Oblicon Midterm Answers 2006

7/26/2019 Oblicon Midterm Answers 2006

1/59

Bankarote Bank became insolvent. Paz Awai suedthe BSP for recovery of her deposits with the saidinsolvent bank on the ground that BSP is the

regulatory and monitoring agency of thegovernment that sees to the viability of localbanks. Will the suit prosper?

NO. The Central Bank has no obligation to pay thedeposits of a depositor of an insolvent bank (Serranov Central Bank, 96 SCR !6".

A borrowed P.! from the B" promising to pay in#anuary $%%" with the agreement that if thepayment was not made at the e&piration of thesaid period" A's house and lot would beconsidered absolutely sold to B for the said sumof P.!. (s this contract valid?

#$S. There is in this %ase a %ontra%t of loan and apro&ise of sale of a ho'se and lot, the pri%e of hi%hsho'ld be the a&o'nt loaned, if ithin the period fi)eds'%h a&o'nt sho'ld not be paid by the debtor*vendorof the property to the vendee*%reditor of the sa&e.Both %ontra%ts are perfe%tly legal. The agree&ent ofthe parties is the la beteen the&, and &'st beenfor%ed (l%antara vs. linea !+ hil -/, 0ar%h ++,!912".

)nder the subsisting *+uard Service ,ontract*between Acme Security and Bart" Acme a dulylicensed security service agency undertook to


2/59

safeguard and protect Bart's business premisesof from theft" pilferage" robbery" vandalism and aother unlawful acts of any person or persons

pre-udicial to Bart's interests. ,arlo" defendantssecurity guard on duty at Barts premises" withoutany authority brought out of Bart's compound acar belonging to a customer" /ino and drove saidcar into another car" driven by 0lmo. Bart sued forthe recovery of the total actual damages heincurred in having the cars of /ino and 0lmorepaired in the sum of P1%"%%%. Bart premised his

claim on the contractual stipulation wherebyAcme assumed the responsibility for the properperformance by the guards employed of theirduties and of the sole responsibility for the actsdone during their watch hours. Acme contestedthe claim alleging that as stipulated in thecontract" his liability is limited to P2"%%%.%% per

guard posted for the amount of loss or damage toany of Bart's property. Will the suit prosper?

3n the %ase of eople4s Car, 3n%. vs. Co&&andoSe%'rity Servi%e gen%y, 0ay ++, !92/, ! SCR -1,'pon hi%h the foregoing proble& as based, the SCessentially r'led that here it appears thatdefendant4s on g'ard on d'ty, instead of %o&plyingith its %ontra%t'al 'ndertaking to safeg'ard andprote%t the b'siness pre&ises of plaintiff, 'nlaf'llydrove o't of plaintiff4s pre&ises a %'sto&er4s %ar, lost%ontrol of it %a'sing it to fall into a dit%h, thereby%a'sing plaintiff to in%'r a%t'al da&ages in the total

2


3/59

a&o'nt of 5,-59.!1, and that 'nder paragraph ofthe 7'ard Servi%e Contra%t, the defendantass'&ed the responsibility for the proper

perfor&an%e by the g'ards e&ployed of their d'tiesand %ontra%ted to be solely responsible for the a%tsdone d'ring their at%h ho'rs and spe%ifi%allyreleased plaintiff fro& any and all liabilities ) ) ) to thethird parties arising fro& the a%ts or o&issions doneby the g'ards d'ring their to'r of d'ty, 'nder thepre&ises, said defendant is liable to inde&nify plaintifffor s'%h da&ages in%'rred.

laintiff as in la liable to its %'sto&er for theda&ages %a'sed the %'sto&er4s %ar, hi%h had beenentr'sted into its %'stody. laintiff therefore as in la

8'stified in &aking good s'%h da&ages and relying int'rn on defendant to honor its %ontra%t and inde&nifyit for s'%h 'ndisp'ted da&ages, hi%h had been

%a'sed dire%tly by the 'nlaf'l and rongf'l a%ts ofdefendant4s se%'rity g'ard in brea%h of their %ontra%t.

aragraph - of the %ontra%t, hi%h li&its defendant4sliability for the a&o'nt of loss or da&age to anyproperty of plaintiff to !,111.11 per g'ard post is byits on ter&s appli%able only for loss or da&agethro'gh the negligen%e of its g'ards ) ) ) d'ring theat%h ho'rs provided that the sa&e is d'ly reportedby plaintiff ithin +- ho'rs of the o%%'rren%e and theg'ard4s negligen%e is verified after properinvestigation ith the attendan%e of both %ontra%tingparties. Said paragraph is &anifestly inappli%able to

3


4/59

the stip'lated fa%ts of re%ord, hi%h involve neitherproperty of plaintiff that has been lost or da&aged atits pre&ises nor &ere negligen%e of defendant4s

se%'rity g'ard on d'ty.Si&ply, the s%ope of liability 'nder aragraph of the%ontra%t is greater hi%h is the one appli%able to thesit'ation. 3t &'st be %o&plied ith in good faith. Thisis a %ase of deliberate brea%h of %ontra%t notnegligen%e. Negligen%e applies in aragraph - of the%ontra%t. en%e, aragraph - is not appli%able b't

aragraph . The Se%'rity Co&pany sho'ld payhole a&o'nt.

Sith filed a petition for !andamus against the ,ity!ayor" the !unicipal Board" the ,ity 3reasurerand the ,ity Auditor" for reinstatement to hisformer position and for the payment of his back

salaries. 3he trial court rendered -udgment in hisfavor and he was paid. 3he city government suedfor refund claiming that the payment to Sith waswrongful and illegal" since it was not a party to thecase" invoking Art. $24 5 (f something is receivedwhen there is no right to demand it" and it wasunduly delivered through mistake" the obligationto return it arises.* Will the suit for refundprosper?

NO. 3n the %ase of City of Ceb' vs. on. i%%io, :e%./!, !961 On pril !!, !9, the SC essentially r'ledthat %onsidering that the indispensable re;'isites of

4


5/59

this 8'ridi%al relation, knon as sol'tio indebiti, are (a"that he ho paid as not 'nder obligation to do so :on ?'an %ase (%. !992",the SC deter&ined that the %aptain and the %re

ere g'ilty of %ontrib'tory negligen%e. e asplaying &ah8ong at the ti&e of the &ishap< theradar shoed the presen%e of the oil tanker, ayahead of ti&e, and if steps ere i&&ediatelytaken, the %ollision %o'ld have been avoided.ad the offi%ers and %re of 0J> :on ?'an been&ore vigilant, they %o'ld have &ini&i=ed theda&age %onsidering the fa%t that of the to

vessels, the 0J> :on ?'an as better e;'ipped.

4. 9undador" who was into&icated" wasgoing home one dark evening in a calesa"the horse stumbled in crossing +orio'srailway tracks" causing the calesa to

strike one of the rails with great force andthrowing the plaintiff from the calesa"from which he suffered in-uries. +oriosued for damages suffered due to9undador's negligence for having beeninto&icated while driving. Will the suitprosper?

NO. 3n Aright vs, 0la. $le%tri% +5 hil !++,the SC r'led that &ere into)i%ation is notnegligen%e, nor does the fa%t of into)i%ationestablish a ant of ordinary %are. 3f a person@s%ond'%t is %hara%teri=ed by a proper degree of

"#


11/59

%are and pr'den%e, it is i&&aterial hether he isdr'nk or sober.

. Amadoras son was shot to death by/affon" a classmate at schoolauditorium. 3he son was in school tosubmit physics pro-ect. 3he schoolcontends that the semester had alreadyended. Who are liable?

3nA!A/:8A ;. ,A " theSC r'led that it is i&&aterial hether these&ester has already ended for st'dents erethere for a legiti&ate p'rpose. e as still inthe %'stody of the s%hool a'thorities. $ven the&ere savoring of the %o&pany of his friends inthe s%hool pre&ises is a legiti&ate p'rpose J%

o'ld also bring hi& in the %'stody of thes%hool. The s%hool prin%ipal and dean are notliable be%a'se they are not tea%hers*in*%harge,b't are &erely e)er%ising general a'thority, notdire%t %ontrol and infl'en%e. B't even thetea%her*in*%harge is not liable be%a'se there isno shoing that the tea%her as negligent inenfor%ing dis%ipline 'pon :affon nor had heaived observan%e of s%hool r'les andreg'lations. is absen%e hen the tragedyhappened %annot be %onsidered against hi&be%a'se he as not s'pposed or re;'ired toreport to s%hool on that day.

""


12/59

So ho is liable hereK 3t4s probably the

dean of the boys. e had earlier %onfis%ated an

'nli%ensed g'n fro& one of the st'dents andret'rned it to the latter Jo taking dis%iplinarya%tion or reporting the &atter to highera'thorities. B't hile he as %learly negligent, itdoes not ne%essarily link hi& to the shootingsin%e it as not shon that the g'n as the one'sed to kill petitioner4s son.

Aho is really liable hereK Nobody, sin%enone of the& as fo'nd to have been %hargedith the %'stody of the offending st'dent, or hasbeen re&iss in the dis%harge of his d'ties.Ahile the %o'rt deeply sy&pathi=es ith thepetitioners, the %o'rt %annot e)tend &aterialrelief as a bal& to their grief.

=. What is the reasoning behind the rule inArt. $21% ,, that teachers or heads ofestablishments of arts and trades areliable for *damages caused by theirpupils and students or apprentices" solong as they remain in their custody?*

3n SA6;:SA ;. (A, H!66 SCR +2-I, theSC e)plained that the rationale of s'%h liability isthat so long as the st'dent re&ains in the%'stody of a tea%her, the latter stands, to a

"2


13/59

%ertain e)tent, in loco parentis (as to thest'dent" and is %alled 'pon to e)er%isereasonable s'pervision over the %ond'%t of the

(st'dent."

ikeise, the phrase 'sed in (rt. +!51"**so long as the (st'dents" re&ain in their %'stody4&eans that the prote%tive and s'pervisory%'stody that the s%hool and its heads andtea%hers e)er%ise over the p'pils and st'dentsfor as long as they are at attendance in the

school, in%l'ding re%ess ti&e.

Mino held a legacy in trust, but hedeposited the same in his personalaccount. This money wasconfiscated during the Philippine

revolution. Can he be compelled toreturn the same?

NO. He was not liable for theconfiscation of the money from the bank

although he mixed it with his personalfunds. He was considered to haveexercised the degree of diligence of a

"3


14/59

good father of a family (Bishop of Jarovs. ela !ena "# !hil $%%& c. $'$).

16. aldorf wor!ed as adisbursing officer of thegovernment. "cme Companytogether with another companybecame sureties on the official bond

of aldorf who misappropriatedgovernment funds forcing "cme topay the government under its suretybond. aldorf was arrested inCanada and on his person #1,$$$

was recovered, which amount wasturned over to the government."cme sued aldorf for the saidamount. %anding, aldorf&s lawyerclaimed the same based on adocument e'ecuted by aldorf

ceding to him the #1$$$ as paymentfor legal services legally tendered.(s %anding correct?

"4


15/59

*n +idelity , eposit -o. vs. ilson& /!hil 0$, upon which the foregoing problem

is based& the 1- ruled that the documentof transfer by itself& and afterwards thenotification of the same to thegovernment did not produce or could itproduce the effect of transfer to 2slawyer of the ownership of 3$444 which

was then in the possession of the!hilippine 5reasury. 5o have this effect&it would have been necessary that thedelivery of the funds be made directly to6& which fact was never proved. 7ll the

funds were with the !hilippine5reasureruntil they were transferred to thepossession of the depository. *t isfundamental principle in all matters ofcontracts and a well8known doctrine oflaw that 9non nudis pactis& sed traditione

dominia rerum transferentur:. Ownershipis transferred among other means& bytradition. 5he delivery of a thingconstitutes a necessary and indispensable

"5


16/59

re;uisite for the purpose of ac;uiring theownership of the same by virtue of a

contract.

1).*n +une ), 1- (sa sold a lot toConnie for P-$$,$$$, on account ofwhich she received P1$,$$$.Connie sold the same on +une /,

1/ to Pino for P-$$,$$$. Pinopaid Connie P1$,$$$ and promisedto pay the balance to (sa. Pino too!possession of the lot although hestill had not paid the balance. (n

"pril 1, (sa again sold the lot to(0ue for P/$$,$$$ who too!possession of the lot and had itfenced despite the opposition ofPino who was in full possession ofthe lot. ho owns the lot?

hen *sa sold the lot to -onnie in$''"& *sa lost the ownership of the land.1o that when he again sold the same this

"6


17/59

time to *;ue in $''0& it had ceased tobelong to him and the latter sale is null

and void. 5he fact that the price of theproperty was not paid in full could not bean obstacle to the ac;uisition ofownership by !ino because as such acondition was not stipulated in thecontract& the latter immediately produced

its natural effects in law& the principaland most important of which being theconveyance of the ownership by means ofdelivery of the thing sold to thepurchaser& without pre $4 !hil %)

"l and Cap sold a house erected on

leased land to "vi, evidenced by adocument ac!nowledged before anotary public. They stipulated thatduring four months from *ctober

"7


18/59

1), 1), the vendors wouldcontinue in possession of the house,

they would pay the e'penses forrepairs, land and other ta'es andthe rent for the leased lot. "vinever too! possession of theproperty. (n March 1, "l andCap for P$$,$$$ sold the same

property to the "rce spouses whotoo! possession of the same. Thetwo sales were not registered. "viinvo!ed symbolic delivery by thee'ecution of the public document of

sale. (s he correct?

NO. *n 7viles vs. 7rcega %% !hil'"% (c. $'$?) the 1- ruled that 7vilescannot invoke symbolic delivery by theexecution of the public document of sale

because there could not have beendelivery due to the stipulations in thedeed of sale in favor of the vendors.

"8


19/59

2.ally entered into a writtenagreement with 3arry to the effectthat they shall organi4e apartnership for the bottling anddistribution of soft drin!s, ally toact as industrial partner ormanager, and 3arry as a capitalist

furnishing the capital necessarytherefor. 3arry claims that hisconsent to the agreement wassecured by the representation ofally that he was the owner, orwas about to become owner, of ane'clusive bottling franchise, whichrepresentation was false. (s hecorrect?*n oodhouse vs. Halili& '!hil 0"#& Jul. $& $'0& upon which theforegoing problem is based& the 1-

ruled that fraud is manifested inillimitable number of degrees orgradations from the innocent praisesof a salesman about the excellence of

"0


20/59

his wares to those maliciousmachinations and representations that

the law punishes as a crime. *nconse;uence& 7rt. $"?4 of the 1panish-ivil -ode distinguishes two kinds of(civil) fraud& the causal fraud whichmay be a ground for the annulment ofa contract& and the incidental deceit

which only renders the party whoemploys it liable for damages. *norder that fraud may vitiate consent&it must be the causal (dolo causante)&not merely the incidental (dolo

incidente)& inducement to the makingof the contract (art. $"?4& 1pan. -iv.-ode@ Hill vs. Aeloso& $ !hil.& $#4). *nthe problem& inasmuch as the principalconsideration& the main cause thatinduced Harry to enter into the

partnership agreement with ally&was the ability of ally to get theexclusive franchise to bottle anddistribute for Harry or for the

2#


21/59

partnership& the false representationmade by ally was not the casual

consideration& or the principalinducement& that led Harry to enterinto the partnership agreement. hilethe representation ally had theexclusive& franchise did not vitiateHarrys consent to the contract.

ally used it to get from Harry2sshare of 4 per cent of the netprofits. *n other words& by pretendingthat he had the exclusive franchiseand promising to transfer it to Harry&

ally obtained the consent of thelatter to give him a big slice in the netprofits. 5his is the dolo incidentedefined in article $"?4 of the 1panish-ivil -ode& because it was used to getthe other partys consent to a big

share in the profits& an incidentalmatter in the& agreement. (/ Canresa#4").

2"


22/59

.*n - 5ovember 16, Cathy, wifeof (van and mother of ena, 7am

and 8ach, passed away inPangasinan. 3er daughter ena, whowas then vacationing in thePhilippines, sent a telegram to theirfather in the 9.:.". announcingCathy;s death. Tele!upad company

accepted the telegram in its%agupan office, for transmission,after payment of the re0uired feesor charges. The telegram, however,never reached its addressee. Cathy

was interred with only herdaughter, ena, in attendance.hen ena returned to the 9nited:tates, she discovered that thewire she had caused the defendantto send had not been received. (s

Tele!upad laible?*n 5elefast vs.-astro& $0/ 1-=7 %%0& 4"D"'D$'//&upon which the foregoing problem wasbased& the 1- held that 7rt. $$?4 of

22


23/59

the -ivil -ode provides that Ethosewho in the performance of their

obligations are guilty of fraud&negligence or delay& and those who inany manner contravene the tenorthereof& are liable for damages.E 7rt."$?# also provides that Ewhoever byact or omission causes damage to

another& there being fault ornegligence& is obliged to pay for thedamage done.E 5elefast was guilty ofcontravening its obligation and is thusliable for damages. 5his liability is not

limited to actual or ;uantifieddamages. 5o sustain 5elefastscontrary position in this regard wouldresult in an ine;uitous situation wherepetitioner will only be held liable forthe actual cost of a telegram fixed

thirty (4) years ago.

6.8enith Company engaged theservices of

23


24/59

Construction Company for theconstruction of a building. The

contract gave


25/59

(nc.B and the other by as!asCorp.B, figured in a collision.


26/59

of tort as a mode of breach. here&without a pre existing contract between

two parties& an act or omission could havenevertheless constituted an actionabletort between them& then the mereexistence of a contract between suchparties will not militate against theapplication of the rules on tort liability or

even the predominance of tort (1ee1ingson vs. B!*& " 1-=7 $$$?@ 7ir +rancevs. -arascoso& $/ 1-=7 $00). 7ccordingly&Bia


27/59

in vigilando) of its employees& althoughGaskas may do so (e uia vs. Canila

Ilectric -o.& %4 !hil ?4#).

hile Bia


28/59

*n case direct evidence is bereft of

the existence or non existence ofnegligence& Bia


29/59

." participated in the public biddingcalled by the 5 for the subply of

-$,$$$ metric tons of


30/59

!new that ", had a deadline tomeet set by her suppliers. *n the

day of the deadline itself, the P5


31/59

cancellation of the allocation contractedby 7rrieta in =angoon& Burma was the

failure of the letter of credit to beopened within the contemplated period.5his failure must& therefore& be taken asthe immediate cause for the conse;uentdamage& which resulted. 5he liability ofthe N7=*-& however& stems not alone

from its failure or inability to satisfy there;uirements of the !NB. *ts culpabilityarises from its willful and deliberateassumption of contractual obligations evenas it was well aware of its financial

incapacity to undertake the presentation.5his


32/59

admission. +irst& that the N7=*- knewthe bank re;uirements for opening letters

of credit@ second& N7=*- also knew itcould not meet those re;uirements. hen&therefore& despite this awareness that itwas financially incompetent to open aletter of credit immediately& N7=*-agreed to pay immediately by means of an

irrevocable& confirmed and assignableletter of credit& it must be similarly beheld to have bound itself too answer forall and every conse;uences that wouldresult from the representation.

7rticle $$?4 of the -ivil -ode whichprovidesK E5hose who in the performanceof their obligation are guilty of fraud&negligence& or delay& and those who in anymanner contravene the tenor thereof& are

liable in damages. Lnder this provision&not only debtors guilty of fraud&negligence or default in the performanceof obligations are decreed liableK in

32


33/59

general& every debtor who fails in theperformance of his obligations is bound to

indemnify for the losses and damagescaused thereby (e la -ru> vs. 1eminaryof Canila& $/ !hil. 4@ Cunicipality ofConcada vs. -a& %# !hil. '$#@ !asumil vs.

-hong& %' !hil. $44@ !ando vs. imene>&0% !hil. %0'@ 7cme +ilms vs. 5heaters1upply& # !hil. #0?.) 5he phrase Ein anymanner contravene the tenorE of theobligation includes any illicit act& which

impairs the strict and faithful fulfillmentof the obligation& or every kind ofdefective performance. (*A 5olentino&-ivil -ode of the !hilippines& citingauthorities& p. $4.)

61.%iesel, the owner of a publicgarage, undertoo! to conveyPasa@ero by automobile from :an

33


34/59

Eernando, Aa 9nion, to Currimao,(locos 5orte. hile on the way to

Currimao the automobile fell down asteep emban!ment as a result ofwhich Pasa@ero was in@ured. (s%iesel liable?

I1. 7s held in Fasam vs. 1mith %0

!hil #0? upon which the foregoing problemwas based& the 1- held that thedefendants liability& if any& wascontractual and that in an action fordamages articles $$4$8$$4? of the -ivil

-ode& and not article $'4& wereapplicable. Neither under 7merican nor1panish law is a carrier of passengers anabsolute insurer against the risks oftravel from which the passenger mayprotect himself by exercising due care

and diligence.

5he case of 7lba vs. 1ociedad7nonima de 5ranvias& Jurisprudencia -ivil&

34


35/59

vol. $4"& p. '"/& cited by the in supportof his contentions& affords a good

illustration of the application of thisprinciple. *n that case 7lba& a passengeron a street car& was standing on theplatform of the car while it was in motion.5he car rounded a curve causing 7lba tolose his balance and fall off the platform&

sustaining severe in


36/59

the passengers had no means of avoidingthe danger or escaping the in


37/59

changed. "lthough the officers !newthat the island was within the

typhoon 4one, they decided toproceed on course. The ship struc!a reef and san!. Many passengersperished. Their heirs sued TitanicCorp., which raised the defense offorce ma@eure. (s Titanic correct?

No. *n !edro Aas;ue> vs. -7 ,+ilipinas !ioneer Fines& *nc. (1ept. $/&$'/0)& the 1- ruled that to constitute acaso fortuito that would exempt a person

from responsibility& it is necessary that($) the event must be independent of thehuman will@ (") the occurrence mustrender it impossible for the debtor tofulfill the obligation in a normal manner@and that () the obligor must be free of

participation in& or aggravation of& thein


38/59

Lnder the circumstances& whileindeed& the typhoon was an inevitable

occurrence& yet& having been kept postedon the course of the typhoon by weatherbulletins at intervals of six hours& thecaptain and crew were well aware of therisk they were taking as they hoppedfrom island to island from =omblon up to

5anguingui. 5hey held fre;uentconferences and oblivious of the utmostdiligence re;uired of very cautiouspersons& they decided to take a calculatedrisk. *n so doing& they failed to observe

that extraordinary diligence re;uired ofthem explicitly by law for the safety ofthe passengers transported by them withdue regard for all circumstances andunnecessarily exposed the vessel andpassengers to the tragic mishap. 5hey

failed to overcome the presumption offault or negligence that arises in case ofdeath or in


39/59

6/." public utility @eep driven byManny *bra, blew a tire, which

caused it to @ump into a ditch. Thetire was a new one. The @eep&soperator claimed fortuitous event.(s he correct? ='plain.

No. *n Juntilla vs. +ontanar& Cay $&

$'/0& the 1- said that the fact alone thatthe tire may have still been good becauseits grooves are still visible does not makethe tire2s explosion a fortuitous event. *fthere is no evidence that the driver has

taken due course precautions tocompensate for any condition liable tocause accidents& such as the roadcondition& a tire blow out could be caused&for instance& by too much air pressure&overloading or speeding at the time of the

accident.

62.


40/59

lot located at the corner of "duanaand "r4obispo :treets, (ntramuros,

Manila. The construction wasunderta!en by the 9nionConstruction, (nc. The plans andspecifications for the building wereprepared by +ason. Two years afterthe building was finished, an

unusually strong earth0ua!e J)./intensityK hit the area where thebuilding was located and its environsand the building in 0uestionsustained ma@or damage. The front

columns of the building buc!led,causing the building to tilt forwarddangerously. The tenants vacatedthe building in view of its precariouscondition. The pivotal issue in thiscase is whether or not an act of

Iod caused the failure of thebuilding?

4#


41/59

*n Juan Nakpil , 1ons vs. -7& $$%1-=7 0'?& $4D4D$'/#& upon which the

foregoing problem was based& the 1- heldthat the general rule is that no personshall be responsible for events whichcould not be foreseen or which& thoughforeseen& were inevitable (7rticle $$?%&New -ivil -ode). 7n act of od has been

defined as an accident& due directly andexclusively to natural causes withouthuman intervention& which by no amount offoresight& pains or care& reasonably tohave been expected& could have been

prevented. ($ -orpus Juris $$?%).

5o exempt the obligor from liabilityunder 7rticle $$?% of the -ivil -ode& for abreach of an obligation due to an Eact ofod& E the following must concurK (a) the

cause of the breach of the obligationmust be independent of the will of thedebtor@ (b) the event must be eitherunforseeable or unavoidable@ (c) the event

4"


42/59

must be such as to render it impossiblefor the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a

normal manner@ and (d) the debtor mustbe free from any participation in& oraggravation of the in v. -ourt of 7ppeals& $/ 1-=700@ Istrada v. -onsolacion& ?$ 1-=7 %"@7ustria v. -ourt of 7ppeals& ' 1-=7

0"?@ =epublic of the !hil. v. Fu>on1tevedoring -orp.& "$ 1-=7 "?'@ Fasam v.1mith& %0 !hil. #0?).

5he principle embodied in the act of

od doctrine strictly re;uires that theact must be one occasioned exclusively bythe violence of nature and all human

agencies are to be excluded from

creating or entering into the cause of the

mischief. hen the effect& the cause of

which is to be considered& is found to bein part the result of the participation ofman& whether it be from activeintervention or neglect& or failure to act&

42


43/59

the whole occurrence is therebyhumani>ed& as it were& and removed from

the rules applicable to the acts of od. ($-orpus Juris& pp. $$?%8$$?0).

5hus it has been held that when thenegligence of a person concurs with an actof od in producing a loss& such person is

not exempt from liability by showing thatthe immediate cause of the damage wasthe act of od. 5o be exempt fromliability for loss because of an act of od&he must be free from any previous

negligence or misconduct by which thatloss or damage may have been occasioned.(+ish , Ilective -o. v. !hil. Cotors& 00!hil. $"'@ 5ucker v. Cilan& %' O.. %?'@Fimpangco , 1ons v. angco 1teamship-o.& % !hil. 0'%& #4%@ Fasam v. 1mith& %0

!hil. #0?).

5he negligence of the defendants wasestablished beyond dispute. Lnited

43


44/59

-onstruction -o.& *nc. was found to havemade substantial deviations from the

plans and specifications& and to havefailed to observe the re;uisiteworkmanship in the construction as well asto exercise the re;uisite degree ofsupervision@ while Nakpil , 1ons werefound to have inade;uacies or defects in

the plans and specifications prepared bythem. 5hese defects were the proximatecauses that rendered the !B7 buildingunable to withstand the earth;uake of7ugust "& $'#/. +or this reason the

defendant and third8party defendantscannot claim exemption from liability.(-f.=epublic vs. Fu>on 1tevedoring& $4/1-=7 "%)

44


45/59

6.!inong went to the F5O to register

his car. 7long the way he met +ikser&

an employee of said F5O. !inongre;uested +ikser to introduce him to

one of the clerks in the F5O& who

could facilitate the registration of his

car. +ikser acceded and drove !inong2s

car to the F5O. hile about to reach

his destination& the car was stoned bysome Bmischievous boys&B and its

windshield was broken. !inong sued

+ikser for payment of damages for

the broken windshield. ill the suit

prosperM

45


46/59

(n %io0uino vs. Aaureano, // :CD"

6, upon which the foregoing problem

was based, the :C held that thee'press language of "rt. 11)2 of the

present Civil Code which is a

restatement of "rt. 11$ of the *ld

Civil Code, e'cept for the addition of

the nature of an obligation re0uiring

the assumption of ris!, compels such aconclusion. (t reads thusL F='cept in

cases e'pressly specified by the law,

or when it is otherwise declared by

stipulation, or when the nature of the

obligation re0uires the assumption ofris!, no person shall be responsible for

those events which could not be

foreseen, or which, though foreseen,

were inevitable.F

46


47/59

=ven under the old Civil Code then,

as stressed by us in the first decision

dating bac! to 1$, in an opinion by+ustice Mapa, the rule was wellsettled

that in the absence of a legal provision

or an e'press covenant, Fno one should

be held to account for fortuitous

cases.F (ts basis, as +ustice Moreland

stressed, is the Doman law principlema@or casus est, cui humana infirmitasresistere non potest.

"uthorities of repute are inagreement, more specifically concerning

an obligation arising from contract

Fthat some e'traordinary circumstance

independent of the will of the obligor,

or of his employees, is an essential

element of a caso fortuito.F

47


48/59

(f it could be shown that such

indeed was the case, liability is ruled

out. There is no re0uirement ofFdiligence beyond what human care and

foresight can provide.F

hat happened was clearly

unforeseen. (t was a fortuitous eventresulting in a loss, which must be borne

by the owner of the car. Deference to

the leading case of Depublic v. Au4on

:tevedoring Corp. will illustrate when

the nature of the obligation is suchthat the ris! could be considered as

having been assumed. "s noted in the

opinion of +ustice +.


49/59

FThe appellant strongly stresses

the precautions ta!en by it on

the day in 0uestionL that itassigned two of its most

powerful tugboats to tow down

river its barge A 1-N that it

assigned to the tas! the more

competent and e'perienced

among its patrons, had thetowlines, engines and e0uipment

doublechec!ed and inspectedN

that it instructed its patrons to

ta!e e'tra precautionsN and

concludes that it had done all itwas called to do, and that the

accident, therefore, should be

held due to force ma@eure or

fortuitous event.F

(ts ne't paragraph e'plained clearly

why the defense of caso fortuito or

force ma@eure does not lie. ThusL

40


50/59

5#


51/59

FThese very precautions,

however, completely destroy the

appellant;s defense. Eor casofortuito or force ma@eure Jwhich

in law are identical in so far as

they e'empt an obligor from

liabilityK by definition, are

e'traordinary events not

foreseeable or avoidable,;events that could not be

foreseen, or which, though

foreseen, were inevitable; J"rt.

11)2, Civil Code of the

PhilippinesK. (t is, therefore,not enough that the event

should not have been foreseen

or anticipated, as is commonly

believed, but it must be oneimpossible to foresee or to

avoid. The mere difficulty toforesee the happening is not

impossibility to foresee the

sameL ;un hecho no constituye

5"


52/59

caso fortuito por la solacircunstancia de 0ue su

e'istencia haga mas dificil o masonerosa la accion diligente delpresente ofensor;JPeiranoEacio, Desponsibilidad ='tra

contractual, p. 26N Ma4eaud,

Traite de la Desponsabilite

Civile, Ool. -, :ec. 16K. Thevery measures adopted by

appellant prove that the

possibility of danger was not

only foreseeable, but actually

foreseen, and was not casofortuito.F

(n that case then, the ris! was

0uite evident and the nature of the

obligation such that a party couldrightfully be deemed as having assumed

it. (t is not so in the case at bar.

52


53/59

-f. 7ustria vs. -7& ' 1-=7 0"?@ N!- vs.-7& $#$ 1-=7 %

66.%idi owned a house in Pasay City,while :enyang owns a fourstoreyschool building in vicinity of %idi&shouse. " powerful typhoon hitMetro Manila. The roof of the

school building was partly ripped offand blown away, landing on anddestroying portions of the roofingof the %idi&s house. Aater, somecity building engineers conducted an

ocular inspection of the destroyedbuildings and found that the mostli!ely reason for the dislodging ofthe roofings structural trusses isthe improper anchorage of the saidtrusses to the roof beams and

recommended that the 2th floor ofthe school building be declared as aFstructural ha4ard. (s :enyangliable?

53


54/59

NO. *n 1outheastern -ollege vs.

-7 "'" 1-=7 %""& July $4& $''/& uponwhich the foregoing problem was based&the 1- ruled that 7rticle $$?% of the -ivil-ode providesK 9Ixcept in cases expresslyspecified by the law& or when it isotherwise declared by stipulation& or when

the nature of the obligation re;uires theassumption of risk& no person shall beresponsible for those events which couldnot be foreseen& or which& thoughforeseen& were inevitable.E

5he antecedent of fortuitous event orcaso fortuito is found in the !artidaswhich defines it as Ean event which takesplace by accident and could not have beenforeseen.E Iscriche elaborates it as Ean

unexpected event or act of od whichcould neither be foreseen nor resisted.E

54


55/59

-ivilist 7rturo C. 5olentino adds thatEfortuitous events may be produced by

two general causesK ($) by nature& such asearth;uakes& storms& floods& epidemics&fires& etc. and (") by the act of man& suchas an armed invasion& attack by bandits&governmental prohibitions& robbery& etc.E*n order that a fortuitous event may

exempt a person from liability& it isnecessary that he be free from anyprevious negligence or misconduct byreason of which the loss may have beenoccasioned.

7n act of od cannot be invoked forthe protection of a person who has beenguilty of gross negligence in not trying toforestall its possible adverseconse;uences. hen a persons negligence

concurs with an act of od in producingdamage or in


56/59

the damage or ined& and removed from the rulesapplicable to acts of od.

5here is no ;uestion that a typhoon orstorm is a fortuitous event& a naturaloccurrence which may be foreseen but isunavoidable despite any amount of

foresight& diligence or care. *n order tobe exempt from liability arising from anyadverse conse;uence engendered thereby&there should have been no humanparticipation amounting to a negligent act.*n other words& the person seeking

exoneration from liability must not beguilty of negligence. Negligence& ascommonly understood& is conduct& which

56


57/59

naturally or reasonably creates undue risk

or harm to others.

*t may be the failure to observe thatdegree of care& precaution& and vigilance&which the circumstances ing that a personclaiming damages for the negligence ofanother has the burden of proving the

existence of fault or negligence causativeof his in


58/59

inspection of petitioners school buildingafter the typhoon. 7s the term imparts&

an ocular inspection is one by means ofactual sight or viewing. hat is visual tothe eye though& is not always reflective ofthe real cause behind. +or instance& onewho hears a gunshot and then sees awounded person& cannot always definitely

conclude that a third person shot thevictim. *t could have been self8inflictedor caused accidentally by a stray bullet.5he relationship of cause and effect mustbe clearly shown.

On the other hand& petitioner elicitedfrom the city building official that theoriginal plans and design of petitionersschool building were approved prior to itsconstruction. *t is a matter of


59/59

not have withstood long years and severaltyphoons even stronger than E1aling.E

50

Documents

Oblicon Midterm Answers 2006