Upload
others
View
0
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Oconee Nuclear Station Pre-Application Meeting - October 13, 2015
LAR to Support Keowee Stator Replacement
Duke Participants
Doug Phelps, Critical Systems Engineering Director, Oconee Nuclear Station
Chris Wasik, Regulatory Affairs Manager, Oconee Nuclear Station
Darla King, Keowee Electrical System Lead Engineer, Oconee Nuclear Station
Boyd Shingleton, Licensing Lead Engineer for Stator LAR, Oconee Nuclear Station
For Information Only 2
Agenda
Introduction/Background Chris Wasik
Proposed Technical Specification Change Chris Wasik
Keowee Outage Timeline Doug Phelps
Diverse Backup Power for Emergency Power System Doug Phelps
Risk Reduction Measures Doug Phelps
For Information Only 3
Introduction
Chris Wasik
Regulatory Affairs Manager, Oconee Nuclear Station
For Information Only 4
Keowee Generator Stator Project
Keowee Hydro Station commissioned in 1971 2008 - 2009 preventative maintenance inspections identified aging mechanisms in rotor pole
assemblies 2009 Duke Energy started planning efforts to refurbish/overhaul both Keowee generators First phase refurbished/replaced all 56 generator field poles on each KHU
• KHU-2 performed January 2014
• KHU-1 performed July 2014 Second phase is to replace stator for each KHU
• KHU-1 scheduled January 2018 • KHU-2 scheduled January 2019
5 For Information Only
Keowee Generator Stator Project
6 For Information Only
Keowee Generator Stator Project
Licensing Background
NRC approved LAR for one-time extended TS Completion Time to allow KHU rotor pole rewind work on January 8, 2014
ONS plans to request a one-time extended TS Completion Time to allow stator on each KHU to be replaced
Similar justification will be provided for stator LAR
7 For Information Only
Proposed Technical Specification Change
Current TS 3.8.1 C – KHU aligned to the overhead path inoperable • Cumulative 45 day Completion Time to restore inoperable KHU over a 3 year period
The License Amendment Request (LAR) will request a one-time 55 day Completion Time for each KHU to allow stator replacement
8 For Information Only
Keowee Generator Stator Project
Doug Phelps
Critical Systems Engineering Director Oconee Nuclear Station
9 For Information Only
Keowee Generator Stator Project
10 For Information Only
Implementation Strategy Original strategy was a standard rewind, estimated to require a 100-120 day Technical Specification
(TS) Allowed Outage Time (AOT) Alternate strategy was developed based on benchmark trip Benchmark plant strategy was to pre-build stator remote to unit Feasibility study was conducted to determine if a pre-build strategy was viable for Keowee Study concluded pre-build stator strategy was feasible and reduces the required TS AOT by ~50% ONS selected option to pre-build the stator in an assembly building to minimize required TS AOT As a result, the scope of the project expanded to include:
• New Frames • Stator Assembly Building • Powerhouse Modifications • Heavy hauling from the assembly facility to the powerhouse and haul path evaluation
Keowee Generator Stator Outage Timeline
11 For Information Only
Start Finish
55 Days – Total Work Window
2 days - Dewater Dual KHU Outage
24 days physical work, generator restoration & testing with contingency 25 days physical work with contingency
2 days - Dewater Dual KHU Outage
2 days - Generator Isolation & Prep for Rotor/Stator Lifts
ONS Electrical Distribution System
12 For Information Only
2 1
4 3
4 7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
26
27
28 31
33
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
4T
KEOWEEHYDRO
Gen 2 Gen 1
40
AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM
to B4T
1T CT1
6900
Main Generator Unit #1
6900 4160
NORMAL SOURCE
STARTUP SOURCE
2TA 2TB
2T CT2
6900 4160
Main Generator Unit #2
6900 4160
NORMAL SOURCE
STARTUP SOURCE
3TA 3TB
3TC 3TD 3TE
3T CT3
6900
Main Generator Unit #3
6900 4160
NORMALSOURCE
STARTUP SOURCE
N1 N2 E1 E2 S1 S2
AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM
to B3T
MFB #1MFB #2
MFB #1MFB #2
CT4
4160
CS 90
CT5
4160
22. 6 MilesCentral White
SK1 SK2
AUTOTRANSFORMER
5T
STANDBY BUS #1STANDBY BUS #2
KEOWEE OVERHEAD
KATOMA
ASBURY NEWPORT
SOUTH HALL
525 KVRED BUS
YELLOW BUS
RED BUS
YELLOW BUS
230 KV
(NORTHGREENVILLE)
DACUS
( CENTRAL)OCONEE
( CENTRAL)CALHOUN
JOCASSEE
13. 8 KV UNDERGROUND FEEDER
4160 EMERGENCY STARTUP BUS
6900 STARTUP BUS
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION
B W WB WB
W B
Aux Transformer Aux Transformer Aux Transformer
Main Transformer Main Transformer Main Transformer
Startup Transformer Startup Transformer Startup Transformer
1TC 1TD 1TE
N1 N2 E1 E2 S1 S2
2TC 2TD 2TE
N1 N2 E1 E2 S1 S2
MFB #1MFB #2
AHP
SWP
BPS
WP
SSFOTS1
30
1TA 1TB
1A1RCP
1B1RCP
1A2RCP
1B2RCP
2A1RCP
2B1RCP
2A2RCP
2B2RCP
3A1RCP
3B2RCP
3A2RCP
3B1RCP
OCB 41
OCB 101
Central Switchyard
100 KV
1
11
7CCT
8CCT
2
12
34
13
Lee Switchyard
100KV
8. 5 MilesFant
Black
OCB 35
SL1 SL2
A B D C
9 10
11 12
B6T/B7T
PSW
ONS Transmission Lines
13 For Information Only
Oconee Nuclear Station Oconee
Nuclear Station
Backup Power for Emergency Power System
Proposed LAR will credit the following backup power sources: • Underground Keowee Hydro Unit • Dedicated Lee Combustion Turbine energizing both Standby Buses during extended completion time • Remaining LCT available and capable of energizing the Standby Buses within one hour • Required offsite power sources available • SSF capable of mitigating SBO for at least 72 hours • Two dedicated Jocassee Hydro Units available either of which has capacity of powering ONS
shutdown loads in approximately one hour • Temporary diesel generator at Keowee capable of restoring unwatered Underground KHU within 4
hours • PSW power system capable of powering SSF
14 For Information Only
Alternate Methods of Maintaining Safe Shutdown
The following systems/equipment can be used to maintain all three Oconee units in a safe shutdown condition:
• SSF operable and capable of providing alternate shutdown capability • PSW System operable and capable of providing alternate shutdown capability • Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump capable of feeding steam generators • FLEX equipment available
One or more of the following power sources can be used to place all three Oconee units in cold shutdown:
• One LCT energizing ONS standby buses prior to outage start • Underground KHU • A second LCT can be started and aligned to the standby buses within one hour • Two Jocassee Hydro Units available, either of which can be aligned to the Oconee 230kV Yellow Bus
in approximately one hour • Any of multiple offsite power sources
15 For Information Only
Lee Combustion Turbines
Two LCTs (7C, 8C) available to power Oconee standby buses Dedicated line electrically separated from the system grid and offsite loads Capacity to supply ONS shutdown loads Routinely operated/tested, demonstrating reliability Black start capable, tested annually Included in the ONS Normal and Emergency Operating Procedures Verified available each shift Staffed continuously
16 For Information Only
Lee Combustion Turbines
17 For Information Only
Jocassee Hydro Station
Two of the four Jocassee Hydro Units can be separated from the grid and dedicated to ONS in approximately one hour
Each Jocassee Hydro Station unit is rated at 195 MVA Two transmission lines, north of ONS, directly connect the Jocassee 230 kV
switchyard to the Oconee 230 kV switchyard Capacity to supply ONS shutdown loads Routinely operated/tested, demonstrating reliability Black start capable, tested annually Included in the ONS Emergency Operating Procedures Verified available each shift Staffed continuously
18 For Information Only
Jocassee Hydro Station
19 For Information Only
Temporary DG located at Keowee for restoring U/G KHU
Onsite DG supplies backup power to KHS during dual KHU outage when unwatered
Adequate capacity to restore the underground KHU Allows for rapid restoration of the underground KHU during loss of all power (≤ 4
hours) Black start capable Use approved Keowee operating procedures Operated and tested prior to outage Verified available each shift Keowee Hydro Station continuously staffed
20 For Information Only
Standby Shutdown Facility and Protected Service Water System
Standby Shutdown Facility Provides an alternate means to achieve and maintain the ONS units in safe shutdown conditions Provides additional defense in depth protection by serving as a backup to existing safety systems Includes a dedicated power system including a diesel generator Credited to mitigate Station Blackout, and other non design basis events Mission time is 72 hours Staffed continuously during dual KHU outages when unwatered
Protected Service Water Provides an alternate means to achieve and maintain the ONS units in safe shutdown conditions Provides additional defense in depth protection by serving as a backup to existing safety systems Alternate power path to connect the SSF switchgear, with sufficient capacity to operate SSF equipment in
the event of a failure of the SSF diesel generator
21 For Information Only
Defense-in-Depth – Multiple Diverse Backup Power Sources
22 For Information Only
Start Finish
Keowee Outage Timeline
55 Days – Total Work Window
2 days - Dewater Dual KHU Outage
FLEX equipment available
SSF Operable (including SSF DG)
1 Lee CT running and energizing Standby Buses
2nd Lee CT in Standby available within 1 hour
9 offsite power sources available
Two Jocassee Hydro Units available within ~ 1 hour
25 days physical work
2 days - Dewater Dual KHU Outage
Underground (U/G) KHU
existing additional
2 days - Generator Isolation & Prep for Rotor/Stator Lifts
24 days physical work, generator restoration & testing
Temporary Diesel Generator at Keowee for restoring KHU associated U/G Path
PSW Power System available* and capable of providing power to the SSF
*commercial power feed during dual KHU outage, Keowee or commercial power feed during single KHU outage
Risk Reduction Measures - Regulatory Commitments
Duke Energy will commit to the following: ONS will not start the extended single KHU outage or a dual KHU outage if severe weather conditions
are forecast within the next two days. ONS will contact the system load dispatcher once per day to ensure no significant grid perturbations
(high grid loading not able to withstand a single contingency of line or generation outage) are expected during extended TS completion time.
ONS will avoid component testing or maintenance of safety systems and important non safety equipment in the offsite power systems that can increase the likelihood of a plant transient (unit trip) or LOOP. In addition, no discretionary switchyard maintenance will be performed.
ONS will verify that TS required systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices that depend on the remaining power sources are operable and preclude subsequent nondiscretionary testing or maintenance activities on these systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices during the extended TS completion time.
ONS will control the steam-driven emergency feedwater pump(s) as “protected” equipment during the extended TS completion time.
ONS will continuously staff the SSF during the dual KHU outages in which the intake is de-watered.
23 For Information Only
Other Risk Reduction Measures
Critical Activity Plan, approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee prior to implementation, used for risk management. Plan will include the following risk reduction measures: LCT and Central Switchyard protected 2nd LCT protected and available within one hour Two Jocassee Hydro Units available either of which can be aligned to the Oconee 230kV Yellow Bus
in approximately one hour Temporary DG located at Keowee Hydro Station with capability to restore available KHU unit to
operable status within 4 hours from dual KHU outage Reduced RCS Inventory not permitted during dual KHU outage PSW available to backup SSF FLEX equipment available
24 For Information Only
Summary
Stator replacement is needed and will improve equipment reliability for emergency power system
• Stator replacement outages scheduled for January 2018 and January 2019
Additional diverse backup power sources result in electrical system defense-in-depth that provides level of protection equivalent with Branch Technical Position guidelines
Additional risk reduction measures will be implemented and managed by critical activity plan
Staff approval of LAR is essential to allow Duke Energy to implement KHU reliability improvements
25 For Information Only
26