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Nuclear Weapons and the Future of National Security

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The Role of Nuclear Weapons

We depend on nuclear weapons every day. The United States’ nuclear weapons have a unique ability to deter conflict, as well as to protect Americans and assure allies under the nuclear umbrella.

Facing page: The B-52 Stratofortress is a long-range, heavy bomber that can carry nuclear or precision guided conventional weapons and ammunition at altitudes up to 50,000 feet. It has been a mainstay of the United States’ nuclear program since the 1950s.

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“The nuclear deterrent is the only weapons system I know of that has worked perfectly without fail, exactly as intended, for [its] entire life span. And because [it has] been so successful, then there may be some who have forgotten why we need [it].”

—General Larry Welch, USAF (ret.)

“We have to be careful when we start talking about one-for-one substitutions of conventional weapons for nuclear weapons,” because “the nuclear weapon has a deterrent factor that far exceeds a conventional threat.”

—General Kevin Chilton, USAF (ret.)

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The State of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons ComplexThe U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure is aging. Some of the facilities on which the United States relies date back to the 1940s Manhattan Project. Decades of underfunding have caused a situation in which our nuclear weapons may become unreliable in the future.

Many of America’s nuclear scientists and engineers with testing experi-ence are quickly approaching retirement. The United States will soon have to rely on the scientific judgment of people who have never participated in nuclear weapons design or engineering.

Facing page, top left: Thin man bomb casings, developed in the 1940s as part of the Manhattan Project.

Top right: Missile maintenance crewmen perform an electrical check on an LGM-30F Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile.

Middle left: American physicist and Nobel Laureate Arthur Holly Compton on the cover of TIME Magazine on January 13, 1936.

Center: General Leslie Groves (left) and J. Robert Oppenheimer working on the Manhattan Project.

Bottom: U.S. ballistic missile submarine USS Tennessee (SSBN 734) departs Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, Ga.

“[The Stockpile Stewardship Program] failed to provide the necessary surveil-lance of the aging warheads, was prevented by Congress from pursuing the Reliable Replacement Warhead, the Nuclear Penetrating Warhead or any ‘new’ designs. Those actions denied the laboratories the opportunity to develop and demonstrate nuclear weapons competence from design through to production and flight tests.”

—John Foster, former director of Defense Research and Engineering at the U.S. Department of Defense, and former director of

the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

“To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.”

—Robert Gates, former Secretary of Defense

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The Need for Nuclear Modernization The United States is the only nuclear weapons power without an active, substantive nuclear weapons modernization program. If the U.S. fails to modernize our weapons array, we are disarming by attrition. President Obama committed to modernization of U.S. nuclear forces during the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) debate, but the Administration’s promises were short-lived. Between fiscal years 2012 and 2016, the Administration will have underfunded our nuclear weapons infra-structure by $1.4 billion, and that doesn’t account for effects of sequestra-tion. It also chose to delay critical weapons life extension programs and a critical Chemical and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility, which leaves the country without a pit-production capability in the near future.

Facing page, top: Hull Technician 3rd Class Stewart Simpson at work in the Machinery Repair Shop aboard the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68).

Bottom: Sailors aboard the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Alabama (SSBN-731). Since her commissioning in 1985, the USS Alabama has participated in more than 50 deterrent patrols.

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“I recognize that nuclear modernization requires investment for the long term, in addition to this one year increase. That is my commitment to the Congress—that my administration will pursue these programs and capabilities as long as I am President.”

—Letter from President Barack Obama to Senators Inouye, Feinstein, Cochran, and Alexander

“To support our stockpile and to continue producing the world class capabilities, we need to modernize our Cold War era facilities and maintain the Nation’s expertise in uranium processing and plutonium research.”

—Thomas D’Agostino, former National Nuclear Security Administrator

“It is critical to accept the linkage between modernizing our current stockpile in order to achieve the policy objective of decreasing the number of weapons we have in our stockpile while still ensuring that the deterrent is safe, secure, and effective.”

—Thomas D’Agostino, former National Nuclear Security Administrator

“Currently, the United States is the only declared nuclear power that is neither modernizing its nuclear arsenal nor has the capability to produce a new nuclear warhead. The United Kingdom and France have programs to maintain their deterrent capabilities. China and Russia have embarked on an ambitious path to design and field new weapons.”

—Robert Gates, former Secretary of Defense

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Maintaining the TriadThe triad of strategic delivery systems—long-range bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-based missiles—provide the best combination of attributes for today’s uncertain and rapidly changing world. Submarines are highly survivable, ICBMs are responsive and inexpensive, and bombers have great signaling value for policymakers in a national security crisis. These unique attributes have granted the triad widespread support that should be sustained in the future.

Facing page:

Top left: A Minuteman III land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) takes off at Vandenberg Air Force Base. The Minuteman III is currently the only land-based ICBM in service in the United States.

Top right: A B-2 Spirit bomber, or Stealth bomber, flies across an open stretch of sky. The B-2 Spirit is a multi-role bomber capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear munitions.

Bottom: The USS Memphis, a nuclear-powered attack submarine, heads out to sea following a brief port visit at Souda Bay, Crete, Greece.

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“The triad of strategic delivery systems continues to have value. Each leg of the nuclear triad provides unique contributions to stability. As the overall force shrinks, their unique values become more prominent.”

—Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States

“Each leg of the triad has advantages that warrant retaining all three legs at this stage of reductions. Strategic nuclear submarines (SSBNs) and the SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] they carry represent the most survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear triad…. Single-warhead ICBMs contribute to stability and, like SLBMs, are not vulnerable to air defenses. Unlike ICBMs and SLBMs, bomb-ers can be visibly deployed forward, as a signal in crisis to strengthen deterrence of potential adversaries and assurance of allies and partners.”

—2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report

“I intend to (a) modernize or replace the triad of strategic nuclear delivery sys-tems: a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise missile, and ICBM, and a nucle-ar-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and SLBM; and (b) maintain the rocket motor industrial base.”

—President Barack Obama

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Nuclear Weapons in the National Security StrategyThe U.S. declaratory policy must be simple and forceful so that our adversaries have as little room to miscalculate as possible. It should be credible and consistent with U.S. values, especially this country’s appreciation for life. Our goal should be to deploy nuclear weapons when their unique capabilities will substantially improve the likelihood of successfully defending the U.S. and its allies against strategic attack.

The Obama Administration’s policy, laid out in the Nuclear Posture Review Report, creates confusing categories of decision making. This could delay U.S. reactions in times of crisis.

Facing page: The UGM-133A TRIDENT II/D5 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile is the sixth generation of the U.S. Navy’s Fleet Ballistic Missile program, which started in 1955. As the Navy continues to address future deter-rence requirements against weapons of mass destruction, the TRIDENT II/D5 will ensure that the United States has a modern, survivable strategic deterrent.

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“As President, I changed our nuclear posture to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. I made it clear that the United States will not develop nuclear warheads. And we will not pursue new military missions for nuclear weapons. We’ve narrowed the range of contingencies under which we would ever use or threaten nuclear weapons.”

—President Barack Obama

“Beyond responsibly reducing the number of nuclear weapons, this Administration has been committed to reducing their role in our national secu-rity strategy as well. We are not developing new nuclear weapons; we are not pursuing new nuclear missions; we are working toward creating the conditions to make deterring nuclear use the sole purpose of our nuclear weapons; and we have clearly stated that it is in our interest and the interest of all other states that the more than 65-year record of nuclear non-use be extended forever.”

—Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance

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Role of Nuclear Weapons Around the World Nuclear deterrence depends on a foe’s belief that its enemy is willing and able to employ nuclear weapons. Leaders around the world understand this and are making nuclear weapons the centerpiece of their foreign policies.

Russia has increased its reliance on nuclear weapons in its most recent national security strategy. China’s nuclear weapons strategy remains opaque and extensive nuclear modernization programs are underway.

NATO “Any possible reduction in America’s nuclear capabilities” in Europe would be contrary to “Europe’s security and NATO’s cohesion.”

—The former defense ministers of NATO members Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania

China “The lack of transparency surrounding China’s nuclear programs—their pace and scope, as well as the strategy and doctrine that guide them—raises questions about China’s future strategic intentions.”

—James Miller, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

“It is not possible to accurately determine the precise level or conditions at which the PRC leadership might elect to attempt to match the U.S. nuclear inventory.”

—General Robert Kehler, USAF

Russia “If you read recent Russian military doctrine … they are actually increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons, the role of nuclear weapons in their strategy.”

—Michèle Flournoy, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

“As regard to [the] use of nuclear weapons in case of aggression, of course [Russia will use them in this case]. What else were they built for?”

—Sergei Ivanov, former Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation

“We have corrected the conditions for use of nuclear weapons to resist aggres-sion with conventional forces not only in large-scale wars, but also in regional or even a local one. … There is also a multiple-options provision for use of nuclear weapons depending on the situation and intentions of the potential enemy. In a situation critical for national security, we don’t exclude a preventive nuclear strike at the aggressor.”

—Nikolay Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council of Russia

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“‘Poland is making itself a target. This is 100 percent certain. … Such targets are destroyed as a first priority.”

—General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, Russia’s Deputy Chief of General Staff

“From a technical viewpoint, there are no restrictions on the possibility of the use of missiles by Russia’s Strategic Missile Force (RVSN). It does not take a long time to select a target and enter it in the flight duty of an intercontinental ballistic missile.” —Col. General Sergei Karakayev, Commander of Russia’s Strategic Missile Troops

“A decision to use destructive force preemptively will be taken if the situation worsens [referring to U.S. missile defense deployments to Europe].”

—Nikolai Makarov, Russia’s Chief of General Staff

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ARMS CONTROL

The Heritage Foundation

Nuclear powers emerge as U.S. stockpile shrinks

Sources: National Resources Defense Council, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Center for Defense Information, U.S. Department of Energy.

America’s stockpile of nuclear weapons is 78 percent smaller now than in 1987, as new treaties took e�ect. Since then, Pakistan and North Korea have become nuclear powers, and Iran has aggressively sought to develop nuclear weapons.

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1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

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U.S. Nuclear Arms Total Stockpile

Newly added nation

Nuclear States North Korea

* Never formally ratified ** Entered into force in 1994 *** Never entered into forceNote: Israel’s status as a nuclear state is undeclared, but believed to have begun in 1968.

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1979SALT II*

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1963Limited Test Ban Treaty

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Should the United States Reduce?The U.S. has yet to see the effects of the reductions required by the New START Treaty, nor have our critical nuclear systems received the funding for the required modernization. Yet, the Administration is intent on another round of reductions.

Facing page: The F-35A Lightning II, seen here during aerial refueling, carries the B61 nuclear bombs that remain a part of the United States’ Enduring Stockpile.

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“I do not agree that it is more than is needed. I think the arsenal that we have is exactly what is needed today to provide the deterrent. And I say this in light of—when we talk about the non-deployed portion of the arsenal, it is sized to be able to allow us to hedge against both technical failures in the current deployed arsenal and any geopolitical concerns that might … cause us to need more weapons deployed.”

—General Kevin Chilton, USAF (ret.)

“The first obstacle is in our heads—or at least the heads of some people. It is this vision that somehow, if we dismantle our strategic nuclear deterrent, other nations would follow our lead and the world would then be a safer place…. The only basis for the idea that drastically reducing the number of nukes we have would magically make us safer and help eliminate other nuclear dangers is hope. But hope is not a plan, and hope is not a basis for security. … Leading the world to zero nuclear weapons is, at best, a fairy tale.”

—General Larry Welch, USAF (ret.)

“Nuclear weapons will be with us for a long time. After this treaty, our focus must be on stopping dangerous proliferators—not on further reductions in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals, which are really no threat to each other or to international stability.”

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Today, America faces the risk of creating a gap between our nuclear capabilities and the future demands of an uncertain strategic environment. Because we simply don’t know what the future holds, we must revitalize the U.S. nuclear-weapons complex—both for ourselves and for our allies around the globe.

To learn more about sound nuclear weapons policies, visit heritage.org.

214 Massachusetts Avenue, NEWashington, DC 20002

(202) 546-4400heritage.org