Object, End and Moral Species in S.T., I-II, 1-21...Saint Thomas Aquinas and the Question of Proportionality, in Louvain Studies9 (1982-1983) 26-46. This was responded to by W.E. MAY,

Object, End and Moral Species in S.T., I-II, 1-21

Joseph A. SELLING

Faculty of Theology, K.U.Leuven

There is little doubt that the text of Thomas’ Summa Theologiae onhuman acts, I-II, 1-21, presents a challenge of interpretation for the moraltheologian. Ever since Peter Knauer1 suggested that the primary mannerin which foreseen but unwanted evil in human activity might be justifiedthrough the presence of (a) commensurate reason, regardless of how thatevil occurs2, there has been a great debate taking place on the topic inCatholic Moral theology3. That debate centers on the question whether itis the object or the end of human activity that primarily determines itsmoral evaluation. Even Pope John Paul II apparently became interested inthe question and in 1987 expressed his intention to address the issue of thefoundations of moral theology4. Six years later, Veritatis Splendor took aresolute position on the matter, clearly opting for the primacy of the objectin the moral evaluation of human activity5.

1. P. KNAUER, La détermination du bien et du mal moral par le principe du double effet,in Nouvelle revue théologique 87 (1965) 356-376. This was later published in a reworkedversion in English as The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect, in Natural Law Forum 12 (1967) 132-162, and was reprinted in R.A. MCCORMICK – C.E. CURRAN (eds.), Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition (Readings in Moral Theology, 1), NewYork, Paulist, 1979, 1-39.

2. In fact, L. JANSSENS dealt with something in the 1940’s very similar to what Knauerwas suggesting, although his contributions were published in Dutch and thus were not widelyknown. Daden met meerdere gevolgen, in Collectanea Mechliniensia 17 (1947) 621-633,was followed by Tijd en ruimte in de moraal, in Miscellanea moralia in honorem eximiiDomini Arthur Janssen (BETL, 2), Gembloux, Duculot, 1948, 181-197. The latter was pub-lished in English translation as Time and Space in Morals, in J.A. SELLING (ed.), Personal-ist Morals: Essays in Honor of Professor Louis Janssens (BETL, 83), Leuven, UniversityPress, 1988, 9-22.

3. One of the early, in-depth responses to Knauer’s challenge can be found in R.A.MCCORMICK, Ambiguity in Moral Choice (1973 Pere Marquette Lecture) which was subse-quently published as the first chapter in R.A. MCCORMICK – P. RAMSEY (eds.), Doing Evilto Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations, Chicago, IL, Loyola University Press,1978, 7-53. Since that time there has been a steady stream of studies published on the prin-ciple of double effect.

4. Spiritus Domini (1 Aug. 1987), in A.A.S. 79 (1987) 1365-1375, was addressed to themoderator of the Redemptorist order on the occasion of the second centenary of the deathof St. Alphonsus de Liguori.

5. Veritatis Splendor refers to the theory of the three sources of morality, object-cir-cumstances-end, in number 74 and subsequently works out an application of that theory, cul-minating with the statement that: “The morality of the human act depends primarily and

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 84/4 (2008) 363-407. doi: 10.2143/ETL.84.4.2033452© 2008 by Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses. All rights reserved.

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A significant portion of the debate makes reference to Thomas’ trea-tise, partially because the encyclical offers a similar reference, but alsobecause some moral theologians appealed to Thomas to substantiate theirposition on the matter long before VS was published6. Since the encycli-cal, there has been a stream of articles published, primarily in The Thomist,attempting to demonstrate that it is the “object” of an act that determinesmoral evaluation7. Of course, determining exactly what constitutes an“object” in I-II, 1-21 is itself a challenge, one that is complicated by theoverlay of ethical paradigms that have been read back into the originaltreatise.

By the time that the practice of auricular confession became established,after Lateran IV (1215) and standardized after Trent (1545-1563, but morelikely with the creation of the seminary curriculum in the early 1600’s)priest-confessors became used to the idea that determining the guilt ormoral responsibility of a penitent involved considering first what wasreported to have taken place (act or object) with regard to the sin being

fundamentally on the ‘object’ rationally chosen by the deliberate will, as is borne out bythe insightful analysis, still valid today, made by Saint Thomas” (VS, 78). This statementthen becomes the basis for the encyclical’s teaching on intrinsically evil acts (VS, 79-83).Curiously, the reference given at this point in the Latin, English, Polish and Spanish ver-sions of the encyclical on the Vatican website (note 126) is to I-II, 18,6, which deals withthe question, “Whether a human action has the species of good or evil from the end?” (theFrench, German and Portuguese versions do not include references).

6. L. JANSSENS, Ontic Evil and Moral Evil, in Louvain Studies 4 (1972-1973) 115-156;Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethics, in Louvain Studies 6 (1976-1977) 207-238; andSaint Thomas Aquinas and the Question of Proportionality, in Louvain Studies 9 (1982-1983) 26-46. This was responded to by W.E. MAY, Aquinas and Janssens on the MoralMeaning of Human Acts, in The Thomist 48 (1984) 566-606.

S. PINCKAERS, Ce qu’on ne peut jamais faire: La question des actes intrinsèquementmauvais: Histoire et discussion, Paris, Cerf, 1986, pp. 33-43, refers to Aquinas as well,relying upon his earlier commentary on the I-II, Somme de La Revue des Jeunes, Paris,Cerf, 1962. The later work has been published in English as A Historical Perspective onIntrinsically Evil Acts, in J. BERKMAN – C.S. TITUS (eds.), The Pinckaers Reader: Renew-ing Thomistic Moral Theology, Washington, DC, C.U.A. Press, 2005, 185-235, pp. 199-211.It may be interesting to note that the only text to which Pinckaers specifically refers in thisstudy is I-II, 18,6. He describes this as “a remarkable article that contains the totality of hisstudy of morality, an article which gives us the Thomistic model of moral action” (p. 37 inFrench, p. 204 in English).

7. In chronological order in The Thomist: C. RIPPERGER, The Species and Unity of theMoral Act, in 59 (1995) 69-90; M. RHONHEIMER, Intentional Actions and the Meaning ofObject: A Reply to Richard McCormick, in 59 (1995) 279-311; W.H. MARSHNER, Aquinason the Evaluation of Human Actions, in 59 (1995) 347-370; S.A. LONG, A Brief Disquisi-tion Regarding the Nature of the Object of the Moral Act According to St. Thomas Aquinas,in 67 (2003) 45-71; S. JENSEN, A Long Discussion regarding Steven A. Long’s Interpreta-tion of the Moral Species, in 67 (2003) 623-643; K.L. FLANNERY, The Multifarious MoralObject of Thomas Aquinas, in 67 (2003) 95-118 and The Field of Moral Action Accordingto Thomas Aquinas, in 69 (2005) 1-30; G.M. REICHBERG, Aquinas on Defensive Killing: ACase of Double Effect?, in 69 (2005) 341-370. More recently, J. PILSNER published a ver-sion of his doctoral dissertation that basically follows the same line of thought: The Spec-ification of Human Actions in St. Thomas Aquinas, Oxford, University Press, 2006.


OBJECT, END AND MORAL SPECIES IN S.T., I-II, 1-21 365

confessed, supplemented with additional information that might have abearing upon the matter (circumstances), and then, if the information hadnot yet been volunteered, inquiring what the penitent thought s/he was try-ing to accomplish (end or purpose) on the occasion of the sin that wasconfessed8. This eventually came to be known as the “three sources ofmorality” (tres fontes), a model that was later proposed as having beenfounded upon the reading of articles 2-3-4 of I-II,18. But does the theoryof the tres fontes genuinely reflect what Thomas was trying to describe?I think not, and I believe that a reasonable explanation why this is the casecan be found both in the treatise on human acts and in the structure of thewhole second part of the S.T.

Why, for instance, after having exposed the three elements of a humanaction in 18,2-3-4, did Thomas then go on to question whether humanaction is good or evil in its species in 18,59? Was that not already deter-mined? If, as many traditional interpretations like to emphasize, 18,2 hadalready concluded that, “the species of an act is derived from its object(actio habet speciem ex obiecto), what was left to discuss or expose inregard to moral evaluation? Of course, this is an easy phrase to quote,especially if one leaves out the following phrase, “just as a movement [hasits species] from its term” (sicut et motus ex termino). Is not a “terminus”closer to the meaning of end than it is to a thing (res, as in res naturalis,referred to three times in the body of the same article)?

What about the very next question: “Whether an action has the speciesof good or evil from its end?” (18,6) Why is the clearly affirmative answerto this question ignored by those who want to force Thomas into the moldof the tres fontes? Further, it might seem possible to speculate that althoughThomas does see that moral species can be determined not only by theobject but also by the end (see the further commentary below), one mightlike to propose that the structure of 18,2-3-4 indicates his preference for theorder of importance of these elements of human action. In order to counterthat misunderstanding, Thomas provides yet another consideration, namely:“Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the speciesderived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely?” (18,7) Althoughthe body of this article must be read carefully, it is immediately evident

8. J.A. SELLING, Veritatis Splendor and the Sources of Morality, in Louvain Studies 19(1994) 3-17.

9. Unless otherwise specified, references to the Summa Theologiae are from the I-II.For simplicity I do not use the notations for questions and articles. Texts referred to are pre-sumed to be in the body of the article, unless otherwise noted (using the notations ofwww.corpusthomisticum.org without the periods: arg, sc, ad). Several references giventogether will be separated by a semicolon and two spaces to aid visual separation. Englishtranslation of these texts are basically taken from that of the English Dominicans (Ben-zinger, 1947-48) which one can find at www.newadvent.org/summa.

However, I make some changes in this sometimes “free translation”, especially with respectto a more literal translation of ea quae sunt ad finem rather than the single word “means”.


366 J.A. SELLING

from glancing at the objections and the responses given to them that, “theend is last in execution, but first in the intention of reason, according towhich moral actions receive their species” (18,7,ad 2)10.

INTERPRETING THOMAS’ THOUGHT

One way of dealing with the cumbersome task of sorting out the objectand the end in 1-21 was attempted by John Finnis in 1991. He simply col-lapsed the end into the object by renaming the latter a proximate end ofthe will11. The schema he presents, in which every proximate end becomesan object of the will directed toward a more remote end, sounds very muchlike the consequentialism that these scholars are trying so hard to defeat.We will, at least for the moment, leave aside how that entire approach dis-regards the effort that Thomas made in 8,3 and 12,4 to distinguish the dif-ferent ways in which one understands the working of the will12.

A few years later, in 1994, William Marshner made a roundaboutattempt to deal with the problem but could come up with little more thanclaiming that the “Fuchs-McCormick-Janssens” scenario, as he calls it,cannot be correct because if it is, it would do “violence … to the Catholicmoral tradition, destroying all moral absolutes at a single stroke”13. Apartfrom his engaging in yet another caricature of what the so-called propor-tionalists had been saying, we must give Marshner credit at least for bring-ing a key text to the attention of his readers, namely 1,3,ad 3. What he didwith this text is another matter, simply pulling out of it what he wanted tofind and leaving the crucial sections unexplored.

The text of 1,3,ad 3 is certainly worth quoting. Pro memoria, the ques-tion being exposed is “whether human acts are specified by their end”, andthe particular objection to which ad 3 responds is the idea “that it is notpossible for the same thing to fall under more than one species, but oneand the same act can be oriented to several ends, thus the end does not pro-vide the species for human acts”14. Obviously, from the wording and struc-ture of the entire article, Thomas is out to demonstrate that the end does

10. … finis est postremum in executione; sed est primum in intentione rationis, secun-dum quam accipiuntur moralium actuum species.

11. J. FINNIS, Object and Intention in Moral Judgments According to Aquinas, in TheThomist 55 (1991) 1-27, p. 13: “Just as a means to an end can be an end relative to someprior means, so one can say that the whole nested set of means / ends is one object, or onecan equally say that each means within that set is itself an object being pursued with somefurther end in view”.

12. 8,3: Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means?, 12,4:Whether intention of the end is the same act as the volition of the means? These texts arediscussed below.

13. MARSHNER, Aquinas (n. 7), p. 363.14. Praeterea, idem non potest esse nisi in una specie. Sed eundem numero actum con-

tingit ordinari ad diversos fines. Ergo finis non dat speciem actibus humanis.



indeed give species to a human action and the way in which he will do thisis to admit that different ends render different species, even when the con-crete activity performed is identical. These different species, however, arenot all of the same kind, for some are moral and others are only natural.

The body of 1,3 provides the straightforward theoretical answer to thequestion: all (created) things are composed of matter and form, and theform of an act is its end. To use different language, the principle of act-ing (principium agendi) gives form to an act and a specific end-point (ter-minus) gives form to a passion. In simple language, we read that “humanacts … receive their species from the end” (actus humani speciem a finesortiuntur). As an aside relevant to what will be developed below, weshould also draw attention to the statement that, given what defines aspecifically human act is the fact that it proceeds from the will, that it isvoluntary, Thomas clearly observes that the object of the will is “the goodand the end” (obiectum autem voluntatis est bonum et finis). Note that theword “object” is not synonymous with the content or matter of a humanact. As we will see, the word “object” has many meanings in the I-II.

Turning to the reply to objection 3 we find a much more concrete illus-tration of the point Thomas is making.

Ad tertium dicendum quod idem actusnumero, secundum quod semel egredi-tur ab agente, non ordinatur nisi adunum finem proximum, a quo habetspeciem, sed potest ordinari ad pluresfines remotos, quorum unus est finisalterius.Possibile tamen est quod unus actussecundum speciem naturae, ordineturad diversos fines voluntatis, sicut hocipsum quod est occidere hominem,quod est idem secundum speciem natu-rae, potest ordinari sicut in finem adconservationem iustitiae, et ad satisfa-ciendum irae.Et ex hoc erunt diversi actus secundumspeciem moris, quia uno modo eritactus virtutis, alio modo erit actus vitii.

Non enim motus recipit speciem ab eoquod est terminus per accidens, sedsolum ab eo quod est terminus per se.

Fines autem morales accidunt rei natu-rali; et e converso ratio naturalis finisaccidit morali.

In response to the third objection wecan say that one and the same act, in sofar as it proceeds once from an agent, isordained to only one proximate end,from which it has its species: but it canbe ordained to several remote ends, ofwhich one is the end of another.Nevertheless, it is possible, that an actwhich is one in respect of its naturalspecies, is ordained to several ends ofthe will, such that the same act ofkilling a man which has its own speciesaccording to nature can be ordained tothe end of safeguarding justice and tothe satisfaction of wrath.And in this case there would be severalacts with different moral species, whichin one way would be a virtuous act andin another way a vicious act.For movement does not receive itsspecies from that which is its terminusper accidens, but only from that whichis its terminus per se.For moral ends are accidental to a nat-ural thing, and conversely the meaningof a natural end is accidental to moral-ity.


368 J.A. SELLING

Moral theologians (unwittingly) attempting to read the tres fontes backinto the I-II will almost invariably concentrate on the first part of this textthat distinguishes proximate and remote ends. For, it the remote end can bebrought forward to define (specify) the act, the proximate end of “killing aman” (occidere hominem) can almost be made to look like an effect or con-sequence of what seems to be “really” happening (safeguarding justice orsatisfying anger). Some try to make this appear to be an instance of theprinciple of double effect, perhaps using the ploy of skipping over to II-II,64,7 on whether it is legitimate to kill in self-defense15.

Such interpretations, however, are not convincing, for there is muchgreater evidence to the contrary. The first bit of evidence comes from aconsideration of the text itself. Thomas makes a very clear distinctionbetween two different kinds of species of human acts, a natural species(species naturae) and a moral species (species moris)16. These can existside by side and may even be “accidental” to each other. In like manner,he also distinguishes two different kinds of “terminus” of human action,one that is per accidens and another that is per se. The source of these dis-tinctions is neither cause and effect nor chronological order. The distinc-tion that determines the moral species is that which simultaneously tellsus whether this is an act of virtue (actus virtutis) or an act of vice (actusvitii). In other words, it is the attitude or disposition of the acting person– that is, one’s engagement with the end which one is aiming to achieve– that indicates and determines the moral species of human activity.

If there is an act of “killing a man to safeguard justice”, then what isdone is per se virtuous (species moris) and only per accidens involving the

15. The investigation of the history of the PDE has a history of its own. J. MANGAN, AnHistorical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect, in Theological Studies 10 (1949) 41-61, claims that it is founded upon the S.T. II-II, 64,7; while J. GHOOS, L’Acte à double effet,étude de théologie positive, in ETL 27 (1951) 30-52 takes the opposite position, pointingout that there is no repetition or reference to any such principle between the time of the S.T.and the seventeenth century.

16. In Thomas’ discussion of the passions, I-II, 22-48, he asks “Whether any passion is goodor evil in its species?” (24,4). The response he gives is relevant to a consideration of acts aswell. “We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been said in regard to acts (18,6&7;20,3) – viz. that the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from twopoints of view. First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no con-nection with the species of an act or passion. Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuchas it is voluntary and controlled by reason”. (Respondeo dicitum, quod sicut de actibus dictumest, ita et de passionibus dicendum videtur, quod scilicet species actus vel passionis dupliciterconsiderari potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est in genere naturae, et sic bonum vel malummorale non pertinet ad speciem actus vel passionis. Alio modo, secundum quod pertinent adgenus moris, prout scilicet participant aliquid de voluntario et de iudicio rationis).

Et ideo nihil prohibet actus qui suntiidem secundum speciem naturae, essediversos secundum speciem moris, et econverse

Thus, nothing prohibits an act with the one and the same natural specieshaving diverse moral species, and viceversa.



taking of a life. The killing of a man is clearly not the kind of thing thata virtuous person would want to engage in except under very compellingcircumstances. To deprive a person of life is certainly an evil. However,in this instance Thomas classifies this evil only in the natural – and not inthe moral – order. Thus, the act simultaneously exhibits an evil (speciesnaturae) and the accomplishment of a good (species moris).

Lest there be any doubt that this interpretation is accurate or even plau-sible, we turn to another, much more explicit piece of evidence, namelythe virtue that we hardly ever hear about17: vengeance (II-II, 108). Admit-tedly, in contemporary English “vengeance” may sound like a rather starktranslation of the Latin vindicatio and it may be worthwhile looking for analternative. For our purposes, however, what is important is not the wordbut the idea.

In four articles, Thomas outlines a position that is as explicit as onemight get with regard to the deliberate doing of harm to another. The harmdone is no less an evil when one names it “punishment”, for Thomas him-self specifically refers to poenale malum and uses a derivative of malumfive times in the body of the first article. What is done to the offendingparty functions as a vehicle for achieving the end of avenging wrongs doneagainst God or neighbors (108,1,ad 2: injurios Dei et proximorum). It isnot done to satisfy merely personal injury; for that, as Thomas points out,would be returning hatred for hatred.

Nor is the avenging party permitted to take delight in the harm done.This observation flows from the crucial importance that Thomas placesupon the intention of the acting person. Enjoyment (fruitio) is said toaccompany the realization of one’s intention (I-II,11), and here Thomaswrites that if the intention of the person is principally (principaliter) on theharm (malum) done, such a human act is illicit18. If, on the other hand, theintention is principally focused on “some good” (aliquod bonum) then thehuman act is licit, regardless of the fact that this good is achieved onlythrough the doing of the harm (malum)19.

17. One searches nearly in vein for a commentary on the S.T. that treats, or even men-tions, the virtue of vengeance. J. PORTER, The Virtue of Justice (IIa IIae, qq. 58-122), in S.J.POPE (ed.), The Ethics of Aquinas, Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2002,272-286, p. 279, writes: “After discussing the acts of religion and the sins opposed to it (IIaIIae, qq. 82-100), Aquinas turns to the other annexed virtues and their correlative sins orvices (IIa IIae, qq. 101-20). Space does not permit a detailed examination of these, whichinclude piety toward parents, gratitude toward benefactors, and obedience toward superiors,as well as friendliness, affability, and liberality in one’s social relations”.

18. II-II,108,1: Si enim eius intentio feratur principaliter in malum illius de quo vin-dictam sumit, et ibi quiescat, est omnino illicitum, quia delectari in malo alterius pertinetad odium, quod caritati repugnat, qua omnes homines debemus diligere.

19. II-II,108,1: Si vero intentio vindicantis feratur principaliter ad aliquod bonum, adquod pervenitur per poenam peccantis, puta ad emendationem peccantis, vel saltem ad cohi-bitionem eius et quietem aliorum, et ad iustitiae conservationem et Dei honorem, potestesse vindicatio licita, aliis debitis circumstantiis servatis.


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One could hardly find a more explicit case where some evil (poenalemalum, presumably of a species naturae) in a human activity is performedprecisely for the sake of achieving a good, intended end. This, however,does not fully settle the matter, for, after making the point that vengeanceis indeed a specific virtue in its own right (108,2) he goes on to discussdifferent kinds of punishment (108,3; cf. II-II, 65). It seems clear that fromthis perspective, the punishment should fit the crime, i.e., there needs tobe a sense of proportion between the good accomplished and the harm(malum) done, even when the punishment is “medicinal” as a preventiveof future sins (108,4: praeservatia a peccato futuro). Although Thomasfollows Cicero in describing eight different kinds of punishment (108,3:disgrace, damages, exile, chains, bondage, retaliation, flogging and death),he mercifully does not enumerate which punishments should accompanywhich sins20.

THE STRUCTURE OF THOMAS’ TEXT

From the very beginning of the treatise on human acts, then, Thomasgives preference to the importance of the end in determining moral species.This should come as no surprise for one who reads the text from the begin-ning and does not immediately jump to the moral evaluation of humanacts (I-II,18). It should be even less remarkable for one who is familiarwith the structure of the entire S.T.

After putting forth the teaching on God and creation, the second part ofthe S.T. turns to that creature most explicitly made in the image of God,namely the human being, specifically endowed with free will and enjoy-ing control over voluntary action21. With regard to human action, Thomaspostulates that it is the end of our actions, ultimately the last end but alsoall the intermediate ends, that advances us toward happiness. Notice thathe begins with our active seeking and accomplishing ends (1-21) and onlythereafter does he attend to our “passive” reaction to all the stimuli in ourlives (22-48). He then moves on to examine the principles of humanactions. Note again that of those things that guide our activity Thomasgives precedence neither to law (90-108) nor to grace (109-114) but specif-ically to the internal motivation of habit (49-54), the virtues (55-70) and

20. I use the term “mercifully” because had Thomas spelled out each punishment appro-priate for a given crime in a systematic way, his teaching might be difficult to accept, aswhen he writes about the use of the death penalty for a crime of theft (I-II,19,10).

21. See the prologue to the second part: Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit, homo factus adimaginem Dei dicitur, secundum quod per imaginem significatur intellectuale et arbitrioliberum et per se potestativum; postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de Deo, etde his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem; restat ut consid-eremus de eius imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum prin-cipium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.



vices (71-89). The same priority is reflected in the second half of the PartTwo, wherein he brings the entire reflection to bear on particular actions.Again he does not lay out a paradigm of external obligations and prohibi-tions but proposes the schema of virtue – habitual internal motivationtoward the achievement of a particular state of being, in short, our tendencytoward the accomplishment of an end.

It is therefore quite logical that Thomas devotes the first five questionsof the I-II to the meaning and attainment of the end that is happiness. Thisis what human activity is all about, ultimately from a theological per-spective this is union with God, but also provisionally as we advancetoward the ultimate or final end for which we are created. Some cognateof the word finis appears over 350 times in these five questions, referringeither to a specific end or to the ultimate end. By contrast, the word for“object” occurs only fifty times, and in none of those occurrences does iteven closely resemble what traditional moralists regard as the “act initself”. With only a few exceptions, in which reference is made to theobject of happiness22, which ultimately of course is union with God, theobject spoken of is either the object of the will, which is said to be the endand the good23, or the object of the intellect, which is (universal) truth24.

Though this first section in the I-II is about human acts, we see thatThomas realized the need to address the meaning of human activity beforehe even began explaining the structure of those acts. For without a mean-ing or purpose, these acts would not be human; they would simply be partof a predetermined program. Thomas considers the activity of non-humansto be instinctual, built into the way that creatures develop. Today we mightsay that certain patterns of behavior are determined by genes, by DNA,while Thomas would follow Aristotle and refer to the form or essence ofa creature.

For an action to be human, it needs to be voluntary, a synonym for whichwe might today use the word “motivated”. A human action, according toThomas, originates from within the person who is the principle of action.One might say something similar about animals, but the goal of non-humanaction is always something immediate25. Humans, on the other hand, movethemselves in that they seek goals (ends) which serve to advance themtoward a (continuously, habitually) sought after “end state”26. In order to

22. 3,7,ad 2; 5,2; 5,3,ad 2.23. 1,1: obiectum autem voluntatis est finis et bonum. See also 1,1,ad 2; 1,2,ad 3; 1,3.24. An interesting combination of the two ideas can be found in 2,8: Obiectum autem

voluntatis, quae est appetitus humanus, est universale bonum; sicut obiectum intellectusest universale verum. See also 3,5; 3,7; 3,8.

25. Thomas actually refers to this as “imperfect knowledge of the end” (6,2).26. M. ROKEACH, The Nature of Human Values, New York, Free Press, 1973, p. 5, writes

“A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence ispersonally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-stateof existence”. He subsequently describes those end-states in terms of what he calls “terminalvalues”, such as a sense of accomplishment or inner harmony, and refers to instrumental


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do this, humans need the intellectual capability to comprehend their end-state as well as to understand the propriety (I-II,14) and use (I-II,16) ofthose things that will contribute to the attainment of their goals. This is whythe will of humans is not simply a desire or appetite27, but an appetite thatis informed by reason (I-II,6,1-2; cf. I,82,3-4).

The treatise on human action is divided into five sections that Thomasmarks out with a short introductory statement about what he will cover,sometimes mentioning what will be seen only later. Thus, after the initialsection (1-5) on the end or meaning of the human act, he deals with theprimary characteristic of human action, voluntariness, and those things thatinevitably accompany it, circumstances (6-7). This is followed by a con-sideration of that which principally concerns the act of the will, namely theend (8-12), and then those things which are deliberated upon and engagedin order to achieve the end (13-17). Finally, after all this is explained, heturns to the evaluation of human action (18-21).

The very structure of the treatise thus illustrates what Thomas is teach-ing. A human action is voluntary action, but one that never takes place ina vacuum or the abstract. It is always situated in circumstances and there-fore can never be evaluated as something “in itself”. The first two articlesof this section discuss the voluntary in humans (6,1) and in irrational ani-mals (6,2). The difference between the two is that the former understandthe end precisely as end and are therefore motivated (move themselves)28.The later may grasp a particular goal but neither understand it as a goal norrelate it to other, more remote goals. 6,1 refers to the end 13 times and 6,2refers to the end 19 times, two of which refer to the manner in which theend is reached (ea quae sunt ad finem). Nowhere in this crucial text on thevoluntary is there mention of objects, particular acts or choice of “means”.

6,3 raises the interesting question about whether any particular act at allneeds to take place for a person to exercise his or her will (voluntariness).

values as a means of moving toward those end-states, such as ambition or honesty. Quotedfrom: T.E. O’CONNELL, Making Disciples: A Handbook of Christian Moral Formation,New York, Crossroad, 1998, 58-62.

27. There are three levels of appetite: the vegetative, which we share with all livingcreatures and which leads (programs) the living thing to grow or to acquire nourishment;the sensitive, which we share with all creatures with sense perception and which leads usto move toward experiencing pleasure or avoiding pain; and the rational (will) which weenjoy as intelligent creatures and which leads us to pursue things that we come to know andrecognize as “good” – i.e., good for me, because it is good for persons and I am a person,because it is good for the scheme of things and I am a part of the scheme of things, andgood in terms of the ultimate meaning of existence and I am pursuing the ultimate mean-ing of existence.

28. 8,1: Quae vero habent notitiam finis dicuntur seipsa movere, quia in eis est prin-cipium non solum ut agant, sed etiam ut agant propter finem. To complete the idea, one mustalso take account of those things by which the end might be accomplished and whetherthese things are proportionate to that accomplishment (7,2: Omne autem quod ordinatur adfinem, oportet esse proportionatum fini). If judged not to be proportionate, one will not bemotivated (move oneself) to work toward that end.



The reasoning behind his negative answer sheds more critical light uponthe traditional, handbook inspired interpretations of the I-II. Thomas dis-tinguishes what we would call act and omission. To act, he writes, is toengage in the “directly” voluntary, while to fail to act when there is clearlyan expectation, mandate or obligation to act is something “indirectly” vol-untary. Those interpretations of the PDE that label “actions” as direct (vol-untary) and effects as “indirect” (voluntary) are therefore not followingThomas’ understanding of actions and effects. The exercise of the willmay be either direct or indirect, but neither of these are effects. The cir-cumstances that count as effects may flow from either exercise of the will.

The last five articles (6,4-8) investigate what might or might not causeinvoluntariness and need not detain us here, for this has nothing to do withobject or ends. We can only say that when a human action is involuntaryit is not moral and therefore has no moral species.

Although circumstances constitute the accidents of a human action anddo not make up its substance (7,1) they are still understood to “touch” itin one way or another29. Therefore, the theologian is expected to take noteof the circumstances of human action (7,2). Thomas gives three reasonsfor this, the first of which bears quoting.

29. 7,1: quaecumque conditiones sunt extra substantiam actus, et tamen attingunt aliquomodo actum humanum, circumstantiae dicuntur.

Circumstantiae pertinent ad considera-tionem theologi triplici ratione.

Primo quidem, quia theologus conside-rat actus humanos secundum quod pereos homo ad beatitudinem ordinatur.Omne autem quod ordinatur ad finem,oportet esse proportionatum fini.

Actus autem proportionantur finisecundum commensurationem quan-dam, quae fit per debitas circumstan-tias.Unde consideratio circumstantiarum adtheologum pertinet.

Circumstances are relevant for the con-sideration of the theologian for threereasons.First, because the theologian considershuman actions insofar as by them one isled to happiness.However, all those things that leadtoward an end must be proportionate tothat end.And acts are proportionate to an endinsofar as there is a certain commensu-rateness which comes about throughappropriate circumstances.Thus, a consideration of circumstancesis relevant for the theologian.

Once again we see that Thomas takes the end as point of departure forunderstanding the structure of human acts. Because the end gives mean-ing to an act and knowledge of the end makes the act human, the measureof the appropriateness of any circumstance is its relation to the end (oportetesse proportionatum fini).

So what are these circumstances? First, we must observe that theyhave nothing to do with the end of a human act. By definition, they stand


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outside the substance of the human act, so that those things that actuallyform part of the human act and are crucial to understanding what the actis about can no longer be considered circumstances. Thomas makes thedistinction between “taking something” and “taking something thatbelongs to another person”. This latter element is not simply a circum-stance but part of the substance of the human act30.

Secondly, circumstances are said to “touch” upon the human act, orperhaps to put it in more modern language, to be related to a human act.This happens in one of three ways: in regard to the act itself, to the effect,or to the cause(s). In this manner, Thomas enumerates (7,3) seven cir-cumstances31.

In relation to the act itself we find time, place and mode of actingIn relation to the effect(s) we find the what is doneIn relation to the final cause is the whyIn relation to the material cause or object is the about whatIn relation to the efficient cause is the whoIn relation to the instrumental cause is the by what aids

A number of things deserve our attention here. With respect to what“touches the act itself” (ipsum actum attingit) Thomas ascribes three cir-cumstances, none of which is the “what is done”. That “what is done”(quid) is much more akin to what he elsewhere refers to as the “externalact” (20,1-6), something distinguishable from and much more limited thanthe human (voluntary) act as a whole. The “what is done”, in its turn, isrelated to circumstantial effects that might flow from human action. Thenthere is the association between the material cause “or object” and the cir-cumstance “about what”. It seems that this is the first time in the I-II thatThomas uses the word “object” specifically in regard to an “object of theact” – but in this case the act spoken of is the external act, the materialcause, and not the entire human (voluntary, and thus candidate for moralevaluation) act. Previously, he had written about the object of the will andthe object of the intellect. When he opens the door to considering “objectof an act”, he is writing simply about the “what is done”, that which con-stitutes the material cause and which is open to further specificationthrough the “about what”, which in this case is merely a circumstance.

30. 7,3,ad 3: illa conditio causae ex qua substantia actus dependet, non dicitur cir-cumstantia; sed aliqua conditio adiuncta. Sicut in obiecto non dicitur circumstantia furtiquod sit alienum, hoc enim pertinet ad substantiam furti. Compare this, however with 18,7,scthat will be discussed below.

31. Thomas takes his list of circumstances principally from Cicero, but adds to this Aris-totle’s consideration of the “about what”. In relation to the act of “taking something thatbelongs to another person”, the fact that something belongs to another person is not a cir-cumstance; but the further precision of “taking a great deal” or “taking only a little” wouldconstitute the circumstance “about what”. The terms Thomas uses in the order they appearin this text are: quando, ubi, quomodo, quid, cur, circum quid, quis, quibus auxiliis.



Furthermore, we begin to see another verbal nuance introduced into thetext in regard to a multiplicity of ends. In positing the final cause as some-thing that can be affected by the circumstance “why”, the text seems tobeg the question of where one might precisely situate the “end” of human(voluntary) action. Just before he deals with the importance of the end andits possible attendant circumstances, he already mentions in the reply to thethird argument that “it is not the end that determines the species of an actthat is a circumstance, but other, additional ends”32 that are understood ascircumstances.

At first, this may be confusing, but the following text (7,4) sheds lighton the problem by observing that the two most important circumstancesare “why” and “in what an act consists”. Again, the original text providesthe best vehicle for commentary.

32. 7,3,ad 3: Non enim finis qui dat speciem actus, est circumstantia; sed aliquis finisadiunctus.

33. An illustration could be the difference between a soldier fighting in a nation’s armyand a mercenary who is hired to fight. The soldier fights to help protect the nation (finis)and also collects a salary (cur). The mercenary fights to earn a salary (finis) and also helpsto protect a nation (cur). On the surface it is almost impossible tell the two apart, andalthough both may be legitimate, they demonstrate very different motivations (ends).

34. 7,4,ad 3: substantialis forma actus, hoc enim attenditur in actu secundum obiectumet terminum vel finem.

Actus proprie dicuntur humani, sicutsupra dictum est, prout sunt voluntarii.Voluntatis autem motivum et obiectumest finis.Et ideo principalissima est omnium cir-cumstantiarum illa quae attingit actumex parte finis, scilicet cuius gratia,secundaria vero, quae attingit ipsamsubstantiam actus, idest quid fecit.

Acts are properly called human insofaras they are voluntary, as stated above. However, the motive and the object ofthe will is the end.Thus, the most important of all the cir-cumstances is that which is related to theact on the part of the end, namely ‘why’;and by the same token, the second mostimportant is that which is related to theact regarding ‘what is done’.

For the text to make sense, we need to realize that there is a distinc-tion being made between the end, properly speaking, and that whichtouches upon or is related to the end. The first sentence affirms that theend, without which there could be no voluntary act, is the proper objectof the will. Those things related to that part of the act constitute addi-tional ends and not the things that substantially define the voluntary actitself33.

It is also worth noting that the word “object” is here again used as a synonym for the driving force coming from the will, the motive. In the reply to the third argument, he again affirms this by equating theobject with the “terminus or end” of a human action34. Finally, we candraw attention to his reply to the argument that the end is basically


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extrinsic to a human act. Thomas answers that “although the end is notitself the substance of the act, it is the most important cause, moving theperson toward activity. Thus it is that the human act is morally specifiedchiefly by the end”35.

THE WILL TO THE END

AND TO THOSE THINGS THAT BRING ABOUT THE END

After his preliminary discussion on the meaning and voluntary charac-ter of human acts as well as those things surrounding them, Thomasembarks upon two clearly distinct topics that address the substance ofhuman acts – the will to the end (8-12) and the deliberated choice of howto accomplish that end (13-17). We will deal with these in the same order,remembering that our topic of inquiry is the meaning and function of theterms “object” and “end” and how these relate to the determination ofmoral species.

I am aware that counting the occurrence of words means relatively lit-tle, but if we were to ask which of the two concepts Thomas mentionsmost in the treatise on human acts the numbers would already begin totell a story. Searching the root of finis on the Corpusthomisticum websiteyields 1089 cases of a variation of the word. Many of these, of course,should be eliminated. Thus, we can discount those cases in which finis isused to describe what we call “means”, ea quae sunt ad finem (130),where it appears in a preamble or in the statement of arguments or objec-tions (260) and perhaps even when it is clear that the meaning is restrictedto the “final end” alone (182). This still leaves 517 occurrences of theconcept of end, approximately 85 of which (not discounted) occur in thefirst five questions.

A search for the root of obiectum yields 249 cases, some of which canalso be discounted as occurring in a preamble or objection (50), or wherethe word names an “objection” to be answered (14). This leaves 185occurrences of the concept of object. If one looks only at question 18 onefinds 73 uses of the word (17 of which can be eliminated according to thecriteria above), the majority of which refer to the object of an act. Thevast majority of the remaining occurrences of the word in 1-17 and 19-21(129) refer to the object of the will or the object of the intellect, not theobject of an act.

As stated, simple word count means little. Nevertheless, it is clear thatin his exposition of the meaning and structure of human acts, Thomas is much more attentive to the end of human intelligence, will and act

35. 7,4,ad 2: finis, etsi non sit de substantia actus, est tamen causa actus princi-palissima, inquantum movet ad agendum. Unde et maxime actus moralis speciem habetex fine.



than he is to the so-called object of human intelligence, will and act. Frequently, the two concepts overlap and it is evident that the “object”written about actually is an end of some sort36. As one reads the textsover and over, one begins to see that the word “object” is really quitemalleable. It is similar to the English word “thing”; it has no specific con-tent of its own and relies upon context to give it a meaning. The primaryquestion seems to be, when one gets to 18,2, does “object” refer to thething done, as most people seem to think, to the material cause, as Thomashad indicated as the point of intersection for a circumstance (7,3), ormerely to the external action, which in at least one way can be consid-ered an effect (20,1,ad 1)?

Before we address that question we need to look at the sections on theprimary act of the will, which is the intention to the end (8-12), and on thesubsequent agreement to, choice and use of whatever it takes to achievean intended end – or not (13-17). It bears repeating that Thomas does nothave a concept of “means” congruent with the use of that term in today’slanguage. He certainly knew that one can accomplish an end without“doing” anything at all (6,3). More profoundly, however, he appreciatesthe integrity of the human act in which ends and means cannot be thoughtof as separate. They are indeed distinct topics, but never separate. This hemakes clear from the very beginning of the section.

Volition, or the engagement of the will, constitutes a movement towardan end, which is always willed as a good (8,1)37. However, volition alsoapplies to those things by which the end is sought (ea quae sunt ad finem).Does this therefore imply two acts of the will? Thomas explains (8,2) thatthe will can be understood in two ways, either as a power that representspotential movement or as an act itself38. If we refer to volition as an act,then there is one and only one “object” of that act which is the end. If werefer to volition as a power or potential, we see that there are two possi-ble ways in which the will can function in the exercise of that power. Onemanner of willing is directed to the end absolutely, or simply for its ownsake. The typical example that Thomas uses is that one can “will to behealthy”. The other manner in which the will functions as a power is whenit is directed to the end which is willed as the reason for willing the means.In schematic form:

36. See 1,2,ad 3; 1,3; 7,4; 7,4,ad 3; 9,1; 9,3; 9,3,ad 3; 11,1; 11,1,ad 1; 11,1,ad 2;11,4,ad 2; 12,4; 12,4,ad 2; 17,3,ad 2; 18,7; 19,2,ad 1; 20,1.

37. This good, of course, is more accurately referred to as an “apparent good”, that is,something presented to the will by reason (cf. 8,1; 9,1; 9,2)

38. In modern language we also speak about “will power” which represents an abilityto make and carry out decisions. This is different from an actual movement of the will, orengagement of that power, in the sense of “wilfully” doing something, e.g., engaging inexercise, for instance, to become/remain fit (= end), or omitting eating that tempting desert,for instance, to become/remain fit (= end). Both the engagement and omission are “acts ofthe (power of the) will”.


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The claim in 8,2 that it is possible to will the end “absolutely” needsto be distinguished from a mere wish. For, the (moral) person that Thomasis writing about here is a motivated person, one who already has a habit(tendency) toward something that, when good, is understood as a virtue.Thus, a person motivated to be just will be moved toward just things orrighteousness. The person may even will ‘just things’ absolutely, such asnon-violence or a just distribution of resources. However, it may be quiteanother thing to achieve those ends in the practical sense, and in some sit-uations (sets of circumstances) one may not choose a given or perhapseven any available path (means) to achieve those ends. If, on the otherhand, there are appropriate paths available, when the will does engage inact it is focused on the end.

The core of the matter is that the things that might ultimately be cho-sen to achieve specific (and specifying) ends, are not willed for them-selves. If they were, they would no longer be in service to an end butwould be functioning as ends themselves (8,2).

39. 8,3: Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to those things thatare in service to the end? 12,4: Whether intention of the end is the same act as the volitionof the those things in service to the end?

act end only

voluntasend (absolutely)

powerend: as the reason forwilling those things inservice to the end

Ea vero quae sunt ad finem, non suntbona vel volita propter seipsa, sed exordine ad finem.

Unde voluntas in ea non fertur, nisiquatenus fertur in finem, unde hocipsum quod in eis vult, est finis.

In truth, those things that are in ser-vice to the end are not good and willedfor themselves, but as ordained to theend.Wherefore the will is directed to them,only insofar as it is directed to theend: so that what it wills in them, isthe end.

This position begs the further question (8,3) whether the will to the endand the will to those things that are engaged to accomplish that end are oneand the same act or two different acts. What Thomas writes here overlapsa good deal with what he writes later in respect to intention (12,4)39.Because both texts are less than easy to understand, they are worth look-ing at closely.

We first consider his opening remark, 8,3,sc:



The first thing that gets our attention here is that there seem to be twoseparate objects and two actions, one directed to the end and the other tothose things that accomplish the end, in modern parlance, the “means”.This interpretation would also seem the most logical for one who hasalready read the tres fontes into 18,2-3-4. However, the body of the arti-cle renders a different impression.

40. In other words, to do (will) something considered (simply, in itself) good is differ-ent from doing (willing) something that is considered “good” primarily because it is use-ful (for achieving the end).

Sed contra, actus diversificantur secun-dum obiecta.Sed diversae species boni sunt finis, etid quod est ad finem, quod dicitur utile.

Ergo non eodem actu voluntas fertur inutrumque.

On the contrary, acts are diversifiedaccording to their objects.But the end is a different species ofgood than that which is in service to theend, which is said to be useful.Therefore the will is not moved to bothby the same act40.

cum finis sit secundum se volitus, idautem quod est ad finem, inquantumhuiusmodi, non sit volitum nisi propterfinem; manifestum est quod voluntaspotest ferri in finem sine hoc quod fera-tur in ea quae sunt ad finem; sed in eaquae sunt ad finem, inquantum huius-modi, non potest ferri, nisi feratur inipsum finem.

Sic ergo voluntas in ipsum finem dupli-citer fertur, uno modo, absolute secun-dum se; alio modo, sicut in rationemvolendi ea quae sunt ad finem.

Manifestum est ergo quod unus et idemmotus voluntatis est quo fertur in finem,secundum quod est ratio volendi eaquae sunt ad finem, et in ipsa quae suntad finem.

Sed alius actus est quod fertur in ipsumfinem absolute.Et quandoque praecedit tempore, sicutcum aliquis primo vult sanitatem, etpostea, deliberans quomodo possitsanari, vult conducere medicum utsanetur.

Since the end is willed in itself,whereas that which is in service to theend, as such, is only willed for the end,it is evident that the will can be movedto the end, without being moved to thethose things that are in service to theend; whereas it cannot be moved tothose things in service to the end assuch, unless it is moved to the enditself. Accordingly, the will is moved to theend in two ways: first, to the endabsolutely and in itself; otherwise, asthe reason for willing those things inservice to the end.Hence it is evident that it is one and thesame movement of the will by which itis moved toward the end as the reasonfor willing those things in service to theend; and toward those things in serviceto the end themselves.But it is another act whereby the will ismoved to the end absolutely.And sometimes this act precedes theother in time; for example when a manfirst wills to have health, and afterwardsdeliberating by what means to behealed, wills to send for the doctor toheal him.


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There is a clear distinction in Thomas’ approach between willing the endabsolutely and willing the end to be accomplished by a certain procedure.When understanding the totality of the human act he recognizes two dis-tinct phases, the movement of the will to the end (8-12), which he will callintention (12), and the movement of the will through those things that real-ize the end in a practical, concrete manner (13-17), which he will refer toin general as choice (13). Perhaps the most blatant proof of the distinctionis that the first phase may be engaged while the person does not go for-ward to actually accomplish the end (8,3,ad 3). The reverse, however, isnot the case. One cannot will “means” – that which is in service to the end– without having willed an end41.

Considering the act of the will that continues through the engagementof concrete act(s) or omission(s) in order to bring about the end in a prac-tical way, it is appropriate here to look ahead and see that Thomas con-siders this one, continuous movement of the will and not two differentacts. In his exposition of intention he underscores this by devoting an entirearticle to it (12,4).

Again, this text must be read carefully because it contains some nuancesthat are necessary to understand Thomas’ thought. At the same time, thefirst argument (12,4,arg 1) and reply already gives us a substantial clue.

41. 8,3,ad 3: Sometimes the will wills the end, and yet does not proceed to will thosethings that are in service to the end (… voluntas aliquando vult finem, et tamen non pro-cedit ad volendum id quod est ad finem).

Videtur quod non sit unus et idemmotus intentio finis, et voluntas eiusquod est ad finem.

Dicit enim Augustinus, in XI de Trin.,quod voluntas videndi fenestram, finemhabet fenestrae visionem; et altera estvoluntas per fenestram videndi transe-untes. Sed hoc pertinet ad intentionem, quodvelim videre transeuntes per fenestram,hoc autem ad voluntatem eius quod estad finem, quod velim videre fenestram.

Ergo alius est motus voluntatis intentiofinis, et alius voluntas eius quod est adfinem

It would seem that the intention of theend and the volition of that which is inservice to the end are not one and thesame movement.For Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 6) that‘the will to see the window, has for itsend the seeing of the window; and isanother act from the will to see, throughthe window, the passersby’. But that I should will to see thepassersby, through the window, belongsto intention; whereas that I will to seethe window, belongs to the volition ofthat which is in service to the end.Therefore intention of the end and thewilling of what is in service to the endare distinct movements of the will

Where the argument goes wrong is by not respecting the distinctionbetween seeing the window (videndi finestram) and seeing through thewindow (per finestram videndi). To look at the window itself indicates an



end of the act of sight, whereas to look at something outside the window,one directs one’s vision in a different manner, one in which the windowis not even “seen”. These are, as Thomas indicates in his response, twocompletely different acts, each of which wills a different end and thereforehas a different meaning. In short, they are two different acts of (the willto) intention, not two acts of the will, one to the end and the other to thosethings in service to the end.

The example is, in fact, very helpful. Think about looking at a distantobject through a glass window. If the object is far enough away, the focusof the eye makes it impossible to see the glass; and vice versa, to focus onthe glass makes the distant object virtually disappear or become severely dis-torted. Focusing on either one is analogous to an act of intention, in this casetwo, mutually exclusive intentions. Now think for a moment of a windowwith two panes of glass, one clear and one darkened. Attempting to look atan object outside the window on a brilliantly sunny day, I may choose tolook through the darkened pane of glass. But as the circumstances changeand the light fades, I may very well make a different choice of how toobserve what I intend to see and look through the clear pane of glass. Thosethings that are of service to the end, therefore, are decided upon in functionof how well they facilitate the realization of the end.

For the sake of brevity, I pass over what appears to be slightly disin-genuous on Thomas’ part in 12,4,sc, where he compares those things inservice to the end and the end itself to the mid-space and terminus of a“natural thing”. In 8,3,ad 3, he seemed to reject the comparison, writingthat the action of the will was actually the reverse of an “execution ofwork” (executione operas). Several readings of the two texts ultimatelyallows compatibility, but not without effort.

The body of 12,4 provides a challenging reflection that must be readwith the foreknowledge of 8,2, where Thomas clearly states that what iswilled in order to accomplish an end cannot be willed in itself or for itsown sake precisely because the “sake” for which it is willed is the end.One can will the end (absolutely) without willing anything else, but not thereverse (8,3,ad 3). Thus, we can now look at the text.

Motus voluntatis in finem et in id quod est ad finem, potest consideraridupliciter.Uno modo, secundum quod voluntas inutrumque fertur absolute et secundumse.Et sic sunt simpliciter duo motus volun-tatis in utrumque.Alio modo potest considerari secundumquod voluntas fertur in id quod est adfinem, propter finem.

The movement of the will to the endand to that which is in service to theend can be considered in two ways.First, according as the will is moved toeach of the aforesaid absolutely and initself.And thus there are really two move-ments of the will to them.Secondly, it may be considered accord-ingly as the will is moved to that whichis in service to the end for the sake ofthe end.


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In the first part of his answer, Thomas writes about a movement of thewill to those things in service to the end “absolutely”. At first, this seemsto stand in direct opposition to what he wrote earlier (8,2 and 8,3,ad 3),unless we understand it to mean that being willed absolutely, each of thosethings becomes an end. This is supported by arg 1 (above) and ad 1:

Et sic unus et idem subiecto motusvoluntatis est tendens ad finem, et in idquod est ad finem.

Cum enim dico, volo medicinam prop-ter sanitatem, non designo nisi unummotum voluntatis.Cuius ratio est quia finis ratio estvolendi ea quae sunt ad finem.

Idem autem actus cadit super obiectum,et super rationem obiecti, sicut eademvisio est coloris et luminis, ut supra dic-tum est.

And thus the movement of the will tothe end and its movement to that whichis in service to the end are one and thesame thing.For when I say: ‘I wish to take medi-cine for the sake of health’, I signify nomore than one movement of my will.And this is because the end is the rea-son for willing those things that are inservice to the end.Now the object, and that by reason ofwhich it is an object, come under thesame act; thus it is the same act of sightthat perceives color and light, as statedabove (8,3,ad 2).

Augustinus loquitur de visione fenes-trae, et visione transeuntium per fenes-tram, secundum quod voluntas inutrumque absolute fertur.

Augustine is speaking of seeing thewindow and of seeing, through the win-dow, the passersby, according as thewill is moved to either absolutely.

Here we see the confirmation that Thomas posits two, separate acts,both aimed at absolutely, and this can only be in regard to two differentends. It is further supported by the last observation of 12,4 that describesconsidering principles and considering conclusions as two, quite distinctacts.

Et est simile de intellectu, quia si abso-lute principium et conclusionem consi-deret, diversa est consideratio utrius-que; in hoc autem quod conclusionipropter principia assentit, est unusactus intellectus tantum.

And the same applies to the intellect;for if it consider principle and conclu-sion absolutely, it considers each by adistinct act; but when it assents to theconclusion on account of the principles,there is but one act of the intellect.

Although it may be possible to consider the conclusion of an intellec-tual exercise absolutely, such as taking for granted that a rectangle con-tains a total of 360 degrees of interior angles, in order to propose or demon-strate (i.e., arrive at) that conclusion convincingly one will need tounderstand and use the principles that support such a conclusion.



The second observation in 12,4 is much easier to grasp since it is merelya repetition of what has already been established, namely that movementtoward the end through the means is one movement of the will, albeit onethat can be logically broken down for better understanding. This is clearlylaid out in 8,2 and 8,3.

Question 9 deals with what moves the will. The first two articles are per-tinent to our survey, while 9,3 comments upon whether the will movesitself. I doubt that many would argue with the affirmative answer to thisquestion, and the following three articles do not concern us here. Never-theless, the first two articles regard the intellect and the sensitive appetite(passions) respectively, both of which are seen to be capable of movingthe will.

It comes as no surprise to observe that the intellect moves the will sincewe already know that the object of the will is the end and the good andthis must be apprehended by the intellect. We will linger over the firstarticle only long enough to highlight Thomas’ emphasis on the object thatspecifies the act of the will. After putting forth the crucial importance ofthe end in human acts, he draws the inevitable parallel with “naturalthings” in pointing out that an act is determined by its “object”. But in anact of the will, the object presented by the intellect is universal being andtruth, and it is this, or some aspect of it, that moves the will.

Sed obiectum movet, determinandoactum, ad modum principii formalis, aquo in rebus naturalibus actio specifi-catur, sicut calefactio a calore.Primum autem principium formale estens et verum universale, quod estobiectum intellectus.Et ideo isto modo motionis intellectusmovet voluntatem, sicut praesentans eiobiectum suum.

The object moves, by determining theact, after the manner of a formal prin-ciple, whereby in natural things actionsare specified, as heating by heat.Now the first formal principle is uni-versal being and truth, which is theobject of the intellect.And therefore by this kind of motionthe intellect moves the will, as present-ing its object to it.

Again, it should be noted that the “object” here, referred to as an objectof the act of the will, is the embodiment of the good. Nowhere in this textdo we ever see those things that are done in service to an end being referredto as an object of the act of the will. Those things can only be seen as anextension of carrying out a commitment to realize an end first envisioned“absolutely”.

The second article presents the tantalizing question of whether the willmight be moved by the passions. His affirmative answer may surprisesome, but closer examination reveals the observation that it is actuallythe intellect that is affected by the passions in its determination of whatis good. Having been, as it were, overcome by the passions, the intellectmay no longer be able to function properly and the disposition of a


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person may be overcome or changed. Interesting as this observation isfor Thomas’ moral psychology, it has little bearing on our question andwe must move on.

Question 10 addresses the manner in which the will is moved in fourarticles. The will tends naturally, writes Thomas, to the good in general(10,1: Hoc autem est bonum in communi, in quod voluntas naturaliter ten-dit). This has been affirmed right along. However, now he extends thescope of the will to all those things that might contribute to the well-beingof the person.

42. 10,1,ad 3: Sub bono autem communi multa particularia bona continentur, ad quo-rum nullum voluntas determinatur.

43. See above, the discussion on 8,2.

naturaliter homo vult non solum obiec-tum voluntatis, sed etiam alia quaeconveniunt aliis potentiis, ut cognitio-nem veri, quae convenit intellectui; etesse et vivere et alia huiusmodi, quaerespiciunt consistentiam naturalem;quae omnia comprehenduntur subobiecto voluntatis, sicut quadam parti-cularia bona.

The human person naturally wills notonly the object of the will, but alsoother things that are appropriate to theother powers; such as the knowledge oftruth, which befits the intellect; and tobe and to live and other like thingswhich regard the natural well-being; allof which are included in the object ofthe will, as so many particular goods.

The object of the will, naturally speaking then, includes many things;in fact, it includes whatever may be the object of any other power. (Thisnotion is particularly pertinent to questions 16 & 17 below.) The reasonfor this is simple: as a rational creature, the will of the person alwaysbenefits from an intelligent component. If it does not, as when the passions may overcome the intellect (cf. 9,2; 10,3), then it is not a gen-uine, free act of the will and hence no moral species can be attributedsimply to the activity in question. As a rational appetite, the will seeksan appropriate good (10,1,ad 3: naturae semper respondet unum, proportionatum tamen naturae) on all levels. At the same time, it isworth pointing out Thomas’ observation that “although under good ingeneral are included many particular goods, the will is not determinedby any of these”42.

Articles 3 and 4 deal with the role of persons in moving the will (cf. 9,2)and the understanding that God does not move the will of necessity. It isthe second article, 10,2, that particularly interests us, for it asks whetherthe will is moved, of necessity, by its object.

In his typical style, Thomas repeats the distinction between the exerciseof the will as act and the full engagement of willing43. In this case, he usesthe analogy of sight, the exercise of which as an act would be equivalentto “looking”. One can always either look or not look. If one does choose



to look or to engage the will as a power, however, then just as sight willbe directed toward “color” (a visible object) so is the will directed towardgood, which is the object of the will44.

Thomas takes the analogy a step further and considers an object whichis only partially colored. I find it helpful here to think of looking at a less than full moon. If one engages one’s sight, i.e., one looks, one “necessarily” sees the illuminated part of the object, but not that part that is not illuminated (“colored”). With the will, however, things areslightly different. For, the good which is the object of the will is knownto be not perfect. Only if that object is “universally good from everypoint of view” (10,2: obiectum voluntati quod sit universaliter bonum etsecundum omnem considerationem) does the will engage “necessarily”.That, he observes, can only happen in the case of (final) happiness (beati-tudo). In every other case, the will is not moved “necessarily” to itsobject.

Now here is where it becomes very interesting with respect to the issuewe are investigating.

44. 10,2: Sicut autem coloratum in actu est obiectum visus, ita bonum est obiectumvoluntatis.

Si autem proponatur sibi aliquod obiec-tum quod non secundum quamlibetconsiderationem sit bonum, non exnecessitate voluntas feretur in illud.Et quia defectus cuiuscumque bonihabet rationem non boni, ideo illudsolum bonum quod est perfectum et cuinihil deficit, est tale bonum quod volun-tas non potest non velle, quod est bea-titudo.Alia autem quaelibet particularia bona,inquantum deficiunt ab aliquo bono,possunt accipi ut non bona, et secun-dum hanc considerationem, possuntrepudiari vel approbari a voluntate,quae potest in idem ferri secundumdiversas considerationes

If, on the other hand, the will is offeredan object that is not good from everypoint of view, it will not tend to it ofnecessity.And since lack of any good whatever,is a non-good, consequently, that goodalone which is perfect and lacking innothing, is such a good that the willcannot not will it: and this is Happi-ness.Whereas any other particular goods,insofar as they are lacking in somegood, can be regarded as non-goods:and from this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by thewill, which can tend to one and thesame thing from various points ofview

“Any particular good”, writes Thomas, can in some way be lackinggood and thus regarded as a non-good. In fact, except for the case of com-plete happiness, everything that is aimed at by the will is going to be a mix-ture of good and non-good. In this case, the will must “set aside orapprove” this mixture of good and non-good.


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In case there is any doubt whether Thomas is writing about the end ofhuman actions rather than merely those things that are in service to the end,a simple reading of the entire article, especially 10,2,ad 3, will make itperfectly clear that the will primarily wills the good as end. It is the endthat attracts the will and invites the person’s engagement. Nevertheless,there will always be something missing from the entire process, short ofembracing the final end. There will always be some lack (of goodness orbeing), some non-good, as Thomas calls it45. But the acceptance of thisnon-good or its rejection is not morally determinative. He suggests thatnon-good may indeed be approved, but he does not yet tell us how. Thiswill come only after he is finished discussing all the elements of thehuman act.

Having considered what the will wills (8: the good), what moves thewill (9: the will itself and the end), and the manner in which it wills (10:the object which is a good but always imperfect except for the perfectgood or final end), it makes sense to give some attention to what mightbe called the final act of the will, namely the enjoyment that one expe-riences in coming to rest at its goal, in the end (11). Enjoyment is an actof the will, signifying that an end has been achieved. It is thus once againaffirmed that the very thing that moves the will is its proper “object”:the end and the goal is the object of the appetitive power46. And whileall sentient creatures can experience enjoyment in one way or another, itis only the rational creature, the human person, who can experience theend precisely as an end and in relation to the ultimate goal and end ofhuman life (11,2).

The third and fourth articles deal with the experience of enjoyment thatdoes not consist in the achievement of the final end and the fact that everyhuman act will fall short of full enjoyment until the final end is achieved.The first reflection (11,3) accepts the idea that only the last end will pro-vide complete enjoyment, but observes that there are also temporary, inter-mediate delights whereby the appetite for a good is satisfied. During humanlife, all ends are intermediate. The second proposition (11,4) allows thatwe can experience enjoyment even when the goal of our desire is not fullyin possession. Thus, there is an imperfect possession even of the end ofhuman life, the ultimate end, which we experience in a partial, “imperfect”manner. Perhaps the response to the second objection (11,4,ad 2) is worthquoting here for it contains the key expression about an act being speci-fied by its object.

45. In 13,6 Thomas has no hesitation referring to a non-good as an “evil”: “in all par-ticular goods, reason can consider an aspect of some good, and the lack of some good,which has the aspect of evil” (rursum in omnibus particularibus bonis potest considerarerationem boni alicuius, et defectum alicuius boni, quod habet rationem mali). See the dis-cussion below.

46. 11,1: finis autem et bonum est obiectum appetitivae potentiae.



The “object” said to be specifying the act of the will here is clearly theend of that act, that which leads to enjoyment or delight when it is attained,whether perfectly or imperfectly. The object is not a behavior nor merelyan external activity.

This section of Thomas’ treatise culminates in the naming and exposi-tion of the primary act of the will, namely “intention”. We need to resistthe temptation to spend a good deal of time on the topic of intention, forthis symbolizes what Thomas considers to be the core function of the will.If a person has no intention-to-an-end, the person will not move in amorally significant manner, i.e., voluntarily. By now, this should be morethan evident.

In respect to our particular investigation of the meaning of end andobject, we can first observe that the word object occurs in only four placeshere, the first of which refers to God as not always being the object ofintention (12,1,ad 1), while the other three all occur in 12,4 which we havedealt with above. Throughout the discussion it is the end that is the pri-mary, even exclusive, focus of the exposition.

Nevertheless, a further precision in Thomas’ thought found in hisresponse to the fourth argument, 12,1,ad 4, may shed further light on howhe understands the working of the will. The argument proposes that the actof the will oriented to the end is called volition (voluntas) or enjoyment(fruitio), whereas the act of the will toward those things in service to theend is called choice (electio). The response echoes what we have seenabove in 8,2.

quies voluntatis dupliciter impeditur,uno modo, ex parte obiecti, quia scili-cet non est ultimus finis, sed ad aliudordinatur; alio modo, ex parte appe-tentis finem qui nondum adipisciturfinem.

Obiectum autem est quod dat speciemactui, sed ab agente dependet modusagendi, ut sit perfectus vel imperfectus,secundum conditionem agentis.

Et ideo eius quod non est ultimus finis,fruitio est impropria, quasi deficiens aspecie fruitionis.

Finis autem ultimi non habiti, est frui-tio propria quidem, sed imperfecta,propter imperfectum modum habendiultimum finem.

the will is hindered in two ways frombeing at rest; first on the part of theobject; by reason of its not being thelast end, but ordained to somethingelse; secondly on the part of the onewho desires the end, by reason of one’snot being yet in possession of it.Now it is the object that specifies [givesspecies to] an act: but on the agentdepends the manner of acting, so thatthe act be perfect or imperfect, as com-pared with the state of the agent.Therefore enjoyment of anything butthe last end is not enjoyment properlyspeaking, as it falls short of the natureof enjoyment.But enjoyment of the last end, not yetpossessed, is enjoyment properlyspeaking, but imperfect, on account ofthe imperfect way in which it is pos-sessed.


388 J.A. SELLING

We recall that Thomas understands the engagement of the power of thewill to take place in two ways. One may will the end absolutely, which herefers to here as a kind of “pure” voluntas. Or one may will the end as thereason for choosing those things in service to the end. When this is thecase, he distinguishes between the engagement of the will in order toaccomplish the end, which he calls intention (intentio), and the coming torest in that accomplishment in an act of delight (fruitio). He does not writethat there is a separate act of intending that which actually accomplishesthe end; for the engagement of those things constitutes one and the sameact, as elaborated further on (12,4) and sketched out earlier (8,2).

Voluntas → end:as the reason for willing those things that are in service to the end

The next article explains why the end of human action does not alwayshave to be the last end (12,2) and the following one tackles the questionwhether two things can be intended at the same time (12,3). This hasnothing to do with the classical – but very post-Thomistic – question ofmeans and ends, but rather with the idea of multiple ends. He proposesthat this can take place in two ways, the first of which is a series of inter-connected ends. We can illustrate with the story of the mason who putstogether bricks to build a structure to earn a living47. All of these things

47. This seemingly simple example needs to be approached with caution, for each of thesteps mentioned may function as an end and terminus. No given structure needs to be com-plete for the competent laying of bricks to be meaningful (one thinks of a mason workingon several projects for a building company), nor does one usually completely earn a livingby building just one structure, any one of which can be a terminus. On the other hand, there

intentio est actus voluntatis respectufinis.Sed voluntas respicit finem tripliciter.

Uno modo, absolute, et sic dicitur volun-tas, prout absolute volumus vel sanita-tem, vel si quid aliud est huiusmodi.Alio modo consideratur finis secundumquod in eo quiescitur, et hoc modo frui-tio respicit finem.Tertio modo consideratur finis secun-dum quod est terminus alicuius quod inipsum ordinatur, et sic intentio respicitfinem.Non enim solum ex hoc intendere dici-mur sanitatem, quia volumus eam, sedquia volumus ad eam per aliquid aliudpervenire.

Intention is an act of the will in regardto the end.Now the will stands in a threefold rela-tion to the end.First, absolutely; and thus we havevolition, whereby we will absolutely tohave health, and so forth.Secondly, it considers the end, as itsplace of rest; and thus enjoymentregards the end.Thirdly, it considers the end as the termtowards which something is ordained;and thus intention regards the end.

For when we speak of intending to havehealth, we mean not only that we haveit, but that we will have it by doingsomething else to bring it about.



are interrelated ends. The other way that multiple ends can be consideredappears very much to be ordered to the effects of human action whereinone can prefer a certain thing because it “is available for several pur-poses” (quod ad plura valet). As we see again (after 7,3) Thomas has noproblem in counting circumstances in general and consequences in par-ticular as part of the “moral calculus”, as one might call it (18,3).

We have already dealt with 12,4 in comparison with 8,3. It should suf-fice to state that although the will moves toward those things that effica-ciously bring about the end, it does so only as passing through a middleterm, accomplishing one, single movement toward that which moves itfrom the beginning. For although “the end may be last in execution, it isfirst in the intention of reason”48.

EA QUAE SUNT AD FINEM

We now come to the section of the I-II describing the movement of thewill through consent, choice and use of those things that are expected tobring about the end which is the object of the will. From the beginning ofour treatment, two things deserve our attention. The first is a reminder thatThomas is not proposing what would today be called a schema of means-ends. He does not see the choice of efficacious actions to be an indepen-dent event. No human (moral) actions are ever voluntarily chosen withouta view toward and subordination to an end which defines the very purposeof the human action as a whole.By extension, it should be immediately evident that any application of thetres fontes theory here would be completely inappropriate. According toThomas, human persons do not “perform an action” which constitutes an“object” that may be further qualified by circumstances and intention. Itis, therefore, no surprise that in this section of the treatise he hardly usesthe word “object” at all. The word occurs twice in 13,1 where it refers tothe object of the will as something presented by reason to the appetitivepower (voluntas)49. It occurs once in 13,5,ad 1, again designating that

are all sorts of activities that do not lend themselves to qualifying as ends in themselves forthe professional mason, such as mixing cement, assembling the bricks at the place of build-ing, setting up measures and guides. These are done not for themselves but only to func-tion in service to the accomplishment of a specific end.

48. Cf. 18,7,ad 2: finis est postremum in executione; sed est primum in intentione ratio-nis, … secundum quam accipiuntur moralium actuum species. The response is completedwith the phrase, “according to which the moral acts receive their species”.

49. 13,1: Manifestum est autem quod ratio quodammodo voluntatem praecedit, et ordi-nat actum eius, inquantum scilicet voluntas in suum obiectum tendit secundum ordinemrationis, eo quod vis apprehensiva appetitivae suum obiectum repraesentat. The text goeson to state that the thing (object) being presented to the will is “good” – not in itself, noreven good absolutely speaking, but good “through being ordained to the end by reason” (exeo quod per rationem est ordinatum ad finem).


390 J.A. SELLING

which reason proposes to the will50, and twice in 13,5,ad 2, where it isexplicitly stated that “the object of the will is the apprehended good”. Itis not used at all in questions 14 or 15, and only once in 16,2,ad 1, refer-ring to an object of enjoyment. One finds it twice in 17,3,ad 2, identifiedas an object of “use” directed toward the end and in 17,6 as well as 17,6,ad2 as the object of reason. In no way is this a discussion merely about an“object of an (external) act” – even though the very topic is those thingsengaged in for the purpose of reaching an end.

The second thing that deserves attention is the structure of this entiresection. The issues are not presented in a logical order but rather in anexplanatory form. This is clear even in the preamble in which Thomasfirst states that he will treat “choice” (13) and then tells us that choice ispreceded by counsel (14). In fact, the order is even more complex than that.The literal order of presentation is: choice (13), counsel (14), consent,(15), use (16) and command (17). However, in the course of his exposi-tion, Thomas notes that:

– decision (sententia) or judgment (iudicium) is followed by choice(13,1,ad 2)

– choice is the desire of what has already been counseled (14,1)– the order of action is as follows (15,3)

ø apprehension of the endø desire of the endø counsel about those things in service to the endø desire of those things in service to the end

– after consent there still remains a choice (15,3,ad 2)– command precedes use (17,3,ad 2)

On the basis of the analysis of his presentation, then, the (chrono)logi-cal order of movement, which should be distinguished as emanating fromreason or the will, is as follows:

50. As far as I can determine, this (13,5,ad 1) constitutes the first use of the term “exter-nal action” (exteriorem actionem) in the I-II, and it is indeed linked to the word “object”.This does not occur again until 18,2. It is certainly worth pointing out that the object or exter-nal action is not chosen for itself, but only for the sake of the end. This is not to say thatthe choice of an external action does not have some bearing upon the will, only that what-ever bearing it may have will have to be subordinate to the primary determination by theend (cf. 18,7).

type of movement

reason 14 counsel

will 15 consent

will 13 choice

reason 17 command

will 16 use



Counsel is a form of inquiry (14,1) directed to those things in serviceto the end (14,2) about practical matters that lie within reach of the agent(14,3) when it is not already evident to reason which course of action tofollow (14,4). Thus, there are cases in which counsel is not necessary –when the way forward to the end is already evident (14,4,ad 1&2). Whencounsel is needed, however, it is always directed to those things in serviceto the end and not to the end itself, for this has already been presented asgood by reason and embraced by the will in the act of intention (14,1; cf.12,1). Counsel is needed because “there is much uncertainty in things thathave to be done” (14,1: in rebus agendis multa incertitude invenitur).

After reason either pronounces something as evident or takes counselabout the uncertainty of particular, contingent things, the will then movestoward an act of consent (15,1). In doing so, the will takes a judgmentabout which things would in fact be appropriate to accomplish the intendedend. If the will approves of several possibilities, then a choice still needsto be made (15,3). If, however, it appears that there is only one way whichis found conducive to the end, then there is effectively no differencebetween consent and choice (15,3,ad 3).

We come, then, to the actual choice of those things that are in service tothe end (13). The very first question about whether choice is an act of thewill or of reason (13,1) is significant, for it exposes the dynamic squarelywithin Thomas’ primary scheme. The simple answer to the question is thatchoice is an act of the will (desire of those things in service to the end,cf.15,3), but the more nuanced answer is that it is both. For the will can onlyrespond to that which is presented to it, and it is reason that, having providedcounsel about the possibilities, presents to the will what is deemed conduciveto achieve the end. In Thomas’ view, reason is the higher power. Hence, itis reason that provides the formal element, and thus the species, to the entiremoral event, flowing from the end to those things chosen to accomplish theend as material elements, dependent upon the formal principle51.

When the query is made about whether ends themselves are “chosen”(13,3), the very idea is dismissed so long as one is speaking of a singleevent. That said, it is possible that what functions as an end from one per-spective becomes conducive to the accomplishment of another end froma different perspective. Using the example of the mason given above, acontractor aiming at building structures may consider utilizing the accom-plishments of a mason (brick), a carpenter (wood) or an engineer (prefab)in order to get the structure built. We should notice here that a “change inperspective” also demands a change in agent, or at least a change in posi-tioning, as when the mason might be functioning as a contractor ratherthan simply as a mason, when one and the same event is taking place. Thefollowing articles have little to do with our subject.

51. 13,1: qui est essentialiter unius potentiae vel habitus, recipit formam et speciem asuperiori potentia vel habitu, secundum quod ordinatur inferius a superiori.


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The last part of this section deals with the command (17) and use (16)of human action to bring about an intended end. It concerns those thingsin service to the end. The command comes from the power of reason todesignate which lower powers are to be put into motion or restrained inorder for the end to be accomplished. In Thomas’ overall psychology, thecommand of reason functions on several levels, but these need not detainus here. Its role in the moral act, however, brings us to the actual engage-ment of the person to finally realize the end. Thomas equates this kind ofmovement with what he calls an operation. It is at this point that somethingactually “gets done”, or that something expected to be done is “inten-tionally” – i.e., voluntarily, for the purpose of achieving a specific andspecifying end – omitted.

The commanded act represents the externalization of the moral event. Itis an “operation” not in the sense of physical, moving parts but in the senseof an activity taking place, which can also occur “indirectly”, by doingnothing (cf. 6,3). It is this external act that we “see” (or observe to be “miss-ing”), and it is this external act that can be understood to function as the“object” of an act, n.b., not the object of the will, nor the object of the intel-lect, nor the object of enjoyment, but merely the external, physical mani-festation of the pursuit of an intended end through the choice of that whichhas been consented to as an effective manner of bringing about that end.

THE MORAL EVALUATION OF HUMAN ACTS

Thomas now has everything in place to address the moral evaluation ofthe human act. He has situated the entire enterprise in the context of thehuman calling to advance toward the ultimate end of happiness (beatitude)that comes from the union with God. He has described the workings of thevoluntary act. He has carefully distinguished the dynamic of human actsaimed at the achievement of a good (intention) and the subsidiary consid-eration and choice of those things necessary to achieve that good (election).In his estimation, the entire process of what we today call “moral decision-making” is guided by reason and effected by the will.

Up to this point, what Thomas is describing looks very familiar. How-ever, there is one major difference between his approach and most con-temporary ways of thinking. For while most of the latter is concerned with“what one is to do”, Thomas is primarily addressing the question, “howdo we achieve the ultimate goal of human life?”.

We should never forget that Thomas is, and thinks like, a theologian.His mind is fixed upon God and the human vocation to live according tothe eternal law (providence; cf. 19,4,9&10). This does not mean that hismoral method is incompatible with a non-theistic approach to ethics.Thomas himself had no difficulty incorporating Aristotle’s ethics into hisown perspective on the moral universe.



However, both his and Aristotle’s methods are different from what mostof us take for granted today. The contrast with so-called secular ethics isthe latter’s pragmatic, empirically-based preoccupation with relatively shortrange goal-seeking that utilizes a “cause and effect” model. This is incom-patible with Thomas’ approach that starts with the presumption that tosome extent we already have the goal in possession, albeit in an imperfectway. In Aristotle’s vision, the ethical person already is virtuous; inThomas’ outlook, we already enjoy the presence of God (grace). The ques-tion for both of them, then, is how do we live this out in a practical man-ner? How do we apply this vision to real life, i.e., how does one formu-late an intention, how do we ascertain whether that end is realizable, andif so, how do we choose the manner of achieving it?

Short term, non-teleological ethics represents a very different approach.Its focus is upon the “means”, a physical, external act or omission. Nor isthis approach entirely absent from Catholic moral theology which, underthe influence of probabilism emphasized moral systems that were preoc-cupied with moral law rather than moral living52. Ironically, the critiqueof this form of legalism was frequently accused of being a kind of conse-quentialism because of its emphasis upon the results of human action ratherthan simply its content. While one could not put Thomas into this category,his emphasis upon the end of human action does have a relativizing impactupon the manner in which human ends are realized.

All this said, of course, does not negate the fact that concrete humanactivity is important, even ethically crucial, with respect to moral evalua-tion. Human acts are not perfectly good simply because they exist, for allhuman activity short of the enjoyment of the last end is imperfect and thuslacking in something. In Thomas’ understanding, following Augustine andDionysius, every absence of a perfection is considered somehow an evil:the privation of (an expected) good.

One must add immediately that the evil associated with the lack of per-fection is not immediately moral. The example Thomas uses here (18,1)is that of a person who is blind. Though blindness and the consequent dif-ficulty a blind person may have in navigating a physical environment aresaid to constitute an evil, surely this is in no way considered a moral evil.A lack of being is convertible to a lack of goodness, but it does not ipsofacto carry a connotation of immorality.

The first article in I-II,18 asks the simple question whether there areboth good actions and evil actions. The affirmative answer seems nearlytrivial, perhaps leaving the reader wondering why the point is being made.Toward the end of his response, however, we encounter a curious, but sig-nificant observation.

52. See, for instance, Julia A. FLEMING, Defending Probabilism: The Moral Theologyof Juan Caramuel, Washington, DC, Georgetown, 2006, p. 125.


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According to Thomas, every human action short of the beatific visionwill always comprise a mixture of being and non-being, completeness andincompleteness, good and evil. But at this point, he is not yet addressingmoral good or evil, the moral species of human action. If one reads thistext with the tres fontes in mind, one will be looking for moral evil – andone will believe that they have found it. But this is not what Thomas isdoing here.

I suggest that there is another, very different way of reading this text.This is a reading without tres fontes, it is a reading that sees the specifi-cally moral evaluation taking place in 18,5-6-7 and not in 18,2-3-4, and itis a reading that claims continuity with I-II,1-17. According to this read-ing, 18,1-4 constitute nothing more than an observation about how goodand evil may be present in human acts, prior to and in preparation of themore pertinent moral discussion in 18,5-6-7. The summation of Thomas’own position is found in the last part of 18,4.

Sic igitur dicendum est quod omnisactio, inquantum habet aliquid de esse,intantum habet de bonitate, inquantumvero deficit ei aliquid de plenitudineessendi quae debetur actioni humanae,intantum deficit a bonitate, et sic dici-tur mala, puta si deficiat ei vel deter-minata quantitas secundum rationem,vel debitus locus, vel aliquid huiusmodi.

We must therefore say that every actionhas goodness, in so far as it has being;whereas it is lacking in goodness, in sofar as it is lacking in something that isdue to its fullness of being; and thus itis said to be evil: for instance if it lacksthe quantity determined by reason, orits due place, or something of the kind.

Sic igitur in actione humana bonitasquadruplex considerari potest.Una quidem secundum genus, proutscilicet est actio, quia quantum habetde actione et entitate, tantum habet debonitate, ut dictum est.Alia vero secundum speciem, quaeaccipitur secundum obiectum conve-niens.Tertia secundum circumstantias, quasisecundum accidentia quaedam.

Quarta autem secundum finem, quasisecundum habitudinem ad causambonitatis.

Thus, there is a fourfold goodness ineach human action.First, that which, as an action, it derivesfrom its genus; because as much as ithas of action and being so much has itof goodness, as stated above.Secondly, it has goodness according toits species; which is derived from itssuitable object.Thirdly, it has goodness from its cir-cumstances, in respect, as it were, of itsaccidents.Fourthly, it has goodness from its end,to which it is compared as to the causeof its goodness.

All Thomas is stating here is that one can speak about the good or evilin human actions from several perspectives. Goodness, or the lack thereof,can be found in an action’s being, its structure (object), its circumstances,and its end. When he writes about the object of an act (18,2), he is sim-



ply describing what is taking place on a natural, even physical level. Thisis the external action, and throughout the body of 18,2 Thomas continu-ously points to the parallel with “natural things” (res naturalis). This isconfirmed in the body of 18,3 when he writes that “In natural things, thewhole fullness of perfection due to a thing does not come from the sub-stantial form that gives it its species”53.

Furthermore, the replies to contrary arguments repeat the same thing.18,2,ad 1 explicitly speaks of “external things”; 18,2,ad 2 clarifies that thething spoken about is not simply the “what is done” (ex qua) but a moreelaborate description of further physical detail (circa quam)54 and 18,2,ad3 virtually makes the object function as an end55. Nevertheless, this objectis merely the end of an action; neither is it the object/end of intention (avoluntary act) nor the object/end of the intellect (the apprehended good).When 18,4 states that there is goodness derived from the object, it is quiteexplicit that this goodness depends upon it being a suitable object. Thatsuitability may only be judged in light of the end to be achieved. Thus thekilling of a man (I-II,1,3,ad 3 and II-II,108,1-3) may be a suitable objectfor safeguarding justice, provided, of course, that all the other circum-stances are in order.

What may be eminently confusing here is Thomas’ use of the word“species” in 18,2: “just as a natural thing has its species from its form,so an action has its species from its object, as movement from its term”56.The species being written about here is the natural species, not the moralspecies, just as the distinction had been made in 1,3,ad 3. For if this con-cerns only an exterior action, the species can be nothing more than a nat-ural one. This is not to suggest that the external action is unimportant,merely that it is not ipso facto morally determinative.

53. 18,3: in rebus naturalibus non invenitur tota plenitudo perfectionis quae debeturrei, ex forma substantiali, quae dat speciem.

54. Cf. 7,3: the circumstance that touches upon the material cause or object is “aboutwhat” (ex parte autem causae materialis, sive obiecti, accipitur circa quid). A very simi-lar idea was developed by E. KRASEVAC, Aquinas, Veritatis Splendor, and ContemporaryMoral Theology, in Listening: Journal of Religion and Culture 30 (1995) 50-63, p. 58 whonoted that for some kind of moral evaluation to be made of human acts, at least one cir-cumstance needs to be included in the description of that act. Krasevac followed up hisunderstanding about the evaluation of human acts in two later articles, The Good That WeIntend, and the Evil That We Do: A New Look at Praeter Intentionem in Aquinas, inAngelicum 79 (2002) 839-854; Can Effects That Are Inevitable and Instrumental Be PraeterIntentionem? Another Look at Aquinas’ Understanding of “Sit Proportionatus Fini”, inAngelicum 82 (2005) 77-88.

55. 18,2,ad 3: “since the object is in some way the effect of the active power, it followsthat it is the term of its action, and consequently that it gives it its form and species, sincemovement derives its species from its term” (Ex hoc autem quod obiectum est aliquo modoeffectus potentiae activae, sequitur quod sit terminus actionis eius, et per consequens quoddet ei formam et speciem, motus enim habet speciem a terminis).

56. 18,2: Sicut autem res naturalis habet speciem ex sua forma, ita actio habet speciemex obiecto; sicut et motus ex termino.


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It is in the following articles that Thomas takes up the moral species ofhuman action57: voluntary, intended, and commanded activity to achievean end. In 18,5 he asks whether human action can be good or evil in itsspecies; in 18,6 whether the good or evil species of an act is from the end,and in 18,7 whether the species from the end takes precedence over thespecies from the object. In the first instance Thomas repeats that “everyaction derives its species from its object” (omnis actus speciem habet exsuo obiecto), but he then takes this to a higher, moral plane by referringthe whole action to the judgment of reason. The object of a physical, exter-nal, commanded act may include the presence of good and evil as a nat-ural species (cf. 18,5,ad 1) but when the object of an act is considered tobe suitable (conveniens) or not according to reason, there is a moral judg-ment taking place that goes beyond the mere external act58.

In the next step, 18,6 demonstrates that it is the end that first (cf. 18,7)provides the moral species of a human voluntary action.

57. In the opening words of the first argument of (18,5, arg 1) he states that “it wouldseem that good and evil in moral actions do not make a difference of species” (Videturquod actus morales non differant specie secundum bonum et malum). This is the very firsttime that he uses the term “moral action” in question 18.

58. Cf. 18,7,sc: “Each genus has its determinate differences. But an action of one samespecies on the part of its object, can be ordained to an infinite number of ends: for instance,theft can be ordained to an infinite number of good and bad ends. Therefore the speciesderived from the end is not contained under the species derived from the object, as underits genus”.

aliqui actus dicuntur humani, inquan-tum sunt voluntarii, sicut supra dictumest.In actu autem voluntario inveniturduplex actus, scilicet actus interiorvoluntatis, et actus exterior, et uterquehorum actuum habet suum obiectum.Finis autem proprie est obiectum inter-ioris actus voluntarii, id autem circaquod est actio exterior, est obiectumeius.Sicut igitur actus exterior accipit spe-ciem ab obiecto circa quod est; itaactus interior voluntatis accipit speciema fine, sicut a proprio obiecto.

Certain actions are called human, inas-much as they are voluntary, as statedabove (1,1).Now, in a voluntary action, there is atwofold action, viz. the interior actionof the will, and the external action: andeach of these actions has its object.The end is properly the object of theinterior act of the will: while the objectof the external action, is that on whichthe action is brought to bear.Therefore just as the external actiontakes its species from the object onwhich it bears; so the interior act of thewill takes its species from the end, asfrom its own proper object.

The distinction between the interior act and the exterior act, which isfurther confirmed in questions 19 and 20 makes it perfectly clear thatthere are two objects and two species. The only thing left to work out is which object-species takes precedence. This is immediately taken



up in 18,7. In the course of this third article on the moral species ofhuman acts, Thomas makes a further distinction between those cases in which the object of the external act is obviously ordained to theaccomplishment of the end and those cases in which the relationshipbetween the external action and the “end” is anything but automatic.The example he uses for the former is “to fight well to obtain victory”.However, we could bring this down to something more concrete, such asthe individual soldier using his weapon against an enemy soldier to con-tribute to the battle; or, as in 1,3,ad 3, killing a man in order to safeguardjustice. The example for the latter case is the classic case of taking theproperty of another in order to give alms. In this case, the first (exter-nal) act does not in any way bring about the internal “act” of wantingto give alms – which consequently cannot be said to be the intended“end” of theft.

Thomas explains that in the latter case, we are really speaking abouttwo, separate moral actions, each with its own end and its own moralspecies. But in the case where the external action does in fact relate to theend in a virtually unimpeded manner, as when the legitimate authority ofthe community (tax collector) takes away the property of another (citizen)to deposit it immediately into the community chest (budget) to the bene-fit of that community and its individual members deemed to be in need,this external action is morally admirable, as long as due proportion isrespected.

It is, therefore, eminently clear that it is the end of moral action thatoccupies first place in moral evaluation, with the proviso, of course, thatwe are speaking of a unified, consequent moral action in which the (exter-nal) action performed genuinely does contribute to the end coming to be.

The remainder of I-II,18 goes on to discuss indifferent actions and theinfluence of circumstances upon the moral evaluation. Those are issuesancillary to our main inquiry about the object, end and moral species, sothey need not detain us here, except perhaps to quote the pertinent obser-vation that leads into the next phase of this investigation. The second argu-ment of 18,8, about indifferent species, suggests that every human action,whether from its end or its object, must be morally significant and hencecannot be indifferent. Thomas replies that,

omne obiectum vel finis habet aliquambonitatem vel malitiam, saltem natura-lem,non tamen semper importat bonitatemvel malitiam moralem, quae considera-tur per comparationem ad rationem, utdictum est.Et de hac nunc agitur.

every object or end has some goodnessor malice, at least naturally:

but this does not imply moral goodnessor malice, which is considered in rela-tion to reason, as stated above.

And it is of this that we are here treat-ing.


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INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR ACTS

What has been named in 18,7 as a clear distinction between internaland external actions is now elaborated in questions 19 and 20 respectively,in order to demonstrate how each of these elements can contribute to thegoodness or malice of the human act. The very order of presentation, whichagain mirrors the presentation of 8-12 and 13-17, indicates the priority thatThomas continuously gives to the end. The end is the object of the (inte-rior) act of the will and therefore an integral part of what makes an act vol-untary, and thus human and moral.

It is also worth noting that in this context, Thomas returns to writing aboutthe “object of the will”, which is the end. This “object” (end) is what isresponsible for the goodness of the will (19,1&2). Furthermore, the goodnessof the will depends upon reason that presents the object (end) to the will (19,3)and upon eternal law (19,4) as well as the Divine Will (19,9&10) which areapprehended by reason. In the remainder of this question59, one other elementworth a brief pause is the treatment of the relation of the will to those thingsin service to the end (19,7). It is here that we encounter the famous exampleof “giving alms for vainglory” (19,7,ad 2) that clearly emphasizes the primacyof intention in the determination of (moral) good or evil in the will60. It is alsohere, however, that we encounter one of the references to Dionysius’ commentabout the need for something to be good in its entirety for it to be consideredgood at all (19,7,ad 3, also refers back to 19,6,ad 1).

Dionysius is undoubtedly one of Thomas’ favorite sources61, but onewonders whether he is always being taken in the right way. The famous

59. We pass over the important discussion about conscience and erring reason which isnot really pertinent to this inquiry. Most mainstream moral theologians agree with Thomas’conclusion that the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason or conscience (19,5:i.e., doing what it mistakenly believes to be wrong). Fewer moral theologians underscoreThomas’ premise that reason cannot err when it comes to the knowledge of divine law, forall are bound to know this. As for whether a will at variance with erring reason can becalled good (19,6: i.e., doing what it mistakenly believes to be right), again, many moraltheologians are quick to embrace the interpretation that a will that follows this erring rea-son cannot as such be referred to as good. Fewer draw attention to the observation that adecision made on the basis of genuine ignorance which is not negligence is, in Thomas’understanding, not voluntary and therefore not subject to a judgment of moral good or evil.

60. In the tres fontes theory, this case would be considered an instance of doing some-thing “good” that becomes “evil” because of the bad intention. In Thomas’ perspective, theact is an act of vainglory and bad from the beginning, from the starting point of why theperson does anything at all. The actual giving of alms to the needy does not have a moralqualification as such but simply a natural quality of good, just as the killing in order to safe-guard justice has a natural quality of evil.

61. S. PINCKAERS, The Sources of Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas, in S.J. POPE (ed.), TheEthics of Aquinas, Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2002, 17-29, p. 17, fol-lowing Busa’s concordance, lists the top four authors cited in the second part of the S.T. as“Augustine, 1,630; Aristotle, 1,546; Gregory the Great, 439; and Dionysius, 202” etc.More references are found, of course, in other parts of the S.T., particularly in the first partwhere Dionysius’ perspective significantly influences Thomas’ understanding of creation.



quotation being referred to here is taken from Dionysius’ text on the DivineNames, which is anything but a moral treatise. Beginning in Chapter Four,the discussion of the names starts with the “good”, with reference to Godas goodness. But this is goodness as being, truth and unity, not moral good-ness. The subsequent discussion about evil, then, is not about moral evilbut about the lack of goodness, the privation of perfection62.

Thomas had already stated (see above, in 18,8) that “every object or endhas some goodness or malice, at least natural to it”. If this is the case andif the statement of Dionysius were applied literally, then no human actionat all would ever be able to be classified as “good”, for all human activ-ity is lacking in something. There must, therefore, be another interpreta-tion for what Thomas is saying here.

If we look again at the objection to which this is a reply, we see that itputs forth the example of a person who wills to steal in order to give alms.The wording of the argument provides an important clue to the solutionwhen it says that the person “has an evil will, although he intends a goodend” (19,7,arg 3: voluntatem malam habet, licet intendat finem bonum).We already know that willing and intending may be distinguished as fromthe general (6: voluntarium) to the more particular (12: intentio or 13:electio). We know further that if the two events do not form a whole (thewill to an end and to those things which actually bring about the end),they are indeed two, separate acts with two, different ends and that theymust be judged independently (see above, the discussion of 8,3 and 12,4).Thus, one could conclude that the good here (almsgiving) is preceded bya moral evil (stealing) and that the entire event cannot be sanctioned forthe simple reason that the presentation of the case as a single action isbogus.

Thomas illustrates the point well in the body of the article by distin-guishing between intention that precedes the act of the will and inten-tion that follows an act of the will. Illegitimately63 taking the propertyof another is an act that is evil by virtue of its end, no matter what deviceis used to bring about that end. However, once that property is acquired,one may feel repentance for what one has done and either return theproperty to the victim or, if that is impossible, give the property to the poor. This is a good act, aimed at a good end. But neither the returnof property nor its being given away as alms can have an effect on the initial act of stealing. Morally speaking, the two are entirely sepa-rate.

62. See, for instance, P. ROREM, Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and anIntroduction to Their Influence, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993, Chapter Four, TheDivine Names, 133-181, esp. pp. 148-153.

63. It is necessary to specify that the taking of property is “illegitimate”, for “anaction of one same species on the part of its object, can be ordained to an infinite num-ber of ends: for instance, theft can be ordained to an infinite number of good and badends” (18,7,sc).


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The application of Dionysius’ thesis here, and analogously elsewhere aswe have already seen (8,3; 12,4) and will see again (20,2&4), is not usedto encompass each and every element of the moral event. No human actionis perfect. There will always be limited options with regard to those thingsin service to the end. There will always be circumstances, some beyondour control and hence involuntary, others within our range of possibilitieswhere we will have to choose among what is available and sometimeseven have to settle for a “lesser evil”. These things do not enter into someall-or-nothing dictatorship of the thesis. Thomas is applying Dionysius’idea only to those things that are relevant to the moral judgment: the endthat needs to be good and those things in service to the end that need tobe appropriate – not perfect.

The appropriateness of those things chosen to realize an end brings usto the discussion of the external act; and the very first thing to be dis-cussed (20,1) returns us to our original question: which element of humanmoral activity takes priority in moral evaluation (species), the object or theend? Or to put it in the manner of Thomas’ question, “is goodness or mal-ice first in the action of the will or in the external action?” The first argu-ment for the external action is responded to with an observation that it isreason that first apprehends the good (or evil) in an external action accord-ing to which it is presented to the will. But in the execution of a humanaction, what takes place in the external action (quid: “what is done”) isunderstood as an “effect” (cf. 7,3). For Thomas, a human action is firstand foremost an action of the will, not simply some physical occurrence;for a mere, physically described activity can be involuntary and thus out-side the realm of moral qualification.

This does not mean that there is no good or evil whatsoever in the exter-nal action.

Bonitas autem vel malitia quam habetactus exterior secundum se, propterdebitam materiam et debitas circum-stantias, non derivatur a voluntate, sedmagis a ratione.

However, the goodness or malicewhich the external action has of itself,on account of its being about due mat-ter and its being attended by due cir-cumstances, is not derived from thewill, but rather from reason.

Note once again that Thomas understands that the external human actionis not simply “what is done” (quid) but the “about which something isdone” (7,3: circa quam, see above, 18,2,ad 2). It is not only the “due mat-ter” but also the “due circumstances” that need to be in place as judgedby reason. The reason why he qualifies the matter and circumstances to be“due” or appropriate (debitam, debitas) is because these particular matterand circumstances need to be fitted to this particular end. What is appro-priate for the achievement of one end may not be appropriate for the



achievement of another end64. It is reason that must work this out beforethe will moves toward the “actual” achievement of its end. If reason judges(see above, 14,1-5) the acceptability of those things that will be in serviceto the realization of the end (matter and circumstances), then the will pre-cedes into action and the external action shares in the goodness of the endaccomplished. For,

64. Consider once again 1,3,ad 3 and II-II, 108: the appropriate punishment should beassigned to a particular crime (cf. II-II, 65). But there are also examples of appropriategoods to be employed for achieving particular ends. In educating someone, for instance, itis possible to give too much or too little information for a particular student at a specificlevel. Too much or too little information may hinder the achievement of the end.

si consideretur bonitas exterioris actussecundum … quod est in executioneoperis, sequitur bonitatem voluntatis,quae est principium eius.

if we consider the goodness of theexternal action … in so far as it is inthe execution of the action done, it issubsequent to the goodness of the will,which is its principle.

If the will is the principle of the external action, then the object ofthat act of the will has got to be not merely the external action which ischosen for the purpose of achieving an end (cf. 13,1) but the end itself– which seems to be exactly the position that Thomas takes here: “theend is the proper object of the will” (20,1: finis sit proprium obiectumvoluntatis).

I write “seems to be” because in the very next article we find somethingthat appears to be slightly different, namely that “the will is good bothfrom its proper object and from its end” (20,2: voluntas sit bona et exobiecto proprio, et ex fine). Exactly what is meant here with the “properobject”? It cannot be the exterior act, for that is the focus of what is herenamed in the conclusion of a conditional statement.

Si igitur voluntas sit bona et ex obiectoproprio, et ex fine, consequens estactum exteriorem esse bonum.

If, therefore, the will is good, both fromits proper object and from its end, it fol-lows that the external action is good.

The text continues.

Sed non sufficit ad hoc quod actus exte-rior sit bonus, bonitas voluntatis quaeest ex intentione finis, sed si voluntassit mala sive ex intentione finis, sive exactu volito, consequens est actum exte-riorem esse malum.

But the goodness of the will which isfrom the intention to the end is not suf-ficient to make the external actiongood: and if the will be evil either byreason of its intention of the end, or byreason of the act willed, it follows thatthe external action is evil.


402 J.A. SELLING

There are three elements present in this text: the (intention to the) end,the external action, and something called the “willed act” (actu volito). Atfirst, it seems that this “willed act” is congruent with what is called the“proper object of the will” immediately above. But 20,1 had just stated thatthe end is the “proper object of the will”. The only explanation that seemsplausible enough to rescue Thomas from contradicting himself is that thefunction of the will to which he alludes is ambiguous. It is an act of thewill to embrace an intention (12) and it is an act of the will to choose thosethings in service to the accomplishment of the intended end (13), butalthough these actions are logically distinguishable, when a person actu-ally engages in a moral act, the movement of the will is one and the same:to the end (12) through those things that are chosen (13) and used (17; cf.8,3; 12,4)65.

In this particular article, however, Thomas is dealing with a virtuallyindisputable authority, Augustine, who wrote, “there are some actionswhich neither a good end nor a good will can make good” (20,2,sc:quaedam sunt quae nullo quasi bono fine, aut bona voluntate, possuntbene fieri)66. Augustine is writing about knowingly speaking an untruth,telling a lie, and in his view, this is something that can never be maderight. In Thomas’ view, this may constitute something contrary to nature,but curiously he does not insist very strongly on the moral condemnationper se. If we turn to his treatment of lying in II-II, 110, we find that heaccepts the distinction between officious, jocose and pernicious lies (II-II,110,2), the first and second of which he seems to appreciate as morally dif-ferent from the telling of a falsehood with the primary and ultimate inten-tion to deceive and thus do injury to another. He clearly differentiatesbetween these by observing that although the pernicious lie constitutes aserious offense, other forms of speaking untruths can be judged moreleniently (II-II, 110,2&4). In the end, Thomas cannot bring himself to treatall falsehoods in the same way67.

But here in 20,2, in direct confrontation with Augustine, Thomas doesnot contest the point. Instead, he allows the distinction between the willas intention and the will to that which is done (or omitted) to achieve theend, to function, or at least to be perceived independently, so that there isthe intention to the end (finem), the performance of an act (quid), and theculmination of the external action (circa quam, indicating all other cir-cumstances). For Augustine, whose text does not even approach the kind

65. Thomas repeats the same idea in 20,3: “the interior act of the will, and the externalaction, considered morally, are one act” (cf. 17,4).

66. Contra Mendacium, VII. Thomas understands a lie as a manifestation of signs not inconformity with the thing signified (II-II, 109,1,ad 3; 110,1).

67. II-II, 110,2: “lies may be divided with respect to their nature as sins, and with regardto those things that aggravate or diminish the sin of lying, on the part of the end intended”,and “it is evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the sin of lying diminishedin gravity”.



of ethical precision that Thomas is working toward in the S.T., general-izations are not out of place. Augustine is frequently preaching and inspir-ing, while Thomas is analyzing and instructing. The former can opine thatlying is always wrong, while the latter can distinguish between uttering afalsehood to deceive, misleading to protect, and obscuring to amuse.

Augustine’s separate categories are then inserted into the “Dionysianexclusion”68 to pronounce every falsehood a lie. But too strong an empha-sis on this would lead to missing the point that Thomas is attempting tomake here, namely that the goodness of the will, which is derived from theend (finis sit proprium obiectum voluntatis) is not yet sufficient to deter-mine whether the whole human act is good. For, the external action mustalso admit of due matter and due circumstances (debitam materiam et deb-itas circumstantiaI). If these are appropriate (debitas) then the whole actis good – because of the goodness of the will (20,1&3). If some of theseare not appropriate, then the integrity of the whole moral act is threatened.The subsequent negative moral evaluation of such an act, however, doesnot rest solely upon the matter or the circumstances but upon the conclu-sion that this matter and/or these circumstances are not appropriate torealize this particular end.

An evil end makes an act evil, no matter what circumstantial good isaccomplished along the way (e.g., vaingloriously giving alms). A goodend lends integrity to a human act which will come to completion throughthe engagement of the proportionate69 matter in circumstances. However,although inappropriate matter or circumstances can destroy the integrity ofa human act pursuing an otherwise good intention, they do not constitutethe starting point of moral evaluation, at least in the approach taken byThomas.

This is again confirmed when Thomas responds to the question“whether the goodness or malice of the external action are the same asthose of the internal action?” (20,3). He does not mean this as some kindof quantitative analysis, nor does he imply that a good intention transformsany shortcomings present in the manner in which that good end is realized.Rather, he is affirming the unity of the interior and exterior act from aspecifically moral point of view. His example is very clear: to achievehealth one may need to take a medicine with a particularly bad taste. Inthat instance, the goodness of taking the medicine is solely dependent uponthe fact that it works toward the realization of a good end. The medicineremains distasteful, but that shortcoming does not overwhelm the achieve-ment of the good end of restoring health. Thus, speaking from the point

68. … bonum ex una integraque causa exsistit, malum autem ex multis partialibusquedefectibus, PG 3 (1857), 729-730, or as Thomas puts it in 18,4,ad 3: quilibet singularisdefectus causat malum, bonum autem causatur ex integra causa.

69. 18,2,ad 1: licet res exteriores sint in seipsis bonae, tamen non semper habent deb-itam proportionem ad hanc vel illam actionem. Et ideo inquantum considerantur ut obiectatalium actionum, non habent rationem boni.


404 J.A. SELLING

of view of the achievement of an end – and it is from this perspective thatthe moral act is primarily evaluated – the entire, integral act is good.

A slightly different issue is taken up in the next article in which Thomasasks “whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that ofthe interior act?” (20,4). Having established the central place of the end asthe object of the will, Thomas does not ignore the role the external actionplays in the totality of human action. Nevertheless, this is seen on two lev-els. First he considers whether the external action has any impact upon thegoodness of the will, and to this question he has a negative response. Whenthe will is good, it is good by reason of its proper object, the end. As a corol-lary, however, he does add that the will can be made better through thevery fact of good acts being performed: either through the fact that suchacts are repeated often (number), or through the experience that one neededto work hard to achieve a particular end (extension), or because the actualaccomplishment of the end was particularly influential (intensity). All ofthese phenomena involve the performance of external actions, but alsostrengthen the will in its (general) commitment to the good.

Secondly, Thomas characterizes the matter and due circumstances of ahuman act as the terminus or end point (terminus et finis) of an act of the will.Since every action is completed or “perfected” by reaching its end point, theexterior action may be said to “contribute” to the achievement of the will.However, while this is evident with respect to “good” exterior action con-tributing to the good-ness of the intending will, there is still the issue of whathappens when some element of the exterior action is less than good or suf-fers from a lack of perfection whereby we could call it “evil”? Thomas’explanation here perfectly parallels what he wrote earlier in 19,6 about a willthat “abides by erring reason”: the evil done is simply involuntary70.

70. See above, n. 59.

Unde non est perfecta voluntas, nisi sittalis quae, opportunitate data, opere-tur.Si vero possibilitas desit, voluntate exis-tente perfecta, ut operaretur si posset;defectus perfectionis quae est ex actuexteriori, est simpliciter involuntarium.

Wherefore the will is not perfect, unlessit be such that, given the opportunity, itrealizes the operation.But if this prove impossible, as long asthe will is perfect, so as to realize theoperation if it could; the lack of per-fection derived from the externalaction, is simply involuntary.

Thomas fully appreciates the limitedness of our created existence.While some of our human actions might be characterized as “perfect”(i.e., complete) within a very narrow range, if we analyze each and everycircumstance of every exterior action we will quickly realize that therefrequently are undesirable elements that we will be forced to accept if we ever hope to accomplish our goals. The complexity of modern



life only aggravates this problem and results in genuine cases of ambi-guity.

Finally, it is worth taking note of the observation that Thomas makes in20,6 about assessing human activity from different perspectives, namelythe natural order or the moral order. These assessments do not alwayscoincide. But it is clear from what he states here and elsewhere that it isthe moral order that takes precedence in his evaluation of human acts.

nihil prohibet aliquem actum esse unumsecundum quod refertur ad genus natu-rae, qui tamen non est unus secundumquod refertur ad genus moris, sicut et econverso, ut dictum est.Ambulatio enim continua est unus actussecundum genus naturae, potest tamencontingere quod sint plures secundumgenus moris, si mutetur ambulantisvoluntas, quae est principium actuummoralium.

Si ergo accipiatur unus actus prout estin genere moris, impossibile est quodsit bonus et malus bonitate et malitiamorali. Si tamen sit unus unitate naturae, etnon unitate moris, potest esse bonus etmalus.

nothing hinders an action from beingone, considered in the natural order;whereas it is not one, considered in themoral order; and vice versa, as we havestated above (3,ad 1; 18,7,ad 1).For continuous walking is one action,considered in the natural order: but itmay resolve itself into many actions,considered in the moral order, if achange take place in the walker’s will,for the will is the principle of moralactions.If therefore we consider one actionaccording to the moral order, it is impos-sible for that which is good and evil toexbibit moral goodness and badness.Nevertheless, if a single act exhibits anatural unity, and not a moral unity, itcan be both good and evil.

While reference is made to two texts here, we could easily add to these,including the texts which would return us to our point of departure: I-II,1,3,ad 3 and II-II,108,1-4. These and other concrete examples demon-strate Thomas’ emphasis upon the primary role of the intention to the endin the moral order. Moral species is determined primarily by the end, whichis simultaneously the object of the will, the object of the intellect, or, inother words, the object of the interior act. It is not determined simply bythe “object of the act” which is another manner of referring to the exte-rior act, or that which is done to bring about the end. The determinationof the exterior act by counsel, consent and choice is always carried out inservice to the end intended and not merely for its own sake.

EPILOGUE

Although the encounter with Augustine in 20,2,sc brings Thomas close to the question on the minds of many an ethicist, it is to his creditand our challenge that he largely ignores the issue of what are almost


406 J.A. SELLING

casually referred to today as “intrinsically evil acts” – material eventsthat are judged to be immoral no matter what end is being intended orwhat circumstances may influence a full assessment of what is takingplace. It should be clear from the text of I-II,1-21 that Thomas simplydoes not think that way. He does not begin his exposure of human actsby looking at material events (external acts). Nor does he culminate hisassessment by stating in 18,2 that an “action has its species from itsobject”.

The good or evil contained in human acts does, of course, have a bear-ing upon the rectitude or malice of human activity, as we have seen. Butin Thomas’ understanding, “evil is more comprehensive than sin, just asgoodness is more comprehensive than rectitude”71. Simply finding evil,some lack of perfection, connected with the execution of those things inservice to the accomplishment of a worthy goal (end) is not enough toforce one to give up on what human persons recognize as milestones onthe way to achieving happiness (beatitude). As Thomas himself points out(11,4; 18,8), every human activity short of union with God will be imper-fect. To allow the Dionysian exclusion to interfere with realistic moraldecision-making would not only be inappropriate, it would make humanmoral decision-making virtually impossible.

Fortunately, this never poses a problem for Thomas. He does, of course,recognize that there are limits on exterior, material actions that precludetheir choice as mechanisms for realizing what would otherwise be hon-ourable ends. These limits are contained in eternal law and should beaccessible by reason. The extent to which reason will be able to grasp thedetails of eternal law (synderesis, I,79,12) must remain an area of intensespeculation. But that need not concern us here.

What we can conclude is that Thomas’ moral assessment of human actsis not to be found in 18,2-3-4 but rather in 18,5-6-7, and the attempt to readthe tres fontes into the treatise on human acts is a mistake. From his text,it is clear that Thomas does not think that goodness or malice exists firstin acts and is subsequently transferred to the will (20,1). Goodness or mal-ice are first characteristics of the will that embraces a good or bad end andchooses a manner of realizing its end in a way that is appropriate or inap-propriate. The key to understanding the first is a sufficient understandingof eternal law, the key to determining the second is a prudential sense ofproportion.

Faculty of Theology Joseph A. SELLING

St.-Michielsstraat 6B-3000 LeuvenBelgium

71. 21,1: malum in plus est quam peccatum, sicut et bonum in plus est quam rectum.



ABSTRACT. — The dominant model used by most moral theologians andphilosophers to interpret Aquinas’ action theory in the first twenty-one questionsof S.T., I-II has been the so-called three sources of morality: object – circum-stances – end. This article suggests that such an interpretation is anachronistic,that it ignores Aquinas’ appreciation of the human act as an integral whole (8,3;12,4), and that it fails to distinguish the multiple meanings of the word “object”in the text. Multiple and close readings of the text, concentrating on every occur-rence of the words “object” and “end”, reveal that the focus of Aquinas’ theoryis on the end of human (voluntary) action and not on the external act, the object.While the external event may be evaluated according to its natural species, it isthe end that plays the primary role in determining the moral species of humanaction.


Documents

Object, End and Moral Species in S.T., I-II, 1-21...Saint Thomas Aquinas and the Question of Proportionality, in Louvain Studies9 (1982-1983) 26-46. This was responded to by W.E. MAY,