Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border GuardsExplaining Immigration Flows and State Responses

Christian Breunig and Adam Luedtke

Department of Political Science - University of TorontoNiehaus Center for Globalization & Governance - Princeton University & University of Utah

Prepared for presentation at the IPES ConferenceCollege Station, November 13-14, 2009

Motivation

Research MotivationImmigration Flows and the Role of the State

Immigration scholars debate three key areas:

• Can the receiving state control/regulate immigration flows? Dopolitical/economic conditions in the receiving state affect levels ofimmigration? How so?

• Are there systematic differences between causal determinants (andthe extent of state control) for inflows of foreign workers versus thosefor asylum-seekers/refugees?

• Do the immigration inflows (and policies) of one state affectneighboring states? How and to what extent?

Research MotivationImmigration Flows and the Role of the State

Immigration scholars debate three key areas:

• Can the receiving state control/regulate immigration flows? Dopolitical/economic conditions in the receiving state affect levels ofimmigration? How so?

• Are there systematic differences between causal determinants (andthe extent of state control) for inflows of foreign workers versus thosefor asylum-seekers/refugees?

• Do the immigration inflows (and policies) of one state affectneighboring states? How and to what extent?

Research MotivationImmigration Flows and the Role of the State

Immigration scholars debate three key areas:

• Can the receiving state control/regulate immigration flows? Dopolitical/economic conditions in the receiving state affect levels ofimmigration? How so?

• Are there systematic differences between causal determinants (andthe extent of state control) for inflows of foreign workers versus thosefor asylum-seekers/refugees?

• Do the immigration inflows (and policies) of one state affectneighboring states? How and to what extent?

Research MotivationImmigration Flows and the Role of the State

Immigration scholars debate three key areas:

• Can the receiving state control/regulate immigration flows? Dopolitical/economic conditions in the receiving state affect levels ofimmigration? How so?

• Are there systematic differences between causal determinants (andthe extent of state control) for inflows of foreign workers versus thosefor asylum-seekers/refugees?

• Do the immigration inflows (and policies) of one state affectneighboring states? How and to what extent?

The ArgumentAn Institutional Theory of Immigration Policy

• If any factor in the receiving state matters, it is likely to be politicalinstitutions - specifically, constraints on pure majoritarian democracy.

• Typically, the median voter is relatively xenophobic compared toimmigration policy outputs (immigrant inflows). What can explainthis gap?

• If political systems connect pure majoritarian preferences with policyoutputs, then immigration policy is more restrictive (smaller inflows).But if political systems constrain majoritarianism, then governmentscater to their pro-immigration ”clients” and ignore populistxenophobia.

Hypothesis: Institutions

Institutional constraints enable immigrant inflows

The ArgumentAn Institutional Theory of Immigration Policy

• If any factor in the receiving state matters, it is likely to be politicalinstitutions - specifically, constraints on pure majoritarian democracy.

• Typically, the median voter is relatively xenophobic compared toimmigration policy outputs (immigrant inflows). What can explainthis gap?

• If political systems connect pure majoritarian preferences with policyoutputs, then immigration policy is more restrictive (smaller inflows).But if political systems constrain majoritarianism, then governmentscater to their pro-immigration ”clients” and ignore populistxenophobia.

Hypothesis: Institutions

Institutional constraints enable immigrant inflows

The ArgumentAn Institutional Theory of Immigration Policy

• If any factor in the receiving state matters, it is likely to be politicalinstitutions - specifically, constraints on pure majoritarian democracy.

• Typically, the median voter is relatively xenophobic compared toimmigration policy outputs (immigrant inflows). What can explainthis gap?

• If political systems connect pure majoritarian preferences with policyoutputs, then immigration policy is more restrictive (smaller inflows).But if political systems constrain majoritarianism, then governmentscater to their pro-immigration ”clients” and ignore populistxenophobia.

Hypothesis: Institutions

Institutional constraints enable immigrant inflows

The ArgumentAn Institutional Theory of Immigration Policy

• If any factor in the receiving state matters, it is likely to be politicalinstitutions - specifically, constraints on pure majoritarian democracy.

• Typically, the median voter is relatively xenophobic compared toimmigration policy outputs (immigrant inflows). What can explainthis gap?

• If political systems connect pure majoritarian preferences with policyoutputs, then immigration policy is more restrictive (smaller inflows).But if political systems constrain majoritarianism, then governmentscater to their pro-immigration ”clients” and ignore populistxenophobia.

Hypothesis: Institutions

Institutional constraints enable immigrant inflows

Alternative ExplanationsPolitical Ideology and Economic Factors

Alternative 1: Government Ideology

Left parties enable immigrant inflows

Alternative 2: The Economy

Economic opportunities determine immigrant inflows

• High unemployment rates deters foreign workers (and possiblyasylum-seekers) from coming to a particular country.

• GDP growth attracts foreign workers and asylum-seekers to aparticular country

Alternative ExplanationsPolitical Ideology and Economic Factors

Alternative 1: Government Ideology

Left parties enable immigrant inflows

Alternative 2: The Economy

Economic opportunities determine immigrant inflows

• High unemployment rates deters foreign workers (and possiblyasylum-seekers) from coming to a particular country.

• GDP growth attracts foreign workers and asylum-seekers to aparticular country

DataImmigration Flows - 1987-2005

Year

For

eign

Wor

kers

05000

100001500020000

1990 2000

AUS AUT

1990 2000

BEL CAN

1990 2000

CHE DEU

1990 2000

DNK

ESP FIN FRA GBR GRC IRL

05000100001500020000

ITA0

5000100001500020000

JPN

1990 2000

NLD NOR

1990 2000

NZL PRT

1990 2000

SWE USA

DataImmigration Flows - 1987-2005

Year

Asy

lum

See

kers

02000400060008000

10000

1990 2000

AUS AUT

1990 2000

BEL CAN

1990 2000

CHE DEU

1990 2000

DNK

ESP FIN FRA GBR GRC IRL

0200040006000800010000

ITA0

2000400060008000

10000JPN

1990 2000

NLD NOR

1990 2000

NZL PRT

1990 2000

SWE USA

Methodology IEstimation and Specification

y = βX + ρWy + ε

where:

• y is (1) foreign workers or (2) asylum seekers

• X includes Political Constraints (Heinsz 2002), Government Ideology(Left Cabinet Seat Share), Lagged Unemployment Rate and LaggedGrowth Rate

and the following extension for capturing cross-country diffusion:

• a connectivity matrix W denoting linkages among observations

• the outcome variable y

• a spatial lag ρ

Methodology IEstimation and Specification

y = βX + ρWy + ε

where:

• y is (1) foreign workers or (2) asylum seekers

• X includes Political Constraints (Heinsz 2002), Government Ideology(Left Cabinet Seat Share), Lagged Unemployment Rate and LaggedGrowth Rate

and the following extension for capturing cross-country diffusion:

• a connectivity matrix W denoting linkages among observations

• the outcome variable y

• a spatial lag ρ

Methodology IEstimation and Specification

y = βX + ρWy + ε

where:

• y is (1) foreign workers or (2) asylum seekers

• X includes Political Constraints (Heinsz 2002), Government Ideology(Left Cabinet Seat Share), Lagged Unemployment Rate and LaggedGrowth Rate

and the following extension for capturing cross-country diffusion:

• a connectivity matrix W denoting linkages among observations

• the outcome variable y

• a spatial lag ρ

Methodology IIIdentifying Neighbors and Interpretation of Effects

Identification of “Neighbors”:

• close geographic proximity (Capitals < 900km)

• being a potential alternative “target country”

Interpretation depends on feedback mechanism:

E (y) = (I− ρW)−1Xβ

• show the distribution of outcomes across all countries

• focus on a specific country and display domestic and diffusion effects

• construct a counterfactual change in immigration flows to a specificcountry and illustrate the impact

Methodology IIIdentifying Neighbors and Interpretation of Effects

Identification of “Neighbors”:

• close geographic proximity (Capitals < 900km)

• being a potential alternative “target country”

Interpretation depends on feedback mechanism:

E (y) = (I− ρW)−1Xβ

• show the distribution of outcomes across all countries

• focus on a specific country and display domestic and diffusion effects

• construct a counterfactual change in immigration flows to a specificcountry and illustrate the impact

Methodology IIIdentifying Neighbors and Interpretation of Effects

Identification of “Neighbors”:

• close geographic proximity (Capitals < 900km)

• being a potential alternative “target country”

Interpretation depends on feedback mechanism:

E (y) = (I− ρW)−1Xβ

• show the distribution of outcomes across all countries

• focus on a specific country and display domestic and diffusion effects

• construct a counterfactual change in immigration flows to a specificcountry and illustrate the impact

Findings – Equilibrium Effects

2020 2040 2060 2080 2100

0.00

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

Foreign Workers

Equilibrium Effects for Political Constraints

Den

sity

AU

S

AU

TB

EL

CA

N

DN

KF

INF

RA

DE

U

GR

C

IRL

ITA

JPN

LUX

NLD

NZ

L

NO

R

PR

TE

SP

SW

E

CH

EG

BR

US

A

3350 3360 3370 3380 3390 3400

0.00

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

Asylum Seekers

Equilibrium Effects for Political Constraints

Den

sity

AU

S

AU

T

BE

L

CA

N

DN

KF

IN

FR

AD

EU

GR

C

IRL

ITA

JPN

LUX

NLD

NZ

L

NO

R

PR

TE

SP

SW

E

CH

E

GB

R

US

A

Findings – Equilibrium Effects

−1100 −1090 −1080 −1070 −1060 −1050

0.00

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.10

Foreign Workers

Equilibrium Effects for Unemployment

Den

sity

AU

S

AU

TB

EL

CA

N

DN

K

FIN

FR

A

DE

U

GR

C

IRL

ITA

JPN

LUX

NLD

NZ

L

NO

R

PR

TE

SP

SW

E

CH

EG

BR

US

A

−130.0 −129.5 −129.0 −128.5 −128.0

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

Asylum Seekers

Equilibrium Effects for Unemployment

Den

sity

AU

S

AU

TB

EL

CA

N

DN

K

FIN

FR

AD

EU

GR

C

IRL

ITA

JPN

LUX

NLD

NZ

L

NO

R

PR

T

ES

P

SW

EC

HE

GB

R

US

A

Findings – Scenario 1: Germany 2000

Political Constraints − Germany 2000

Foreign Workers

−14−8−7−6−5−30152020

Findings – Scenario 1: Germany 2000

Political Constraints − Germany 2000

Asylum Seekers

02367151617213357

Findings – Scenario 1: Germany 2000

Unemployment − Germany 2000

Foreign Workers

−1055−3−102347

Findings – Scenario 1: Germany 2000

Unemployment − Germany 2000

Asylum Seekers

−128−10

Findings - Scenario II: Immigration to Germany doubles

Inflow Doubles − Germany 2000

Foreign Workers

−59−42−370

Findings - Scenario II: Immigration to Germany doubles

Inflow Doubles − Germany 2000

Asylum Seekers

0679

Discussion and Conclusions

Empirically, we find:

• political constraints and unemployment rate contribute toimmigration inflows

• the first more important for asylum seekers and the latter for foreignworkers

• occurrence of two diffusion processes: spill-over and competition

Theoretically, we propose:

• institutional constraints shield policy makers from anti-immigrationsentiment resulting in higher immigrant inflows

• Left parties are not “softer” on immigration than Right

• diffusion processes need to be model and theorized explicitlyalready in progress: estimating y = βX + ρWy + φyt−1 + ε withdifferent W

Discussion and Conclusions

Empirically, we find:

• political constraints and unemployment rate contribute toimmigration inflows

• the first more important for asylum seekers and the latter for foreignworkers

• occurrence of two diffusion processes: spill-over and competition

Theoretically, we propose:

• institutional constraints shield policy makers from anti-immigrationsentiment resulting in higher immigrant inflows

• Left parties are not “softer” on immigration than Right

• diffusion processes need to be model and theorized explicitlyalready in progress: estimating y = βX + ρWy + φyt−1 + ε withdifferent W

Connectivity Matrix

Country ISOCODE Connections

Australia AUS JPN NZLAustria AUT DNK DEU ITA LUX CHEBelgium BEL DNK FRA DEU IRL LUX NLD CHE GBRCanada CAN USADenmark ‘ DNK AUT BEL FIN DEU LUX NLD NOR SWEFinland FIN DNK NOR SWEFrance FRA BEL DEU IRL LUX NLD CHE GBRGermany DEU AUT BEL DNK FRA LUX NLD CHE GBRGreece GRC ITAIreland IRL BEL FRA NLD GBRItaly ITA AUT GRC CHEJapan JPN AUS NZLLuxembourg LUX AUT BEL DNK FRA DEU NLD CHE GBRNetherlands NLD BEL DNK FRA DEU IRL LUX CHE GBRNew Zealand NZL AUS JPNNorway NOR DNK FIN SWEPortugal PRT ESPSpain ESP PRTSweden SWE DNK FIN NORSwitzerland CHE AUT BEL FRA DEU ITA LUX NLD GBRUnited Kingdom GBR BEL FRA DEU IRL LUX NLD CHEUnited States USA CAN