles to report above) has been entirely random. The seed number of subsampling enables the reader to replicate the selection procedure.

132

What did incumbent regimes do against their rival oligarchs in their struggle for power? In all four countries, authoritarian leaders employed their state power to attack the oligarchs’ organizational resources to prevent them from gaining organizational strength and reputation as a trustworthy rival. It was particularly evident in situations when oligarchs had decent opportunities to mount collective resistance against the regime. However, Tsarukyan and Prokhorov generally demonstrated hesitancy to inciting or joining substantial collective actions against their rivals in Armenia and Russia, respectively. This pattern is in line with H2a. Moreover, the two oligarchs did not stand in crucial elections when it really counted. Therefore, they appeared untrustworthy in the eyes of the people, which paved an easy way for Sargsyan in Armenia and Putin in Russia to neutralize them politically. In contrast, Ivanishvili and Poroshenko articulated a much more clear and credible opposition to their main rivals in Georgia and Ukraine, respectively. Ivanishvili’s organizational resources were subject to frequent and intensive attacks by the Georgian government. However, Ivanishvili focused specifically on improving his personal reputation and credibility of a rival as soon as he entered the Georgian political scene. Similarly, Poroshenko made substantial efforts to enhance his reputation and organizational resources. Similar to previously discussed oligarchs, these efforts occurred at a greater level ahead of elections. The analysis above also shows that Poroshenko has over time been well entrenched in the government since he headed the National Bank of Ukraine, Ministries for Foreign Affairs, and Economic Development and Trade. This is most likely why his organizational resources were not subject to attacks by the incumbent regime as often as was the case with the three other oligarchs. Yet, reports showed that the Kremlin, which arguably early figured out his political goal to gain the ultimate political power, attempted to persuade him to get Ukraine back in the Russian sphere of influence. To that end, the Russian authorities blocked his business in Russia due to accusations of selling tainted products. Moreover, his businesses were eventually seized or forced to shut down in Crimea and Russia. Next empirical chapter switches our attention to the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs in Ukraine where they have been most prominent for regime change in connection with the two color revolutions.

135

Chapter six. Oligarchs, mass opinion and struggles for political ascendancy during two color revolutions in Ukraine

How does the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs play out in Ukraine where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change? To repeat, this interaction refers to struggles for power and influence between oligarchs and pseudo-democratic regimes in the framework of such key factors as mass opinion and state power abuse. As discussed at length in the research design chapter, the aforementioned question guides the current chapter. Ukraine has since the declaration of its independence undergone multiple democratic breakthroughs which are popularly dubbed as “color revolutions”. The first part of the chapter investigates how the interaction played out before and after the two color revolutions in Ukraine. This investigation employs secondary literature on oligarchs’ and the incumbents’ behavior, which makes the discussion about the “true preferences” of these players difficult. Yet, it is here worth repeating that my analysis is inspired by the core ideas of the so-called “revealed preference theory”. The theory emphasizes the importance of revealing the preferences of individuals by focusing on their behavior, rather than by asking them to state their “true” preferences (Samuelson, 1938; Richter, 1966). In spite of some obvious limitations associated with not being able to study the true or stated preferences of these actors, I compensate for this weakness by relying on the established scholarship of Ukrainian politics and the works of key Ukraine experts. An additional strategy of coping with the weakness is to resort to official statements by and public interviews with some prominent oligarchs in Ukraine whenever possible. Thus, while it is generally difficult to make a direct link between revealed preferences and actual intentions in political contexts, the described approach of the first part of this chapter would yield some hints as to how oligarchs and incumbent elites interact within the crucial framework of mass opinion and state power for understanding regime trajectories. Overall, the empirical focus of the first part of this chapter will be

134

135

Chapter six. Oligarchs, mass opinion and struggles for political ascendancy during two color revolutions in Ukraine

How does the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs play out in Ukraine where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change? To repeat, this interaction refers to struggles for power and influence between oligarchs and pseudo-democratic regimes in the framework of such key factors as mass opinion and state power abuse. As discussed at length in the research design chapter, the aforementioned question guides the current chapter. Ukraine has since the declaration of its independence undergone multiple democratic breakthroughs which are popularly dubbed as “color revolutions”. The first part of the chapter investigates how the interaction played out before and after the two color revolutions in Ukraine. This investigation employs secondary literature on oligarchs’ and the incumbents’ behavior, which makes the discussion about the “true preferences” of these players difficult. Yet, it is here worth repeating that my analysis is inspired by the core ideas of the so-called “revealed preference theory”. The theory emphasizes the importance of revealing the preferences of individuals by focusing on their behavior, rather than by asking them to state their “true” preferences (Samuelson, 1938; Richter, 1966). In spite of some obvious limitations associated with not being able to study the true or stated preferences of these actors, I compensate for this weakness by relying on the established scholarship of Ukrainian politics and the works of key Ukraine experts. An additional strategy of coping with the weakness is to resort to official statements by and public interviews with some prominent oligarchs in Ukraine whenever possible. Thus, while it is generally difficult to make a direct link between revealed preferences and actual intentions in political contexts, the described approach of the first part of this chapter would yield some hints as to how oligarchs and incumbent elites interact within the crucial framework of mass opinion and state power for understanding regime trajectories. Overall, the empirical focus of the first part of this chapter will be

134

137

Struggles for power and mass opinion about the oligarchs in Ukraine Ukrainian politics and oligarchs during the 2004 Orange Revolution The Orange Revolution in 2004 was the second democratic breakthrough in the post-Soviet region of pseudo-democracies. Scholars have proposed several decisive developments prior to this revolution. The most important of these processes encompass the breakdown of the ruling national-democrat centrist alliance, the Kuchmagate scandal (the brutal assassination of investigative journalist Heorhiy Gongadze) and the rise of a new opposition in the 2002 election (Kuzio, 2007). However, the role of the oligarchs and their interdependence with the incumbents has been stressed as another key factor that has been decisive for the Orange Revolution to take place.

President Kuchma and his administration were dependent on influential oligarchs in Ukraine in their efforts to curtail their opposition. Kuchma was himself part of the Dnipropetrovsk oligarchic clan. During Kuchma’s first presidential term (1994-1999), the Dnipropetrovsk clan ruled Ukraine, Kuchma himself and oligarch Pavlo Lazarenko being its key members. Lazarenko was a very influential oligarch from the Dnipropetrovsk region of Ukraine. In 1992-1995, he served as the governor of this region. Kuchma later appointed him as the prime minister of Ukraine (1996-1997). During his time in office, Lazarenko built the United Energy Systems of Ukraine (YESU), the largest industrial and financial group in Ukraine. Tensions between Kuchma and Lazarenko rose gradually following the increasing political ambitions of Lazarenko. In 1999, Lazarenko challenged Kuchma politically, which led to the parliament stripping him of his legislative immunity due to charges of corruption, embezzlement of state property and money laundering. Lazarenko fled to the United States where he was detained for charges of money laundering (Matuszak, 2012: 15).

Rival oligarchs to Kuchma emerged in Lazarenko’s Hromada Party in 1997. Yulia Timoshenko was a companion of Lazarenko, having served as director of YESU in 1995-1997. When Lazarenko was forced to step down and escape the country, Timoshenko acted temporarily as Lazarenko’s deputy in the Hromada Party. She, however, established her own Batkivshchyna party subsequently. The regime of Kuchma put her in jail for one month in 2001 on charges of illegal tax fraud and gas export. Timoshenko, who briefly (from late December 1999 to January 2001) served as deputy prime minister in the cabinet of Viktor Yuschenko, subsequently switched to be part of the opposition against President Kuchma (Matuszak, 2012: 32-34).

According to Taras Kuzio, one of the most quoted Ukraine experts, oligarchs entered Ukrainian politics in the 1998 Rada elections (Kuzio, 2007: 31). As already touched upon elsewhere in this thesis, the oligarchs

136

on the triggers and consequences of the two color revolutions in Ukraine (The 2004 Orange and 2014 Euromaidan Revolutions). The primary aim is to study and understand the role of oligarchs in these processes, which will help to approach the specific research question that guides this chapter.

This chapter will also offer a unique quantitative survey analysis of Ukrainian students in Kyiv about their opinion towards the oligarchs’ current importance in Ukrainian politics. University students, as will be shown below, were the primary group of active citizens during the two color revolutions in Ukraine. For this reason, assessing their attitudes towards oligarchs, their role in regime trajectories and their influence on the political system is crucial for addressing the research question guiding this chapter. In other words, university student opinion about oligarchs is essential to assessing how oligarchs have interacted with the incumbent regimes in the crucial framework of mass opinion and state power in a country where oligarchs, according to prior studies, have been most influential for regime change.

As discussed in more detail previously in the research design chapter, the survey analysis derives its logic from an integrated perspective based on the entire theoretical discussion (see the prior work and theory chapter) as well as findings from the two preceding empirical chapters. Against this background, I assume that Kyiv university students generally harbor negative attitudes towards oligarchs as a group and individuals. Key variables explaining this negative relationship are university students’ perceptions of the shady past of oligarchs as to their wealth accumulation as well their adversary influence on the political system. However, I believe that individual oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation will be conducive to positive attitudes towards them even among Kyiv university students. As emphasized previously, this survey aids this thesis in exploring how the interaction of oligarchs with incumbents and mass opinion plays out in a context of a higher level of oligarchic influence on the political system in addition to being most prominent for regime change.

137

Struggles for power and mass opinion about the oligarchs in Ukraine Ukrainian politics and oligarchs during the 2004 Orange Revolution The Orange Revolution in 2004 was the second democratic breakthrough in the post-Soviet region of pseudo-democracies. Scholars have proposed several decisive developments prior to this revolution. The most important of these processes encompass the breakdown of the ruling national-democrat centrist alliance, the Kuchmagate scandal (the brutal assassination of investigative journalist Heorhiy Gongadze) and the rise of a new opposition in the 2002 election (Kuzio, 2007). However, the role of the oligarchs and their interdependence with the incumbents has been stressed as another key factor that has been decisive for the Orange Revolution to take place.

President Kuchma and his administration were dependent on influential oligarchs in Ukraine in their efforts to curtail their opposition. Kuchma was himself part of the Dnipropetrovsk oligarchic clan. During Kuchma’s first presidential term (1994-1999), the Dnipropetrovsk clan ruled Ukraine, Kuchma himself and oligarch Pavlo Lazarenko being its key members. Lazarenko was a very influential oligarch from the Dnipropetrovsk region of Ukraine. In 1992-1995, he served as the governor of this region. Kuchma later appointed him as the prime minister of Ukraine (1996-1997). During his time in office, Lazarenko built the United Energy Systems of Ukraine (YESU), the largest industrial and financial group in Ukraine. Tensions between Kuchma and Lazarenko rose gradually following the increasing political ambitions of Lazarenko. In 1999, Lazarenko challenged Kuchma politically, which led to the parliament stripping him of his legislative immunity due to charges of corruption, embezzlement of state property and money laundering. Lazarenko fled to the United States where he was detained for charges of money laundering (Matuszak, 2012: 15).

Rival oligarchs to Kuchma emerged in Lazarenko’s Hromada Party in 1997. Yulia Timoshenko was a companion of Lazarenko, having served as director of YESU in 1995-1997. When Lazarenko was forced to step down and escape the country, Timoshenko acted temporarily as Lazarenko’s deputy in the Hromada Party. She, however, established her own Batkivshchyna party subsequently. The regime of Kuchma put her in jail for one month in 2001 on charges of illegal tax fraud and gas export. Timoshenko, who briefly (from late December 1999 to January 2001) served as deputy prime minister in the cabinet of Viktor Yuschenko, subsequently switched to be part of the opposition against President Kuchma (Matuszak, 2012: 32-34).

According to Taras Kuzio, one of the most quoted Ukraine experts, oligarchs entered Ukrainian politics in the 1998 Rada elections (Kuzio, 2007: 31). As already touched upon elsewhere in this thesis, the oligarchs

136

on the triggers and consequences of the two color revolutions in Ukraine (The 2004 Orange and 2014 Euromaidan Revolutions). The primary aim is to study and understand the role of oligarchs in these processes, which will help to approach the specific research question that guides this chapter.

This chapter will also offer a unique quantitative survey analysis of Ukrainian students in Kyiv about their opinion towards the oligarchs’ current importance in Ukrainian politics. University students, as will be shown below, were the primary group of active citizens during the two color revolutions in Ukraine. For this reason, assessing their attitudes towards oligarchs, their role in regime trajectories and their influence on the political system is crucial for addressing the research question guiding this chapter. In other words, university student opinion about oligarchs is essential to assessing how oligarchs have interacted with the incumbent regimes in the crucial framework of mass opinion and state power in a country where oligarchs, according to prior studies, have been most influential for regime change.

As discussed in more detail previously in the research design chapter, the survey analysis derives its logic from an integrated perspective based on the entire theoretical discussion (see the prior work and theory chapter) as well as findings from the two preceding empirical chapters. Against this background, I assume that Kyiv university students generally harbor negative attitudes towards oligarchs as a group and individuals. Key variables explaining this negative relationship are university students’ perceptions of the shady past of oligarchs as to their wealth accumulation as well their adversary influence on the political system. However, I believe that individual oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation will be conducive to positive attitudes towards them even among Kyiv university students. As emphasized previously, this survey aids this thesis in exploring how the interaction of oligarchs with incumbents and mass opinion plays out in a context of a higher level of oligarchic influence on the political system in addition to being most prominent for regime change.

139

who had been plundering Ukraine’s economic resources. One of the most important issues uniting people during the Orange Revolution was popular perceptions about the growing prosperity of the oligarchs to their disadvantage as well as grand corruption. As in Russia, people viewed privatization as unfair and only to have benefited a small group of oligarchs. In contrast, the Yanukovich team in collaboration with the Kuchma regime praised the rise of a national bourgeoisie and pledged that the new elite would emerge to put the interests of citizens at its foremost political focus. As Yuschenko and his political ideas of reform were more popular, the Yanukovich campaign and Kuchma administration made use of negative PR strategies to portray Yuschenko as a Nazi or an American puppet (Kuzio, 2006a: 51-52).

Ukrainian sociologists carried out an interesting study of protester attitudes during the Orange Revolution. A clear majority of the surveyed demonstrators supported the idea of mixed economy. Yet, whereas 63 percent of the respondents favored the development of private enterprise in their country, almost 56 percent of the respondents opposed the privatization of large state enterprises. What is more interesting is that almost 54 percent of the respondents expressed that privatization of land should not be allowed in Ukraine (Beissinger, 2013: 9). In addition, what most protesters in the Orange Revolution had in common was their deep dissatisfaction with Leonid Kuchma, grand corruption (Beissinger, 2013: 9) and disdain towards the ruling clan of oligarchs (Karatnycky, 2005; Kuzio, 2005a).

Indeed, the deep aversion against the oligarchs as a group has been a prevalent phenomenon in post-Soviet Ukraine. For example, a survey from Ukraine in 2001 asked its respondents about their perceptions of oligarchs. More than every second respondent (55 percent) answered that he/she refers to the oligarchs mainly as those who steal from Ukraine with the help of the authorities. The second most popular answer (approximately 27 percent) was that the oligarchs are very wealthy people who hold decisive sway over the government in Ukraine. Almost 17 percent of the respondents answered that the oligarchs are a small group who rule Ukraine. Nearly 12 percent of the respondents stated that the oligarchs were the wealthiest people in Ukraine (Kuzio, 2007: 32). The survey gave the respondents the opportunity to pick from a list of names who they perceived as oligarchs. The results showed that people perceived Pavlo Lazarenko (almost 34 percent), Yulia Timoshenko (almost 21 percent), Leonid Kuchma (almost 12 percent) and Grigoriy Surkis to be typical oligarchs (Kuzio, 2007: 33).

138

represented deep regional divisions in the vested political and economic interests in Ukraine. During his second term in office, Kuchma failed in his efforts to concentrate even more powers in the office of the president. Kuchma had for a long time attracted several influential oligarchs to his camp. For instance, in the 2002 parliamentary elections, several oligarch-linked parties gained seats in the Rada. While the Labour Party represented the Dnipropetrovsk oligarchic clan, the Party of Regions represented the Donetsk clan. These parties formed a ruling alliance with the support from parliamentarians elected from the single-member constituencies (see Chapter five). The newly created opposition bloc Our Ukraine, led by Yushchenko, gained 23.5 percent support in this election. Gradually, the then less influential oligarchs Petro Poroshenko and David Zhvania opted for backing Yuschenko as Ukraine was approaching the 2004 presidential election (Matuszak, 2012: 17-20).

Ahead of the election, Kuchma’s public support was at a historic low level, which required him to find other options for maintaining the ruling clan’s grip on power. Kuchma’s major challenge was to find a loyal successor candidate who would be accepted by most influential oligarchic clans. He ultimately chose the then Prime Minister Yanukovych. Yanukovich was the party leader of the strongest ruling party in the government coalition in Ukraine. Yanukovich was member of the Donetsk clan and closely linked to one of Ukraine's wealthiest oligarchs, Rinat Akhmetov. Although most other oligarchs were in disfavor of Yanukovich due to his connections to Akhmetov, they still opted for backing him in the presidential election against Yushchenko whose central election pledge was to liberalize the market in Ukraine (Matuszak, 2012: 20-26)

The ruling oligarchic clans that were backing Kuchma concerted multiple efforts to amend the constitution in Ukraine. For example, Kuchma conducted a referendum in 2001 to bring more powers to the hands of the president. The referendum involved questions about 1) whether the president was to be given the right to dissolve the parliament in case it failed to form a majority, 2) the abolition of MP immunity from prosecution, 3) severely restricting the number of MPs and 4) establishing an upper house in the Rada of appointed regional governors. Although the referendum was successful for Kuchma and his ally oligarchs, they were unable to implement the majority of these amendments in the parliament due to a major rift between the ruling regime and the opposition (Kuzio, 2007: 39).

Oligarchs played a major role in the Orange Revolution according to most Ukraine experts. Mass protests erupted in Kyiv on November 23, 2004, following the announcement of Ukraine’s Central Election Commission that the then Prime Minister Yanukovych won the run-off election. Yuschenko was backed by the large masses, less influential oligarchs and smaller entrepreneurs (D’Anieri, 2007). Broadly speaking, Ukrainians were tired of the ruling regime in Ukraine, which they equated with the oligarchic clans

139

who had been plundering Ukraine’s economic resources. One of the most important issues uniting people during the Orange Revolution was popular perceptions about the growing prosperity of the oligarchs to their disadvantage as well as grand corruption. As in Russia, people viewed privatization as unfair and only to have benefited a small group of oligarchs. In contrast, the Yanukovich team in collaboration with the Kuchma regime praised the rise of a national bourgeoisie and pledged that the new elite would emerge to put the interests of citizens at its foremost political focus. As Yuschenko and his political ideas of reform were more popular, the Yanukovich campaign and Kuchma administration made use of negative PR strategies to portray Yuschenko as a Nazi or an American puppet (Kuzio, 2006a: 51-52).

Ukrainian sociologists carried out an interesting study of protester attitudes during the Orange Revolution. A clear majority of the surveyed demonstrators supported the idea of mixed economy. Yet, whereas 63 percent of the respondents favored the development of private enterprise in their country, almost 56 percent of the respondents opposed the privatization of large state enterprises. What is more interesting is that almost 54 percent of the respondents expressed that privatization of land should not be allowed in Ukraine (Beissinger, 2013: 9). In addition, what most protesters in the Orange Revolution had in common was their deep dissatisfaction with Leonid Kuchma, grand corruption (Beissinger, 2013: 9) and disdain towards the ruling clan of oligarchs (Karatnycky, 2005; Kuzio, 2005a).

Indeed, the deep aversion against the oligarchs as a group has been a prevalent phenomenon in post-Soviet Ukraine. For example, a survey from Ukraine in 2001 asked its respondents about their perceptions of oligarchs. More than every second respondent (55 percent) answered that he/she refers to the oligarchs mainly as those who steal from Ukraine with the help of the authorities. The second most popular answer (approximately 27 percent) was that the oligarchs are very wealthy people who hold decisive sway over the government in Ukraine. Almost 17 percent of the respondents answered that the oligarchs are a small group who rule Ukraine. Nearly 12 percent of the respondents stated that the oligarchs were the wealthiest people in Ukraine (Kuzio, 2007: 32). The survey gave the respondents the opportunity to pick from a list of names who they perceived as oligarchs. The results showed that people perceived Pavlo Lazarenko (almost 34 percent), Yulia Timoshenko (almost 21 percent), Leonid Kuchma (almost 12 percent) and Grigoriy Surkis to be typical oligarchs (Kuzio, 2007: 33).

138

represented deep regional divisions in the vested political and economic interests in Ukraine. During his second term in office, Kuchma failed in his efforts to concentrate even more powers in the office of the president. Kuchma had for a long time attracted several influential oligarchs to his camp. For instance, in the 2002 parliamentary elections, several oligarch-linked parties gained seats in the Rada. While the Labour Party represented the Dnipropetrovsk oligarchic clan, the Party of Regions represented the Donetsk clan. These parties formed a ruling alliance with the support from parliamentarians elected from the single-member constituencies (see Chapter five). The newly created opposition bloc Our Ukraine, led by Yushchenko, gained 23.5 percent support in this election. Gradually, the then less influential oligarchs Petro Poroshenko and David Zhvania opted for backing Yuschenko as Ukraine was approaching the 2004 presidential election (Matuszak, 2012: 17-20).

Ahead of the election, Kuchma’s public support was at a historic low level, which required him to find other options for maintaining the ruling clan’s grip on power. Kuchma’s major challenge was to find a loyal successor candidate who would be accepted by most influential oligarchic clans. He ultimately chose the then Prime Minister Yanukovych. Yanukovich was the party leader of the strongest ruling party in the government coalition in Ukraine. Yanukovich was member of the Donetsk clan and closely linked to one of Ukraine's wealthiest oligarchs, Rinat Akhmetov. Although most other oligarchs were in disfavor of Yanukovich due to his connections to Akhmetov, they still opted for backing him in the presidential election against Yushchenko whose central election pledge was to liberalize the market in Ukraine (Matuszak, 2012: 20-26)

The ruling oligarchic clans that were backing Kuchma concerted multiple efforts to amend the constitution in Ukraine. For example, Kuchma conducted a referendum in 2001 to bring more powers to the hands of the president. The referendum involved questions about 1) whether the president was to be given the right to dissolve the parliament in case it failed to form a majority, 2) the abolition of MP immunity from prosecution, 3) severely restricting the number of MPs and 4) establishing an upper house in the Rada of appointed regional governors. Although the referendum was successful for Kuchma and his ally oligarchs, they were unable to implement the majority of these amendments in the parliament due to a major rift between the ruling regime and the opposition (Kuzio, 2007: 39).

Oligarchs played a major role in the Orange Revolution according to most Ukraine experts. Mass protests erupted in Kyiv on November 23, 2004, following the announcement of Ukraine’s Central Election Commission that the then Prime Minister Yanukovych won the run-off election. Yuschenko was backed by the large masses, less influential oligarchs and smaller entrepreneurs (D’Anieri, 2007). Broadly speaking, Ukrainians were tired of the ruling regime in Ukraine, which they equated with the oligarchic clans

141

presidential palace. This happened after the masses declined to accept a peaceful settlement between the political opposition and the Yanukovich regime (Shveda & Park, 2016: 88-90). This rejection marked an important difference between the Orange and Euromaidan movements—people agreed that no one political leader could solve their problems and the people themselves were to organize and build a better future for Ukraine (Diuk, 2014: 10).

Several prominent Ukrainian oligarchs made public statements and gave interviews on the causes of the Euromaidan movement and its implications for the society. Rinat Akhmetov, for instance, made clear in the wake of the Euromaidan movement that he fully supported the people of Ukraine fighting for their democratic rights. He further declared his full solidarity with the anger of the people who, like him, were shocked by Yanukovich’s unexpected U-turn on his election pledge to sign the agreement on deep association with the EU. Akhmetov also said that he saw the popular protests as a clear sign of Ukraine being a free and democratic society. He ensured that Ukraine was not going to diverge from this political path. He concluded his public statement by urging all the sides of the national crisis to hammer out a compromise together (Segodnya, 2013a). Victor Pinchuk, another powerful oligarch in Ukraine, made a similar statement. He stressed that the Euromaidan was a show of optimism and hope for a better future for the people of Ukraine. He expressed his genuine support for the popular uprising against the incumbents. Pinchuk made clear that he warmly appreciated that the civil society of Ukraine truly demonstrated its power in taking decisions and expressing its opinion on key political issues. In addition, Pinchuk ensured that the protests made him reflect on his own responsibility as both a businessman and citizen. In particular, he also mentioned that, as in the course of the Orange Revolution, his goal was to do his utmost to find a peaceful and constructive solution to the national crisis (Segodnya, 2013b). In a 2015 interview, oligarch Dmytro Firtash also expressed his views on the Euromaidan and Ukrainian politics after the revolution. In particular, he said that he, contrary to generally accepted opinion, was not among the financial contributors of the movement. He further emphasized that the Euromaidan was not a viable solution to Ukraine’s political problems. He pointed to the fact that ordinary people, as in the course of the Orange Revolution, genuinely struggled for changes. Yet, as he further stated, those who came to power after the two revolutions betrayed the people in the same way as their predecessors had done. Furthermore, he emphasized that the post-Euromaidan incumbent elite’s declared wish to fight against oligarchs was nothing more than a strategy to distract popular attention from their challenges to deal with Ukraine’s economy and the war. Firtash also stated that the oligarchs rather constitute the driving force of the private sector in Ukraine. They are the ones who create jobs, pay out wages and taxes. Therefore, he saw the government’s witch-hunt against oligarchs as a clear

140

Ukrainian politics and oligarchs during and after the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution The Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 was a key turning point in the post-Soviet era of Ukraine. The large masses were highly dissatisfied with President Yanukovich’s abrupt U-turn in the question of Ukraine’s ratification of the Association Agreement (AA) with the EU. In fact, a long-term reason for the mass uprising was grand corruption and dissatisfaction with the ruling regime.

University students were the driving force of the Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine (McFaul, 2005; Gorenburg, 2015; Poltorakov, 2015). In the initial stage of the Euromaidan movement, their main demand was reorientation of Ukraine’s foreign policy towards European integration. By the end of November 2013, there were two parallel Euromaidan movements going on in central Kyiv—one held by the civil society and another by the political opposition. The major demands of Euromaidan protesters were the resignation of Mykola Azarov’s cabinet and ratification of the agreement with the EU. Yanukovich and his administration refused to submit to these demands. Most protesters returned to their homes. When the number of protesters dwindled considerably, the authorities opted for using brutal force against several hundreds of protesters, most of which were students. This brutal repression of peaceful protesters sparked public anger against the regime and the Euromaidan went into the second phase. The day after the brutal beating of peaceful students, the media broadcasted multiple videos showing the security forces’ harsh violence. People again congregated in the central Maidan Square in Kyiv. Almost half a million citizens gathered following the beatings. One group of protesters occupied the office of Kyiv City Administration, which led to severe clashes between them and the police forces. In this second phase of the Euromaidan, protesters also added their demand for Yanukovich and his cabinet to resign. The Euromaidan movement became violent following the regime’s use of brutal force against the demonstrators (Shveda & Park, 2016: 87).

The third stage of the Euromaidan started on January 16, 2014, when the parliament adopted a law that prohibited outdoor gatherings and demonstrations. On January 22, bloody clashes took place between protesters and the security forces close to the president’s administration building in central Kyiv. The security forces killed several protesters during these clashes. Western and Russian envoys as well as the opposition and the government attempted in vain to find a solution to the political crisis. The participants of the Euromaidan came from all parts of Ukraine as well as from Georgia and Belarus. Euromaidan protests turned yet more violent from February 18 to 21, with the authorities killing 88 protesters. In total, the violence of these days resulted in 113 deaths on the activist side. The Euromaidan Revolution was over when Yanukovich and his entourage fled after protesters stormed the

141

presidential palace. This happened after the masses declined to accept a peaceful settlement between the political opposition and the Yanukovich regime (Shveda & Park, 2016: 88-90). This rejection marked an important difference between the Orange and Euromaidan movements—people agreed that no one political leader could solve their problems and the people themselves were to organize and build a better future for Ukraine (Diuk, 2014: 10).

Several prominent Ukrainian oligarchs made public statements and gave interviews on the causes of the Euromaidan movement and its implications for the society. Rinat Akhmetov, for instance, made clear in the wake of the Euromaidan movement that he fully supported the people of Ukraine fighting for their democratic rights. He further declared his full solidarity with the anger of the people who, like him, were shocked by Yanukovich’s unexpected U-turn on his election pledge to sign the agreement on deep association with the EU. Akhmetov also said that he saw the popular protests as a clear sign of Ukraine being a free and democratic society. He ensured that Ukraine was not going to diverge from this political path. He concluded his public statement by urging all the sides of the national crisis to hammer out a compromise together (Segodnya, 2013a). Victor Pinchuk, another powerful oligarch in Ukraine, made a similar statement. He stressed that the Euromaidan was a show of optimism and hope for a better future for the people of Ukraine. He expressed his genuine support for the popular uprising against the incumbents. Pinchuk made clear that he warmly appreciated that the civil society of Ukraine truly demonstrated its power in taking decisions and expressing its opinion on key political issues. In addition, Pinchuk ensured that the protests made him reflect on his own responsibility as both a businessman and citizen. In particular, he also mentioned that, as in the course of the Orange Revolution, his goal was to do his utmost to find a peaceful and constructive solution to the national crisis (Segodnya, 2013b). In a 2015 interview, oligarch Dmytro Firtash also expressed his views on the Euromaidan and Ukrainian politics after the revolution. In particular, he said that he, contrary to generally accepted opinion, was not among the financial contributors of the movement. He further emphasized that the Euromaidan was not a viable solution to Ukraine’s political problems. He pointed to the fact that ordinary people, as in the course of the Orange Revolution, genuinely struggled for changes. Yet, as he further stated, those who came to power after the two revolutions betrayed the people in the same way as their predecessors had done. Furthermore, he emphasized that the post-Euromaidan incumbent elite’s declared wish to fight against oligarchs was nothing more than a strategy to distract popular attention from their challenges to deal with Ukraine’s economy and the war. Firtash also stated that the oligarchs rather constitute the driving force of the private sector in Ukraine. They are the ones who create jobs, pay out wages and taxes. Therefore, he saw the government’s witch-hunt against oligarchs as a clear

140

Ukrainian politics and oligarchs during and after the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution The Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 was a key turning point in the post-Soviet era of Ukraine. The large masses were highly dissatisfied with President Yanukovich’s abrupt U-turn in the question of Ukraine’s ratification of the Association Agreement (AA) with the EU. In fact, a long-term reason for the mass uprising was grand corruption and dissatisfaction with the ruling regime.

University students were the driving force of the Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine (McFaul, 2005; Gorenburg, 2015; Poltorakov, 2015). In the initial stage of the Euromaidan movement, their main demand was reorientation of Ukraine’s foreign policy towards European integration. By the end of November 2013, there were two parallel Euromaidan movements going on in central Kyiv—one held by the civil society and another by the political opposition. The major demands of Euromaidan protesters were the resignation of Mykola Azarov’s cabinet and ratification of the agreement with the EU. Yanukovich and his administration refused to submit to these demands. Most protesters returned to their homes. When the number of protesters dwindled considerably, the authorities opted for using brutal force against several hundreds of protesters, most of which were students. This brutal repression of peaceful protesters sparked public anger against the regime and the Euromaidan went into the second phase. The day after the brutal beating of peaceful students, the media broadcasted multiple videos showing the security forces’ harsh violence. People again congregated in the central Maidan Square in Kyiv. Almost half a million citizens gathered following the beatings. One group of protesters occupied the office of Kyiv City Administration, which led to severe clashes between them and the police forces. In this second phase of the Euromaidan, protesters also added their demand for Yanukovich and his cabinet to resign. The Euromaidan movement became violent following the regime’s use of brutal force against the demonstrators (Shveda & Park, 2016: 87).

The third stage of the Euromaidan started on January 16, 2014, when the parliament adopted a law that prohibited outdoor gatherings and demonstrations. On January 22, bloody clashes took place between protesters and the security forces close to the president’s administration building in central Kyiv. The security forces killed several protesters during these clashes. Western and Russian envoys as well as the opposition and the government attempted in vain to find a solution to the political crisis. The participants of the Euromaidan came from all parts of Ukraine as well as from Georgia and Belarus. Euromaidan protests turned yet more violent from February 18 to 21, with the authorities killing 88 protesters. In total, the violence of these days resulted in 113 deaths on the activist side. The Euromaidan Revolution was over when Yanukovich and his entourage fled after protesters stormed the

143

Mapping out student attitudes towards oligarchs in Ukraine In the previous section of this chapter, I provided a detailed account of the revealed preferences of the incumbent elites on the one side, and the oligarchs on the other, in struggles for power in Ukraine before and after the two color revolutions. As expected, Ukraine is a particularly interesting case due the higher level of oligarchization of its political and economic system in comparison with other post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. However, the above illustrative narrative needs to be supplemented with more specific reports about what an informed and energetic category of Ukrainian citizens perceives of oligarchs today. As seen above, university students were an important segment of the population that formed the core of popular uprisings against pseudo-democratic regimes during the Orange and Euromaidan movements. In addition, the available evidence indicates that they will play an important future role in the political and economic life of Ukraine. Below, I provide systematic evidence on Kyiv students’ attitudes towards oligarchs and their political significance. The main idea, as already noted, is to illustrate how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion in a country where they have been crucial for regime trajectories.

Table 12. Attitudes towards oligarchs as a group and individuals Positive Negative Difference Indifferent/neutral Total

N Attitudes towards oligarchs as a group

34.7 43.7 -9.0 21.5 311

Attitudes towards Ihor Kolomoyskyi

47.3 33.1 14.1 19.6 311

Attitudes towards Rinat Akhmetov

44.1 39.5 4.5 16.4 311

Attitudes towards Petro Poroshenko

50.8 29.3 21.5 19.9 311

Notes: The table is based on the following questions in order of their appearance: Q8, Q15a, Q15b and Q15c. See the questionnaire in the Appendix to this chapter. Table 12 takes a closer look at student attitudes towards oligarchs as a group and individuals. We can see that the plurality of respondents (43.7 percent) disfavor oligarchs as a group (by 9 points). However, more than one third of the students (34.7 percent) in the survey harbor positive attitudes towards oligarchs as a group. Another interesting aspect is that 21 percent of the respondents neither like nor dislike oligarchs a group. Indeed, looking at the oligarchs as a group is important for understanding the role of oligarchs in regime trajectories given the centrality of mass opinion in struggles for power

142

political strategy by incumbents to maintain their power by picturing the oligarchs as the greatest enemies of Ukraine (Segodnya, 2015).

In the 2014 October Rada elections (following the ouster of Yanukovich), two thirds of the political forces that gained seats were created and sponsored by oligarchic clans. These parties were the Opposition Bloc (the successor to the Party of Regions (POF) headed by Yuriy Boyko and Serhiy Lyovochkin), People’s Front (linked to Ihor Kolomoysky), Poroshenko Bloc (Petro Poroshenko’s own party) and Radical Party (sponsored by Rinat Akhmetov and Ihor Kolomoysky) (Kuzio, 2017: 2). Oligarchs established and sponsored these parties for strategic reasons. For instance, the former ruling POF emerged to enable a compromise deal between warring groups in the Donetsk oligarchic clan. Oligarchs also created parties to steal votes from other, more genuine parties such as in the case of the Svoboda Party (intended to take votes from Timoshenko’s Batkivshchyna party) (Kuzio, 2016a: 138).

Neither the Orange nor the Euromaidan Revolution was able to bring about far-reaching changes with regard to the lessening of oligarchs’ grip over politics in Ukraine. Moreover, genuine political parties have been absent in Ukraine primarily due to the predominance of main regime leader or oligarch-funded election projects (pocket opposition parties) (Kuzio, 2016a: 131). Using their massive wealth and media resources, the oligarchs in Ukraine have been able to maintain their firm hold on the parliament and the presidency even in the wake of popular uprisings (Kuzio, 2016a: 131-132). Interestingly, most oligarchs seem to have favored the option of keeping themselves out of the limelight. In addition, no administration in post-Soviet Ukraine has ever imprisoned any oligarch (Kuzio, 2016a: 134). Although Timoshenko submitted to the popular demand to renationalize oligarchs’ assets in the wake of the Orange Revolution, nothing happened subsequently because it was condemned as a populist policy proposal among influential elites in Ukraine and the international community (Kuzio, 2016a: 134).

In sum, the above account of Ukrainian politics with regard to how the interaction (in the framework of mass opinion and state power) between oligarchs and incumbents played out in connection to the two color revolutions points to several important facts. First, oligarchs and mass opinion about oligarchs were important factors in the struggles for power between the ruling state elites and the opposition. As presidents in Ukraine lacked greater levels of state power (in contrast to their counterparts in, for instance, Russia), they were unable to establish a solid UPF for their opposition in order to sustain themselves in power. Moreover and as expected, key oligarchs and their clans were crucial political players that exerted an extraordinary influence on the political life of Ukraine. Hence, the findings of this part of the chapter point to the crucial importance of oligarchs in regime change given their interactions with the incumbent regime in the crucial framework of mass opinion and state power.

143

Mapping out student attitudes towards oligarchs in Ukraine In the previous section of this chapter, I provided a detailed account of the revealed preferences of the incumbent elites on the one side, and the oligarchs on the other, in struggles for power in Ukraine before and after the two color revolutions. As expected, Ukraine is a particularly interesting case due the higher level of oligarchization of its political and economic system in comparison with other post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. However, the above illustrative narrative needs to be supplemented with more specific reports about what an informed and energetic category of Ukrainian citizens perceives of oligarchs today. As seen above, university students were an important segment of the population that formed the core of popular uprisings against pseudo-democratic regimes during the Orange and Euromaidan movements. In addition, the available evidence indicates that they will play an important future role in the political and economic life of Ukraine. Below, I provide systematic evidence on Kyiv students’ attitudes towards oligarchs and their political significance. The main idea, as already noted, is to illustrate how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion in a country where they have been crucial for regime trajectories.

Table 12. Attitudes towards oligarchs as a group and individuals Positive Negative Difference Indifferent/neutral Total

N Attitudes towards oligarchs as a group

34.7 43.7 -9.0 21.5 311

Attitudes towards Ihor Kolomoyskyi

47.3 33.1 14.1 19.6 311

Attitudes towards Rinat Akhmetov

44.1 39.5 4.5 16.4 311

Attitudes towards Petro Poroshenko

50.8 29.3 21.5 19.9 311

Notes: The table is based on the following questions in order of their appearance: Q8, Q15a, Q15b and Q15c. See the questionnaire in the Appendix to this chapter. Table 12 takes a closer look at student attitudes towards oligarchs as a group and individuals. We can see that the plurality of respondents (43.7 percent) disfavor oligarchs as a group (by 9 points). However, more than one third of the students (34.7 percent) in the survey harbor positive attitudes towards oligarchs as a group. Another interesting aspect is that 21 percent of the respondents neither like nor dislike oligarchs a group. Indeed, looking at the oligarchs as a group is important for understanding the role of oligarchs in regime trajectories given the centrality of mass opinion in struggles for power

142

political strategy by incumbents to maintain their power by picturing the oligarchs as the greatest enemies of Ukraine (Segodnya, 2015).

In the 2014 October Rada elections (following the ouster of Yanukovich), two thirds of the political forces that gained seats were created and sponsored by oligarchic clans. These parties were the Opposition Bloc (the successor to the Party of Regions (POF) headed by Yuriy Boyko and Serhiy Lyovochkin), People’s Front (linked to Ihor Kolomoysky), Poroshenko Bloc (Petro Poroshenko’s own party) and Radical Party (sponsored by Rinat Akhmetov and Ihor Kolomoysky) (Kuzio, 2017: 2). Oligarchs established and sponsored these parties for strategic reasons. For instance, the former ruling POF emerged to enable a compromise deal between warring groups in the Donetsk oligarchic clan. Oligarchs also created parties to steal votes from other, more genuine parties such as in the case of the Svoboda Party (intended to take votes from Timoshenko’s Batkivshchyna party) (Kuzio, 2016a: 138).

Neither the Orange nor the Euromaidan Revolution was able to bring about far-reaching changes with regard to the lessening of oligarchs’ grip over politics in Ukraine. Moreover, genuine political parties have been absent in Ukraine primarily due to the predominance of main regime leader or oligarch-funded election projects (pocket opposition parties) (Kuzio, 2016a: 131). Using their massive wealth and media resources, the oligarchs in Ukraine have been able to maintain their firm hold on the parliament and the presidency even in the wake of popular uprisings (Kuzio, 2016a: 131-132). Interestingly, most oligarchs seem to have favored the option of keeping themselves out of the limelight. In addition, no administration in post-Soviet Ukraine has ever imprisoned any oligarch (Kuzio, 2016a: 134). Although Timoshenko submitted to the popular demand to renationalize oligarchs’ assets in the wake of the Orange Revolution, nothing happened subsequently because it was condemned as a populist policy proposal among influential elites in Ukraine and the international community (Kuzio, 2016a: 134).

In sum, the above account of Ukrainian politics with regard to how the interaction (in the framework of mass opinion and state power) between oligarchs and incumbents played out in connection to the two color revolutions points to several important facts. First, oligarchs and mass opinion about oligarchs were important factors in the struggles for power between the ruling state elites and the opposition. As presidents in Ukraine lacked greater levels of state power (in contrast to their counterparts in, for instance, Russia), they were unable to establish a solid UPF for their opposition in order to sustain themselves in power. Moreover and as expected, key oligarchs and their clans were crucial political players that exerted an extraordinary influence on the political life of Ukraine. Hence, the findings of this part of the chapter point to the crucial importance of oligarchs in regime change given their interactions with the incumbent regime in the crucial framework of mass opinion and state power.

145

Table 13. Attitudes about the political participation of the oligarchs (in %) Experience of oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation

Agree Disagree Difference Indifferent/neutral

Total N

Q10b 39.9 43.1 -3.2 17.0 311

Perceptions about the political role of oligarchs

Agree Disagree Difference Indifferent/neutral

Total N

Q11c 41.5 42.4 -1.0 16.1 311 Q13c 57.6 28.0 29.6 14.5 311 Q6b 53.7 28.6 25.1 17.7 311

Perceptions about oligarchs’ influence on the political system

Agree Disagree Difference Indifferent/neutral

Total N

Q10c 58.2 26.0 32.2 15.8 311 Q14a 57.2 27.3 29.9 15.4 311 Q4a 47.9 37.6 10.3 14.5 311 Q4b 46.3 34.7 11.6 19.0 311 Q9c 44.4 33.8 10.6 21.9 311

Perceptions about the true incentives for oligarchs’ involvement in politics

Agree Disagree Difference Indifferent/neutral

Total N

Q9a 54.7 32.2 22.5 13.2 311 Q9b 53.7 34.7 19.0 11.6 311 Q13a 50.5 33.8 16.7 15.8 311

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in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Yet, focusing on three politically and economically influential oligarchs in Ukraine is equally important in order for us to gain a better understanding of possible nuances in the particular element of opinion about oligarchs when people shift their attitudinal focus from the group to prominent individual oligarchs. To reiterate, the most important reason for this particular focus on individual oligarchs is that politics in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies is highly person-centered— primarily revolving around powerful individuals.

As discussed earlier, Ihor Kolomoyskyi, Rinat Akhmetov and Petro Poroshenko have been prominent oligarchs and political players in post-Soviet Ukraine. Turning to university student opinion about these three oligarchs, we find revealing differences between attitudes towards oligarchs as a group and individuals. In particular, Table 12 suggests that the plurality of the respondents answered that they are positively disposed towards both Akhmetov and Kolomoyskyi. Later in this chapter, I will delve deeper into this difference in attitudes towards oligarchs as a group and individuals.

As for Poroshenko, we can observe in Table 12 that the majority of the students favor him, which most likely can be attributed to his presidency. Overall, we see a clear paradox among university students in Kyiv. While the plurality of them clearly disfavor the oligarchs as a group, a similar share of respondents are positively disposed towards the three key individual oligarchs in Ukraine (47.3 percent for Ihor Kolomoyskyi, 44.1 percent for Rinat Akhmetov and 50.8 percent for Petro Poroshenko). Let us now turn to looking at the perceptions of the respondents about the motives of the oligarchs’ political participation and the implications of this involvement for their country.

145

Table 13. Attitudes about the political participation of the oligarchs (in %) Experience of oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation

Agree Disagree Difference Indifferent/neutral

Total N

Q10b 39.9 43.1 -3.2 17.0 311

Perceptions about the political role of oligarchs

Agree Disagree Difference Indifferent/neutral

Total N

Q11c 41.5 42.4 -1.0 16.1 311 Q13c 57.6 28.0 29.6 14.5 311 Q6b 53.7 28.6 25.1 17.7 311

Perceptions about oligarchs’ influence on the political system

Agree Disagree Difference Indifferent/neutral

Total N

Q10c 58.2 26.0 32.2 15.8 311 Q14a 57.2 27.3 29.9 15.4 311 Q4a 47.9 37.6 10.3 14.5 311 Q4b 46.3 34.7 11.6 19.0 311 Q9c 44.4 33.8 10.6 21.9 311

Perceptions about the true incentives for oligarchs’ involvement in politics

Agree Disagree Difference Indifferent/neutral

Total N

Q9a 54.7 32.2 22.5 13.2 311 Q9b 53.7 34.7 19.0 11.6 311 Q13a 50.5 33.8 16.7 15.8 311

144

in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Yet, focusing on three politically and economically influential oligarchs in Ukraine is equally important in order for us to gain a better understanding of possible nuances in the particular element of opinion about oligarchs when people shift their attitudinal focus from the group to prominent individual oligarchs. To reiterate, the most important reason for this particular focus on individual oligarchs is that politics in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies is highly person-centered— primarily revolving around powerful individuals.

As discussed earlier, Ihor Kolomoyskyi, Rinat Akhmetov and Petro Poroshenko have been prominent oligarchs and political players in post-Soviet Ukraine. Turning to university student opinion about these three oligarchs, we find revealing differences between attitudes towards oligarchs as a group and individuals. In particular, Table 12 suggests that the plurality of the respondents answered that they are positively disposed towards both Akhmetov and Kolomoyskyi. Later in this chapter, I will delve deeper into this difference in attitudes towards oligarchs as a group and individuals.

As for Poroshenko, we can observe in Table 12 that the majority of the students favor him, which most likely can be attributed to his presidency. Overall, we see a clear paradox among university students in Kyiv. While the plurality of them clearly disfavor the oligarchs as a group, a similar share of respondents are positively disposed towards the three key individual oligarchs in Ukraine (47.3 percent for Ihor Kolomoyskyi, 44.1 percent for Rinat Akhmetov and 50.8 percent for Petro Poroshenko). Let us now turn to looking at the perceptions of the respondents about the motives of the oligarchs’ political participation and the implications of this involvement for their country.

147

that bureaucrats should stop working for oligarchs (see Q14a). At the same time, every second respondent believes that some oligarchs are willing or capable of actively combating corruption (see Q13a, 50.5 percent). This evidence once more lends support to the argument that people generally distinguish between the oligarchs as a group and individuals as to their influence on the political system.

A common thread that runs through the evidence is that the contested wealth concentration in the hands of the oligarchs is a major cause of dissatisfaction among the respondents. In particular, the majority (53 percent) of the students answered that they will never accept the participation of the oligarchs in politics due to their shady past of wealth accumulation (see Q10a). Interestingly, there is a sharp rift between the respondents as to whether they are prepared to forgive the past sins and errors of oligarchs. In fact, while 40 percent of the respondents agreed that they would accept the oligarchs as legitimate political players in case they opt for redistributing their wealth to the broad masses, 41 percent of the students answered that they would not accept such a deal (Q12a).

Turning to the pure political dimensions of the perceptions about the oligarchs, we find some intriguing evidence. Forty-four percent of the respondents believe that the oligarchs still contribute to political competition in Ukraine through the parties they control (see Q9c). At the same time, most students (almost 57 percent) answered that the oligarchs are an essential part of the current political system in Ukraine and that they therefore are not expecting substantial political changes in their country (see Q13c). However, the plurality of the respondents perceive that oligarchs opposing the regime (see Q4b, 46 percent) and the oligarchs who are pro-Western are conducive to democratic advancement in Ukraine (see Q4a, nearly 48 percent). Interestingly and expectedly, the vast majority (53.7 percent, see Q6b above) of the respondents consider President Petro Poroshenko as an oligarch.

Overall, the descriptive evidence presented above suggests that Ukrainian students in Kyiv clearly differentiate between oligarchs as a group and individuals. This has serious implications for their perceptions about the oligarchs’ primacy in their political system and for regime trajectories. What is more, almost 40 percent of the students answered that they or someone in their family had received grants or other kinds of material support from oligarchs (see Q10b). All these aspects further justify a closer focus on the determinants of students’ support for oligarchs as a group and individuals in Ukraine.

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Table 13. Attitudes about the political participation of the oligarchs (in %) (continued) Attitudes towards the political role and legitimacy of oligarchs given their past of wealth accumulation strategies

Agree Disagree Difference Indifferent/neutral

Total N

Q10a 53.1 29.3 23.8 17.7 311 Q12a 40.2 41.2 -1.0 18.6 311 Notes: The above question numbers indicate the following items in the questionnaire: Q10b = I personally or someone in my family received material support from an oligarch’s charity foundation; Q11c = I trust political parties that have oligarchs in leading positions; Q13c = The oligarchs are an integral part of our current political system; expecting some positive political changes is too naïve; Q6b = Our president is an oligarch; Q10c = All oligarchs in our country are corrupt and promote corruption in the public administration; Q14a = Bureaucrats should stop working for oligarchs; Q4a = Only pro-Western oligarchs are conducive to democratic development in our country; Q4b = Only those oligarchs who are disloyal to our political leadership contribute to democratization; Q9c = By means of their political parties, oligarchs contribute to increasing political competition in our country; Q9a = Oligarchs are in politics due to narrow material interests; Q9b = Oligarchs are in politics to ensure their and their families’ survival and prosperity; Q13a = Some oligarchs are prepared to оr capable of actively combating corruption; Q10a = People will not accept oligarchs’ participation in politics due to their contested methods of wealth accumulation and Q12a = People would accept oligarchs as legitimate political players if they are ready to share their massive wealth with the people to eradicate economic inequality. See the questionnaire in the Appendix to this chapter for more details.

Before switching our focus to the results in Table 13, it bears repeating that I have earlier thoroughly discussed the five broad dimensions that the above survey questions measure as to perceptions about oligarchs (see the research design chapter). Indeed, several of the above variables can be put into multiple groups. However, the five coarse categories of variables used in this thesis are (1) university student’ experiences of oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation, (2) perceptions about the political role of oligarchs, (3) perceptions about their influence on the political system, (4) perceptions about the true incentives for oligarchs’ involvement in politics and (5) attitudes towards the political role and legitimacy of oligarchs given their past of wealth accumulation strategies. The majority of the students considered that the oligarchs engage in politics for their own material interests (see Q9a, nearly 55 percent) and the prosperity of their families (see Q9b, nearly 54 percent). Furthermore, we also observe in Table 13, that 58 percent of the respondents consider the oligarchs to promote corruption in the public administration (see Q10c). Moreover, the majority (over 57 percent) concurred with the statement

147

that bureaucrats should stop working for oligarchs (see Q14a). At the same time, every second respondent believes that some oligarchs are willing or capable of actively combating corruption (see Q13a, 50.5 percent). This evidence once more lends support to the argument that people generally distinguish between the oligarchs as a group and individuals as to their influence on the political system.

A common thread that runs through the evidence is that the contested wealth concentration in the hands of the oligarchs is a major cause of dissatisfaction among the respondents. In particular, the majority (53 percent) of the students answered that they will never accept the participation of the oligarchs in politics due to their shady past of wealth accumulation (see Q10a). Interestingly, there is a sharp rift between the respondents as to whether they are prepared to forgive the past sins and errors of oligarchs. In fact, while 40 percent of the respondents agreed that they would accept the oligarchs as legitimate political players in case they opt for redistributing their wealth to the broad masses, 41 percent of the students answered that they would not accept such a deal (Q12a).

Turning to the pure political dimensions of the perceptions about the oligarchs, we find some intriguing evidence. Forty-four percent of the respondents believe that the oligarchs still contribute to political competition in Ukraine through the parties they control (see Q9c). At the same time, most students (almost 57 percent) answered that the oligarchs are an essential part of the current political system in Ukraine and that they therefore are not expecting substantial political changes in their country (see Q13c). However, the plurality of the respondents perceive that oligarchs opposing the regime (see Q4b, 46 percent) and the oligarchs who are pro-Western are conducive to democratic advancement in Ukraine (see Q4a, nearly 48 percent). Interestingly and expectedly, the vast majority (53.7 percent, see Q6b above) of the respondents consider President Petro Poroshenko as an oligarch.

Overall, the descriptive evidence presented above suggests that Ukrainian students in Kyiv clearly differentiate between oligarchs as a group and individuals. This has serious implications for their perceptions about the oligarchs’ primacy in their political system and for regime trajectories. What is more, almost 40 percent of the students answered that they or someone in their family had received grants or other kinds of material support from oligarchs (see Q10b). All these aspects further justify a closer focus on the determinants of students’ support for oligarchs as a group and individuals in Ukraine.

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Table 13. Attitudes about the political participation of the oligarchs (in %) (continued) Attitudes towards the political role and legitimacy of oligarchs given their past of wealth accumulation strategies

Agree Disagree Difference Indifferent/neutral

Total N

Q10a 53.1 29.3 23.8 17.7 311 Q12a 40.2 41.2 -1.0 18.6 311 Notes: The above question numbers indicate the following items in the questionnaire: Q10b = I personally or someone in my family received material support from an oligarch’s charity foundation; Q11c = I trust political parties that have oligarchs in leading positions; Q13c = The oligarchs are an integral part of our current political system; expecting some positive political changes is too naïve; Q6b = Our president is an oligarch; Q10c = All oligarchs in our country are corrupt and promote corruption in the public administration; Q14a = Bureaucrats should stop working for oligarchs; Q4a = Only pro-Western oligarchs are conducive to democratic development in our country; Q4b = Only those oligarchs who are disloyal to our political leadership contribute to democratization; Q9c = By means of their political parties, oligarchs contribute to increasing political competition in our country; Q9a = Oligarchs are in politics due to narrow material interests; Q9b = Oligarchs are in politics to ensure their and their families’ survival and prosperity; Q13a = Some oligarchs are prepared to оr capable of actively combating corruption; Q10a = People will not accept oligarchs’ participation in politics due to their contested methods of wealth accumulation and Q12a = People would accept oligarchs as legitimate political players if they are ready to share their massive wealth with the people to eradicate economic inequality. See the questionnaire in the Appendix to this chapter for more details.

Before switching our focus to the results in Table 13, it bears repeating that I have earlier thoroughly discussed the five broad dimensions that the above survey questions measure as to perceptions about oligarchs (see the research design chapter). Indeed, several of the above variables can be put into multiple groups. However, the five coarse categories of variables used in this thesis are (1) university student’ experiences of oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation, (2) perceptions about the political role of oligarchs, (3) perceptions about their influence on the political system, (4) perceptions about the true incentives for oligarchs’ involvement in politics and (5) attitudes towards the political role and legitimacy of oligarchs given their past of wealth accumulation strategies. The majority of the students considered that the oligarchs engage in politics for their own material interests (see Q9a, nearly 55 percent) and the prosperity of their families (see Q9b, nearly 54 percent). Furthermore, we also observe in Table 13, that 58 percent of the respondents consider the oligarchs to promote corruption in the public administration (see Q10c). Moreover, the majority (over 57 percent) concurred with the statement

149

Table 14. Determinants of student opinion about the oligarchs as a group and individuals (continued) Expected

relationship (direction)

Group Akhmetov Kolomoyskyi Poroshenko

Perceptions about the true incentives for oligarchs’ involvement in politics Q9a (-) -0.00826

(0.0546) -0.0794 (0.0532)

-0.0931* (0.0558)

-0.112* (0.0588)

Q9b 0.0260 (0.0532)

0.000987 (0.0508)

-0.0487 (0.0552)

0.0168 (0.0544)

Q13a 0.149** (0.0563)

0.0532 (0.0507)

0.111** (0.0540)

0.0323 (0.0547)

Attitudes towards the political role and legitimacy of oligarchs given their past of wealth accumulation strategies Q10a -0.111**

(0.0519) -0.0230 (0.0515)

-0.0882 (0.0568)

-0.0951* (0.0549)

Q12a 0.0254 (0.0492)

-0.0579 (0.0461)

0.0549 (0.0499)

-0.0151 (0.0527)

Constant 4.808** (0.935)

6.310** (0.967)

5.924** (0.988)

6.957** (1.064)

Notes: The models above also account for gender, age, education, income level, the degree of political interest and political orientation. See the Appendix to this chapter for the questionnaire and the summary statistics of the variables. N = 311; Adj. R2 = 25 % (Group); Adj. R2 = 24.3 % (Akhmetov); Adj. R2 = 16.9 % (Kolomoyskyi); Adj. R2 = 19.5 % (Poroshenko). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 significance levels. The first column indicates the expected direction of the relationship. The above question numbers indicate the following items in the questionnaire: Q10b = I personally or someone in my family received grants or similar material support from an oligarch’s charity foundation; Q11c = I trust political parties that have oligarchs in leading positions; Q13c = The oligarchs are an integral part of our current political system: expecting some positive political changes is too naïve; Q13b = Our president is an oligarch; Q10c = All oligarchs in our country are corrupt and promote corruption in the public administration; Q14a = Bureaucrats should stop working for oligarchs; Q11a = Only pro-Western oligarchs are conducive to democratic development in our country; Q11b = Only those oligarchs who are disloyal to our political leadership contribute to democratization; Q9c = By means of their political parties, oligarchs contribute to increasing political competition in our country; Q9a = Oligarchs are involved in politics due to their narrow material interests; Q9b = Oligarchs are involved in politics to ensure their own and their families’ survival and prosperity in our society; Q13a = Some oligarchs are prepared to or capable of actively combating corruption; Q10a = People like me will never accept oligarchs in politics due to their contested methods of wealth accumulation and Q12a = People would accept oligarchs as legitimate political players if they are ready to share their massive wealth with the people to eradicate economic inequality. Table 14 above contains four regressions models: attitudes towards oligarchs as group and three models of attitudes towards Rinat Akhmetov, Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Petro Poroshenko, respectively. It is worth restating here

148

The determinants of support for oligarchs among Ukrainian students In the subsequent regression models, I will investigate what determines students’ support for oligarchs as a group and individuals in Ukraine. This statistical analysis will enable us to dig deeper into the mechanism that drives public opinion about oligarchs as a group and individuals. Table 14. Determinants of student opinion about the oligarchs as a group and individuals Expected relationship

(direction) Group Akhmetov Kolomoyskyi Poroshenko

Experience of oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation Q10b (+) 0.114**

(0.0522) 0.125** (0.0519)

0.0624 (0.0534)

0.0123 (0.0534)

Perceptions about the political role of oligarchs

Q11c 0.0124 (0.0623)

0.0915 (0.0584)

0.0810 (0.0618)

0.123* (0.0648)

Q13c (-) -0.120** (0.0582)

0.0121 (0.0592)

0.0387 (0.0587)

-0.0483 (0.0599)

Q13b -0.0915 (0.0589)

-0.194** (0.0575)

-0.0615 (0.0595)

-0.137** (0.0634)

Perceptions about their influence on the political system

Q10c (-) -0.182** (0.0550)

-0.127** (0.0585)

-0.131** (0.0575)

-0.0379 (0.0576)

Q14a -0.00598 (0.0523)

-0.0165 (0.0581)

-0.0302 (0.0569)

-0.128** (0.0620)

Q11a 0.0802 (0.0560)

-0.0290 (0.0526)

0.0782 (0.0557)

0.0981* (0.0577)

Q11b 0.0387 (0.0603)

-0.0524 (0.0562)

-0.0446 (0.0565)

-0.0890 (0.0598)

Q9c 0.0339 (0.0535)

0.0123 (0.0512)

0.0268 (0.0558)

0.0226 (0.0531)

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Table 14. Determinants of student opinion about the oligarchs as a group and individuals (continued) Expected

relationship (direction)

Group Akhmetov Kolomoyskyi Poroshenko

Perceptions about the true incentives for oligarchs’ involvement in politics Q9a (-) -0.00826

(0.0546) -0.0794 (0.0532)

-0.0931* (0.0558)

-0.112* (0.0588)

Q9b 0.0260 (0.0532)

0.000987 (0.0508)

-0.0487 (0.0552)

0.0168 (0.0544)

Q13a 0.149** (0.0563)

0.0532 (0.0507)

0.111** (0.0540)

0.0323 (0.0547)

Attitudes towards the political role and legitimacy of oligarchs given their past of wealth accumulation strategies Q10a -0.111**

(0.0519) -0.0230 (0.0515)

-0.0882 (0.0568)

-0.0951* (0.0549)

Q12a 0.0254 (0.0492)

-0.0579 (0.0461)

0.0549 (0.0499)

-0.0151 (0.0527)

Constant 4.808** (0.935)

6.310** (0.967)

5.924** (0.988)

6.957** (1.064)

Notes: The models above also account for gender, age, education, income level, the degree of political interest and political orientation. See the Appendix to this chapter for the questionnaire and the summary statistics of the variables. N = 311; Adj. R2 = 25 % (Group); Adj. R2 = 24.3 % (Akhmetov); Adj. R2 = 16.9 % (Kolomoyskyi); Adj. R2 = 19.5 % (Poroshenko). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 significance levels. The first column indicates the expected direction of the relationship. The above question numbers indicate the following items in the questionnaire: Q10b = I personally or someone in my family received grants or similar material support from an oligarch’s charity foundation; Q11c = I trust political parties that have oligarchs in leading positions; Q13c = The oligarchs are an integral part of our current political system: expecting some positive political changes is too naïve; Q13b = Our president is an oligarch; Q10c = All oligarchs in our country are corrupt and promote corruption in the public administration; Q14a = Bureaucrats should stop working for oligarchs; Q11a = Only pro-Western oligarchs are conducive to democratic development in our country; Q11b = Only those oligarchs who are disloyal to our political leadership contribute to democratization; Q9c = By means of their political parties, oligarchs contribute to increasing political competition in our country; Q9a = Oligarchs are involved in politics due to their narrow material interests; Q9b = Oligarchs are involved in politics to ensure their own and their families’ survival and prosperity in our society; Q13a = Some oligarchs are prepared to or capable of actively combating corruption; Q10a = People like me will never accept oligarchs in politics due to their contested methods of wealth accumulation and Q12a = People would accept oligarchs as legitimate political players if they are ready to share their massive wealth with the people to eradicate economic inequality. Table 14 above contains four regressions models: attitudes towards oligarchs as group and three models of attitudes towards Rinat Akhmetov, Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Petro Poroshenko, respectively. It is worth restating here

148

The determinants of support for oligarchs among Ukrainian students In the subsequent regression models, I will investigate what determines students’ support for oligarchs as a group and individuals in Ukraine. This statistical analysis will enable us to dig deeper into the mechanism that drives public opinion about oligarchs as a group and individuals. Table 14. Determinants of student opinion about the oligarchs as a group and individuals Expected relationship

(direction) Group Akhmetov Kolomoyskyi Poroshenko

Experience of oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation Q10b (+) 0.114**

(0.0522) 0.125** (0.0519)

0.0624 (0.0534)

0.0123 (0.0534)

Perceptions about the political role of oligarchs

Q11c 0.0124 (0.0623)

0.0915 (0.0584)

0.0810 (0.0618)

0.123* (0.0648)

Q13c (-) -0.120** (0.0582)

0.0121 (0.0592)

0.0387 (0.0587)

-0.0483 (0.0599)

Q13b -0.0915 (0.0589)

-0.194** (0.0575)

-0.0615 (0.0595)

-0.137** (0.0634)

Perceptions about their influence on the political system

Q10c (-) -0.182** (0.0550)

-0.127** (0.0585)

-0.131** (0.0575)

-0.0379 (0.0576)

Q14a -0.00598 (0.0523)

-0.0165 (0.0581)

-0.0302 (0.0569)

-0.128** (0.0620)

Q11a 0.0802 (0.0560)

-0.0290 (0.0526)

0.0782 (0.0557)

0.0981* (0.0577)

Q11b 0.0387 (0.0603)

-0.0524 (0.0562)

-0.0446 (0.0565)

-0.0890 (0.0598)

Q9c 0.0339 (0.0535)

0.0123 (0.0512)

0.0268 (0.0558)

0.0226 (0.0531)

151

administration (see Q10c, -0.182**). Attitudes towards oligarchs as a group become significantly more negative the more university students tend to concur with the statement that the oligarchs are an integral part of the current political system in Ukraine and that expecting positive political changes is to be naïve (see Q13c, -0.120**). In contrast, we can see that students in Kyiv tend to harbor positive attitudes towards oligarchs collectively when they perceive that some of them are ready to or are already actively combating corruption (see Q13a, 0.149**). Moreover and as anticipated, being recipient of material support from oligarchs makes the respondents more positively predisposed towards oligarchs as a group (see Q10b, 0.114**).

Reading further from Table 14, we can see that increasingly believing that Akhmetov is honest and credible is positively associated with having received material support from an oligarch’s charity foundation (see Q10b in the Akhmetov model, 0.125**). Likewise, the more university students think that all oligarchs are corrupt in Ukraine and promote corruption in the public administration, the more negative attitudes towards Akhmetov (see Q10c, -0.127**). Turning to the Kolomoyskyi model, we observe that students who believe that oligarchs are corrupt and promote public corruption are significantly more likely to believe that Kolomoyskyi is dishonest and politically unreliable (see Q10c, -0.131**). Also, we can see that students who believe that some oligarchs are prepared to or are actively combating corruption are significantly more likely to perceive Kolomoyskyi rather honest and politically credible (see Q13a, 0.111**). Finally and as for Poroshenko, evidence from Table 14 suggests that students tend to perceive Poroshenko as dishonest and politically untrustworthy the more they believe that the oligarchs engage in politics only for their own narrow material interests (Q9a, -0.112*). A similar negative effect on attitudes towards Poroshenko exerts believing that oligarchs accumulated their wealth unfairly, which in the eyes of the average respondent in Kyiv disqualifies oligarchs from being legitimate political players in Ukraine (Q10a, -0.0951*). Moreover, negative attitudes about Poroshenko are substantially associated with university students believing that bureaucrats in the public administration should stop playing into the hands of the oligarchs (Q14a, -0.128**). Yet, trusting political parties that have oligarchs in leading positions is significantly associated with favoring Poroshenko as an honest and politically credible person (Q11c, 0.123*). We can further see that only in the Poroshenko model are student attitudes significantly and positively correlated with thinking that only pro-Western oligarchs help Ukraine in its way to democratization (Q11a, 0.0981*). This result may be a clear sign of Poroshenko’s successful political performance as a pro-Western politician in contrast to making efforts to bring Ukraine back to

150

that university student opinion about oligarchs is crucial for gaining a better understanding about how oligarchs have interacted with the incumbents and mass opinion in Ukraine where they have been crucial players as to reaching regime change. The current survey analysis departs from a holistic perspective based on the theory chapter (see the prior work and theory chapter) as well as earlier findings from previous empirical chapters. In particular, key aspects of relevance to the subsequent analyses are students’ perceptions about the political role of oligarchs and their influence on the political system, perceptions about the true incentives for oligarchs to engage in politics, attitudes towards the political legitimacy of oligarchs in light of their shady past of wealth accumulation and student experiences about oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation. The variables in the table are ordered according to these coarse categories.

The first column of Table 14 reminds us what direction of the relationship to expect according to our broad expectations. In particular, based upon most of the indications, we should expect that Kyiv university students generally harbor negative attitudes towards oligarchs as group and individuals. Key variables explaining this negative relationship involve their perceptions about the shady past of oligarchs as to their wealth accumulation as well their corrupt influence on the political system. Yet, I assume that individual oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation will be conductive to positive attitudes towards them. It is in this light that this analysis aids this thesis in exploring how the interaction of oligarchs with incumbents and mass opinion plays out in a context of a higher level of oligarchic influence on the political system in addition to oligarchs being most prominent actors for regime change.

Starting with the non-significant results in all the four models presented in Table 14, we can see that the variables Q9b (“Oligarchs are involved in politics to ensure their own and their families’ survival and prosperity in our society”), Q9c (“By means of their political parties, oligarchs contribute to increasing political competition in our country”), Q11b (“Only those oligarchs who are disloyal to our political leadership contribute to democratization”) and Q12a (“People would accept oligarchs as legitimate political players if they are ready to share their massive wealth with the people to eradicate economic inequality”) appear not to be of statistically significant importance for Kyiv university students’ attitudes towards the oligarchs as a group and individuals.

Turning to the group model in Table 14, I explore what determines student opinion about the oligarchs as a group in Ukraine. As we would expect from the theoretical discussion of this thesis, there is a significant negative relationship between favoring oligarchs as a group and thinking that oligarchs acquired their wealth unfairly (see Q10a, -0.111**). In addition, we can also observe that students in Kyiv tend to dislike the oligarchs as a group the more they perceive that the latter are corrupt and stimulate corruption in the public

151

administration (see Q10c, -0.182**). Attitudes towards oligarchs as a group become significantly more negative the more university students tend to concur with the statement that the oligarchs are an integral part of the current political system in Ukraine and that expecting positive political changes is to be naïve (see Q13c, -0.120**). In contrast, we can see that students in Kyiv tend to harbor positive attitudes towards oligarchs collectively when they perceive that some of them are ready to or are already actively combating corruption (see Q13a, 0.149**). Moreover and as anticipated, being recipient of material support from oligarchs makes the respondents more positively predisposed towards oligarchs as a group (see Q10b, 0.114**).

Reading further from Table 14, we can see that increasingly believing that Akhmetov is honest and credible is positively associated with having received material support from an oligarch’s charity foundation (see Q10b in the Akhmetov model, 0.125**). Likewise, the more university students think that all oligarchs are corrupt in Ukraine and promote corruption in the public administration, the more negative attitudes towards Akhmetov (see Q10c, -0.127**). Turning to the Kolomoyskyi model, we observe that students who believe that oligarchs are corrupt and promote public corruption are significantly more likely to believe that Kolomoyskyi is dishonest and politically unreliable (see Q10c, -0.131**). Also, we can see that students who believe that some oligarchs are prepared to or are actively combating corruption are significantly more likely to perceive Kolomoyskyi rather honest and politically credible (see Q13a, 0.111**). Finally and as for Poroshenko, evidence from Table 14 suggests that students tend to perceive Poroshenko as dishonest and politically untrustworthy the more they believe that the oligarchs engage in politics only for their own narrow material interests (Q9a, -0.112*). A similar negative effect on attitudes towards Poroshenko exerts believing that oligarchs accumulated their wealth unfairly, which in the eyes of the average respondent in Kyiv disqualifies oligarchs from being legitimate political players in Ukraine (Q10a, -0.0951*). Moreover, negative attitudes about Poroshenko are substantially associated with university students believing that bureaucrats in the public administration should stop playing into the hands of the oligarchs (Q14a, -0.128**). Yet, trusting political parties that have oligarchs in leading positions is significantly associated with favoring Poroshenko as an honest and politically credible person (Q11c, 0.123*). We can further see that only in the Poroshenko model are student attitudes significantly and positively correlated with thinking that only pro-Western oligarchs help Ukraine in its way to democratization (Q11a, 0.0981*). This result may be a clear sign of Poroshenko’s successful political performance as a pro-Western politician in contrast to making efforts to bring Ukraine back to

150

that university student opinion about oligarchs is crucial for gaining a better understanding about how oligarchs have interacted with the incumbents and mass opinion in Ukraine where they have been crucial players as to reaching regime change. The current survey analysis departs from a holistic perspective based on the theory chapter (see the prior work and theory chapter) as well as earlier findings from previous empirical chapters. In particular, key aspects of relevance to the subsequent analyses are students’ perceptions about the political role of oligarchs and their influence on the political system, perceptions about the true incentives for oligarchs to engage in politics, attitudes towards the political legitimacy of oligarchs in light of their shady past of wealth accumulation and student experiences about oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation. The variables in the table are ordered according to these coarse categories.

The first column of Table 14 reminds us what direction of the relationship to expect according to our broad expectations. In particular, based upon most of the indications, we should expect that Kyiv university students generally harbor negative attitudes towards oligarchs as group and individuals. Key variables explaining this negative relationship involve their perceptions about the shady past of oligarchs as to their wealth accumulation as well their corrupt influence on the political system. Yet, I assume that individual oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation will be conductive to positive attitudes towards them. It is in this light that this analysis aids this thesis in exploring how the interaction of oligarchs with incumbents and mass opinion plays out in a context of a higher level of oligarchic influence on the political system in addition to oligarchs being most prominent actors for regime change.

Starting with the non-significant results in all the four models presented in Table 14, we can see that the variables Q9b (“Oligarchs are involved in politics to ensure their own and their families’ survival and prosperity in our society”), Q9c (“By means of their political parties, oligarchs contribute to increasing political competition in our country”), Q11b (“Only those oligarchs who are disloyal to our political leadership contribute to democratization”) and Q12a (“People would accept oligarchs as legitimate political players if they are ready to share their massive wealth with the people to eradicate economic inequality”) appear not to be of statistically significant importance for Kyiv university students’ attitudes towards the oligarchs as a group and individuals.

Turning to the group model in Table 14, I explore what determines student opinion about the oligarchs as a group in Ukraine. As we would expect from the theoretical discussion of this thesis, there is a significant negative relationship between favoring oligarchs as a group and thinking that oligarchs acquired their wealth unfairly (see Q10a, -0.111**). In addition, we can also observe that students in Kyiv tend to dislike the oligarchs as a group the more they perceive that the latter are corrupt and stimulate corruption in the public

153

Summary of the results How does the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs play out in Ukraine where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change? This interaction pertains to rivalry for power and influence between oligarchs and pseudo-democratic regimes in the framework of two crucial factors (mass opinion and state power) for understanding regime trajectories. This chapter, initially, looked more closely upon this interaction in the wake of the two color revolutions in Ukraine. In particular, the above account revealed that one of the most important driving forces of the Orange Revolution was people’s great disfavor of oligarchs along with the public’s substantial dissatisfaction with rampant corruption at the highest echelons of power. In contrast, the Euromaidan movement in 2014 primarily revolved around Yanukovich’s sudden and complete change of policy with regard to Ukraine’s ratification of the agreement on deep association with the EU. Yet, post-Euromaidan political processes still point to the fact that oligarchs have maintained their influence on political life by means of political parties. What however changed after the Euromaidan is that many oligarchs opted for keeping a much lower profile in formal politics in Ukraine.

This chapter also explored attitudes towards the oligarchs among Ukrainian university students in Kyiv. Exploring unique survey data gathered in Kyiv in the spring of 2017 provides interesting results. I found support for several theoretical arguments discussed in the full theory chapter. First and as expected, evidence from the survey suggests that the perceptions of students about oligarchs’ political role and legitimacy is primarily seen in light of their shady past of wealth accumulation. Thus, university students disfavor oligarchs as a group because they perceive that the oligarchs acquired their massive wealth unfairly. In general, they consider this fact as a major obstacle for them to accept the oligarchs as legitimate political players. What also generates dissatisfaction with the oligarchs as a group is their unduly influence on public administration and their promotion of corruption. The respondents in Kyiv tend to be dissatisfied with the oligarchs as a group the more they perceive them to be an integral part of the current political system and status quo in Ukraine. Hence, these results suggest that the oligarchs as group are viewed to have adversary influence on the entire political system. However, Kyiv student attitudes seem to become increasingly more favorable towards the oligarchs as a group if they or someone in their family had received material support from the oligarchs. This suggests that oligarchs successfully enhance their personal reputation through well-designed strategies such as charity and other kinds of provision of material support to the public. University students’ satisfaction with oligarchs as a group also increases when they see that some oligarchs are willing to or already are combating corruption in Ukraine. This finding implies that the respondents tend to be sympathetic to oligarchs if they perceive the latter are truly getting involved in politics to help

152

Russia’s sphere of influence.37 Finally yet importantly, those who think their president (i.e. Poroshenko himself) is an oligarch tend to be unsympathetic to him (see Q13b, -0.137**).

37 It is here worth restating that the variable Q11a was included in the questionnaire partly as a controlling proxy for respondents’ attitudes towards the West’s influence on Ukrainian politics and oligarchs in contrast to that of Russia.

153

Summary of the results How does the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs play out in Ukraine where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change? This interaction pertains to rivalry for power and influence between oligarchs and pseudo-democratic regimes in the framework of two crucial factors (mass opinion and state power) for understanding regime trajectories. This chapter, initially, looked more closely upon this interaction in the wake of the two color revolutions in Ukraine. In particular, the above account revealed that one of the most important driving forces of the Orange Revolution was people’s great disfavor of oligarchs along with the public’s substantial dissatisfaction with rampant corruption at the highest echelons of power. In contrast, the Euromaidan movement in 2014 primarily revolved around Yanukovich’s sudden and complete change of policy with regard to Ukraine’s ratification of the agreement on deep association with the EU. Yet, post-Euromaidan political processes still point to the fact that oligarchs have maintained their influence on political life by means of political parties. What however changed after the Euromaidan is that many oligarchs opted for keeping a much lower profile in formal politics in Ukraine.

This chapter also explored attitudes towards the oligarchs among Ukrainian university students in Kyiv. Exploring unique survey data gathered in Kyiv in the spring of 2017 provides interesting results. I found support for several theoretical arguments discussed in the full theory chapter. First and as expected, evidence from the survey suggests that the perceptions of students about oligarchs’ political role and legitimacy is primarily seen in light of their shady past of wealth accumulation. Thus, university students disfavor oligarchs as a group because they perceive that the oligarchs acquired their massive wealth unfairly. In general, they consider this fact as a major obstacle for them to accept the oligarchs as legitimate political players. What also generates dissatisfaction with the oligarchs as a group is their unduly influence on public administration and their promotion of corruption. The respondents in Kyiv tend to be dissatisfied with the oligarchs as a group the more they perceive them to be an integral part of the current political system and status quo in Ukraine. Hence, these results suggest that the oligarchs as group are viewed to have adversary influence on the entire political system. However, Kyiv student attitudes seem to become increasingly more favorable towards the oligarchs as a group if they or someone in their family had received material support from the oligarchs. This suggests that oligarchs successfully enhance their personal reputation through well-designed strategies such as charity and other kinds of provision of material support to the public. University students’ satisfaction with oligarchs as a group also increases when they see that some oligarchs are willing to or already are combating corruption in Ukraine. This finding implies that the respondents tend to be sympathetic to oligarchs if they perceive the latter are truly getting involved in politics to help

152

Russia’s sphere of influence.37 Finally yet importantly, those who think their president (i.e. Poroshenko himself) is an oligarch tend to be unsympathetic to him (see Q13b, -0.137**).

37 It is here worth restating that the variable Q11a was included in the questionnaire partly as a controlling proxy for respondents’ attitudes towards the West’s influence on Ukrainian politics and oligarchs in contrast to that of Russia.

155

also pointed to how specific efforts by oligarchs (such as providing material support for citizens) influence opinion about them positively.

154

Ukraine to overcome such an everyday concern as rampant corruption in the public sector.

This chapter also investigated what factors drive student opinion about three key oligarchs in Ukraine. Results suggest that students in Kyiv equally disfavor Akhmetov and Kolomoyskyi when they perceive that oligarchs are corrupt and promote corruption in Ukraine (this variable was not significant in the Poroshenko model). However, while perceptions about oligarchs’ contested methods of wealth accumulation are not significantly related to attitudes towards Akhmetov and Kolomoyskyi, this was the case in the Poroshenko model (see Q10a, -0.0951* in Table 14). Overall, disfavor of Poroshenko increases when university students in Kyiv perceive that oligarchs engage in politics for their narrow material interests and when they perceive that bureaucrats should stop being instruments in the hands of the oligarchs. A reasonable explanation for this difference can be the fact that Poroshenko has been more visible politically during the post-Soviet era of Ukraine. This is perhaps why these more “political” factors predict university student opinion about Poroshenko. Lastly and surprisingly, it was only in the Akhmetov model (among the models for individual oligarchs) I found evidence suggesting that receiving material support from an oligarch’s charity fund significantly contributes to perceiving the individual oligarch as an honest and politically reliable person.

Overall, the findings of this chapter on Ukraine may suggest that oligarchs develop a personal reputation among the public, which most likely constitutes a crucial resource for maintaining their political and economic influence. In addition, performing a more visible political opposition through making efforts to combat corruption, or appearing to do so, seems to have a positive effect on mass opinion about oligarchs among Kyiv university students. What has been most fascinating to observe in Ukraine is that both ruling oligarchic clans as well as key, individual oligarchs have persistently sought to adapt their political game of survival to changes in their political environment in order to maintain their political influence.

Taken together, there are two main implications of this chapter’s findings for our understanding of how the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs plays out in Ukraine. First, mass opinion about oligarchs appears to be an important aspect (as suggested by the findings from the Kyiv student survey) for our understanding of the role of oligarchs in regime trajectories given the centrality of mass opinion and state power. Put differently, oligarchs’ personal reputation as well their political performance seem to be crucial aspects to account for when attempting to understand oligarchs’ interaction with incumbents in Ukraine. Second, particularly challenging for oligarchs are perceptions about their unduly wealth concentration as well as sway over politics (as evaluated by a particularly informed group of citizens such as university students). In this regard, the student survey in this chapter

155

also pointed to how specific efforts by oligarchs (such as providing material support for citizens) influence opinion about them positively.

154

Ukraine to overcome such an everyday concern as rampant corruption in the public sector.

This chapter also investigated what factors drive student opinion about three key oligarchs in Ukraine. Results suggest that students in Kyiv equally disfavor Akhmetov and Kolomoyskyi when they perceive that oligarchs are corrupt and promote corruption in Ukraine (this variable was not significant in the Poroshenko model). However, while perceptions about oligarchs’ contested methods of wealth accumulation are not significantly related to attitudes towards Akhmetov and Kolomoyskyi, this was the case in the Poroshenko model (see Q10a, -0.0951* in Table 14). Overall, disfavor of Poroshenko increases when university students in Kyiv perceive that oligarchs engage in politics for their narrow material interests and when they perceive that bureaucrats should stop being instruments in the hands of the oligarchs. A reasonable explanation for this difference can be the fact that Poroshenko has been more visible politically during the post-Soviet era of Ukraine. This is perhaps why these more “political” factors predict university student opinion about Poroshenko. Lastly and surprisingly, it was only in the Akhmetov model (among the models for individual oligarchs) I found evidence suggesting that receiving material support from an oligarch’s charity fund significantly contributes to perceiving the individual oligarch as an honest and politically reliable person.

Overall, the findings of this chapter on Ukraine may suggest that oligarchs develop a personal reputation among the public, which most likely constitutes a crucial resource for maintaining their political and economic influence. In addition, performing a more visible political opposition through making efforts to combat corruption, or appearing to do so, seems to have a positive effect on mass opinion about oligarchs among Kyiv university students. What has been most fascinating to observe in Ukraine is that both ruling oligarchic clans as well as key, individual oligarchs have persistently sought to adapt their political game of survival to changes in their political environment in order to maintain their political influence.

Taken together, there are two main implications of this chapter’s findings for our understanding of how the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs plays out in Ukraine. First, mass opinion about oligarchs appears to be an important aspect (as suggested by the findings from the Kyiv student survey) for our understanding of the role of oligarchs in regime trajectories given the centrality of mass opinion and state power. Put differently, oligarchs’ personal reputation as well their political performance seem to be crucial aspects to account for when attempting to understand oligarchs’ interaction with incumbents in Ukraine. Second, particularly challenging for oligarchs are perceptions about their unduly wealth concentration as well as sway over politics (as evaluated by a particularly informed group of citizens such as university students). In this regard, the student survey in this chapter

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6. In general, how interested are you in politics?

(1) Not interested at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Very interested

7. What would you say is your political orientation on a left-to-right scale?

(1) Extreme political left 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Extreme political right

8. In general, to what degree do you like the oligarchs as a group in

your country?

(1) Don’t like at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Like them very much 9. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following

statements?

(1) Completely disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Completely agree

a) Oligarchs are involved in politics due to their narrow material interests b) Oligarchs are involved in politics to ensure their own and their families’

survival and prosperity in our society c) By means of their political parties, oligarchs contribute to increasing

political competition in our country 10. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following

statements?

(1) Completely disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Completely agree

a) People like me will never accept oligarchs in politics due to their contested methods of wealth accumulation

b) I personally or someone in my family received grants or similar material support from an oligarch’s charity foundation

c) All oligarchs in our country are corrupt and promote corruption in the public administration

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Appendix Questionnaire

1. What is your biological sex?

Male Female Other

2. What is your age? Please choose your age group 16-18 19-22 23-26 27-35 36+

3. What is the highest education you have attained?

• No education • Elementary school • Upper secondary school or high school • University degree

4. What is your current occupation?

• Working • Unemployed • Student • Work + study • Other

5. What is your monthly income in dollars ($)?

• 0-50 • 51-100 • 101-150 • 151-200 • 200-299 • 300+

157

6. In general, how interested are you in politics?

(1) Not interested at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Very interested

7. What would you say is your political orientation on a left-to-right scale?

(1) Extreme political left 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Extreme political right

8. In general, to what degree do you like the oligarchs as a group in

your country?

(1) Don’t like at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Like them very much 9. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following

statements?

(1) Completely disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Completely agree

a) Oligarchs are involved in politics due to their narrow material interests b) Oligarchs are involved in politics to ensure their own and their families’

survival and prosperity in our society c) By means of their political parties, oligarchs contribute to increasing

political competition in our country 10. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following

statements?

(1) Completely disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Completely agree

a) People like me will never accept oligarchs in politics due to their contested methods of wealth accumulation

b) I personally or someone in my family received grants or similar material support from an oligarch’s charity foundation

c) All oligarchs in our country are corrupt and promote corruption in the public administration

156

Appendix Questionnaire

1. What is your biological sex?

Male Female Other

2. What is your age? Please choose your age group 16-18 19-22 23-26 27-35 36+

3. What is the highest education you have attained?

• No education • Elementary school • Upper secondary school or high school • University degree

4. What is your current occupation?

• Working • Unemployed • Student • Work + study • Other

5. What is your monthly income in dollars ($)?

• 0-50 • 51-100 • 101-150 • 151-200 • 200-299 • 300+

159

14. Public administration is a crucial element in our country. What do you think about the following statements?

(1) Totally disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Totally agree

a) Bureaucrats should stop working for oligarchs

15. To what extent do you consider the following persons to be honest and politically credible?

(1) Extremely dishonest and unreliable 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

(10) Extremely honest and credible

a) Ihor Kolomoyskyi b) Petro Poroshenko c) Rinat Akhmetov

158

11. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following

statements?

(1) Completely disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Completely agree

a) Only pro-Western oligarchs are conducive to democratic development in our country

b) Only those oligarchs who are disloyal to our political leadership contribute to democratization

c) I trust political parties that have oligarchs in leading positions

12. People like me would accept oligarchs as legitimate political players if:

(1) Completely disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Completely agree

a) Oligarchs are ready to share their massive wealth with the people to eradicate economic inequality

13. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following

statements?

(1) Completely disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Completely agree

a) Some oligarchs are prepared to оr capable of actively combating corruption

b) Our president is an oligarch c) The oligarchs are an integral part of our current political system.

Thus, expecting some positive political changes is too naïve

159

14. Public administration is a crucial element in our country. What do you think about the following statements?

(1) Totally disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Totally agree

a) Bureaucrats should stop working for oligarchs

15. To what extent do you consider the following persons to be honest and politically credible?

(1) Extremely dishonest and unreliable 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

(10) Extremely honest and credible

a) Ihor Kolomoyskyi b) Petro Poroshenko c) Rinat Akhmetov

158

11. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following

statements?

(1) Completely disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Completely agree

a) Only pro-Western oligarchs are conducive to democratic development in our country

b) Only those oligarchs who are disloyal to our political leadership contribute to democratization

c) I trust political parties that have oligarchs in leading positions

12. People like me would accept oligarchs as legitimate political players if:

(1) Completely disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Completely agree

a) Oligarchs are ready to share their massive wealth with the people to eradicate economic inequality

13. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following

statements?

(1) Completely disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Completely agree

a) Some oligarchs are prepared to оr capable of actively combating corruption

b) Our president is an oligarch c) The oligarchs are an integral part of our current political system.

Thus, expecting some positive political changes is too naïve

161

Table 15. Summary statistics of the variables in the Kyiv university student survey (continued) N Mean SD Min Max (Q10b) I personally or someone in my family received grants or similar material support from an oligarch’s charity foundation

311 4.745981 2.317488 1 10

(Q10c) All oligarchs in our country are corrupt and promote corruption in the public administration

311 5.954984 2.157784 1 10

(Q11a) Only pro-Western oligarchs are conducive to democratic development in our country

311 5.33119 2.045363 1 10

(Q11b) Only those oligarchs who are disloyal to our political leadership contribute to democratization

311 5.334405 1.937093 1 10

(Q11c) I trust political parties that have oligarchs in leading positions

311 4.864952 2.099407 1 10

(Q12a) People would accept oligarchs as legitimate political players if they are ready to share their massive wealth with the people to eradicate economic inequality

311 5.144695 2.23642 1 10

(Q13a) Some oligarchs are prepared to or capable of actively combating corruption

311 5.437299 2.05609 1 10

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Table 15. Summary statistics of the variables in the Kyiv university student survey N Mean SD Min Max (Q1) Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female)

311 1.4791 .5003681 1 2

(Q2) Age group (4 groups)

311 2.311897 1.032919 1 5

(Q3) Education (4 groups)

311 2.118971 .8918955 0 3

(Q4) Current occupation (5 categories)

311 1.948553 1.017868 1 4

(Q5) Monthly income in USD

311 2.585209 1.595853 0 5

(Q6) Interest in politics

311 5.064309 2.057805 0 9

(Q7) Political orientation from left to right

311 5.237942 1.939731 0 9

(Q8) Attitudes towards oligarchs as a group

311 4.745981 2.084453 0 8

(Q9a) Oligarchs are involved in politics due to their narrow material interests

311 5.893891 2.235706 1 10

(Q9b) Oligarchs are involved in politics to ensure their own and their families’ survival and prosperity in our society

311 5.717042 2.226743 1 10

(Q9c) By means of their political parties, oligarchs contribute to increasing political competition in our country

311 5.401929 1.997384 1 10

(Q10a) People like me will never accept oligarchs in politics due to their contested methods of wealth accumulation

311 5.745981 2.099871 1 10

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Table 15. Summary statistics of the variables in the Kyiv university student survey (continued) N Mean SD Min Max (Q10b) I personally or someone in my family received grants or similar material support from an oligarch’s charity foundation

311 4.745981 2.317488 1 10

(Q10c) All oligarchs in our country are corrupt and promote corruption in the public administration

311 5.954984 2.157784 1 10

(Q11a) Only pro-Western oligarchs are conducive to democratic development in our country

311 5.33119 2.045363 1 10

(Q11b) Only those oligarchs who are disloyal to our political leadership contribute to democratization

311 5.334405 1.937093 1 10

(Q11c) I trust political parties that have oligarchs in leading positions

311 4.864952 2.099407 1 10

(Q12a) People would accept oligarchs as legitimate political players if they are ready to share their massive wealth with the people to eradicate economic inequality

311 5.144695 2.23642 1 10

(Q13a) Some oligarchs are prepared to or capable of actively combating corruption

311 5.437299 2.05609 1 10

160

Table 15. Summary statistics of the variables in the Kyiv university student survey N Mean SD Min Max (Q1) Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female)

311 1.4791 .5003681 1 2

(Q2) Age group (4 groups)

311 2.311897 1.032919 1 5

(Q3) Education (4 groups)

311 2.118971 .8918955 0 3

(Q4) Current occupation (5 categories)

311 1.948553 1.017868 1 4

(Q5) Monthly income in USD

311 2.585209 1.595853 0 5

(Q6) Interest in politics

311 5.064309 2.057805 0 9

(Q7) Political orientation from left to right

311 5.237942 1.939731 0 9

(Q8) Attitudes towards oligarchs as a group

311 4.745981 2.084453 0 8

(Q9a) Oligarchs are involved in politics due to their narrow material interests

311 5.893891 2.235706 1 10

(Q9b) Oligarchs are involved in politics to ensure their own and their families’ survival and prosperity in our society

311 5.717042 2.226743 1 10

(Q9c) By means of their political parties, oligarchs contribute to increasing political competition in our country

311 5.401929 1.997384 1 10

(Q10a) People like me will never accept oligarchs in politics due to their contested methods of wealth accumulation

311 5.745981 2.099871 1 10

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Chapter seven. Conclusions: Oligarchs, state power and mass opinion

This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature on pseudo-democracies, democratization and oligarchs and its understanding of pseudo-democratic regime trajectories in the post-Soviet context. Two dominant, competing bodies of the literature have pointed either to mass opinion (about the main regime leader or regime in principle) or to the level of state power concentration and abuse by incumbents (by maintaining an uneven playing field for rivals) for understanding regime maintenance or changes towards democratization in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. However, this thesis has stressed that a major limitation in this discussion is the fact that that the role of such powerful players as the oligarchs has been largely overlooked in these processes. The main aim of this thesis was to study and understand the role of oligarchs in post-Soviet pseudo-democratic regime trajectories given the framework of the two central aspects of mass opinion and state power.

This thesis has shared the claims of prior studies stating that the level of state power as well as mass opinion are equally important factors that explain different regime trajectories. However, it seeks to contribute to this discussion by having addressed three specific questions: 1) What is the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and popular support for democracy in principle, 2) Given that dominant theories point either to mass opinion or to state power as the dominant factors in understanding regime maintenance or change, how do oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion? 3) How does this interaction play out in situations where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change?

In relation to the first two research questions, four hypotheses were derived in order to examine the research problem guiding this study. In particular, the two following hypotheses concerned the research question about the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and the public’s normative regime support: (H1)—Political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution are negatively

162

Table 15. Summary statistics of the variables in the Kyiv university student survey (continued) N Mean SD Min Max (Q13b) Our president is an oligarch

311 6.21865 2.348048 1 10

(Q13c) The oligarchs are an integral part of our current political system; expecting some positive political changes is being too naive

311 5.768489 2.061421 1 10

(Q14a) Bureaucrats should stop working for oligarchs

311 6.221865 2.221371 1 10

(Q15a) Attitudes towards Ihor Kolomoyskyi

311 5.289389 1.960871 1 10

(Q15b) Attitudes towards Petro Poroshenko

311 5.33119 1.997488 1 10

(Q15c) Attitudes towards Rinat Akhmetov

311 5.090032 1.985008 1 10

Notes: Q4 has been used in the survey, but not in the regression models of the chapter. Yet, the variable was important during the fieldwork in Kyiv in order to reduce the risk of oversampling some categories of university students as to their current occupation.

163

Chapter seven. Conclusions: Oligarchs, state power and mass opinion

This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature on pseudo-democracies, democratization and oligarchs and its understanding of pseudo-democratic regime trajectories in the post-Soviet context. Two dominant, competing bodies of the literature have pointed either to mass opinion (about the main regime leader or regime in principle) or to the level of state power concentration and abuse by incumbents (by maintaining an uneven playing field for rivals) for understanding regime maintenance or changes towards democratization in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. However, this thesis has stressed that a major limitation in this discussion is the fact that that the role of such powerful players as the oligarchs has been largely overlooked in these processes. The main aim of this thesis was to study and understand the role of oligarchs in post-Soviet pseudo-democratic regime trajectories given the framework of the two central aspects of mass opinion and state power.

This thesis has shared the claims of prior studies stating that the level of state power as well as mass opinion are equally important factors that explain different regime trajectories. However, it seeks to contribute to this discussion by having addressed three specific questions: 1) What is the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and popular support for democracy in principle, 2) Given that dominant theories point either to mass opinion or to state power as the dominant factors in understanding regime maintenance or change, how do oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion? 3) How does this interaction play out in situations where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change?

In relation to the first two research questions, four hypotheses were derived in order to examine the research problem guiding this study. In particular, the two following hypotheses concerned the research question about the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and the public’s normative regime support: (H1)—Political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution are negatively

162

Table 15. Summary statistics of the variables in the Kyiv university student survey (continued) N Mean SD Min Max (Q13b) Our president is an oligarch

311 6.21865 2.348048 1 10

(Q13c) The oligarchs are an integral part of our current political system; expecting some positive political changes is being too naive

311 5.768489 2.061421 1 10

(Q14a) Bureaucrats should stop working for oligarchs

311 6.221865 2.221371 1 10

(Q15a) Attitudes towards Ihor Kolomoyskyi

311 5.289389 1.960871 1 10

(Q15b) Attitudes towards Petro Poroshenko

311 5.33119 1.997488 1 10

(Q15c) Attitudes towards Rinat Akhmetov

311 5.090032 1.985008 1 10

Notes: Q4 has been used in the survey, but not in the regression models of the chapter. Yet, the variable was important during the fieldwork in Kyiv in order to reduce the risk of oversampling some categories of university students as to their current occupation.

165

and the existence of an uneven playing field (UPF) wield any effect on popular support for democracy in principle (hence, H1a was not supported). One possible, but not exhaustive explanation for these unexpected results in contrast to H1a can be that actual state power abuse occurs in a very sophisticated manner and thereby renders such practices less politically charged with regard to its importance for normative regime support. Verifying this explanation, however, would require further study.

The second research question, mainly investigated in Chapter five, was concerned with how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion (given the central role of mass opinion and state power). Based on the analysis of four individual oligarchs in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine the findings offered interesting details about how the four oligarchs Gagik Tsarukyan (Armenia), Bidzina Ivanishvili (Georgia), Mikhail Prokhorov (Russia) and Petro Poroshenko (Ukraine) interacted with incumbents and mass opinion in their respective countries. As theorized, all the four oligarchs made great efforts to enhance their personal reputation and organizational resources for their political struggle (thus, support for H2). Moreover, the incumbent regimes in all the four countries employed their state power to attack and hamper the accumulation of organizational resources of their rival oligarchs in order to prevent them from developing a greater organizational strength and the reputation of a trustworthy challenger. These patterns were more evident in circumstances when the rival oligarchs had great opportunities to join or mount collective challenges against the incumbent regime. However and as expected, the rival oligarchs in Armenia and Russia generally hesitated to incite or join collective actions that could challenge the incumbent regimes. In addition, Gagik Tsarukyan (Armenia) and Mikhail Prokhorov (Russia) performed a wavering and untrustworthy opposition to the main leader of the incumbent regime by not standing in crucial elections on fateful occasions. These weaknesses enabled the presidents of Armenia and Russia to neutralize them as political threats and further secure their grip on the regime (hence, H2a is supported). In stark contrast, Bidzina Ivanishvili (Georgia) and Petro Poroshenko (Ukraine) performed a relatively more truthful opposition to their main rivals in Georgia and Ukraine, respectively. For instance, Ivanishvili’s organizational resources were subject to frequent and intensive attacks by the authorities in Georgia. However, Ivanishvili focused specifically on improving his personal reputation and credibility as a rival as soon as he formally entered the Georgian political scene. Likewise, Poroshenko made substantial efforts to improve his reputation and organizational resources. As in the case of the other three oligarchs, these efforts were most prominent close to national elections. The evidence from this thesis also indicates that Poroshenko has been well entrenched in the government since he headed the Central Bank of Ukraine, Ministries for Foreign Affairs, and Economic Development and Trade. This most likely explains why his organizational resources were not subject to the same frequency of attacks by the authorities in contrast to the

164

associated with normative support for democracy across all post-Soviet pseudo-democracies; (H1a)—The negative effect of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution on normative support for democracy will be more pronounced in countries with a greater degree of state power concentration in the hands of the regime. Two additional hypotheses concerned the second research question about the interaction between oligarchs and incumbents and mass opinion: (H2)—All individual, politically motivated rival oligarchs operate with the intention of enhancing public opinion about themselves by developing their personal reputation, organizational capacity and by performing a credible opposition to the regime and (H2a)—We should expect that all pseudo-democratic regimes abuse their state power against the rival oligarch. However, a stronger state power enables the authorities to damage the credibility of the rival oligarch primarily by making him appear unpredictable and unreliable in the eyes of the public (H2a). This enables the main regime leader to elevate himself above key rival oligarchs and thereby improve the prospects for successful regime maintenance. Next, I provide a condensed summary of the findings of this thesis with a primary focus on the role of oligarchs. A section then follows where I discuss these results in the framework of prior research with regard to potential alternative explanations. I will also discuss the implications of the findings of this thesis for the literature on regime survival and democratization in addition to focusing on how oligarchs influence regime survival or drifts to democratization in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Finally, this thesis will conclude with a discussion of suggested areas for future research.

Results The main argument of this thesis is that both pseudo-democratic rulers and politically motivated, rival oligarchs devote considerable time and resources to swaying mass opinion in their struggles to secure their power or overturn the regime, respectively. The first research question about the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and the public’s normative regime support was mainly investigated in the chapter (Chapter four) exploring normative democratic support in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine). The evidence showed that ordinary people’s normative support for democracy wanes when oligarchs’ strategic, political interests systematically have precedence over those of the average citizen (H1 is supported). Moreover and as expected by this thesis, people’s perceptions of unfair wealth distribution in their country have a substantial negative influence on their normative support for democracy as the best form of government. Interestingly and in contrast to the study expectations, the level of state power does not have any significant, amplifying effect on these linkages. Nor do the concentration of state power

165

and the existence of an uneven playing field (UPF) wield any effect on popular support for democracy in principle (hence, H1a was not supported). One possible, but not exhaustive explanation for these unexpected results in contrast to H1a can be that actual state power abuse occurs in a very sophisticated manner and thereby renders such practices less politically charged with regard to its importance for normative regime support. Verifying this explanation, however, would require further study.

The second research question, mainly investigated in Chapter five, was concerned with how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion (given the central role of mass opinion and state power). Based on the analysis of four individual oligarchs in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine the findings offered interesting details about how the four oligarchs Gagik Tsarukyan (Armenia), Bidzina Ivanishvili (Georgia), Mikhail Prokhorov (Russia) and Petro Poroshenko (Ukraine) interacted with incumbents and mass opinion in their respective countries. As theorized, all the four oligarchs made great efforts to enhance their personal reputation and organizational resources for their political struggle (thus, support for H2). Moreover, the incumbent regimes in all the four countries employed their state power to attack and hamper the accumulation of organizational resources of their rival oligarchs in order to prevent them from developing a greater organizational strength and the reputation of a trustworthy challenger. These patterns were more evident in circumstances when the rival oligarchs had great opportunities to join or mount collective challenges against the incumbent regime. However and as expected, the rival oligarchs in Armenia and Russia generally hesitated to incite or join collective actions that could challenge the incumbent regimes. In addition, Gagik Tsarukyan (Armenia) and Mikhail Prokhorov (Russia) performed a wavering and untrustworthy opposition to the main leader of the incumbent regime by not standing in crucial elections on fateful occasions. These weaknesses enabled the presidents of Armenia and Russia to neutralize them as political threats and further secure their grip on the regime (hence, H2a is supported). In stark contrast, Bidzina Ivanishvili (Georgia) and Petro Poroshenko (Ukraine) performed a relatively more truthful opposition to their main rivals in Georgia and Ukraine, respectively. For instance, Ivanishvili’s organizational resources were subject to frequent and intensive attacks by the authorities in Georgia. However, Ivanishvili focused specifically on improving his personal reputation and credibility as a rival as soon as he formally entered the Georgian political scene. Likewise, Poroshenko made substantial efforts to improve his reputation and organizational resources. As in the case of the other three oligarchs, these efforts were most prominent close to national elections. The evidence from this thesis also indicates that Poroshenko has been well entrenched in the government since he headed the Central Bank of Ukraine, Ministries for Foreign Affairs, and Economic Development and Trade. This most likely explains why his organizational resources were not subject to the same frequency of attacks by the authorities in contrast to the

164

associated with normative support for democracy across all post-Soviet pseudo-democracies; (H1a)—The negative effect of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution on normative support for democracy will be more pronounced in countries with a greater degree of state power concentration in the hands of the regime. Two additional hypotheses concerned the second research question about the interaction between oligarchs and incumbents and mass opinion: (H2)—All individual, politically motivated rival oligarchs operate with the intention of enhancing public opinion about themselves by developing their personal reputation, organizational capacity and by performing a credible opposition to the regime and (H2a)—We should expect that all pseudo-democratic regimes abuse their state power against the rival oligarch. However, a stronger state power enables the authorities to damage the credibility of the rival oligarch primarily by making him appear unpredictable and unreliable in the eyes of the public (H2a). This enables the main regime leader to elevate himself above key rival oligarchs and thereby improve the prospects for successful regime maintenance. Next, I provide a condensed summary of the findings of this thesis with a primary focus on the role of oligarchs. A section then follows where I discuss these results in the framework of prior research with regard to potential alternative explanations. I will also discuss the implications of the findings of this thesis for the literature on regime survival and democratization in addition to focusing on how oligarchs influence regime survival or drifts to democratization in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Finally, this thesis will conclude with a discussion of suggested areas for future research.

Results The main argument of this thesis is that both pseudo-democratic rulers and politically motivated, rival oligarchs devote considerable time and resources to swaying mass opinion in their struggles to secure their power or overturn the regime, respectively. The first research question about the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and the public’s normative regime support was mainly investigated in the chapter (Chapter four) exploring normative democratic support in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine). The evidence showed that ordinary people’s normative support for democracy wanes when oligarchs’ strategic, political interests systematically have precedence over those of the average citizen (H1 is supported). Moreover and as expected by this thesis, people’s perceptions of unfair wealth distribution in their country have a substantial negative influence on their normative support for democracy as the best form of government. Interestingly and in contrast to the study expectations, the level of state power does not have any significant, amplifying effect on these linkages. Nor do the concentration of state power

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oligarchs on the public administration and capture of the political system in Ukraine. However and as we would expect from the main theoretical argument of this thesis, the students seem to express increasingly more positive attitudes towards oligarchs as a group if they or someone in their family received material support from the oligarchs. What is also interesting is that student attitudes towards oligarchs as a group become increasingly more positive if they perceive that some oligarchs are actively counteracting corruption or at least show clear signs of willing to do so.

The final empirical chapter has also examined the determinants of student opinion towards individual oligarchs in Ukraine—namely Rinat Akhmetov, Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Petro Poroshenko. These three oligarchs have arguably been among the most politically visible and influential oligarchs in the contemporary political life of Ukraine. By looking more closely at the determinants of attitudes towards these oligarchs, the goal of this thesis has been to explore the differences in mechanisms that influence attitudes towards oligarchs as a group and individuals, respectively. Key findings suggest that student opinion towards Akhmetov and Kolomoyskyi is negatively influenced by their perceptions of oligarchs as a group being corrupt and promoting corruption in Ukraine. Interestingly, this linkage was not significant in the regression model explaining student opinion towards Poroshenko. In addition, the regression models explaining university student attitudes towards Akhmetov and Kolomoyskyi revealed that thinking of unfair concentration of wealth in the hands of the oligarchs is not a significant determinant. In contrast, perceiving an unfair concentration of wealth in the hands of oligarchs negatively influences student attitudes towards Poroshenko. Moreover, student disfavor of Poroshenko grows significantly with believing that oligarchs engage in politics for their narrow material interests, when they conceive of oligarchs’ wealth accumulation process as unfair and illegitimate as well as perceive that bureaucrats are primarily running the errands for the oligarchs. A reasonable guess for the difference of the results between the three oligarchs may be the fact that Poroshenko has been more prominent politically during the post-Soviet era. We should here not forget the fact the Poroshenko was the president of Ukraine during the time of data collection in Kyiv. In sum, these are the possible reasons why the more politically prominent factors predict student opinion about Poroshenko. Lastly and surprisingly, the variable of receiving grants from an oligarch’s charity fund is only statistically significant in the regression model for Akhmetov (the variable is positively correlated with perceiving Akhmetov as an honest and politically credible person). This variable, hence, is not a significant explanatory factor in the models for the two remaining Ukrainian oligarchs. This difference is somewhat surprising since all the three oligarchs have actively provided philanthropic support through their charity funds (iPressUA, 2014; Childbrand, 2014; Kostiuchenko & Söderbaum, 2014). However, a very likely explanation for this difference might be the fact that the Rinat Akhmetov Foundation has been more visible

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experience of the three remaining oligarchs. However, reports showed that the Kremlin, which early noticed his political ambitions to gain the ultimate political power, attempted to persuade him to get Ukraine back in the Russian sphere of influence. To that end, the Russian authorities blocked his confectionary business in Russia due to accusations of selling tainted products. Moreover, his confectionary factories were eventually seized or forced to close in Crimea and Russia.

The final research question (studied in Chapter six) was concerned with how the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs plays out in situations where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change. It is an explorative study of Ukraine, a country where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change. The chapter first offered a thorough review of the secondary literature on Ukraine with particular regard to the aforementioned interaction between oligarchs and incumbents immediately before and after the two color revolutions in 2004 and 2014. This account provided important insights into the Ukrainian context for the subsequent analysis of survey data from Kyiv tapping into university students’ perceptions about oligarchs and their role in politics. According to key country experts, influential oligarchs and their clans had been key political players that wielded an extraordinary influence on the political life of Ukraine. The major implication of this influence was that mass opinion about them has also been central to key struggles for political power in Ukraine. In fact, while one of the major topics that contributed to popular uprising during the Orange Revolution was the public’s dissatisfaction with the oligarchs, the Euromaidan movement was more specifically oriented towards the then President Viktor Yanukovych’s abrupt U-turn with regard to the ratification of the Association Agreement with the EU. Yet, the oligarchic clans’ substantial recourse to behind-the-scene-arrangements has characterized Ukraine’s post-Euromaidan politics. These aspects served as an important starting point and context for the subsequent analysis of the survey data from Kyiv. The major reason for focusing on university student attitudes was to gain a better understanding of the determinants of public opinion about oligarchs from such a well-informed and politically active category of citizens given the oligarchs’ crucial importance for regime trajectories. The results from the survey in Kyiv offered intriguing insights into how the competition for power between oligarchs and incumbents plays out in Ukraine given the centrality of mass opinion and state power in the hands of the regime. As expected, evidence from this chapter entails that students harbor negative attitudes towards oligarchs as a group. The main explanation for this finding seems to be related to the fact the students perceive that oligarchs acquired their vast wealth unfair. Moreover, this aspect also appears to be the major reason for why students generally do not consider oligarchs as a legitimate group of political players. Other key aspects that explain Kyiv students’ disfavor of oligarchs as a group is their perceptions of oligarchs as encouraging corruption, the major influence of

167

oligarchs on the public administration and capture of the political system in Ukraine. However and as we would expect from the main theoretical argument of this thesis, the students seem to express increasingly more positive attitudes towards oligarchs as a group if they or someone in their family received material support from the oligarchs. What is also interesting is that student attitudes towards oligarchs as a group become increasingly more positive if they perceive that some oligarchs are actively counteracting corruption or at least show clear signs of willing to do so.

The final empirical chapter has also examined the determinants of student opinion towards individual oligarchs in Ukraine—namely Rinat Akhmetov, Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Petro Poroshenko. These three oligarchs have arguably been among the most politically visible and influential oligarchs in the contemporary political life of Ukraine. By looking more closely at the determinants of attitudes towards these oligarchs, the goal of this thesis has been to explore the differences in mechanisms that influence attitudes towards oligarchs as a group and individuals, respectively. Key findings suggest that student opinion towards Akhmetov and Kolomoyskyi is negatively influenced by their perceptions of oligarchs as a group being corrupt and promoting corruption in Ukraine. Interestingly, this linkage was not significant in the regression model explaining student opinion towards Poroshenko. In addition, the regression models explaining university student attitudes towards Akhmetov and Kolomoyskyi revealed that thinking of unfair concentration of wealth in the hands of the oligarchs is not a significant determinant. In contrast, perceiving an unfair concentration of wealth in the hands of oligarchs negatively influences student attitudes towards Poroshenko. Moreover, student disfavor of Poroshenko grows significantly with believing that oligarchs engage in politics for their narrow material interests, when they conceive of oligarchs’ wealth accumulation process as unfair and illegitimate as well as perceive that bureaucrats are primarily running the errands for the oligarchs. A reasonable guess for the difference of the results between the three oligarchs may be the fact that Poroshenko has been more prominent politically during the post-Soviet era. We should here not forget the fact the Poroshenko was the president of Ukraine during the time of data collection in Kyiv. In sum, these are the possible reasons why the more politically prominent factors predict student opinion about Poroshenko. Lastly and surprisingly, the variable of receiving grants from an oligarch’s charity fund is only statistically significant in the regression model for Akhmetov (the variable is positively correlated with perceiving Akhmetov as an honest and politically credible person). This variable, hence, is not a significant explanatory factor in the models for the two remaining Ukrainian oligarchs. This difference is somewhat surprising since all the three oligarchs have actively provided philanthropic support through their charity funds (iPressUA, 2014; Childbrand, 2014; Kostiuchenko & Söderbaum, 2014). However, a very likely explanation for this difference might be the fact that the Rinat Akhmetov Foundation has been more visible

166

experience of the three remaining oligarchs. However, reports showed that the Kremlin, which early noticed his political ambitions to gain the ultimate political power, attempted to persuade him to get Ukraine back in the Russian sphere of influence. To that end, the Russian authorities blocked his confectionary business in Russia due to accusations of selling tainted products. Moreover, his confectionary factories were eventually seized or forced to close in Crimea and Russia.

The final research question (studied in Chapter six) was concerned with how the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs plays out in situations where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change. It is an explorative study of Ukraine, a country where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change. The chapter first offered a thorough review of the secondary literature on Ukraine with particular regard to the aforementioned interaction between oligarchs and incumbents immediately before and after the two color revolutions in 2004 and 2014. This account provided important insights into the Ukrainian context for the subsequent analysis of survey data from Kyiv tapping into university students’ perceptions about oligarchs and their role in politics. According to key country experts, influential oligarchs and their clans had been key political players that wielded an extraordinary influence on the political life of Ukraine. The major implication of this influence was that mass opinion about them has also been central to key struggles for political power in Ukraine. In fact, while one of the major topics that contributed to popular uprising during the Orange Revolution was the public’s dissatisfaction with the oligarchs, the Euromaidan movement was more specifically oriented towards the then President Viktor Yanukovych’s abrupt U-turn with regard to the ratification of the Association Agreement with the EU. Yet, the oligarchic clans’ substantial recourse to behind-the-scene-arrangements has characterized Ukraine’s post-Euromaidan politics. These aspects served as an important starting point and context for the subsequent analysis of the survey data from Kyiv. The major reason for focusing on university student attitudes was to gain a better understanding of the determinants of public opinion about oligarchs from such a well-informed and politically active category of citizens given the oligarchs’ crucial importance for regime trajectories. The results from the survey in Kyiv offered intriguing insights into how the competition for power between oligarchs and incumbents plays out in Ukraine given the centrality of mass opinion and state power in the hands of the regime. As expected, evidence from this chapter entails that students harbor negative attitudes towards oligarchs as a group. The main explanation for this finding seems to be related to the fact the students perceive that oligarchs acquired their vast wealth unfair. Moreover, this aspect also appears to be the major reason for why students generally do not consider oligarchs as a legitimate group of political players. Other key aspects that explain Kyiv students’ disfavor of oligarchs as a group is their perceptions of oligarchs as encouraging corruption, the major influence of

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majority of citizens believe that an authoritarian leader who does not need to care about elections and legislative bodies is what is required in order to set things right in their country. This, indeed, is a very pessimistic and alarming finding for those who have thought that oligarchs could play a central role in advancing democracy (cf. Åslund, 2005).

Second, the analysis in Chapter five of the four oligarchs suggests that both politically motivated rival oligarchs as well as incumbents in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies make great efforts to sway public opinion in their struggles for power. As for the part of oligarchs in these crucial interactions, this thesis shows how individual, rival oligarchs focus on enhancing their reputation and organizational capacity in their struggle for power. The qualitative findings from the analysis of the four oligarchs’ political struggle show that they bolster their organizational capacity both to counter the incumbent regime’s abuse of state power and to develop their reputation and credibility as a rival. In fact, the findings suggest that oligarchs particularly aim at mass opinion in their struggle for power. However, this is what all pseudo-democratic incumbents appear to do as well. While all the four pseudo-democratic regimes abused their state power to counter the four rival oligarchs in the four countries under study, evidence from Armenia and Russia suggests a more nuanced understanding of these interactions. In particular, in both of these countries (with a greater degree of state power concentration in the hands of the regime), incumbents abused their state power in order to manipulate public opinion by damaging the reputation and credibility of the two rival oligarchs Gagik Tsarukyan (Armenia) and Mikhail Prokhorov (Russia). This thesis believes that the main regime leaders do so in order to elevate themselves above their powerful rivals. Doing so seems to be important in these pseudo-democracies due to politics being largely person-centered. Indeed, neutralizing influential rival oligarchs by damaging their reputation and credibility, I believe, is a previously overlooked, yet key regime maintenance tool in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (cf. Hale, 2015; Levitsky & Way, 2010a).

Third and relatedly, the findings of this thesis suggest that oligarchs played a crucial political role in the color revolutions of Ukraine (the two color revolutions toppled incumbent pseudo-democratic regimes). However, the survey analysis of Kyiv university students showed that they consider most oligarchs corrupt and harmful to the development of their political system. For this group of citizens, oligarchs’ unduly concentration of wealth disqualifies them from being legitimate political players in Ukraine. Thus, these findings point to the further aggravation of the preconditions for political democratization if people consider oligarchs—key players during the two color revolutions—as crooks who enrich themselves at the expense of the broad public. However, further evidence from this thesis suggests that people differentiate between oligarchs as group and individuals, which, at least hypothetically, paves the way for some rival oligarchs to make their bid for

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in also providing humanitarian help to refugees from the war zone in eastern Ukraine (Rinat Akhmetov Foundation, 2017). Taken together, evidence from the chapter suggests that oligarchs’ efforts to enhance their reputation and credibility may have different effects on mass opinion due the scope and discernibility of these efforts.

Discussion of the results and the implication of the findings How do the findings of this thesis contribute to the literature and its understanding of how oligarchs influence regime survival or drifts to democratization in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies? The overall findings point to a number of important aspects. First, mass opinion about the oligarchs as a group and individuals is a largely disregarded, yet essential factor for being able to understand the role of oligarchs in the regime trajectories of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies given the centrality of mass opinion and state power. Despite being a group in a continuous state of flux, oligarchs have been a prominent category of influential political and socio-economic players in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Oligarchs have generally concentrated a great deal of wealth in their own hands, which has not gone unnoticed among ordinary citizens. A substantial socio-economic disaster brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union, in which ordinary citizens came out as clear losers in contrast to most oligarchs as a group and individuals. This negative spiral has been ongoing virtually uninterruptedly to date. Such experiences, as I have attempted to show in this thesis, are among the most important factors that drive the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and normative regime support among the masses. Drawing from the findings of Chapter four, the first of the three empirical chapters, one can say that oligarchs play a negative role for such an important (attitudinal) precondition of democratization as mass support for democracy in principle. This thesis stresses that the attitudinal dimension of democratization is a major factor in understanding regime trajectories in this context with regard to how incumbent regimes maintain their power or safeguard themselves against gradual democratic development. More specifically, the results suggest that for an overwhelming majority of citizens in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (five out of a total of six pseudo-democratic countries are studied in this thesis), oligarchs’ actual influence on the political system to the detriment of the public at large and perceptions of unfair wealth concentration are seen as major issues. However, what is surprising is that most post-Soviet citizens, irrespective of the specific country context with regard to state power concentration in the hands of the regime, believe that a democratic form of government will not be able to solve the issues of oligarchs’ strategic interests having systematic precedence over those of the broad citizenry. Rather, the

169

majority of citizens believe that an authoritarian leader who does not need to care about elections and legislative bodies is what is required in order to set things right in their country. This, indeed, is a very pessimistic and alarming finding for those who have thought that oligarchs could play a central role in advancing democracy (cf. Åslund, 2005).

Second, the analysis in Chapter five of the four oligarchs suggests that both politically motivated rival oligarchs as well as incumbents in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies make great efforts to sway public opinion in their struggles for power. As for the part of oligarchs in these crucial interactions, this thesis shows how individual, rival oligarchs focus on enhancing their reputation and organizational capacity in their struggle for power. The qualitative findings from the analysis of the four oligarchs’ political struggle show that they bolster their organizational capacity both to counter the incumbent regime’s abuse of state power and to develop their reputation and credibility as a rival. In fact, the findings suggest that oligarchs particularly aim at mass opinion in their struggle for power. However, this is what all pseudo-democratic incumbents appear to do as well. While all the four pseudo-democratic regimes abused their state power to counter the four rival oligarchs in the four countries under study, evidence from Armenia and Russia suggests a more nuanced understanding of these interactions. In particular, in both of these countries (with a greater degree of state power concentration in the hands of the regime), incumbents abused their state power in order to manipulate public opinion by damaging the reputation and credibility of the two rival oligarchs Gagik Tsarukyan (Armenia) and Mikhail Prokhorov (Russia). This thesis believes that the main regime leaders do so in order to elevate themselves above their powerful rivals. Doing so seems to be important in these pseudo-democracies due to politics being largely person-centered. Indeed, neutralizing influential rival oligarchs by damaging their reputation and credibility, I believe, is a previously overlooked, yet key regime maintenance tool in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (cf. Hale, 2015; Levitsky & Way, 2010a).

Third and relatedly, the findings of this thesis suggest that oligarchs played a crucial political role in the color revolutions of Ukraine (the two color revolutions toppled incumbent pseudo-democratic regimes). However, the survey analysis of Kyiv university students showed that they consider most oligarchs corrupt and harmful to the development of their political system. For this group of citizens, oligarchs’ unduly concentration of wealth disqualifies them from being legitimate political players in Ukraine. Thus, these findings point to the further aggravation of the preconditions for political democratization if people consider oligarchs—key players during the two color revolutions—as crooks who enrich themselves at the expense of the broad public. However, further evidence from this thesis suggests that people differentiate between oligarchs as group and individuals, which, at least hypothetically, paves the way for some rival oligarchs to make their bid for

168

in also providing humanitarian help to refugees from the war zone in eastern Ukraine (Rinat Akhmetov Foundation, 2017). Taken together, evidence from the chapter suggests that oligarchs’ efforts to enhance their reputation and credibility may have different effects on mass opinion due the scope and discernibility of these efforts.

Discussion of the results and the implication of the findings How do the findings of this thesis contribute to the literature and its understanding of how oligarchs influence regime survival or drifts to democratization in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies? The overall findings point to a number of important aspects. First, mass opinion about the oligarchs as a group and individuals is a largely disregarded, yet essential factor for being able to understand the role of oligarchs in the regime trajectories of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies given the centrality of mass opinion and state power. Despite being a group in a continuous state of flux, oligarchs have been a prominent category of influential political and socio-economic players in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Oligarchs have generally concentrated a great deal of wealth in their own hands, which has not gone unnoticed among ordinary citizens. A substantial socio-economic disaster brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union, in which ordinary citizens came out as clear losers in contrast to most oligarchs as a group and individuals. This negative spiral has been ongoing virtually uninterruptedly to date. Such experiences, as I have attempted to show in this thesis, are among the most important factors that drive the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and normative regime support among the masses. Drawing from the findings of Chapter four, the first of the three empirical chapters, one can say that oligarchs play a negative role for such an important (attitudinal) precondition of democratization as mass support for democracy in principle. This thesis stresses that the attitudinal dimension of democratization is a major factor in understanding regime trajectories in this context with regard to how incumbent regimes maintain their power or safeguard themselves against gradual democratic development. More specifically, the results suggest that for an overwhelming majority of citizens in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (five out of a total of six pseudo-democratic countries are studied in this thesis), oligarchs’ actual influence on the political system to the detriment of the public at large and perceptions of unfair wealth concentration are seen as major issues. However, what is surprising is that most post-Soviet citizens, irrespective of the specific country context with regard to state power concentration in the hands of the regime, believe that a democratic form of government will not be able to solve the issues of oligarchs’ strategic interests having systematic precedence over those of the broad citizenry. Rather, the

171

successful regime maintenance in pseudo-democracies to the main regime leader’s popularity, my thesis adds important insights into this perspective. More specifically, one could discuss from the view of the alternative explanations that popular support for the main regime leader (higher support for Putin in contrast to weak support for Yanukovich) or major scandals (such as the Gldani prison scandal in Georgia, see Chapter five) essentially explain why some of the actors were more successful in maintaining their regime or ousting the pseudo-democratic regime leader. I, however, claim that my study clearly illustrates that all the four pseudo-democratic regimes under study in Chapter five, irrespective of their state power, made systematic efforts to damage the reputation of their main rival oligarch. What this study has shown in more detail (in contrast to prior research) is the fact that the rival oligarchs in Armenia and Russia (higher state power and UPF) hesitated to push their struggle for power to a new high, which clearly helped the incumbents to tarnish the rival’s reputation and political credibility. Indeed, one can also speculate whether or not regimes with greater state power employ powerful rival oligarchs as puppets in their political game to ensure their legitimacy due to some sort of behind-the-scene-agreements. While it is difficult for this thesis to make an irrefutable claim against such a possibility, most of the evidence revealed in this thesis still suggests that the two rival oligarchs’ failure in Armenia and Russia was most likely due to their systematic wavering on several fateful occasions with regard to popular protests and elections. This recurring wavering damaged the oligarch’s reputation even in light of powerful efforts to develop organizational strength and reputation. In other words, developing their organizational capacity (monetary, human, administrative and media resources) and reputation indeed appear to be key elements in oligarchs’ struggle for power against the incumbents. However, equally important for the oligarchs is to personally maintain their credibility through consistent political performance of opposition and to avoid appearing as an inept rival. In sum, these findings add additional insights into the scant literature with partial focus on the efforts pseudo-democratic regime leaders make in order to be looked upon as unrivaled and unparalleled leaders of the regime (Rose, Mishler & Munro, 2006: 193-195; Gel'man, 2010).

As to their possible influence on oligarchs, the role of Russia and the West has been somewhat downplayed in this thesis, which some may see as a possible limitation. In reviewing prior work on post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, I very early declared that I subscribe to the more dominant argument in prior studies stating that domestic factors are of much greater importance for understanding regime trajectories in this context than a primary focus on external influence from, for instance, Russia. This thesis does not ignore the importance of sophisticated propaganda tools and leverages that may have enabled the Kremlin to influence the actions of rival oligarchs in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies. At the time of writing, some serious investigations are taking place in the United States as to the extent of

170

power and regime change given their efforts to enhance their reputation and credibility of a rival to the regime. Bidzina Ivanishvili and Petro Poroshenko interacted relatively successfully with mass opinion in the face of state power abuse and despite being part of the detested group.

Finally, it is here also necessary to devote some attention to the strategies of the incumbents in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies. As shown in more detail earlier, all post-Soviet pseudo-democratic leaders continuously abused their state power to maintain an uneven playing field (UPF) in order to wear down their opposition. From the perspective of the regime, oligarchs are a crucial group of players who can neither be ignored nor given substantial power. As was clearly described in the empirical chapters, most pseudo-democratic regimes abused their state power by attacking the organizational resources of their rival oligarchs. For instance, in case of Georgia we could read evidence of the then President Mikheil Saakashvili banning ordinary people from financially supporting Ivanishvili’s political campaign. Saakashvili also employed his state power to prevent Ivanishvili from standing in election by revoking his Georgian citizenship. In the case of Armenia and Tsarukyan, we could similarly see that President Serzh Sargsyan abused his state power not only to damage the organizational capacity of Tsarukyan, but also to elevate himself above him by damaging his reputation and credibility as a rival. Hence, these examples suggest that state power and mass opinion are mutually related in post-Soviet regime trajectories of pseudo-democracies. By focusing on the importance of oligarchs, this thesis has attempted to illustrate some instances of that relationship.

The findings of this thesis can also be discussed in terms of possible limitations of this thesis’s main argument due to the predominance of alternative explanations in prior research. Initially, it is worth repeating that the aim of this thesis is not to explain why there have been different regime outcomes in general. This thesis has rather aimed its focus at studying and understanding the role of oligarchs in key processes of regime maintenance or democratization given the centrality of two competing explanations that point either to the crucial importance of mass opinion or state power. Concerning whether oligarchs’ political struggles are successful, some critics may argue that the difference in the level of state power itself accounts for the dissimilar outcomes of the four oligarchs’ political struggle (the focus of Chapter five). One such claim could be that relatively higher state power in the hands of the incumbent regimes in Armenia and Russia is what essentially enabled them to neutralize their rival oligarchs. My response to such a reasonable remark would be that a) my thesis has shown that pseudo-democratic regimes mainly seek to avoid using brutal repression and b) rather focus on tarnishing the reputation of the rival oligarchs primarily to show that there is a great shortage of potent and trustworthy rivals against them. Thus, this argument is a more nuanced perspective on the tools for regime maintenance in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. While key scholars of this field have attributed

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successful regime maintenance in pseudo-democracies to the main regime leader’s popularity, my thesis adds important insights into this perspective. More specifically, one could discuss from the view of the alternative explanations that popular support for the main regime leader (higher support for Putin in contrast to weak support for Yanukovich) or major scandals (such as the Gldani prison scandal in Georgia, see Chapter five) essentially explain why some of the actors were more successful in maintaining their regime or ousting the pseudo-democratic regime leader. I, however, claim that my study clearly illustrates that all the four pseudo-democratic regimes under study in Chapter five, irrespective of their state power, made systematic efforts to damage the reputation of their main rival oligarch. What this study has shown in more detail (in contrast to prior research) is the fact that the rival oligarchs in Armenia and Russia (higher state power and UPF) hesitated to push their struggle for power to a new high, which clearly helped the incumbents to tarnish the rival’s reputation and political credibility. Indeed, one can also speculate whether or not regimes with greater state power employ powerful rival oligarchs as puppets in their political game to ensure their legitimacy due to some sort of behind-the-scene-agreements. While it is difficult for this thesis to make an irrefutable claim against such a possibility, most of the evidence revealed in this thesis still suggests that the two rival oligarchs’ failure in Armenia and Russia was most likely due to their systematic wavering on several fateful occasions with regard to popular protests and elections. This recurring wavering damaged the oligarch’s reputation even in light of powerful efforts to develop organizational strength and reputation. In other words, developing their organizational capacity (monetary, human, administrative and media resources) and reputation indeed appear to be key elements in oligarchs’ struggle for power against the incumbents. However, equally important for the oligarchs is to personally maintain their credibility through consistent political performance of opposition and to avoid appearing as an inept rival. In sum, these findings add additional insights into the scant literature with partial focus on the efforts pseudo-democratic regime leaders make in order to be looked upon as unrivaled and unparalleled leaders of the regime (Rose, Mishler & Munro, 2006: 193-195; Gel'man, 2010).

As to their possible influence on oligarchs, the role of Russia and the West has been somewhat downplayed in this thesis, which some may see as a possible limitation. In reviewing prior work on post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, I very early declared that I subscribe to the more dominant argument in prior studies stating that domestic factors are of much greater importance for understanding regime trajectories in this context than a primary focus on external influence from, for instance, Russia. This thesis does not ignore the importance of sophisticated propaganda tools and leverages that may have enabled the Kremlin to influence the actions of rival oligarchs in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies. At the time of writing, some serious investigations are taking place in the United States as to the extent of

170

power and regime change given their efforts to enhance their reputation and credibility of a rival to the regime. Bidzina Ivanishvili and Petro Poroshenko interacted relatively successfully with mass opinion in the face of state power abuse and despite being part of the detested group.

Finally, it is here also necessary to devote some attention to the strategies of the incumbents in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies. As shown in more detail earlier, all post-Soviet pseudo-democratic leaders continuously abused their state power to maintain an uneven playing field (UPF) in order to wear down their opposition. From the perspective of the regime, oligarchs are a crucial group of players who can neither be ignored nor given substantial power. As was clearly described in the empirical chapters, most pseudo-democratic regimes abused their state power by attacking the organizational resources of their rival oligarchs. For instance, in case of Georgia we could read evidence of the then President Mikheil Saakashvili banning ordinary people from financially supporting Ivanishvili’s political campaign. Saakashvili also employed his state power to prevent Ivanishvili from standing in election by revoking his Georgian citizenship. In the case of Armenia and Tsarukyan, we could similarly see that President Serzh Sargsyan abused his state power not only to damage the organizational capacity of Tsarukyan, but also to elevate himself above him by damaging his reputation and credibility as a rival. Hence, these examples suggest that state power and mass opinion are mutually related in post-Soviet regime trajectories of pseudo-democracies. By focusing on the importance of oligarchs, this thesis has attempted to illustrate some instances of that relationship.

The findings of this thesis can also be discussed in terms of possible limitations of this thesis’s main argument due to the predominance of alternative explanations in prior research. Initially, it is worth repeating that the aim of this thesis is not to explain why there have been different regime outcomes in general. This thesis has rather aimed its focus at studying and understanding the role of oligarchs in key processes of regime maintenance or democratization given the centrality of two competing explanations that point either to the crucial importance of mass opinion or state power. Concerning whether oligarchs’ political struggles are successful, some critics may argue that the difference in the level of state power itself accounts for the dissimilar outcomes of the four oligarchs’ political struggle (the focus of Chapter five). One such claim could be that relatively higher state power in the hands of the incumbent regimes in Armenia and Russia is what essentially enabled them to neutralize their rival oligarchs. My response to such a reasonable remark would be that a) my thesis has shown that pseudo-democratic regimes mainly seek to avoid using brutal repression and b) rather focus on tarnishing the reputation of the rival oligarchs primarily to show that there is a great shortage of potent and trustworthy rivals against them. Thus, this argument is a more nuanced perspective on the tools for regime maintenance in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. While key scholars of this field have attributed

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Areas for future research This study has focused on understanding the role of oligarchs for regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies given the two competing explanations in the literature. However, there are many pseudo-democracies in other parts of the world and the inclusion of more pseudo-democracies outside the post-Soviet space is necessary to generalize the results of this thesis. This suggestion of broadening the study area is well in line with recent discussions in pertinent literature on the regime trajectories in the post-Soviet context. In fact, key experts in this field still seem to disagree on whether a regime’s state power (Way, 2015, 2017) or the expectations of the main regime leader’s political future and popularity primarily account for different regime trajectories (Hale, 2017). One way of solving this puzzle would be to examine the veracity of the aforementioned explanations for differing regime trajectories in post-Soviet dynamics by applying them to cases outside the post-Soviet context (Hale, 2017: 583). Moreover, I have shown that focusing on the role of oligarchs is a necessary aspect to account for in solving the aforementioned puzzle.

Thus, an important path ahead is to expand this study in time and context. Indeed, the results of this thesis evidence that public perceptions about oligarchs are intimately connected with people’s general experiences of the oligarchs’ performances as a group and individuals. In this light, it would therefore be necessary to broaden our focus to other pseudo-democracies in the world in order to understand whether the offered understanding of the interactions between oligarchs and incumbent regimes is valid in other contexts as well. In my view, this would indeed be the case due the fact that research on contemporary oligarchs, for instance in Southeast Asia and Latin America, suggests that wealth concentration in the hands of a few, well-heeled oligarchs is increasingly becoming a substantial factor in enabling or hampering incumbent elites’ struggles for maintaining their regime by safeguarding it against attacks by popular demands for democratic reforms (Hutchcroft, 1991; Singh, 2000; Robison & Hadiz, 2005; Winters, 2013; Winters, 2011; Johnston, 2014). Therefore, an important step forwards would be to check the veracity of this thesis’s main arguments in the aforementioned context of pseudo-democracies since regimes there have shown similar regime patterns and levels of oligarchic dominance over their economies (Winters, 2011; Johnston, 2014).

Another important aspect that merits greater investigatory attention is the perceptions of oligarchs themselves about the role of public opinion about them for regime trajectories. Conducting elite interviews with some of the current or past influential oligarchs would add more insights into the role of mass opinion in elite struggles for power. Both the comparative chapter on the four oligarchs as well as the detailed chapter on Ukraine showed that people seem to distinguish between oligarchs as a group and individuals. An

172

Russian impact on the 2016 presidential election by means of social media and fake news. Most anecdotal, although highly sensible, explanations suggest that such negative influence and manipulative efforts did indeed take place. As a successor of the Soviet KGB, the Russian security services have incrementally advanced their manipulative tools to a degree that makes it much harder for social scientists to be able to recognize sophisticated manipulations on the web. Taken together, I emphasize once more that I do not preclude the possibility that the Kremlin could have manipulated the political scene and the actions of rival oligarchs behind the stage. However, I have made every possible effort to control for its possible influence and to clarify that I subscribe to those dominant branches of prior research that assign the greatest importance to domestic factors as discussed earlier.

The findings of this study have also societal and policy implications. In particular, they suggest that oligarchs are key political players whose behavior has substantial implications for the prospects of attitudinal as well as political democratization. One of the most important societal and policy implications is that oligarchs seem to fill an important political void left by dysfunctional or disregarded political parties in a socio-political context marked by patronal politics and personal exchanges. The general suggestions, for example with regard to EU projects aimed at strengthening the civil society, perhaps need to be revised if we really want to be able to strengthen the preconditions for democratization in this context. In fact, most oligarchs in this context (as expected) are primarily interested in defending their material wealth by engaging in politics, developing their organizational strength and popularity among ordinary citizens. Since this study finds that oligarchs in countries with higher state power have recurrently wavered from their opposition to the incumbent regime on fateful occasions, the EU and other influential international policy-makers could benefit from paying greater attention to strengthening the political democratization processes by providing greater support for rival oligarchs. The main reason is that evidence from this thesis indicates that they have played a critical role in ousting pseudo-democratic regimes whose leaders desperately clung onto the power. In fact, the close contact between some crucial oligarchs, EU bureaucrats and Western ambassadors in the wake of the Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 seem to lend support for policy changes in the proposed direction. Yet and as discussed in more detail elsewhere in this thesis, domestic factors are more decisive than external pressures and aid with regard to influencing regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (Solonenko, 2009; Simão, 2012; but see Tansey, Koehler & Schmotz, 2016). Therefore, Western political aid needs to be complemented with programs that can enhance oligarchs’ low level of legitimacy in the eyes of the broad masses in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies.

173

Areas for future research This study has focused on understanding the role of oligarchs for regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies given the two competing explanations in the literature. However, there are many pseudo-democracies in other parts of the world and the inclusion of more pseudo-democracies outside the post-Soviet space is necessary to generalize the results of this thesis. This suggestion of broadening the study area is well in line with recent discussions in pertinent literature on the regime trajectories in the post-Soviet context. In fact, key experts in this field still seem to disagree on whether a regime’s state power (Way, 2015, 2017) or the expectations of the main regime leader’s political future and popularity primarily account for different regime trajectories (Hale, 2017). One way of solving this puzzle would be to examine the veracity of the aforementioned explanations for differing regime trajectories in post-Soviet dynamics by applying them to cases outside the post-Soviet context (Hale, 2017: 583). Moreover, I have shown that focusing on the role of oligarchs is a necessary aspect to account for in solving the aforementioned puzzle.

Thus, an important path ahead is to expand this study in time and context. Indeed, the results of this thesis evidence that public perceptions about oligarchs are intimately connected with people’s general experiences of the oligarchs’ performances as a group and individuals. In this light, it would therefore be necessary to broaden our focus to other pseudo-democracies in the world in order to understand whether the offered understanding of the interactions between oligarchs and incumbent regimes is valid in other contexts as well. In my view, this would indeed be the case due the fact that research on contemporary oligarchs, for instance in Southeast Asia and Latin America, suggests that wealth concentration in the hands of a few, well-heeled oligarchs is increasingly becoming a substantial factor in enabling or hampering incumbent elites’ struggles for maintaining their regime by safeguarding it against attacks by popular demands for democratic reforms (Hutchcroft, 1991; Singh, 2000; Robison & Hadiz, 2005; Winters, 2013; Winters, 2011; Johnston, 2014). Therefore, an important step forwards would be to check the veracity of this thesis’s main arguments in the aforementioned context of pseudo-democracies since regimes there have shown similar regime patterns and levels of oligarchic dominance over their economies (Winters, 2011; Johnston, 2014).

Another important aspect that merits greater investigatory attention is the perceptions of oligarchs themselves about the role of public opinion about them for regime trajectories. Conducting elite interviews with some of the current or past influential oligarchs would add more insights into the role of mass opinion in elite struggles for power. Both the comparative chapter on the four oligarchs as well as the detailed chapter on Ukraine showed that people seem to distinguish between oligarchs as a group and individuals. An

172

Russian impact on the 2016 presidential election by means of social media and fake news. Most anecdotal, although highly sensible, explanations suggest that such negative influence and manipulative efforts did indeed take place. As a successor of the Soviet KGB, the Russian security services have incrementally advanced their manipulative tools to a degree that makes it much harder for social scientists to be able to recognize sophisticated manipulations on the web. Taken together, I emphasize once more that I do not preclude the possibility that the Kremlin could have manipulated the political scene and the actions of rival oligarchs behind the stage. However, I have made every possible effort to control for its possible influence and to clarify that I subscribe to those dominant branches of prior research that assign the greatest importance to domestic factors as discussed earlier.

The findings of this study have also societal and policy implications. In particular, they suggest that oligarchs are key political players whose behavior has substantial implications for the prospects of attitudinal as well as political democratization. One of the most important societal and policy implications is that oligarchs seem to fill an important political void left by dysfunctional or disregarded political parties in a socio-political context marked by patronal politics and personal exchanges. The general suggestions, for example with regard to EU projects aimed at strengthening the civil society, perhaps need to be revised if we really want to be able to strengthen the preconditions for democratization in this context. In fact, most oligarchs in this context (as expected) are primarily interested in defending their material wealth by engaging in politics, developing their organizational strength and popularity among ordinary citizens. Since this study finds that oligarchs in countries with higher state power have recurrently wavered from their opposition to the incumbent regime on fateful occasions, the EU and other influential international policy-makers could benefit from paying greater attention to strengthening the political democratization processes by providing greater support for rival oligarchs. The main reason is that evidence from this thesis indicates that they have played a critical role in ousting pseudo-democratic regimes whose leaders desperately clung onto the power. In fact, the close contact between some crucial oligarchs, EU bureaucrats and Western ambassadors in the wake of the Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 seem to lend support for policy changes in the proposed direction. Yet and as discussed in more detail elsewhere in this thesis, domestic factors are more decisive than external pressures and aid with regard to influencing regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (Solonenko, 2009; Simão, 2012; but see Tansey, Koehler & Schmotz, 2016). Therefore, Western political aid needs to be complemented with programs that can enhance oligarchs’ low level of legitimacy in the eyes of the broad masses in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies.

175

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A third venue for future research is to try to investigate how elite and mass-level opinion about the oligarchs interact and the implications of this interrelationship for the preconditions for gradual democratization or successful regime survival. Overall, future studies based on the aforementioned suggestions would further advance our understanding of how elites struggling for power make capital of opinion in their political game.

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A third venue for future research is to try to investigate how elite and mass-level opinion about the oligarchs interact and the implications of this interrelationship for the preconditions for gradual democratization or successful regime survival. Overall, future studies based on the aforementioned suggestions would further advance our understanding of how elites struggling for power make capital of opinion in their political game.

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Censor (2009f), Poroshenko ponjal, chto ukrainskie politiki - jeto stado baranov, okruzhennye volkami, http://censor.net.ua/news/82967/poroshenko_ponyal_chto_ukrainskie_politiki__eto_stado_baranov_okrujennye_volkami, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2009g), Poroshenko ustroit Wizz Air razbor poletov iz-za hamskogo otnoshenija k passazhiram, http://censor.net.ua/news/108468/poroshenko_ustroit_wizz_air_razbor_poletov_izza_hamskogo_otnosheniya_k_passajiram, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2009h), Poroshenko uverjaet, chto vse svoi vizity za granicu oplachivaet iz sobstvennogo karmana, http://censor.net.ua/news/109072/poroshenko_uveryaet_chto_vse_svoi_vizity_za_granitsu_oplachivaet_iz_sobstvennogo_karmana, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2009i), Poroshenko: My ne sobiraemsja idti kuda-to, chtoby razozlit' Rossiju, http://censor.net.ua/news/103471/poroshenko_quotmy_ne_sobiraemsya_idti_kudato_chtoby_razozlit_rossiyuquot, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2009j), Poroshenko: Ukraina mozhet vstupit' v NATO v techenie vsego odnogo goda, http://censor.net.ua/news/106902/poroshenko_ukraina_mojet_vstupit_v_nato_v_techenie_vsego_odnogo_goda, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2010a), Janukovich s Poroshenko, Levochkinym i German uletel v Brjussel', http://censor.net.ua/news/114372/yanukovich_s_poroshenko_levochkinym_i_german_uletel_v_bryussel, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2010b), Poroshenko ponabljudal za Janukovichem: Prezident projavljaet bol'shuju gotovnost' k reformam, a na soveshhanijah govorit lish' na ukrainskom, http://censor.net.ua/news/114506/poroshenko_ponablyudal_za_yanukovichem_prezident_proyavlyaet_bolshuyu_gotovnost_k_reformam_a_na_soveschaniyah, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2010c), Poroshenko raskritikoval Kabmin za korrupcionnyj mehanizm, http://censor.net.ua/news/136456/poroshenko_raskritikoval_kabmin_za_korruptsionnyyi_mehanizm, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2010d), Poroshenko rasskazal, pochemu ljudi vyshli na akciju protesta, objasniv raznicu mezhdu nyneshnim i pomaranchevym majdanami, http://censor.net.ua/news/143083/poroshenko_rasskazal_pochemu_lyudi_vyshli_na_aktsiyu_protesta_obyasniv_raznitsu_mejdu_nyneshnim_i_pomaranchevym, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

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Censor (2011a), Politiku sdelali biznesom i zarabatyvajut na jetom bol'she, chem ljubye biznesmeny, – Poroshenko o nardepah, http://censor.net.ua/news/187363/politiku_sdelali_biznesom_i_zarabatyvayut_na_etom_bolshe_chem_lyubye_biznesmeny_poroshenko_o_nardepah, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2011b), Poroshenko ne hochet v Prezidenty - post ne udovletvorjaet ego ambicij, http://censor.net.ua/news/192734/poroshenko_ne_hochet_v_prezidenty_post_ne_udovletvoryaet_ego_ambitsiyi, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2011c), Poroshenko ob izmenenii izbiratel'nogo zakona: Jeto real'naja opasnost' dlja vsej strany i dlja kazhdogo ukrainca, http://censor.net.ua/news/186703/poroshenko_ob_izmenenii_izbiratelnogo_zakona_eto_realnaya_opasnost_dlya_vseyi_strany_i_dlya_kajdogo, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2011d), Poroshenko prorochit novyj Majdan: On uzhe ne budet v forme 2004 goda, kogda ljudi matom ne rugalis', http://censor.net.ua/news/160652/poroshenko_prorochit_novyyi_mayidan_on_uje_ne_budet_v_forme_2004_goda_kogda_lyudi_matom_ne_rugalis, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2011e), Poroshenko schitaet, chto Ahmetov – s vavkoj v golove, http://censor.net.ua/news/187407/poroshenko_schitaet_chto_ahmetov_s_vavkoyi_v_golove, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012a), Janukovich naznachil Poroshenko upravljajushhim banka, http://censor.net.ua/news/209545/yanukovich_naznachil_poroshenko_upravlyayuschim_banka, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012b), Janukovich o Poroshenko: Ego kandidaturu predlozhil Azarov, teper' zhdem ot nego plana dejstvij, http://censor.net.ua/news/198225/yanukovich_o_poroshenko_ego_kandidaturu_predlojil_azarov_teper_jdem_ot_nego_plana_deyistviyi, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012c), Nel'zja byt' chastichno beremennym, - Poroshenko o strategii vlasti po sotrudnichestvu s Tamozhennym sojuzom, http://censor.net.ua/news/227305/nelzya_byt_chastichno_beremennym_poroshenko_o_strategii_vlasti_po_sotrudnichestvu_s_tamojennym_soyuzom, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012d), Nuzhno sokrashhat' razryv mezhdu bogatymi i bednymi... Odna lish' blagotvoritel'nost' ne pomozhet, - Poroshenko, http://censor.net.ua/news/195500/nujno_sokraschat_razryv_mejdu_bogatymi_i_be

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Censor (2009f), Poroshenko ponjal, chto ukrainskie politiki - jeto stado baranov, okruzhennye volkami, http://censor.net.ua/news/82967/poroshenko_ponyal_chto_ukrainskie_politiki__eto_stado_baranov_okrujennye_volkami, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2009g), Poroshenko ustroit Wizz Air razbor poletov iz-za hamskogo otnoshenija k passazhiram, http://censor.net.ua/news/108468/poroshenko_ustroit_wizz_air_razbor_poletov_izza_hamskogo_otnosheniya_k_passajiram, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2009h), Poroshenko uverjaet, chto vse svoi vizity za granicu oplachivaet iz sobstvennogo karmana, http://censor.net.ua/news/109072/poroshenko_uveryaet_chto_vse_svoi_vizity_za_granitsu_oplachivaet_iz_sobstvennogo_karmana, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2009i), Poroshenko: My ne sobiraemsja idti kuda-to, chtoby razozlit' Rossiju, http://censor.net.ua/news/103471/poroshenko_quotmy_ne_sobiraemsya_idti_kudato_chtoby_razozlit_rossiyuquot, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2009j), Poroshenko: Ukraina mozhet vstupit' v NATO v techenie vsego odnogo goda, http://censor.net.ua/news/106902/poroshenko_ukraina_mojet_vstupit_v_nato_v_techenie_vsego_odnogo_goda, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2010a), Janukovich s Poroshenko, Levochkinym i German uletel v Brjussel', http://censor.net.ua/news/114372/yanukovich_s_poroshenko_levochkinym_i_german_uletel_v_bryussel, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2010b), Poroshenko ponabljudal za Janukovichem: Prezident projavljaet bol'shuju gotovnost' k reformam, a na soveshhanijah govorit lish' na ukrainskom, http://censor.net.ua/news/114506/poroshenko_ponablyudal_za_yanukovichem_prezident_proyavlyaet_bolshuyu_gotovnost_k_reformam_a_na_soveschaniyah, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2010c), Poroshenko raskritikoval Kabmin za korrupcionnyj mehanizm, http://censor.net.ua/news/136456/poroshenko_raskritikoval_kabmin_za_korruptsionnyyi_mehanizm, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2010d), Poroshenko rasskazal, pochemu ljudi vyshli na akciju protesta, objasniv raznicu mezhdu nyneshnim i pomaranchevym majdanami, http://censor.net.ua/news/143083/poroshenko_rasskazal_pochemu_lyudi_vyshli_na_aktsiyu_protesta_obyasniv_raznitsu_mejdu_nyneshnim_i_pomaranchevym, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

187

http://censor.net.ua/news/201363/poroshenko_dlya_prozrachnosti_protsedur_goszakupok_privlechem_ukrainskih_navalnyh, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012n), Poroshenko: Ja soglasilsja stat' ministrom, chtoby zashhitit' biznes, http://censor.net.ua/news/201368/poroshenko_ya_soglasilsya_stat_ministrom_chtoby_zaschitit_biznes, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012o), Poroshenko: Moja pozicija po prigovoram Timoshenko i Lucenko ne izmenilas', http://censor.net.ua/news/201356/poroshenko_moya_pozitsiya_po_prigovoram_timoshenko_i_lutsenko_ne_izmenilas, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012p), Poroshenko: Pravitel'stvo dolzhno platit' nalog na roskosh' v pervuju ochered', http://censor.net.ua/news/208400/poroshenko_pravitelstvo_doljno_platit_nalog_na_roskosh_v_pervuyu_ochered, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012q), Prokuratura ser'ezno zanjalas' korporaciej Poroshenko: idut proverki, http://censor.net.ua/news/207492/prokuratura_serezno_zanyalas_korporatsieyi_poroshenko_idut_proverki, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012r), Syn Poroshenko v 26 let stal vice-konsulom v Kitae i uzhe ushel so sluzhby, http://censor.net.ua/news/205768/syn_poroshenko_v_26_let_stal_vitsekonsulom_v_kitae_i_uje_ushel_so_slujby, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012s), Uroven' otnoshenij mezhdu Ukrainoj i ES nahoditsja na samom nizkom urovne za poslednie gody, - Poroshenko, http://censor.net.ua/news/205290/uroven_otnosheniyi_mejdu_ukrainoyi_i_es_nahoditsya_na_samom_nizkom_urovne_za_poslednie_gody_poroshenko, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2013a), Dlja biznesa ne tak strashna Rossija, kak ukrainskie siloviki i nalogovaja, - Poroshenko, http://censor.net.ua/news/259275/dlya_biznesa_ne_tak_strashna_rossiya_kak_ukrainskie_siloviki_i_nalogovaya_poroshenko, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2013b), Iz-za rossijskogo zapreta Roshen sokrashhaet personal, http://censor.net.ua/news/258468/izza_rossiyiskogo_zapreta_roshen_sokraschaet_personal, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2013c), “Ja znaju tochno, kakim budet sledujushhee predlozhenie Rossii Janukovichu - status nabljudatelja v Tamozhennom sojuze”, - Poroshenko,

186

dnymi_odna_lish_blagotvoritelnost_ne_pomojet_poroshenko, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012e), Poroshenko budet ballotirovat'sja v VR: Ja poobeshhal vinnichannam, http://censor.net.ua/news/201360/poroshenko_budet_ballotirovatsya_v_vr_ya_poobeschal_vinnichannam, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012f), Poroshenko ne nameren vstupat' ni v odnu frakciju v Rade, http://censor.net.ua/news/226892/poroshenko_ne_nameren_vstupat_ni_v_odnu_fraktsiyu_v_rade, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012g), Poroshenko obeshhaet pokazat' vse svoi rashody i otkazat'sja ot zarplaty, http://censor.net.ua/news/201872/poroshenko_obeschaet_pokazat_vse_svoi_rashody_i_otkazatsya_ot_zarplaty, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012h), Poroshenko podderzhivaet dejstvija oppozicii, kogda oni derutsja za principy, http://censor.net.ua/news/227280/poroshenko_podderjivaet_deyistviya_oppozitsii_kogda_oni_derutsya_za_printsipy, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012i), Poroshenko priznan samym bogatym chinovnikom vysshego ranga: Tigipko i Horoshkovskij pozadi, http://censor.net.ua/news/201774/poroshenko_priznan_samym_bogatym_chinovnikom_vysshego_ranga_tigipko_i_horoshkovskiyi_pozadi, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012j), Poroshenko rasskazal kak popadet v Radu: Opredelilsja zadolgo do vhozhdenija v pravitel'stvo», http://censor.net.ua/news/207194/poroshenko_rasskazal_kak_popadet_v_radu_opredelilsya_zadolgo_do_vhojdeniya_v_pravitelstvo, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012k), Poroshenko soglasilsja stat' ministrom: Reshenie ja prinjal, http://censor.net.ua/news/201074/poroshenko_soglasilsya_stat_ministrom_reshenie_ya_prinyal, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012l), Poroshenko zajavil, chto budet rabotat' v Rade: Pered Ukrainoj stojat ser'eznye ugrozy. Na voznju vremeni net, http://censor.net.ua/news/223073/poroshenko_zayavil_chto_budet_rabotat_v_rade_pered_ukrainoyi_stoyat_sereznye_ugrozy_na_voznyu_vremeni, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012m), Poroshenko: Dlja prozrachnosti procedur goszakupok privlechem ukrainskih Naval'nyh,

187

http://censor.net.ua/news/201363/poroshenko_dlya_prozrachnosti_protsedur_goszakupok_privlechem_ukrainskih_navalnyh, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012n), Poroshenko: Ja soglasilsja stat' ministrom, chtoby zashhitit' biznes, http://censor.net.ua/news/201368/poroshenko_ya_soglasilsya_stat_ministrom_chtoby_zaschitit_biznes, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012o), Poroshenko: Moja pozicija po prigovoram Timoshenko i Lucenko ne izmenilas', http://censor.net.ua/news/201356/poroshenko_moya_pozitsiya_po_prigovoram_timoshenko_i_lutsenko_ne_izmenilas, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012p), Poroshenko: Pravitel'stvo dolzhno platit' nalog na roskosh' v pervuju ochered', http://censor.net.ua/news/208400/poroshenko_pravitelstvo_doljno_platit_nalog_na_roskosh_v_pervuyu_ochered, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012q), Prokuratura ser'ezno zanjalas' korporaciej Poroshenko: idut proverki, http://censor.net.ua/news/207492/prokuratura_serezno_zanyalas_korporatsieyi_poroshenko_idut_proverki, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012r), Syn Poroshenko v 26 let stal vice-konsulom v Kitae i uzhe ushel so sluzhby, http://censor.net.ua/news/205768/syn_poroshenko_v_26_let_stal_vitsekonsulom_v_kitae_i_uje_ushel_so_slujby, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012s), Uroven' otnoshenij mezhdu Ukrainoj i ES nahoditsja na samom nizkom urovne za poslednie gody, - Poroshenko, http://censor.net.ua/news/205290/uroven_otnosheniyi_mejdu_ukrainoyi_i_es_nahoditsya_na_samom_nizkom_urovne_za_poslednie_gody_poroshenko, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2013a), Dlja biznesa ne tak strashna Rossija, kak ukrainskie siloviki i nalogovaja, - Poroshenko, http://censor.net.ua/news/259275/dlya_biznesa_ne_tak_strashna_rossiya_kak_ukrainskie_siloviki_i_nalogovaya_poroshenko, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2013b), Iz-za rossijskogo zapreta Roshen sokrashhaet personal, http://censor.net.ua/news/258468/izza_rossiyiskogo_zapreta_roshen_sokraschaet_personal, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2013c), “Ja znaju tochno, kakim budet sledujushhee predlozhenie Rossii Janukovichu - status nabljudatelja v Tamozhennom sojuze”, - Poroshenko,

186

dnymi_odna_lish_blagotvoritelnost_ne_pomojet_poroshenko, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012e), Poroshenko budet ballotirovat'sja v VR: Ja poobeshhal vinnichannam, http://censor.net.ua/news/201360/poroshenko_budet_ballotirovatsya_v_vr_ya_poobeschal_vinnichannam, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012f), Poroshenko ne nameren vstupat' ni v odnu frakciju v Rade, http://censor.net.ua/news/226892/poroshenko_ne_nameren_vstupat_ni_v_odnu_fraktsiyu_v_rade, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012g), Poroshenko obeshhaet pokazat' vse svoi rashody i otkazat'sja ot zarplaty, http://censor.net.ua/news/201872/poroshenko_obeschaet_pokazat_vse_svoi_rashody_i_otkazatsya_ot_zarplaty, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012h), Poroshenko podderzhivaet dejstvija oppozicii, kogda oni derutsja za principy, http://censor.net.ua/news/227280/poroshenko_podderjivaet_deyistviya_oppozitsii_kogda_oni_derutsya_za_printsipy, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012i), Poroshenko priznan samym bogatym chinovnikom vysshego ranga: Tigipko i Horoshkovskij pozadi, http://censor.net.ua/news/201774/poroshenko_priznan_samym_bogatym_chinovnikom_vysshego_ranga_tigipko_i_horoshkovskiyi_pozadi, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012j), Poroshenko rasskazal kak popadet v Radu: Opredelilsja zadolgo do vhozhdenija v pravitel'stvo», http://censor.net.ua/news/207194/poroshenko_rasskazal_kak_popadet_v_radu_opredelilsya_zadolgo_do_vhojdeniya_v_pravitelstvo, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012k), Poroshenko soglasilsja stat' ministrom: Reshenie ja prinjal, http://censor.net.ua/news/201074/poroshenko_soglasilsya_stat_ministrom_reshenie_ya_prinyal, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012l), Poroshenko zajavil, chto budet rabotat' v Rade: Pered Ukrainoj stojat ser'eznye ugrozy. Na voznju vremeni net, http://censor.net.ua/news/223073/poroshenko_zayavil_chto_budet_rabotat_v_rade_pered_ukrainoyi_stoyat_sereznye_ugrozy_na_voznyu_vremeni, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2012m), Poroshenko: Dlja prozrachnosti procedur goszakupok privlechem ukrainskih Naval'nyh,

189

Censor (2013l), Poroshenko: Moi shansy stat' mjerom Kieva ochen' vysoki, http://censor.net.ua/news/232820/poroshenko_moi_shansy_stat_merom_kieva_ochen_vysoki, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2013m), Posle dolgih debatov Rybak podderzhal vkljuchenie Poroshenko v delegaciju v Evroparlament, http://censor.net.ua/news/239423/posle_dolgih_debatov_rybak_podderjal_vklyuchenie_poroshenko_v_delegatsiyu_v_evroparlament, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2013n), Rossija vvela zapret na sladosti Poroshenko: Nashi podozrenija opravdalis', http://censor.net.ua/news/248752/rossiya_vvela_zapret_na_sladosti_poroshenko_nashi_podozreniya_opravdalis, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2013o), Timoshenko nuzhna strane, - Poroshenko, http://censor.net.ua/news/233319/timoshenko_nujna_strane_poroshenko, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2013p), U Rossii pojavilis' pretenzii k biznesu Poroshenko, http://censor.net.ua/news/247049/u_rossii_poyavilis_pretenzii_k_biznesu_poroshenko, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2013q), Ukraina oderzhala pobedu nad Rossiej v torgovoj vojne, - Poroshenko, http://censor.net.ua/news/253434/ukraina_oderjala_pobedu_nad_rossieyi_v_torgovoyi_voyine_poroshenko, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2013r), Ukraina potrebovala cherez VTO snjat' zapret na postavki Roshen v Rossiju, http://censor.net.ua/news/258988/ukraina_potrebovala_cherez_vto_snyat_zapret_na_postavki_roshen_v_rossiyu, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2013s), V UDARe somnevajutsja, chto Poroshenko – oppozicioner: U nego est' opredelennye dogovorennosti s Bankovoj, http://censor.net.ua/news/240351/v_udare_somnevayutsya_chto_poroshenko_oppozitsioner_u_nego_est_opredelennye_dogovorennosti_s_bankovoyi, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2014a), Bulatov uletel v Rigu dlja lechenija i zashhity ot presledovanij, - Poroshenko (obnovleno), http://censor.net.ua/news/269185/bulatov_uletel_v_rigu_dlya_lecheniya_i_zaschity_ot_presledovaniyi_poroshenko_obnovleno, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2014b), Klichko peredumal idti v prezidenty i podderzhal kandidaturu Poroshenko,

188

http://censor.net.ua/news/239686/ya_znayu_tochno_kakim_budet_sleduyuschee_predlojenie_rossii_yanukovichu_status_nablyudatelya_v_tamojennom, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2013d), Karasev rasskazal o bol'shoj oshibke Poroshenko, http://censor.net.ua/news/240014/karasev_rasskazal_o_bolshoyi_oshibke_poroshenko, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2013e), Onishhenko ne iskljuchaet vozvrashhenija Roshen na rossijskij rynok, no nado mnogo porabotat', http://censor.net.ua/news/250093/onischenko_ne_isklyuchaet_vozvrascheniya_roshen_na_rossiyiskiyi_rynok_no_nado_mnogo_porabotat, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2013f), Pod Administraciju stjagivajutsja agressivnye molodchiki v maskah: Poroshenko govorit o provokacijah, http://censor.net.ua/news/261703/pod_administratsiyu_styagivayutsya_agressivnye_molodchiki_v_maskah_poroshenko_govorit_o_provokatsiyah, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2013g), Poroshenko-mladshij prisoedinilsja k Bat'k?vshhine, http://censor.net.ua/news/236341/poroshenkomladshiyi_prisoedinilsya_k_batkvschine, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2013h), Poroshenko mechtaet, chtoby kandidaturu prem'era vnosila oppozicija, http://censor.net.ua/news/239717/poroshenko_mechtaet_chtoby_kandidaturu_premera_vnosila_oppozitsiya, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

Censor (2013i), Poroshenko ozvuchil dva uslovija, pri vypolnenii kotoryh oppozicija sjadet za stol peregovorov s Janukovichem, http://censor.net.ua/news/261948/poroshenko_ozvuchil_dva_usloviya_pri_vypolnenii_kotoryh_oppozitsiya_syadet_za_stol_peregovorov_s_yanukovichem, retrieved: 2016-02-17.

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Linnaeus University Dissertations Below please find a list of recent publications in the series Linnaeus University Dissertations. For a full list and more information: Lnu.se 272. Ami Bylund, 2017, “Wait for us to catch up”. Aspects of family functioning af-ter gastric bypass surgery (vårdvetenskap/caring sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-53-3. 273. Joacim Rosenlund, 2017, Environmental research collaboration: Cross-sector knowledge production in environmental science (miljövetenskap/environmental science) ISBN: 978-91-88357-55-7. 274. Ingrid Djukanovic, 2017, Depression in older people – Prevalence and pre-ventive intervention, (vårdvetenskap/caring sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-56-4. 275. Cecilia Malmqvist, 2017, Planting and survivability of Douglas fir (Pseudotsuga menziesii (Mirb.) Franco) in Sweden: Questions of seedling storabil-ity, site preparation, bud burst timing and freezing tolerance, (skog och träteknik/forest and wood technology) ISBN: 978-91-88357-57-1. 276. Hanna Woksepp, 2017, Individualized treatment and control of bacterial in-fections (biomedicinsk vetenskap/biomedical sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-58-8. 277. Gunnel Holmér, 2017, Flaskor på löpande band – arbete och arbetskrafts- rekrytering vid Surte glasbruk 1943-1978 (historia/history) ISBN: 978-91-88357-60-1. 278. Liselott Årestedt, 2017, Den ombokade resan – att leva som familj med kro-nisk sjukdom (vårdvetenskap/caring sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-61-8. 279. Charlotte Marchand, 2017, Phytoremediation of soil contaminated with pe-troleum hydrocarbons and trace elements (miljövetenskap/environmental science) ISBN: 978-91-88357-63-2. 280. Anne-Lie Vainik, 2017, Polisanmälningar i grundskolan – en mekanism för reduktion av social komplexitet (socialt arbete/social studies) ISBN: 978-91-88357-65-6. 281. Uniben Tettey, 2017, Primary energy use of residential buildings - implica-tions of materials, modelling and design approaches (byggteknik/built environ-ment) ISBN: 978-91-88357-66-3. 282. Chizheng Miao, 2017, Essays on Self-employment, Happiness and Interna-tional Trade (ekonomi/economics) ISBN: 978-91-88357-67-0.

228

Åslund, Anders (2007a), Comparative Oligarchy. Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. In Åslund, Anders & Dabrowski, Marek (eds.) et al., Europe after enlargement, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Åslund, Anders (2007b), How capitalism was built : the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia (1st ed), Cambridge; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Åslund, Anders (2008), Russia's capitalist revolution : why market reform succeeded and democracy failed, Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Åslund, Anders (2009), How Ukraine became a market economy and democracy, Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Åslund, Anders (2013), How capitalism was built : the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia (2nd edition), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Åslund, Anders (2014), "Oligarchs, Corruption, and European Integration", Journal of Democracy, vol.25, (3), 64-73.

Åslund, Anders (2015), Ukraine : What Went Wrong and How to Fix It, Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Åslund, Anders & Dabrowski, Marek (eds.) Åslund, Anders et al. (2007), Europe after enlargement, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Linnaeus University Dissertations Below please find a list of recent publications in the series Linnaeus University Dissertations. For a full list and more information: Lnu.se 272. Ami Bylund, 2017, “Wait for us to catch up”. Aspects of family functioning af-ter gastric bypass surgery (vårdvetenskap/caring sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-53-3. 273. Joacim Rosenlund, 2017, Environmental research collaboration: Cross-sector knowledge production in environmental science (miljövetenskap/environmental science) ISBN: 978-91-88357-55-7. 274. Ingrid Djukanovic, 2017, Depression in older people – Prevalence and pre-ventive intervention, (vårdvetenskap/caring sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-56-4. 275. Cecilia Malmqvist, 2017, Planting and survivability of Douglas fir (Pseudotsuga menziesii (Mirb.) Franco) in Sweden: Questions of seedling storabil-ity, site preparation, bud burst timing and freezing tolerance, (skog och träteknik/forest and wood technology) ISBN: 978-91-88357-57-1. 276. Hanna Woksepp, 2017, Individualized treatment and control of bacterial in-fections (biomedicinsk vetenskap/biomedical sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-58-8. 277. Gunnel Holmér, 2017, Flaskor på löpande band – arbete och arbetskrafts- rekrytering vid Surte glasbruk 1943-1978 (historia/history) ISBN: 978-91-88357-60-1. 278. Liselott Årestedt, 2017, Den ombokade resan – att leva som familj med kro-nisk sjukdom (vårdvetenskap/caring sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-61-8. 279. Charlotte Marchand, 2017, Phytoremediation of soil contaminated with pe-troleum hydrocarbons and trace elements (miljövetenskap/environmental science) ISBN: 978-91-88357-63-2. 280. Anne-Lie Vainik, 2017, Polisanmälningar i grundskolan – en mekanism för reduktion av social komplexitet (socialt arbete/social studies) ISBN: 978-91-88357-65-6. 281. Uniben Tettey, 2017, Primary energy use of residential buildings - implica-tions of materials, modelling and design approaches (byggteknik/built environ-ment) ISBN: 978-91-88357-66-3. 282. Chizheng Miao, 2017, Essays on Self-employment, Happiness and Interna-tional Trade (ekonomi/economics) ISBN: 978-91-88357-67-0.

297. Miralem Helmefalk, 2017, Multi-sensory cues in interplay and congruency in a retail store context: Consumer emotions and purchase behaviors (företags-ekonomi/business administration) ISBN: 978-91-88357-90-8. 298. Bettina Vogt, 2017, Just assessment in school – a context-sensitive comparative study of pupils’ conceptions in Sweden and Germany (pedagogik/pedagogy) ISBN: 978-91-88357-92-2. 299. Marie-Louise Möllerberg, 2017, Families’ life situation when living with cancer: Aspects of health and family sense of coherence (vårdvetenskap/caring scienc-es) ISBN: 978-91-88357-94-6. 300. Alexander Gustafsson, 2017, Theoretical modeling of scanning tunneling mi-croscopy (fysik/physics) ISBN: 978-91-88357-96-0. 301. Anna Salomonsson, 2017, ”Skeendet på stället”: Röster och samtidigheter i tre verk av Sara Lidman (litteraturvetenskap/ comparative literature) ISBN: 978-91-88357-98-4. 302. Elias Broman, 2018, Ecology and evolution of coastal Baltic Sea ‘dead zone’ sediments (biologi/biology) ISBN: 978-91-88761-00-2 (print), 978-91-88761-01-9 (pdf). 303. Carina Bunse, 2017, Bacterioplankton in the light of seasonality and envi-ronmental drivers (biologi/biology) ISBN: 978-91-88761-02-6 (print), 978-91-88761-03-3 (pdf). 304. Ulrika Bossér, 2017, Exploring the complexities of integrating socioscientific issues in science teaching (naturvetenskapernas didaktik/natural sciences didactics) ISBN: 978-91-88761-02-6 (print), 978-91-88761-03-3 (pdf). 305. Alina Franck, 2018, The junior-to-senior transition in Swedish athletes: A longitudinal study (idrottsvetenskap/sport science) 978-91-88761-09-5 (print), 978-91-88761-10-1 (pdf)

306. Sylvia Haus, 2018, Climate impact of the sustainable use of forest biomass in energy and material system - a life cycle perspective (byggteknik/building tech-nology) 978-91-88761-11-8 (print) 978-91-88761-12-5 (pdf)

307. Min Hu, 2018, Studies of the fibre direction and local bending stiffness of Norway spruce timber – for application on machine strength grading (bygg-teknik/building technology) 978-91-88761-13-2 (print), 978-91-88761-14-9 (pdf).

308. Yahya Jani, 2018, Landfills and glass dumpsites as future bank accounts of re-sources - waste characterization and trace elements extraction (miljöveten-skap/environmental science) 978-91-88761-15-6 (print), 978-91-88761- 16-3 (pdf).

283. Catharina Carlsson, 2017, Hästunderstött socialt arbete – ett samtalsrum med potentiella möjligheter för ungdomar med självskadebeteenden och deras personal (so-cialt arbete/social studies) ISBN: 978-91-88357-70-0. 284. Deliang Dai, 2017, On high-dimensional Mahalanobis distances (statis-tik/statistics) ISBN: 978-91-88357-71-1. 285. Stefan Andersson, 2017, Information and Communication Technology – me-diated support for working carers of older people (vårdvetenskap/caring sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-72-4. 286. Torgny Klasson, 2017, Informationsteknik och avvägningar mellan indivi-dens frihet och statsmakt – En analys av svenska riksdagsdebatter (statsveten-skap/political science) ISBN: 978-91-88357-73-1. 287. Fortunate Atwine, 2017, Healthcare-seeking behaviour and management of type 2 diabetes in Uganda: Perspectives of persons with diabetes, traditional healers and healthcare providers (vårdvetenskap/caring sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-74-8. 288. Andreas Eckert, 2017, Contributing to develop contributions – a metaphor for teaching in the reform mathematics classroom (matematikdidaktik/didactics of mathematics) ISBN: 978-91-88357-75-5. 289. Abdulaziz Abrar Reshid, 2017, Essays on Gender Inequality and Neighbor-hood Effects (nationalekonomi/economics) ISBN: 978-91-88357-81-6. 290. Emma Lindeblad, 2017, Self-concepts and psychological health among chil-dren and adolescents with reading disabilities and the influence of assistive technology (psykologi/psychology) ISBN: 978-91-88357-82-3. 291. Hanna Holst, 2017, Det lärande utrymmet - lärande och vårdande möten mellan patienter, studentpar och handledare vid Utvecklande och Lärande VårdEn-heter (vårdvetenskap/caring sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-83-0. 292. Karin Johansson, 2017, Reflektion, Insikt och Ansvar – Lärandet i att leva med diabetes (vårdvetenskap/caring sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-84-7. 293. Peter Ström, 2017, Utredning inleds: Språk, genredrag och ansvar i barna-vårdsutredningar (svenska/svenska språket) ISBN: 978-91-88357-85-4. 294. Marie Rask, 2017, Women receiving notification of an abnormal Pap smear result – experiences and impact on health-related quality of life (vårdveten-skap/caring sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-86-1. 295. Jon Tinnert, 2017, Microevolution in pygmy grasshoppers (biologi/biology) ISBN: 978-91-88357-87-8. 296. Anna-Carin Aho, 2017, Living with recessive limb-girdle muscular dystro-phy: Affected young adults’ and parents’ perspectives, studied through a salutogenic framework (vårdvetenskap/caring sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-89-2.

297. Miralem Helmefalk, 2017, Multi-sensory cues in interplay and congruency in a retail store context: Consumer emotions and purchase behaviors (företags-ekonomi/business administration) ISBN: 978-91-88357-90-8. 298. Bettina Vogt, 2017, Just assessment in school – a context-sensitive comparative study of pupils’ conceptions in Sweden and Germany (pedagogik/pedagogy) ISBN: 978-91-88357-92-2. 299. Marie-Louise Möllerberg, 2017, Families’ life situation when living with cancer: Aspects of health and family sense of coherence (vårdvetenskap/caring scienc-es) ISBN: 978-91-88357-94-6. 300. Alexander Gustafsson, 2017, Theoretical modeling of scanning tunneling mi-croscopy (fysik/physics) ISBN: 978-91-88357-96-0. 301. Anna Salomonsson, 2017, ”Skeendet på stället”: Röster och samtidigheter i tre verk av Sara Lidman (litteraturvetenskap/ comparative literature) ISBN: 978-91-88357-98-4. 302. Elias Broman, 2018, Ecology and evolution of coastal Baltic Sea ‘dead zone’ sediments (biologi/biology) ISBN: 978-91-88761-00-2 (print), 978-91-88761-01-9 (pdf). 303. Carina Bunse, 2017, Bacterioplankton in the light of seasonality and envi-ronmental drivers (biologi/biology) ISBN: 978-91-88761-02-6 (print), 978-91-88761-03-3 (pdf). 304. Ulrika Bossér, 2017, Exploring the complexities of integrating socioscientific issues in science teaching (naturvetenskapernas didaktik/natural sciences didactics) ISBN: 978-91-88761-02-6 (print), 978-91-88761-03-3 (pdf). 305. Alina Franck, 2018, The junior-to-senior transition in Swedish athletes: A longitudinal study (idrottsvetenskap/sport science) 978-91-88761-09-5 (print), 978-91-88761-10-1 (pdf)

306. Sylvia Haus, 2018, Climate impact of the sustainable use of forest biomass in energy and material system - a life cycle perspective (byggteknik/building tech-nology) 978-91-88761-11-8 (print) 978-91-88761-12-5 (pdf)

307. Min Hu, 2018, Studies of the fibre direction and local bending stiffness of Norway spruce timber – for application on machine strength grading (bygg-teknik/building technology) 978-91-88761-13-2 (print), 978-91-88761-14-9 (pdf).

308. Yahya Jani, 2018, Landfills and glass dumpsites as future bank accounts of re-sources - waste characterization and trace elements extraction (miljöveten-skap/environmental science) 978-91-88761-15-6 (print), 978-91-88761- 16-3 (pdf).

283. Catharina Carlsson, 2017, Hästunderstött socialt arbete – ett samtalsrum med potentiella möjligheter för ungdomar med självskadebeteenden och deras personal (so-cialt arbete/social studies) ISBN: 978-91-88357-70-0. 284. Deliang Dai, 2017, On high-dimensional Mahalanobis distances (statis-tik/statistics) ISBN: 978-91-88357-71-1. 285. Stefan Andersson, 2017, Information and Communication Technology – me-diated support for working carers of older people (vårdvetenskap/caring sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-72-4. 286. Torgny Klasson, 2017, Informationsteknik och avvägningar mellan indivi-dens frihet och statsmakt – En analys av svenska riksdagsdebatter (statsveten-skap/political science) ISBN: 978-91-88357-73-1. 287. Fortunate Atwine, 2017, Healthcare-seeking behaviour and management of type 2 diabetes in Uganda: Perspectives of persons with diabetes, traditional healers and healthcare providers (vårdvetenskap/caring sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-74-8. 288. Andreas Eckert, 2017, Contributing to develop contributions – a metaphor for teaching in the reform mathematics classroom (matematikdidaktik/didactics of mathematics) ISBN: 978-91-88357-75-5. 289. Abdulaziz Abrar Reshid, 2017, Essays on Gender Inequality and Neighbor-hood Effects (nationalekonomi/economics) ISBN: 978-91-88357-81-6. 290. Emma Lindeblad, 2017, Self-concepts and psychological health among chil-dren and adolescents with reading disabilities and the influence of assistive technology (psykologi/psychology) ISBN: 978-91-88357-82-3. 291. Hanna Holst, 2017, Det lärande utrymmet - lärande och vårdande möten mellan patienter, studentpar och handledare vid Utvecklande och Lärande VårdEn-heter (vårdvetenskap/caring sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-83-0. 292. Karin Johansson, 2017, Reflektion, Insikt och Ansvar – Lärandet i att leva med diabetes (vårdvetenskap/caring sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-84-7. 293. Peter Ström, 2017, Utredning inleds: Språk, genredrag och ansvar i barna-vårdsutredningar (svenska/svenska språket) ISBN: 978-91-88357-85-4. 294. Marie Rask, 2017, Women receiving notification of an abnormal Pap smear result – experiences and impact on health-related quality of life (vårdveten-skap/caring sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-86-1. 295. Jon Tinnert, 2017, Microevolution in pygmy grasshoppers (biologi/biology) ISBN: 978-91-88357-87-8. 296. Anna-Carin Aho, 2017, Living with recessive limb-girdle muscular dystro-phy: Affected young adults’ and parents’ perspectives, studied through a salutogenic framework (vårdvetenskap/caring sciences) ISBN: 978-91-88357-89-2.

309. Abdul Aziz Ali, 2018, On the use of wavelets in unit root and cointegration tests (statistik/statistics) 978-91-88761-26-2 (print), 978-91-88761-27-9 (pdf).

310. John Hennessey, 2018, Rule by Association: Japan in the Global Trans-Imperial Culture, 1868-1912 (historia/history) 978-91-88761-31-6 (print).

311. Farshid Bonakdar, 2018, Cost-optimality approach for prioritisation of building envelope energy renovation – A techno-economic perspective (bygg-teknik/building technology) 978-91-88761-33-0 (print), 978-91-88761-34-7 (pdf).

312. Emma Ahlstrand, 2018, Metal ions in life: towards accurate computer-aided studies of protein-ion interactions (kemi/chemistry) 978-91-88761-37-8 (print), 978-91-88761-38-5 (pdf).

313. Tigran Babajan, 2018, Oligarchs, State Power and Mass Opinion –A Study of the Role of Oligarchs in Post-Soviet Pseudo-democracies (statskun-skap/political science) 978-91-88761-39-2 (print), 978-91-88761-40-8 (pdf).