Nyaay Proofs for Soul - A Chakravarti

7/29/2019 Nyaay Proofs for Soul - A Chakravarti

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ARINDAM CHAKRAVARTI

THE NYAYA PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL

1. It was clear to a Naiyayika as ancient as Uddyotakara (Circa 6th CenturyAD) that negative existential statements cannot be truly made by the useof genuinely referential simple subject-terms. It is by presupposing l theexistence of tigers that we can assert: Tigers growl, whereas we cannot sopresuppose the existence of unicorns when we say: Unicorns are fictional.This very old philosophical problem about subject-terms of existence-denyingstatements recurs in many contexts, especially between the Nyaya and theBuddhists in their debates concerning existence of God [How can youcoherently say God does not exist *?I , reality of the external world[(The external object is unreal - refers to an external object ! ! ] ,concerning a supporting example for the contra-positve of the Buddhistdefinition of existence [viz. whatever is (causally) non-effective is non-existent 3] and finally in the debate concerning the need for a proof ofthe existence of the self. [See Appendix] The basic semantic principle withwhich the Naiyayika operates is stated rather plainly by Uddyotakara asfollows [N.V. 3.1.1.1

Na hi ekam padam nirarthakam paiy&nahSince artha (as against pravyttinimitta etc.) usually is the term fordenotation or reference, here he is actually expressing the Russellianassumption of the Nyaya semantics, viz., that every genuine single (i.e.sinple) expression must denote an object. Accordingly Uddyotakara cutswhat Quine has called Platos Beard by analysing The rabbit-horn doesnot exist into The rabbit bears no causal relation with horns or as simplyNo rabbit has horns. This looks very much like Russells policy of breakingup all apparently empty subject-terms into non-empty predicates like . . .is a rabbit and . . . has a horn, except that the technique used is notof a formalised language of quantifiers of a predicate-logic. Later on thedevelopment of the regimented language devised by the Navya-Naiyayikasmade very perspicuous techniques available for expressing such a denial.

Joumaloflndian Philosophy 10 (1982) 211-238.0022-1791/82/0103-0211 $02.80.Copyright 0 1982 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.


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212 ARINDAM CHAKRAVARTIBut the expressionwould alwaysbe - however technically circumspectin what Carnapwould call the material mode, namely, in the idiom of anabsence nd its counter-entity. Another vital difference between Uddyorakaruand Russell would be this: while Russellscriteria for being a reference-guaranteedsingular expressionwere too stringent to allow any ordinary nounto qualify asgenuinely singular, Uddyorakara doeshold The Self [orat any rate Z] as a genuinely singular term which cannot be coherentlyusedas he subject-termof an (absolutely) negative existential. That iswhy he diagnoses Self exists as autologically [or should we say Self-vahdatingly] true, Self doesnot exist as self-contradictorily false andDoes the self exist? to be aspointless as Is that tree a tree? Obviously,in this context he doesnot think that it is the full-fledged notion of aNy&ya-Carresian ure-egowhich is in this sense ncontroversial. What onecannot significantly deny is the existenceof the referent of the term I.Even f one is a physicalist and refers to the body wheneverhe uses I- one is not a doubter of the existence of the self but is simply a disputantof the spiritual-substance theory of self. Gauramahowever seemso avoideven this trouble of taking The Self - asgenuinely singular. His proposedproof of the self doesnot take the form of an inference which establishesthat there is existence n the locus of the Self because f the presenceofsomeother existence-pervadedactor in it, i.e. it is not a wra - stidhyaka,&ma-paksaka,somethinghetuka inference. Such an inference even fconstrued might be at once rejectedby the opponent astiiraybsiddhasince he opponent challenges he very existenceof the paksa,viz, &man.Whenwe come to this really controversial use of the term The Self[because he uncontroversial use made Self (= I) exist(s) - trivially true]Cauramawould have t analysedalmost n a Russellian ashion into:

The X such that X is a substanceother than the live elementalsubstances,he manas inner sense), paceand time. By provingthat such a substances the referent of the I-usage in all ourself-ascriptionsof consciousness-predicatese.g. n I wish,I am happy, I know etc.) Gautama would claim to haveproved that the self of the typical Ny%ya Vaisesika) ind exists,becausen his ontology &man is just a surrogate or:The non-corporeal substance ther than manasand the sense-faculties to which emotions, cognitions and volitions belong.


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PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF SOUL 2132. The Cartesian ine of argument, hough not explicitly adopted, was notat all foreign to the Naiyaiyika. That the Indian philosopherswere awareof the absurdity of denying the existence of the subjectwho does he denialis amply attested to by later discussions . As in contemporary Westernphilosophy the exact nature of the selfrefutation incurred by such a statementas I do not exist was subjected o careful analysis.Udayana cameup withsubtle distinctions betweenself-contmdiction 5, selfact-nullijkation 6, andself-refitation. That is why Uddyotakara makes t clear that he is not goingto prove that what is referred to by the pronoun I exists, for on that scorethere cannot be any significant disagreement.

[Na Kascti&ma Sadbhtie Vipratipadyate]It is only this or that specific metaphysicalnature of the self that is thesubject of controvercy. Thus one can maintain that the same-seemingubject(which Kant called the Synthetic unity of apperception) relying on whichwe recogniseobjective continuity (in the form, e.g. of the person Z whoexperiencedan object visually am now experiencing he sumeobject tactually)is really

(4

Et(4

nothing over and above he distinct (& momentary) bits ofexperiences each distinct from another.a bundle of such experiences or perhapsa series)somesubstantiveentity other than the experiences7oris identical with the body of an individual to which theseexperiencesare to be ascribed.

A decision between hese alternatives must be made, f at all, by meansofargumentsor inferences, or as Humes intimate entrance into himselfshowedone cannot directly perceive as east n normal introspection)anything more than these nner states hemselves 3.In the main argument, herefore, the only empirical premiss s theintuitively self-evidentproposition that there are statesof consciousness,e.g. wish, aversion,effort, pleasureand pain.In the Cartesiandictum we cannot straightforwardly take the ergo asa sign of inferential passage, ecauseDescartes onsidered Sum to be aprimitive - not an arrived-at-certainty, and leaned heavily on its selfevidentcharacter. t would obviously be a grossmistake to think that Descarteswas


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214 ARINDAM CHAKRAVARTIdeducing I exist from any such generalmajor premissaswhatever thinksexists - ashe himself madevery clear n his reply to objections 9. Evenfor the Naiyayika there is no such property F such that whatever has or lacksF has or lacks existence.For them existence s the highestuniversal hencedoesnot admit of any definition. They were constantly criticising theBuddhists attempt to define existence n terms of causalproductivity,because there is no way of proving any such generalisationaswhateverF s exists. But one seemso find someevidence hat Descartesoo sometimesformulated the cogito-sum n the form of an inference. If I am to stop withjust what is immediately and incorrigibly given to me I cannot assertanythingmore than Lichtenbergs tag i : There is a thought. From this, if we areto pass o a thinker which Descartes xplicitly says is not identical withits thinking l1 we must take recourse o an inference. This, precisely, s theinference which Descartes ivulges n the face of Hobbes hird objection, andwhich constitutes, at least, part of Gautamas ntended proof:

it is certain, ways Descartes, that thinking cannot exist withouta thing which thinks, or generally that any accident or activitycannot be without a substanceof which it is the activity i2.This sounds ike an echo of Vatsyayanasargument 3, except that whatDescartesoosely calls accident or activity is classifiedby Vdtsylyam asquality, and that Descartes annot, without inconsistency with the rest of hissystemshow up the derived inferential nature of the conclusion that theself exists 14.3. Gautamasown argument as spelled out by Vatsyayana s most naturallytaken by Uddyotakara and Vlliulpati as a couple of arguments ivettedtogether. But it is mentioned in the Bhasyaasone complete argumentexemplifying the Sirndnyatodysfa type of inference. A formal proof of validityof the argument as a whole may be given in the following way:

Sx = x is a substanceQx = x is a qualityZxy = x inhers in Y

ck = x is a state of consciousness(e.g. desire)Bx = x is a body (or manasor dikor indriya . . . )

Adopting the above symbolism, the premisses an be written as:


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PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF SOUL 215(1) (3x1 (Cx)

(2) (x> cc; B)(3) 0 [ex WI (0 - WI(4) Q LO m (BY --Ix VI

Hence the inference:(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)

(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18)(19)

CaCa 3 QaQa>(W (Sy - lau)Qa(3~) (St l lay)

Sb . labCa 3 (Y) (By 3 -1ay)64 (BY 1 -lay)Bb 3 -lablab 3 -Bblab-BbSbSb - -Bb(3x) (Sx l -Bx)

[There are states ofconsciousness or mentalevents][States of consciousness arequalities][All qualities inhere in somesubstance or other][Conscious states cannotinhere in any corporealsubstance, e.g. body]

l,E. I2, u. I3,u. I6, 5, M. P7,8, M. P9, E. I4, u. I11,5,M.P12, u. I13, Trans., D. N10, Simp14,15,M. P10, simp17,16, Conj18, E. G Q.E.D.

Notice that the conclusion only proves that there is some substance otherthan the body etc., which, as we have seen at the end of the first section,amounts to: There is self. This representation of the argument as a single oneproving the contention that qualities like desire inhere in a substance otherthan body etc. - also accords with Jayantas formulation to which we shallcome back at the end of this paper.4. If, on the other hand we follow the suggestions of Uddyotakara andVacaspati, we interpret the argument as a ho-tier one. The first step is aclear BARBARA of the Aristotelian syllogistic mood:


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216 ARINDAM CHAKRAVARTI[Al All qualities call for a substance o which they belong.PI Desire,aversion,cognition, pleasure,pain, volition, all these

are qualities.:. [C] Desireetc call for a substance o which they belong.Both the VHrtika & the Tatparyatika say that this is the genuineStiti?r~~fo-dpta inference. Since his provesonly the dependence f the consciousness-qualities upon someother substance

[icchadi gunin%rpp%ratantry;u;n Vacaspati)]it must be supplementedby a further &~vat argument o the effect thatthis other substance s no other than the spiritual substanceor soul. Thissuggested omplementary secondstep is a disjunctive syllogism:

PI

[El:. [F]

The substance o which desireetc belong is either earth or wateror air or fire or &&a (or a conglomeration of these), or spaceor time or manas or it is someninth substancedifferent fromall these.Neither earth nor water . . . nor manas s the substance o whichdesireetc belong.Someninth substancedifferent from all these s that to whichdesireetc belongs.

To complete the argument we have only to add the verbal decision, that weare warranted by common usage o make, of calling that non-physical non-psychological substance o which all our consciousexperiencesare ascribed- the Self or &man. Is not it the one who feels, hinks, wishesand wantsthat each of us calls the I?In the above argument, the major premissof the fast step, namely,every quality is parasitical on a substance, as been often challengedbyphenomenalistsand what Strawsoncalls noownership theorists (in theIndian context thesewere always he Buddhists). Our experiences theso-called nner-states aswell as he posited objects of those colours andtouches, tastesand smellsneed not necessarilybe own& by or belong tosomethingbeyond themselves nd ontologically more selfsufficient, theyhave said. In the external world -- such a supportlessshow of (naturallyunsharablehence private) sense-objectseadsnot only to a sort of flux-doctrine but also to somesort of solipsism.But in the inner world


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PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF SOUL 217non-ascription of the experiences might give rise to such bizarre philosophicalinterjections as this: Here is a nice little piece of jubilation! There a prettydirty bit of jealousy, and lo! What a clear act of belief [of course, theyare not any ones jubilation, jealousy or belief, they happen just in theirown right] . The explanation of their logically unwashable stamp of beingsome-ones in terms of their happening around a body does not always work- because certain unlocated. conceptual thoughts are simply not ascribableto the body as such. Even if it does work, the general premise that qualitieshave to be ascribed to something stands unchallenged, and a Naiyayika likeUdayana argues elaborately (c.f, Afmatattva Viveka 3rd controversy) againstthe objection:

na guy vyatinktaica guni n&misti kincana.[This is no quality-possessor over and above the qualities]

Premiss [B] has also been challenged: qualityhood does not belong to desireetc., so the conjecture of a substratum is superfluous.

[Guqatvamapi mistyasya yatodhisthina Kalpand -Ny&ya Manjari,P-151

Uddyotakara however supports their categorisation as qualities by aneliminative argument. Since mental states are usually very short-lived (noneof the them are eternal) they cannot be either universals, or ultimateparticularities (residing in atoms) or the relation of inherence. There areother technical reasons for not classing them as either actions or substances.So they can only be qualities. Once we admit [A] and [B] , [C] followslogically. Now, to be a substance in the Vaisesika framework which is alsothe Nyaya framework, something must be either any of the eight alreadyadmitted types or be a new ninth one. So [D] is analytically derived from[C] in the Nyaya - ontology.

The most interesting and controversial move is [E] which cancels thecandidature of body, manas and other sense faculties as the owner-substanceof desire etc. This is the Naiyayikas battle against physicalists of differentshades, and that is what we are going to take up next.5. Since nobody ever thinks of earth, water, fire or air to be individually thesupport of states of consciousness or the possessorof P-predicates (as wemay call desire etc., after Strawson) the Naiyayika does not consider them


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218 ARINDAM CHAKRAVARTIsingly. There cannot be a seriousphilosophical position that it is earth or firethat feels he pain, entertains the belief, plans the action or has the thoughtthat people are said to have.Bakzstaprfda, the Vaisesikacommentator orKa@&r, showshow such a thesis would lead to the highly absurd positionthat the referent of the terms I and that of earth (etc) would be thesame.It is only through the human body, their joint product - that corporealsubstances ave maintained their age-old ivalry with the spiritual substance.Materialistic theories of the self-body dentity have sprung n all ages romthe common speech-formsike I am fat, from the logical necessityofgiving ground to our ascription of mental predicates o other personsofwhom only the body is surely cognisableby any of us, and from otherreductive behaviouristic considerations.The Nyaya rejects he thesis thatconsciousnessthe generalblanket, covering all mental-conduct-predicates 5)is a property of the physical body on the following grounds [N. S. 312146. . . 312155.1(a) If a quality (like colour) belongs o a body it inheres n it as ongas he body lasts, unlesssomenew antagonistic quality (falling under thesame detemzinable) comes o replace t. But consciousnesss not found inthe body at death, when, often the body stays ntact and no other opposite(pratidvandi) quality of the samecategory supplants,pushesout consciousnesswhich is just found missingWecannot explain this fact by an analogy with speed Vega) which is aquality of somebodiesat only some times but may not continue to be inthem as ong as he bodies do, since speed s caused in a body by someotherfactor, namely motion - a sort of activity (of going,gamanam) of the samebody which ceasing, t ceases.Wecannot fmd any correspondingcauseeitherin or outside the body which may be held responsible or the occasionalemergence nd occasionaldisappearance f consciousnessn it. It is temptingto argueagainst his that since according o the Nyaya theorist even the souldoesnot contain these consciousness-attributes ll along its careeras asubstance, or in liberation, it is said to shake hem off, the same ayhad-dravyabhfvitva will disqualify consciousnessor being a specialattributeeven of the soul. But the objection would not have much strength, becauseit is only about the specialqualities of the body that the Naiyayika formsthe Vyapti that they are unlosable by the physical substance,and not aboutall qualities of all substances.


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PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF SOUL 219From the general point which later has been put in a nut shell by Msuuntifha

as M~e$u Vyabhi&-&z/r, one can develop a more neutral argument to theeffect that if Mr Xs body were the same as the Mr X who felt the wish, knewthe propositions, planned the action etc., then, why cant we point at the bodyand say that is Mr X - over there! after Mr Xs death, when for all practicalpurposes Mr Xs body is still there?

A similar argument has been hinted at by Kripke in the following footnote:(Naming, Necessity and Natural kinds, Cornell, 1977 P-101) The simplestCartesian argument can perhaps be restated as follows: Let A be a name(rigid designator) of Descartes body. Then Descartes argues that since he couldexist even if A did not, 0 (Descartes # A), hence Descartes # A.

Those who have accused him of a modal fallacy have forgotten that Ais rigid. . . . On the other hand, provided that Descartes is regarded as havingceased o exist after his death, Descartes # A can be established withoutthe use of a modal argument; for, if so, no doubt A survivedDescartes whenA was a corpse. Thus A had a property (existing at a certain time) whichDescartes did not.

Obviously this last formulation goes against the immortality of the self butwe can put it as A survived a vanishing of the mental states.(b) Since consciousness is present all over the body, any part of it (because

parts of a substance are also substances) must be called a conscioussubstance or a feeler or a wisher, if we are to attribute consciousnessto the body at all. But this leads to the absurd position that one bodycontains hosts of conscious agents or subjects, often participating in eachothers private experience.

(c) The final and the weightiest argument is that consciousness cannotbe an attribute of the body because it is basically dissimilar to the bodilyqualities, Corporeal qualities, like colour, sound, weight, temperature etc.- however dissimilar to each other are either available to external perceptionor are totally imperceptible, because dispositional (and has to be inferred,as the Naiyayika thinks weight is). But ocurrent conscious states like afeeling of pain, or an act of cognition, or a spark of joy, an impulse of activewill - have the peculiarity that they are neither publicly observable byexternal sense-organsnor completely imperceptible, but only internallyperceptible through the privileged access of the subject of those experiences.

Besides the point of privacy, there are other respects in which a mentalstate is generically different from a physical (and for the matter, a cerebral


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220 ARINDAM CHAKRAVARTIone), e.g. ntentionality (Savisaya~tva) and unlocatability (but for somaticsensation).Wecannot sensibly ask the question: Does your knowledgemeasure our squarefeet? Is your remorse o the west of your sulk?which could be relevantly asked f knowledge, remorse,or sulk were thingslike a patch of colour, a bang of soundsor a motion of molecules.By thisvery argument we may hope to explode the most plausible-lookingbehaviouristic or Central-state-materialistic heory. However closecorrelationand unfailing agreementn presence nd absence ne may show between areported mental event and a recorded physiological event, one cannotidentify the two or say that the gaiety or pang tself is that particular eventin the endocrine glandsor of the autonomic nervous system. The strongestevidenceof positive and negativeconcommitancebetween wo phenomena(the CBrv5kamaterialists even put forward the evidence hat nutritiousdiet goes o increaseof intelligence and lack of food reducesour mentalpowers!) doesnot establish hat the one is due to the other, or is an inherentquality of the other.For, as Bh5syaon NS 312153 learly brings out, while the gaiety or pangis felt or perceived nternally, the physiological eventsare either inferred orexternally observed n the laboratory (most normally by others, not by thesubject himself). To quote Moore on this point:I have no doubt, myself, that thesebodily processeso occur, when we see; and thatphysiologistseally do know a great deal about them. But all that I shall mean by seeing. . . is the mental occurrence - the act of consciousnesswhich occurs (as is supposed) asa consequence of or accompaniment of these bodily processes.This mental occurrence,which I calI seeing is known to us in a much more simple and direct way, than arethe complicated physiological processeswhich go on in our eyes and nerves and brains

(Some Main Problems, Ch. II)If the central-state dentity theory were correct, I could never know, exceptby subsequently nferring from X-ray plates or from a general aith in theauthority of physiologists that I am having a painful experience or even thatI am angry becausewhat happens nside my C. N. S. s simply not perceptibleby me.All Ryles rhetorical tricks fail to account for the patently occurrent anddirectly perceptible (internally) feelingswe have of a flashing solution of amathematical problem, the suddenrecognition of a face or a name, oaccount for which we must bring in a private stage, for after all, we do not


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PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF SOUL 221observe hese phenomenaeither by sight, touch or hearing of ourselves,orby inferring from complicated physiological reports or pictures on screens.Not all mental statesare explicable (away!) asdispositions to behave(physically) in a certain fashion.Later the Naiysyikas also stressedhe philosophically momentous pointthat only states ike knowledge or wish can be directed towards or aboutan object, whereasno bodily qualities are such.6. To establish he status of the self as a ninth independent substanceonemust show that its job cannot be done by the mars or internal sense-organ.The Naiyayikas (or the Indian philosophers n general) manusmostnaturally demandsmind as ts English equivalent, because hat word doescarry that sensen most non-philosophical contexts. But to the Westernphilosopher in generalno distinction between mind and self or the soulis intelligible. There is no talk of a mind or an internal sense rgan over andabove he self. The necessityof admitting both the entities (Atman andManas) emergesn course of VitsyHyanas argumentsagainst he thesis thatthe manas tself can be the substance which we are ooking for as he ownerof consciousstates.(a) If we ust please,as WesternPhilosophersdo, to call the possessorof desireetc., manas or mincf that is a nomenclatural decision whichhardly needs o be disputed. Thus it is of no philosophical importance toobserve hat in English The self comes n contact with the mind makesan idiomatic howler whereas n Indian philosophy of mind the &ma-manah-samyoga is a necessary ondition of all kinds of cognition. If, of course,wego further to identify the knower of the inner stateswith the instrumentof our introspective cognition, we shall be making an unwarranted exceptionto the generalrule (which we have to admit in the caseof external sensation):

There is a substantival knower besides he instrumental organ(= faculty) - in every caseof perception.If we do not require a man&i (minder) over and abovea manana Kriy&

Karaqa (the instrumental causeof the act of minding) - why should werequire a drastH seer) over and above he da&ma darianakiycikaranaKriydkaraqa (the instrumental causeof the act of seeing, .e. the visualsense)? et it is felt that we need to posit some seer over and above heeyes.As Socratescautions Iheaetetus t is not the eyes hat seebut we orour souls hat see hrough the windows of the eyes. t is this soul which


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222 ARINDAM CHAKRAVARTIsurvives he loss or damage f the sense-facultiese.g. becomingblind ordeaf) and can remember ts oncecollected data which it could not have donehad it been identical with the sense-organtself. (If the senses ere theSelf how can there be memory of snese xperiencesafter the damageof thatsense-organ? I%~czTz&~u)ence he generalrule of distinguishing theinstrument of a sensationor experience rom its owner or subject. Foravoiding confusion we translate manas as inner sense.Going to show the need for positing a substantial perceiverdistinct fromthe perceptual organs internal or external) VSitsylyanamakesa very -Rylean-sort of distinction. The common speech-forms A is X-ing withB implies a distinction between A and B. Sometimes his implications isjust a false inguistic illusion. Vatsyayanasexample for this could havefitted snugly in the first few pagesof the Concept of Mind.The building stands by its pillars.From this sentencewe cannot correctly infer that the building is someseparate ubstance uite other than the pillars which are ust instrumentsfor its action of standing. It is, in Vs words,a statement regarding the whole and its parts, and not regarding one and another thing(N.S.B. 3/1/1)16But sometimes he suggestionof duality is basedon real distinction. Inthe sentence The cutter is lopping the tree with his axe, the cutter andthe axe are surely two different things. With this preface,Vatsyayanaproceeds o enquire whether when we use sentence ike.

I am seeingwith my eyes orHe is introspecting with his inner sense- the Iand the eyes he He and the inner senseare to be interpreted in thebuilding-pillar model or in the cutter-axe model.How he rejects he former model and finds only the latter suitable for ourreports of mental acts s partly indicated above.A further argument for theobject-neutral (Avyavasfhita,) common subject distinct from the object-specific (Vyavasthita) sense-facultiess derived from the uev importantintuitive evidenceof feeling the Sameobject by touch and seeing t by eyes.This is a very significant stitra of Gautamawhere he proves he self asnon-identical with any specific sensibility or withamy aggregate f them:


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PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF SOUL 223Dar$ana Sparianribhyamekdrtha graha@ (3. 1. 1)

Both the unity of the object and the unity of the subject are presupposedand hence proved by a sort of transcendental argument very stronglyresembling that of Kant in his first edition (Critique of Pure Reason) versionof the Transcedental Duduction. Just as there must be an object whichsupports both the visual and the tactual qualities - and is continuant enoughto be reidentified by different sense-reports - (hence the objection to themomentariness or nonexistence of the external object of perception) -similarly we cannot account for such introspective data as that the samemyself who had touched the object am now seeing it - unless there weresome subject, some unity of apperception behind all these senseexperiences.This explains why most contexts where the Nyaya is up against the Buddisttheory of nonexistence or nonpermanence of an external object - are alsocontexts where it attackes simultaneously their no-soulism, i.e. Ks+bhangaulfdaand nainitmya &a are taken care of by the same sort of arguments.

One subject cannot conceivably remember the experience of another butthe fact of synaesthesia shows that a sense-datum appropriate to one senseis often seen to arouse reaction in another, e.g. the very look of an once-tasted food may stimulate some sensation in our palate, causing it to water,say.

Further if the sense of sight in one were a distinct perceiver itself otherthan the sense of touch or the inner sense I could never have had a correctintrospection like the following:

I am touching this coldish paper, perceiving its white colour,and am also thinking these thoughts.This happens because, as FraiastapUda says: There is one on-looker whocan look at different things at the same time through its different windows(Aneka gavdk@ntarvarti prekpkavat ubhayadarii kaScid ekah)7. The question of dik, K&%xor a;kria being the supporting substance ofconsciousness does not arise. They are introduced into the ontology toserve specific purposes, namely, of accounting for our valid cognition ofspatial determination of far, near, right, left, up, down, big, small, etc., oursense of duration and change, and finally ik6a for the explanation of ourauditory sensation which requires some empty space for making room for


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224 ARINDAM CHAKRAVARTIvibrations (if all spacewas filled with matter nothing could move - etc.).It is asunexpected to the Naiyayika that somebodywould come orwardwith the suggestion hat dik or K&r or a%Gaare the owners of mental statesas t was unexpected to Russell hat a triangle will be said to play football.Thus we have equipped ourself with the negativepremise or the residual(PaCesa) argument:

Body, manas,sense-faculties ik, kHla,or 5kkHSare not eligibleto be the holder of desireetc. - which - being Bh&zs(cognitive statesor at any rate mental qualities) cannot beunreceptacled,hence the soul has o be admitted as he ninthsubstancewhich supports, thesequalities [Na hi Bhrfvaman&&iraqz Piziy&nah . . . tato Yadtihiiro bh&ah sa &nG -Uddyotakara]

But to honour Vatsyayanasoriginal intention we may also represent hewhole argument asone Sim&zyatod.mJa inference and typically so, since herelation between the Zinga(mark/reason/hetu) and the Zingi (= to-be-inferredobject;anumeya) is not accessibleo perception [Apratyakge Zinga-Zinginohsambandhe] and the anumeya getsestablished hrough its community withsomeother featire - namely the substance-demandingarasitical nature ofall qualities. Notes, that Vatsyayanawas operating with a notion of anumeyawhich was not quite the samewith the later concept of S&dhya. In hisinference the Serf itself is the thing to be inferred and the logical structure ofthe inference s lessarticulate. The qualities like desireare the Zingaor marksfrom which the marked or Zingi, i.e. the self is inferred - although it is byitself absolutely intrinsically imperceptible [Anumeyasya nitya paroksatvdttadeva s&m&nyato drsfam - Jayanta] - hence the classification of the wholeunbroken inference a SBm%nyatorsta.Jayanta, who showshow we can reformulate any inference to make tlook like Piirvavat, Se.tivat or Slmanyatodrsta - provides us arigorous unitary picture of the inference with a typically Nyaya-scholasticdevice of sandwitching more than one hetus to prove a compound sadhya:

QuaZities like desire etc. [= Paksa]inhere in some substance other than the body etc. [= Sadhya]Because, they are qualities of such a type that there are ZogicaZ bstaclesin taking the body or any other substance as their substratum


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PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF SOUL 225[&zrir@u btidhakapram&wpapattau satyam Kiryatvtit -N. Manjari]

8. Although Gautamaexplicitly mentioned only cognition, conation,aversion,desire,pleasureand pain, asmarks from which we can nfer theself s nature and existence,we can prove it also from many other hetus. TheN@a Manjari, for example, suggests uite a handful of alternative reasonswhy it is incumbant upon us to admit a noncorporeal self. The self can beinferred from the instrumental nature of the sense aculties which need anagent o weild them, from the goal-seeking ehaviour of the human-body,from the selfheating,self developing, unique nature of a living organismwhich points to an interestedperson inhabiting it who - as t were -looks after his own house, or from the analysisof any of the processes fvalid cognition - which consist n bringing together of successivemental acts.How even the undeniable fact that any of us can understand he meaningof words used by another points to the existenceof someone cogniserwhotakesheed of all the soundsand then builds up the meaningsystematicallyout of it yielding at the end a complete cognition of sentence-meaningis beautifully illustrated by Jayanta n an elegantverse:The successivehearing of different phonemes, a successiveunderstanding of the wordmeanings with the help of remembered conventional semantic rules, a recollection ofall those previously apprehended meanings through the mental traces they left at thetime of listening to the last syllable, a synthesising of all the singly understood meaningsaccording to rules of syntactical relevance among them, all these would be impossiblewithout one abiding subject who runs through the whole process and holds it togetherto yield a single understanding of the sentence.*7The latest theories of understanding a languageasa kind of implicit knowledgewhich, however nchoate, is an inner disposition (manifestableby outerbehaviour) of the listener-arestrikingly similar to this account of our graspof meaning,and both point to a knower who abides.

NOTES AND REFERENCES* The Nyaya term for presupposition in this sense s Abhyupagama (c.f. Appendix)But sometimes Uddyotakara thinks, like Russell, that The Self is so and so not onlyposits but asserts (says = Abhidhotte) that the self exists. [See Appendix P-31.


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226 ARINDAM CHAKRAVARTI2 See, Kusumdnjali, 3rd Stavaka and the discussion thereof.3 See, Atmatattva Viveka, 1st chapter, the relevant portion is translated by B. K.Matilal in his section on Udayana in Nyaya Vaisesika (A History of Indian LiteratureSeries) Otto Harrassowitz, 1977, pp. 97-100.4 See Fellowship Lectures (Vol. II) 2nd Edition 1906, by C. K. Tarkalankrfra P-87.s E.g.: My mother was barren.6 E.g.: I am silent or dumb. Interestingly, enough, Hintikka thinks that for DescartesI think is a performatory certainty, because 1 am not thinking, perhaps - wouldbe Svakriya VirodhT - if stated consciously. Compare some ones saying I amabsent - in a roll-call, which is Bernard Williamss iIIustration of self-refuting statement(Descartes, P-74) or Priors illustration of somebody answering a phone-call by sayingIm not here.7 Thus Udayana at the beginning of the 3rd Chapter of the Atmatattvaviveka Astitabadiha darsana-sparsanabhyamekarthaPratisandhilnam tadidam (a) ekaikavisayam(b) Va SyHt Samudaya Visayam VB, (c) tadatirikta Vastu visayam Va . . . .* Gautama does not usually speak of the possibility of a direct perception of the self.Later, of course, Uddyotakara - through Udayana and after him most NaiyPyikasadmitted the possibility of a direct perception of the self. Apart from the case of aYogic-meditation, of course, such perception is not an experience of the pure ego assuch but is more like a logically presupposed component of our reflective after-cognition*when it takes the form of the knowledge that 1 have known a jar. The Naiyayika analysesit, like Russell (cf. Prqblem of philosophy, Chapter 5, on acquitance with the self) asa direct cognition of a complex object my-cognition - of a jar - where, as an elment,the self must also have been an object of cognition. Thus although the general Nyayastrategy is to infer the abiding self as the only explanation of our capacity to reidentifyobjects across the data of different senses from the fact o f Pratisandh%na orrecognition) Uddyotakara speaks also of a separate Ahamiti Vijfitinam which mightbe something like Kants notion of the I think that accompanies all our representations(Critique of Pure Reason. B, 132).9 See, Bernard Williams, Descartes (Pelican, 1978), P-89.lo Strawson, Individuals P-95.r1 See, S. V. Keeling - Descartes (Oxford, 1968), P-105.r2 Ibid., pp. 105-106.r3 Icchadayo Gunah, gun&a dravyasarnstharrah, tad yade@m sthanam sa HtmP ti(N.S.B. l/1/5). r4 The official argument of Descartes admittedly fails the moment I is substitutedby any non-fist-person nominative.r5 Except, that about pleasure and pain the Nyaya view is that they are objects ofconsciousness,not conscious states themselves. Vatsyayanas analysis of Iccha showsthat he thought memory and recognition as essential to it.l6 Here, for the sake of example, we have to provisionally forget the Nyaya notion ofthe very inseparable relation between parts and their whole. Because the standardNyPya theory would take the whole really as a completely new and distinct entity.l7 VarGnarp Sravanam Kramena Samayasmrtya tadarthagrahah. / Tatsamskarajamantyavarna kalanakale tadalocanam / Akanksadi nibandhanarrvaya KItam VF&y&rthaSampindanam / / Jiratraikena Vinatidurghatamato Nityatma siddhir dhruvam.N.M. Pt II (Varanasi 71)


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PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF SOUL 227APPENDIX

UDDYOTAKARA ON THE LOGICAL DIFFICULTIES OFTHE EXISTENCE OF THE SELFTranslations from the introductory commentary on Ny&ya Szitra Bh&yaNo. 3.1.1. *Examination of the objects of knowledge comesnext in the sequence.That(or those) centring which our egoistic llusions l set up this [snare of]Samsara [for the souls], and that (or those) a correct knowledge of whosereal essenceeads o a release rom this Samsara, ill be taken up presentlyfor examination [on the basisof the already examinedmeans of validcognition] becauset comesnext in the [already announced] 3 order oftopics.Among these [aforeenumerated] (twelve) objects of knowledge the self(literally, the designation of I for each of us) is the first.

Hencea critical discussionof the self.But what precisely s to be adjudicatedhere?Whether or not it (the self) is an entity distinct from the body, the sense-faculties 4, the inner-sense , and the faculty of understanding6.- ** No (that cannot be the topic of discussion)because he seat of theproperties is not itself yet established.[In other words, it is yet to be proved that there is a self at all, so onenquiry into what sort of a thing it is can be legitimate at this stage.]- Distinctnessor non-distinctness(from body etc.) is a property of theself. Propertiescan subsistonly if there is a substratum for them to subsistin. Here the substratum tself is unproven (i.e. in question), we cannotlegitimately judge which of a pair of properties belongs o a certain property-bearerwhen the latter entity itself remainsunproven.* Henceshould you not rather prove the (existence of the) property beareritself first?No, (we need not do that), becausen the aphorism above,(starting withthe words Desire, aversionetc. . . . - ) the existence of the self has beenalready proved; discussion of the nature of an object) legimately followsthe proof (of its existence).


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228 ARINDAM CHAKRAVARTIFurther, because here is hardly any controversy regarding he existenceofthe self. (A controversy which can result in a soubt.) No one actually

disagrees bout the exisferice of the self but disagrees nly with this or thatparticular manner of determining its nature, e.g. (as o whether) the selfis simply the body or it is the cognitive faculties like the Understanding,or it is a bundle of all these (physical and mental phenomena)or it is some(substance)other than all these. And that is a controversy regarding hespecific nature of the self which could not be reasonably aisedunless heexistence of the self was aken for granted asestablished.Thus a criticaldiscussionabout the properties (or characteristics)of the self is justified.It is also ustified and is indeed the only sort of discussionabout the selfthat can be carried out) because a proof establishing nonexistence (of theself in particular, or of any object whatsoever) s impossible. There s noproof which establishes hat the self doesnot exist, hence no one (canconceivably) dispute the proposition that the self is existent.* No, but, somephilosophers (Most likely, the Buddhists, for whomwhatever exists is conditioned, or in that sensemust have been causedorborn, i.e. for whom, to be is to have come nto existence) argue hat itdoesnot exist becauset is not born. The full-fledged argument would be:

The self doesnot exist (Contention)Becauset is unborn Wetu)Like the rabbit-horn (Ud5harana example)But in the above he words Self doesnot exist give rise to acontradiction. The expression does not exist is intended to be equi-referential with the expression the self . (i.e. they are purported to be trueof the sameobject) - hence t doesnot (coherently) assert he non-being ofthe self.

l Why is it so?By using the (referring) expression The self we speakof the being (ofthe self) whereasby saying does not exist we go on to deny the same7.A certain object which is denied in a certain locus must be existent in someplace other than that locus; thus when (the predicate) . . . doesnot existis applied to an object to which the term The Jar is also applied, theapplication of the term The Jar in such a context (in an identifying


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PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF SOUL 229manner) doesnot allow us to assert he absolute nonexistence of the jar, butonly permits us to assert hat it is absent rom a certain place or at a certaintime -by the words The Jar doesnot exist.Denial of being in a specific place s illustrated by statements ike: Xis not at home, denial of being in a specific time is illustrated by statementslike X doesnot exist now, or did not exist in the past or will not existin the future. [Notice the use of present-tensen all these cases,n theoriginal; B-& N&i, 0rdhvar.n tisti etc ., This is significant becausewhenyou mention the temporal specification n the existential predicate - thepredicate becomes enselessly rue of the subject, Thus Dummett remarksin Frege (P-387) that if we take as he predicate: etists at a time t ratherthan just exists then we can take this as enselessly rue or false of anitem. Uddyotakara here issuesalmost an ungrammaticalsentence ike: Itdoes not exist in the past, perhapswith the samedefiance asexpressed yRussell:The occumence of tense in verbs is an exceedingly annoying vulgarity due to OUIpreoccupation with practical affairs (Log,ic and Knowledge, P-248).But all thesedenials presuppose r posit 8 the being of the jar (or X), withoutwhich assumption, hey make no sense.Hence he question: Is it with respectto a certain place or with respect o a certain time that the denial is beingmade n the statement The self doesnot exist? If it is meant as a denialwith respect o a specific region of space, hat is not relevant to the self,becauset is intrinsically non-spatial. The existence of the self cannot possiblybe denied by denying its presencen or occupation of a certain region ofspace9. Is it then your intention to deny that the body (which is spatial)is not the self? But, then, who is it that ever avers hat the body is the self lo- so that you are negating t?l If the form of the denial is: The self doesnot exist in the body? Who, pray,would maintain that the self is (necessarily) ocated in the body, whichyou are disputing?

l But where is then the self?The self is no where!l Well, in that case, s not it nonexistent?


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230 ARINDAM CHAKRAVARTINo, not that it doesnot exist at all, it is only in a specific way (namely,spatially) that its existence s being denied.

l What s the cogency of such a position as hat the self neither stays n thebody nor stays elsewhere,and yet it is not nonexistent either?This is how the position is consistent: a thing ought to be described orindicated) in the way that it really is. Since this entity (Self) is not (locatableashere or there) -we have to state t that way. (In the present context)negation with respect o a specific time would also not be ustified, becausethe distinction of the three tensescannot appear n the self.The difference between past present and future finds no expression nthe self becauset is eternal (in the sense f a-temporal). That the self is soeternal wilI be demonstratedsubsequentlyaswe have already found in therecited l1 siitras (concerning the permanence f the soul).Hence ensed denial of existence s not relevant either.While going to deny the self one uses he word The self one must beable to articulate what one is talking about. Wedont find a single term l2which is meaningless 3.Thus, even f you use he term The Self meaningto refer to nothing besides he body, you do not get around the incoherence.For then, the sentence The self doesnot exist means hat the body (andother psychophysical elements)do not exist. [Which is ridiculous]

l What, f we say that the object which you imagine to be the self doesnotreally exist?Wedo not imagine the self. To be imagined s to be the object of acognition which arisesout of a superimposition of certain properties of anobject of a certain kind upon another object which is not of that kind, buthas somegeneralresemblancewith the former object. Wedo not think ofthe soul in that fashion.When,nevertheless, ou say That which you imagine to be the self,you lend yourself to the query: In what way do we imagine the self? Asexistent or asnonexistent?Suppose we are said to imagine the self) asexistent; then what is thecommon property that an actually nonexistent object can sharewith anexistent one - on the basisof which the self becomes he object ofimagination? Going to point out somecommon property of the (putativelynonexistent self and the (existent) not-self - one has to hypostatise the self


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PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF SOUL 231(Atmdabhyupagato bhavati), since an absolutely unreal item (which,according o the Nyaya doesnot bear any property at all) doesnot shareany common property with any existent one.Thus by imagining (hence hypothetically positing) the self to be theputative referent of our ego-usage4 which in fact, refers to the body, andthen negating hat imagined referent we cannot get rid of the incoherencebecausewe thereby posit some eferent of our ego-usage hich is other thanthe body etc. (and, which at any rate is the object of denial)*5 Even the hetuin the above nference, viz.: Because t is unborn is counter-conclusive[proves he contradictory of the desiredconclusion, i.e. proves he absenceof the Sadhya n the pak.u. Here &Gya is As&t5 and paksa s Atman ]becauset only serves o distinguish the self from another classof entities[thus, by assumption,classifying t as another sort of entity.] asbeingborn and being unborn are both properties of entities.* What s it to be born or to be unborn?That which has a causeof coming into being is born. That which has nocausewhich brings it into existence s unborn. Why is it so? Becausehenegativeprefix (nir = un-/non-) serves o deny only the fact of birth (orcausation). n this case he negativeprefix serves nly to signify that theobject so characterised as no birth. In this way, by calling it birthless youdo not deny the selfs existence [but rather presupposets existence] anymore than by calling the bottle water-less ~nudakuh kaman&luh) youdeny the bottles existence.

l What f by saying is not born we mean to deny its being?16In that casealso (the hetu is fallacious) because he hetu and thecontention to be proved coincide with each other.Being unborn, to wit, is a property and a property cannot be legitimatelysupposed o subsiston its own becauset is in the nature of a property toinhere in somesubstanceand the substancewhich supports the property(that which is characterisedas unborn) is the self and thus (instead of provingthe nonexistence) t proves he existence of the self and is hence counter-conclusive as a hetu.* What, f we maintain that the property is there but no property-bearer assuch?


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232 ARINDAM CHAKRAVARTIThat too doesnot help you out of the inconsistency because oconceivableproperty if found to be self*ubsistent (or non-parasitical). What

precisely does t mean to say becauset is unborn?If it is supposed o mean hat the self doesnot have a birth, it (the hetu)is unfounded (i.e. doesnot even reside n the Pak?) because he self doeshave a birth.9 What on earth is the birth of a self?Entering into a specialrelation with a spatio-temporally determinatecombination of a physical body, the sense-faculties nd understanding, heaffective apparatus,and a seriesof unperceivedmerits and demerits (in short- for the self to be born is to be embodied).l Well, then, let unborn mean uncaused.That is not to be controverted; but the hetu againbecomes ounter-conclusive n sofar aswhatever s uncaused s eternal; hence going to provenonexistenceyou have proved an everlastingexistence - thus the hetu iscounter conclusive. ndeed, the hetu and the contention here are at conflicthere as ollows: the contention is to show that the self doesnot exist,whereas he hetu tells us that the self has a necessary elation with existence.Thus the contention and the hetu being respectively nvolved with non-existence and existence, hey are mutually contradictory.By these argumentswe also forestall any reformulation of the ?.elj-disproving nference by taking herus ike: Because t is causeless, Becausethere is no ground for its being born, Becauset is not an effect, Becauseit is not a cuase as equally faulty.l What happens f it (the statement The self doesnot exist) is compared othe (obviously true) statement: The rabbit-horn doesnot exist?

[would you than disallow any denial of existence?]Even this is unfounded as an example.l why?The (compound) term rabbit-horn refers to a relation (doesnot referto any unreal entity!) Hencewe are not here denying the existence ofa particular (named) object but are simply denying a relation (between twoexistent objects)


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PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF SOUL 233l Let us take the relation between the rabbit and the horn itself as heexample (of a significantly denied object)

That too is not a proper example (of an empty subject-term)becausewe can envisage,n somecontext, somesort of relation between a horn anda rabbit.*l That is counter-intuitive. To think that there can be (grow) a horn upona rabbit goesagainstcommon sense.No, it doesnot flout commonsense, ecause he common usage ofdenying rabbit-horns) is only concernedwith denying the cause-effectrelation. Peopleactually maintain that aseffect, or as cause, he rabbit doesnot have horns. Unlike the cow which relates o its horn as an effect to itscause 9, the rabbit is not so related causally with horns. But by denial ofthe relation of causeand effect, between he two we do not assert henonexistence of either (or even not the nonexistence of the causal elationitself) That something s not the effect or causeof someother thing doesnot mean that that something doesnot exist. Just as he jar belonging toDevadatta.

[which, after all, may not be an effect or causeof Devadatta,so that we can make the following statement: Devadatta is notcausedby the jar, or its equivalent: Devadattas causal elationto the jar doesnot exist, or even (quite monstrously): The Jar(caused) Devadattadoesnot exist where the apparentreference o a nonexistent object is just an illusion.]Further, when you state that the rabbit-horn doesnot exist you are opento the question: whether that is an absolute genericnegation or a partialspecific negation?If it is a genericnegation then it is not fully justified because as shownabove)you cannot do that. Whenyou say that the rabbit doesnot haveany horn you cannot possibly mean that it cannot have (somehow ittedto its head, say) even the horn of a cow or someother animal. Not thatyou want to deny the existence of the horns of COWand buffaloes aswell.Hence, t must be a specific denial, i.e. a particular kind of horn is deniedof the rabbit, namely the specific horn of which the rabbit is an effect, andwhich is the causeof a rabbit.That is merely the negation of a specific cause-effect elation. And the


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234 ARINDAMCHAKRAVARTIcauseeffect relation itself is found somewhere lse(between other objects)and is being denied only between his pair of terms, hence the relation toocannot serveas an example of an absolutely nonexistent object. By theabove reasoningeven (the apparent predication of) nonexistence aboutsky-flower etc. is also to be taken asexplained [Here we again skip anepistemologicaldiscussionabout whether the self can be perceivedetc. orotherwise known .]The word Self (or I) must denote an entity other than what isdenoted by words standing for the elements ike visible form etc.Because, eing a single word, it is distinct from words like Visible form[Riipa] etc. Like the word Jar.By such argumentswe can reach an entity which adequately explainsour I cognition (which accompanies nd is presupposed y all ourreidentificatory and selfconscious houghts)l What, f the example (of the word Jar) is itself unfounded?l [Because he word may be held to stand for nothing besidesa collection ofRtipa etc. - the phenomenalist account of the jar doesnot consider tsomethingbeyond its visible form etc.]To this we hve already replied that the possessor f qualities (like shape,size, colour) is distinct from the qualities themsleves.l What, f the hetu is chargedof inconclusiveness, y the counterexampleof the word Darkness [which though a single word other than the wordsRiipa etc. - does ot stand for any distinct positive entity) - is notall distinct words - have to denote - distinct objects!!]l Suppose, hat is, the word I or Self doesnot stand for any distinctentity any more than the word darkness which doesnot denote anythingother than visible form etc.No that is contraband. To say that the word darkness is withoutreferent is to oppose [Your?] establisheddoctrine. Because arkness s saidto be of a collective nature. (i.e. a combination of severalelements??).Wedo not suppose hat the word darkness is vacuous.l But since you cannot categorisedarknessunder any of the three relevant


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PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF SOUL 235categories of objective entities, viz., substance, quality or action - wouldnot it go against the texts to admit the word darkness as denotingsomething (which is, then, something other than those three types ofentities)?

No, it is only because you have misunderstood the purport of the textthat you think so. The word darkness act&y can denote either asubstance or a quality or an action - when these are divorced from anyassociation with light. [That is, anything is called darkness when it isunlit] Hence, no conflict with the text of the Sutras.* There are still others other would arrange the inference as follows:

The living body (= Paksa) is soulless (Sadhya) Because t isreal (hetu).

[The tacit generalisation being that all that is real is devoid of any soul]But that wont do, because one cam-rot coherently give any of the

alternative interpretations [to the above hetu and sadhya] .What is the Purport of the phrase Soulless (Niratmakam)?Can it mean something like: not of any use to the self?

*** There is no example available of this. There is no single object whichis not of any use to the soul or is it meant to negate the soul (in the sensethat) the body does not become the soul?

Who wants to hold that it does?In the phrase Ninitmakam (literally = non-Selfed) the negative prefix

NY must apply to the term following it. You must be able to say whatit is that has a soul (is - self-ed) because we do not find nir being usedwhere the term which follows does not exist (as a meaningful term) [Thusnon-abracadabra does not make sense] . Just as Non-mosquito-infested(which presupposes by implication places which are mosquito-infested).

Is it simply the denial of the self in the body? That is proving the obvious,because who is here to contend that the body is essentially the vehicle ofthe soul?

Even if you reformulate your contention as:The body does not enter into any relation with a self. Therewould be again the old problem about lack of a suitablecorroborative example.


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236 ARINDAM CHAKRAVARTIAll these are specific negations of this or that location or relation of theself) but every specific negation (as shown above)hypostatise the generic

entity (E.g. The self is not perceived proves hat there is somethingwhichis not perceived.Obviously Uddyotakara here ignores he interpretationof the negation as an external one - It is not the case hat the self isperceived - from which no existential generalisation ollows] . And thisbeing so that is meant to be denied gets conceded.l What f we try this line? The word Self refers o somenon-permanententity, becauset is amdeout of phonemes?To begin with, that hetu is made nconclusive by the counterexampleofwords standing for eternal objects, ike ,&&z which are also words madeof phonemes.Since he word Self is also used or the body (e.g. I hurtmyself at the back or He wished himserf to be less at) that way theargument proves he obvious (for the body is admittedly nonpermanent).If we qualify the contention as ollows:

The word Self when it is used or something other thanthe body refers o something non permanent. - Westill haveourselvescommitted to the existence (may be - not thepermanence)of something other than the body to which theword Self refers. This contradicts the initial intention toprove that the self doesnot exist at all.In this way- in whatever manner we may try to evaluate he position that theself doesnot exist we find that it doesnot stand to reason.St. Annes CollegeOxford, England

NOTES AND REFERENCES TO THE APPENDIX

* A note on the style of Uddyotakara: He often seems to repeat himself-whereas whathe does is to follow the traditional (pedagogical?) practice of a commentator, namely:Svu-pdu vaya~am; elucidating ones own cryptic statements.** Passagesmarked with a dot ( l) in the beginning represent the position of ahypothetical opponent.* ** [This step seems obscure to me]


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PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF SOUL 2371 Here the text uses only the word Aharpktia. We have taken a little freedom toconvey the sense of mithya-jfitiam which is described in the Nyaya Sutras as theproximate cause of our bondage, to be counter-acted by Tattva Jfidnam mentionedimmediately after this in this line.* Etymologically signifying the transitory or changefiZ this word has very widerange of application with varying and subtle nuances. It can be used to mean the worldin general, the creation (=Sarps$i) the worldly life, family-life (when a !&p&i iscontrasted to a Yati or monk) or the state of bondage (the verb SamLrat~ iscontrasted to mucyate). The word breathes a general tone of profound regret at theinvolvement, suffering etc. of repeated births and deaths as if -of a malady which wemust be cured of (as in janana - msranadi Samsk%nala Sarptaptah - Ved%nta Sara),a net in which we are caught by our beglnningless Karma and Avidy&3 Vide: N. Sutra 1. 1. 1.4 Indriya: Usually translated as Sense-Organ might be confused with the physicalorgan itself e.g. the nose with the olfactory sense. Hence the present translation.5 Manas: the instrument of introspective perception.6 Buddhi: the ascertaining faculty or judging power.7 Compare David Pears (Is Existence a Predicate? in Philosophical Logic Ed byStrawson: P-98) :Now suppose that I say instead This room does not exist, then this statement wouldbe a referential contradiction since . . it implies, simply by its reference, that the roomexists and then . . . it goes on to deny its existence with the verb does not exist, andthis is a contradiction.8 The exact word used here is Abhyupagata which is a very common term inphilosophical debates. It means conceded. Hence Abhyupagamav~da = argumentationgranting (without accepting) something to be the case. Corresponding English speechforms would be - Even if we, for the sake of argument, admit that. . . . But in thepresent context Abhyupagama means assumption or presupposition.9 Althought the NaiyPyika assigns ubiquity or All pervasive - quantity (Bibhuparim@za) to the Self, as the subsequent argument clearly brings out, the Nyaya self isnot a Spatial entity. Just as it is timeless, and in that senseomnitemporal, it is spaceless- and in that sense Vibhu, everywhere present.lo Obviously, Physicalism is not being taken seriously into consideration, howeverplausible it might appear to the Western thinkers.i1 It is said that the academic procedure was to recite the entire body of Sutras first andthen go on commenting upon them The permanence and immortality of the soul isintroduced by the sutras 3.1.19-25.l2 Considering later development of the Nyaya semantics, Single - here meansSimple or unanalysable.l3 Meaning = reference, denotation. This has a basic link with the subsequent Nyayacliche: All that exists is nameable and knowable.l4 Though in ordinary Sanskrit parlance, it has come to mean egotism or even pride,the original meaning of Ahamhxfra is our use of the 1st person pronoun and its cognates(and corresponding ego-centric thoughts). Hence Ahamk%ra, Mamaktia = I -usage andMine -usage. Thus Tvarpkara means calling some one as you and Humktia meansan angry adress with Hum. In the present context the translation egoism wouldnot be appropriate - hence the literal import is emphasised.


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238 ARINDAM CHAKRAVARTIl5 Here a passagedealing with Buddhist Scriptures has been skipped.16 The argument then becomes a petitio prim%: The self does not exist because it hasno being.1 The statement now would be:llre relation between rabbit-and-horn does not exist - the whole of the underlinedexpression being claimed to be an empty singular term.18 We can actually take a pair of horns from the carcassof another animal and placeit on a rabbit so that it is related to the horns by the relation of contact or conjunction.l9 This alludes to the very queer (but tightly reasoned) ontological belief of theNaiyayikas- and Vai@kas that a whole is caused by its parts, in which it also inheres.So, the cow which inheres in its limbs would be an effect of its genuine parts.

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Nyaay Proofs for Soul - A Chakravarti