Occupied Country, Displaced People

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NRC REPORTSWestern Sr

OCCuPiEd COuNTRy, diSPlaCEd PEOPlE ››2

A thematic report from the Norwegian Refugee Council, issue 2/2008



WESTERN SahaRa>BaCkgROuNd

Whie the Sahrawis wait for their rights to be respecte, the internationa com-

munit has chosen to ook the other wa. The Sahrawis have earne through

bitter experience that without the hep of powerfu friens, it is of itte use to

have justice on our sie.

Ever since Morocco invae this thin popu-

ate esert countr in 1975, in efiance of UN

resoutions, the internationa communit has

been unabe to push through a soution to the

confict. A new roun of UN-e taks began

in 2007 between Morocco an Poisario, the

iberation movement of Western Sahara, anfurther taks are panne in 2008. But there is

itte room for optimism in terms of fining a

soution that both parties can accept.

It is urgent for the Sahrawis that the confict

is resove. For over three ecaes the majorit

of the Sahrawi popuation has ive in refugee

camps on an open, win-swept Agerian esert

pain, whie the Sahrawis uner occupation have

ha enough of repression an iscrimi nation.

There is now an increase anger of renewe

confict.

MOROCCO REjECTS uN SOluTiON Western

Sahara is a ivie countr. Those iving in the

refugee camps are cut off from contact with theirreatives in the occupie territor. Morocco has

buit a 2,200 kiometre-ong wa that ivies

the countr in two. It is amost impossibe to

get over the wa, which is fanke b one of

the wor’s argest minefies. The area west of

the wa, with its great natura resources an

we-stocke fishing waters, is controe b

Morocco. The eastern sie, a most unprouc-

tive strip of esert, is uner Poisario contro

The partition of the countr is the resut o

a 16 ear war which broke out after Morocca

invasion. Morocco buit up its miitar efence

in orer to cut off Poisario’s guerria forces.

The iberation movement, base in refugee camp

in Ageria, continue its arme resistance untithe UN succeee in brokering a ceasefire

between the two sies in 1991. Agreement wa

reache on a etaie pan, which aso gave ra

timeines for Morocco’s withrawa from

Western Sahara an for the return of refugees

In September 1991 the UN Securit Counc

epoe the MINURSO force (”UN Mission

for the Referenum in Western Sahara) to the

Western Shr – arc’s st coonMore than 80 former coonies have

gaine inepenence since the UN

was foune, a process which has

affecte more than one biion peope,

an in which the UN itsef has pae

a crucia an riving roe.

For most of us the ecoonisation of

Africa beongs to the histor books,

an is viewe as one of the UN’s

greatest successes. An et the origina

popuation of Western Sahara has not

et been aowe to exercise its em-

ocratic right to ecie its own future.

Western Sahara is therefore sti seen

b the UN as a coon, an thesubjugation of its peope uner the

present occuping power of Morocco

is much harsher than it was uner the

o Spanish coonists up unti 1975.

For over 30 ears more than haf of

the Sahrawis, the origina popuation

of Western Sahara, have ive in four

isoate refugee camps in Ageria.

Their homean is ivie aong a

Moroccan-buit wa, an eectronic

surveiance, an mines an soiers

wi put a stop whatever the wa itsef

fais to. Famiies have been separate

for ecaes, an new generations

grow up in the camps without ever

having seen their homean. In the

occupie territories there are now

more Moroccans than Sahrawis.

But espite great efforts b the ref-

ugees to estabish structures an to

engage in a certain egree of marine

savage, the are compete epen-

ent on internationa ai. However,

this ai has constant iminishe

over the past few ears an is ver

unpreictabe. Manutrition an

anaemia are wiesprea an the eu-

cation sector is isintegrating. For

the government in exie the strugge

is twofo: the have to meet the ref-

ugees’ immeiate nees at the same

time as carring out nation-buiing

in exie. The refugees fear that

epenence on ai from a poitica

ivie EU an an uner-finance

UN ma be use to force the Sah-

rawis to abanon their strugge for

an inepenent Western Sahara.

The UN has efine Western Sahara

as a ecoonisation question an in

1975 the Internationa Court of Jus-

tice in The Hague rejecte Morocco’s

aege “historica caim” on Western

Sahara. The African Union has rec-

ognise Western Sahara an accept-

e it as a member countr, having

efine the question of Western

Sahara as the right to sef-etermina-

tion. In the times in which we ive it

is more important than ever to

efen the principes of internation-

a aw. The tracks of the UN are cear,

but at the same time it is power that

prevais. What use is it to have the

support of the UN an the AU when

powerfu countries such as France,

the US an Spain are either iniffer-

ent or active oppose the Sahrawis

egitimate rights? For ecaes the

refugees of Western Sahara have

been asking themseves this question:

What use is it to have right on our

sie if ou o not get justice?

Western Sahara is cear negecte

b the internationa communit.

Humanitarian assistance is ecreas-

ing ear b ear, there is itte meia

attention, an minima wi on the

part of the internationa communit

to fin a soution aong the ines that

the UN has outine. These things are

a connecte. Meia, onor coun-

tries an eveopment ai organi-

zations ose interest when a refugee

situation has been ong-asting – an

the reason for its uration is mostoften a conscious poic on the part

of the actors who wie power.

The UN Securit Counci, The UN

Genera Assemb an thereb a the

wor’s states have expresse their

support in principe for the Sahrawis’

right to etermine their own future,

but the nee to foow up this sup-

port in practice. It must increase its

humanitarian assistance an active

engage to have Western Sahara

pace higher up on the internation-

a, poitica an humanitarian agen-

a. Morocco shou be put uner

far greater pressure. The occuping

countr is without oubt ragging

its feet in the hope that the refugee

communities wi simp break up

an isperse. Not unike the Govern-

ment of Bhutan (see NRC Report

Issue 1/2008), the re on the notion

that injustice pas iviens, just so

ong as ou have powerfu friens.

CONTENTS

cr Sretteber itor

diTORial: Occupie countr,space peope 2

aCkgROuNd: Western Sahara –frica’s ast coon 3

he Sahrawis: historicarigins of a peope 6

The changing face of therefugee camps 6

ThE REfugEES: Isoate in the esert 9

POliTiCS: The gameof the great powers 10

UN’s tracks fae intothe san 12

Fish, phosphates aninternationa business 14

huMaN RighTS: Imprisonefor their views 14

The Sahrawis’ right tosef-etermination 16

RECOMMENdaTiONS OfThE NORWEgiaN REfugEECOuNCil 18

OCCuPiEd COuNTRy, diSPlaCEd PEOPlE

P h o t o : B e r s e r k P r o d u c t i o n s

dITOR: Richar Skretteberg EdITORIAl TEAM: Ronn Hansen, Vikram Oera Komanskog, CONTRIBUTORS: Per Kristian Cappeen Niesen, Ei Wærumogneru, Eirik Hjort Kirkeru TRANSlATION: Jane Thompson AddRESS: Norwegian Refugee Counci, P.O.box 6758, St. Oavs pass, 0130 Oso, Norwa ESIGN & lAyOUT: Cox Oso FRONT PAGE: The Sahrawis are ver prou of the cutura uniqueness an their histor. From a parae in the refugee camp

mara in Ageria. Photo: Norwegian Refugee Counci/Ronn Hansen BACK PAGE: The 2200 kiometres ong Moroccan miitar wa through Western Saharaeeps the popuation in the occupie areas in an shuts the refugees out. Moroccan arm camp in the centre of the picture. Photo: Jean lamore PRINTING:ameben Grafiske Eition: 3,000 I SBN: 978-82-7411-181-8

Dakhla refugee camp, Algeri



NRC REPORTS Western Sr

untr. Its manate was to impement the

tement pan in cooperation with the parties.

e first steps were to i entif quaifie voters

as to ater organise a referenum in ear

92, when the Sahrawis were to choose between

egration into Morocco an fu inepenence.

This is where the probems starte. Instea

taking just a few weeks, the UN operation

u take a of eight ears to ientif the

aifie voters. The process was continuous

mpere b Morocco, which mae use of the

a to move increasing numbers of Moroccan

ters into Western Sahara, contrar to inter-

tiona aw. When MINURSO fina compet-

the registration process in 2000, Morocco

use to accept the eventua ist of quaifie

ters.

Not even the appointment of the former US

cretar of State James Baker as the UN Sec-

ar- Genera’s Persona Envo to Westernhara hepe expeite the process. during the

en ears that Baker worke towars reaching

agreement between the two sies, he pre-

nte severa proposas for a soution. The ast,

ich he put forwar in 2003, propose that

Moroccan setters who ha been resient in

estern Sahara since 1999 wou be abe to vote

the referenum. To the surprise of man,

isario, which ha area mae numerous

mpromises, accepte the proposa, knowing

that the cou ose a referenum uner

ese new conitions. However, it was rejecte

Morocco.

In 2004, Baker gave up an resigne as the UN

cretar- Genera’s Persona Envo, beieving

o be impossibe to fin a soution acceptabe

both parties. The resut of ears of the UN’s

rk – a ist of quaifie Sahrawi voters – is

e awa in heav stee boxes somewhere in

neva.

SiSTENCE ON iNTEgRaTiON The Sahrawis have

en promise a referenum which wi ecie

ir own future. Over 100 UN resoutions an

WESTERN SahaRa>BaCkgROuNd WESTERN SahaRa>BaCkgROuNd

the Internationa Court of Justice in The Hague

(1975) affirm that the Sahrawis have interna-

tiona aw on their sie. Notwithstaning this,

the have never been aowe to exercise their

right to sef-etermination. Instea, Morocco

can continue its occupation without an great

etriment to itsef, espite this not being rec-

ognise b a singe countr in the wor. The

Sahrawis’ own state, on the other han, the

Sahrawi Arab democratic Repubic (SAdR) has

been recognise b over 80 countries since

19761. Unike Morocco, SAdR is aso a member

of the African Union (AU).

Morocco refuses to accept a referenum which

wou aow inepenence as one of the ater-

natives. As a “new” propose soution, it put

forwar a pan in 2007 which wou entai the

annexation of Western Sahara as an integrate

part of Morocco, but with a egree of autonom.

The UN has not reacte to the fact that

Morocco is thereb fing in the face of the

agreements it signe with Poisario in the 1990s

an of internationa aw, which cear affirms

the Sahrawis’ right to sef-etermination. On

the other han, two of the permanent members

of the UN Securit Counci, the USA an

MOROCCO

A I R E

G L

A

MAURITANIA

MAURITANIA

BirLehlou

El Aaiun

ATLANTIC OCEAN

O ued D r â a

Oue d A‘ s S aqu i aA l H a m r a

O u e

d A l K

h a

t t

SubkhatDoumasSubkhat

Tidsit

SebkhadeChinchane

SubkhatTah

SubkhatAghzoumal

SebkhetOummedDrousTelli

SubkhatTanwakka

SebkhetIjill

LEGEND

WESTERN SAHARA

P h o t o : Ei r i k H j or t Ki r k e r u d

France, in 2007 pronounce the Moroccan

pan to be a “serious an creibe” proposa.

Whie the search for a poitica soution

rags on, the refugees ive uner extreme ci-

mate conitions in the Agerian esert. Amost

a the foo the eat bears the ogo of an inter-

nationa ai organisation. Over the past ears,

the ai has constant wine an its supp

has become more unpreictabe. This tota

epenence makes the refugees extreme vu-

nerabe to faiing an inaequate assistance.

Accoring to Poisario, which manages the

camps, 165,000 Sahrawi refugees are iving in

Ageria. New generations have grown up with-

out ever having seen their homean, an an

entire peope are ivie from one another b

the Moroccan occupation, the wa an the

anmines.

a BaRRiER TO dEvElOPMENT The first arge

Sahrawi emonstrations within the occupie

territories of Western Sahara took pace in 1999,

an represente a new turn in the Sahrawi

resistance movement.

Now it was no onger on Poisario an the

refugees in Ageria who were the Sahrawis’ heroic

freeom fighters. The front ine of the confict

ha move to the occupie territories. Both

internationa organizations an the press cov-

ere the Sahrawi activists being subjecte to

summar arrests, torture, house searches an

wiesprea surveiance b the Moroccan poice.2

The secon wave of emonstrations an har-

assment began in the spring of 2005.

In perios of 2005 an 2006, amost ever

singe eaing human rights activist in Western

Sahara was arreste.

Toa the ceasefire in Western Sahara con-

tinues, but it is tenuous. The patience of the pop-

uation in the occupie territories has reache

breaking point, an Poisario threatens to take

up arms again if their right to choose inepen-

ence is not respecte.

The Moroccan occupation is a barrier to eve-

opment, stabiit an securit in this region on

the thresho of Europe. Ageria, Morocco’s arch

enem, is Poisario’s main supporter. The absence

of cooperation an peace between Morocco an

Ageria makes poitica an economic integration

in North Africa impossibe, an prevents effective

anti-terrorist cooperation between the two coun-

tries. It is because of the occupation of Western

Sahara that attempts to estabish a Maghreb

Union have repeate founere.

iNCREaSiNg NaTiONaliSM ”Man beieve that

the Moroccan annexation of Western Sahara

is eveoping into an estabishe fact,” sas Ph.d

caniate Jacob Mun at the Institute of Arab

an Isamic Stuies, Universit of Exeter, UK

Mun is about to pubish a book on the

Western Sahara confict.

“But what man overook is that at the

same time, Sahrawi nationaism is increasing

he states in an interview with the NRC.

Mun points out that the 32 ear-ong margin

aisation of the Sahrawis in the occupie terri

tor, an the isoation of the refugee popua-

tion, have on strengthene their esire for

inepenence. He is of the view that the 1991

agreement with Morocco now appears mean-

ingess to man Sahrawis, an that there is a

imit to how ong Poisario can continue to tak

a moerate ine without osing creibiit with

the Sahrawis. The creibiit of the UN as a

confict negotiator stans an fas upon its

abiit to fin a soution before the outbreak

of renewe open confict, Mun beieves. ■

Official name: Sahrawi Arab Democratic■

Republic (SADR). Recognised by approx.80 countries

Capital: El Aaiún (Laayoune)■

Geography: Area 260,000 km■ 2. Bordered

by Morocco to the north, Mauritania tothe south and Algeria to the northeast.

Climate: Very hot in June/July■

(+50-60°C), as low as 0°C in Januar y.

Population:■ 13 Area controlled by Morocco:

approximately 400,000, of which250-300,000 Moroccan settlers and

100-150.000 Sahrawis. In addition thereare some 160.000 Moroccan soldiers

and police.Area controlled by Polisario: approxi-■

mately 30,000 nomads.

Refugees: Approximately 160,000 are■

refugees in camps in Algeria14, 26,000 inMauritania.

Religion: The population is Sunni Muslim,■

but the majority have a liberal religious

outlook.Natural resources: Large deposits of high■

quality phosphate, large fish stocks off the

coast, possible deposits of oil and gas.

WESTERN SahaRa: faCTS


The tea ritual is important in the Sahrawis’ culture and their daily lives.



ver we organise, compare with camps in

other parts of the wor. The refugees them-

seves take care of ai istribution, an are in

charge of a aministration, eucation an

heath services. Crime is virtua non-existent.

during the ear part of Senia’s chihoo, the

Sahrawis were sti at war w ith Morocco. The

refugees were happ to work without pa,

running the camps, working in hospitas an

in the miitar. With vounteer teachers an a

iterac rate of over 90%, the refugee camps

became a unique, eucate communit on the

African continent.

”At that time m fami got a we neee

through ai,” sas Senia, isting a the iffer-

ent foo an consumer goos the receive.

ChRONiCally MalNOuRiShEd The situation for

refugees is far worse now. despite frequent peas

for more humanitarian ai b the UN High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to the

internationa communit, there is an ever

ecreasing amount of foo on Senia’s fami

inner tabe, an it’s of poorer quait.

”We on get haf the amount of foo we

use to”, sas Senia.

UNHCR an the Wor Foo Programme

(WFP) estimate that two thirs of the women

in the refugee camps suffer from anaemia, whie

an assessment mae b Norwegian Church Ai

in 2007 estimate anaemia at 46%. UNHCR an

WFP estimate that one thir of chiren uner

five are chronica unernourishe3, whie

Norwegian Church Ai in 2004 estimate it to

be as high as 40%. In some perios the refugees

consume as itte as one thir of the ai rec-

ommene caorie intake4, an amost never

receive fresh foo.

The ack of ai has a marke effect on the a

to a ife of the camps. Refugees who previ-

ous receive a the neee from foreign

onor organisations must now make up for the

shortfa with what itte the earn. The econom

that was former base on vountar commu

nit work is therefore crumbing. Man of those

who use to work as vounteers for the com-

munit have been force to ook aroun for

other sources of income. Some have set up sma

shops in the camps, or engage in commercia

activities in Mauritania or the town of Tin-

ouf a few kiometres awa. Others receive

mone through Spanish chi-sponsoring

schemes. Teachers have begun to eave their

cassrooms, no onger abe to affor to teach.

There are two reasons for the ecine in humani-

tarian assistance, accoring to the Wor FooProgramme (WFP)5. The first is so-cae onor

fatigue: few organisations are motivate to giv

ai to the same refugee popuation for three

ecaes in succession.

The secon reason is the ispute as to how

man refugees actua ive in the camps.

Popuation figures have awas been a sensitive

subject for both sies in the Western Sahara

confict. Poisario caims that 165 000 refugees

ive in the camps. However, in 2005 WFP an

UNHCR reuce the ai to cover the “90 000

most vunerabe refugees” without efining wha

“most vunerabe” means, or how the ha com

up with that figure. After an extensive foo in

the refugees camps in Januar 2006, the figure

was raise to 125,000, an in June 2007 this

change was confirme b UNHCR6. Be that as

it ma, the UN continues to have probems in

securing enough ai for the refugee camps.

Various UN agencies an Sahrawi organisations

issue frequent warnings that foo stocks are on

the verge of epetion, an wi on ast for a

few weeks onger7.

WaNTiNg TO gET OuT Of ThE CaMPS The win

ing ai situation an poitica stagnation hav

resute in a whoe generation of outh who

ream of getting awa from the camps 8. Man

NRC REPORTS Western Sr NRC REPORTS Western Sr

The nomaic popuation of Western Sahara

has historica been organise into tribes, of

which the argest were Reguibat, Ait lahsen,

zarguien an Oue deim. Poitica these

ribes were organise through a counci cae

Ait Arbain. This organisationa setup rough

covers the geographic area that toa is

Western Sahara, an is being use to egitimise

Western Sahara’s histor as a nationa entit.

Sahrawi cuture iffers from Moroccan

an Agerian, but ess so from Mauritanian.

language, music, ress an fami structures

how great simiarities with those of Mauritania

an western Africa, an serve to unerine

heir ifferences to Morocco an North Africa.

Hassania, the oca iaect of Arabic sp o-

ken in Western Sahara an Mauritania, is

istinct ifferent from Maghreb Arabic as

poken in North Africa. The iaect is in-

guistica coser to cassica Arabic, but aso

has man oanwors from Berber. The Spanish

coonia heritage has aso e to the use of

man oanwors from Spanish.

Women’s participation in societ is, in an

Arab context, reative robust. As a histori-

ca nomaic popuation, women have he

propert rights, an contro over househo

an ivestock. This is aso refecte in toa’s

exie communit, where to a arge extent it is the

women who run the camps on the oca eve.

The Sahrawis are, ike their neigh bours,

Musim. Nevertheess the istinguish them-

seves b their ibera an reaxe interpreta-

tion of Isam. The Sahrawis o not have a

traition of mosques, reigion is consiere a

private matter to be practise at home, an has

itte infuence on ai ife an poitics. ■

hRONOlOgy Of ThE laST 35 yEaRS Of CONfliCT

WESTERN SahaRa>POPulaTiON

The Shrws:hstorc orgns o peopeThe histor of the Sahrawis stretches back to the 12th centur,

when Arab tribes from yemen migrate into the region. The

mixe with the oca Berber p opuation an African groups from

south of the Sahara.

algERia>REfugEE CaMPS

The chng ng ce o the regee cmps

Up unti the 1990s, a cash econom ha et to

reach this outpost in the Sahara esert. But a

few ears after the enforcement of the ceasefire

in 1991, the four Sahrawi refugee camps began

sow to change.

”Before, everone ive the same wa an

i vountar communit work as part of the

strugge for iberation. But now that the ai

has ecrease an the cash econom has taken

over within the camps, the communit spirit is

iminishing an the ifferences are increasing,”

sas Senia.

Senia Aberahman is 19 ears o an a refu-

gee. She grew up in the Smara refugee camp,

one of four camps in an open, r esert

anscape in the south-western corner of

Ageria.

like a Sahrawi refugee chiren, Senia ha

to eave the camp to continue her eucation

beon primar schoo. She has scarce seen

her fami since 1999. She attene ower sec-

onar schoo in northern Ageria, an upper

seconar schoo in Norwa. She is now stu-

ing meicine at a coege in Boston, USA.

The Sahrawi refugee camps are sti consiere

A wining amount of

humanitarian ai is being

given b the internationa

communit to the refugees

in Ageria. This has resute

in chronica manour-

ishe chiren an a gen-

eration of outh who wantto get out of the camps.

73: The Libera-

n Movement,

ont Polisario, is

rmed in Spanish

hara to evict the

anish colonial

wer.

1974: Spain gives

in to many years of

pressure by the UN

for the country’s

decolonisation,

and agrees to hold

a referendum.

Summer 1975: The UN sends

a delegation to the region in

preparation for the referendum.

The delegation visits every one

of the communities in Spanish

Sahara and reports back that

the Sahrawis unanimously call

for the colony’s independence.

1975: Morocco opposes UN plans

for a referendum, maintaining that

the region was part of Morocco

long before colonial times.

Morocco succeeds in postponing the

referendum by asking the UN to

seek advice from the Internation-

al Court of Justice in the Hague.

16 October 1975: The

International Court of

Justice issues a clear dec-

laration on Western Saha-

ra: Morocco’s claim on

Western Sahara is rejected.

There were indeed certain

ties between the people of

Western Sahara and the

6 November 1975: King Hassan II of Morocco disregards

the Hague declaration and initiates the so-called «green

march». Moroccan military forces and 350,000 Moroc-

can civilians invade Western Sahara, while Mauritanian

forces invade simultaneously from the south. When the

Moroccan Air Force drops bombs with white phosphorus

and napalm over communities in Western Sahara, the

majority of the Sahrawi population takes refuge over

the border in Algeria.

27 February 1976: Polisario

establishes the Sahrawi Arab

Democratic Republic, which is late

recognised by over 80 countries,

and is now a full member of the

African Union.

Kingdom of Morocco, but «the Court has

found no legal ties of such a nature as might

affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV)

on decolonisation of Western Sahara, and, in

particular, of the application of the principle

of self-determination through the free and

genuine expression of the will of the peoples

of the territory».10 ›

El Aaiun, the capital of occupied Western Sahara.

P h o t o : N or w e gi a nR e f u g e e C o u n c i l / R o n n y H a n s e n

The children in therefugee camps have

few toys and must

entertain themselves.




NRC REPORTS Western Sr NRC REPORTS Western Sr

She points her han towars the sk an starts

to te me the names of the various stars. Even

though she is compete bin, she can sti

sense what once she cou see. She norma

taks of her reams for our homean;

tonight, however, she tes me a ifferent stor

– the thing that change h er ife forever.

like man other women at the time when she

was oung, she marrie at the age of tweve,

but ha no chiren unti she was twent. Her

faiure to have a chi within one ear of mar-

riage was a great worr to her fami. However,

her husban was an unerstaning man, an

i not use this as a reason for ivorce. She use

to start the a ver ear, miking the cows.

“Everthing was green, an the air was so fresh,”

she sas, comparing the pace she is from to the

ari refugee camp where she has ive for the

past thirt ears.

One a in Januar 1976, something extraor-

inar happene. Asisa ha area hear that

the Moroccan arm ha attacke that area an

riven peope from their homes, but no one in

the fami ha fu unerstoo the gravit of

the situation before it hit them. Moroccan troops

storme into their itte viage. Her husban

ran off immeiate to fight for his peope, an

Asisa, with her three aughters an three sons,

ha to cross the esert to seek refuge in Ageria.

The ha to trave on foot; neither cames nor

cars cou be use as transport, as this wou

make them much too visibe a target for

Moroccan bomber aircraft. The cou on

trave at night, hiing uring the a among

trees an rocks to rest. “laa an I ha to take

turns ooking out for aircraft whie the others

sept,” granmother recas.

laa, m mother, was tweve, but the eest of

the chiren. Brahim, the oungest, was on

eight months o. The ran out of foo an

water after three as, as the ha on been abe

to bring a sma number of possessions with

them. Now the ha to ive on what the cou

fin in the barren esert. Soon after, Brahim

ie of ehration an on two as ater the

other two itte bos were kie b a anmine.

“Haf the fami was gone. It was an utter catas-

trophe, an now it was just msef an m three

surviving chiren feeing through the esert.”

sas granmother.

The next a, as the continue eastwars, a

pane roppe a bomb right in front of them.

The bomb bine m granmother, but the

continue waking. With a smie an with tears

in her ees she sas: “The a after, two men

from Poisario came in a truck an took us to

the camps.”

A month after the arrive at the refugee camps

in Ageria, Asisa receive a message that he r

husban ha been kie in combat.

M granmother is an exampe to me of grea

courage an of the justice of the Sahrawis’

strugge. With haf her fami kie, an after

thirt ears of iving in refugee camps, she sti

hopes to be abe to return to her homean.

“The Moroccans ma have weapons, guns an

panes, but we Sahrawis have patience an etermination,” is what granmother awas sas.

We, the oung peope of Western Sahara, hav

not experience war for ourseves, or the inva

sion of our countr b Morocco. But we we

know how it has affecte a of us. I msef wa

born in one of these camps. Whie I am stu-

ing abroa, m fami of se ven are a sti

iving in the same tent. The fami has ive

here in this temporar wa for ear after ear

Sometimes the temperature rises above 50

egrees C, an there isn’t much ou can o with

oursef, except wait – wait for the interna-

tiona communit to act.

Unike man other oung Sahrawis, a numbe

of m reams have been fufie. I was the firs

Sahrawi to be chosen to stu in Norwa, an

now I have a schoarship to a coege in the US

Of the foreigners I speak to, ver few have hear

of the Sahrawi refugees. The camps have been

there for so ong, but in such a istant, eserte

pace that I think on a tin number of peop

in the wor have ever hear our stor,” Senia

concues.■

PERSPECTivE>diSPlaCEMENTlgERia>REfugEE CaMPS

those who eave en up as tomato pickers or

nstruction workers in Spain.

The Presient of the Sahrawi Repubic,

ohamme Abeaziz, has escribe this outh

igration as «the most serious an catastrophic

reat that our societ faces».

“youth emigration is a matter of great con-

n, because it serves the poic pursue b

orocco, the aim of which is to empt these

ritories of their inhabitants an to strip

peope’s insurrection of its active power”,

s Presient Abeaziz9. This statement

obab refers equa to the exous of Sahra-

outh from the occupie territories as from

refugee camps.

Given the scarcit of resources, Poisario can

itte to offer oung peope meaningfu jobs

higher eucation within the camps.

Cial diviSiONS Accoring to Senia, some-

ng which occupies man peope in the camps

he socia changes which are now springing up

ng with the cash econom. She maintains

at the greatest ifference between famiies is

ether the have manage to sen a fami

mber to Spain or not.

“In aition to most peope actua being

orer, man have begun to fee poorer,” she

s. “Not on are chiren manourishe an

ng in extreme povert, but the have rea

come aware of the affuence in Europe. It

sn’t ike that before.” like man other

hrawi refugee stuents, Senia pans to

urn to a free an inepenent Western

hara when she h as compete her stuies.

hings go as panne, she wi be a quaifie

ctor in eight ears.

”I pra to Go that Western Sahara is

epenent b the time I compete m

uies. If it isn’t, I wi go back to the camps

wa. It’s important for me to use m

owege an skis for the goo of m

ope.” ■

Nght over Western ShrNight has just faen. M granmother, Asisa, an I are sitting on the soft, co

san unes of the Agerian esert, ooking up at the starr sk.

By SENia aBdERahMaN (19), STudENT aNd REfugEE

79: Mauritania withdraws from Western Sahara and

andons its territorial claim. Morocco quickly takes

er that part of Western Sahara which had been

der Mauritanian control. The UN General Assembly

acts by stating that it «deeply deplores the aggra-

tion of the situation resulting from the continued

cupation …», and urges Morocco «to terminate the

cupation of the Territory of Western Sahara».11

1981-1987: To stop the attacks by

Polisario, Morocco (with the help of

Israel and the USA12) builds a 2,200

km long wall across Western Sahara,

flanked by one of the world’s largest mine-

fields. Today, the fortification stretches

right across the whole of Western Sahara

and divides the country in two.

1991: The UN Security Council and

the parties agree on a referendum for

the people of Western Sahara. The

UN MINURSO mission is stationed

in Western Sahara with a view to

holding the referendum in the first

half of 1992

2000: The referendum

has still not been held.

Morocco refuses to

accept the lists of eligi-

ble voters produced by

the UN.

2004: James Baker

resigns as Personal

Envoy, believing it to

be impossible to find a

solution acceptable to

both parties.

2007: The UN

Security Council

requests the parties

to meet once again to

find a solution, and

their first direct talks

in seven years com-

mence.

2008: The only thing the two parties

have so far agreed upon is to continue

negotiations. Polisario wants a refer-

endum with independence as one of the

options. Morocco opposes this and offers

limited autonomy under Moroccan

control.

hRONOlOgy Of ThE laST 35 yEaRS Of CONfliCT

Senia Abderahman (19) has grown up in the refugee camps.

P h o t o : H e i d i H a u g e n



NRC REPORTS Western Sr NRC REPORTS Western Sr 1

a we prevente the Green March, we wou

ve estroe our reationship with Morocco,”

then US Secretar of State Henr Kissinger,

erring to Morocco’s entr into Westernhara in1975.

e Moroccan invasion took pace in the mist

the Co War. decassifie ocuments of

eetings in the White House bear witness to

e US’s cear awareness of Morocco’s entr

o Western Sahara15.

ven its strategic ocation on the Straits of

bratar, on the oorstep of Europe, Morocco

s a strong han of cars in reation to its

ies. It knows that the EU wants cose coop-

tion to hep sove probems reate to immi-

ation an rugs, an it has therefore succeee

making itsef an important partner of the

est. Morocco aso uses the Arab league to

rner support for its occupation of Western

hara, an it appears to be a cose a in the

’s so-cae “War on Terror”.

Sh agaiNST SElf-dETERMiNaTiON In his

tobiograph John Boton, the former US

mbassaor to the UN, testifies that the US’s

ationship with Morocco has remaine fun-

menta unchange since 197516. From 1997

2000, together with UN Specia Envo James

ker, Boton worke to fin a soution to the

estion of Western Sahara. despite his back-

oun as a Conservative an cose frien of

orge W. Bush’s aministration, he was harsh

tica of US poic in the case of Western

hara.

he accepte Morocco’s ine that inepen-

ce for the Western Sahara – which near

erone thought the Sahrawis wou choose

a genuine free an fair referenum- wou

stabiize Morocco an risk a takeover b

reme Isamicists.” writes Boton17.

He emphasises that near everone thought

the Sahrawis wou choose inepenence if a

referenum were he. Boton sas he engage

in a number of efforts in the US to fin supportfor the Sahrawis to have their referenum, but

without success. He aso maintains that the Bush

aministration has preferre stabiit for the

Moroccan monarch over sef-etermination

for the Sahrawis.

When in Apri 2007 Morocco put forwar a

proposa to incue Western Sahara as part of

Morocco, the American State department chose

to escribe it as “a constructive contribution to

fining a soution to the confict”. At the same

time the US has mae agreements with the

Kingom for the supp of armaments to the

tune of severa biion oars.

However, it is not the US which is Morocco’s

cosest a, but France. Each time the case of

Western Sahara has come up for iscussion in

the UN Securit Counci or the EU, France has

obbie for Morocco’s interests. France has, for

exampe, succeee in preventing the conem-

nation b the Securit Counci of the human

rights infringements committe b Morocco.

When the UN Secretar Genera aske for the

manate of the MINURSO force to be extene

to incue human rights monitoring in the

countr, France oppose this. France is Morocco’s

foremost traing partner an provier of

eveopment ai, an for man ears France’s

poitica eite has ha cose ties to Morocco.

In 2001 the American energ compan Kerr

McGee an the French oi compan TotaFinaEf

entere into contracts with Morocco on oi

exporation off the coast of Western Sahara.

However, in Januar 2002 the UN Secretariat

cear state that it was iega to extract oi

from the occupie territor.

SPaiN’S lEgaCy during the ast few ears of

East Timor’s strugge for iberation from

Inonesian occupation, Portuga, its o coo-

nia power, pae a eaing roe in supportingthe iberation of the East Timorese. Spain pas

no such roe towars the Sahrawis, inee quite

the reverse.

Since Spain withrew from the territor in

1975, most Spanish governments have one

their utmost to maintain goo neighbour

reations with Morocco. The ogic seems to be

that on through goo cooperation with its

southern neighbour can Spain hope to prevent

a wave of rugs an immigrants fooing in

over its vunerabe borer. Moreover Spain has

territoria isputes with Morocco, both in reation

to the two sma Spanish encaves on Morocco’s

northern coast, Ceuta an Meia, an to an

possibe oi iscoveries in the waters off the

Canar Isans.

One of the most powerfu interest groups in

Spanish foreign poic an in the Western

Sahara case is the Spanish fishing inustr, an

in 2006 Spain succeee in pushing through a

controversia fishing agreement between the EU

an Morocco. Uner this agreement, the EU

pas EUR 144 miion to the Moroccan gov-

ernment in return for EU fishing feets being

aowe to fish in waters uner Moroccan

contro, incuing the occupie territories of

Western Sahara. Amost a the fi shing quotas

are grante to Spain. The Spanish pubic’s

wiesprea support for the Sahrawis an the

Western Sahara iberation movement, the

Poisario Front, therefore has ifficut in

infuencing centra government poic on

Morocco.

Given the French an Spanish support for

Morocco, the EU has become compete inca-

pabe of action in terms of putting poitica

OliTiCS>ThE gaME Of ThE gREaT POWERS

Morocco has a ver goo reationship with France an traitiona has ha

ose inks with Spain. Mone an weapons have come from the US an Saui

rabia, so it is of itte hep that the African Union sies with Western Sahara.

POliTiCS>ThE gaME Of ThE gREaT POWERS

pressure on the occupier. Countries frien

to the Sahrawi cause, such as Sween, Finan

an Irean, have unti now faie to outweigh

the pro-Moroccan obb.

afRiCaN SuPPORT Morocco has significant

support from among the Arab states too. Among

them is the Kingom of Saui Arabia which

strong supports Morocco both poitica an

economica. For a ong time Morocco aso

pae a ke roe as a riving force for iaogue

in the confict between Israe an the Paestin-

ians. This meant that countries with interests in

the Mie East wishe to keep reations with

the Moroccan monarch on a goo footing.

The African Union (AU) for its part maintains

its eman for iberation of the Western Sahara

an recognises the Sahrawi Repubic as an ine-

penent state an a fu m ember of the Union.

Man of the member countries have recognise

the Sahrawi Repubic, aso known as the Sahrawi

Arab democratic Repubic (SAdR).

The Repubic entertains cose inks with the

three major powers on the African continent,

South Africa, Nigeria an Ageria. One of the

ast countries to recognise the Sahrawi Repubic

was actua South Africa, which recognise the

Repubic as a resut of Morocco reneging, since

2004, on its promise to accept a referenum for

the Sahrawis. Eight-four countries in Africa,

latin America an Asia have at some point since

1976 recognise the Repubic of Western Sahara

as an inepenent state.

Toa Morocco is the on countr in Africa

which is not a member of the AU. It withrew

in protest from the AU’s forerunner, the OAU,

when Western Sahara was accepte as a fu

member in 1984.

Mauritania, Western Sahara’s neighbouring

countr to the south, assumes a reative neutra

stance in the confict, an therefore maintains

goo reations with both the Poisario iberation

movement an with Morocco. Aroun 20-30,000

Sahrawi refugees ive in Mauritania18, an man

of the refugees from Ageria trave to Mauritania

for a few months a ear to fin work. Here

refugees iving both in the camps an in Europe

aso get to meet their reatives from the occupie

territories, beon the reach of the Moroccan

authorities. Moreover the Sahrawis an Mau

ritanians speak the same iaect of Arabic

(Hassania) an man are members of the

same tribes. ■

Morocco – popr wth the Westespte occpton n njstce

BOaTS TOThE CaNaRy iSlaNdSMost of those who fled from Western

Sahara in 1975 and 1976 travelled toAlgeria, when Morocco began its occu-

pation of the country. But the flood of

refugees from Western Sahara has con-tinued until the present. In the past few

years it has taken a new direction, west-wards to the Canary Islands in small,

overcrowded boats. When the Sahrawisarrive in the Canaries, many seek political

asylum. During certain periods, Spain

has granted asylum to several hundredSahrawi boat refugees at a time.

There are occasional reports of Sahrawislosing their lives on the sea-crossing to

the Canary Islands.

Strong bonds between Morocco and France have protected the occupier against necessary pressure.

P h o t o : E r i k H a g e n




aso cae for MINURSO’s manate to be

broaene, but the subject has never been

opene for ebate b the S ecurit Counci. So

the mission stans back as a “sient witness to

grave abuses of human rights”, accoring to

Amnest 19.

despite the ceasefire, the Sahrawis maintain that

the UN presence has been a fiasco. For man

of them, it was unacceptabe to a own their

weapons at a back in 1991 in favour of a ref-

erenum. Now the see that Poisario’s strateg

ma have been a faiure an that the UN is not

in a position to push ahea for a soution. TheSahrawis are merciess in their criticism: “UN

stans for Unite Nothing,” the sa in the

refugee camps in Ageria.

Mosgaar is nevertheess certain that another

war wi not provie a soution, an that neither

Poisario nor Morocco cou emerge as victors.

“On the contrar, another war cou ea to

unrest throughout North West Africa. It wou

cost man ives on both sies, an cause new

waves of refugees. Morocco wou be severe

affecte economica, an there wou awas

be the risk that a war wou invove the neigh-

bouring countries. Ever a without war is a

goo a,” sas Mosgaar. ■

N>failEd ExPECTaTiONS

uN’s trcks e nto the sn

ong as Morocco opposes the referenum,

e UN process fins itsef up a bin ae.

en seven ears of James Baker serving as the

N’s Specia Envo were not enough to obtain aution which respecte the rights of Sahrawis.

spite previous agreements to ho a refer-

um which wou incue the possibiit of

epenence, Morocco now ecines to accept

se. So it is back to square one. A 17-ear-ong

N-e process has faie to ea to an poit-

breakthrough at a.

urt Mosgaar, the former UN Force Com-

aner of its mission i n Western Sahara,

NURSO, beieves the UN must react. He sas

e UN nees to be cearer in its emans, an

at it is high time for the referenum on ine-

nence for Western Sahara to be he. He is

ereb critica of Morocco’s rejection of a ref-

num.

he UN shou state that the referenum on

estern Sahara must encompass the possibiit

inepenence. Of course the referenum

ust incue this aternative. you on nee

norma eve of insight to unerstan this,”

sas Mosgaar in an interview with

the NRC.

REalPOliTik The danish Major-Genera wasForce Commaner of MINURSO from 2005-

2007. He now hos a senior position in the

danish miitar, an has some cear opinions

on the faie UN process. He beieves that

“commercia thinking an cassic reapoitik” are

the major reasons wh a soution on Western

Sahara has never been arrive at.

“Some of the permanent members of the

Securit Counci have ha inks with one of

the parties concerne, which has meant the

in’t want to app too much pressure. I am

a ver strong supporter of the UN, but I aso

think it has some weaknesses. The UN must

have a position, an one shoun’t awas opt

for the easiest soution,” sas Mosgaar.

The dane himsef has shown an abiit to act.

When he was Force Commaner for MINURSO,

he gave the orer that the Moroccan fag over

the UN buiing shou be owere for goo.

The fag ha cause great irritation to man

Sahrawis an UN staff, but none of his pree-

cessors up to that point ha are to take it

own. This sma but ver smboic act was to

make him most unpopuar in Moroccan circes.

“The matter is simpe. The UN is cear that

Western Sahara is a territor whose status is sti

uncear. So it is unacceptabe that a Moroccan

fag shou f above the UN buiing. It goes

irect against our manate. I on’t know how

this can have continue for 16 ears without

anone having taken action”, he sas.

He sas that the fag issue is one of man instanc-

es of the UN s aing one thing in New york,

but often paing a ifferent roe in practice.

TiME TO gET TOugh After 17 ears of iaogue

between the parties, with a frustrate an iso-

ate popuation in the Agerian esert, an 45

miion oars in annua costs to the MINUR-

SO mission, the Major Genera thinks that the

UN has spent far too ong tring to fin a

soution. The chief probem, he maintains, ies

in the choice having been mae to ahere to

Chapter VI of the UN Charter on a peacefu

soution acceptabe to both parties.

“It is high time the UN got tough an spoke

out more cear. If the UN oes not eviate

from Chapter VI, another 30 ears wi go b of maintaining the status quo”, sas Mosgaar.

If the Securit Counci goes a step further an

makes use of Chapter VII, it manates the use

of force b UN member states to create peace.

This is the course taken when it is seen that a

peacefu soution to a confict is not forth-

coming, an the situation is a threat to inter-

nationa peace an securit. When Iraq occupie

Kuwait in 1990, an the UN went to the mii-

tar efence of the countr, the Securit Counci

invoke Chapter VII, an since 1990 we over

100 resoutions have been aopte in accor-

ance with Chapter VII. However, the Securit

Counci has been unwiing to o the same when

it comes to Morocco’s occupation of Western

Sahara since 1975.

“uNiTEd NOThiNg” The main task of the

MINURSO force was to oversee the ceasefire.

This part of the agreements between Poisario

an Morocco has been a great success. Mosgaar

sas that espite everthing the two parties

cooperate we with the UN on this part of the

agreement.

“At the same time, some wi perhaps sa that

the ceasefire on postpones the probem, as

it was, after a, on meant to be an interim

soution whie awaiting a permanent poitica

soution.”

On the other han, MINURSO has no manate

to intervene or to report on human rights vio-

ations in Western Sahara. For severa ears

Poisario has been caing for MINURSO to have

the right an the ut to protect the civiian

popuation against such vioations. Norwegian

Foreign Affairs Minister Jonas Gahr Støre has

he former miitar chief of the UN mission in Western

ahara beieves the UN must stan firmer on the caim

or a referenum on inepenence. But some permanent

members of the Securit Counci have not wante to

ush too har for this, he sas.

high COMMiSSiONER aS TRavEl OPERaTOR

Since 2004 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR,has been carrying out a programme for increased contact between

Sahrawis in the refugee camps and those in the occupied territories.The main part of the programme consists of charter flights which

shuttle between the two places. In this way Sahrawis from the

refugee camps are given the opportunity to visit their relativesin the occupied territories for a few days, and vice versa.

The programme has been very popular with the Sahrawis. Severalthousand people have taken part in the visit programme – most

of them women – while still many more are on the waiting listto take part. The programme is very costly and at times has

come close to being terminated due to lack of funds.

MiNuRSOUnited Nations Mission for a Referendum in Western Sahara. (Mission des Nation■

Unies pour l’organisation d’un referéndum au Sahara Occidental)

Established by the UN Security Council in 1991.■

Consists of over 480 men (civilian and military).■

Operates on both sides of the wall.■

Has as its mandate, inter alia, to monitor the cea sefire, organise the referendum,■

oversee the exchange of prisoners and the later reduction of Moroccan troops.

Read more at: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minurso.■

NORWay SuPPORTS ThE uN

Norwegian policy in the matter of Western Sahara has alwaysbeen to «support the UN General Secretary’s efforts to achieve

a political solution», and has lately added that “Norway sees itas important to refrain from actions that can be seen as a legit-

imization of the situation in Western Sahara”20. When Norway

sat on the Security Council from 2001-2002 it played an activepart in defending the rights of Sahrawis. And since the end of

the 1990s the Norwegian MFA has su pported humanitarian aidprojects in the refugee camps, as well as landmine clearance in

the Polisario-controlled parts of Western Sahara.But apart from this, Norway has taken few political initiatives

to work for a solution to the conflict. Norwegian support to the

UN is unreserved and unchanged, despite the UN’s inability toput pressure on Morocco to respect international law.

- MINURSO force commander

rt Mosgaard.

Photo: Eirik Hjort Kirker



NRC REPORTS Western Sr 1

orocco’s tremenous focus on the fishing

ustr in Western Sahara has upset the

puation composition in the occupie

ritories. Some estimate that as man as

0,000 fishermen now ive aong the coast of

estern Sahara21. If this is correct, there ma

man more Moroccan fishermen than oca

hrawis eft in the occupie territories.nce the Sahrawis are not traitiona fish-

men, but nomas, the are scarce active

a in the fishing inustr.

Norwegian companies pa an active part

this eveopment. For exampe, the Norwe-

n fishing enterprise Sjøvikgruppen, from

sun in the count of Møre an Roms-

, pans to empo up to 300 Moroccan

ters in Western Sahara. The compan has

th fishing icences an on-shore processing

iities, an informs the Norwegian press

at the projects present no probems since

estern Sahara “has awas been Moroccan”22.

In aition, Norwegian shipping companies

nsport fish an phosphate to the interna-

na market. Morocco’s iega export of

osphate brings in an income of aroun

e biion Norwegian kroner ever ear23.

RWEgiaN Mfa adviSES agaiNST Severa of

e companies brush asie the ethica iem-

mas of this business activit. One of the ship-

ping companies which transport phosphate

from Western Sahara is partia Norwegian-

owne Gearbuk.

“Athough oing business with the Moroccan

occuping power is not to be recommene,

it isn’t prohibite either,” sas Kristian Jebsen,

chairman of the boar of Gearbuk24. Thecompan sas it has not consiere the ethica

or mora aspects of carring this freight, since

there are others who bu an s e phosphate.

“We on transport it,” sas Jebsen25.

In a 16 month perio from 2006-07, the

compan transporte aroun 130,000 tons

of phosphate to New Zeaan 26. This corre-

spons to earnings of about 43 miion

Norwegian kroner (225 miion USd) for

the Moroccan state-owne phosphate com-

pan. B comparison, the Norwegian

humanitarian ai to the refugee camps in the

same perio totae just 6 miion kroner.

The Norwegian authorities avise Norwegian

businesses against operating in Western Sahara.

The same stance is aso evient in the man-

agement of the State Pension Fun – Inter-

nationa, which opte to se its shares in the

American oi compan Kerr-McGee in 2005.

The compan was about to carr out oi

exporation off the coast of Western Sahara on

behaf of the Moroccan nationa authorities.

“Morocco has occupie Western Sahara

for man ears, espite the strong conem-

nation b the UN. In the Avisor Counci’s

jugment, Kerr-McGee is faciitating Morocco’s

possibe expoitation of natura resources in

the region. The Avisor Counci views this

activit as a ‘particuar grave infringement

of funamenta ethica norms,’ in part because

this cou hep egitimise Morocco’s caim of

sovereignt an thereb unermine the UN

peace process,” was the statement issue b

the Norwegian department of Finance at

that time27.

Kerr-McGee subsequent ost se vera of

its other sharehoers, unti in 2006 it mae

pubic that it wou no onger continue its

activities in Western Sahara. ■


OREigN CaPiTal>STRENgThENS ThE OCCuPaTiON huMaN RighTS>gRavE viOlaTiONS

imprsone or ther vews

It has never been eas to work for human rights

in Western Sahara. Since 2000 a the inepen-

ent human rights organisations in the occupie

territories have either ha to cease operating

as a resut of a court jugment, or have been

enie registration. The networks of Sahrawi

human rights activists must therefore operate

iega. The ocument how Sahrawi voices

are bruta sience through arrests, e xtensive

surveiance, vioent ispersa of emonstrations

an constant house searches. These vioations

are aso we ocumente in an interna report

b the UN High Commissioner for Human

Rights.28

The main concusion of the report b the High

Commissioner is that the non-fufiment of

Morocco camps own

har on Sahrawis who

eman sef-etermination

or inepenence.

sh, phosphtes nnternton bsnessoreign companies are paing an increasing important roe in the

Western Sahara confict. The provie empoment to Moroccan

tters an income to the authorities of the occuping power.

the Sahrawis’ right to sef-etermination is the

primar cause of a other human rights vioa-

tions in the countr, an this is wh the Moroccan

vioations are main irecte at those who

eman that this right be respecte. Vioations

against outh who are active in emonstrations

are particuar common.29,30, 31. Amnest an

other human rights organisations frequent

report that Sahrawis are arreste an etaine

for weeks at a time, without being charge or

trie, an with no visits permitte.

In aition to vioations b the authorities,

man Sahrawis experience iscrimination b

their Moroccan neighbours. This ai iscrim-

ination means that the Sahrawis have graua

become economica marginaise in their own

countr. Man fin that poor Moroccans who

have recent move to Western Sahara to tr

their uck there have enjoe greater economic

success than themseves. Sahrawis who are

poitica active are often fire from their paces

of work, have their wages cut or are refuse

schooing. Sometimes the Moroccan poice stir

up vioence between Moroccans an Sahrawis

b “encouraging gangs of oca thugs to break

into an vanaise the homes an paces of

business” of Sahrawis32. This is what happene

when Sahrawi stuents at universities through-

out Morocco were attacke in Ma 2007.

Athough the vioations are ess wiesprea than

when the war was raging between 1975 an

1991, the are sti being extensive committe.

Some vioations committe in the seventies an

eighties have eft a asting mark on the Sahrawi

communit. At that time one of the most wie

use means of oppression was abuction, an

there are sti aroun 500 Sahrawis iste as

“isappeare” foowing arrest b the Moroccan

poice or miitar. In September 1991 King

Hassan reease 350 Sahrawi prisoners from

secret jais. Man of them ha been missing

since 1975, an the authorities unti then ha

enie a knowege of them. Except for this

one instance, Moroccan authorities have shown

no wiingness to sove the man hunre cases

of isappearance.

Foowing criticism of the human rights situa

tion in Morocco an Western Sahara, in 2004

the Moroccan authorities appointe a Justice

an Reconciiation Commission33. However,

quick became obvious that the Commission

eat with cases reating to Western Sahara wit

more circumspection, an more ranom than

cases concerning Morocco. Of the pubic hearing

scheue to take pace in Morocco an Wester

Sahara, on one was cancee, an this was

in fact the on hearing panne to be he in

the Western Saharan capita E Aaiun. Huma

Rights Watch has ecare that the cases con-

cerning Western Sahara were “unerrepresente”

in the commission’s pubic hearings34.

Amnest Internationa has note a certain

improvement in human rights conitions in

Morocco in the past few ears, but points out

that this oes not app to the parts of West-

ern Sahara occupie b Morocco. “Here the

situation is far more critica”, the write in

their “Countr Profie: Morocco an Western

Sahara”35. ■

Demonstration in

occupied El Aaiun.The risk of arrest and

torture is imminent.

From the inside of the infamous “black prison” in the Western Saharan capital, where the majo-rity of Sahrawi political prisoners are kept.

h oil from Western Sahara end up

Omega 3 capsules all over the world,

rticularly Norway.

to: M. Knutsen Bjørke/Norwatch




NTERNaTiONal laW>a MaTTER Of dECOlONizaTiON

The Shrws’ rght to se-et ermnton

1963, the countr was incue in the Unit-

Nations ist of Non-Sef-Governing Terri-

ries36, an a number of Ge nera Assemb

soutions have confirme that the decaration

the Granting of Inepenence to Coonia

untries an Peopes is appicabe in this case.37

r Non-Sef-Governing Territories an their

erim aministrators, the principe appies thate interests of the popuation must be abso-

e paramount.38 The Internationa Court of

stice in the Hague (ICJ) has aso confirme

at the confict is a ecoonization question

a matter of the right to sef-etermination.39

e Moroccan invasion was aso a vioation of

e ban on the use of force in the UN Charter

tice 2, an the e facto Moroccan contro of

estern Sahara acks both egait an egitimac.

e Sahrawi refugees an the popuation of the

cupie territor have certain inherent rights

ich cannot be compromise in negotiations

Reapoitik. The right to sef-etermination

funamenta human right.40 It has a promi-

nent pace in internationa aw, enshrine in

common Artice 1 of the 1966 Internationa

Covenant on Civi an Poitica Rights (ICCPR)

an the 1966 Internationa Covenant on Eco-

nomic, Socia an Cutura Rights (ICESCR) an

is consiere a peremptor norm in interna-

tiona customar aw. Morocco is a part to a

the major human rights conventions. Exampesof vioations of the right to sef-etermination

are foreign miitar occupation or annexation,

an other forms of coonia or neo-coonia

expoitation. In a more inirect fashion, pop-

uation transfers aso constitute a breach of this

right.41 Morocco’s conuct in reation to Western

Sahara is as an obvious vioation.

Peope who are subject to a coonia power or

to simiar aien subjugation, cear have this

right.42 In other wors, the Sahrawi peope them-

seves have the right to ecie their internationa

poitica status without pressure or interference.

The right to sef-etermination invoves the right

to a particuar process – “the free expresse wi

of peopes” must be hear.43 This is norma

interprete as requiring a census or referenum

of some sort.44 In this process inepenence

must be an aternative for peope who are sub-

ject to aien occupation or other subjugation.45

“Peope” is not snonmous with “popuation”,

an the Moroccan setters o not necessari

have a right to participate in the sef-etermi-nation process.

iNTERNaTiONal laW aNd NaTuRal RESOuRCES

B virtue of the right to sef-etermination, a

peopes aso possess the right to avance their

own economic, cutura an socia eveopment,

incuing the freeom to govern their own

natura resources.46 It is aso state in the 1982

Convention on the law of the Sea that coasta

states have sovereign rights over natura resources

on the continenta shef outsie their own an

territor. Morocco has no sovereignt over

Western Sahara, an therefore no right to expore

an expoit its resources. Artice 73 of the UN

Charter stipuates that the economic expoitation

of resources in non-sef-governing territories

ma on take pace with the consent of the oca

popuation an must be in accorance with their

economic interests. To trae or engage with

Morocco’s iega exporation an expoitation

of Western Saharan resources can be consiere

a vioation of internationa aw an a contri-

bution to consoiate the iega occupation.

(The ut of non-recognition eat with beow,

is particuar reevant in this connection).

This was mae cear in the avisor opinion

from the UN lega Avisor47 an was aso a

strong factor in a recommenation from the

Norwegian Petroeum Fun’s ethica counci

to withraw investments in Kerr-McGee.48

Internationa Humanitarian law / laws of War

aso has simiar rues: The occuping power can

on use propert to the extent that it is neces-

sar for the aministration of the occupie

territor an to cover the nees of the soiers;

never to cover the occuping state’s own nees

or to improve own econom (which must be

he separate from the econom of the occupie

territor.)49

he rights of refugees an of the Sahrawi peope must be unerstoo within the wier

ontext of internationa aw. Western Sahara is one of few remaining ecoonization

uestions which are governe, inter aia, b provisions of the UN Charter.

iNTERNaTiONal laW>a MaTTER Of dECOlONizaTiON

SySTEMaTiC huMaN RighTS viOlaTiONS As the

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

state in its 2006 report50, the ifficut genera

human rights situation for refugees an the

Sahrawi peope is inke to the faiure to respect

the funamenta right of sef-etermination.

For exampe, it is expicit prohibite b the

Moroccan authorities to question Morocco’s

contro of Western Sahara. Such a restriction of

freeom of speech, particuar in view of the

peope’s funamenta right to sef-etermination,

oes not come uner an of the permitte

restrictions in ICCPR Artice 19. Furthermore,

the Moroccan authorities o not respect the rightto form associations an assembe to express

opinions on the matter. demonstrators’ an

activists’ rights to ife an not to be subjecte to

torture or other inhuman an egraing treat-

ment are sti vioate, there are unresove

questions regaring the “isappeare”, an there

are continuous vioations of the right to a fair

tria. Reports an comments from the High

Commissioner for Human Rights, the Human

Rights Commission, the Committee Against

Torture, Amnest Internationa, Human Rights

Watch, the US State department an severa

other institutions an organizations confirm

the sstematic pattern of human rights vioa-

tions. As the UN High Commissioner for

Human Rights aso concue, funamenta

changes in Morocco’s egisation an egisa-

tive practice are neee for the countr to

comp with its internationa obigations.

REfugEES The humanitarian situation of the

refugees in particuar is becoming more an

more precarious. The ICESCR has specia

arrangements aowing eveoping countries to

prioritise their own citizens to a certain egree,

but the 1951 Refugee Convention contains some

minimum socia an economic stanars for

refugees. Ageria, as an as um countr, must

meet its obigations accoring to the basic human

rights conventions an the 1951 Refugee Con-

vention, to which it is a part. Member states

of human rights conventions are uner an

obigation to respect an promote the rights

of a peope within their territor, incuing

refugees an asum se ekers. Ageria, however,

is of the view that the have no responsibiit

for the refugees, ue to the fact that the are

organise b a government in exie, SAdR, e

b Poisario. Ageria’s stance has no supportmall number of Sahrawi nomads still live in the Polisario controlled areas of Western Sahara. Camel and goat herding forms the basis of the livelihood of the Sahrawi nomads.



m internationa aw an human rights bo-

, an the countr must protect everone on

territor. Poisario expains the restriction

temporar suspension of human rights

ovisions b reference to the extraorinar

ture of the situation – that rights cannot

oper be protecte unti Western Sahara

s fu inepenence.51

l COuNTRiES havE a RESPONSiBiliTy The

ernationa communit an iniviua coun-

es have a responsibiit to resove the confict

Western Sahara an to protect the rights of

e refugees. As the High Commissioner for

uman Rights states, the internationa com-

unit must take a necessar steps to ensure

at the right to sef-etermination is respecte.

mmon Artice 1 of ICCPR an ICESCR

ige all member states to promote the reai-ion of the right to sef-etermination an

pect that right, in accorance with the pro-

ions of the UN Charter.52 Since the obigations

have eat with, are peremptor norms an

p erga omnes (that is, in reation to all ; not

t between parties), a states must o wh at

n their power to make the parties respect

em. Accoring to the Artices on State

sponsibiit, iniviua states have a ut of

non-recognition of gross vioations of inter-

nationa aw. This ut arguab goes beon

active compicit, extening aso to sient or

passive assistance b acquiescence.53 The ICJ has

aso confirme a ut of non-recognition.54

The ack of poitica wi that has mae it pos-

sibe for Morocco to continue ening the

Sahrawis their right to sef-etermination, is

not a wa of respec ting this obigation in goo

faith. Poicies that must be consiere to sup-

port or recognise the Moroccan presence in

Western Sahara wou be a irect breach of

the obigation. ■

NTERNaTiONal laW>a MaTTER Of dECOlONizaTiON

the government of Morocco:

Halt its undermining the Sahrawi people’sinalienable right to self-determination,

through a referendum with an option ofindependence.

Show full respect for the human rights inthe occupied territories, notably the right

to freedom of ass ociation, assembly,

movement and expression.Halt and reverse the deportation of the

occupied territory’s population and thetransfer of Morocco’s own population to

the territory.Release all political prisoners and prisoners

of conscience and account for the more

than 520 “disappeared” Sahrawis.Lift the information blockade imposed on

the occupied territories and allow the freemovement of people and information in

the occupied territories.Allow the monitoring of, and reporting

on, the human rights situation in the

Minurso area of operations, for example

through a strengthening of the MINUR-

SO mandate.Halt the exploitation of the natural resourc-■

es of Western Sahara and the involvementof foreign companies in such activities.

To the government of Algeria:

Take all relevant measures to ensure that■

all Sahrawi refugees present on its terri-tory benefit from the protection of the 1951

refugee convention and the internationalhuman rights conventions to which it is a

party.

To the international community, in particular

France, Spain and the United States:

Exert more proactively their influence on■

Morocco in support of a solution that fullyrespects the Sahrawi people’s inalienable

right to self-determination through a ref-

erendum with an option of independence.Exert more proactively their influence on■

Morocco to ensure full respect for the

human rights, international law and

International Humanitarian Law in the

occupied territories.Increase the provision of aid to the Sah-■

rawi refugees in a way that is predictable,sustained and timely.

Ensure the monitoring of, and reporting on,■

the human rights situation in the Minurso

area of operations, for example through a

strengthening of the MINURSO mandate.Strive for the lifting of the information■

blockade imposed on the occupied territo-ries by the Moroccan government so that

people and information may flow freely.Actively discourage the involvement of for-■

eign companies in the exploitation of the

natural resources of Western Sahara, as aconsequence of the duty of non-recognition.

Secure the funding needed for confidence-■

building measures (CBMs) to prepare the

ground for future repatriation of the refu-gees.

ECOMMENdaTiONS Of ThE NORWEgiaN REfugEE COuNCil

ENdNOTES


The Moroccan conveyor belt for phosphates from the occupied Western Sahara is more than100 km long and thereby the world’s longest.


iNTERESTiNg WEBSiTES:

www.arso.org www.wsahara.net www.wsrw.org www.vest-sahara.no

1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_the_Sahrawi_Arab_Democratic_Republic

2 See e.g. the report of the Office of the United NationsHigh Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Sep-tember 2006. www.arso.org/OHCHRrep2006en.htm

3 “Sahrawi plight must not be forgotten, warns WFPchief”, press release by the World Food Programme(WFP), 13 November 2006, http://www.wfp.org/ english/?ModuleID=137&Key=2291



6 Sahara Press Service, 20 June 2007, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Sahara-Update/message/1949

7 Example: World Food Programme, “Shortage of dona-tions impact Sahrawi refugees in Algeria”, 27 October

2006, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/WFP/ fa978cb7091e 8121b8999692af1b2368.htm

8 Afrol News, 4 October 2006, “87% of young Sahrawiswant to emigrate”, http://www.afrol.com/arti-cles/21719

9 Klassekampen, Norway, 24 December 2007, «De ungeflytter ut».

10 Read the declaration at http://www.vest-sahara.no/files/ pdf/icj_opinion.pdf

11 Resolution 34/37 of 1979

12 « Le Maroc avait recruté des militaires israéliens etaméricains pour concevoir “le mur de sable” au SaharaOccidental », Le Point (France), 14 January 2008.

13 Numbers are very difficult to ascertain. Morocco makes nodistinction between Moroccan settlers and Sahrawis. Thenumber of military troops is kept secret. MINURSO isunwilling to give numbers.

14 WFP Executive board WFP/EB.2/2004/4-B/4doc, 5May 2004

15 “How the US and Morocco seized the Spanish Sahara”Jacob Mundy in Le Monde Diplomatique, January2006, http://mondediplo.com/2006/01/12asahara

16 Bolton, John (2006) Surrender Is Not an Option:Defending America at the United Nations, ThresholdEditions. See relevant excerpts here: http://w-sahara.blogspot.com/2007/11/john-bolton-on-western sahara.html

17Bolton, John (2006) Surrender Is Not an Option:Defending America at the United Nations, Threshold

Editions. http://w-sahara.blogspot.com/2007/11/john-bolton-on-western sahara.html

18 Shelley, Toby: “Sons of the Clouds” in Red PepperMagazine Dec. 2007-Jan. 2008, http://www.redpepper.org.uk/article730.html

19 Amnesty International, 1996. Human rights violationsin the Western Sahara. London: AI Index MDE29/04/96, April 18.

20 Norwegian MFA, 11 September 2007. http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/tema/Norgesfremme-og-kul

tursamarbeid/Norges-omdomme/Bedrifters-samfunnsansvar/Vest-Sahara.html?id=480822

21 Toby Shelley: Natural Resources and Western Sahara.Olsson, Claes (ed.) The Western Sahara Conflict –TheRole of Natural Resources in Decolonization, p.17-21.

22 Fiskaren, Norway. http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ Sahara-Update/message/1732

23 For international legal aspects of the resource exploita-tion in Western Sahara, see UN opinion S/2002/161,Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secre-tary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel,addressed to the President of the Security Council.

24 Norwegian TV2 news programme 3 September 2007.

25 Norwegian TV NRK2 «Spekter», 7 November 2007.

26 «UD tok hintet - offentliggjør frarådning», Norwatch,12.09.2007, http://www.norwatch.no/index.php?artikkelid=1629&back=1

27 Norwegian Department of Finance press release, 6June 2005.http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumentarkiv/Regjeringen-Bondevik-II/Finansdepartemen

tet/234231/234458/forste_selskap_utelukket_fra_petroleumsfondet.html?id=256344

28 United Nations, Office of the United Nations HighCommissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). 2006.Report of the Office of the United Nations High Com-missioner for Human Rights Mission to Western Saha-ra and the Refugee Camps in Tindouf : 15/23 May and19 June 2006. Geneva: OHCHR, 8 September 2006.http://www.arso.org/OHCHRrep2006en.htm

29 Amnesty International (AI). 2006. ‘Morocco/WesternSahara’. Report 2006: State of the world’s humanrights. London: AI.

30 Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2006. ‘Morocco’. Worldreport 2006. New York: HRW.

31 U.S. Department of State. 2006. Western Sahara:Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2005.Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureauof Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61702.htm.

32 U.S. Department of State. 2000. Western Sahara:Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 1999.Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureauof Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/ wsahara.html.

33 French: Instance équité et réconciliation.

34 Human Rights Watch. 2005. Morocco’s truth commis-sion: Honoring past victims during an uncertainpresent. New York: HRW, November, 17/11E.

35 Amnesty International Norge. 2004. Landprofil:Marokko og Vest-Sahara http://www.amnesty.no/web.

nsf/pages/41A8D198956D4B0CC1256EA1004B9CFA36 UN Charter Chapter XI (A/5514, annex III). General

Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) 1960, also concernsnon-self-governing territories.

37 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colo-nial Countries and Peoples, General Assembly resolu-tion 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

38 UN Charter Article 73. Morocco is not considered as”Administrative Power” for Western Sahara, butthese provisions may in any case be taken as applica-

ble by analogy, cf. Letter from the UN Office of LegalAffairs to the President of the Security Council,12.02.2002, S/2002/161. Available at:http://www.vest-sahara.no/files/pdf/un_legal_opinion_Corell_olaeng.pdf

39 Western Sahara ,Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports1975, 16 October 1975, paragraph 68

40 See e.g. SIRES11675 of 28.04.2006. “OHCHRMission to Western Sahara and the Refugee Camps inTindouf 8 September 2006” (OHCHR report).http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-01475.pdf

41 International Humanitarian Law / Laws of War is alsrelevant: Morocco is in breach of the Fourth GenevaConvention Article 49 – that is, the occupant cannotdeport or transfer parts of its population to the occu-pied territory.

42 This follows from preparatory work to the Conventionlater UN Resolutions, and statements by the Conven-tion’s Commission for Human Rights. It is also clearin the ICJ opinion on Western Sahara paragraph 59:”[I]ts [the principle of self-determination as a rightof peoples] application for the purpose of bringing allcolonial situations to a speedy end…”

43 The ICJ opinion on Western Sahara paragraph 68quoted above.

44 E.g. Cassese Self-Determination of Peoples. A LegalReappraisal, 1995. According to the ICJ opinionparagraph 71 the General Assembly has a certaindiscretion regarding form and process.

45 Inter alia Cassese op.cit. but also mentioned in UNreport S/2003/565.

46 ICCPR and ICESCR common Article 1 (2), GeneralAssembly resolution 1803 (XVI), 1962, Declarationon permanent sovereignty over natural resources.

47 Letter from UN Legal Advisor, 12.02.2002,S/2002/161, see footnote 3. Available at :http://www.vest-sahara.no/files/pdf/un_legal_opinion_Corell_olaeng.pdf

48 Council recommendation 12.04.2005, Available inNorwegian here: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fintema/andre/Etiske-retningslinjer/Tilradninger-og-brev-fra-Etikkradet/Tilradning-om-uttrekk-2.html?id=91683

49 Inter alia the 1907 Haag Convention on land warfareparticularly Articles 52 and 53.

50 See OHCHR Report

51 See OHCHR Report

52 ICESCR and ICCPR text: “promote the realization othe right of self-determination” and “respect that rigin conformity with the provisions of the Charter of theUnited Nations.” A duty to promote this right througcommon and independent action, is also mentioned in

General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV), ICJ opinionon Western Sahara paragraph 58 and”The Wall”paragraph 156.

53 Principles on State Responsibility, inter alia 41, by thInternational Law Commission.

54 In inter alia “The Wall” 2004 regarding the Israeliwall on occupied territory and the opinion in 1970 onSouth-Africa’s presence in Namibia.



WWW.NRC.NO

“The wa of shame” in Western Sahara

Documents

Occupied Country, Displaced People