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United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Ref.

Policy Instruction

OCHA’s Structural Relationships Within An Integrated UN Presence

Approved by: John Holmes, Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Approval date: 1 May 2009 Contact: Chief, Policy Development and Studies Branch Review date: 1 May 2011

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Policy Instruction OCHA’s Structural Relationships Within An Integrated UN Presence

Contents: A. Purpose B. Scope C. Rationale D. Policy E. Terms and Definitions

F. References G. Monitoring and Compliance

H. Dates I. Contact J. History ANNEXES

A. Countries and areas where the principle of integration should be applied. B. List of Acronyms

A. PURPOSE 1. This policy instruction clarifies the structural relationships that Humanitarian

Coordinators and OCHA should have with any political mission1 or multidimensional peacekeeping operation within an ‘integrated UN presence.’ By doing so, this policy instruction will help ensure that Humanitarian Coordinators and OCHA field offices are best placed to support both the UN’s need for coherence and their own responsibilities for humanitarian coordination under General Assembly Resolution 46/182.2

B. SCOPE 2. This policy applies wherever there is a Humanitarian Coordinator, OCHA Field Office

or OCHA Field Presence and a ‘integrated UN presence.”

1 Unless the text specifies otherwise, the term “political mission,” will be used throughout this document as short-hand to collectively refer to all of the following: DPA and DPKO-led special political missions, DPA-led political missions, DPA-led peacebuilding support offices, DPKO-led political missions and DPKO-led peacebuilding missions. Please note, these are not definite and distinct categories of UN missions. Instead, these are terms that are often used interchangeably and overtime as concepts evolve.

2 OCHA’s mandate, as contained in General Assembly Resolution 46/182, reaffirms that “humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. More recent General Assembly resolutions, including 59/141 and 60/124 recognize and reiterate the independence of humanitarian action as autonomous from political and military objectives. Multiple Security Council resolutions, including 1296 and 1674, also stress the importance of upholding and respecting humanitarian principles, including neutrality and impartiality.

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2.1. On 26 June 2008, in Decision No. 2008/24, the Secretary-General endorsed the recommendations of the 25 June 2008 United Nations Policy Committee meeting concerning integration. Per the Secretary-General’s decision, the term ‘integrated UN presence’ refers to any context in which the United Nations has a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission in addition to a United Nations Country Team. Typically, an integrated UN presence will be led by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General. When it includes a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) will be the lead department at headquarters. When it includes a political mission, either the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) or DPKO can be in the lead.

2.2. The term integrated UN presence includes all situations referred to as ‘integrated

missions.’ Until recently, there was no official definition of an integrated mission. On 12 March 2009, however, the UN’s Integrated Mission Steering Group 3 endorsed guidelines which state that the term ‘integrated mission’ “refers to structurally integrated field missions, for example, UN peacekeeping or special political missions that have a double or triple-hatted DSRSG/RC/HC who report to the SRSG/Head of Mission.” 4

2.3. The term integrated UN presence also includes situations that were not referred to as

integrated missions such as DPA-led political missions and peacebuilding support offices with no combined DSRSG/RC/HC.

2.4. Not included in the term integrated UN presence are political missions with a regional

mandate and those situations in which the UN has a traditional peacekeeping operation working alongside a UN Country Team.

2.5. The following diagram illustrates the relationship of these various terms. For more on

the distinction between multidimensional and traditional peacekeeping operations, please see the definitions section of this policy instruction.

3 The Integrated Mission Steering Group was established by Decision No. 2008/24 of the Secretary-General which

endorsed the recommendations of the 25 June 2008 United Nations Policy Committee meeting concerning integration. The group meets at the level of Assistant Secretary-General or above to help “ensure implementation and progress on integration related issues.”

4 “United Nations Integrated Mission Planning Process Guidelines: Role of the Headquarters -- Integrated Planning

for UN Field Presences;” United Nations Integration Steering Group; 12 March 2009, page 17

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INTEGR ATED MISSION

Any UN peacekeeping or political mission that has a double hatted position (DSRSG/RC) or triple-

hatted position (DSRSG/RC/HC)

DP

A-L

ED

UN INTEGRATED PRESENCE

Any context in which the UN has a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission in addition to a UN Country Team

Has a Double or Triple Hat UNAMI

UNIPSIL1

UNSCO UNSCOL2

No Double or Triple Hat

BONUCA UNMIN

UNOGBIS UNPOS

Special Envoy for LRA Affected Areas

TRADITIONAL PKO

MINURSO UNDOF

UNFICYP UNIFIL

UNMOGIP UNOMIG UNTSO

MULTIDIMENSIONAL PKO or POLITICAL / PEACEBUILDING MISSION

BINUB 3 # MINUSTAH* MONUC* UNAMA #

No Double or Triple Hat

MINURCAT* UNAMID* UNMIK*

Has a Double or Triple Hat UNMIL* UNMIS* UNMIT* UNOCI*

• Political offices with a regional mandate, e.g. UNOWA

• Special Envoys and Special Reps. with no country-level presence

DP

KO

-LE

D

1 Executive Rep. of the SG / RC 2 Deputy Special Coordinator / RC 3 Executive Rep. of the SG / RC / HC

As of

April 2009

* Peacekeeping operation # Political / Peacebuilding mission

2.6. This policy instruction does not address how OCHA will participate in planning

processes for peacekeeping and political missions. It also does not provide guidance on how OCHA should interact in the field with a mission on a day-to-day basis. These topics will be addressed in future guidance. The present instruction focuses exclusively on the structural relationship the Humanitarian Coordinator and OCHA should have with any peacekeeping or political mission within an integrated UN presence. As such, this policy does not prejudice any policies and / or guidance which have been, or may be developed by humanitarian agencies on the interface of their own work with an integrated UN presence.

C. RATIONALE 3. As noted in DPKO’s “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations -- Principles and

Guidelines,” which is more commonly referred to as DPKO’s capstone document, “the United Nations has the unique ability to mount a truly comprehensive response to complex crises.”5 To maximize the overall impact of its support to countries emerging from conflict, the UN developed the concept of ‘integration.’

3.1. According to the Secretary-General’s decision of 26 June 2008, the main purpose of

integration is to apply the UN’s different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner. By doing so, the UN will be able to maximize both its collective impact and the impact of its individual components in support of countries emerging from conflict.6

5 “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations -- Principles and Guidelines,” 18 January 2008, page 25 6 “Decision of the Secretary-General,” Decision No. 2008/24, 26 June 2008, paragraphs ia and ib

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3.2. OCHA fully supports efforts to strengthen the coherence of the UN presence in a

country. A more coherent approach can help improve the protection of civilians and facilitate humanitarian action.

3.3. As the capstone document notes, however, a coherent and mutually supportive

approach “does not mean that all United Nations actors on the ground should be physically integrated or subsumed under a single structure.”7 Instead, what is required, according to the Secretary-General’s decision is an effective strategic partnership, under the leadership of the SRSG, between the peacekeeping or political mission and the UN Country Team.8 This partnership should be based on “a shared vision among all UN actors as to the strategic objectives of the UN presence at the country-level,”9 which should, in turn, be “based on a shared understanding of the operating environment.”10 Structural or programmatic integration, on the other hand, depends according to the capstone document, on “whether or not it will add real value and improve the impact of the United Nations engagement.”11 In other words, form must follow function.12 This policy instruction outlines the factors that should be systematically considered when determining if structural integration of the Humanitarian Coordinator and/or OCHA with a peacekeeping or political mission adds value.

D. POLICY 4. There is nothing inherent in the concept of an integrated UN presence13 that is

contrary to humanitarian principles. Indeed, when devised, organized and operated well, an integrated UN presence can help improve the protection of civilians and facilitate humanitarian action.

4.1. The peacekeeping missions that comprise one part of an integrated UN presence

often have a key role to play in facilitating humanitarian action, for example, by improving the security situation -- a notion the Security Council recognized at the behest of humanitarian agencies in Resolution 1674. In situations, however, where peace consolidation is nascent or continues to be challenging a degree of separation between the mission and the humanitarian coordination function will generally maximize the potential of the integrated UN presence to effectively facilitate humanitarian action.

4.2. Experience suggests the structural relationship that an HC and / or OCHA should

have with a peacekeeping or political mission in an integrated UN presence is best determined by a careful analysis of the political and security contexts, and three additional and related factors: i.) the role of non-UN humanitarian actors, ii.) the role of national authorities and iii.) the likely external perceptions of the peacekeeping or political mission within an integrated UN presence.

7 “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations -- Principles and Guidelines,” 18 January 2008, page 71 8 “Decision of the Secretary-General,” Decision No. 2008/24, 26 June 2008, paragraph ib 9 “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations -- Principles and Guidelines,” 18 January 2008, page 53 10 Ibid, pages 53 and 54 11 Ibid, pages 54 12 “Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations,” May 2005, page 17 13 As outlined in the 26 June 2008 Decision of the Secretary-General.

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4.3. If the mission is not accepted or seen as not neutral and impartial by any of the parties to the conflict, there is a risk that humanitarian actors, which typically provide the bulk of assistance to a country emerging from crisis, will avoid interaction with the mission in order to avoid any damage to their own impartial, neutral image. These actors need to avoid this damage because if any parties to the conflict come to believe humanitarian actors are not acting impartially, it could jeopardize humanitarian operations, including access to affected populations and the security of beneficiaries and humanitarian personnel.

4.4. When new peacekeeping or political

missions are first deployed to countries emerging from crisis, the three factors noted above, and a political / security context that is usually still in flux, will typically warrant a “one foot in, one foot out” approach. This means there should be a combined DSRSG/RC/HC position, and a clearly identifiable OCHA presence outside the mission structure. This limited form of structural integration offers the best means of achieving overall coherence of international assistance to a country emerging from crisis by linking up all UN elements through the DSRSG/RC/HC, while at the same time maintaining, through OCHA, a liaison between UN political and military actors and the non-UN humanitarian actors outside the mission.

4.5. When a new peacekeeping or political

mission is deployed in exceptionally unstable or stable situations, other arrangements will generally be warranted. Persistent widespread conflict or lack of a credible peace process, for example, will typically work against acceptance of a peacekeeping or political mission by the parties to the conflict and warrant a “two feet out” approach. A two feet out approach means both the HC and OCHA are outside the mission.14

4.6. Stable post-conflict settings, on the other

hand tend not to undermine acceptance and will typically warrant a fully integrated “two feet in” approach. This means there will be a combined DSRSG/RC/HC or simply a DSRSG/RC if conditions warrant the phasing out of the HC position. There

14 These situations may become more likely. In recent years, DPKO has been increasingly tasked by the Security

Council to deploy in situations where there is no peace to keep even though United Nations peacekeeping operation are, in principle, deployed to support the implementation of a cease-fire or peace agreement according to DPKO’s capstone document (see page 19).

Mission

Integrated UN Presence

DSRSG/RC/HC

OCHA

UNDP

UNHCR

WFP

UNICEF

WHO

ONE FOOT IN / ONE FOOT OUT

Mission

Integrated UN Presence

RC/HC

OCHA

UNDP

UNHCR

WFP

UNICEF

WHO

TWO FEET OUT

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will be no identifiable OCHA field office, though OCHA may provide residual humanitarian capacity, if needed, through a field presence based in the Resident Coordinator’s office.

4.7. Experience indicates however, that in

countries emerging from crisis the latter two situations are rare, particularly in the initial phase of a new mission. For this reason, the “one foot in, one foot out,” approach has been, and will be used in the majority of cases and should be considered OCHA’s default structural relationship with any peacekeeping or political mission within an integrated UN presence.

4.8. Once a peace process has taken hold and stability has become entrenched

throughout the county, leading to a steady phasing down of humanitarian assistance, OCHA’s engagement could transition from the “one foot in / one foot out” arrangement to the more structurally integrated “two feet in” approach. OCHA should reexamine its structural relationships within an integrated UN presence periodically as part of its routine planning process using this policy instruction as a guide.

4.9. In the case of missions established prior to the approval of this policy instruction,

adjustments of structural relations between the HC, OCHA and the mission may be considered. OCHA will review the existing relations, in consultation with its partners, by examining the political / security context in each country and the three factors noted above, to ensure that structural integration of the HC and/or OCHA does indeed add value. In particular, OCHA should ensure that the fully integrated “two feet in” approach is not being used in situations where the political and security situation continues to be in flux warranting a “one foot in, one foot out” relationship. In instances where the structural relationship is not adding maximum value, and could be detracting from the UN’s overall efforts, OCHA will work with DPKO and DPA to make any adjustments that may be needed.

4.10. When assessing the political and security contexts, and the key factors noted above

to determine the most appropriate structural relationship for both new missions and those that existed prior to the approval of this instruction, OCHA’s leadership and staff will consult widely with all partners, particularly humanitarian partners, including UN humanitarian agencies, the Red Cross Movement and NGOs.

4.11. Regardless of the structural relationship used, OCHA always recognizes the need for

close cooperation with the peacekeeping or political mission, and will help support efforts to achieve “i.) a shared vision of the UN’s strategic objectives, ii.) closely aligned or integrated planning, iii.) a set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace and iv.) agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation,” as outlined in the Secretary-General’s decision of 26 June 2008.15

15 “Decision of the Secretary-General,” Decision No. 2008/24, 26 June 2008, paragraph ic

Mission

Integrated UN Presence

UNDP

UNHCR

WFP

UNICEF

WHO

TWO FEET IN

OCHA2

1 HC may be phased out if conditions warrant. 2 Field Presence based in RC Office if needed.

DSRSG/ RC/HC1

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4.12. OCHA also recognizes that it is important for the mission that the humanitarian community has a coherent position on their day-to-day interactions with the mission that is well communicated, in advance, to the mission, especially any military components present. OCHA’s leadership and staff will work, regardless of structural arrangements, to coordinate a common position. OCHA staff will also work to ensure that the mission, including its military component, is consulted at an early planning stage anytime the humanitarian community needs the military’s assistance with access, protection and other humanitarian issues.

4.13. The remainder of this policy instruction presents in greater detail the three factors

noted above, and three models of structural relationships for humanitarian coordination.

5. Three Key Factors: 5.1. As indicated above, in addition to a careful analysis of the political and security

context, there are three factors that should be taken into account when determining which of the structural relationships is best suited to a given situation.

5.2. Perceptions -- The perceptions of parties to the conflict, beneficiaries and local

populations of the United Nations in general, the mission, humanitarian action and the agencies that deliver aid are crucial. If one or more parties to the conflict believes, rightly or wrongly, that humanitarian actors are not neutral, or that humanitarian action is not being implemented strictly on the basis of need, they may become less willing to support or allow the delivery of assistance. For example, they might block access to populations requiring life-saving assistance or put the safety of the intended beneficiaries or humanitarian personnel at risk.

5.2.1. How humanitarian actors interact with a peacekeeping or political mission can affect

the perceptions that parties to the conflict, beneficiaries and local populations have of the humanitarian agencies and the assistance they provide. Like humanitarian actors, UN peacekeeping and political missions need to be impartial. “Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties.”16 While missions share an obligation to be impartial however, they need not be neutral To illustrate why, DPKO’s capstone document, makes the following analogy “Just as a good referee is impartial, but will penalize infractions, so a peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertaking of the peace process or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation upholds.” 17

5.2.2. The likelihood that a peacekeeping or political mission will be accepted therefore, is

greatly reduced where there is i.) no peace agreement, ii.) or a peace agreement that does not enjoy popular support, iii.) or a popular peace agreement that some parties nonetheless refuse to support. In these situations, which are typical in a country emerging from crisis, the likelihood that the mission will have to penalize actions that violate the peace process or international norms is generally higher.

5.2.3. Other factors also affect acceptance. For example, acceptance of the mission by

parties to the conflict and local populations can be affected by how the mission goes

16 “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations -- Principles and Guidelines,” 18 January 2008, page 33 17 Ibid, page 33

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about penalizing spoilers. The use of force, or a reluctance to use force in particular can cause a pronounced decrease in acceptance. The manner in which a peacekeeping or political mission interacts with an international or regional military force in the country, can also complicate perceptions and acceptance. Even the mandate of the mission itself can affect perception and acceptance. The mandate of a UN peacekeeping or political mission sets out the Security Council’s political, and sometimes military, objectives for a given country. These may be viewed as biased and not neutral by some parties to the conflict and / or the local population thereby undermining acceptance of the mission.

5.2.4. If the presence of a political or peacekeeping mission is not widely accepted, there is

an inherent risk that humanitarian agencies will also not be accepted if they are perceived as being too closely associated with the mission. In determining the nature of OCHA’s engagement with a political or peacekeeping mission, therefore it is necessary to consider i.) the status of any political or peace process, ii.) how advanced and entrenched the peace-building process has become, iii.) how the parties to the conflict and local populations are likely to perceive UN efforts to deal with infractions, including the use of force. and iv.) how structural relationships would impact perceptions.

5.3. Importance of Non-UN Humanitarian Actors -- In a crisis, the operations of NGOs

and the Red Cross Movement are invariably instrumental to the overall humanitarian effort, which can in turn support stabilization in a country in crisis. The Red Cross Movement and many of these NGOs will typically refuse close association with a peacekeeping or political mission. The risk, as noted above lies in the perception of the parties to the conflict. If the parties to the conflict believe the mission is not neutral, which frequently occurs in a country emerging from crisis, they may also believe the same about any humanitarian or other actor associated with the mission. If the parties to the conflict believe this, it could make them less willing to support or allow the delivery of assistance or may even lead to increased security risks.

5.3.1. If OCHA is too closely associated with a mission that’s not perceived as neutral, its

traditional humanitarian partners may distance themselves from, or refuse to participate in, OCHA’s humanitarian coordination efforts for the same reason. This would undermine the ability of the ERC to carry out his or her mandate as set forth by UN member states in General Assembly Resolution 46/182. It would also undermine the Cluster Approach to humanitarian coordination agreed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, as the success of this approach, for which OCHA is the steward, depends on the participation of NGOs. Additionally, if non-UN providers of assistance distance themselves from OCHA, the UN and the international community may lose an opportunity to i.) improve the impact of humanitarian action, ii.) increase coherence between the various kinds of assistance being provided and iii.) harness the full added value of humanitarian assistance, including its contribution to stability. While the sole objective of humanitarian assistance is to meet humanitarian needs, effectively meeting this objective can also help stabilize a country in crisis. Experience demonstrates that stability can in turn enable peace-building and consolidation.

5.3.2. Because of the critical role played by non-UN humanitarian actors, it is vital that

these actors feel comfortable participating in OCHA’s humanitarian coordination mechanisms. In determining the nature of OCHA’s structural relationships in an integrated UN presence therefore, it is necessary to consider the scope and importance of non-UN humanitarian assistance to the population, the stability of the

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country in crisis and the need for coordination between the UN mission and the wider assistance community.

5.3.3. While the emphasis here is on non-UN actors because of the scale of the assistance

they provide, it should nonetheless be noted that the UN’s own humanitarian agencies often face the same risk as their NGO and Red Cross counterparts. Indeed, the views that parties to the conflict develop about any UN peacekeeping or political mission can greatly affect their views of UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP and other humanitarians components of the UN. Unlike NGOs and the Red Cross though, the UN’s humanitarian agencies do not have the option of refusing association with the peacekeeping or political mission. In such circumstances, it is often helpful to minimize the structural integration of the HC, OCHA and their coordination structures to preserve a degree of humanitarian independence even for UN humanitarian agencies.

5.4. Role of National Authorities -- In a country emerging from crisis, the willingness

and capacity of national authorities to meet their obligations to provide humanitarian assistance and social services in a systematic and needs-based fashion may be in doubt, and may continue to be in doubt until a peace process is well advanced and stability is well entrenched country-wide. As a result, humanitarian actors and their operations are likely to remain critical well after the country has started to emerge from crisis and even after recovery programs have commenced. Perceptions of these humanitarian actors and their critical operations will, therefore, continue to be important, and will continue to affect the relationship between humanitarian actors and the peacekeeping or political mission, which should, in turn, guide OCHA’s structural relationship to the mission. Once peace-building is sufficiently advanced however, the willingness and capacities of the national authorities to meet their obligations to the country’s population may diminish any reliance on international humanitarian actors. The overall success of peace-building may in fact depend in part on the ability of the government to gain legitimacy in the eyes of its population by fully and impartially implementing this responsibility. As this point is reached, greater structural integration of OCHA functions into the mission becomes feasible.

5.4.1. In determining the nature of OCHA’s structural relationship with a peacekeeping or

political mission, therefore, it is necessary to consider the role of the national authorities in the conflict and their capacity and willingness to provide needs-based assistance to civilian populations. The greater the capacity, the less reliance there should be on humanitarian actors and therefore, the less critical the perception concerns involved.

6. Structural Relationships: 6.1. One Foot In, One Foot Out

HC OCHA Current Examples • Inside Mission • Combined DSRSG/RC/HC

• Field Office outside the mission MONUC UNOCI UNSCO

6.1.1. When -- Suitable in the majority of countries emerging from crisis because: there is a clearly identified peace process, or signed peace agreement;

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stabilization is beginning but may not yet be entrenched throughout the country, conditions permit limited, early recovery programs, the willingness and / or ability of national authorities to provide impartial aid and social services remains in doubt, though capacity building is starting to be feasible;

humanitarian agencies and their assistance continue to be the main life-line for civilian populations,

perception issues remain important.

6.1.2. What -- “One foot in, one foot out” constitutes limited structural integration. There should be a combined DSRSG/RC/HC position. An identifiable OCHA presence to support the HC should, however, remain outside the mission structure and be physically located outside the mission compound.18 As is the case in all contexts, OCHA will report to the HC, in this case a DSRSG/RC/HC. This will promote coherence with the UN’s overall strategy. In addition, OCHA will support mechanisms established to facilitate UN system coherence. OCHA, as is also customary in all contexts, will also report to the ERC through the Director of CRD. OCHA will maintain a degree of autonomy from the political activities and security operations of the mission which will allow it to meet with non-humanitarian partners and beneficiaries as needed. The OCHA presence will be staffed by OCHA in consultation with the HC using OCHA’s own administration and resources. If there are any disagreements over strategy, roles, resources and staffing, the HC will resolve these with the ERC.

6.1.3. Benefits -- Many DSRSG/RC/HCs have felt that placing the HC in the mission

provides him or her with greater clout and leverage, which makes it easier for them to get humanitarian issues heard by the government, mission and some international partners (e.g. the World Bank). This model also enhances the willingness of humanitarian partners to interact freely with the OCHA office and more easily allows OCHA to interact directly with parties to the conflict and civilian populations on humanitarian issues such as access. This model also has one significant strategic advantage. Should peace fail and avenues for political dialogue between the parties and the UN be closed off, this model preserves OCHA’s lines of communications with all parties to the conflict for humanitarian purposes. In time, these channels of communication could be used by other UN actors to re-open political dialogue with the parties.

6.1.4. Drawbacks -- More effort may be needed to ensure good communication and

coordination between the DSRSG/RC/HC inside the mission and OCHA on the outside. A clear understanding of roles, responsibilities and coordination mechanisms will have to be developed between the ERC, SRSG, HC and OCHA head of office. OCHA’s partners in the NGO community may be dissatisfied with this arrangement and concerned that the HC’s position in the mission may undermine his or her ability to uphold humanitarian principles and priorities. The DSRSG/RC/HC may have less time to address humanitarian issues due to multiple hats and competing priorities. This model may also result in limitations on independent humanitarian action, advocacy and reporting. OCHA will need to actively and consistently address these concerns.

18 While this should be the goal, it is understood that in some situations, security considerations may dictate

collocating with the mission. The option of collocating with other UN humanitarian agencies should, however, always be explored first before collocating with the mission.

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6.1.5. Conclusion -- In situations where stabilization is beginning but not yet entrenched country-wide some perception challenges will remain. External humanitarian assistance will continue to be a paramount need. In such situations, this arrangement strikes the best compromise between OCHA’s need to fully and directly engage with its partners, parties to the conflict and civilians, and the UN’s overall need for a coherent operation in support of peace building and consolidation. This arrangement also offers the best means of achieving overall coherence of all international assistance -- UN and otherwise -- by providing a liaison between UN political actors and the still critical humanitarian sphere of operation.

6.2. Two Feet Out

HC OCHA Current Examples

• Outside mission • No DSRSG/RC/HC position

• Field Office outside the mission UNAMID UNPOS

6.2.1. When -- Exceptional circumstances. Suitable in highly unstable situations where: armed conflict is still active and widespread, peace agreements do not exist, have yet to take hold or do not enjoy popular support among the population;

national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect the civilian population and provide impartial aid and social services;

the importance and role of humanitarian agencies is greatest; and perception issues remain critical.

6.2.2. What -- Structural and organizational integration should be minimized. There should

be no combined DSRSG/RC/HC. Instead the RC and HC positions should both remain outside the mission structure, supported by an OCHA presence that is also kept outside the mission. Alternatively, in exceptionally rare situations, the RC position could be moved inside the mission while the HC remains outside, supported by an OCHA presence that also remains outside the mission. Of these two variations, OCHA’s preference is the former. In either case, the HC, with support from OCHA, will ensure that strategy, planning, roles and communications are coordinated as appropriate with the UN mission (as outlined in paragraph ic of the Secretary-General’s decision of 26 June 2008) to increase strategic cohesion and overall effectiveness. OCHA will also take particular care to coordinate and share relevant information with the mission whenever the HC or OCHA itself is negotiating access and / or other issues with armed or informal groups given the potential affects these discussions can have on any ongoing peace negotiations or mediation efforts.

6.2.3. Benefits -- In either alternative, an external HC would have a better chance of addressing perception challenges. The HC and OCHA would have an opportunity to establish a distinctly humanitarian footprint, visible for both humanitarian partners, the various parties to a conflict, and other relevant actors such as community, tribal, or religious leaders. A separate HC would be well placed to pursue independent, impartial advocacy efforts with all groups without fear of compromising the UN’s or other actors’ political considerations.

6.2.4. Drawbacks -- Obtaining agreement on the two feet out arrangement may be

extremely difficult and may require extensive negotiations. DPKO and DOCO will

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want to ensure maximum coherence between UN political and developmental objectives by combining the DSRSG and RC positions inside the mission. This, however, implies a split of the unified RC/HC position which will invariably pre-date deployment of a mission. Splitting the position violates standard UN and IASC practice which strives to keep the RC and HC combined. Whether the RC stays outside the mission or is combined with the DSRSG inside the mission, strategic and operational coherence could be more difficult. Greater efforts may be required to ensure good communication and coordination between the mission and the elements outside the mission. In particular, there should be concerted efforts to ensure that humanitarian concerns are taken into consideration in any security management discussions so that security related decisions do not unnecessarily impact in a negative fashion on humanitarian operations. The establishment of a joint planning unit and the development of an integrated strategic framework (as outlined in paragraph ic of the Secretary-General’s decision of 26 June 2008) could contribute to facilitating coherence.

6.2.5. Conclusion -- In extremely volatile situations -- particularly when the peacekeeping or political mission is not widely accepted or when there is no peace -- this arrangement is most likely to maximize the coordination and effectiveness of the humanitarian effort and ensure that humanitarian objectives can still be achieved. In so doing it can also help stabilize the situation. While the challenges posed by a less integrated structure are real, these can be more easily managed with concerted efforts than the perceptions of parties to the conflict and the civilian population.

6.2.6. Note -- This may be a temporary arrangement while volatile political and security

conditions and / or perception issues persist. Circumstances permitting, it could transition to a one foot in / one foot out arrangement.

6.3. Two Feet In

HC OCHA Current Examples

• Inside Mission or phased out. • If inside, combined

DSRSG/RC/HC position

• Field presence based in the RC’s office

6.3.1. When -- Exceptional circumstances. Suitable in unusually stable situations where: there is a peace to keep, e.g. there is a signed peace agreement that enjoys popular support and is being implemented by parties to the conflict;

no armed groups remain active, stabilization is entrenched throughout the country, national authorities are willing and in a position to resume responsibility for providing impartial aid and social services,

capacity building becomes a major part of the international assistance effort as humanitarian programming places greater emphasis on helping national authorities provide assistance and less on substituting for the authorities,

humanitarian assistance needs phasing out in favor of recovery and development,

the RC office is taking on an increasing role in the coordination of assistance.

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6.3.2. What-- Full structural and organizational integration becomes feasible. There should be a combined DSRSG/RC/HC or the HC position may be phased out completely leaving a DSRSG/RC. There will be no identifiable OCHA field office. OCHA may however, provide residual humanitarian capacity, if needed, through a field presence based in the Resident Coordinator’s office. Field presences will be recruited and funded through OCHA’s regional offices, per OCHA’s Policy Instruction on the Roles and Responsibilities of Regional Offices. OCHA may also provide specialized surge capacity and support for limited durations as needed from its regional offices, particularly for emergency preparedness and contingency planning activities.

6.3.3. Benefits -- Full structural and organizational integration should simplify management

and reporting lines. By addressing residual humanitarian coordination needs through a strengthened RCs office, the UN may also be better able to ensure that these efforts build rather than substitute for national capacity, and that OCHA’s valuable information is not lost in the transition period. Maintaining a humanitarian capacity in the RC’s office rather than the mission itself, will also preserve options for the UN. In the event the situation deteriorates, a distinctly humanitarian footprint can be more easily reestablished from the RC’s office, than it can be from the mission itself.

6.3.4. Drawbacks -- This arrangement makes it difficult to undertake UN humanitarian action in a distinct and separate manner from the difficult development and political work of the UN mission, should the need arise. As a result, this option may risk alienating some humanitarian partners and some donors with strong links to these partners, who will remain key operational actors within a country well after the establishment of a UN mission. OCHA can mitigate this outcome however, by phasing down according to a well prepared exit strategy based on a shared analysis that it has worked out with its traditional humanitarian partners. Moreover, if this option is implemented, by definition it means that humanitarian action is being overtaken by recovery and development.

6.3.5. Conclusion -- While humanitarian challenges will certainly remain well into the post-

conflict setting, the challenge once stability has been achieved will be to ensure that national authorities have the capacity to coordinate international assistance, including humanitarian aid, within the context of nationally-set priorities. This capacity can best be built within an overall recovery and development effort spearheaded by the RC or the integrated mission.

6.3.6. Note -- As a peace process takes hold, and stability spreads leading to a steady

phasing down of humanitarian assistance, OCHA’s engagement could transition from the “one foot in / one foot out” arrangement to this more integrated approach.

7. Roles and Responsibilities: 7.1. This policy applies to all OCHA staff. Only the following staff however, are specifically

accountable for its implementation: i.) senior managers, ii.) Humanitarian Coordinators in affected countries, iii.) Heads of Office in affected countries, iv.) section chiefs and desks officers for affected countries and v.) policy officers dealing with mission planning. Accountable means that they will advocate for the appropriate structural relationship between OCHA and the mission based on the factors in this policy instruction and consultations with UN and non UN partners, particularly in the field.

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7.2. The Chief of PDSB, in consultation with Director of CRD will ensure that compliance is consistent with related integration policy development efforts being undertaken within the Secretariat.

7.3. In the case of new peacekeeping or political missions, discussions on the structural

relationship between the mission and humanitarian coordination arrangements will often be undertaken in conjunction with a formal UN Strategic Assessment. This assessment will “develop an integrated analysis of the underlying causes, dynamics and consequences of conflict” and make a recommendation through the UN’s Policy Committee to the Secretary-General on i.) “possible UN strategies to support conflict resolution and peace-building,” and ii.) the “appropriate nature, scale and scope of UN engagement.” The Strategic Assessment should not, therefore, be dictating humanitarian coordination mechanisms. Rather they should indicate how they may relate to the mission.

7.4. The Strategic Assessment may be followed by an Integrated Mission Planning

Process or a Technical Assessment Mission to further elaborate the objectives of the mission and facilitate planning and deployment.

7.5. At headquarters, these processes may be supported by an integrated mission task

force. OCHA’s engagement in, and support for these processes will be detailed in future guidance, however, in the interim OCHA staff should always work to ensure that the substantive views of UN humanitarian agencies, and OCHA itself, are included in all policy documents prepared for the UN Policy Committee and the Secretary-General.

E. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

• Field Presence A Field Presence is any small deployment of staff such as i.) a Regional Disaster Response Advisor not based in a Regional Office, ii.) a National Disaster Response Advisor, iii.) a Humanitarian Affairs Officer supporting a Resident Coordinator, iv.) a National Humanitarian Affairs Officer supporting a Resident Coordinator, or v.) a specialized OCHA professional supporting a Resident Coordinator. Field Presences do not have stand alone work and cost plans. Their costs and work should be reflected in the corresponding cost and work plans of the Regional Office to which they report.

• Field Office

A Field Office is a large deployment of staff in support of a response to a humanitarian emergency. In most instance the office will also support a Humanitarian Coordinator. Field Offices typically have stand alone work and cost plans.

• Integrated UN presence

Per the United Nations Policy Committee meeting of 25 June 2008, the term integrated UN presence refers to any context in which the UN has a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission in addition to a UN Country Team. Typically, an integrated UN presence will be led by an SRSG. When it includes a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, DPKO will be the lead

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department at headquarters. When it includes a political mission, either DPA or DPKO can be in the lead.

• Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operation The DPKO Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations includes the following description. A multidimensional peacekeeping operation is “composed of a range of components including military, civilian police, political, civil affairs, rule of law, human rights, humanitarian, reconstruction, public information and gender.”

• Traditional UN Peacekeeping Operation

The DPKO Capstone document, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, includes the following definition in its glossary of terms. Traditional UN peacekeeping operations are “United Nations peacekeeping operations conducted with the consent of the parties to a conflict, usually States, in which “Blue Helmets” monitor a truce between warring sides while mediators seek a political solution to the underlying conflict.”

F. REFERENCES 8. Normative or superior references

• United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 • United Nations General Assembly Resolution 59/141 • United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/124 • United Nations Security Council Resolution 1296 • United Nations Security Council Resolution 1674

9. Related guidance

• “Decision of the Secretary-General;” Decision No. 2008/24; 26 June 2008 • “Summary Record of Discussion;” United Nations Policy Committee; 25 June 2008 • “Integration Submission to the Policy Committee;” United nations Policy Committee;

23 June 2008 • “Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions;” United Nations Policy Committee; 17

January 2006 • “United Nations Integrated Mission Planning Process Guidelines;” United Nations

Policy Committee; 13 June 2006 • “United Nations Integrated Mission Planning Process Guidelines: Role of the

Headquarters -- Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences;” United Nations Integration Steering Group; 12 March 2009

• “Note of Guidance on the Relationship between HCs and SRSGs;” Inter-Agency Standing Committee; December 2000

• “Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations;” Expanded UN ECHA Core Group; by Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolf Kent, and Karen von Hipple; May 2005

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ANNEX A. COUNTRIES AND AREAS WHERE THE PRINCIPLE OF INTEGRATION

SHOULD BE APPLIED 19

COUNTRY MISSIONS NOTE

Africa Burundi BINUB Central African Republic BONUCA

MINURCAT

Chad MINURCAT Cote d’Ivoire UNOCI DRC MONUC Guinea-Bissau UNOGBIS No HC present; not relevant to

OCHA Liberia UNMIL HC being phased out in 2009;

not relevant to OCHA Sierra Leone UNIPSIL No HC present; not relevant to

OCHA Somalia UNPOS Sudan UNMIS

UNAMID

Uganda

Office of the Special Envoy for LRA Affected Areas

Americas Haiti MINUSTAH Asia Afghanistan UNAMA Nepal UNMIN Timor-Leste UNMIT Europe Kosovo UNMIK No HC present; not relevant to

OCHA Middle East Iraq UNAMI Israel/oPt UNSCO Lebanon UNSCOL No HC present; not relevant to

OCHA Note: The following countries and areas with UN peacekeeping missions are not included since the relevant missions are not multi-dimensional, as required by Decision 2008/24 of the Secretary-General:20 Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), Georgia (UNOMIG), Cyprus (UNFICYP), Pakistan and India (UNMOGIP), and Western Sahara (MINURSO). Also not included are countries with Special Representatives or Envoys that do not have a presence at the country level, e.g. Myanmar, or countries where the UN has some political involvement but no formal political mission, office or envoy (e.g., Kenya). Lastly, political offices with a regional mandate are not included (e.g., Central Asia and West Africa).

19 “Decision of the Secretary-General,” Decision No. 2008/24, 26 June 2008, page 3 20 Ibid, page 3

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ANNEX B. LIST OF ACRONYMS BINUB.............. United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi BONUCA ......... United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic CRD ................. Coordination and Response Division DOCO.............. Development Operations Coordination Office DPA ................. Department of Political Affairs DPKO............... Department of Peacekeeping Operations DSRSG............ Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General ERC ................. Emergency Relief Coordinator ERSG............... Executive Representative of the Secretary-General GA.................... General Assembly HC.................... Humanitarian Coordinator IASC ................ Inter-Agency Standing Committee LRA.................. Lord’s Resistance Army MINURCAT...... United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad MINURSO........ United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara MINUSTAH...... United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti MONUC ........... United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo NGO................. Non-Governmental Organization OCHA .............. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs RC.................... Resident Coordinator SC.................... Security Council SRSG............... Special Representative of the Secretary-General UNAMA............ United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNAMI ............. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq UNAMID........... African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur UNDOF............ United Nations Disengagement Observer Force UNDP............... United Nations Development Program UNFICYP......... United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus UNHCR............ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF ........... United Nations Children’s Fund UNIFIL ............. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon UNIOSIL .......... United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone UNMEE............ United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea UNMIK ............. United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UNMIL.............. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon UNMIN ............. United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti UNMIS ............. United Nations Mission in the Sudan UNMIT ............. United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste UNMOGIP........ United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan UNOCI ............. United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire UNOGBIS ........ United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau UNOMIG.......... United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia UNOWA........... United Nations Office for West Africa UNPOS............ United Nations Political Office for Somalia UNSCO............ Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process UNSCOL.......... Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon UNTSO ............ United Nations Truce Supervision Organization USG-HA........... Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs WFP................. World Food Programme WHO ................ World Health Organization