Chapter II

NUCLEAR THREATS TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AND SOUTH PACIFIC

Having discussed the concepts of nuclear weapon free zone and the

zone of peace in general and in the context of Southeast Asia and

South Pacific in the previous chapter, it is now appropriate to discuss

the conditions that led to the declaration of ZOPFAN in Southeast

Asia and NWFZ in South Pacific. 1

Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia unlike South Pacific never faced any direct

nuclear activity like nuclear testing and dumping of nuclear wastes.

But because some of the most important and busy sea routes of the

world are present in the region, like Malacca, Ombdi, Sundo,

Combock etc., the transit of nuclear powered ships and submarines

cannot be ruled out and that way there had always been the

presence of nuclear weapons in the region.2

2

See Chapter 1, pp.5-7.

Muthiah Alagappa, "Nuclear Weapon- Free Zone in Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects", Austrlaian Outlook, vol.41.

42

Besides this, due to the massive involvement of the Super

Powers, Southeast Asia's vulnerability a nuclear attack can be

understood. On several occasions the situation came on the verge of

involving nuclear-weapons, such as during the US-Vietnam war.3

During the clash between erstwhile Soviet Union and China over

Usuri river in 1969, there was fear of a full scale war and a

possibility of nuclear strike by Soviet Union which could have been

extended to the Southeast Asia as well. 4

The existence of m111tary bases of nuclear powers in the region

also made it sensitive danger from nuclear-weapons United States

maintained two milltary bases in Ph111ppines. Subic Bay and Clark

air base, Soviet Union had two bases in Vietnam, Kamram Rahn Bay

and Danang air base._5 The two Super Powers always followed a

4

5

no. I. Dec. 1987, p.l74.

For details of US-Vietnam war see Allen Goodman. "Is it too late to End Vietnam War?" Southeast Asia. An International Quarterly, vol.l, no.4, Fall 1971. pp.364-377.

Claude and Buss, "RP-US Relations : For Old Times", Solidaritv, no. 12, January-March 1989, p.33.

See Paul Dibb, "The Interests of Ssoviet Union in Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific : Implications for Regional Security". Paper presented at Conference on International Security in Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific Region.

43

policy of non-disclosure about the presence of nuclear weapons at

these bases.

The possibility of nuclear presence at the US bases in

Philippines always bothered the Filipinos as they were opposed to

nuclear weapons on their soil or in ships or planes in transit. They

hated the US policy of 'no confirm. no deny'. There were several

demonstrations against it. 6

Thus. due to the presence of three nuclear powers i.e. the

United States. erstwhile Soviet Union and China. which is also a

nuclear power, Southeast Asia was always exposed to nuclear

threats. The involvement of the three nuclear powers was so great

that the region became an arena for the conflict and competition of

great powers. The ideological competition between the two power

blocs was reflected in the area and since World War II it was exposed

to various conflicts. The security concerns of the countries of

6

12-15 July r982. SDSC. Australian National University. Canberra.

Robert C. Hom. "The Soviet Perspective", SoutheastAsia under New Balance of Power. (New York: Praeger Publishers. 1975). p.33.

44

Southeast Asia had always been the penetrations of external powers

in the regional conflicts. 7

Looking at these situations it can be understood as to why a

need for a much more broad concept like ZOPFAN was felt in

Southeast Asia with SEANWFZ as only one of its components.

Now. one has to see the international and regional

developments during that period and why this particular time. i.e.

1971 was chosen by the ASEAN countries to declare the idea of

neutrality. The declaration was prompted by certain major

developments on international scene.

First. the British decision of 1968 to withdraw from east of

Suez by 1971. Secondly. in 1969 came the Guam declaration by

President Nixon of America. that the US would withdraw from

Indo-China and that the regional allies would have to take care of

their security by themselves with the help of the United States.

Thirdly. the increase of the so-called 'Communist threat' to the states

7 Hasnan Habib. "ASEAN in the Search of Peace and Stability in Southeast Asia". UN Regional Workshop for Asia Pacific (New York: United Nations. 1991 ). p.229.

45

of the region. 8

British Withdrawal from East of Suez

The British military presence in Singapore and mainland

Malaysia was mainly guided by the protection oftrading routes to its

dominions in the area and their internal security.9 In September

1954, Britain became a member of Southeast Asia Treaty

Organization (SEAT0) 10 in order to expan~ its role in the security

arrangements of the area. In 1957. it signed Anglo-Malayan Defence

Agreement with the independent Malaysian government which was

again expanded in 1963. 11

But from 1966. the situations changed. A strong economic

constraint was felt. In 1968. with the devaluation of Sterling, there

10

II

G.V.C. Naidu. "Neutralization of Southeast Asia: Zone of Peace. Freedom and Neutrality". Strategic Analysis, vol. 10. no. 3, June 1980. p.358.

Michael Leifer. ed .. Constraints and Adjustments in British Foreii!n Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd .. 1972). pp.86-87.

SEATO was signed in 1954 in Manila, by the US, UK. Australia, New Zealand. Pakistan, Singapore and Malaysia.

Leifer. n.IO, p.87.

46

came a reversal of policies. In July 1967, the Wilson Administration

announced its decision to withdraw all military forces and facilities

from Singapore/Malaysia by mid 1970s. At first, the announcement

was received with good grace since there was sufficient time to make

alternative arrangements and also there was a provision for

compensation. 12

But the announcement was revised after a few months and it

was stated that the withdrawal was to be completed by 1971.

Although Britain tried to give assurance of its continued participation

in the security of the area in the form of Five Power Defence

Agreement. 1:3 but Malaysia and Singapore expressed grave concern

over the announcement. They 'stressed the importance which they

attached to the defence agreements with Britain'. 14

In terms of the consequences of the British withdrawal there

were two major concerns - economic and strategic. In economic

12

14

Leifer, n.l 0. p.89.

It was to include Britain. Australia, New Zealand. Singapore and Malaysia.

The Times, 9 January 1968. p.l.

47

terms, the consequences were to be dire. 15 In the terms of strategic

environment of the area there arose a fear of creation of a vacuum.

This became a matter of grave concern for the ASEAN countries as

the situation could have increased the great power rivalry in the

region. 16 Subsequently. the proposal for neutralization was put

forward by Malaysia in 1970.

The interest of the United States in Southeast Asia is said to

have been based on three pillars: stability. trade and access. both

before and after World War II. 17 To achieve these objectives. US

attached great importance to its relations with ASEAN countries. The

commitment ofthese nations towards free market system has always

been a concern of United States. As a result. ASEAN countries

always had a massive trade with the US. 18

15

16

17

18

ibid .. 10 January 1968. p.23.

ibid .. 9 January 1968. p.l.

Charles H. Stevenson. "US Foreign Policky in Southeast Asia: Implications for Current Regional Issues", Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol.14. no.2. September 1992. p.87.

See A.Z. Hilali, "US Interests and Policies in Southeast Asia". Pakistan Horizon, vol.44, no.3. July 1991. pp.67 -96.

48

The US bases in the Philippines were another major concern

for the United States. These bases were viewed as a keystone of the

US defence structure for the Asia Pacific region. The US bases in

Philippines provided a platform from where US forces could operate

in the event of emergency in the East Asia, the Indian Ocean and

Southwest Asia. 19

It is generally accepted now that the US became heavily

involved in the affairs of Southeast Asia in general, and Indochina in

particular. in the aftermath of Geneva Conference of 1954.20

However. the defeat of US forces in Vietnam and anti-government

protests which were joined by students, profess-ors. political

commentators and some prominent senators, along with common

men, made the government realize that the Vietnam war had cost

them heavily. 21 After the elections of 1968, Richard Nixon became

the President of America with a pledge that he would terminate the

20

21

Muthiah Alagappa, US ASEAN Security: Unit and Possibilities (Malaysia: ISIS. 1986). pp.ll-12.

A.C.Kevein, "Major Power Influence on the Southeast Asian Region. An Australian View' Working Paper No.l83. IDSC. Australian National University. Canberra 1983. p.ll.

Waris Shere, ed., In Search of Peace, (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1988), p.l75.

49

war in Vietnam. He laid down an outline of a new foreign policy for

America in a press conference held in Guam in July 1969. It came

to be known as the Guam Declaration.22

The blueprint of Nixon's policy was presented as "US Foreign

Policy for the 1970s : A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon" in

February 1979. It is also called the Nixon Doctrine. In this,

President Nixon also laid bare a new policy for Southeast Asia while

stating: "Abrupt shifts in our policies - no matter how sound in

concept are unsettling". and that "precipitate shrinking of the

American role would not bring peace". He also assured the ASEAN

leaders. that "US will keep all its treaty commitments". 2:1 The nu

clear issue also came up in the Nixon Doctrine. It said: "US will

provide shield if a nation allied with it, or if a nation whose survival

the United States considers vital to its security and the security of

the region as a whole. "24

22

24

For details, see Guam Declaration, published in Southeast Asia under New Balance of Power (New York: Praeger Publishers. 1974). pp. 122-9.

Taken from the Text of the Nixon Doctrine. published in Southeast Asia undaer New Balance of Power (New York: Praeger Publishers. 1974).

ibid.

50

The Nixon Doctrine represented a change in the US strategy in

Southeast Asia. This created a panic among ASEAN members.

Moreover. the growing tilt of the US towards China was another

reason of concern for the countries of Southeast Asia. The

announcement in July J 971, by President Nixon after the secret visit

by Henry Kissinger to Peking, about his forthcoming visit to China.

caught the ASEAN countries unaware and unprepared. Thus a need

for a new approach towards regional security was felt. 25

The Communist Threat

The Communist threat has always remained one of the most

important factors in the policies of US and its ASEAN allies. The

American policies in Southeast Asia was always shaped in reference

to its interests vis-a-vis Soviet Union and China.26 The Indochina

conflict increased the Communist intervention in the area and soon

took a form of bipolar conflict.

25

26

K.P.Saksena. Cooperation in Development: Problems and Prospects for India and ASEAN, (New Delhi: Sage Publications). p.31.

Sheldon W. Simon, "United States Security Policy and ASEAN". Current History, vol.89, March 1990, p.98. '

51

The growing Communist influence in Indochina resulted in the

formation of Communist Party of Indochina under Ho Chi Minh in

1930. From mid-sixties onwards North Vietnamese troops started

using the eastern province of Kampuchea against the United

States.27 However. in 1970 Prince Sihanouk, who was ruling

Kampuchea. was overthrown by an American instigated coup. By

extending the Vietnam war to Kamp.uchea, the American

strengthened the Communist forces of the area.28 Prince

Sihanouk. after the coup. commented that "the Socialist camp

considers recent events are a direct threat to that balance of forces

between the United States and itself. "29

Southeast Asia did not contain an interest considered vital for

Moscow until mid 1960s. Eurocentricism, lack of substantial ties

and narrow and rigid policies followed by Stalin led to a low Soviet

involvement in the region. In fact, the influence ofChina. the United

27

28

29

Michael Leifer, "Peace and War in Cambodia", Southeast Asia. an International Quarterly. vol.l. nos. 1-2, winter-spring 1971. pp.59-60.

G.V.C. Naidu, "The Kampuchean Problem: Prospect and Prospect", Strategic Analysis, January 1987, p. 1232.

The Times, 19 March 1970.

52

States and Japan. was of more concern for Soviet Union rather than

the region itself. 30

After the World War II, however, diplomatic relations were

established with Thailand in 1946. with Burma in 1948 and with

Indonesia in 1950. It also recognized the Democratic Republic of

Vietnam in 1950.

Several developments in late 1960 led Soviet Union to forge

closer ties with Asian countries like British withdrawal from East of

Suez. American withdrawal from mainland southeast Asia and the

intensifying Sino-Soviet conflict. After the death of Stalin, when

Nikita Khrushchev came to power, the Soviet foreign policy

underwent quite a radical change. the basts of which was to forge

closer ties with the third world countries, especially with those who

were critical of the United States and its allies.31

30 Robert C. Horn, "The Soviet Perspective", Southeast Asia Under New Balance of Power (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974). p.30.

Muthia Alagappa. "Major Powers and Southeast Asia". International Journal. vol.44. no.3, September 1989. pp.553-4.

53

Since 1969 Soviet Union has become increasingly active in the

region. The increased inability of Soviet navy and merchant fleet,

particularly with the granting by Singapore in 1970 of berthing

facilities for Soviet use, was at least in part intended to present a

strategic psychological and economic counterweight to US.e~2

The Asian Collective Proposal. put forward by Leonid Brezhnev

in 1969 was also a part of the same strategy. The idea was put

forward in his address to the World Conference of Communist and

Workers Party held at Moscow. He said:· "Despite the pressing

problem of the present international situation. we do not push into

the background more long range tasks. especially the creation of a

system of collective security in those parts of the world where the

threat of the unleashing of the new world is centered. "33

However. Soviet diplomatic overtures in the region did not

achieve the desired outcome. The ASEAN countries remained

suspicious towards Soviet initiatives. But the Soviet endorsement of

32 Horn. n.32, p.4 7.

Chairman Brezhnev Reference to Collective Security. reported in Pravda, 8 June 1969.

54

ZOPFAN proposal did facilitate its relations with ASEAN countries.34

Along with the support of ASEAN initiatives and trying to

increase its influence with them Soviet Union by late 1970s had

started giving uncritical support to Vietnam in its quarrels with

Khmer Rouge. The increasing operations of its Pacific fleet and

military presence in Cam Rahn and Denang in Vietnam also shows

Soviet Union's growing involvement in the region.

ASEAN countries on the other hand more than other were

concerned with the negative Super Power rivalry. In their effort to

keep away the external powers. they felt the relevance of ZOPFAN

and NWFZ.35

The South Pacific

Even since the beginning ofnuclear age in 1945, the countries

of South Pacific have faced direct nuclear threat due to the nuclear

34

35

For details see. A.G. Noorani, Brezhnev Plan for Asian Securitv: Russia in Asia (Bombay, 1975).

Muthiah Alagappa. "Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict". Australian Journal of International Affairs. vol.47. no.2, October 1993. p.l95.

55

tests conducted by nuclear weapon states like Britain and France.

Apart from their testing .. nuclear installations and transport of

nuclear armed ships have also made South Pacific one of the most

nuclearized regions of the world.

There is an atmosphere of relative peace in the area as the

stakes of external powers are not very high. Moreover, there is

almost no conflict among the regional states except for a few cases

like New Caledonia and border dispute between PNG and

Indonesia. 3G The internal conflict situation of the region is relatively

peaceful but in recent past there has been some upheavals.

The first among these problems is the problem of New

Caledonia. The indigenous Kanaks are demanding freedom from

their French colonial masters who have refused to oblige. The South

Pacific countries support the demands ofKanaks. However. in 1988,

Matigem Treaty was signed which was welcomed in So~th Pacific.37

36

:l7

Ramesh Thakur, "A Nuclear Free Zone Pacific : A New Zealand Perspective", Pacific Affairs, vol. 58, no. 2, summer 1985.

For details see Gino J. Naldi, "Self-determination in the South Pacific : The Case of New Caledonia". World Today, vol. 41. nos. 8-9. August-September 1985.

56

The second great source of anxiety is the border problem

between PNG and Australia on the one hand. and Indonesia on the

other. PNG and Indonesia share a common border through Irian

Jaya where the people are ethnically Malenasian. They have not

reconciled with the fact that they are a part of Indonesia. The Free

Papua Movement (COM) has many sympathizers among South Pacific

nations. But PNG is careful enough not to antagonize its powerful

neighbour. 38

South Pacific Forum (SPF) is the most important regional

organization. It was founded in 1971. Presently it has 14 members.

In the period immediately after the ~econd World War. the

South Pacific became one of the most nuclearized regions of the

world by way of testing and dumping of weapons and wastes

respectively. There were also the problems of nuclear bases in the

area. All these activities generated strong anti-nuclear sentiments in

South Pacific. The threat posed by nuclear activities led to a strong

anti-nuclear movement in the South Pacific and signing of the Treaty

38 Manmohini Kaul. Pearls in the Ocean (New Delhi: OBSPD. 1993), p.6.

57

of Rasotonga in 1985. First we have to look into the various kinds

of nuclear activities which were going on in the region.

Nuclear Testing

Americans were the first one to start using the Pacific for the

nuclear tests. Between 1946 and 1958 the US Government exploded

sixty-six nuclear devices in Bikini and Emitak Atolls in the Marshall

Islands. It was here that the first thermonuclear (hydrogen) borrib

was exploded in 1952.39 In these tests six islands were destroyed

and many others so irradiated that they became uninhabitable. 40

Initially. the inhabitants agreed to vacate their homes on American

assurance that they would be able to retum when the tests were

over. But ttll today they are unable to retum to their homes due to

. the danger of radioactivity. 41 It can be said that the painful

experience of Marshall Islanders became one of the major causes of

40

41

Greg Fry. "A Nuclear Free Zone for the South West Pacific: Prospects and Significance". Working Paper No. 75. Australian National University, Canberra, 1983, pp. 11-12.

Editorial. Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. vol. 18, no. 2. April-June 1986. p.9.

"Bikini : A Way of Life Lost". Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. vol.l8, no. 2, April-June 1986, p.l8.

58

the anti-nuclear sentiments of the Pacific people. 42 The memory of

the sufferings of Marshall Islands were strengthened by a film 'Half

Life', widely circulated during 1986. The film, made by Dennis

O'Rourke, suggested that the US allowed Marshall Islanders to die as

a scientific test of radiation.43

Another country which indulged in the nuclear testings in the

South Pacific was Britain. The United Kingdom conducted a series

of nuclear tests in Australia between 1952 and 1957 and on

Christmas Jslands between 1957 and 1958. This Island was also

used by the United States.44

The majority ofthe tests conducted by Britain and the US were

atmospheric except a few which were conducted under water.45 But

42

44

45

T.V. Paul, "Nuclear Free Zone in the South Pacific", Round Table, July 1986.

For details see Robert Milliken, "Half Life : Deadly Show". Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, vol. 18. no. 2, April-June 1986, pp. 90-91.

John Gee, "The Evolution of South Pacific Nuclear Zone : Australian Perspective", UN Regional Disarmament Workshop for Asia Pacific (New York: United Nations. 1991). p. 159.

ibid.

59 .

after the signing of Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 these two

countries stopped using Pacific sites for nuclear tests. 46

France, which was considered as the main culprit. began

atmospheric testings at Mururoa Atoll in 1966. After it was forced to

abandon its Sahara test site following Algerian independence.

established its Centre d'experimentation du Pacific at Mururoa Atoll

in the Tuamotu.47

Throughout the years 1966-1979. the French testings attracted

strong opposition from regional states. This opposition was

intensified by the election of Labour governments in Australia and

New Zealand in 1972 and 1975 respectively. Later on Australia, New

Zealand and Fiji challenged the French Nuclear Testings in the

International Court of Justice and at other world forums. The effect

of this regional opposition together with the weight of the world

opinion made the French to shift from atmospheric testing to

46

47

"South Pacific : A Not so Nuclear Free Zone", Peace Studies, (Melbourne), October 1985, pp. 6-8.

Jean Chesneaux, "France in the Pacific : Global Approach or Respect for Regional Agendas". Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. vol. 18. no. 2. April-June 1986, p. 74.

60

underground testing from 1975 onwards. 48

On its part, France justified these testings on three grounds:

First. they argued that the French right to test, to maintain its

security should be recognized as it is for Britain, the US, the Soviet

Union and China; secondly. under French law overseas territories

are treated as being a part of France. and hence the tests are being

undertaken on French soil and that it should nqt be the business of

others; finally. the French government contends that the tests are

safe. 4n

Subsequently. France even started terrorist kind of activities

when French agents sabotaged a protest ship Rainbow Warriors,

belonging to an inter national environmental group, on I 0 July 1985

on Auckland Harbour. It caused international furor and diplomatic

embarrassment for France. At first French Government denied its

involvement in the affair. However. later it was proved and French

President Mitterrand had to order an inquiry into it. The 'Rainbow

48

49

Kevin C. Clements. "New Zealand's Role in Promoting Nuclear Free Pacific", Journal of Peace Research, vol. 25, no. 4. December 1988.

Fry, n. 41, p.l3.

61

Warrior' disaster was taken very seriously and France's political

ratings fell even lower.50

But even after this, French continued with their nuclear

testings which remains to be a prime concern for the region.

Nuclear Dumping

Apart from nuclear testing, another major long-term threat that

the people of South Pacific are facing is the dumping of nuclear

wastes. There was a strong opposition of the Japanese Plan to dump

up to 10,000 barrels of radioactive waste north of the Mariana

Islands during 1980s.51 The US was already using the California

coast line to dump nuclear wastes there. This issue was taken up by

subsequent South Pacific Forum meetings and finally Japan had to

abandon its plan of dumping nuclear wastes in the Pacific. The

decision to prohibit the dumping of nuclear wastes in the area was

included in the Treaty of Rarotonga. This reflects the concern of the

50

51

See Ramesh Thakur, "A Dispute of Many Colours : France, New Zaland and RainbowWarrier Affair", World Today, vol. 92, no. 12. December 1986.

See South Pacific Forum Communiques, 1971-85. reported in Australian Foreign Affairs Record, 1971-85.

62

South Pacific Forum that the region should not become a dumping

ground of nuclear wastes.

Other Nuclear Activities

There are also certain other forms of nuclear activities in the

region which became a issue of concern for the countries of South

Pacific. The Americans and French continue to bring to the area the

most hi-tech nuclear weaponry. The US has started deploying

Trident submarines each equipped with 24 Trident and lind Multiple

war headed missiles in the Indian and Pacific Ocean. 52

Moreover. there is the problem of military bases which have

nuclear capabilities. There are mainly three military bases of America

which come within the zone of Treaty of Rarotonga. These bases are

in Australia. The US installations at North-West Cape. Rine Gap and . .

Nkurrungar are central to the American interests in the region and

also for the Australian-American relationship.

North West Cape

It is presently one of the most important links in the US global

52 Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. n. 42. p.9.

63

defence network. Its main purpose is to maintain reliable

communications with the submarines of the US fleet serving in the

area - and in particular. 'to provide communication for American

navy's most powerful deterrent force- the nuclear powered ballistic

missile submarines'.53

Nurrunger

It is located in the Woomera restricted area about 480 kms

north-west of Adelaide. It was one of the two ground stations for the

American satellite early warning system. Nurrunger provides a real

time data link between the North American Air Defence Command

(NORAD) the Strategic Air Command (SAC)·and the National Military

Command system on the one hand and the satellite early waning

system on the other hand.54

Pine Gap

The Pine Gap facility which became operational in 1969 is

located 19 km south-west of Alice Springs. The business end of the

53

54

Desmond Ball, "US Installations in Australia". Working Paper No. 36, SDSC, Australian National University, Canberra, June 198l,p.3.

ibid., p.4.

64

facility currently consists of seven large random and enormous

computer complex. Pine Gap is controlled by the CIA with extensive

participation of NASA. 55

These installations and facilities on the Austraian soil was

perceived by the people ofSouth Pacific as a possible target of attack

posing nuclear threat no only that country lent to the entire

region. 56

The Growing Presence of Soviet Union and American Attitude·

According to Ramesh Thakur. during 1980, the two factors

which accelerated the process of the declaration of South Pacific as

nuclear free zone are the growing presence of Soviet Union and the

nuclear policies of the Reagan Administration. 57 In this context, it

has to be seen that during mid 1980s with the begtn.nlng of

Gorbachev era, the erstwhile Soviet Union showed new interest in

55

56

57

ibid., p.5.

ibid., p.5.

Based on a personal interview with Ramesh Thakur.

65

Asia Pacific region.58 It signed two fishing agreements with Kiribati

and Vanuatu in 1985 and 1986 respectively. 59 Soviet Union also

tried to exploit the growing anti-Western and anti-nuclear sentiments

in the region by giving support to peace groups and several labour .

movements.60 ·However, this sudden rise of interest died down very

soon since the country did not renew its fishing agreement nor it was

able to make any powerful impact.61

As far as policies of Reagan Government is concerned, it

adopted a more aggressive stand regarding nuclear weapons. The

starting of'Star Wars' programme etc. made the countries suspicious

towards US intentions. Further, the silence on the part of the United

States regarding French nuclear testings in the region further fuelled

the suspicion that American neutrality amounts to support for the

58

59

60

61

For details see Soviet Review, vol. 23. no. 31. 7 August 1986. See passim and Soviet Review. vol. 24, no. 30, 30 July 1987.

John C. Dorrance. "The Soviet Union and the Pacific Islands: An American Assessment and Proposed Western Strategy". Working Paper 207.

ibid.

See Kaul. n.39.

66

French position.62

Rise of Anti- Nuclear Movement

As stated earlier, the rise of anti-nuclear feelings in the Pacific

grew along with the beginning of nuclear-testing in the region. The

incident of Marshall Islands gave a further boost to these feelings.

However. during 1980s these feelings reached their zenith. There

were several protests to close down the American bases in Australia.

In French Polynesia, indigenous Moachi people were arrested for

protesting against the French nuclear testings.63

The peace groups active in the region also played a very

important role in strengthening the movement against nuelear threat.

Some of the peace groups active in the region are World Peace

Council, the Congress for International Disarmament and

Co-operation, Alice Springs Peace Group etc. These groups also

acted as 'pressure groups' on the governments to adopt an

62 Keith D. Suter. "The US and the South Pacific : A Benign Neglect". Contemporary Review, vol.258, no. 1503, Apri11991, p. 188.

Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, n.42, p.3.

67

anti-nuclear stand.64

The tough stand adopted by New Zealand banning all nuclear

armed ships into its water has further strengthened the anti-nuclear

movement. 65 Following the example of New Zealand, several other

countries have banned the visits of nuclear armed ships. For

example, Solon on Islands which previously accepted the US ship

visits, in 1985 adopted a policy against it. Vanuatu reemphasized a

standing ban on such visits. Leaders of now deposed Fijian

government indicated that they would follow New Zealand's policy.66

With the election of Labour Governments in Australia and New

Zealand on an anti-nuclear platform, the movement gained

momentum and culminated into the signing of NWFZ treaty or the

treaty of Rarotonga, to be discussed in the Fourth Chapter.

64

65

66

J.C. Dorrance, "Strategic Co-operation and Competition in the Pacific Islands". Working Paper No.203. SDSC, Australian National University. Canberra. January 1990. p.l4.

For details see David Lange. Nuclear Free: The New Zealand Way (Penguin Books).

Paul F. Gardner. "Tuna Poaching and Nuclear Testing in South Pacific". Orbis. spring 1988.

68