Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review September …...2005 • Nuclear Decommissioning Authority set-up taking strategic responsibility for UK’s nuclear legacy • British

Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review

September 2013

Produced for the

Department of Energy & Climate Change

Innovation Delivery Team

by The Madano Partnership and

Integrated Decision Management Ltd

By The Madano Partnership

and Integrated Decision Management Ltd

Nuclear Innovation Analysis:

Landscape Review

Produced for the Department of Energy & Climate Change


September 2013

Nuclear Innovation Analysis:

Landscape Review

Produced for the Department of Energy & Climate Change


September 2013


Department of Energy and Climate Change

Contents

Chapter

1. Introduction and Background to Study _____________ 1

2. UK Nuclear Innovation Landscape _________________ 2

3. Clarifying Assumptions and Project Development ___________________________ 7

4. Stakeholder Research and Research Findings ____________________________________ 10

5. Discussion of Findings _________________________ 12

6. Cost Benefit Analysis __________________________ 21

7. Conclusions and Recommendations ______________ 30

Appendices:

I. Bibliography _____________________________________________________ 32

II. Study Participants ________________________________________________ 33

III. Interview Guide __________________________________________________ 34

IV. Challenges/Barriers derived and rated by workshop participants _____________________________________________ 36

V. Acronyms _______________________________________________________ 37

VI. UK Fuel Market Share from Oxford Economics Report _____________________ 38

Department of Energy and Climate Change 1


The Madano Partnership (Madano) and Integrated Decision Management Ltd (IDM), were commissioned by the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) to undertake a “Nuclear Energy Innovation – Investment Analysis”1.

DECC’s Energy Innovation Delivery Team has a remit to

invest in technologies that will provide significant benefits

to the UK in terms of the secure supply of renewable and

low carbon energy, and require that investment decisions

are evidence-based to ensure that public money is used

in the most cost effective manner. Previous analysis in the

nuclear sector had indicated that investment across the

nuclear life cycle could provide benefits worth between

£5-40bn to 2050 and £5-90bn to 21002.

DECC had prioritised a number of sub-areas where

there was considered to be an early need for investment,

identified as themes in this earlier analysis. Areas were

prioritised based on the potential benefit resulting

from investment in innovation that were within DECC’s

Innovation programme remit. These themes included:

i. Innovative Fuel Formsii. Capex – Components

iii. Capex – Building Materialsiv. Capex – Construction, Installation and

Commissioningv. Waste Management, Reprocessing and Storage (in

relation to historic, existing and future systems)vi. Innovation in the Regulatory Process

To ensure optimal benefit is derived from any future

investment decisions, DECC wished to undertake further

analyses within each of these sub-areas to define specific

R&D programmes and/or capital investment that will

unlock benefits for the UK. Early project meetings clarified

that the area of study was to start with Technology

Readiness Levels (TRLs)3 of around 4, with projects to take

the TRL to around 8. The innovation should be deployable

in 10-20 years, a much shorter time horizon than other

studies which extended to 2050 and beyond.

This shorter time horizon emphasised that reviewing

the current organisation of the nuclear industry in the

UK would enable innovation to be identified “starting

from where we are now”, leading to an understanding

of the opportunities, challenges and barriers faced

by potential innovators operating in the real nuclear

world of 2013. The Madano-IDM project therefore

centered on engaging with a wide range of actual and

would-be innovators, and with their actual and potential

customers, to map both the innovation landscape and

the marketplace in which they operate as well as the

opportunities and possible barriers, including cost

benefit analysis of investing in potential areas.

Chapter 1.

Introduction and Background to Study

1 Tender No: TRN 500/10/2012

2 See Technology Innovation Needs Assessment (TINA) Nuclear Fission, Summary Report, Carbon Trust, April 2013 at www.lowcarboninnovation.co.uk/document.php?o=16

3 Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) are a technology management tool that provides a measurement to assess the maturity of evolving technology. Typically, TRL 1 is where Basic Principles have been observed and reported; TRL 4 is where Technology basic validation has been made in a laboratory environment through to TRL 9 where Actual Technology has been qualified through successful mission operations. See for example “Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) in the Project Lifecycle”, Ministry of Defence website, www.aof.mod.uk/aofcontent/tactical/techman/content/trl_applying.htm

2 Department of Energy and Climate Change


In order to explore the potential opportunities for the UK it is important to understand first the landscape in which UK nuclear innovation now operates. It is instructive to appreciate how the industry has evolved into its current state, and to be clear about the structural benefits and barriers presented by the 2013 nuclear industry in the UK.

UK Nuclear Industry Evolution

The UK nuclear power landscape evolved from the 1950s

early dominance of the national imperatives to become

a nuclear weapons state, to a structure reflecting the

‘flowsheet’ of nuclear energy generation, namely:-

1. United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) – an R&D organisation which pursued scientific progress and undertook development of reactor designs and fuel cycle concepts

2. British Nuclear Fuels plc. (BNFL) – a manufacturing and processing organisation, spun out of UKAEA in 1971, which carried out fuel cycle operations from uranium ore concentrate to nuclear fuel, and from spent fuel to wastes, reprocessed uranium and separated plutonium

3. URENCO – a tri-national uranium enrichment organisation set up by the Treaty of Almelo in 1971, and pioneer of the centrifuge enrichment process. It and its technology are now world-leading. This was originally organised with three nationally-owned production plants.

4. Reactor consortia: the UK contracted out the construction of both the Magnox and AGR stations to consortia of UK engineering companies

5. Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) and South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) – electricity utilities which placed orders for nuclear stations and sold their electricity output.

The Figure below shows the arrangement circa 1975.

Chapter 2.

The UK Nuclear Innovation Landscape

UOCReactor

andProcess R&D

UKAEA

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fuel plant designFuel Element DesignSpringfields

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Gaseous DiffusionCentrifuge

Uranium Enrichment

Uranium OxideFuel

Uranium metalFuel CEGB

MagnoxReactors

CEGBAGR

Reactors

Figure 1. The UK Nuclear Industry circa 1975



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Chapter 2

Figure 2. UK Nuclear development – 1950-2012 onwards



Chapter 2

Notably, the French industry was organised on similar

lines, with the Commissariat à l’énergie atomique (CEA)

covering nuclear research; Comurhex (Conversion Métal

URanium HEXafluorure) producing uranium hexafluoride;

Eurodif (European Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment

Consortium) undertaking enrichment operations;

FBFC (Franco-Belge de Fabrication du Combustible)

manufacturing nuclear fuel, Framatome designing reactors,

Cogema (Compagnie générale des matières nucléaires)

dealing with the spent fuel, and EDF (Électricité de France)

owning the reactors and marketing the electricity.

As set up, both the UK and French nuclear energy and fuel

cycle systems were essentially state owned and operated.

Though the French system has been consolidated under

CEA (research), AREVA (reactors and fuel cycle) and EDF

(reactor owner/operator and electricity supply), it remains

within the orbit of the French state.

The UK nuclear programme has been characterised by

changes of policy direction, stops and starts over the

decades since its inception, as illustrated in Figure 2.

In 1990, the non-nuclear elements of the CEGB were

privatised as part of the then Government policy to sell off

nationalised industries. The CEGB’s nuclear responsibilities

were split in 1996, with the Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR)

stations and recently-completed Pressurised Water

Reactor (PWR) at Sizewell B forming British Energy (BE),

while the older Magnox reactor fleet became Magnox

Electric, which was transferred to BNFL ownership in

1998. In 1999, BNFL acquired the Westinghouse Electric

Company, which covered fuel manufacture, reactor design

and construction, and reactor services, making BNFL

a complete nuclear company – from the processing of

uranium, fuel manufacture via reactor operation to spent

fuel management.

The UK Government’s 2002 Energy Review4 concluded

that “because nuclear is a mature technology within a

well-established global industry, there is no current case

for further Government support” and that “the decision

whether to bring forward proposals for new nuclear build

is a matter for the private sector”. This view was formalised

in “Our Energy Future – creating a low carbon economy”5

in 2003.

Meanwhile, the liberalisation of the electricity supply

structures under NETA (March 2001), meant that utilities

which were not vertically integrated with retail suppliers

were vulnerable to reductions in wholesale electricity price.

British Energy, which was not so vertically integrated, had

to be rescued by Government payments in 2002, and

ultimately was sold, becoming part of EDF Energy in 2009.

In parallel to the declaration of a ‘no new nuclear’ future,

there was increasing recognition of the scale and costs of

the historic waste management legacy, where liabilities had

been accumulating since the 1950s. The early 2000s saw

the restructuring of UK nuclear fuel cycle operations, with

an emphasis on waste management and decommissioning

rather than the commercial supply of fuel cycle services.

The establishment of the Nuclear Decommissioning

Authority (NDA) as a Non-Departmental Public Body under

the Energy Act 2004 therefore resulted in the transfer of 19

sites, previously under the control of UKAEA and BNFL, and

their associated Civil Nuclear - Liabilities and Assets formally

back into the public sector6. BNFL had been a plc (with the

shares held by the Government) since 1984.

The commercial model adopted for the NDA was derived

from the US system, and delivers its clean-up mission

through Site Licensee Companies (SLCs) which are licensed

to operate nuclear sites. Competitive contracts are let out to

consortia of companies (Parent Body Organisations) who

own the SLCs for the period of the contract.

The Westinghouse business was sold to Toshiba in

2006, thus removing reactor building and nuclear fuel

manufacture from the UK’s nuclear portfolio. The decision

to sell that business was once again due to the Government

wanting to reduce the number of assets it actually owned,

and also to remove any potential conflicts it could be seen

to have with the advent of new nuclear build.

The privatisation of the nuclear energy industry in the UK

in the 1990s, the nuclear energy policy change between

early 2000 and 2006, and the restructuring of the legacy

clean-up sector has resulted in a much more fragmented

and complex nuclear landscape, which is discussed in the

following Section.

UK Nuclear Landscape 2013

The current UK nuclear marketplace can therefore be

characterised under two main headings – activities

associated with nuclear electricity generation and fuel

cycle operations, and legacy clean-up.

Legacy and current nuclear electricity generation and fuel cycle operations

• Magnox reactors – run by Magnox Ltd, an SLC of NDA. All reactors except Wylfa 1 are shut down and have entered defueling/decommissioning. Wylfa 1 scheduled to stop generation in September 2014

• AGRs – 7 twin-reactor stations owned and run by EDF Energy. Major work and incentive to increase planned lifetimes



Chapter 2

• PWR – Sizewell B (single reactor) owned and run by EDF Energy. Currently scheduled to begin decommissioning in 2035, but life extension probable

• Fuel Manufacture – Springfields Fuels Limited is owned by Westinghouse Electric Company UK on a long term site lease from the NDA. Undertakes conversion of uranium tetrafluoride to uranium hexafluoride for enrichment, and is the only manufacturer of AGR fuel. Also fabricates PWR fuel

• Enrichment – URENCO has one of its three uranium enrichment plants at Capenhurst, and is installing a plant to convert uranium hexafluoride tails into oxide for storage and/or disposal. URENCO shares are currently held 1/3 by the UK Government, 1/3 by the Dutch Government and other parties and 1/3 by the German utilities RWE and E.On. The shareholders have all agreed to explore a possible sale of part or all of the organisation

• Spent Fuel Reprocessing – Magnox reprocessing is undertaken by Sellafield Ltd, the Sellafield SLC. The activity is scheduled to come to an end around 2020. Oxide Fuel Reprocessing is undertaken in the Sellafield THORP facility for UK and foreign customers. The activity is scheduled to stop around 2018

Nuclear New Build

In January 2006, the Government launched another energy

review consultation7, which revisited the potential role that

new nuclear reactors could contribute to energy security

and the decarbonisation of the UK economy. The “Meeting

the Energy Challenge” White Paper of 2007 contained “a

preliminary view is that it is in the public interest to give the

private sector the option of investing in new nuclear power

stations”.

Over the next six years, the Government introduced

a number of facilitative actions, including Regulatory

Justification and Generic Design Assessment of ‘new

build’ reactor designs, National Policy Statements with

eight nominated sites, Funded Decommissioning Plans

and Waste Transfer Prices, and Electricity Market Reform.

This has led to three proposals for new build on five of the

nominated sites. The three prospective ‘new build’ utilities

are:

• EDF Energy – Planning permission granted for the construction of two EPRs at Hinkley Point and a further 2 EPRs are proposed to be subsequently constructed at Sizewell. Originally the consortium anticipated the participation of Centrica, which withdrew from new build in February 2013. EPR™ (PWR – AREVA) achieved Regulatory Justification and, through the Generic Design Assessment (GDA) process, the issue of a Design Acceptance

Confirmation by the Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR) and a Statement of Design Acceptability from the Environment Agency (EA)

• Horizon Nuclear – now owned by Hitachi-GE (Japan) - twin ABWR stations planned for the Wylfa and Oldbury sites. Hitachi-GE have applied to DECC for Regulatory Justification and the regulators have been asked to begin the GDA process

• NuGen – owned by GDF-SUEZ (France) and Iberdrola (Spain), reactors planned to be constructed on the Moorside site adjacent to Sellafield but the technology choice has yet to be made.

The Westinghouse AP1000® PWR has achieved Regulatory

Justification, ONR Interim Design Acceptance Confirmation

(IDAC) and EA Interim Statement of Design Acceptability

(ISoDA), but has not yet been selected for deployment.

Legacy Clean-up

The NDA, through its SLCs, Dounreay Site Restoration

Ltd (DSRL) and Research Sites Restoration Ltd (RSRL) are

responsible for the remediation work at Dounreay, Harwell

and Winfrith.

• The Parent Body for DSRL is the Babcock Dounreay Partnership Ltd, a consortium of Babcock International Group (UK), CH2MHILL and URS (USA)

• The RSRL Parent Body is the Babcock International Group (UK)

The Magnox sites decommissioning SLC is Magnox Ltd,

whose Parent Body is Energy Solutions (USA).

The RSRL and Magnox Ltd contracts are currently the

subject of an NDA competition process. The consortia

wishing to proceed (as of January 2013) are:

• Reactor Site Solutions (Bechtel, Energy Solutions)

• Babcock Fluor Partnership

• CAS Restoration Partnership (CH2MHill, AREVA, Serco)

• UK Nuclear Restoration Ltd (AMEC, Atkins)

Sellafield site’s parent body, Nuclear Management

Partners, is a consortium of AREVA (France), URS (USA)

and AMEC (UK).

The NDA mission across its 19 sites is “to deliver safe,

sustainable and publicly acceptable solutions to the

challenge of nuclear clean-up and waste management”

and involves decommissioning and cleaning up the

range of civil nuclear facilities, ensuring that all the waste

products, both radioactive and non-radioactive, are

safely managed, and implementing Government policy

on the long-term management of nuclear waste. This

also involves managing the UK’s stocks of civil nuclear



Chapter 2

materials including the development of technology

options for the storage, and either re-use or disposal of

uranium and plutonium inventories.

From the outline above, the structure of UK’s nuclear

sector is seen to be complex and complicated to map, as

seen in Figure 3 below.

With the advent of new international entrants into the

UK, it is still evolving both in market area of new nuclear

build projects and in legacy clean-up. This presents

challenges in aligning the range of structural, contractual

and commercial drivers of this diverse

marketplace to promote innovation.

UK Nuclear Market Size

The UK civil nuclear market size is also

split between ‘new build’ and clean-up;

the potentially major, developer-funded

‘new build’ market being added to the

publically funded legacy management

initiative set up in the early 2000s.

The financial split between these two

elements will depend on the size of

the ‘new build’ programme, this has

been initially envisaged as 16GWe8, but

DECC has been studying a number of

scenarios of up to 75GWe. The overall

size of the two markets is illustrated semi-

quantitatively, for programmes of 16GWe

and 40GWe, in Figure 4 below.

Figure 4 illustrates:

1. A clean-up market which, at least in this decade, is comparable in size to the ‘new build’ market, and is characterised by many one-off projects which would benefit from innovative approaches in the short term if legacy management costs are to be contained and progress facilitated.

2. A 16GWe ‘new build’ programme whose undiscounted costs are comparable with those of legacy clean-up in the early years. For this tranche, the reactor designs are

essentially fixed, and this would be expected to limit the possible potential for innovation in the 15-20 year timeframe envisaged in this study.

3. The large increase in amount and rate of spend attendant on changing to a 40GWe new build programme.

4 The Energy Review, Performance and Innovation Unit Energy, February 2002

5 Our Energy Future: Creating a low carbon economy, February 2003 CM 5761) http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file10719.pdf

6 Noting that BNFL had been a plc (with the shares held by the Government) since 1984

7 Our Energy Challenge, securing clean affordable energy for the long term, January 2006 (cm6887) http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm68/6887/6887.pdf

8 See Nuclear Industrial Vision Statement, HMG, 2013

Figure 4. UK Nuclear Spend, Schematic

Figure 3. Nuclear Industry in the UK, 2013

0.0

2.0

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2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029

16GWe 40GWe

Clean-up - Discounted programme spend £ 53 B

£3.0B Current NDA SpendGross Annual

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AGRs

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AGR SFStorage

EDF (F) Reactors EPR Areva (F) Fuel Areva (?)

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NuGen (F, Sp) Reactors ? Fuel ?

UF4, previously UOC

UF6 LEUF6

SpringfieldsFuel, UF6

CapenhurstEnrichment

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Ops, Fuel CycleCleanup

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Calder

Reactor AP1000Westinghouse –Toshiba (US/J) UK Build???

*

*

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As discussed in Chapter 1, the Madano-IDM project was asked to consider six sub-areas prioritised by DECC from the Carbon Trust report “Technology Innovation Needs Assessment: Nuclear Fission”, and other areas of potential interest to identify possible projects looking to advance from around TRL 4 to around TRL 8. The sub-areas were:





The first four sub-areas can be viewed from the point of

view of innovation in either (a) existing (GEN III)9 or (b)

future reactor and fuel cycle technologies (GEN IV). The

Carbon Trust assessment included examination of GEN IV

systems, but the analysis does not differentiate between

the very different reactor systems within the GEN IV

categorisation, and there is currently no Government

policy on which, if any, of the systems are of interest to the

UK. These considerations, and the 10-20 year time horizon

of the Madano-IDM project, led to the exclusion of GEN

IV reactor systems from further study. The exclusion of

GEN IV essentially rules out the theme of Innovative Fuel

Forms, and even GEN III systems would be unlikely to be

able to introduce any truly innovative fuel in the 20 year

timeframe10.

For GEN III reactor systems, the assertion11 has been that as

more reactors are built, the cheaper the individual reactors

become, and this has been used to scope the effects of

innovation in any defined programme. The “First of a Kind”

(FOAK) to “Nth of a Kind” (NOAK) improvement is largely

predicated on economic modelling work for low-value

high-number manufactured items such as computers and

compact fluorescent light bulbs12. There are problems in

transferring this model to nuclear reactors, as published

figures for reactor cost are extremely variable13, and

modelling studies of nuclear systems14 15 16 generally rely

on an assumed improvement figure.

NOAK improvement has been tested by examining one

of the few sources of hard data on nuclear projects. The

IAEA’s Power Reactor Information System (PRIS)17, gives

building start dates and on-line dates for all reactors

in IAEA-participating countries. If there are FOAK to

NOAK improvements, these should be mirrored in a

reduction in construction time as programmes progress.

However, extensive examination has revealed only one

programme, PWRs constructed in South Korea, where

such a reduction is observed. A more typical example is

that of reactor construction in France, which is illustrated

in Figure 5 below, and where build time increases from

FOAK to NOAK. Similar effects are observed in the UK’s

Magnox and AGR programmes.9

Chapter 3.

Clarifying Assumptions and Project Development



Chapter 3

The UK is seeking to embark upon a 16GWe initial

programme of ‘new build’ Light Water Reactors, which

relies on the candidate reactors satisfying the rigorous

demands of the GDA, which has involved reactor vendors

providing extensive and detailed information on their

designs to the UK Regulators. The GDA, therefore in

effect ‘freezes’ many details of the candidate reactor

design and, by extension, many of the components of

those designs and their manufacture, together with the

methods of construction of the reactor buildings.

In relation to the innovation marketplace, this means

that ‘new build’ innovation cannot be scaled by an

“NOAK Driver”, and must look to innovation at levels of

the supply chain which will not adversely impact on the

ability of reactors to meet GDA requirements and build

programmes.

It is also notable that themes ii – iv cover the supply

of components, the building and commissioning of

reactors, but do not focus on their subsequent operation,

maintenance, or assuring their operational life. In fact

there are many areas where developments in sensors,

data acquisition, storage and handling, and condition

monitoring could be assumed to be brought to bear on

the post-commissioning life of a nuclear power station.

These innovations were sought and examined as part of

the project.

In sub-area v, (Waste management, reprocessing and

storage in relation to historic, existing and future systems),

considerations of timescale have already eliminated

innovation for future (GEN IV) systems. Reprocessing

activities in the UK are scheduled to be completed by

around 202018. The current new build programme is

predicated on ‘one-through’ LWRs, where the spent fuel

is consigned to geological disposal, so current policy

would seem to offer little market driver for innovation in

this area. In the longer term, some of the Generation 4

systems being studied do require reprocessing, but others

do not. A driver for innovation would therefore only occur

when there was some level of strategic intent to deploy

systems requiring reprocessing.

In the area of waste management, decommissioning and

storage, there is great scope for innovation in the legacy

clean-up of NDA’s facilities, and the techniques developed

could assist in future decommissioning projects such as

the AGR stations, Sizewell B and, in due course, ‘new

build’ reactors in the UK, and a multitude of potential

facilities overseas.

A 2012 paper to the NDA Research Board19 reported the

R&D needs generated by the NDA, Radioactive Waste

Management Directorate (RWMD), ONR, EDF, EA, the

Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) and the European

Commission. Many UK responses were co-ordinated by

the Nuclear Waste Research Forum, which is seeking to

share experience and maximise learning across the whole

UK Waste Management and Decommissioning sector.

The broad research topics derived are shown below.

18

Figure 5. Build times of French reactors versus start number

Bui

ld T

ime

for a

ll Fr

ench

Rea

ctor

s (y

ears

)

Reactors in order of construction start date



Chapter 3

In sub-area vi (Innovation in the Regulatory Process),

innovation would involve improvements in cost and

timescale of projects by seeking ways of optimising the

regulatory approach while maintaining the stringent

application of safety, security and environmental

standards. For ‘new build’ reactors, there has already been

very significant innovation in the setting up and running

of the Generic Design Assessment (GDA) process,

which brought all the regulators together under a co-

ordinated joint programme. This innovation is now being

further tested by the requirement to perform GDA on a

very different reactor type, Hitachi’s ABWR. Anecdotal

evidence suggested that the GDA process evolved during

the consideration of the EPR and AP1000 reactor systems,

and is likely to further evolve during ABWR and any other

systems seeking deployment in the UK.

In the legacy clean-up area, the research topics already

quoted will involve site operators working with the

regulators to extend innovation from technology into the

effective regulation of the changing practices.

This review of the six sub-areas has shown that:

i. Innovative fuel forms: the timescale and TRLs examined by this project make it unlikely that any candidates for innovation will be found under this theme.

ii. Capex - Components iii. Capex - Building Materials iv. Capex - Construction, Installation and

Commissioning: innovation by the currently planned candidate reactors would appear to be somewhat constrained as a result of the reactor designs being fixed in order to pass through the GDA process. A UK commitment to a larger programme and/or the deployment of advanced reactor systems could open up further innovation opportunities.

v. Waste Management, Reprocessing and Storage (in relation to historic, existing and future systems): a fertile area for innovation in a marketplace currently worth £3bn per annum.

vi. Innovation in the Regulatory Process: possibilities for innovation in systems and processes, already achieved in new reactor build and with significant possibilities in waste management and decommissioning.

1. Characterisation:

• Improved techniques to support the development of decommissioning and site remediation plans

• Improved techniques to support the application of the waste hierarchy as a framework for waste management decision making, from prevention of waste generation through to minimisation of impact of disposal

2. Decommissioning:

• Improved decontamination techniques – to minimise waste or allow man entry

• Improved remote decommissioning technologies – to avoid man entry

3. Waste Treatment:

• Treatment techniques for wastes with no confirmed disposal route

• Alternative techniques to encapsulation

4. Waste Packaging & Storage:

• Optimised packaging solutions

• Understanding of waste package evolution from production to disposal

5. Land Quality:

• Improved technologies or approaches for the management of contaminated land to avoid ex-situ disposal

6. Management of Plutonium:

• Technically underpinned route for re-use in modern reactors

Box 1. Common R&D Themes from NDA Research Board Paper

9 ‘GEN III’ refers to reactors that are commercially available for deployment at the present time. The term ‘GEN IV’ is a generic catch-all for systems being developed for future use under the Generation 4 International Forum. The technologies covered by this term may be seen at http://www.gen-4.org/Technology/systems/index.htm

10 For an example of the issues involved, see feature on the development of slicon carbide fuel cladding at http://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurestudying-silicon-carbide-for-nuclear-fuel-cladding/

11 See, for example, Electricity Generation Cost Model - 2011 Update, Revision 1, Parsons Brinkerhoff for DECC, August 2011, page 2412 For example, Using the Experience Curve Approach for Appliance Price Forecasting, USDOE Energy Efficiency and Renewable energy, February 201113 Costs of Generating Electricity, IEA-NEA, 201014 Mott McDonald UK Electricity Generation Costs Update, Mott McDonald, 201015 Parsons Brinkerhoff Electricity Generation Cost Model - 2011 Update16 Electricity generation cost model 2012 update of non-renewable technologies, Parsons Brinkerhoff, 201217 At www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/ 18 NDA-Business Plan 2013-2016, March 201319 Summary and Analysis of Board Member Responses to UK Decommissioning R&D Needs, Paper for NDA Research Board, April 2012



Stakeholder Engagement

The examination in Chapter 3 of the industry and market structure, together with the analysis of the likely areas for innovation, prescribed a direct approach to a broad cross-section of the industry and its supply chain. This involved the Project Team undertaking desktop studies, using personal contacts and subsequent referrals to approach lead organisations such as NDA, NDAs SLCs, AREVA, Horizon and Westinghouse, together with Tier 2 contractors, universities, and research consortia. These contacts led to the identification of relevant SMEs.

An interview framework was created and is included in

Appendix IV, which was used to guide a variety of contacts

through interview discussions and in-depth meetings. The

purpose of the interview guide was intended to:

1. Guide the respondent as to the areas, TRLs and timescales that we were hoping to cover.

2. Identify innovation candidate technologies or opportunities.

3. Define the TRLs involved before/after innovation development.

4. Ask whether barriers exist to the maturing of these projects and what magnitude of investment would be involved?

5. If so, to identify the barriers.

6. Identify whether new funding or potential collaboration would assist the development of the innovation.

7. Determine if any current projects were feeding into any co-ordinating/networking schemes of workshops.

8. Ask whether the respondent ever engaged with DECC, TSB or EPSRC on any other funding body on the particular project(s) or technology(s)?

9. Find out whether the respondent consider bidding for such funding and;

10. If not why not?

11. Enquire whether the respondent any estimates of the cost/benefit of the market opportunity and;

12. If so could an estimate be given?

13. Had the respondent any other suggestions for DECC on the piece of work being undertaken by Madano-IDM.

By no means were all of those contacted willing to respond.

Their stated reasons ranged from time constraints, to

slight apathy with the current state of nuclear in the UK,

to some parties even denying involvement in the industry

even though they are clearly involved. However, some

56 responses were obtained and a complete list of the

organisations represented is seen in Table 1 below.

Information Sensitivity

The responses to the interviews and to the more

extensive meetings yielded a range of information at

varying levels of detail and commercial sensitivity. It

was impossible, when having in-depth discussions with

innovative organisations, to avoid conversations which at

least touched on levels of detail which impinged on the

Intellectual Property Rights of the companies concerned.

Also, in seeking to discuss opportunities and challenges

some fairly direct and forceful observations were made

which might be misconstrued outside the context of the

meeting/interview.

The decision has therefore been taken not to attribute

quotations to individual companies in this report, but

still to use the anonymised quotations where they add a

particular flavour and emphasis to the points respondents

made and the clear themes that developed over the

course of the interviews. Similarly, it was not felt prudent

to include all the meeting notes and completed interview

forms into a public domain report. Instead, a Commercial

Annex to this report is being prepared which will go only

to DECC as the commissioning organisation for the work.

Market Uncertainty

UK organisations seeking to develop innovative products

and services into the overall UK nuclear market, face the

fundamental problem of predicting the market size. As

detailed in Chapter 3, the size of the legacy market (waste

management, decommissioning and storage) is relatively

Chapter 4.

Stakeholder Research and Research Findings



Chapter 4

well understood, in comparison to the uncertainty

associated with the size of the new build market. With

the reactor designs for at least the first phase of new

build essentially fixed, and as UK manufacture will

feed into, rather than lead, the supply chain, it would

appear unrealistic to expect UK innovation to have any

significant effect on the size of the market. UK innovation

in new build will therefore rely on generating market

share in the market that materializes. This is currently

uncertain, given the continued hiatus in the EDF Energy

commitment to Hinkley Point C, and the introduction of

new, ABWR, technology for Horizon’s two potential sites

in October 2012.

Because of this uncertainty, there was no valid basis on

which innovators could have been expected to produce

detailed business cases for their innovations, and there

was therefore limited evidence available from would-be

innovators which could present the basis of a “bottom-

up” Cost Benefit Analysis approach. Such uncertainty will

affect all and any CBA techniques, and for this reason the

analyses in Chapter 6 of this report are based on defined

new build scenarios20.

Consolidation of information

The information obtained was found to contain many

themes and topics which were common to many

organisations, sometimes viewing the same topic from

very different viewpoints. Overall, the project team

considered that the ‘general overview’ defined itself after

the first few contacts, and further interviews/meetings

added more detail, but did not change what became a very

well-defined picture of the industry and the opportunities

and challenges of innovation within it.

Workshop

This picture was further tested in a workshop held on

1st May 2013 and attended by some 20 people representing

a cross section of the industry, together with DECC, TSB

and the Carbon Trust. The workshop aimed to:

• Understand the current innovation context, landscape and concepts;

• Appreciate the challenges which innovation could address;

• Explore possible futures, developments and innovation directions.

This gave rise to a 20-page photo report full of useful and

astute observations, which was distributed to attendees

for comment. Once this material had been consolidated,

it was evident that, while it raised very few matters or

concepts which had not arisen in the interviews/meetings,

it did add greatly to the richness of views expressed and

underlined the wide agreement on a variety of topics.

In the light of this preliminary finding, it was decided not

to produce a separate report on the workshop, but to use

the workshop as an additional data source for the overall

evaluation of the industry’s views on the opportunities of,

and barriers to, innovation as defined by the DECC project

specification. This is discussed in Chapter 5.

•Alstom•AREVA•ONR •Arup•Atkins•Babcock•Bellrock Technology Ltd•Beran Instruments•Bradtec•Cambridge Ultrasonics•The Carbon Trust•CEMEX•Ceram•Costain•Cranfield University•Cybula Ltd•Dalton Cumbria Facility•Dalton Institute•Darchem Engineering

•DBD•Department for Business,

Innovation and Skills (BIS)•EDF Energy•EPSRC•Fluor•GE Hitachi•Halcrow•Horizon•Hosakawa Micron•Imperial College•Jacobs•Lloyds Register•Mott MacDonald•National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL)•Nuclear AMRC•Nuclear Decommissioning

Authority (NDA)•Nuclear Engineering Services (NES)

•NIA•Nuvia•OC Robotics•ONR•PCubed•Pinsent Masons•REACT•Redhall•Rolls Royce•Sellafield Sites Ltd•Sheffield Forgemasters•Sir Robert McAlpine•Sulzer•Technology Strategy Board•Tetronics•TISICS Ltd•University of Birmingham•University of Manchester•URENCO

Table 1. Organisations involved in interviews and/or meetings

20 For example, see range of scenarios in DECC 2050 Pathways at https://www.gov.uk/2050-pathways-analysis



This chapter summarises the findings of the interviews, meetings and workshop facilitated by Madano-IDM, under a variety of headings which arose from the assembled data and views, namely:

• What is Innovation?

• Roles and Organisation

• Public and Political Acceptance

• Innovation and Access

• IPR and Commercial Arrangements – sharing risk and reward

• New Build

• Waste Management and Decommissioning Legacy

• The Market is International

• Innovation Examples

• Recognising and Measuring Success

• Innovation Opportunities

What is Innovation?

The question “What is innovation?” came up in many of the

interviews and was extensively covered in the workshop,

as it became apparent that many meanings of the word

‘innovation’ were in use, some of them contradictory:

“I just improve the way we do things, I don’t

innovate.”

Madano-IDM had started from the Oxford English

Dictionary definition – “the introduction of novelties,

the alteration of what is established” – which covers

all ‘change in the way things are done’. In the current

context, we must add the rider that the “introduction

of novelties” should improve the outcome, arriving at a

definition like “the introduction of novelties, the alteration

of what is established so as to improve the outcome of the

endeavour.”

Clearly this beneficial change can take many forms, from

developing a totally new technology (e.g. flash drives),

developing completely novel materials (e.g. graphene),

via applying different technologies to old problems, to

simple incremental improvement of existing systems. All

these ‘introduce novelties that makes things better’, so we

have considered ‘innovation’ to cover everything from a

Nobel Prize to a successful item in a suggestions box.

Debate in the workshop centred round the Madano-IDM

view of innovation as shown in Figure six below. This had

been predicated on the DECC requirement for innovations

from TRLs 3-4 to TRLs 8-9, and for deployment over 10-20

years. It was pointed out that ‘manufacturing’ had been

omitted as a category, and this has been added to Figure 6.

Figure 6. Types of Innovation

Chapter 5.

Discussion of Findings

Types of innovation

• Science

• Technologies

◊ New Technologies

◊ Improvements

◊ New Applications

• Materials

• Engineering

• Manufacturing

• Regulation

• Organisational Structures

• Contractual Structures

• Commercial Systems/Applications

Too long timescale?

Too long timescale?

Drivers/barriers

Drivers/barriers

New materials too long timescale (?) – but new applications?

Immediate – but codes, regs?

Immediate – drivers/barriers

Balance timescale improvements with regulatory dilemmas

Attributes

Motivations

Barriers}



Chapter 5

While the general impression given by Figure 6 was

agreed, it was felt, in many areas, to be too broad

brush, and probably too much influenced by the pace of

innovation in mainstream reactor designs and fuel cycle

processes. In particular, some SMEs pointed out that, in

areas such as data gathering/manipulation and robotics,

the pace of change can be such that projects will advance

from TRL3 to full deployment in less than a decade. The

Figure was thus deemed useful, but as a guide rather than

a ‘straitjacket’.

While the research found a significant number of areas

of activity around innovation based on new materials

or technologies, it was evident that process innovation

also offers significant savings and should be an area of

attention.

“My work is more around improving

processes in nuclear rather than new

technologies, it is just as important.”

Overall there was strong agreement that the key process

was to identify innovation, of whatever sort, then to make

and sell a compelling case for its introduction.

Roles and Organisation

There were many views expressed on the value of the

UK defining, and sticking to, a long term strategy for the

role of nuclear power in meeting energy security and

carbon reduction targets. This was contrasted with the

stop-go-stop experience over the last 60 years which has

been illustrated in Figure 2 in Chapter 2, and has led to an

industry structure put together for the 2003 ‘No Nuclear’

energy policy being still in place in the current “‘New

Build’, New Opportunities” climate.

The UK has a current policy of reducing its carbon

emissions by 80% (from the 1990 baseline) by 2050, which

will require the decarbonisation, not only of the electricity

supply industry, but of large segments of the economy. It

is clear to most informed opinion that nuclear must have a

significant role to play in this decarbonisation. Presently a

very large range of scenarios is in play (zero to 75GWe),

so there is no real clarity of what nuclear role is desired or

required. During the consultations most opinion was firm

that such decarbonisation could not be achieved without

a long term energy strategy with a clearly defined role for

nuclear.

This perceived lack of a long term strategy is combined

with a lack of clarity on who does what, both at policy

level between DECC and BIS, and in the roles of, and

coordination between, associated organisations such as

the DECC Innovation team, the BIS Low Carbon Economy

team, Go-Science, and the TSB. One continuing theme

was that there is real difficulty in “mapping the system”,

leading to uncertainty in matters such as who to talk

to, who funds what, and who to consult about making

alliances.

Amongst those we spoke to, DECC is widely seen as

lacking the general industry, and specific nuclear industry

background necessary to be able to look forward and

solve issues in the nuclear world ‘as it is’. In particular

the acquisition of such industry knowledge could aid

innovation projects by being able to understand the

challenges and how to help overcome them. There is

also a perception that there is very little knowledge flow

across departments and organisations, and still less cross-

department or cross-organisation working.

Moving away from central government, the current

structures of both the NDA and National Nuclear

Laboratory (NNL) are seen as sub-optimal, which seems

mainly to derive from an uncertainty in their roles. For NDA

this includes its role in setting strategy and its relationship

to DECC, and the level of its control/influence on SLCs.

NDA’s role in R&D comes in for comment, and for some its

role is not understood:

“Need a body to lead on R&D….. and leave

the NDA to start/keep shutting things down.”

“NDA does not accept responsibility for

technical strategy and expects its contractors

to lead engineering innovation and

development.”

NNL is widely seen as a potential competitor by many to

whom a proper “National Laboratory” would be a strong

ally (see also IPR). It should be noted that this study

was conducted before, during and after the Beddington

Review21 and Nuclear Industrial vision statement22. Various

Beddington-derived proposals include moves to develop

NNLs status as a National Laboratory, which would seem

to be universally welcomed.

Both NDA and NNL are perceived as lacking in commercial

expertise and acumen. There are, however some good

exceptions to this rule, with the Nuclear Waste Research

Forum (driven by Sellafield Technical Strategy area and the

NDA), which is itself driven by the NDA Research Board

already mentioned in Chapter 3. This is taking a ‘pan-UK

view’ and is appearing to open minds and to be making

progress in co-ordinating, and sponsoring best practice

and innovation in the area of waste management and

decommissioning. However such ‘areas of excellence’

often rely on personalities rather than system drivers,

which are notably absent – and this is acknowledged by

the participants.



Chapter 5

The potential sponsors of innovation complain of a lack of

appreciation of the problems that need to be tackled, and

the timescales involved.

“Don’t propose immediate treatment of

groundwater when I won’t be tackling that

until 2040.”

– but from the supply chain this is read as a lack of

imagination:

“2040 is only a point on a Gantt chart, moving

points like that are what innovation is about.”

All of the above feed into a lack of energy and drive

from within the industry to find new projects and ways

to overcome the barriers. There are many reports of

nuclear-relevant innovations being used in oil and gas

sectors, because access is easier and innovation drivers

are stronger.

The Beddington Review has, however, raised expectations

that there is more interest in nuclear R&D and in nuclear

strategy in general. However, there are doubts of the

realism of the achievability of the stated objectives when

starting from the current fragmented industry structure

and R&D landscape. It is widely mentioned that France has

CEA as a ‘one-stop-shop’, whereas UK, by contrast, has a

dozen overlapping organisations to talk to. A coordinating

body is desperately needed and long overdue.

The overall requirement is for the UK to develop an

innovation-friendly culture, with a ‘chain of benefit’ across

the supply chain, so that innovation can come from any

level but retain a fair reward.

This ‘chain of benefit’ was explored in the workshop, and

was agreed to be the central requirement for a culture of

successful innovation. The need for linked drivers and

enablers is represented in Figure 7 below.

Figure 7. Need for linked drivers and enablers

This sort of coherence was deemed essential for success,

and the workshop also outlined a ‘path to the future’,

which, though currently only in outline, would surely

repay study and development. It is shown below.

Figure 8. Coherent route to a successful UK nuclear future

JointSharedVision

Fast startthat

fades out

‘Bottom of the Inbox’

Anxiety

Frustration

Falsestart

Success

Must have all 4 of these in place...

If any one is missing...

FAILURE

PressureFor

Change

CapacityFor

Change

ActionableFirstSteps

JointSharedVision

Fast startthat

fades out

‘Bottom of the Inbox’

Anxiety

Frustration

Falsestart

Success

PublicPositive

• Government Investment• Private Investment• Universities attract new talent• Skill culture• Programmes growing• Investment in facilities

• Customers buy• Learning curves / cost reduction• Supply pipeline• Plants building• World Gold Standard

GovernmentPositive

Must have all 4 of these in place...

If any one is missing...

FAILURE

NOW

FUTURE

PressureFor

Change

CapacityFor

Change

ActionableFirstSteps



Chapter 5

One missing element in Figure eight, but which was

reflected in many of the interviews and much of the

workshop discussion, was the need for the UK to identify

and pursue a niche or niches where it could feasibly

become the ‘World Gold Standard’. This reflects a need

to “identify business opportunities” rather than “pursue

innovation per se” – identifying the niches, then using

“the supply chain from academia through to industrial

development and manufacture” as the best way of

maximising market development.

The contrast between Figure eight and the situation

reported in the bulk of the research findings, points to

a clear opportunity for DECC to lead in facilitating the

development of innovations across the TRL 3-4 to 7-9

TRL “Valley of Death”. However, from the evidence,

many of the key barriers to innovation appear cultural

and structural rather than stemming merely from lack

of funding. Creating a “Nuclear UK Innovation Culture”

will probably depend more on coherent leadership than

additional funding, however welcome this might be.

The workshop looked, in four groups, at four ‘case

studies’ of different types of innovation, and reported

on the challenges and barriers to innovation that

were anticipated. These were then ‘marked’ by all the

workshop attendees. The results of this exercise are

given in Appendix V, and while not, of course, statistically

robust, do give a very useful insight into the difficulties

anticipated by those actually operating within the industry.

In particular, the four highest ranked challenges/barriers

chime very well with the rest of the research findings, and

are reproduced below.

Challenge/Barrier Marks Rank

Lack of institutional innovation climate

13 1

Need for national leadership (public and private), direction and vision

11 2

No incentive for business given long return on investment/access to (private sector) funding

9 3

Making and selling a compelling case for changes (team/individual credibility)

8 4

Table 2. Ranked Challenges/Barriers from Workshop Exercise

During the workshop there was much discussion around

the development of “innovation portals” similar to the

Centre for Defence Enterprise (CDE). Many thought

such a scheme aligned to civil nuclear power could have

enormous benefit for the UK and help unblock a number

of the current issues.

The CDE is aligned with the Government’s Small Business

Research Initiative (SBRI) managed by the Technology

Strategy Board (TSB).

CDE is the first point of contact for anyone with a disruptive

technology, new process or innovation that has a potential

defence application. CDE funds research into novel high-

risk, high-potential-benefit innovations sourced from

the broadest possible range of science and technology

providers, including academia and small companies, to

enable development of cost-effective capability advantage

for UK Armed Forces.

CDE is the entry point for new science and technology

providers to defence, bringing together innovation and

investment for the defence and security markets.

All CDE research proposals must be submitted online via

the portal. The CDE team at Harwell is available to talk to

you about your innovative idea or you can book a one-to-

one surgery appointment via the events page. Once your

proposal is submitted you can track its progress online.

CDE welcomes research proposals via two different routes:

• Open call – an enduring call for any innovative research ideas that have a potential defence and security application;

• Themed call – a specific call for innovative research ideas to meet particular challenges.

Public and Political Acceptance

This area, which would not initially come to mind under

the heading of ‘innovation’, was mentioned in several

interviews and was discussed in the workshop, appearing

in Figure eight. It is plausible that the cyclical nature of

political support for nuclear power revealed in Figure two,

Chapter two, may be put down to a relationship between

the perceived need for nuclear power by politicians and

the acceptance of it by the public. It has been argued that

a long term strategy is necessary if innovation is to flourish

in the nuclear industry in the UK. This would involve a long

term political commitment, which would be made easier if

there was demonstrable long-term public support, which

in turn would require public appreciation of the role of

nuclear in an energy-secure low carbon economy.

The fragmented nature of the industry, already reviewed,

has meant there is no ‘owner’ of the industry’s stakeholder

relations, a role which was, in the past, largely undertaken

by BNFL as part of its ‘license to operate’. The need for

some overall stakeholder role was emphasised in the

workshop:

“Scope for innovation in political/public

acceptability arenas, particularly with respect

to the Geological Disposal Facility.”



Chapter 5

This in turn chimes well with the work being done by

DECC to define/refine the Managing Waste Safely

(MRWS) process in the aftermath of the rejection by the

Cumbrian stakeholders of continued participation in the

search for a Geological Disposal Facility for radioactive

waste, The broader context of public acceptance should

be borne in mind during any future developments in the

industry, and will be a factor in the on-going support for

secure low carbon energy.

Innovation and Access

Reflecting the fragmented nature of the industry, its

confusing organisation and the inadequately-defined

roles, the innovation landscape lacks co-ordination and

collaboration – there is no one-stop shop to find out what

is happening, and there are major issues of accessibility

and complexity. This makes both ‘knowing what’s going

on” and “affecting what’s going on” difficult.

There is perceived to be lack of innovation right across the

landscape, partly due to past and on-going uncertainties

around nuclear policy – the same legacy of the past 60

years of chopping and changing. This feeds into difficulties

in R&D funding and access to innovation – with diverse

funders mirroring the complex industry structure. Access

is adequate for practised companies, but even the good

ones admit that entry is a struggle, and many holders of

good innovations are not big enough/good enough/

determined enough to succeed. SMEs particularly find it

difficult to be able to put together bids: it is always difficult

to break into new markets, and SMEs are at a natural

disadvantage as they are small and any extra effort in

processes is disproportionately difficult for them.

“It would be easier if the funding was better

aligned.. at least in one central place.”

The TSB approach was actively criticised by some SMEs

and Institutions, and it is considered onerous, particularly

as it appears to require a large commercial partner

(though, in some situations, this is actually not the case).

Such partners can be difficult to find, and when they are

found it is often difficult to partner while at the same time

protecting the SME’s IPR. However, and understandably,

the process has been praised by some of the larger

players. Alternative approaches are suggested, with the

MOD’s Centre for Defence Enterprise23 much quoted

as an exemplar of good practice. This offers open calls

on managed themes, and once an outline proposal is

received CDE representatives contact the proposer to

refine an application with the intent that its assessment

chances will be improved. There is also no requirement

for partnering or matching funding, making it easier for

SMEs with worthwhile innovations to make progress.

“TSB calls are quite difficult actually. We can

end up doing projects we don’t necessarily

want to do as the guidelines push you into

collaborations you wouldn’t otherwise do.”

“We have a lot of experience and have been

successful in TSB calls, but can understand

how new entrants find the task daunting.”

The paragraphs above indicate a real problem: that

SMEs, particularly ‘out of industry’ SMEs, may have the

innovations that the nuclear industry needs, but the

barriers to entry are high: how to find out what’s needed,

how to fit solutions within the nuclear regulatory and

safety case framework, how to find industry players

motivated to innovate, how to get partners without being

‘eaten’. Individually, such remarks could be passed off a

“the whingeing of the unsuccessful”. Collectively, they

paint a clear picture of an industry with widespread and

high barriers to innovation, particularly from SMEs.

“The key thing for companies like us, is

that we need to bring the market in to us…

we need big companies to engage with us

otherwise we’re almost shooting in the dark.”

With these barriers, the 3-4 to 7-9 TRL “Valley of Death”,

which innovations fail to cross, seems to be a reality. A

DECC call for projects in this area would be well aimed,

but might end up ameliorating a few of the symptoms,

while leaving the structural ‘illness’ untreated. There is

a need to generate market “pull” as well as innovation

“push”: perhaps targeted contractual change which would

allow/promote cultural and motivational change to “do a

good job for UK plc”. The key question is how to generate

motivation within a system with multiple organisational,

contractual, commercial and procurement barriers to

innovation. This is reported at various layers – from those

who look above them and find barriers to innovation, and

to those that look at them from below and find the same

problem.

“We spend 1bn euros a year on R&D and

while we have an interest to do that, the UK’s

set up is almost anti-innovation.”

Innovation requires access to information – “what is the

problem” – access to data (which frequently cannot, or

will not, be shared) and physical access to environments in

which solutions can be tested. There was speculation on

whether it might be possible to derive metrics for inertia/

resistance to innovation: while clearly a non-trivial task,

this might allow improvement to be measured.



Chapter 5

IPR and Commercial Arrangements – sharing risk and reward

There were many problems reported on the difficulty of

protecting IPR, and difficulties in negotiating confidentiality

agreements. Some of the larger organisations are said to

refuse confidentiality agreements outright, and often take

over the IPR as a condition of support. Innovative SMEs

can end up either with little return for their idea, or they

can be bought up and shut down.

“How can you encourage innovation when

the client will take the IP off you in return for

a relatively small contract.”

This perception is widespread, and emphasises the need

for a ‘chain of benefit’ across the supply chain – with

a fair distribution of risk and benefit for all stages of the

innovation chain. ‘Small’ must be able to present to ‘large’

without getting ‘eaten’. There seems little to encourage

joint engagement between an equipment manufacturer

and an end user, and the ‘Tiering’ of contractors, formalised

in the legacy waste management and decommissioning

market, promotes barriers between tiers.

New Build

There is a growing lack of conviction that ‘new nuclear’

will actually happen, and no real understanding of the role

nuclear could/would play in the UK low carbon energy

future. The 2050 aspiration (i.e. 80% less CO2 by 2050)

does not appear to reflect the UK’s need for integrated

energy systems to deliver a low carbon economy, and

a meaningful longer term energy policy joining “now”

and “then” with a real strategy would help to signal

Government commitment.

If ‘new build’ does not happen, there will be major

knock-on effects for people, skills, graduate recruitment/

retention, all of which are essential resources if any UK

nuclear success is to be had. On the other hand, positive

commitments on ‘new build’ can unlock investment in the

UK ‘new build’ supply chain.

“Financing R&D on civil nuclear remains challenging...

particularly with the delays on ‘new build’, a move on ‘new

build’ would unlock a lot of stalled activity.”

The current position is that on ‘new build’ “UK is playing

catch-up and the start is being delayed”, although EDF is

progressing AGR life extension.

UK is seen as highly regulated across the whole nuclear

industry, and this is essential to the level of public

acceptance it can achieve. However, it should be noted

that the Generic Design Assessment process was an

example of innovation, with all the regulators working

as a team with a common goal and an incentive to

work thoroughly but without delay. This ‘balance of

forces’ was conspicuously lacking during the licensing

of Sizewell B, as there were strong timescale drivers

to get the station constructed, licensed and operating,

which overrode any motivation of the Sizewell B team to

challenge the regulator requirements to modify/augment

safety systems, therefore increasing costs. There was

widespread support in the workshop for the proposition

that “there would never have been another reactor as long

as the Sizewell B licensing process remained in place,”

Waste Management and Decommissioning Legacy

The UK legacy nuclear cleanup is, at £3bn or so per annum,

a major market which should give a real opportunity for

the UK to be a world leader in nuclear decommissioning.

The current structure is widely seen as a barrier rather

than a driver of such developments, with perceptions

from the outside virtually unanimous that the system

does little to incentivise innovation or, indeed, progress

a decommissioning and waste management, a drive by

Government which could “help UK firms to the top table.”

“Decommissioning is an obvious area for the

UK to develop a leadership role both in terms

of expertise and technology innovation…

It’s a large industry for the UK and I don’t

understand why we don’t exploit the

opportunities it presents more.”

There are exceptions, for example the Nuclear Waste

Research Forum, but as already discussed this is

‘people and personality’ based rather than driven by the

contractual/commercial structure. It would only take a few

people to move on and the progress could cease.

Perceptions of the legacy clean-up market include:

“There is currently no incentive to

decommission and deal with waste …

[decommissioning] policy is about care and

maintenance.”

“The current system is based upon care and

maintenance rather than actually wanting to

do anything.”

“The current system at Sellafield does not

make contractors think how best to get the

most innovative processes or technologies

on to the site… it is very much focused on an

operations and maintenance model.”

One area where innovation is reported is in a more

phased approach by regulators to high-hazard-potential

plants at Sellafield. Formerly, no project could be initiated

until all the downstream processes and projects were in



Chapter 5

place to take waste into a final disposable form. Now, the

realisation that the priority is progress in Hazard Potential

reduction in the short term, short term progress is being

facilitated by phased approvals, while ensuring that routes

to final disposal are not compromised.

To maximise the chances of the UK becoming a world

leader in nuclear clean-up, the clean-up market would

need to maximise the opportunities for UK firms to win

jobs, gain experience and strengthen the UK supply chain.

However, the perception is that procurement procedures

and recourse to OJEU24, are widely used/interpreted to

the detriment of setting up UK capabilities and supply

chains, with the UK apparently playing to a set of rules

very different to those of its international competitors.

One subject which was not much mentioned in the

interviews/meetings, but was dealt with in the workshop,

was the disposal of radioactive waste and the progress

towards a Geological Disposal Facility. Progress on

disposal, along with ‘new build’, would be a signal that the

UK nuclear industry is ‘on the move from cradle to grave’.

The current hiatus may, in the long term, be as damaging

as a short term hiatus for ‘new build’.

“They need to sort out the GDF issue. It was

a massive blow to the UK and the nuclear

industry that GDF process has stalled. It

could have really delivered a lot of innovation

around nuclear waste management.”

The Market is International

The international dimension of innovation is growing, and

this was discussed, and found broad agreement, in the

workshop. Even a nuclear industry the size of France’s is

turning to its international peers for ideas. This was not to

say that the UK could not find international markets for

its innovative ideas, merely that it must find, and pursue,

suitable niches. For example by setting the benchmark for

regulation, standards and codes, the UK could develop

an international niche, attracting good people into the

industry and the UK.

This observation emphasises the need for any analysis of

nuclear industry futures for the UK to ‘start from where we

are’ (i.e. the industry structure as seen in Figure three), not

‘where we’d like to be’.

Innovation Examples

Though the observations of the industry representatives

that have been contacted, as reported in the sections

above, has concentrated on barriers to innovations and

on the changes needed for improvement, the interviews

and meetings did reveal a range of innovative ideas which

could make a significant difference to the effectiveness of

nuclear activities in the UK if they were implemented.

The detailed findings have been included in the

Commercial Appendices to this report, with distribution

restricted to DECC, but it is relevant here to give a broad

representation of the innovations proposed and the field

in which they could operate. It should be noted that Table

3 below is not intended to be comprehensive, but gives

a “snapshot” of the innovation topics discussed during

the stakeholder engagement exercise. The innovations

are assigned to the six themes identified by DECC, which

were examined in Chapter three, and are repeated for

convenience below.







Chapter 5

Table 3. Example Innovations proposed during stakeholder contacts

Technology Description TRL Level Opportunities Theme

Data management and consolidation

Integrates sensors and monitoring technologies without the need for a central concentrator

5 Automatically determine how data can be interpreted in a system

a25

Condition monitoring system

Monitors integrity of machinery Not stated Identifies early on issues with machinery and parts and allows early warning for maintenance / improves safety

a

Corrosion studies and testing

Only one rig in the UK 4-5 As a nuclear capability the ability to understand corrosion in reactors is very important

a

Virtual environments Developing gaming engines to deal with specific issues around nuclear sites

7-8 Develops knowledge on decommissioning and testing. Good training tool

v

Robotics Development of hand sensors for robotics

5-6 Would reduce time and improve efficiency

v

Graphite management Convert graphite to CO2

7 Speed up decommissioning and save money

v

Concrete integrity measurement

CMS – Inspects and monitors the integrity of concrete structures from installation and construction

5-6 Identifies early on issues with structures and allows early warning for maintenance

iv

Waste encapsulation Encapsulation of solid intermediate Level Waste (ILW)

4 More cost effective than other forms of encapsulation

v

Depth of contamination in concrete

Measuring the depth of contamination in concrete

5 Reduction in the cost of decommissioning and waste management

v

Plasma Arc Technology

Using plasma arc technology will significantly reduce amount of nuclear waste for disposal

7 Technology would significantly reduce the amount of cost spent on nuclear waste disposal

v

Data Signals monitoring system

Monitors signals – heat, vibrations, movements. Seeks to analyse data and produce abnormality detection systems

4 Requires large data sets. Difficult to get access to large players and existing plants

a

Fire protection technology

The thermal insulation technology is endothermic and absorbs heat

7-8 Would reduce major fire risks ii

Metal-fuelled fast reactor

Various components and fuel forms Not Applied

-

Powder technology applications

Applying powder processing and sorting techniques in place of chemical processes

9 in other industries

Documents

Nuclear Innovation Analysis: Landscape Review September …...2005 • Nuclear Decommissioning Authority set-up taking strategic responsibility for UK’s nuclear legacy • British