Of Our Favorite Nietzschean Question

Jason S. Caro

Political Theory, Vol. 27, No. 6. (Dec., 1999), pp. 750-768.

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OF OUR FAVORITE NIETZSCHEAN QUESTION

JASON S. C A R 0 University qfCul!forniu, Los Angelex

M O R E THAN ANY OTHER PHILOSOPHER, Nietzsche has drawn the question o f his relation to the feminine. The question has become a real favorite. It may be that asking about "Nietzsche and the feminine" seems use- ful.' Such a formulation can encompass a great deal, including feminism, "woman," the "Eternal-feminine," the role o f women in a Nietzschean poli- tics, and even Nietzsche's own relationships with women.2

However, the very fact o f this all-too-familiar question raises aquestion o f the politics o f this fashionable deployment. I f politics are about advantage then maybe we are being well served by this problem o f the feminine and Nietzsche. Now what could be the advantage o f that? Possibly this Nietzsche is a kind o f catalyst and a segregated place called "the current Nietzsche debate" where we can foist o f f our own growing uncertainties and preoccupa- tions. Any responses to the feminine, perhaps those suggestive o f patriarchy, can be ascribed to him, out there, apart from us.

To make the case for the uses and abuses o f Nietzsche requires us to ques- tion ourselves. Otherwise, any answers to that question o f the feminine and Nietzsche will, yet again, be attributed solely to him. A knowledge o f Nietz- sche on our favorite question (let us briefly suppose this ideal circumstance) allows the familiar positions in that debate, such as feminist, misogynist, or woman, to stay accessible. Such knowledge strengthens those positions, for we know where to place Nietzsche in relation to them. That leaves us safe and sound, our politics and understandings intact.

My aim here is to demonstrate how our familiar politics are always already at risk. They rely upon a supplementary order dubbed here, for lack o f a better

AClrHOR'S NOlE: This study hcis benefited greutly,fron~ the comment.^ o f Victor Wolfensteln, Sum Weher, the Nietzsctzepcrnelists ut the 1996 Norttzeustern Politiccrl Science Conference, and ttze unonymous reviewers ((fthis journcrl. Specicrl uc.knowledgement goes to Curole Puternun.for her insigtzt und criticism.

POLITICAL THEORY, Vol 27 No 6. December 1999 750-768 0 1999 Sage Publlcatlons, Inc

Caro / OUR FAVORITE NIETZSCHEAN QUESTION 75 1

term, "rhetoric."' No one simply takes a position on Nietzsche and the femi- nine. Yes, to be a feminist in the debate must mean, for example, to work against Nietzsche's "misogynist" view.4 But this kind of clearly oppositional politics will have required rhetoric to delineate and refine both positions. As will be seen, such established political relationships are the effect of a supplementary order. For the understandings that we have regarding our favorite question, rhetoric modifies, refines, hurts, and debilitates others and ourselves.

My problem then is a classic one revolving around a lack of knowledge of ou r~e lves .~The problem can be located when we, those who write, think, and speak of Nietzsche, address this philosopher on the feminine.' It is a political problem if the harm (or good) that Nietzsche is said to have on the feminine is accompanied by additional but unacknowledged hurts. To draw out this other, rhetorical, order, indeed this other politics, it is not enough to yet again consult Nietzsche on the feminine. We must also face the interrogative spot- light, for unless our familiar political understandings are questioned, all that can reemerge is the familiar. And the effects of rhetoric will then continue to hurt and discipline us.

Luckily, the political philosopher is well acquainted with the means for questioning oneself. In a dialogue, like that of the young Plato, everyone is in question. (If only we could engage in a dialogue with Nietzsche.) Hence, after reviewing how the feminine and Nietzsche is usually considered, I seek out adialogue with the mustachioed philosopher on our favorite question. As the only work of this kind, Luce Irigaray's Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietz- sche provides a unique opportunity.' The Marine Lover has the usual cast of characters including woman, lover, Nietzsche, feminist, patriarch, and so forth. But in a dialogue, because of their constant interplay, these figures are blurred. So how do they become the settled and familiar positions that we know? Alternatively, what are the origins of our favorite Nietzschean ques- tion and its politics? In response, I retrace the rhetorical workings of such politics and the Marine Lover.

I. READING NIEZSCHE RHETORICALLY

A reevaluation of our favorite problematic, that of Nietzsche and the femi- nine, cannot be another interpretation. That presupposes that we can have access to a knowledge of Nietzsche, that his views are "at hand." In other words, by carefully reading Nietzsche's writings on the feminine, we can know his thinking in that regard. At the very least, assuming acommitment to

752 POLITICAL THEORY / December 1999

accuracy, it is thought that one can develop an argument or a best guess on the matter.

But this familiar approach presumes, somewhat presumptuously I might add, a great deal. The presumption is not so much whether we can discern Nietzsche's true intentions, although there is that if you like, but rather there is a presumption that we can interpret.' Now of course we can do so. Claims and efforts to that effect are made all of the time. But the question is how can we do this, say, when it comes to interpreting Nietzsche's thought of the femi- nine.' What must happen for that?

When it comes to "Nietzsche" interpretation, there is a pattern of issuing caveats and cautionary admonitions beforehand. For example, Nehamas begins his commentary with some circumspection regarding the "difficulty" of interpreting ~ietzsche." ' Nehamas warns that "Nietzsche's views, what- ever they are, are not simply there, available for inspection." Rather "in order to know" Nietzsche's views "we must first. . . interpret his texts." And such interpretation, when one is committed to close exegesis, "is both a personal and creative affair." Nehamas acknowledges the difficulties of that endeavor when it comes to Nietzsche. And evidently, Nehamas avoided the pitfalls enough to recognize that "Nietzsche's views of women, still disturb me after all these many years."

Similarly, Ackermann spends some time working out the problem of interpreting ~ie tzsche ." In his Nietzsche: A Frenz iedhok , Ackermann takes it upon himself to work against a veritable minefield of possible interpreta- tions. These views range from Nietzsche as an early "analytic philosopher" (Danto, Nehamas), as existentialist (Kaufmann, Jaspers), to Nietzsche as poststructuralist oracle (Derrida, Deleuze). Such views, charges Ackermann, all require that Nietzsche be "divided into parts." As a result, what is relevant in his works is expounded, while the rest is dismissed as "ironic, mad or what- ever."

"Perhaps," Ackermann finally suggests, "it is time for exposition to begin." Accordingly, in contrast to those who have merely used Nietzsche for their own agendas, Ackermann strives to free Nietzsche from the ideological "misreadings" and return Nietzsche to himself. This time, "Nietzsche" is to be presented on his "own terms." Ackermann's study therefore relays the "coherent" doctrine of the "lonely thinker."

Now it may come as a surprise that the claim that Ackermann makes to getting Nietzsche right, on his "own terms" as it is said, is not of concern. What is more interesting, and yet is entirely unsurprising, is that like Neha- mas, Ackermann too overcomes the interpretive challenges enough to be able to represent Nietzsche's political theory. Regarding our favorite question,

Cnro / OUR FAVORITE NETZSCHEAN QUESTION 753

Ackermann finds that Nietzsche has a view of women as being playthings for his "warrior" caste, a view derived from Nietzsche's nostalgic classicism (in this case then, there is a compounding of the interpretive accomplishment, not only regarding Nietzsche but also about the nature of gender relations among the ancients).''

Both commentators then, Nehamas and Ackermann, preface their discus- sions by acknowledging that the interpretation of Nietzsche presents special challenges. Indeed, there is such prefatory discussion of the problem of inter- preting Nietzsche in nearly every study of him.13 This generally has the pat- tern of first indicating the difficulty of reading Nietzsche and then, invariably, overcoming it.I4

Regarding Nietzsche's thought of the feminine, the sheer number of refer- ences to women raises a different sort of issue.15 The views of "woman" expressed in his writings vary a great deal (and not only between each other). Even when it comes to that most notorious remark, there are grounds for doubt over its meaning: " 'You are going to women'? Do not forget the whip!' " ( ~ ~ ~ 4 : 8 6 ) . ' ~ ~ u r g a r dnotes the difficulty of tracing the author of this heavily punctuated statement. Not only is it a quotation from the story of Zarathustra, but also it is stated there by the little old woman. Given such confusions, the question can arise: who really said that?''

The problem of Nietzsche's relation to the feminine also extends to the total effect of his writings on the topic. Even if that infamous statement about the whip is firmly designated as misogynistic, Nietzsche can yet be compli- mentary, even envious, of "woman." Nietzsche's attack on the truth of the Alexandrian and Socratic types led him to encourage illusion, myth, and superficiality.1XFor Nietzsche, woman's expertise in such "arts" is praisewor- thy: "But perhaps this is the most powerful magic of life: it is covered by a veil interwoven with gold. . . . Yes, life is a woman" (KSA 3:352). One could go on to juxtapose a whole series of germane comments. But the end result would be, according to Burgard, that "we . . . cannot finally decide" Nietz- sche's view of woman. As such, that is, as this philosophical, political, and philological "problem," there is a need for more "debate" on it.

Ultimately, the difficulty of Nietzsche is seen as inherent to his thought. Klein suggests that "the ways in which Nietzsche composed his texts and his rejection of argumentative form force readers to self-consciously reflect upon the question of how these texts are to be read."" The problem of inter- preting Nietzsche is so well known that it has generated a literature all by i t~el f .~( 'Andgiven the motif of Nietzsche as difficult, it is not uncommon to make reference to those famous excerpts that confirm that perception such as there are "only interpretations" or "these are only my truths."

754 POLITICAL THEORY 1 December 1999

But there is at least one more way to think of the difficulty of Nietzsche. Perhaps it is not simply that Nietzsche is hard to interpret, the empirical, read- able Nietzsche that is, but rather it is being said that interpreting Nietzsche is "difficult." Nehamas, Ackermann, Klein, or Burgard, among others, are say- ing that "Nietzsche" is tough to read. It is literally what is being done with Nietzsche: setting up the idea that he is especially difficult to interpret. This is the preparatory, practical aspect of our political theory; the rhetoric, let us say, and its forgotten maneuvers are identifiable.

What raised my suspicions is that, given all the caveats, given all of those declarations of the "difficulty" of interpreting Nietzsche, it nevertheless always manages to get done. One wonders why philosophers, political theo- rists, and other commentators bother to mention such difficulties at all if they can always be surpassed, unless this pattern of successful overcoming should be read as a tribute to our intrepid, interpretive abilities. There is then an intellecto-centrism at work. That Nietzsche winds up being interpreted, every single time, is no coincidence. It is what rhetoricians call hypophora, the "statement of an objection (together with its refutation)" as made by the speaker himself." Although it is difficult, and one hears this often enough, Nietzsche interpretation is always accomplished.

Given the 100 percent success rate in interpreting Nietzsche, what would be really interesting is if someone declared, just once, that they were unable to interpret Nietzsche! We might learn a lot from such "failure."22 What would make this scenario interesting is that, for the first time perhaps, it could be asked of the fumbling interpreter, "So why couldn't you interpret Nietz- sche, especially his views of the feminine? Everybody else can." Then the conditions for interpretation would have to be laid out. Then the presumption that we can just leap in and interpret would be in question.23

It turns out that the very presumption that we can interpret (Nietzsche for a response) is enabling. To go ahead and assume our interpretive ability saves a lot of trouble because one can then just "get down to b~siness."~'It is so obvi- ous that an interpreter is present with a burning question and so are Nietz- sche's writings.25 The stage is set. It seems straightforward enough to just go ahead and . . . interpret.

But when the question is how so, the presumption that interpretation can be done appears as an enabling technique. It is a hysteronproteron, a reversal in the order of time that emphasizes what comes later over what comes before. The general idea is to "forget about how we can interpret; what mat- ters is that we can so let's just get on with it." So this is also a type ofparaleip- sis, a useful omission for an effect. Our presumptuousness is a maneuver aid- ing the kind of explication whereby Nietzsche can speak to us. And as we know so well, Nietzsche often speaks to us of the feminine."

Caro / OUR FAVORITE NIETZSCHEAN QUESTION 755

11. THE RHETORIC OF OUR FAVORITE QUESTION

Imagine that, at last, we got Nietzsche "right." Now he would speak to us of the feminine. We would have the perfect information for our political deci- sions. Then we could reject Nietzsche (as is often done when it comes to his views of women).27 Or we may redeem him (by claiming, for instance, that one must distinguish his sentiments on women from his beliefs about them)." Perhaps Nietzsche's thought would provide some new fixes.'?he interpreta-tions of our favorite question are like usable mon~logues.~" We are the mas- ters of our fate, and the thought of Nietzsche is to be used as we see fit.3'

But if there were a dialogue with Nietzsche, the outcome would not be so sure. The genre of the dialogue, as is best known from Plato, alters the nature of our political under~tanding.~' A dialogue is the ultimate equalizer for it prevents anyone from determining the outcome (which is why the finer ones end aporetically). No intellectual historian could then cross-examine Nietz- sche for his thoughts on a selected topic. In a dialogue, Nietzsche can employ any number of counterstrategies. He can evade our question, dissimulate, or maybe, he might just answer.

To a degree, the characters of Irigaray's dialogue are familiar." Woman, feminist, lover, Nietzsche as patriarch, and Nietzsche as producer of attrac- tive ideas can all be discerned in the Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche. These are some of the same figures found throughout our debate. The same tensions are here too. How does Nietzsche feel about woman'? Misogynist or no? Can Nietzsche contribute to some form of feminism? On such matters, in their various roles, Irigaray's figures interact. But always, the characters are jockeying for position in their ongoing relationship and so their roles are never cut-and-dried.

With all of these possibilities and permutations, the politics of a dialogue are very uncertain-which is why reading the Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche has potential. Irigaray's dialogue inevitably gives us an unsettled rendition of "Nietzsche and the feminine."34 It therefore provides a chance to track any emergence of the more settled politics, positions, and issues that have become so favored. That is, in a dialogue on our favorite question, one can witness how any transformation happens from disordered and blurred positions to a more ordered, familiar politics. We can address a question of origins, in this case being the origins of our favorite question.

A. Part One

In "Immemorial Waters," Nietzsche stands as a philosophical consumer of women. Warmly, the Marine Lover seeks him out. Initially, Nietzsche is a

756 POLITICAL THEORY 1December 1999

kind of macho thinker due to the "manifold typology of women in his work, its horde of mothers, daughters, sisters, old maids, wives, governesses, pros- titutes, virgins, grandmothers, big and little girls," and even feminist^.'^

Whether any of these views capture the essence of woman is not the point. Rather, the diversity of Nietzsche's theories (of women) indicates his theft of the credit for the social relationships they built together, that they had to build "t~gether."'~ Every interaction, with any female that Nietzsche envi- sions and relates himself to, be it mother, sister, or Lou, requires her specific presence. Yet no recognition is given of her contribution as one different from his:

You fold the membrane between us in your own way. . . . The membrane was not yours to have. We formed it together. And if you want it for yourself, you make a hole in it just because I lack any part.37

Woman, in any other "way" than how Nietzsche has conceived her, is simply a gap or "hole" in the "membrane" of his social theory. He constantly moves to fill that gap with yet another theory (of a woman). In amoment, theMarine Lover will return to the implications of this terrible gap. But here, the Marine Lover tries to lure and coax the ardent philosopher.

The Marine Lover's first task is to try to make Nietzsche aware that still another woman exists other than any "woman" that he might speak of.

I was your resonance. . . . I was merely the drum in your own ear sending back to itself your own truth. And to do that. . . I had to be supple and stretched, to fit the texture of your words. My body aroused only by the sound of your bell. Today I was this woman, tomor- row that one. But never the woman, who . . . holds herself back.'"

The only women that Nietzsche has yet been aware of are those who duly conform to his "truths." For the haughty Nietzsche, any different women must be the result of some new Nietzschean theory." The differences force a kind of frenzied naming race on Nietzsche's part to keep up with all the novel aspects that women present. Hence, that "horde" of women in his works. Against such squandering and Nietzsche's theft of all the credit, the Marine Lover suggests that with every theory of woman, there is concurrently a woman "beyond" the reductive view.4"

Initially, the race to "name" all of the variants of women can be a risky problem for Nietzsche. Each redescription of his marine counterpart carries the risk that she might not conform. That could reveal the failure of a Nietz- schean theory. Every woman can expose what his social theory "lacks" at any one moment. Ultimately though, Nietzsche's attitude to this possible

Caro /OUR FAVORITE NIETZSCHEAN QUESTION 757

catastrophe is affirmative. He can pat himself on the back for overcoming, for weathering each storm.

And as he takes each next step, he suffers from the risk that it entails! And each time he plunges back into the depths of her flesh, her stillness exalts him and he thrills at the bril- liance of his new exploit!4'

Nietzsche does not realize that his thrilling new exploit required a sharing that allowed his view of her, whichever "woman" it is at the moment, to be possible. Instead, Nietzsche prides himself on his own creativity, on his Wille-zur-Macht, or his ability to "exploit!" But such self-congratulation is to "make believe that one has found new fortune within the self."" The Marine Lover's Nietzsche never recognizes her contribution to his social theory. He presses ahead and squanders all he has, even though it is not all his4'

A predicament arises when Nietzsche loses his theoretical nerve or loses faith in his images. Nietzsche comes to see that there is nothing but his theo- ries or his perspectives. With this recognition, all of the possibilities of "woman" suggest that he is not in control of the women he sees. Taking stock, it is hard to take the full credit for so many different relationships. But if Nietzsche is not directing then who is? No one else is recognizable. Nietz- sche's feminine, marine counterpart becomes a "flood," a "drowning in a pleasure that he has not ~ i l l e d . " ~

In the past, any gap in a social theory could be filled by some image of "God." "He" had been the faithful standby for explaining the mystery of one's surroundings. But Nietzsche proclaimed God's death and nihilism descends. Irigaray views Nietzsche's shrill proclamation as expressing his fearful, unavoidable descent into the marine "abyss" of undifferentiated "woman."'*

Women are not unaffected by Nietzschean nihilism. Already Nietzsche's "echonomics" has drained women of their lifeblood. Each time Nietzsche called to a woman, be it mother, sister, or Marine Lover, she dutifully responded or called back. But because his women have never been credited with contributing to the social whole, Nietzsche does not expect any help from that quarter. And there is nowhere else to turn. And they have not been allowed enough practice so they could not help him anyway:

For anyone who does nothing but obey ceases to be heard. And if the one and the other are not joined in the difference of their movements, they risk the abyss one within the other, no longer sensing anything either of the same or of the other. The one in the other they fall back. And at the end . . .no bridge remains in that breaking up and thawing of ice.4h

758 POLITICAL THEORY / December 1999

This is an apocalyptic projection o f the results o f Nietzsche's relationship with the feminine. Behold what the half-baked speculations o f the oblivious lover, those that underrated his counterpart, have led to.

B. Part Two

"Immemorial Waters" registers the social negatives o f patriarchal theory, o f feminine compliance, and o f the nihilistic aftermath. But "Veiled Lips" deals specifically with women's creative ability. Now, the Marine Lover no longer cares whether Nietzsche ignores her contribution or not. She recog- nizes it. She can speak, create, and comprehend too.47 After all, she has her own "lips." A great deal o f scholarship has been devoted to ascertaining just what such an Irigarayan practice entails.4R In Part Two, the Marine Lover gives a demonstration. And again, as she must, she includes Nietzsche in her musings.

No longer the oblivious lover, Nietzsche now stands firmly as arch-patriarch because o f his powerful theory o f woman as "appearance." Here, Nietzsche considers "woman" to be an "artist" who can always change her appearance or act her part. He declares, "her great art is the lie." According to this Nietzsche, women are, "without any qualities o f their own-hence when speaking o f women, the recourse to typographic signs, various kinds o f sus- pension markers, bracketing, quotation marks, parentheses, cuts in texts, ex~lamations."~?he use o f so many punctuation marks enables Nietzsche to place women at a "di~tance."~" He will do anything it takes to avoid seeing their contribution to his efforts and his philosophy. Woman as a whole being can get lost in "so many doublings o f parentheses and quotation marksn5'

On the other hand, this "distancing pins down the feminine in a display." Irigaray associates such distancing with a patriarchal process o f abstraction. It is an approach that determines women not as creators but as how they appear. The Marine Lover notes that the setting aside o f woman as "simula- crum is a way o f keeping something in reserve."" Nietzsche's simple theory o f appearance again leaves him with most o f the credit for developing and guiding the (social) relationship. She is only as she appears to Nietzsche, nothing more. Women must not be looked at too closely or their contribution might start to show through.

Woman as "appearance" means that she must "present" herself. She has to be there, obviously. That is, Nietzsche (or patriarchy), ever fearful o f a lack o f meaning, cannot have the absence o f woman in social theory. So Nietzsche's theory o f woman as appearance keeps her around, but only just SO.~"O the Marine Lover mimes caustically,

Caro / OUR FAVORITE NIETZSCHEAN QUESTION 759

Pretend to be . . . whatever you like. That 1s according to your own need or desire. This 'posing as' will actually be a bonus. The bonus that, as yet, plays no part in hereconomy. This 'posing as' is not her due. She strays into it, without finding herself. Unless she is reduced to the master's desire.54

Since women are always viewed in and as their latest pose, then that is all that can be seen (especially if she appears in her grandest finery).

At various points in Part Two, the Marine Lover suggests that women do not need Nietzsche's recognition. He uses a "gold" standard to assess their value.55 But woman can "manage without gold. She doesn't really need it."5h She is never in accord with any one standard. Thus,

a woman can subsist by already being double in her self: both the one and the other. . . . The female (one) being the other, without ever being either one or the other. Ceaselessly in the exchange between the one and the other. With the result that she is always already the red.^^

The Marine Lover is careful to say that such self-valuation is not limiting. Thus, "woman" can have "the pleasure of endlessly exchanging herself within herself' but this "does not cut off her access to depth."5x The Marine Lover uses the duality of her "lips" to introduce a cautious, "undecidable" theory of w ~ m a n . ~ '

The ideas of "Veiled Lips" are quite famous. They have subsequently been examined in numerous formats. And when "Veiled Lips" is detextualized, as when it receives separate attention in commentary or in an article, it is a dis- tinctive, feminist manifesto. But in an ongoing dialogue, the feminism and tactics of "Veiled Lips" are aresponse to what "Nietzsche" is doing. Her posi- tion results from an engagement with his patriarchalism.

But to have the patriarchal philosopher to work against, the oblivious, even cuddly Nietzsche of the previous section had to disappear. A form of anacoluthon has taken place, a deviation whereby an earlier construction is not maintained. By the second section of the text, Nietzsche expresses only his overall theory of "woman" as "appearance." As such, Nietzsche is just the kind of figure that the Marine Lover can turn against. Compared to this cool villain, the first Nietzsche was practically a joy, a eupherrlisnz whereby his friendliest face could be seen. The earlier Nietzsche related to as many women as he could, only to wind up tragically lost to nihilism. He was oblivi- ous to any wider costs, being concerned only with the woman of his interest at the time, mother, sister, Lou, and so forth. But in Part Two, Nietzsche's harsher stance enables a new position and politics to emerge: a fully fledged feminist using her own "lips" to ask pointed questions. She no longer coaxes

760 POLITICAL THEORY / December 1999

Nietzsche. She accuses him. And she has every right given this tougher Nietz- sche. But note well that it was a conversion of Nietzsche that makes the femi- nism of "Veiled Lips" possible.

C. Part Three

Once the critique of patriarchy is complete and a feminist symbolic is in place, what remains is, in turn, Nietzsche's response to the Marine Lover. In many respects, the Marine Lover has come full circle, and the question is now, What will the arch-patriarch do in the changed circumstances offered by feminism? Part Three, titled "When the Gods are Born," addresses the Nietz- schean reply to his feminist, and now more assertive, Marine Lover.

Three gods in particular are examined here: Apollo, Jesus, and Dionysus. These are Nietzsche's gods, the ones he turned to for his transformations. I must note that the renditions and criticisms in the Marine Lover of Nietz- sche's Apollo and Jesus are extraordinary. But as Irigaray's "Nietzsche" rejects them as options for himself, they need not be addressed here. Faced now with a feminist interlocutor, Nietzsche turns firmly to Dionysus in a sub- section titled "The Child Still in the ~radle."'" Just as the Marine Lover changed from a beguiling, compliant devotee to something else, so too does Nietzsche change. From the Nietzsche of sections one and two of the Marine Lover, he closes tragically as the maddened Nietzsche, as Dionysus.

What makes thc archaic deity of Dionysus useful for Nietzsche are the god's "drunken" oscillations between flesh and thought, child and man, and even between male and female." Containing such massive contradictions in a single concept of "Dionysus" would be the most "prodigious" philosophy. Nietzsche made at least two concerted efforts to theorize himself in this way: first indirectly in Thus Spoke Zurathustra and finally more explicitly in Ecce orn no.^^

The Marine Lover knows why Dionysus was Nietzsche's alternative to herself. The Dionysian "child-god" had always longed for the whole mother and he calls "out endlessly for her."h3 But now, denied (or denying) his Marine Lover, Nietzsche suspects such calls will go unanswered. His longing for a "perfect woman" cannot be fulfilled. She was destroyed for the birth of Zeus: "For the chasm was dug . . . before the child-god came into the world. The earth already conceals the mother's murder. . . . The father's savagery, buried, covered over."'?he father referred to here is Zeus, who, in order to symbol- ize the myth of his own self-birth, was the first to repress the role of woman. He then gave his symbolizing power to his sons, the dutiful Apollo and the rebellious Dionysus. As a male heir to Apollo's divine power, Nietzsche has

Caro 1 OUR FAVORITE NIETZSCHEAN QUESTION 761

himself determined the social world while simultaneously reducing woman's contribution to the bare minimum.

But Dionysus as the "child-god doesn't settle for that."h5 Insatiable, he is sensitive to the "attractions of the (whole) body; Still lover of mortal woman."'%e dilemma that Nietzsche faces is how to use his inherited power for social theory while knowing of its limits. Thus,

in Dionysus, the fight to the death between two conceptions of the world is still staged. He participates in both, and clearly shows he is tom apart by that double allegiance. Dis- cord that he overcomes only in drunkenness. Into which he draws all who follow him and share his suffering.h7

The Nietzschean option for replacing his Marine Lover is a seductive but drunken one. Eventually, Nietzsche makes himself the "victim" of that terri- ble, patriarchal power. He "feminizes" his own body, or as Derrida has sug- gested, Nietzsche becomes "woman."hx Only then can Nietzsche give birth to himself as the strange child-god Dionys~s .~ ' And as Dionysus, Nietzsche finds himself "surrounded" by "woman," at last receiving constant attention from his nurses, mother, and sister.'"

Irigaray's criticism of this Dionysian option is that it is the "same" old patriarchal process. It commits the same crime against a new target. So it rep- licates the harmful effect it had on women except that it causes the death of Nietzsche this time. "Even should the god grant an increase of power and glory to the living man, if this is not continuous with his conception and his infancy, is he not induced to die rather than f lou r i~h?~ ' This is a different objection than what was seen in the other sections of the Marine Lover. It is one thing for the Marine Lover to object to Nietzsche turning the harsh gaze of abstraction on herself. It is a different matter to object to the Dionysian option. Her main criticism of this Nietzschean response is explicit: "The sac- rifice he makes to the Idea is inscribed in this-that he preferred the Idea to an ever provisional openness to a female other . . . To the point of willing to become that female other. Despite all physiology." 72 "Nietzsche" preferred to "other" himself rather than negotiate with his new, self-assured partner.73 But having ruled, is it not time for Nietzsche to be ruled in turn or at least to refrain from ruling? Nietzsche seems to break the dictate of dialogue, which is that there is no escaping one's counterpart in this eternal engagement.7%e refuses the Marine Lover, his feminine, now feminist, complement. Yet he somehow manages to relate to a (strange) "female other."

In tracing the rhetoric of such a relation, the question is not why but how does this happen. I offer no psychological or biographical explanations for why Nietzsche would become Dionysus. It is not aquestion of the viability or

762 POLITICAL THEORY / December 1999

the desirability of "man" becoming "woman," of "Nietzsche as woman," or of "Nietzsche" becoming "Dionysus." One need only acknowledge that these are all familiar views in the debate over the feminine and ~ i e t z s c h e . ~ ~ Given that, what cues are offered by the Marine Loverthat show how these positions are possible?

Recall that Nietzsche preferred an "Ideal" to a "provisional openness to a female other." He evidently turned upon his own body and away from the Marine Lover. But in following her transformation from lover to feminist, Nietzsche may ask whether this latest Marine Lover is playing yet another role, for "woman" is so "artistic" that way. After all, "enlightenment" of the feminist sort had always been "man's affair, man's lot." Unless "woman seeks a new adornment for herself that way-I do think that adorning herself is part of the ~ternal -~eminine?"~ ' In leaving such conjecture as a question, Nietzsche recognizes an aporia that grammarians define as an artifice that enables doubt. Such doubt serves as an excuse for turning to a more trustwor- thy partner and Dionysus. And as political theorists, who can blame Nietz- sche, for it was Hobbes who taught that only fools enter into uninsured contracts.

111.RAMIFICATIONS

What is the point of this condensed reading of a dialogue? In sum, the familiar politics of our favorite Nietzschean question rely upon a supplemen- tary order, upon rhetoric. Politics as we know them are not all that is going on. The Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche reminds us that the fashionable question of the feminine and Nietzsche has strange origins. Yes, the issues of our favorite problematic, such as desire, patriarchy, whether Nietzsche is a "misogynist" or not, if Irigaray's feminism is "separatist," and what chal- lenges feminism must face, can be developed from the Marine Lover. But we can no longer focus simply on the issues at hand even though the dialogue seems to address precisely those issues.

To see beyond our familiar politics, one need only ask who must be speak- ing for there to be such issues. For instance, to ask about the potential of Nietzschean theory for feminism is to be a feminist or perhaps a progressive. To suggest that Nietzsche is a misogynist or antifeminist is to presume that Nietzsche has that position. But these familiar political roles are neither set positions nor identities, at least not if the Marine Lover is any indication.

In "Veiled Lips," there was not simply a feminist charging Nietzsche with misogyny or patriarchy. More precisely, she is that feminist called the Marine

Caro 1 OUR FAVORITE NIETZSCHEAN QUESTION 763

Lover who comes after the beguiling, cooing lover of "Immemorial Waters." Similarly, there is not simply the Nietzsche who can be identified as a patri- arch or misogynist. He is that Nietzsche who follows the oblivious, foolhardy Don Juan of Part One. And there is not simply a crazed Nietzsche who pro- claims himself Dionysus, but rather there is the Nietzsche who follows and is to be seen in contrast to those two prior versions of Nietzsche and his marine counterparts.

It is not amatter of authorial intentions nor of going beyond them. Reading Irigaray's dialogue enables us to witness the openness of the seemingly static positions that are taken in and for our favorite debate. Certainly, we have our political postures, and we ask our familiar questions all of the time. Hence, the massive literature that has developed around our favorite problematic. We charge "misogyny," or antifeminism, or "reverse ressentiment" and so forth. We ask about Lou SalomC or Nietzsche's sister. But a different world can be seen that complicates such inquiries because Irigaray's dialogue raises the question of how these positions are possible. Yes, one can find the usual posi- tions of our debate in the Marine Lover. But to do so, they must be abstracted from the ongoing interplay of the dialogue. Nietzsche as patriarch has to be detached from those other Nietzsches just as the Marine Lover as feminist has to be subtracted from what came before. Only then are the more familiar, more settled, roles and politics recognizable. They are not simply there or present. Those politics originate through rhetoric.

I have characterized the extra order required for our politics in terms of rhetorical or grammatical figures. But I am neither a rhetorician nor a gram- marian. They have merely provided a nomenclature for a productive set of maneuvers: anacoluthon, aporia, hypophora, paraleipsis, and so forth. The stance, or what Heidegger calls the "comportment," that we have toward these other politics is where the stakes are higher.77 One can endeavor to har- ness such tactics, to become technicians of them, and thereby maintain our masterful posture. But we would be using them inauthentically since, as has been demonstrated, they are what make our political inquiries possible. More likely, we will again forget or hide this supplementary order. That is our way, our realpolitik. But that will not stop the effects of rhetoric.

NOTES

1 . The reference here is to that well-titled volume of essays, Nietzsche und the Feminine, ed. Peter Burgard (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994). Also see Jean Graybeal, krnguuge und "the Feminine" in Nietzsche and Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).

764 POLITICAL THEORY / December 1999

2. For a discussion on whether Nietzsche can contribute to a feminist politics, see Maude- marie Clark, "Nietzsche's Misogyny," International Studies in Philosophy 26 (1992): 3- 12. Also useful is Tamsin Lorraine, "Nietzsche and Feminism: Transvaluing Women in Thus Spoke Zaru- thustru," Internutionul Studies in Philosophy 26 (1992): 13-30, as well as Lynne Tirrell, "Sexual Dualism and Women's Self-creation: On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Reading Nietz- sche for Feminists" in Nietzsche and the Feminine, 158-83.

3.For more on rhetoric, see Paul de Man, Allegories ($Reading (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni- versity Press, 1979).

4. For the idea that Nietzsche is a misogynist, see Judith Shklar, Ordinary Vices, (Cam-bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 226. Also see Penny Weise, Gendered Community (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 156. For an argument against the misogynist view, see Fredrick Appel, "The Ubermensch's Consort: Nietzsche and the Eternal Feminine," History (fPolitical Thought 18 (1997): 515.

5. Thus, "we are necessarily strangers to ourselves, we do not comprehend ourselves, we have to misunderstand ourselves, for us the law 'Each is furthest from himself' applies to all eternity-we are not 'men of knowledge' with respect to ourselves." See the preface to the Gene-alogy ofMoruls in the Busic Writings ofNietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1968), 451.

6. For Nietzsche's instructive deployment of "we," see Tracy Strong, introduction to Friedrich Nietzsche: Twilight ofthe Idols (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1998), xvii-xix. For a sensi- tizing view of the politics of referring to "us" or "we" see my "Onloookers of Hegel's Phenome- nology:' Political Studies 45 (1997): 914-27.

7. Luce Irigaray, The Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietz.~che, trans. Gillian Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). Translation occasionally adjusted. See Amante Marine de Friedrich Niehsche (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1980). Henceforth referred to as Marine and Amunte, respectively.

8. For a discussion of Nietzsche's intentionality, see Peter Levine, Nietzsche und the Mod- ern Crisis o f the Humunities (Albany: State University of New York, 1995) chap. 7.

9. Derrida notes what "ridiculous naivete . . . what sly, obscure, and shady business are behind declarations ofthe type: Friedrich Nietzsche said this or that, he thought this or that about this or that subject." See Jacques Demda, "Otobiographies: The Teaching of Nietzsche and the Politics of the Proper Name," in The Eur o f the Other, trans. Avital Ronell (Lincoln: Nebraska University Press, 1985), 14.

10.Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche Life us Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 38.

1 I. Robert Ackemann, Nietzsche: A Frenzied Look (Amherst: Univers~ty of Massachusetts, 1990), 10.

12. Also see Appel, "The Ubermensch's Consort," 526. 13.For an exception to the rule, see Tracy Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and Politics cfTruns-

,figuration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973, 4-5 14. The pattern of reading Nietzsche with "difficulty" has a fine history in the English-

speaking study of his work. Kaufmann recounts how, while visiting Trinity College, he inquired whether the "Salter" on the faculty roster was the same one who had written of Nietzsche. "Dear no," came the response, "he did not deal with crackpot subjects like that." Given that perception, notjust of the difficulty of Nietzsche but of his incoherence, interpreters were satisfied to simply show some unity in Nietzsche's philosophy. So in his What Nietzsche Meuns, Morgan's aim is to explode "the myth of his capricious inconsistency." Pfeffer also rejects the view of Nietzsche as contradictory, arguing instead that his thinking is united by "one underlying principle." See Walter Kaufmann's preface to Nietzsche Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (New York:

Caro / OUR FAVORITE NIETZSCHEAN QUESTION 765

Vintage, 1950). See also George Morgan, Whut Nietzsche Meuns (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1941), 29, and Rose Pfeffer's preface to Nietzsche: Disciple ofDionysus (Lewisburg, PA: Buck- nell University Press, 1972).

15. Peter Burgard, "Introduction: Figures of Excess," in Nietzsche and the Feminine, 8. 16. KSA refers to Friedrich Nietzsche, Sumtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgube in 1.5

Einzelbunden, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988). 17. See Paul Patton's introduction to Nietzsche, Feminism, und Politicul Theory (New York:

Routledge, 1993) and Gary Shapiro, Alcyone: Nietzsche on Gf t s , Noise und Women (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 30-31.

18.Wayne Klein, Nietzsche und the Promise ofPhilosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 132.

19. Ibid., 48. 20. See Karen Carr, "Nietzsche on Nihilism and the Crisis of Interpretation," and Babette

Babich, "Self-Deconstruction: Nietzsche's Philosophy as Style," both in Soundings 73 (1990): 85-104 and 105-24. Also see Alan Schrift, Nietzsche und the Question c!f'Interpretution: Between Hermeneutics und Deconstruction (New York: Routledge, 1990), and Jean Granier, "Perspectivism and Interpretation," in The Neiv Nietzsche (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 19 1 Kaufmann devotes his longest chapter to "Nietzsche's Method because of the "grave difficul- ties encountered when one tries seriously to follow Nietzsche's thought." From Kaufmann, Nietzsche, 72.

21. Herbert Smyth, "Figures" in Greek Grammur (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), 679. Also see Friedrich Nietzsche, Nietzsche on Rhetoric und Lunguuge, ed. Sander Gilman, Carole Blair, and David Parent (New York: Oxford, 1989), 51-82.

22. For a discussion of Nietzsche's use of failure, see Georges Bataille, On Nietzsche, ed. Sylvere Lotringer (New York: Paragon House, 1992).

23. Strong raises this question about ourselves by arguing that, in spite of many efforts, it is not possible to discern a Nietzschean politics. See Tracy Strong, "Nietzsche's Political Misap- propriation" in The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1996), 119. Demda also raises the question "of the interpretation of interpretation." See Jacques Demda, Spurs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 73.

24. In Reading Nietzsche, the editor insists, "We want to get back down to the basics-reading Nietzsche." Solomon contends that his "idea of the book is to be just about Nietzsche" as opposed to any "fancy presentation of interpretations for their own sake, theories of interpreta- tion and theories about theories of theories of interpretation." See Richard Solomon's introduc- tion to Reuding Nietzsche (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988), 6.

25. For a discussion of the problem of presence, see Martin Heidegger, Being und Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 47. Also see Jacques Denida, Murgins of Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 31-32.

26. Panon notes casually that the "problematic" of Nietzsche's relation to the feminine has always been around. See Paul Panon's introduction to Nietzsche, Feminism, und Politicul Theory.

27. Bruce Detwiler, Nietzsche und the Politics ofAristocrutic Rudicalism (Chicago: Univer- sity of Chicago, 1990), 193.

28. Maudemarie Clark, "Nietzsche's Misogyny," Internutional Studies in Philosophy, 26 (1994): 5. Alternatively, Nietzsche's outbursts may be a function of his relation to his mother. See Graybeal, Lunguage, 9 1.

29. See Janet Lungstrum, "Nietzsche Writing Woman~Woman Writing Nietzsche: The Sex- ual Dialectic of Palingenesis," in Nietzsche und the Feminine, 135-57.

766 POLITICAL THEORY / December 1999

30. Nehunas argues that "we must read Beyond Good and Evil as a long, sustained, some- times rambling and disorganized but ultimately coherent, monologue." See Alexander Neha- mas, "A Reading of Beyond GoodundEvil," in Reading Nietzsche (Oxford, UK: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1988), 51.

31. Ansell-Pearson has argued that Nietzsche has a profound effect on the "identity" of his "we," his readers, ourselves. But what is meant by our identity being challenged in this way is that Nietzsche's thought (of the Ubermensch,for instance) can provide an alternative politics for "us" to choose or reject. See Keith Ansell-Pearson, "Who is the Ubermensch? Time, Truth and Woman in Nietzsche," Journal of the History ~ f I d e a s 53 (1992): 309-30.

32. Leo Strauss, City und Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 59. 33. Irigaray's Murine Lover of Friedrich Niehsche should be a comfortable book for the

political theorist. Many of the elements that are found in the Socratic dialogues are replayed again. For instance, eros, that definitive component of the philosophical dialogue, is present in the Marine Lover, for it is admittedly an "amorous" dialogue. See Irigaray's admission in Luce Irigaray,Le Corps-u-corps avec: lumere (Montreal: Les Editions de laplein lune, 198 I), 295. In addition, where Plato's dialogues have raised questions of the identity of, say, the historical Soc- rates, for example, Irigaray's book also challenges our views of identity.

34. Perhaps this is why the text has received relatively scant attention. One commentator noted, "I found no one, up until a year after its publication, who had been able to read Amunte Mitrine with its complex literary allusions." From Eleanor Kuykendall, "Toward an Ethic of Nurturance: Luce Irigaray on Mothering and Power" in Mothering, Essays in Feminist Theory, ed. 1.Treblicot (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanhead, 1984), 270. Irigaray's Murine Lover has been seen as a work of prose or "fiction." See Frances Oppel, "Speaking of Immemorial Waters" in Nietzsche, Feminism, and Politrcal Theory, 92, 107.

35. Denida, Spurs, 101-3. 36. The Marine Lover comments that "I love to share whereas you [Nietzsche] want to keep

everything for yourself." Marine, 19;Amitnte, 25. 37. Marine, 7; Amante 13-14. 38. Marine, 3; Amunte, 9. 39. This is a standard lrigarayan theme. Thus, the "production of women, signs and com-

modities is always referred back to men." Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. Caro- lyn Burke (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 171.

40. "I had been taught that a woman who belonged to no one was nothing.. . . Nothing? This whole that always and at every moment was thus becoming new?" From Mi~rine, S;Amante, 1I .

41. Mi~rine,24; Amitnte, 30. 42. Marine, 18;Amunte, 24. 43. Such squandering is analogous to Bataille's notion of "expenditure." See Georges

Bataille, "The Notion of Expenditure," in Visions ofExcess: Selected Writings, 1927-1 939 (Min-neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 122.

4 4 . Marme, 36-37; Amante, 43. 45. Irigaray (Murine,9 1 ;Ami~nte,97) writes, "A ground rises up, a montage of shapes disin-

tegrates. The horror of the abyss attributed to woman. Loss of identity--death." See also Ellen Mortensen, "Woman's Untruth and le feminin: Reading Luce Irigaray with Nietzsche and Hei- degger," in Engaging with Iriguruy: Ferninkt Philosophy und Modern Europeun Thought, ed. Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor, and Margaret Whitford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 212.

46. Mi~rine,36; Amitnte, 43. 47. Mortensen, "Woman's Untruth," 219.

Caro 1 OUR FAVORITE NIETZSCHEAN QUESTION 767

48. For an excellent review, see Maggie Berg, "Luee Irigaray's Contradictions: Poststmctur- alism and Feminism," Signs 17 (Fall 1991): 50-70.

49. Marine, 82; Amwnte, 88. 50. "But still! My noble enthusi~t-there is also in the most beautiful sailing ship so much

noise and bustling, and alas, so much petty, pitiable bustling! The enchantment and most power- ful effect of woman, is, to use the language of philosophers, an effect at a distance." See Nietz- sche's Gay Science (1:60) in the Basic Writings.

51. Marine, 83; Amwnte, 89. A number of commentators have puzzled over Nietzsche's extravagant punctuation regarding women. See Clark, "Nietzsehe's Misogyny," 7, as well as Appel. "The Ubermensch's Consort," 516-17, and Demda, Spurs, 69.

52. Marine, 88; Amante, 94. 53. Marine, 89; Amante, 95. 54. Marine, 84; Amante, 90. 55. The Marine Lover (p. 189) wonders aloud whether "men-perhaps?-know no other

way." 56. Marine, 85; Amante, 91. 57. Marine, 86; Amnante, 92-93. 58. Marine, 90; Amante, 96. 59. Marine, 90; Atnante, 96. 60. Marine, 123;Amante, 131. 61. See Sarah Kofman, "Baubo: Theological Perversions and Fetishisms" in Nietzsche's

New Seas, ed. Michael Gillespie and Tracy Strong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 197-98.

62. See Bataille, On Nietzsche, xxx. 63. Marine, 127;Amante, 135. 64. Marine, 126; Amante, 134. 65. Marine, 134;Amante, 143. 66. Marine, 130;Atnante, 139. 67. Marine, 129;Amante, 137. 68. Denda , Spurs, 101. 69. Marine, 135; Atnante, 144. Valadier argues "that lnan must assume an authentically

'feminine' attitude in welcoming Dionysus." As part of his evidence, Valadier quotes Nietzsche, "A labyrinthian man does not look for truth, he forever seeks only his Ariadne." From a letterto J. Burckhardt, January 4, 1889, signed "Dionysus." See Paul Valadier, "Dionysus Versus the Crucified," in The New Nietzsche, 249.

70. But the Marine Lover (p. 124) criticizes the cult of the phallus that these women built around the Dionysian Nietzsche: "Drunk with his miracles, dancing with him, raving with him. . .all ofthem are his lovers, and his followers, and his senants. And for him they would kill their own child, and fool the godliest of women. . . for they are wholly devoted to his madness. To their wild rapture. To their pure passion." Krell makes the suggestion that Irigaray is resentful of such phallic pleasure. See David Krell, "To the Orange Groves at the Edge of the Sea: Remarks on Irigaray's Atnunre Marine," in Nietzsche and the Feminine, 205.

71. Marine, 135-36;Atnante, 144. 72. Marine, 187;Amante, 201. This is the only place in the text where Nietzsche is called by

name. 73. For Irigaray's vision of a more democratic and negotiated relationship between the sexes,

see Luce Irigaray, Thinking the Difference for a Peaceful Revolution (London: Athlone, 1994), xvi, 24.

768 POLITICAL THEORY / December 1999

74. Ansell-Pearson, for instance, suggests that Nietzsche's "solipsist" turn away from his lover is a function of his own "ressentiment." See Keith Ansell-Pearson, "Nietzsche, Woman and Political Theory," in Nietzsche, Feminism, and Politicul Theory, 40.

75. See Kelly Oliver, Womanizing Nietzsche: Philosophy's Relition to the Feminine (New York: Routledge, 1995), chap. 4.

76. See Beyond Good und Evil in the Basic Writings, sec. 232. 77. Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," in Basic Writlngs (San Francisco: Harper,

1993), 122.

Jason S. Curo is cin c~dvanced grc~duate student in politicul science ut the University o f California, Los Angeles. He is completing a study of the origins ($freedom. He k1.s urit-ten on Hegel and is interested in the history of the craft c!fpoliticc~l philosophy.

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