Stefano Silvestri, Rapporteur

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Occasional Papers

n°48December 2003

Space and security policyin Europe

Executive summary

Centre for European ReformDeutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige PolitikEuropean Union Institute for Security StudiesFondation pour la Recherche StratégiqueInstitut d’Etudes Européennes de l’Université catholique de Louvaincoordinated by the Istituto Affari Internazionali

In January 2002 the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) became a Paris-basedautonomous agency of the European Union. Following an EU Council Joint Action of20 July 2001, it is now an integral part of the new structures that will support the furtherdevelopment of the CFSP/ESDP. The Institute’s core mission is to provide analyses andrecommendations that can be of use and relevance to the formulation of EU policies. Incarrying out that mission, it also acts as an interface between experts and decision-makersat all levels.

Occasional Papers are essays or reports that the Institute considers should be made avail-able as a contribution to the debate on topical issues relevant to European security. Theymay be based on work carried out by researchers granted awards by the ISS, on contribu-tions prepared by external experts, and on collective research projects or other activitiesorganised by (or with the support of) the Institute. They reflect the views of their authors,not those of the Institute.

Publication of Occasional Papers will be announced in the ISS Newsletter and they willbe available on request in the language - either English or French - used by authors. Theywill also be accessible via the Institute’s Website: www.iss-eu.org

The European Union Institute for Security StudiesParis

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© EU Institute for Security Studies 2003. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be repro-duced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,photo-copying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the EU Institute for SecurityStudiesISSN 1608-5000Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in France by L’Alençonnaised’Impressions. Graphic design by Claire Mabille (Paris).

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Space and security policy in Europe

This study was funded by the European Space Agency (ESA)ESA Technical Officer: Simonetta Cheli

Occasional Papers

n°48December 2003

Research GroupStefano Silvestri, Rapporteur (IAI, Rome)Klaus Becher (EUISS, Paris)Jean-Pierre Darnis (IAI, Rome)Giovanni Gasparini (IAI, Rome)Daniel Keohane (CER, London)Michel Liégeois (ULV, Louvain)Michele Nones (IAI, Rome)Xavier Pasco (FRS, Paris)Niklas Reinke (DGAP, Berlin)Henning Riecke (DGAP, Berlin)Burkard Schmitt (EUISS, Paris)Isabelle Sourbes-Verger (FRS, CNRS, Paris)Jost Vielhaber (DGAP, Berlin)

With contributions byAngela Garrigos de la UzMike Winerstig (FOI, Stockholm)

Executive summary

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Contents

1

Foreword 3

Outlook 5

Space, a decisive asset for European security policy 9

Aspects of intergovernmental cooperation in Europe 11

2.1 General position of the EU with respect to internationalcooperation in space 13

2.2 Re-thinking political and military sovereignty 13

2.3 Schemes for possible cooperation: multiplicity, complexity 14

European institutions and space policy for security and defence 17

3.1 The EU as the hub of European security policy 18

3.2 ESA as a dual-use space agency 20

3.3 Other aspects of institutional development 21

Space and security in Europe: a crossroad between policy and industry 23

Conclusions 27

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2

Foreword

Space is a strategic asset, and its importance both in terms of technology and security cannot be overestimated.Firstly, space technology is at the cutting-edge, acting as a catalyst for technological progress and generating appli-cations that are crucial for the functioning of modern societies. Secondly, it is the example par excellence of adual-use technology. Its applications are normally multi-purpose, and space operations can be seen as a contin-uum, including civil and military as well as security and defence functions. In consequence, space assets representkey instruments for a comprehensive approach to security.

However, Europe still has difficulties responding to the importance of space in general and its security implica-tions in particular. Granted, recent initiatives like Galileo and GMES are encouraging, but they cannot hide thatimportant structural deficiencies persist. Europe’s space sector is facing not only a lack of funding, but also politicaland institutional fragmentation that makes efficient and effective solutions difficult to achieve. In this context, theclear distinction between military and civil space activities is particularly important, since it is increasingly in con-tradiction with technological and security evolutions.

Having this in mind, the IAI in Rome brought together an international consortium of Think Tanks to finalisea research program for the European Space Agency (ESA) on the perspectives of space in the European securityand defence policy. The research team consisted of six European research institutes, including the EUISS. Its taskwas to analyze how the various actors in Europe deal with space and how to promote convergence towards a Euro-pean space security policy.

To achieve this objective, the consortium chose a two-step-approach: It investigated the political, institutionaland economic aspects of the various national and European space policies. This assessment is particularly impor-tant, since there is not only an unbalanced distribution of space activities and funding in Europe, but also a sharpdivision between civil European programs and national military programs. Then, based on this ‘inventory’, theresearch team evaluated the perspectives for a common European space security policy and developed concreteproposals for political action.

The consortium presented its findings in early December 2003 at an international conference in Rome. Thefull report with all contributions on the various national policies is available on-line via the IAI website(http://www.iai.it).

This Occasional Paper contains the Executive Summary and the Conclusions of the report. Given the signifi-cance of the issue and its implication for CFSP/ ESDP, the EUISS felt it important to publish them and make themavailable to a wider public.

Burkard Schmitt, EUISS,Paris, December 2003

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Outlook

The evolution of a European space policy isencouraged by the recent EU decision to

develop the Galileo project. This decision con-firms the willingness to pursue a policy in thespace technologies that goes beyond thenational level, even if national visions are stillpredominant. A new security concept is emerg-ing. The evolution of the foreign, security anddefense policy (CFSP, ESDP) and the protectionof population requires an integrated approach.

Security needs are connected to the techno-logical progress. Space assets must be used toprotect populations, resources and territories,but also to maintain the integrity and the capa-bilities of the technological base. Space systemsare a fundamental aspect of “technological secu-rity”: they offer extremely versatile solutions in aglobal, international dimension.

This research analyses how the different EUactors deal with these topics and how to pro-mote convergence towards a European SpaceSecurity Policy.

1. Space is a strategic asset. Europe has alwaysmaintained an important presence inspace. The development of dual-use tech-nologies calls for a “European” approachto space security, linking the present natio-nal defence programs with mainly civilianEuropean programs. The functions andmeans of security and defence uses of spaceoverlap considerably. In fact, space opera-tions can be seen as a continuum, inclu-ding civilian and military functions as wellas security and defence operations.

2. The emergence of the EU in Europeanspace policymaking has been characterisedby an increasing interest in more “strate-gic” programs. Future European decisionsand performance in the security anddefence applications of space are likely to

impact on the transatlantic relationship aswell as help to define Europe’s role in theworld (and the future of Europe’s defence-industrial base). Therefore, thinking in thisarea can no longer be kept on the marginsof the European political process, butrequires far-reaching political choices.

3. Space tools are necessary for our collectivesecurity, but there is no “European aware-ness” of the benefits of common space sys-tems. A security and defence space usercommunity still has to be created bothamong national defence establishmentsand at the level of the general Europeanpublic.

4. The supply side is structurally inadequate.The globalisation of the market underlinesthe weakness of the European industrialbase vis-à-vis American competitors. Fur-ther rationalisation is needed and will pro-bably imply a growing level of industrialconcentration. This process will have to beguided to avoid excessive distortion of themarket. A principle informing this policyshould be continuity in techniques, indus-tries and functions in space activities whe-ther scientific, commercial security ordefence.

5. Three functions are needed in any future,improved, space policy framework:

a. targeted R&D for advanced space applica-tions;

b. increased involvement of those respon-sible for security and defence in spacepolicy decision-making;

c. increased institutionalised political visibi-lity and effectiveness of security-relatedspace activities.

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6. There is no structure in place today inEurope that can cross-reference all space-related activities and provide an overar-ching approach for generating the neededassets and capabilities, also with recourseto commercial or public dual-use opportu-nities and public-private partnership solu-tions. Instead of continuing to rely onnational approaches or possibly setting upa second European space agency for secu-rity and defence, there is the potentiallyattractive option of the European SpaceAgency (ESA) taking full advantage of thedual-use nature of space through a coope-rative arrangement with the EU.

7. European governments and institutionsshould act to preserve some competitionon the European market, at least in thosesectors in which market dimensions andtechnological and industrial characteris-tics allow it, while opening up to concen-tration in other areas, such as launchers.The rise of a security and defence demandwill have important positive effects on thecompetitiveness of the European market,making room for at least two differentcompetitors in each sector.

8. It might be counterproductive to aim forthe complete rationalisation and unifica-tion of European space policies in the shortterm as national governments logics andchoices still are and will continue to bedeterminant. It is possible, however, toplan a European policy (under either a col-lective or an enhanced cooperation frame-work) that links all the European compo-nents and choices in space to some strate-gic primary objectives that could provideEurope with the knowledge and functionsit still lacks today and make its presence inspace more coherent and complete.

9. The European authorities should draw upsome overarching industrial policy objec-tives to maintain full autonomy in basicspace capabilities (in terms of satellites,

launchers, ground segments, technologiesand services) to guarantee access to and theoptimal utilisation of space in accordancewith a European policy. This does notexclude the possibility of agreements withother space powers nor does it call forparity with the US. It is merely a sufficientobjective with minimal technologicalassets. In order to develop scientific andtechnological know-how, European autho-rities should also strive to maintain a lively,competitive and diversified Europeanindustrial and technological basis. Thismeans guaranteeing a volume of produc-tion in the long run, and some publicinvestment in science and technology thatcan have an anti-cyclical function with res-pect to commercial demand.

10. The most recent EU developments mightplay a positive role. The EU itself could bebetter placed to identify and articulatedemand in terms of space assets, taking inthe perceptions and choices of variousEuropean states (or more precisely a groupof states, following an enhanced coopera-tion logic) and establishing criteria for theburden sharing and management of thesystems.

11. In practical terms, “space security” com-mittees can be set up in parallel in the ESAand the EU Council, in charge of thinking,programming, implementing and mana-ging such a program, as well as providingan institutional link between the two insti-tutions. To avoid creating too many insti-tutional bodies, the composition of thecommittees could be the same.

12. One of the best ways to elevate Europe’sspace, security and defence capabilities-building efforts to a new level could be thelaunching, preferably by the EuropeanUnion, of a European Security and DefenceAdvanced Projects Agency with a small,non-permanent staff and flexible, mission-based activity. Like DARPA in the US, this

Space and security policy in Europe

would provide a framework for pursuing astrategic approach to applied technologiesof the future, combining a well-definedvision with highly responsive structuresand methods.

13. These and other changes will not comeeasily. Thus the European Council willhave to make a head start in this directionby establishing an independent space com-mittee, composed of European experts andbringing together assessments from space

industry, potential civilian and defencespace users in the foreign, security anddefence spheres. Such a committee shoulddetermine the optimal level for Europeanambitions in space with regards to demandand the evolution of needs. Apart from itsfunction of advising the European Coun-cil, such a committee could do very impor-tant public work, contributing to the muchneeded identification and building of aEuropean space constituency.

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Outlook

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1

Space, a decisive asset for European security policy

Space technology is linked to collective secu-rity, with the term “security” referring to the

protection of European citizens from potentialrisks of both military and non-military origin.The European Commission Green Paper on“European Space Policy” included a statementon how security can be enhanced through spacetechnologies. Space assets are fundamental formany common European endeavours, such asdeveloping a “knowledge-based economy” ormore integrated transport policies (single skyfor example). At the same time, the developmentof a Common Foreign and Security Policy and aEuropean Security and Defence Policy requiresmany new military capabilities. The increasinguse of information technology is linked to theseefforts to increase European capabilities, espe-cially to meet data transmission and informa-tion requirements. The ECAP (European Capac-ities Action Plan) calls for concrete actions toincrease asset availability.

The Thessalonica European Councillaunched the concept of an EU Security Strat-egy. This was an important step towards a betterdefinition of the political basis of future spaceapplications for security. Also, the decision tocreate an intergovernmental agency in the fieldof defence capacities development, research,acquisition and armament by 2004 represents acornerstone for the development of securitytechnologies, and thus for space activities, in theEU. In the United States, space technology is“military oriented” due to a military strategyincreasingly based on the concept of “informa-tion dominance”. European space technology ismore “civilian oriented”; in fact, it is dual-use.

This duality has been established politically.The preamble of the ESA Convention defines itsmission as one of “peaceful purposes”. Thedevelopment of European security policy, which

deals with how to “help secure peace and defendstability”, confirms the compatibility of thispolitical orientation with the “non aggressive”use of technology.

The European space framework is exclusivelycivilian. Major defence/security programs havebeen developed on a national basis, and some-times through bilateral or trilateral cooperationin data exchange. The development of dual-useprograms calls for a “European” approach tospace security, able to link national defence andEuropean civilian approaches.

Civilian spin-offs of space-based technolo-gies, backed by a strong “broad security policy”coming from EU authorities, establish someimportant points:

The “security of citizens” is the basis of thegrowing use of space technologies. Thissecurity concept deals with both civil andmilitary security.In some cases, applications for the securityof citizens are only civilian, such as space-based crop monitoring or water manage-ment networks.In most cases, the space-based securityapplications provide sensitive informationthat have to be gathered and delivered bymeans of a clear procedure. There is the need for a strong political/juri-dical framework that can also facilitate thedevelopment of a defence, police and jus-tice administration users community. The development of CFSP/ESDP calls for anumber of space-based assets and applica-tions to be matched by a significant opera-tional capability.There is no link between intelligence usersof space; better coordination of space at theEuropean level could guarantee greatereffectiveness.

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The concept of “space security” involves dif-ferent elements:

The security applications provided byspace technologies are a linchpin of Euro-pean policy.The development of space is the concretetranslation of a common democratic Euro-pean political project. Space security appli-cations are directly linked to the role ofEurope in the world. The negotiations bet-ween the US and the EU on the Galileo sys-tem clearly confirm this.The space sector helps to define a “securityconcept” for Europe and a common strate-gic culture, not only where applicationsimprove the security of the citizens, butalso for the technological capacity in itself.

End-user and industrial needs contributeto a comprehensive technological security. Space security includes defence and othersecurity applications but is mainly civilian-driven, based on a very specific dual-useapproach developed among multilateraland national European institutions.

Moreover, the European Convention on theFuture of Europe included “European SpacePolicy” and a “European Space Program” in itsdraft Constitutional Treaty: a strong commit-ment shaping a high-tech sector and confirmingits strategic importance. The draft Constitu-tional Treaty also calls for an important institu-tional and operational effort to foster such a security concept.

Space and security policy in Europe

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Aspects of intergovernmental cooperation in Europe

Space developments have been independentof the general process of European integra-

tion. In addition, different civilian and militarybodies, either exclusively national or actingthrough various partnerships, have contributedto defining space policy and developing indus-trial activities. The European Space Agency hasbecome the main authority in the Europeanspace industry. However, the growing role of theEuropean Union, the development of militaryspace activities, and changes in the industrialsector are new features that have to be taken intoaccount along with the internal evolution of thenational space sectors in individual Europeanmember countries.

Today, the main contributions to space inEurope are made by the European Space Agency,the European Union and intergovernmentalprograms.

European space programs as a whole arecharacterised by:

a strong Research and Development orien-tation leading to experimental programsand acquisition of competence in high-tech domains;collective operational and strategic objec-tives;national goals.

For two of the major European space proj-ects, Galileo and GMES, R&D aspects are man-aged by ESA while strategic issues are handled bythe EU. In these cases, the involvement ofnational governments provides an additionallayer of cooperation. The national authoritiesresponsible for space matters can be either agen-cies devoted more or less exclusively to space,

ministries (for example, research and technol-ogy, industry or foreign trade) or “inter-ministe-rial” entities. For the military space sector,defence ministries are responsible for thoseactivities unrelated to civilian activities.

One of ESA’s missions was to coordinate theEuropean space programme and national pro-grammes with a view to gradually “Europeanis-ing” the latter. In practice, European space pro-grammes have not supplanted purely nationalactivities and both attitudes towards and thedegree of involvement in them are far from uni-form across Europe.

The tasks of the space agencies are now beingreappraised in all countries. This reflects thegradually changing relations between the vari-ous protagonists and a certain maturity in thesector after more than thirty-five years of prac-tice.

ESA has proven its ability both in managingmajor programmes and in carrying out originalspace science. However, new factors concerningthe evolution of technology, changes in nationalspace preferences and developments in the gen-eral framework of the European community allrequire a redefinition of objectives and ambi-tions for the future European space policy. Inthis context, ESA intends to enlarge its role tocontribute to the implementation of Europeanspace policy as shown by the strategic work it hascarried out with the EU (Green Paper exercise).While ESA remains the principle forum for anyintergovernmental cooperation, with its ownmechanisms for discussion and negotiation,current trends are towards a more visible role forthe EU in intergovernmental relationships.

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Space and security policy in Europe

TTHHEE FFIIRRSSTT EEUU--EESSAA CCOO--MMAANNAAGGEEMMEENNTT PPRROOGGRRAAMM :: GGAALLIILLEEOO

The Galileo program of satellite navigation and positioning can be considered the first “genuine” European Union-led space program. The programme began at the European level, under a tripartite authority composed of the European Space Agency, the European Union, and the Eurocontrol organisation for the certification of air traffic. Largely supported by Brussels, the objective of establishing a completely independent European commercial system was initially embodied in a European directive, essentially civilian in character despite an obvious military dimension. One of the consequences of EU involvement in this initiative has been the creation of a new system of financing known as PPP (Public Private Partnership). As shown by the Laeken “non decision” in 2001, some governments fear that developing the Galileo satellite capability could jeopardise national sovereignty in this field. Aside from a strictly military analysis, Galileo’s evolution has been plagued by some questioning about its relevance for national purposes and by government-to-government disputes about the political and industrial benefits (until recently involving Germany and Italy). It must be noted that the most recent intergovernmental discussions were settled without putting the principle of an EU-led Galileo program into question.

MMIILLIITTAARRYY EEXXPPEERRIIEENNCCEE ,, TTHHEE WWEEUU HHEERRIITTAAGGEE IINN TTHHEE EEUU

In 1991, the Western European Union Satellite Centre for satellite data interpretation was set up in Torrejon, Spain, marking the conclusion of a long process of reflection. Five years later, the WEU’s appraisal of activities at the Torrejon centre during its experimental stages showed that it had not yet achieved maximum efficiency. One of the main problems was genuine cooperation in sensitive areas like intelligence. More globally, the WEU had to deal with a basic lack of uniformity between member countries, in terms of financial resources as well as the political and strategic approach. However, the decision in May 1997 to support and strengthen activities at the Torrejon centre shows that the importance of space methods assets is officially recognised, at least at the political level, even though most current programmes are still being developed in the context of direct bilateral or multilateral cooperation between the relevant countries. In 2001, the Centre was designated a permanent Agency reporting to the EU Council, demonstrating that it plays a recognised role and that its missions are indeed considered a part of the development of the common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

TTHHEE FFIIRRSSTT EEUURROOPPEEAANN ““EENNLLAARRGGEEDD SSEECCUURRIITTYY ”” IINNIITTIIAATTIIVVEE :: GGMMEESS

Originally strictly for monitoring the environment, the GMES has since been enlarged to the CFSP’s security dimension with the notion of security incorporated into the title of the programme with the “S” of GMES. Apart from its commitments to programmes agreed upon in the civil domain by ESA, the European Commission favours an approach characterised by great caution in piloting a programme with acknowledged dual prospects, but which will be difficult to impose as an instrument of collective sovereignty, especially in the military field. It should, in theory, lead to the setting-up of an operational system for global monitoring of the environment by 2008.

2.1 General position of the EUwith respect to internationalcooperation in space

The emergence of the EU in European space pol-icymaking has been characterised by an increas-ing interest in more “strategic” programs. Thisinterest has changed the conditions of transat-lantic cooperation in a rather radical manner:the EU decision to consider programs such asGalileo and GMES has stirred up a lot of scepti-cism in the US.

The EU has a relatively active policy in thefield of space cooperation. It has establishedcontacts with Russia and with China, mainlybecause of a potential cooperation on theGalileo program in accordance with the openedEU position to multilateral partners.

Today, one of the main issues in the buildingof a European military competence is the har-monization of national programs. Other Euro-pean countries are studying the development oftheir own capabilities (German Sar Lupe, ItalianCosmo Skymed, French Pléiades) with agree-ments for exchange of information with othercountries (Belgium, Sweden, Spain and Aus-tria).

The possible development of a Europeansecurity and defence presence in space requirescareful consideration:

It is taking place in a changing Europeanpolitical context since the affirmation ofthe “Headline Goals” aimed at establishinga European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF).Space technologies, like information tech-nology, are undergoing profound changesbased on constant improvements in thecost/performance ratio of electronic com-ponents and, in a correlated way, on impro-vements in systems architecture making itpossible to combine distinct systems. Suchsystems enrich the information producedfor all users, including the military. More-over, given the flexibility of use which itpermits, this technical opening up couldrespond, a priori and against all expecta-tions, to the new security requirementsthat worry military headquarters today.

For all military players, the harnessing andincreased use of all kinds of informationare necessary in all “modern” military ope-rations. As seen by a professional army, theenemy is characterised by the lack of infor-mation possessed about him and theunpredictable actions which he mightundertake. Military strategies thereforeseek to compensate the lack of knowledgeof the modern enemy by the reinforcementof their ability to see, to detect, to know.The convergence of these technical deve-lopments and new requirements appearsto push to the fore the role of space as a pri-marily strategic defence tool.The European initiatives are obviously noexception. Yet, this is precisely where theproblem lies. In effect, the magnitude ofthe consequences of the choices increasesthe difficulty in building a European mili-tary space presence. Thinking in this areacan no longer be kept on the fringes of theEuropean political process, but requiresfar-reaching political choices.

2.2 Re-thinking political andmilitary sovereigntySetting up military space activity on a Europeanscale raises questions of political and militarysovereignty. Questions of sovereignty are cur-rently treated in the context of conventionalmultinational relations, as with the “commonoperational requirements” of the Helios mili-tary observation programme. EstablishingEuropean programmes moves the problem to acompletely different level, on the one handbecause of the structural problems and hencethe question of responsibilities posed by theirdevelopment, on the other because of the politi-cal and strategic value that is attached to them.

Two key European programmes – civilian,but of a strongly dual nature – can be taken asevidence of this turning-point: Galileo andGMES. They reveal the scope but also the greatsensitivity of the choices that EU member statesmust make. The latter are aware that the credi-bility of a European political and military whole

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Aspects of intergovernmental cooperation in Europe

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depends on their involvement today. Yet,increasing examples of security-related, not tosay military security-related applications ofthese programmes make it impossible for Euro-pean states to restrict debates exclusively to eco-nomic, industrial or purely civil interests, andstrengthen national reluctance to engage fullyin their development.

2.3 Schemes for possiblecooperation: multiplicity,complexity

The creation of a true European military spacepresence appears all the more delicate in that theway towards European integration is not

unique, and multiple ways of cooperating arestill open today. In this domain, cooperation hasnever gone beyond bilateral or multilateral rela-tionships, with the exception of NATO Satcomassets. The latest arrangement, the CommonOperational Requirement (COR) attempts tobuild on the cooperation inaugurated in thesensitive area of space intelligence gatheringwith the Helios-1A and Helios-1B satellites. TheCOR is a process of cooperation at the highestlevel, which may guarantee more permanentmultilateral strategic agreements in future. Theprocess involves finding simple funding agree-ments for a programme, but also defining oper-ational objectives common to the differentnational systems, in the first instance those ofGermany, Spain, France and Italy. This poolingof military requirements for optical, radar and

Space and security policy in Europe

EEUURROOPPEEAANN MMIILLIITTAARRYY SSPPAACCEE :: TTHHEE CCHHAANNGGIINNGG FFRRAAMMEE OOFF RREEFFEERREENNCCEE

A rough estimate extrapolated from existing systems costs (without the exploitation costs) gives an order of magnitude of the global investment that a European collective space defence system could require. Table 1 - Costs of a potential European military space capability

Application Programme Cost

(Millions ) Programme Duration

(years) Annual Cost (Millions )

Telecom 3,140 15 209

Observation 2,283 10 228

Galileo 150 8 19

SIGINT 875 10 87

Warning 555 10 55

Surveillance 251 10 25

Total 7,254 623

Source: European Global Space Metasystem for Security and Defence, presentation by Major General D. Gavoty in the Workshop on “Security and Defence Aspects of Space: The challenges for the EU, Contribution to the Green Paper Consultation Process” organised by the Greek Presidency of the EU, Athens, 8-9 May 2003, http://europa.eu.int/comm/space/futur/consultation5_en.html

infra-red observation could compensate for thetemporary character of common programmingventures.

Efforts nevertheless have to be made to trans-late such a document into a European reality.What is, for the moment, only an initiative forsome member states could become the embryo

of a decision for action taken at the Europeanlevel. In this sense, the COR could be a pertinent“bottom-up” type mechanism to advance Euro-pean integration, even though this does not nec-essarily mean greater technical cooperation anymore than it implies greater interoperability apriori.

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Aspects of intergovernmental cooperation in Europe

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3

European institutions and space policyfor security and defence

In pooling Europe’s resources for space activi-ties, a separate integration track was created in

the form of the European Space Agency. While ESA stands outside the community

approach, its statute qualifies it, like the EU, asmore than simply an intergovernmental cooper-ation structure – it has an obligatory pro-gramme and its own common infrastructure.

Yet, the EU First Pillar, the European Com-munity Treaty, still stipulates that the defencesector is largely outside the scope of the commu-nity authority and remains under the control ofnational governments. Policy areas where theEuropean Commission is authorised to addresssecurity aspects openly and spend funds onthem are still rare. It is clear at this time, though,that internal security as well as defence in the EUwill remain intergovernmental for the foresee-able future, and any active role of the EU and theEuropean Commission will be geared at facili-tating member states’ efforts.

Today, the European Commission sees itsspace role in conducting joint research anddevelopment, drafting regulatory conditionsand gathering broad support for projects ofEurope-wide interest such as Galileo. In the lastdecade, space activities have moved beyond theirearlier focus on technology development andbegun to deliver mature applications, in partic-ular in communications and earth observation,including weather and climate change monitor-ing. Some of these applications have assumedimportant roles in various sectors of life and eco-nomic activity and are also relevant for securityand defence.

The fragmentation of European spaceefforts – the split between civil and militaryactivities and between national agencies andESA, with the growing role of the EU – finallygave rise to calls for new institutional solutions.

In 2003, the Commission presented its GreenPaper on European Space Policy, prepared incooperation with ESA. It elaborates the funda-mental notion that the benefits of space must beput more at the service of Europe and its citi-zens. Among the key areas where strong benefitscould be expected are sustainable development,including global monitoring for stricter controlof environmental regulations and capacities formanaging environmental crises, as well as thesecurity of citizens through CFSP and ESDP.The intensive public debate about the GreenPaper that unfolded in the first half of 2003 pro-vides a good basis for the White Paper.

As far as security is concerned, the GreenPaper embraces the space aspects of the fullspectrum of Petersberg tasks, both civil and mil-itary, that are covered by CFSP and ESDP. Itrightly reflects the ECAP finding that “to a cer-tain extent, the critical shortcomings of currentcrisis management are directly linked to a spacetechnology capability”.

Given the limited nature of EU defence inte-gration, however, with the common defenceremaining within the remit of member states,most of them coordinated by NATO, the Com-mission’s Green Paper necessarily stops short ofoffering a truly integrated vision of a Europeanspace policy that includes strictly military andintelligence space capabilities. Therefore, theanswer to the Commission’s call for a more effi-cient and ambitious approach to space thatbinds efforts of the EU, ESA and member statestogether, will have to go beyond the Green Paperdebate.

The first goal, as the Green Paper specifies,“is to ensure Member States discover addedvalue” in a common, coherent EU space policythat also addresses security and defence. In practical terms, at least in the beginning, this

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challenge translates into the prospect of mobil-ising additional funds through European coop-eration for security and defence-related spaceactivities led by those members states that haveactive policies in this field.

This could be achieved in three ways: exploiting more effectively research andtechnology development funds for dual-use purposes on the national and Euro-pean levels; increasing space funds for security applica-tions; generating increased political support foradditional appropriations to security-rela-ted space programmes by raising aware-ness and enabling accelerated success. TheCommission estimates that total annualspending on space in the EU will have to bedoubled to 12 billion euros to support theprogrammes seen as necessary compo-nents of a future coherent European spacepolicy.

The functions needed in any futureimproved policy framework would thus be:

targeted R&D for advanced space applica-tions; increased involvement of those responsiblefor security and defence in space-policydecision-making; increased, institutionalised political visibi-lity and effectiveness of security-relatedspace activities.

These three points can serve as criteria forevaluating various possible future institutionalapproaches to space and security between EU,ESA, other related agencies and national institu-tions.

3.1 The EU as the hub ofEuropean security policy

The political and military lessons of theBalkans wars of the 1990s led to the decision toequip the EU with a set of military and civilianpolice tools for crisis reaction, permitting thelaunch of the ESDP Headline Goal initiative in

1999. Interpretations of the “Petersberg tasks”on which this effort is based have been some-what at variance in different member statesfrom the beginning. There is increasing accept-ance today that a broader spectrum of defencetasks, such as conflict prevention, joint disar-mament operations, military advice and assis-tance, post-conflict stabilisation and combat-ing terrorism (cf. Morillon Report to the Euro-pean Parliament, March 2003), should be explic-itly included. For planning purposes, it wouldbe advisable to build on the most robustassumptions regarding the possible nature andscope of future EU operations. This applies evenmore in the strategic environment after 11 September 2001.

The draft strategy paper “A Secure Europe ina Better World” presented by Javier Solana inThessalonica in June 2003 provides an overviewof the challenges, including international ter-rorism, proliferation of Weapons of MassDestruction (WMD) and the collapse of effec-tive state institutions in many parts of the world,and makes the case for a “more active, morecoherent and more capable” European Union inresponse to these challenges, working with partners.

For the additional defence and intelligencecapabilities required, space is going to be crucialas a field that offers cutting-edge technologyadvantages, covers the increasing global reach ofEuropean responsibilities and in effect favoursthe cost-effective use of scarce funds by provid-ing force-multiplying components and capabil-ities. The same is true not only for the ESDP’sPetersberg tasks but also for other shared Euro-pean security tasks that do not normally fallunder ESDP, such as border and coastal security.

Given the severe deficiencies in Europe, forboth military and non-military missions, in cer-tain key areas such as command and control ofoperations, global secure communications,strategic intelligence (monitoring, early warn-ing, situation assessment), mapping, navigationand positioning, operational surveillance, tacti-cal situation awareness, force protection andeffective engagement capacity (all with a spacedimension), the main focus of implementation

Space and security policy in Europe

efforts in ESDP has been the process of capabil-ity-building. European Capabilities Action Plan(ECAP), set up 19 working groups to examinethe most significant shortcomings. None ofthem dealt specifically with space. However, anumber of space-related capabilities have beenincluded in the list of shortfalls, i.e. strategicsatellite imagery, signal intelligence, early warn-ing and support for UAVs.

There is today no structure in place in Europethat could cross-reference such space-relatedelements and provide an overarching approachfor generating the required assets and capabili-ties, also with recourse to commercial or publicdual-use opportunities and public-private part-nership solutions. The overlapping of requiredspace-related capabilities for defence purposesand for non-defence security purposes (such asborder police, coast guard and emergencyresponse) must be recognised and exploited onthe national as well as European level.

A significant contribution could come fromthe creation of a European security and defencecapabilities agency tasked not just with runningprocurement programmes, but also overseeingand targeting R&D, monitoring national effortsand assisting in the identification of require-ments. Key member states of the EU are backingthe creation of such an Agency, building onexisting structures such as OCCAR, and thedraft Constitution produced by the Conventioncalls for its establishment (cf. Burkard Schmitt,The European Union and Armaments, EU-ISSChaillot Paper n. 63, Paris).

There is no guarantee, however, that such anagency would focus sufficiently on space. Theremay thus be the need to provide a separateframework and impetus on the European levelspecifically for the security and defence dimen-sions of space. One such proposal, even morenarrowly designed for the military dimension,has been offered by the French General Gavotyin the form of an “Eumilsat” agency that wouldalso be in charge of controlling the operationalsystems, including Galileo. What should beavoided is a further deepening of the existingcivil/military divide because this would furtherundermine hopes for a more intelligent andeffective use of limited resources.

To ensure that a European security anddefence space agency would be able to draw onthe technical expertise of ESA and its Europeannetwork, a considerable degree of integrationwithin ESA would probably be of advantage.Such an approach could also facilitate theinvolvement of defence and security ministersfrom national governments in the politicalguidance of the agency; for the foreseeablefuture, defence ministers will continue to beable to meet only informally in the EU context,whereas the ESA Convention would provide theflexibility for member states to be representednot only by research ministries, especially underoptional programmes (where the EU can also bea participant).

A security and defence authority created bymember states within ESA, with EU participa-tion, would also be a good place for developingand implementing European policies for secu-rity-relevant regulations on space, such as shut-ter control for imaging devices in times of crisis.

Given the fact that within Europe there is astrong asymmetry of military space efforts, withFrance spending more than twice as much as allothers combined, the French experience andexpectations are certainly going to be a majorfactor in the future institutional development.If others want to motivate France and othercountries into less traditional approaches fortheir military space efforts, they will at least haveto put attractive levels of additional funds onthe table.

One complicating, but at the same time help-ful element is the fact that the European capa-bilities-building efforts in ESDP are closelycoordinated with NATO, since most membersbelong to both organisations and must makesure that their forces are geared to the require-ments of both. This applies even more after thedecision in NATO to establish an alliedResponse Force (NRF) and push for the adop-tion of network-centric, transformationalapproaches to defence among European allies.

Future European decisions and performancein security and defence applications of space arelikely to impact not just on the quality oftransatlantic consultation and cooperation ininternational security affairs but also on other

19

European institutions and space policy for security and defence

20

aspects of strategic importance such as Europe’srole in the world and the future of the Europeandefence industrial base.

In space, the overwhelming US dominance isparticularly striking since the vast majority ofspace expenditure and in particular of militaryspace expenditure worldwide is in the US, leav-ing European firms at a severe disadvantagewith respect to their US competitors in aero-space and defence.

The space sector is thus intricately linked tothe question of defence market access andexport control negotiations with the US andalso to the themes recently addressed in theEuropean Commission’s communication“Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy”(March 2003) with a view to creating a Europeandefence equipment market.

In this context as well as in many otherrespects, the fact that space activities are rele-vant to a number of different directorates-gen-eral of the Commission needs to be taken intoaccount when shaping a future organisationalframework for a coherent EU space policy. A cer-tain risk of rivalries, with adverse consequences,may arise between portfolios such as research,development, technology and innovation,enterprise, transport and trans-European net-works, information society, environment andexternal relations in the pursuit of their respec-tive tasks and policies.

The Commission, and the EU as a whole, arenot yet sufficiently organised for an active,coherent space-policy role. This has also beenvisible in current space programmes with an EUrole such as GMES and Galileo. It will be neces-sary in the future to find a suitable assignmentof roles and lead responsibility within the EU.

3.2 ESA as a dual-usespace agencyESA can offer very attractive infrastructure forthe whole range of space projects and has a suc-cessful track record. It has traditionally, though,been hindered from engaging in explicitly security-relevant activities by the reference to“exclusively peaceful purposes” in its statute.

Tacitly its achievements in providingautonomous access to space have of course alsobeen motivated, as has been true for all otherspace powers, by the desire to gain access to thesecurity and defence applications of space suchas intelligence gathering from orbit.

The institutional separation of civil and mil-itary space activities was historically rooted (aswith NASA and the US Department of Defence)and was originally based on valid political andlegal considerations. However, it increasinglybecame outdated after the end of the Cold War.In 1993, ESA’s International Relations Commit-tee recommended an open mind towards a rolein setting up a WEU satellite surveillance sys-tem. ESA has indeed shown flexibility. Not onlywere the Helios-1 satellites and several other mil-itary payloads launched with Ariane. Helios-1was also tested as at ESTEC (European SpaceResearch and Technology Center, ESA Noord-wijk, Netherlands).

ESA’s successful demonstration of an opticalcommunications link between ESA’s Artemisand Envisat may lead to a similar link betweenArtemis and Helios-2.

Recently, ESA officially decided to re-evalu-ate the legal meaning of its statute, concludingthat the Convention does not restrict ESA’scapacity to launch and implement space pro-grammes for defence and security purposes ordual purposes or for national or internationalpublic bodies in charge of security and defence.It also installed a security clearance system.

There is the potentially attractive option totake full advantage of the dual-use nature ofspace in ESA itself, based on a future cooperativearrangement with the EU. Any such opportu-nity to avoid intra-European duplicationshould be welcome as a cost-reducing factor.

On the other hand, one must realisticallyassume that defence space systems are likely toremain national assets for some years to come.Even in the longer term, there may always besome defence applications that are deemed sosensitive that they are either not available at allto European cooperation or need to be dealtwith in special ways.

Given the infant nature of European militaryspace, it is too early to judge to which extent this

Space and security policy in Europe

aspect is likely to undermine the vision of ESA asa single European space agency. In any case (as inthe Helios programme) the facilities that ESAcan draw on as a service provider – possibly aug-mented by a progressively consolidating net-work of currently national space facilities –should be available for specific tasks even in thecontext of such special programmes.

3.3 Other aspects ofinstitutional developmentIn order to both gain cutting-edge capabilitiesand help sustain a capable and viable industrialbase in Europe, it is urgent that efforts be madeto strengthen dual-use aware, mission-orientedresearch and technology development in the EUin support of other community policies and tojump-start advanced R&D investment in thedefence-space sector. Only by fostering the earlypooling of European efforts at the research andtechnology level can the present situation, inwhich systems remain national and are onlymade mutually accessible (imagers, transpon-ders) as a minimal form of European coopera-tion, be changed.

At the moment, the Western EuropeanArmaments Group (WEAG) is the only placewhere this is attempted to some degree. Satellitesurveillance technology has been one of theCommon European Priority Areas (CEPA) inthis organisation since 1990. In 2000, this waswidened to include military space technology asa whole.

One of the best ways to put Europe’s space,security and defence capabilities-buildingefforts on a new footing would be the launching,preferably by the European Commission, of aEuropean Security and Defence Advanced Projects Agency with a small, non-permanent

staff and flexible, mission-based activity. LikeDARPA in the US, this would provide a frame-work for pursuing a strategic approach toapplied technologies of the future, combining awell-defined vision with highly responsive struc-tures and methods.

A more active security and defence space usercommunity is needed to interact constructivelyin the development of concepts and require-ments, the acquisition process and jointexploitation of space systems for security anddefence purposes in Europe. It would also be ofgreat help in professional interaction with USspace experts and in perceiving developments inUS military space policy with more accuracy andtimeliness.

Furthermore, a whole range of new institu-tional and regulatory decisions will have to betaken to deal with new tasks in the field of secu-rity and defence applications of space. Galileoand its security implications (cf. G. Gasparini,G. Lindström, The Galileo satellite system and itssecurity implications, EU-ISS Occasional Paperno. 44, Paris) have already provided a wake-upcall. Among other things, security-aware poli-cies will have to be established for access to sig-nals and for their denial, as well as precautionsfor system protection.

Finally, once the operational systems are inplace, European command structures in chargeof space systems will have to be developed. Theymay have to satisfy full military requirements aswell and the specific European desire to exploitthe dual-use nature of many space systems for abroad range of security applications. In somecases, parallel user structures will be unavoid-able because core security and defence tasksoften require a different approach than would awider notion of security, e.g. environmentalmonitoring.

21

European institutions and space policy for security and defence

22

4

Space and security in Europe:a crossroad between policy and industry

Development of the European Security andDefence Policy requires space assets. Therefore,Europe needs to maintain a technological andindustrial base or it will lack the autonomyrequired for strategic decision. Specific policiesmust increase its efficiency and competitive-ness, overcoming European imperfections onboth the supply and the demand side of thespace market.

The main problems in the area of space andsecurity are:

The lack of significant funds devoted tosecurity and defence in Europe. This realityemerges dramatically from a simple com-parison of European and American expen-ditures: the ratio is 1 to 2.6 in the commer-cial market; 1 to 3 in meteorology; 1 to 4 incivil institutional demand; 1 to 30 in themilitary area. This limited demandimpacts negatively on the European indus-trial base in a number of ways. The overall production of European indus-try will remain lower than US productionand this will have a negative impact oncompetitiveness since non recurrent andfixed costs, such as research and develop-ment, must be borne almost entirely bycivil production. The dependence on thecommercial market amplifies the effects ofeconomic crisis, as recently occurred, sincethe military sector is not big enough todevelop significant anti- cyclical demand.From the technological point of view, thedual nature of space requires full exploita-tion of all possible applications, civil andmilitary.The lack of institutional demand for

launch services implies that the Europeanlauncher, Arianespace, is less competitive. The commercial attractiveness of Euro-pean products is limited to non-securitysectors.

One problem is the absence of a commonEuropean strategy that guarantees the conver-gence of the present and future national, inter-national and European efforts. It can only besolved by adopting a European space policy thatincludes both civil and military aspects. In themeantime, closer coordination betweennational and European dimensions, as well asbetween civil and military activities must bedeveloped. This will avoid duplications and thedispersion of scarce resources and will graduallybring about the pooling of technological, indus-trial and operational capabilities.

The supply side is also structurally inade-quate. The globalisation of the market under-lines the weakness of the European industrialbase vis-à-vis American competitors.

Further rationalisation is needed and willprobably involve greater industrial concentra-tion. This process must be guided to avoid exces-sive distortion of the market, of which some isalmost inevitable. The European governmentsand institutions should act to preserve somecompetition on the European market, at least inthose sectors in which the market dimensionsand technological and industrial characteristicsallow, while opening up to concentration inother areas, such as launchers.

The introduction of a security and defencedemand will have important positive effects onthe competitiveness of the European market,

23

24

making room for at least two different competi-tors for each sector.

Some conclusions can be drawn from a com-parison of US and European experiences:

The experience of the American space sec-tor underlines the anti-cyclical role of insti-tutional spending (in particular from theDepartment of Defence).The institutional support of the R&D inthis particular sector is critical for any suc-cess, given the high level of uncertainty andthe long-term prospective of the invest-ments.

It is important to offer the supply side acommon set of regulations and unifieddemand, providing a stable, predictableand rich counterpart.The presence of strong demand organisedaround a single actor is a key asset; the seg-mentation of demand into different agen-cies specialised by mission should be avoi-ded. Strong political backing for the supply-side reform and concentration processshould provide the necessary incentives tocut costs.

Space and security policy in Europe

25

Space and security in Europe: a crossroad between policy and industry

TTaabbll

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26

Space and security policy in Europe

TTaabbll

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Conclusions

The European Union (EU) cannot ignorespace nor remain out of it. This is well under-

stood by the member countries that have a sig-nificant space policy. The creation of the Euro-pean Space Agency (ESA) and the importance ofits activities in terms of science, technologicaland commercial programs illustrates this politi-cal concern. At the same time, more “space ori-ented” European countries have developed anautonomous space activity, with some defenceand security space assets. Also the EU, throughEuropean Commission initiatives, has became aspace policy maker, starting with transporta-tion and environment monitoring fields: theGalileo and GMES programs, both developed bythe European Union and ESA, clearly show thistrend.

Meanwhile, the EU has further strengthenedits attempt to define a Common European For-eign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a EuropeanSecurity and Defence Policy (ESDP) and hasstarted acting as an international security player(in Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, the FYROMand Congo).

The EU Intergovernmental Conference willevaluate a number of proposals made by theEuropean Convention, including the strength-ening of European solidarity in the security field(in particular against terrorism) and the modifi-cation of some procedures and institutions toimprove the efficiency of the European foreign,security and defence policy.

Space, and the role of space in the future ofEurope, has to be included in that framework.That could overcome one of the main con-straints on efficiency in European space policy:the fragmentation of players and strategies. Thisis obvious today in the telecommunication fieldwhere Europe has produced three different mil-itary projects (Syracuse, Skynet and Sicral). In

the defence field some cooperation programsinvolving small group of countries recall theextensions of national logic.

Europe is already a very significant spaceactor, both collectively and thanks to thenational space policies of some of its memberstates. Today European space policy is led by dif-ferent bodies, depending on the applications:national space authorities, national defenceauthorities, ESA and some EU CommissionDirectorates.

The current relationship with the US, theworld’s only space power, can also lead to frag-mentation. Only important civilian scientificprograms are multilaterally managed by ESAwith a direct partnership link with NASA, butthere is no parity between Europeans and Americans.

In the commercial field, and even more so inthe defence field, there is no such multilateralframework and each country has a direct bilat-eral relation with the US, with the exception ofsome general agreements (service agreements)managed by NATO. It may not be easy to over-come those multiple factors of fragmentation.This has been the framework for operations fordecades.

To break away from these strategies andunbalanced policies calls for a redefinition ofstrong strategic, institutional and organisa-tional patterns.

For example, financing European spaceactivities with a unified community budgetcould be counterproductive: today those activi-ties (including ESA multilateral activities) arefinanced through individual national budgetsbased on the national demand, which can varyappreciably from one country to another. ESAresponds to that demand with an adequateoffer. The same logic is all the more necessary for

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28

Space and security policy in Europe

defence budgets. Instead EU budget contribu-tions follows an objective logic based on param-eters (GNP and population): it is dubious thatsuch “objective” criteria can increase the spacebudget.

Enhanced cooperation is a different case: if agroup of countries decides to undertake a pro-ject in a certain sector with some key objectives,there is a clear interest on the part of the partici-pating countries to finance the achievement ofthe project, even in a non-proportional way. Inthe end this means that it is not very likely (andmight be dangerous too) to pursue a completerationalisation and unification of Europeanspace policies in the short term, and thatnational government logic and choices are andwill continue to be determinant.

This is also true for the space programslinked to security and defence policy. In thedefence sector, space expenses are included inthe very tight and shrinking framework ofnational defence budgets. National defencebudgets define and maintain different priori-ties, and are not able to promote a competitivecritical level of technological capacities. Thismakes it impossible for them to fully benefitfrom the enormous operational potentialoffered by space technologies. In other words,no individual European country can financealone the space program needed to moderniseits security forces.

Obviously this situation deepens the gapbetween Europe and the US in terms of spacetechnologies. In fact, in that sector the expenseratio between the EU and the US is 1:2.6 in thecommercial market, 1:3 in the meteorologicalsector, and 1:30 in the defence sector. This has ahuge impact on European industry’s competi-tiveness and technological capacity. Thus, threerelated problems have to be addressed in a Euro-pean logic:

the insufficient level of European spaceexpenditure; the lack of convergence between differentinitiatives;the structure of supply (to maintain thecompetitive capacity).

On the political and strategic side, Europerequires space assets to achieve its objectives insecurity and defence policy but also to be able tomaintain its role as a global space policy player.

One principle behind this policy must becontinuity in techniques, industries and func-tions in space activities whether scientific, com-mercial security or defence. This would make itpossible to work out a closely linked frameworkfor budgeting, planning, implementation andmanagement of programs.

The term security is comprehensive of bothcivilian and military activities. After the end ofthe Cold War and in the absence of a dominantmilitary threat against the Western world, theperception of new threats, risks and vulnerabili-ties has gained importance.

Terrorism, organised crime, risks stemmingfrom forced or illegal mass migrations, securityof supplies and of main trade routes, availabilityof strategic resources, protection of the environ-ment and the like, have become the main sourceof worry. Those new threats cannot be dealt withby military force only, but require a combina-tion of different means, both civilian and mili-tary, better encompassed by the term security.

Moreover, while high-intensity, purely mili-tary confrontation is still possible, militaryoperations and priorities are shifting away fromwhat was traditionally defined as “defence pol-icy” (defending borders, defending the nationagainst well identified and “symmetric” ene-mies, planning confrontation between easilyidentifiable armies, with a high level of legiti-macy, etc.) towards crisis management interven-tion (of a dual – civilian and military – nature),preventive engagement, counter-proliferationand counter-terrorism, support of civilian secu-rity operations, peace- and state-building. Theseoperations are a significant element of any com-prehensive “security and defence policy”.

There is considerable overlapping of func-tions and means between the security anddefence uses of space. In fact, space operationscan be seen as a continuum, including civilianand military functions as well as security anddefence operations. Specific military require-

29

Conclusions

ments (such as continuous availability, greaterreliability, interoperability, protection, minia-turisation, speed, redundancy, etc.) increase theperformance of space systems and provide a pos-itive push towards technological developmentsthat can further increase their utility and com-petitiveness for civilian and security uses.

The general tendency seems to be going inthe direction of an increasing internationalisa-tion of security policies (in the EU and globally),which goes hand in hand with the globalisationof the economy and of all kind of services. Thefight against international terrorism has accel-erated this development, already present in cri-sis management and peace operations, armscontrol and disarmament policies, the fightagainst organised crime, etc. Yet these consider-ations contrast sharply with the present seg-mentation of European space policies into civil-ian and military activities, as well as among sci-entific research, economic and other activities,including security and defence, and betweennations.

Transatlantic problems also increase the dif-ficulty in identifying an overall, coherent Euro-pean space policy. The scientific cooperationbetween ESA and NASA contrasts with Europe’smilitary dependence on the United States; how-ever, transatlantic differences emerge whenEurope launches strategic programs such asGalileo; communication satellites are conceivedwith different technologies, creating problemsof interoperability; and intelligence satellitesbecome a bone of contention, as well as trigger-ing the prospect of so-called “network-centric”warfare. There is the need to identify basic ele-ments of a transatlantic cooperation policycoherent with the development of a EuropeanSecurity and Defence Policy and with the vari-ous new requirements stemming from the oper-ations in which European forces are involved.

In general, the major space projects have beendecided by the major users, and the US is promi-nent among them. France, Britain, and now alsothe EU and ESA, are trying to foster space activi-ties, but the US is, and will remain, the mainspace actor (and Europe’s major partner) for

many years to come. But Europeans have onlybeen able to accept or refuse participation in US-defined and US-led projects, never the other wayround. Even good European ideas have some-times been implemented as US-led projects,with subsequent European participation.

Moreover, the strong US tendency to con-sider space as an essential element of US militarydominance and to make military operationsincreasingly dependent on space assets andtechnologies diminishes the possibility that theUnited States will generously share these sameassets and technologies with its allies, except onan ad hoc and limited basis and in exchange forfull compliance with US political, economicstrategic and operational priorities.

Finally, differences are emerging between theUS and Europe on the best way to use spaceassets in operations. The American concept ofnetwork-centric warfare, based on the use ofwideband communication of a large amount ofdata to the lowest possible level of fighting unit(ideally, the individual soldier) requires a delega-tion of authority and an independence in deci-sion-making that is generally refused by Euro-pean military planners, who prefer a more cen-tralised distribution of selected information (ona “need to know” basis) following a hierarchicalline.

Europeans doubt that a complete technolog-ical restructuring of their operational units andtheir hardware can be useful and suggest that abetter compromise would be for their forces tobe “network enabled” or at best “networkbased”, but not fully “network centred”.

This debate is also fuelled by the differentstrategic perspectives of the EU and the US.While the latter maintains a truly global strate-gic outlook, based on its ability to project over-whelming force worldwide, Europe has morelimited ambitions and requirements, focussingon relatively proximate threats and on what isneeded to perform the missions defined by thePetersberg tasks. Such a regional vision does notexclude the possibility of worldwide force com-mitments, which are not seen as isolate Euro-pean operations, however, but in support and

30

with the assistance of other allies, either local or,more likely, the Americans themselves.

Thus, while a high degree of interoperabilityis deemed essential to maintain the possibilityof joint operations among allies, complete tech-nological and operational identity is generallyrejected. This may indeed reduce the possibilityof conducting fully integrated, joint militaryoperations and favour instead various forms ofdivision of labour with a significant degree ofseparation, but it seems to be in line with thegrowing US tendency to downgrade the central-ity of coalition warfare operations conducted byfully multinational headquarters. This increas-ing US independence underlines the impor-tance of achieving greater European autonomy.

Considering the global spread of militaryand security crises and the degree of exploita-tion of existing space assets, the degree of redun-dancy that could be guaranteed by more andmore effective European assets could increasethe security of the network and perform a usefulbackup and decongestion function. The factthat US and EU security perceptions generallyremain very similar, almost identical, favour thisdevelopment.

Inter-agency problems complicate Europeandecision-making on space. Respective functionsand specialisations must be defined better toallow for more effective integration and policycoherence (and more efficient use of the limitedresources available). While being the focus ofEuropean space policy, ESA cannot really “drawup” policies. It can only autonomously initiatethe study or the proposal of new programmes,but still needs the approval of member statesbefore it can implement or make budget alloca-tions to them.

The European future in space has to be builton the existing reality. Present European spaceactivities are generally carried out through vari-ous national agencies or ministries: nationalinstitutions are generally more capable thaninternational ones at dribbling relevant budget-ary decisions past institutional and politicalobstacles, lobbying for greater space budgets,gathering public support and identifying eco-nomic interests and technical capabilities.

The EU is a relatively new actor in space. Ithas the ability to initiate policies and fund them,but not to substitute all other actors. Its mainasset is the possibility of combining overall secu-rity and industrial policies with space policy,thus allowing for more coherence and rationali-sation. The first basic objective should be thestabilisation of the European presence in spacein order to guarantee Europe’s space capacity forthe future, consistent with its political and eco-nomical weight and able to fulfil the needs of anarticulated European security and defence pol-icy.

This requires a number of minimum condi-tions:

full autonomy in basic space capabilities(satellites, launchers, ground segments,technologies and services) in order to gua-rantee access to and the optimal utilisationof space in accordance to European policy.This does not exclude agreements withother space powers nor does it call forparity with the US; it is merely a sufficientobjective with minimal technologicalassets.a lively, competitive and diversified Euro-pean industrial and technological basis forthe development of scientific and techno-logical know-how. This means guaran-teeing a volume of production in the longterm, and some public investment pro-grams in science and technology that canhave an anti-cyclical function with respectto commercial demand.

It is important to identify what could be anessential and minimal European presence inspace for security and defence purposes.Roughly, this would include a network of satel-lites to match requirements in terms of commu-nication, observation, positioning, electronicintelligence and early warning: assets that gowith adequate ground segments, and with spacesegment investment costs of around 8-9 billioneuros over a period of 8 to 15 years, for a yearlyinvestment below 800 million euros (with a partalready allocated). These assets might not beaffordable by a single European country but are

Space and security policy in Europe

highly compatible with a multilateral invest-ment effort. Such a system would also provideCFSP, ESDP and the European rapid interven-tion forces with a higher degree of efficiency andautonomy. The details of such a space architec-ture are not new: they have long been known toEuropean governments. The real problem ishow to realise them.

The most recent EU developments couldplay a positive role. The EU may have to identifyand articulate demand more precisely in termsof space assets, gathering the perceptions andchoices from various European states (or moreprecisely a group of states, following anenhanced cooperation logic), and establish cri-teria for burden sharing and systems manage-ment. This would be the best way to guaranteeequal fruition for users but also to establish thenecessary link with the Atlantic Alliance and theUS.

Within such a framework, ESA could act onthe supply side, guaranteeing the necessarytechnical level and the system kick-off, linkingup directly with the European industrial baseand national authorities.

In practical terms, a “space security” commit-tees could can be set up in parallel in the ESAcontext and in the EU Council of Ministers, incharge of designing, programming, implement-ing and managing programs, and providing aninstitutional link between the two institutions.Also, a European space security and defence sec-tor could flank the future EU headquarters, butthis need for a higher institutional profile forspace security should not be limited to defence.

Again, European space is mainly civilian anda dual-use sector. This calls for a higher “dual-use space security” profile, which means that onthe ESA side (ESA Council) European intergov-ernmental Councils would be specifically put incharge of space security, while on the EU side theEuropean Council would give a precise mandate

to develop coordination competence at theCoreper level, with a structure able to check andapprove the security policy involvement of EUspace projects.

In order to avoid too many institutionalspace security entities, such as one dedicatedcooperation security council in ESA andanother for space security in the EU Council, thecomposition of such a committee could be thesame for both (space security being an“optional” program for some ESA countries andan “enhanced cooperation” for EU members), orthe ESA and EU Councils could take a paralleldecision to define a joint space security author-ity under the responsibility of the EU High Rep-resentative, with competence on the strategicand security aspects of space security.

As a starting point, the EU shall proceed forspace in the same way that it progressively pro-duced CFSP and ESDP: identification of objec-tives, problem analysis, solution hypotheses tobe evaluated by European institutions and pub-lic opinion.

Such a task could be best done by a spe-cialised Space Security Committee, composedof European experts bringing together assess-ments from space industry, potential civilianand defence space users in the foreign, securityand defence spheres. Such a committee couldhelp to determine the optimal level of Europeanambitions in space, with regards to bothdemand and the evolution of needs. This SpaceSecurity Committee would carry out veryimportant policy work, useful for identifyingand building up a much needed European spaceconstituency.

In the end, this Committee would present itsconclusions to the European Council to start aformal decision-making process in the commu-nity framework and with the involvement ofinterested institutions.

31

Conclusions

n°47 EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004? November 2003Taras Kuzio

n°46 EU-Russian security dimensions July 2003Edited by Dov Lynch

n°45 €uros for ESDP: financing EU operations June 2003Antonio Missiroli

n°44 The Galileo satellite system and its security implications April 2003Gustav Lindström with Giovanni Gasparini

n°43 La question du Cachemire. Après le 11 septembre et la nouvelledonne au Jammu et Cachemire Mars 2003Christophe Jaffrelot et Jasmine Zérinini-Brotel

n°42 L’Union en action : la mission de police en Bosnie Janvier 2003Agnieszka Nowak

n°41 La Bulgarie et la Roumanie dans le Pacte de stabilité Janvier 2003Ralitza Dimtcheva

n°40 Iraq: a European point of view December 2002Martin Ortega

n°39 Iraq: the transatlantic debate December 2002Philip H. Gordon

n°38 Getting there: building strategic mobility into ESDP November 2002Katia Vlachos-Dengler

n°37 From candidate to member state: Poland and the future of the EU September 2002Rafal Trzaskowski

n°36 Optimiser le processus de Barcelone Juillet 2002Dorothée Schmid

n°35 L’ONU au Kosovo : leçons de la première MINUK Mai 2002Eric Chevallier

n°34 Bigger EU, wider CFSP, stronger ESDP? The view from Central Europe April 2002Edited by Antonio Missiroli

n°33 A new European Union policy for Kaliningrad March 2002Sander Huisman

n°32 Managing separatist states: a Eurasian case study November 2001Dov Lynch

n°31 Aspects juridiques de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense Novembre 2001Lydia Pnevmaticou

n°30 Reconciling the Prince’s Two ‘Arms’. Internal-external security policy coordination in the European Union September 2001Ferruccio Pastore

Occasional Papers

All Occasional Paperscan be accessed via the Institute’s website:

www.iss-eu.org