NPR 4.2: BALLISTIC, CRUISE MISSILE, AND MISSILE DEFENSE ... · Missile Developments 134 BALLISTIC, CRUISE MISSILE, AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS: TRADE AND SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS,

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997

Missile Developments

134

BALLISTIC, CRUISE MISSILE, ANDMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS: TRADE AND

SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS,JULY-OCTOBER 1996

CONTENTS

AFGHANISTANwith:Pakistan, 138

AFRICAwith:Ukraine, 138

AUSTRALIAwith:Russia and Thailand, 138United States, 138

BELARUSwith:Russia, 138

BOSNIAInternal Developments, 139

BRAZILInternal Developments, 139

with:Russia and United States, 139United States, 140

BULGARIAwith:Russia and United States,140

CANADAwith:India, 140

ISRAELInternal Developments, 152

with:China, 141India, 147Iran, Lebanon, and Syria, 149Iraq, 152Syria, 153Turkey, 153United Kingdom, 153United States, 153

ITALYwith:Germany, Netherlands,Turkey, and UnitedStates, 143

JAPANwith:

United States, 155

KUWAITwith:United States, 155

LEBANONwith:Israel, Iran, and Syria, 149

MALAYSIAwith:Turkey, 156

CHINAInternal Developments, 140

with:India and Pakistan, 141Iran, 141Israel, 141Pakistan, 141Russia and Ukraine, 141United States, 142

CYPRUSwith:Russia, United Kingdom, andUnited States, 142

CZECH REPUBLICInternal Developments, 142

EGYPTwith:Russia, 142United States, 142

FINLANDwith:Russia, 143

FRANCEwith:Russia, 143

GERMANYwith:Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, andUnited States, 143

Ukraine, 143United States, 144

GREECEwith:United States, 144

HUNGARYInternal Developments, 144

INDIAInternal Developments, 144

with:Canada, 140China and Pakistan, 141Israel, 147Russia, 148Slovakia, 148

IRANInternal Developments, 148

with:China, 141Israel, Lebanon, andSyria, 149North Korea, 149North Korea and UnitedStates, 149Russia, 149

IRAQInternal Developments, 150

with:Israel, 152

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MISSILE TECHNOLOGYCONTROL REGIME(MTCR)DEVELOPMENTS, 156

NETHERLANDSwith:Germany, Italy, Turkey, andUnited States, 143

NORTH ATLANTICTREATY ORGANIZATION(NATO)with:Russia, 157

NORTH KOREAInternal Developments, 157with:Iran, 149Iran and United States, 149Pakistan and Taiwan, 157Syria, 157

NORWAYwith:Russia, Ukraine, and UnitedStates, 157

PAKISTANwith:Afghanistan, 138China, 141India and China, 141North Korea and Taiwan, 157

RUSSIAInternal Developments, 158

with:Australia and Thailand, 138Belarus, 138-139Brazil and United States, 139Bulgaria and United States, 140China and Ukraine, 141Cyprus, United Kingdom,and United States, 142Egypt, 142Finland, 143France, 143India, 148Iran, 149NATO, 157

Norway, Ukraine, and UnitedStates, 157Singapore, 160United Arab Emirates, 160United States, 160

SINGAPOREwith:Russia, 160

SLOVAKIAwith:India, 148

SOUTH KOREAInternal Developments, 161

SYRIAwith:Israel, 153Israel, Iran, and Lebanon, 149North Korea, 157

TAIWANInternal Developments, 161

with:North Korea andPakistan, 157United States, 161

THAILANDwith:Australia and Russia, 138

TURKEYwith:Germany, Italy, Netherlands,and United States, 143Israel, 153Malaysia, 156United States, 162

UKRAINEInternal Developments, 162

with:Africa, 138China and Russia, 141Germany, 143MTCR, 156Norway, Russia, and UnitedStates, 157United States, 162

UNITED ARAB EMIRATESwith:Russia, 160

UNITED KINGDOMwith:Cyprus, Russia, and UnitedStates, 142Israel, 153MTCR, 156

UNITED STATESInternal Developments, 163

with:Australia, 138Brazil, 140Brazil and Russia, 139Bulgaria and Russia, 140China, 142Cyprus, Russia, and UnitedKingdom, 142Egypt, 142Germany, 144Germany, Italy, Netherlands,and Turkey, 143Greece, 144Iran and North Korea, 149Israel, 153Japan, 155Kuwait, 155MTCR, 156Norway, Russia, andUkraine, 157Russia, 160Taiwan, 161Turkey, 162Ukraine, 162

WASSENAAR ARRANGE-MENT, 163



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OVERVIEW

During the July-October 1996 period, United NationsSpecial Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors were yet againprevented from examining sites suspected of containing in-formation and materials associated with Iraq’s prohibitedballistic missile program. In July, it was feared that prohib-ited materials, including objects that looked like Scud bal-listic missiles were removed from a suspect location whilethe Iraqis delayed the inspectors en route. According toUNSCOM Chief Rolf Ekeus, Iraq conceals banned weap-ons and materials by transporting them around on trucksand railway cars prior to inspections. Iraq continued to ob-struct UNSCOM despite Prime Minister Tariq Aziz’s agree-ment with Ekeus in June to provide unconditional access toall sites the commission wants to inspect. In late August,Ekeus traveled to Baghdad with a U.N. Security Councildeclaration demanding that Iraq provide his inspectors withunrestricted access to military installations in their searchfor banned materials. Ekeus departed from Iraq with assur-ances that future searches would not be blocked. However,in its semi-annual report to the U.N. Security Council inOctober, UNSCOM accused Baghdad of “systematicallyconcealing” prohibited weapons and stated that Iraq stillhad to account fully for all of its banned weapons, items,and capabilities in its ballistic missile program.

Also in the Middle East, the joint Israeli-U.S. Arrow-2anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) program made signifi-cant headway in July when the Arrow-2 successfully inter-cepted a Scud-type missile armed with a dummy chemicalwarhead over the Mediterranean Sea. Encouraged by thesuccessful test, the Israeli government may exclude Arrow-2 funding from planned defense budget cuts. Future launchesof the Arrow-2 will test the missile’s interception capabili-ties against different targets at various altitudes. The IsraeliAir Force is scheduled to receive at least 50 Arrow-2 mis-siles by February 1998, according to Israeli sources.

In East Asia, there were indications in October that NorthKorea was preparing for a test flight of the 1,000 km-rangeNo-dong-1 ballistic missile and that Iranian officials wouldbe present at the test-site. The United States reacted by send-ing reconnaissance aircraft to monitor the test area and de-manding that North Korea cancel the test.

In South Asia, Pakistan reportedly received blueprints

and equipment from China to build an M-11 missile factoryin Tarwanah, and there were conflicting reports as to whetherthe facility will be capable of producing complete missilesystems or just their components. Construction of the facil-ity began in 1995. In a related development, the China Na-tional Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporationmay have supplied Pakistan with guidance technology aswell as chemicals to manufacture solid fuel. In response,the Indian Ministry of Defence’s 1996 annual report stressedthe need for India to deploy the Prithvi ballistic missile andto develop the projected 2,500 km-range Agni IRBM in or-der to counter missile threats in the region. According to thereport, advanced weapons in China and Pakistan andBeijing’s missile sales to Islamabad compelled India to “re-main on guard.” The report said that New Delhi will pre-serve its options to deploy missiles as warranted by nationalsecurity requirements. Abdul Kalam, director general ofIndia’s Defence Research and Development Organisation(DRDO), said operational testing of the Agni could begin assoon as the government gave the go-ahead. DRDO officialssaid the next phase of the IRBM project will involve devel-oping facilities for missile production and an emphasis onoperations and extensive exercises.

During a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)seminar held during the summer in Washington, D.C., for-eign policymakers and specialists from 12 member statesand seven non-MTCR countries exchanged ideas on howto impede the transshipment of missile technology. Thisgathering was followed in October by the 1996 MTCR Ple-nary Meeting in Edinburgh, United Kingdom, where mem-bers agreed on steps that could be taken to improve theregime’s effectiveness in restricting regional missile prolif-eration in South Asia and the Persian Gulf. The membersalso agreed to encourage key non-MTCR transshippers toadhere to regime guidelines, and to give them “practical as-sistance” in implementing transshipment controls on mis-sile technology. Although the United States has judgedUkraine’s export control policies to be in line with theMTCR , Kiev’s inventory of Scud-B missiles prohibits aneeded American endorsement for Ukraine to join the re-gime. Ukraine is reportedly not prepared to accept theAmerican position that new members must give up theiroffensive missiles before joining the regime. Meanwhile,

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U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Harold Smith said Wash-ington does not favor a Ukrainian suggestion to convertSS-24 ICBMs into space launch vehicles. Smith said theICBMs are “too expensive to maintain” and should be de-stroyed. But Stanislav Konyukhov, chief designer atUkraine’s Pivdenmash, said Ukraine is not consideringdestroying its SS-24 ICBMs.

Controversy continued to surround U.S. National Intelli-gence Estimate 95-19 (NIE 95-19) after the General Account-ing Office (GAO) released a report which said the estimatewas flawed. In November 1995, NIE 95-19 asserted that theUnited States will not be threatened by a new ballistic mis-sile for the next 15 years. According to the GAO, the NIEfailed to provide clear judgments, did not identify the basisfor its conclusions, and did not examine worst-case scenariosfor future missile developments abroad. The GAO said sev-eral assumptions were incorrectly presented as fact-basedjudgments, including the NIE’s assertion that the MTCRwill “significantly limit” international missile sales and thatno country that possesses ICBMs will sell them. The reportalso contested the NIE’s conclusion that “three unidentifiedcountries” will not attempt to produce long-range ballisticmissiles, as well as its estimate that it takes five years todevelop an ICBM.

Wyn Bowen and Kimber Cramer

NOTE:

A date marked with an “*” indicates that an event wasreported on that date; a date without an “*” is the datewhen an event actually occurred.

The numbers listed in parentheses following the biblio-graphic references refer to the identification number of thedocument in the CNS Missile Database from which the newssummaries are abstracted. Because of the rapidly changingnature of the subject matter, The Nonproliferation Reviewis unable to guarantee that the information reported hereinis complete or accurate, and disclaims liability to any partyfor any loss or damage caused by errors or omissions.



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AFGHANISTAN

AFGHANISTAN WITH PAKISTAN

10/2/96The Russian newspaper NezavisimayaGazeta reported that 15 nuclear-capable Scudmissiles that were seized by the Taliban mili-tia in Kabul, Afghanistan, could be trans-ported to Pakistan. The missiles are said tobe “more-or-less in battle readiness.” In thelate 1980s, the Soviet Union delivered themissiles to the Najibullah regime in Afghani-stan. The Talibans have acquired an un-known number of short-range Luna-Mtactical missiles, “which may also fall into thehands of Islamabad.”

Indian Express, http://express.indiaworld.com/ie,10/3/96 (6538).

AFRICA

AFRICA WITH UKRAINE

10/24/96Ukraine’s ambassador to South Africa, Le-onid Guryanov, offered African countriesUkrainian space technology to monitorweather cycles and explore marine resources.Guryanov told delegates at an internationaltrade show that Ukraine was a world famousproducer of “certain types of space equip-ment which is of the highest technologicallevel.” Guryanov said many opportunitiesexisted for African countries to use Ukrai-nian space technology and SLVs to explorethe sea shelf and monitor the Earth. Accord-ing to Guryanov, there was room for greatertrade between Ukraine and African countries,including trade in military-related items.Guryanov added that prospects were goodfor Ukraine to use its rocket and missile build-ing potential in Africa for peaceful and mili-tary purposes.

Reuter, 10/24/96; in Executive News Service, 10/25/96 (6668).

AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIA WITH RUSSIA AND THAILAND

7/3/96*United Communications of Thailand has“taken a 50 percent stake” in a project toconstruct a satellite launch center at GunnPoint, located north-east of Darwin inAustralia’s Northern Territory. United Com-munications plans to buy an interest inAustralia’s Space Transportation Systemsto conduct an $8 million study to determinethe feasibility of building the center, whichwill be used primarily to launch Russian Pro-ton SLVs. The $500 million (A$630) center’sequatorial location would increase theProton’s payload capacity for launchingcommunications satellites into geostation-ary transfer orbit. If the go-ahead is givenfor the launch center to be built, the Austra-lian government will provide A$126 millionto improve infrastructure in the Northern Ter-ritory.

Flight International, 7/3/96-7/9/96, p. 21 (6466).

AUSTRALIA WITH UNITED STATES

8/26/96*Australian Defense Minister Ian McLachlanrejected, “on the grounds of cost,” a pro-posal “in the short term” to purchase U.S.-manufactured BGM-109 Tomahawk cruisemissiles to arm Australia’s new Collins-classsubmarines.

Australian Broadcasting Corporation OnlineWWW (Internet), 8/26/96; in FBIS-EAS-96-166,8/26/96 (6519).

BELARUS

BELARUS WITH RUSSIA

8/29/96*According to the Belarusian Ministry ofDefense’s press office, S-300 missile crewsfrom the country’s 15th Air Defense Brigadedeparted for Russia to participate in a “tacti-

cal and field firing exercise” scheduled tocommence in early 9/96. The exercise will becommanded by Lieutenant General ValeryyKastenka, commander of the Belarusian AirDefense Troops, at the Russian Air DefenseTroops testing ground at Ashuluk near As-trakhan. This will be the first large-scale ex-ercise of the National Air Defense Troops.

Belapan (Minsk), 8/29/96; in FBIS-SOV-96-169,8/29/96 (6542).

9/7/96Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenkaarrived in Moscow for an unscheduled meet-ing with Aleksandr Lebed, secretary ofRussia’s Security Council, to discuss the re-moval of Russian missile units from Belarus.According to the Russian Security Councilpress service, Russian Defense Minister IgorRodionov was also present at this “workingmeeting.”

Belapan (Minsk), 9/16/96; in FBIS-SOV-96-181,9/16/96 (6497). Itar-Tass (Moscow), 9/9/96; inFBIS-SOV-96-176, 9/9/96 (6497).

9/13/96Viktar Sheyman, secretary of state at theBelarusian Security Council, met withAleksandr Lebed to examine issues relatedto the withdrawal of Russia’s StrategicRocket Forces (SRF) from Belarus. Lebednoted the importance of establishing animplementation procedure to insure that thelast 18 Topol ICBMs are transferred fromBelarus to Russia by the end of 1996, underthe terms of a bilateral agreement betweenthe two countries. Aleksandr Barkhatov,Lebed’s press secretary, said Russia andBelarus agreed that nothing could stop “nor-mal implementation” of this agreement. Ac-cording to unnamed sources affiliated withLebed, the establishment of a regional air-defense system was also scheduled to bediscussed during the meeting.

Belapan (Minsk), 9/16/96; in FBIS-SOV-96-181,9/16/96 (6497). Andrey Surzhanskiy, Itar-Tass(Moscow), 9/13/96; in FBIS-SOV-96-179, 9/13/96 (6497).

9/22/96Russian Public TV reported that BelarusianPresident Lukashenka said Russia hadagreed to partly fund the Belarusian air de-fense forces. Lukashenka said that he andRussian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov

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reached the agreement during the former’strip to Moscow on 9/7/96. The Russian De-fense Ministry did not confirm Lukashenka’sstatement.

OMRI Daily Digest, 9/23/96 (6540).

BOSNIA

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

10/1/96Russian Battalion troops from the Implemen-tation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia confiscatedhand grenades and 16 SA-12 missiles fromBosnian Muslims in Zvornik, according to“sources close to IFOR.” SRNA in Belgradereported that inhabitants of the neighboringvillages of Malesic, Kozluk, and Kiseljakheard two explosions on 10/1/96. An anony-mous official from the Bosnian Serb Repub-lic Interior Ministry in Zvornik said theexplosions “could have been caused by thedestruction of explosive devices confiscatedfrom the Muslims.”

SRNA (Belgrade), 10/2/96; in FBIS-EEU-96-193,10/2/96 (6611).

BRAZIL


7/22/96*According to Brazilian Space Agency (AEB)President Luiz Gylvan Meira Filho, Brazil’sannual space budget totals between $120million and $130 million. AEB receives ap-proximately 50 percent of this budget to de-velop the Veiculo Lancador de Satellites(VLS) SLV, the Alcantara Launch Center(CLA), and Brazil’s data collection satellites,including the SCD-1 and SCD-2. Approxi-mately one-third of AEB’s annual budget isspent on the VLS. After Brazil finishes test-ing its subsystems within “the next fewmonths,” the VLS will either be prepared forlaunch or undergo a “major redesign.” TheVLS will probably not be launched until 1997,and the rocket’s program managers will iden-

tify a more specific launch date in 8/96. Thefour-stage VLS is designed to launch a 150kg satellite to an altitude of 750 km. Four VLS“flight models” are being constructed as partof the rocket’s “demonstration program.” Therocket’s first payload will be Brazil’s SCD-3satellite. Although the VLS project currentlydoes not require infusions of new technol-ogy “from anywhere,” AEB’s acquisition ofrocket technology from overseas is no longera problem because of Brazil’s membership inthe MTCR.

Peter B. de Selding , Space News, 7/22/96-7/28/96, p. 22 (6462).

8/4/96*The Brazilian government plans to “resusci-tate” the country’s weapons industry for ex-ports by improving its technological quality,as well as for guaranteeing basic supplies tothe Brazilian Armed Forces. The principalfocus of this resuscitation will be Imbel, apublic company created in 1975 and con-nected to the Army Ministry and AvibrasAerospace Industry, a private companybased in Sao Jose dos Campos. Avibras’ prin-cipal export is the truck-mounted Astros-2artillery rocket system. Avibras also rents its“precision laboratories” for other companiesto test products. By keeping Imbel opera-tional, the Brazilian Armed Forces hope toavoid another Engesa situation. Engesaceased operations in 1995 after the armedforces reduced equipment orders from thecompany. Brazil’s loss of defense trade withIran and Iraq also contributed to the demiseof Engesa.

Sonia Mossri, Folha De Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo),8/4/96, p. 17; in FBIS-LAT-96-153, 8/4/96(6471).

8/29/96Brazilian President Fernando HenriqueCardoso said Brazil will launch the first pro-totype of the VLS “in the next few months”from CLA in the northeastern state ofMaranhao. Cardoso said Brazil was “enter-ing [a] cycle favorable to research and con-struction of technology in the area of spacedevelopment.” Cardoso made his remarksduring a ceremony to unveil a 10-year Brazil-ian space program. During the ceremony,Strategic Affairs Secretary RonaldoSardenberg said the ability to plan, build, and

launch satellites will be “an important stepin the definition of Brazil in the next century.”Brazil hopes CLA’s equatorial location willallow the country to profit in the commercialspace launch market. Rockets launched fromequatorial locations require less fuel to orbitsatellites because they benefit from the ef-fect of the Earth’s centrifugal forces. Fourdevelopment flights of the VLS are plannedfrom CLA before the rocket is declared op-erational. The VLS project has been delayedat various stages over the past 15 years byfinancial problems and an embargo by theleading industrialized countries. Prior to 10/95, the MTCR countries restricted the trans-fer of rocket technology to Brazil because ofproliferation concerns.

William Schomberg, Reuter, 8/29/96; in Execu-tive News Service, 8/30/96 (6672). Flight Inter-national, 9/11/96-9/17/96, p. 45 (6672).

BRAZIL WITH RUSSIA AND

UNITED STATES

7/22/96*Although the Brazilian government has al-ready decided to open CLA to “internationaluse,” it has not decided whether the centerwill be offered for use by a Russian rocket inorder to compete directly with the EuropeanSpace Agency’s (ESA) Ariane SLV, which islaunched from Kourou in French Guiana. Thegovernment still needs to consider severalfactors, including the daily costs of operat-ing CLA and the political implications ofcompeting directly with ESA. CLA costsapproximately $12 million to operate annu-ally. If CLA were upgraded to handle a “biglaunch vehicle,” significant extra resourceswould be needed. CLA currently has twopads for launching sounding rockets. Oneof these pads is being upgraded for use bythe VLS. AEB has invited other countries tolaunch their rockets from CLA because thecenter will be too expensive to operate if it isused only to launch satellites for domesticpurposes. The agency is currently workingon the legal aspects of establishing a 15-yearlease arrangement with a foreign launch pro-vider.

Peter B. de Selding , Space News, 7/22/96-7/28/96, p. 22 (6462).



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BRAZIL WITH UNITED STATES

7/8/96*A U.S. Commerce Department trade missionwill visit Brazil between 11/4/96 and 11/10/96to discuss SLVs and other space-related tech-nologies. U.S. industry and government rep-resentatives with an interest in trading orsetting up partnerships with Brazil are beinginvited to participate in the mission. In 1995,Brazil imported $584 million worth of U.S.aerospace products, and it has been pre-dicted this figure will rise by the year 2000.

Patrick Seitz, Space News, 7/8/96-7/14/96, p. 2(6468).

BULGARIA

BULGARIA WITH RUSSIA AND

UNITED STATES

9/13/96*The Bulgarian army possesses eight nuclear-capable SS-23 (OTR-23/9M714 ‘Oka’) ballis-tic missiles. Although the SS-23 missiles arenot nuclear-armed, nuclear warheads couldhave been transferred to Bulgaria from theSoviet Union in 40 minutes during the ColdWar. According to Vasil Lyutskanov, the SS-23 missiles belong to Bulgaria and not Rus-sia, and they should not be destroyed assome countries have suggested. During Bul-garian President Zhelyu Zhelev’s first trip tothe United States, American experts wereinvited to inspect the SS-23 missiles “toclarify the issue on the spot.” Twelve monthslater, American experts inspected the mis-siles, and U.S. ambassador to Sofia HughKenneth Hill was shown documents “prov-ing Bulgarian ownership of the eight missilecomplexes.”

Vasil Lyutskanov, Trud (Sofia), 9/13/96, p. 10; inFBIS-EEU-96-179, 9/13/96 (6534).

CANADA

CANADA WITH INDIA

10/15/96The Canadian Space Agency (CSA) and theIndian Space Research Organisation (ISRO)signed a Memorandum of Cooperation(MOC) regarding the peaceful use of outerspace for commercial and scientific purposes.According to CSA President W. M.MacEvans, Canada does not subscribe tothe US view that India’s SLV program was“oriented towards [the] launch of missiles.”MacEvans did not exclude the possibilitythat Canada might eventually use India’sPolar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) or Geo-Synchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle(GSLV). MacEvans added that India andCanada shared an interest in using space togenerate economic, scientific, and techno-logical benefits. ISRO Chairman K.Kasturirangan said Canada and India identi-fied a number of areas for cooperation.MacEvans and Kasturirangan said the agree-ment covered the commercial use of spacetechnology, an area in which CSA has moreexperience and could help ISRO.Kasturirangan said the MOC was the resultof a series of talks between Canada and In-dia, and reflected the view shared by bothcountries that space systems and technolo-gies should be used to serve mankind.

Indian Express, www.indiaworld.com/ie, 10/16/96 (6597).

CHINA


4/4/96*China’s Naval Engineering Institute recentlycompleted development of a guided-missilesimulation-training system. The system is aresult of China’s focus, since 1990, on incor-porating computer-based technology intostrategic units such as the People’s Libera-tion Army’s (PLA) Second Artillery Corps,

which is China’s strategic missile forces unit,and the PLAN’s (PLA-Navy) missile-relatedforces. The simulation-training system is acomputerized, multimedia, multitasking sys-tem that enables personnel to program com-plex combat scenarios, to respond, and thento display the results. The article notes thatthe use of this technology will save the PLA“millions of yuan” in training costs.

Yang Zhenbo, Keji Ribao (Beijing), 4/4/96 , p. 2;in FBIS-CST-96-009, 4/4/96 (6560).

9/9/96*An investigation is expected to be completedby 11/30/96 into the 8/96 failure of a Chineselaunch vehicle that was carrying a U.S.-madecommunications satellite. China Great WallIndustry Corp., China’s commercial launchservice provider, is conducting the investi-gation. Three panels will investigate the fail-ure: the Investigation Oversight Committee,led by Senior Technical Advisor for theChina Aerospace Corp. (CASC) Ren Xinmin;the Failure Investigation Committee, led byXie Guangxuan, consultant for the commit-tee of science and technology at CASC; andthe Failure Analysis Team, led by Fan Shihe,chief designer of the Long March-3 rocket.

Space News, 9/9/96-9/15/96, p. 12 (6679).

10/96An International Astronautical Federation(IAF) group toured Chinese space facilities.They learned that China’s secret “Project921,” which has been under development bythe Ministry of Defense since 1992, is slatedto launch two astronauts into space in 1999,celebrating the People’s Republic of China’sfiftieth anniversary. An unmanned orbital testflight is set for 1998. China has also dis-cussed plans for launching a space stationinto orbit in 2020. The Chinese Long March-3 (LM-3) is capable of launching 5,000 kginto low orbit, and the upgraded LM-3A canlaunch 6,900 kg. The LM-3B with liquid strap-on boosters could launch 11,500 kg into loworbit. The IAF group also learned that Chinais designing an oxygen/hydrogen first stage.China has developed two smaller oxygen/hydrogen upper stage versions, and “be-lieves it has the technology to develop anoxygen/hydrogen rocket engine comparableto the European Vulcain used on the Ariane5 and Japanese LE-7 used on the H-2.” China

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is also currently conducting research on largekerosene/hydrogen engines. In late 10/96, aLong March-2D (LM-2D) is expected tolaunch an FSW-2 satellite from the Jiuquanlaunch site in the Gobi desert. The FSW-2 isequipped with a camera system that will beused for military reconnaissance and remotesensing. The LM-4 is currently receivingthree significant upgrades. The launch ve-hicle is now capable of launching two pay-loads into space after the development of atwin-satellite launch system. The first flightof this system will “simultaneously launchthe new FY-1C polar orbit weather satelliteand a 400 kg magnetospheric research space-craft” in late 1997 or early 1998. Develop-ment is also underway on the third stage ofthe LM-4. By giving it restart capabilities,the LM-4 will be able to place medium-sizepayloads (1,000-1,500 kg) into highly ellipti-cal orbits. China hopes to make this systemoperational by 1998. In addition, the LM-4 isexpected to have a larger payload capacityfor future missions.

Aviation Week & Space Technology, 10/21/96, p.22 (6680). China News Digest, http://www.cnd.org:800, 10/14/96. (6680.)

CHINA WITH INDIA AND PAKISTAN

7/11/96Indian Foreign Minister Kumar Gujral toldthe Indian parliament about evidence thatPakistan had obtained Chinese-made M-11ballistic missiles.

Defense News, 7/15/96, p. 2 (6539).

CHINA WITH IRAN

9/3/96Iran confirmed that an agreement had beenconcluded with China regarding the acquisi-tion of “heavy and light arms.” Unconfirmedreports stated that the deal includes missilelaunchers, missiles, warplanes, supportships, armored trucks, and transport ve-hicles. The $4.5 billion deal was discussedon Iranian Defense Minister MohammedForuzandeh’s recent visit to China during ameeting with Minister of Defense ChiHaotian. The agreement is expected to becompleted in 12/96 and to be paid for withhard currency and oil over a period of fiveyears.

Washington Times, 9/4/96, p. A12. IRIB Televi-sion Network (Tehran), 9/3/96; in FBIS-NES-96-

173, 9/3/96 (6567).

CHINA WITH ISRAEL

8/6/96Hong Kong customs officials announcedthat, in 5/96, they found a Sidewinder (AIM-9) short-range air-to-air missile-launcher andtwo undeclared 700 kg “fighter-training”bombs among the cargo of a China-ownedDragonair shipment from the China NationalAero-Technology Import-Export Corporation(CATIC) to Israel. China was returning thelauncher and the bombs to Israel after re-verse-engineering the U.S. technology. Thecase against Dragonair for false declarationopened on 9/3/96. Dragonair pled guilty toavoid an investigation into CATIC, and wasfined $80,000. The launcher and the bombsare now the property of the Hong Kong Cus-toms Department, to be used at its trainingschool.

Bruce Gilley, Far Eastern Economic Review, 9/5/96, pp.15-16 (6573).

CHINA WITH PAKISTAN

4/29/96Hong Kong customs authorities seized 200boxes of ammonium perchlorate originatingin Xian, China, and bound for Pakistan’sSpace and Upper Atmosphere Commission(SUPARCO). The shipper, China Ocean Ship-ping, will appear in court in 12/96 when thecase against it for false declaration reopens.The case began on 9/16/96.

Bruce Gilley, Far Eastern Economic Review, 10/3/96, p. 20 (6675).

8/25/96U.S. intelligence officials have concluded thatPakistan is “using blueprints and equipmentsupplied by China” to build a medium-rangemissile factory in Tarwanah, a suburb ofRawalpindi. Some analysts say that the fac-tory is a “turnkey” facility capable of con-structing entire M-11 missile systemscomplete with two missile stages, rocketmotors, solid-fuel, and guidance systems.Others contend that the facility may produceonly M-11 components, and Pakistan will stillneed to import certain technology, includingsteel for the bodies of rocket motors andguidance systems. Pakistan may be able toproduce major components of the M-11within two years. There are also reports that

the China National Precision Machine Im-port & Export Corporation supplied Pakistanwith such sophisticated equipment as gyro-scopes, accelerometers, and on-board com-puters, and that Pakistan has alreadyacquired “sufficient quantities of key solidfuel ingredients,” such as hydroxy-termi-nated poly-butadiene (HTPB), fine aluminumpowder, ammonium perchlorate, aziridine andRDX to build a missile. U.S. officials haveknown about the facility since last year, whenconstruction of the factory allegedly began.A recently released U.S. National IntelligenceEstimate (NIE) on China’s missile-related as-sistance to Pakistan describes the facility andits purpose. The document states that Paki-stan may have developed nuclear warheadswhich could be fitted on M-11 missiles. U.S.officials say that China and Pakistan mayhave signed a secret deal a decade ago re-garding Chinese assistance in the construc-tion of a Pakistani missile factory, as well asthe transfer of approximately three dozencompleted M-11 missiles. China’s allegedassistance to Pakistan would violate itspledge to observe the provisions of theMTCR, and the United States could imposesanctions on certain exports to China suchas electronics, military goods, and space-re-lated equipment.

R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 8/25/96, p.A1 (6621). Hong Kong AFP, 8/27/96; in FBIS-NES-96-167, 8/27/96 (6621). Pravin Sawhney,Asian Age (Delhi), 8/27/96; in FBIS-NES-96-168,8/27/96 (6621). Farhan Bokari, Defense News, 8/2/96-8/8/96, p. 58 (6621).

CHINA WITH RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

9/96Chinese engineers attempted to steal SS-18ICBM blueprints from the Yuzhnoye missileplant in Ukraine. China has been attemptingto acquire missile technology from Russiaand Ukraine in an effort to improve its ballis-tic missile fleet. The U.S. intelligence com-munity is concerned that Chinese efforts topurchase components of the SS-18 “couldbolster its capabilities in areas such as guid-ance and MIRV warheads.” China currentlyhas seven to 12 Dong Feng-5 (DF-5) ICBMmissiles, which are capable of reaching theUnited States, and 10 DF-4s, which can reachMoscow. Chinese officials say that acquisi-tion of SS-18 technology would improve theirspace launch systems.



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Joseph C. Anselmo, Aviation Week & Space Tech-nology, 10/21/96, p. 23 (6596).

CHINA WITH UNITED STATES

10/30/96*A U.S. federal grand jury is investigatingwhether McDonnell Douglas exercisedproper regard for the end-use of factory-sized, metal-shaping machine tools in a saleto the China National Aero-Technology Im-port-Export Corporation (CATIC) Group. Ifthe grand jury determines that McDonnellDouglas knew that CATIC might divert themachine tools for military use, then the Jus-tice Department may bring formal criminalcharges against the company for knowinglyviolating U.S. export control laws. The ma-chine tools were a $5 million side agreementreached in early 1994 as part of a $1.6 billiondeal for 40 commercial MD-90 Trunkliner air-craft, half to be built in the United States andhalf to be built in China. According to theexport license, which the United States re-viewed in summer 1994, the machine toolswere to be delivered to an as-yet-unconstructed machine tool center in Beijingfor use in building the aircraft. The dual-useconcern with metal-shaping machine toolsis that, in addition to shaping aircraft “skins”(the craft’s outer metal surface), they are alsouseful in shaping missile skins. With the dual-use concern in mind, the Commerce Depart-ment approved the export license in 9/94 withthe requirement that McDonnell Douglasmonitor strictly the shipments of the machinetools and progress on the Beijing tool cen-ter. In early 1995, four shipments of machinetools arrived in China. According to the ex-port license, all the shipments were to go toBeijing, and two of them did. The other two,however, went directly to Shanghai. It is notclear why McDonnell Douglas did not bringthis to the attention of the Commerce De-partment. By 3/95, it was clear that the Beijingtool center was not going to be built and, inthe same month, McDonnell Douglas dis-covered that China had placed several piecesof the equipment in a newly constructedbuilding at a military facility in Nanchang,800 mi from Beijing, and only 375 mi fromShanghai. Among other things, theNanchang facility produces cruise missiles.McDonnell Douglas notified the CommerceDepartment, which suspended the license in

4/95 and opened an investigation in 11/95.Because of its complexity, the CommerceDepartment referred the case to the JusticeDepartment. The Justice and Commerce De-partments’ main concern is that, since thediverted machine tools were shipped directlyto Shanghai, CATIC had probably plannedthe diversion from the beginning. McDonnellDouglas’s silence regarding the Shanghaideliveries might have indicated that it wasaware of the impending diversion, but, toensure the success of the main Trunklinerdeal, chose to overlook it. Toward the end ofthe Trunkliner negotiations, CATIC impliedthat the machine tool side agreement wouldhave “a big influence” on the success of thedeal as a whole. Traditionally, Boeing hasdominated the Chinese commercial aircraftmarket; therefore, success of the Trunklinerdeal was important to McDonnell Douglas.

Jeff Gerth and David E. Sanger, New York Times,10/30/96, p. A1 (6636).

CYPRUS

CYPRUS WITH RUSSIA, UNITED

K INGDOM , AND UNITED STATES

9/96According to unnamed sources, the U.S. andthe U.K. sought to stop the Greek CypriotNational Guard from acquiring the RussianS-300 anti-missile system. Unnamed militarysources attribute the American and Britishopposition to fears that the acquisition ofthe S-300 and “the completion of the militaryairport in Paphos, which will be accompa-nied by the permanent presence of the GreekAir Force in Cyprus,” will significantly alterthe balance of power on the island by de-stroying Turkey’s current air advantage. Thesame sources have suggested these stepsmay trigger a Turkish preemptive strike toprevent achievement of these goals. Accord-ing to unnamed “informants,” the NationalGuard’s purchase of the S-300 will proceedas planned, despite efforts by “third parties”to block it.

Ioannis Kharalambidhis, I Simerini (Nicosia), 9/18/96, p. 1; in FBIS-WEU-96-182, 9/18/96(6485). Ioannis Kharalambidhis, I Simerini

(Nicosia), 9/5/96, p. 18; in FBIS-WEU-96-173,9/5/96 (6485). Makarios Dhrousiotis, OFilelevtheros (Nicosia), 9/18/96, p. 1; in FBIS-WEU-96-182, 9/18/96 (6485).

CZECH REPUBLIC


7/25/96The Czech news media reported that theCzech Republic eliminated the last of the SS-23 “Spider” (OTR-23/9M 714 Oka) ballisticmissiles it acquired from the Soviet Union.The Czech Republic announced in 1994 thatit would eliminate its 24 SS-23 missiles and 4SS-23 launchers.

Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, 7/31/96, p. 3 (6527).

EGYPT

EGYPT WITH RUSSIA

8/14/96*Egypt is contemplating the acquisition of S-300PMU-1 anti-tactical ballistic-missile(ATBM) systems from Russia. According tosources in the Middle East, Egypt is seekingto increase both its ATBM and tactical bal-listic missile capabilities.

Flight International, 8/14/96-8/20/96, p. 21(6484).

EGYPT WITH UNITED STATES

9/25/96*Egypt plans to purchase tactical missiles,aircraft, and fighter-aircraft upgrades worth$246 million from the U.S. Department ofDefense.


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FINLAND

FINLAND WITH RUSSIA

7/24/96*Finland is acquiring the Buk-M1 air defensesystem from Russia and will send approxi-mately 30 anti-aircraft specialists, primarilyfrom the Helsinki Air Defense Regiment andthe Armed Services Materiels Institute, toRussia for training. Finland will receive thesystem as partial payment for the SovietUnion’s debt to Helsinki that Russia inher-ited. Russia will not ship the Buk-M1 untilafter 11/96, when the training program is tobe completed. The Buk-M1 will replace thePechora defense system that Finland cur-rently deploys to defend Helsinki.

Helsingin Sanomat (Helsinki), 7/24/96, p. A5;in FBIS-WEU-96-169, 7/24/96 (6494).

FRANCE

FRANCE WITH RUSSIA

7/96The French government helped facilitate theestablishment of a Franco-Russian venturecalled Starsem to market Russia’s Soyuz SLVand Europe’s Ariane SLV. Starsem will handlecommercial and industrial operations forSoyuz SLVs, which will be marketed to launchsmall satellites into low and medium orbits.The French firms Aerospatiale andArianespace have 35 and 15 percent sharesin Starsem, respectively. The Russian SpaceAgency (RKA) and Russia’s Samara StateResearch and Production Space Center eachhave a 25 percent stake. Samara is one ofRussia’s principal space organizations andis responsible for space station components,orbital capsules, spy satellites, and SLVs.Starsem will be based in the Suresnes sub-urb of Paris, France. According to FrancoisCalaque, managing director of Aerospatiale’sspace business unit and president ofStarsem, a number of companies have shownan interest in Soyuz despite having already

signed launch contracts with other firms.Calaque said these firms have anxieties aboutthe credibility of certain SLVs, a problemwhich the Soyuz does not have. Calaque saidthat, on average, Starsem intends to conductfive commercial launches every 12 monthsby the turn of the century. Calaque saidStarsem will primarily use the Russian-oper-ated Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakstan,and will only launch occasionally from thePlesetsk Cosmodrome in northern Russia.Officials representing French industry andgovernment said they were confidentStarsem will not steal business from theAriane SLV. Calaque said Starsem will notlaunch Earth observation satellites for Euro-pean governments unless all of the govern-ments involved agree. At some point,Starsem will seek to manufacture and launchEarth observation spacecraft, as well as par-ticipate in the international space stationproject. RKA’s Viktor Kouznetsov will serveas deputy chairman of Starsem. Starsem’s fi-nal incorporating documents are expected tobe filed in Paris in early 8/96, after whichAerospatiale and Arianespace will orderStarsem’s first Soyuz SLV at an estimatedprice of $20 million.

Peter B. de Selding, Space News, 7/22/96-7/28/96, pp. 4, 19 (6667). Aviation Week & SpaceTechnology, 7/22/96, p. 17 (6667).

9/18/96*The French firm Thomson-CSF AirSys iscollaborating with Russia’s Fakel missile de-sign company to “develop a vertical launchsystem for the VT-1 supersonic missile usedin its Crotale Naval New Generation (CNNG)weapon.” Although initial design work onthe system has begun, officials from AirSyssaid the project was still a cooperative ven-ture and a formal agreement between the twocompanies had not been signed. Fakel willprovide assistance for the design of the ejec-tion and tilt sections of the new system, us-ing cold-launch technology that has notbeen introduced previously in the West. Theproject will involve the development of a gasgenerator to “propel the missile above thelaunch ship’s superstructure before it is seton course and its launcher activated.” Be-cause the launch system will be “more com-pact and safer to use,” AirSys claims it willconstitute an improvement on similar sys-

tems under development by other compa-nies, which require ignition to take place in-side canisters on board the ship itself. Nofigures on the entry into service or cost ofthe system were made available.

Jane’s Defence Weekly, 9/18/96, p. 11 (6531).

GERMANY

GERMANY WITH ITALY , NETHERLANDS ,TURKEY, AND UNITED STATES

9/4/96*U.S. Army Colonel Daniel Montgomery, pro-gram executive officer for air and missile de-fense, said the Netherlands and Turkey areinterested in participating in the MediumExtended Air Defense System (MEADS) pro-gram with the U.S., Italy, and Germany. Be-cause it is not clear whether Turkey and theNetherlands are interested in a financial in-vestment in the program, and because thecurrent participants believe the programneeds to advance before new participantsare accepted, the countries may participateinitially as observers. MEADS has facedproblems because of France’s withdrawalfrom the program and the lack of strong sup-port from the U.S. Congress. Despite this lackof support, the U.S. Army expects Congressto approve a $56.2 million request for theMEADS program in Fiscal Year 1997 funds.A trilateral NATO agency has been createdto administer the MEADS program fromHuntsville, Alabama, and a competition isunderway between two teams led byRaytheon/Hughes and Lockheed Martin, re-spectively, as part of the MEADS definition/validation phase.

Barbara Starr, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 9/4/96, p. 4(6557).

GERMANY WITH UKRAINE

8/23/96The Ukrainian Defense Ministry said theGerman government has set aside DM3.5million to finance the destruction of fivenuclear missile silos in Ukraine by the end of1996. The funds were allocated under theterms of a Ukrainian-German protocol. Ger-



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many has given Ukraine DM3.1 million overthe past two years to develop environmen-tally sound technologies for destroying mis-sile silos. Ukraine is scheduled to destroy 36percent of its missile silos over the next sevenyears.

Raisa Stetsyura, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 8/23/96; inFBIS-SOV-96-166, 8/23/96 (6469).

GERMANY WITH UNITED STATES

10/23/96*Under an agreement with the U.S. firmLockheed Martin Vought Systems, the Ger-man company Dasa LFK-Lenkflugkoerpersysteme will develop aPatriot PAC-3 air-defense system for Ger-many. The PAC-3 missile will be developedby Daimler-Benz Aerospace and LFK, whileSiemens AG will be responsible for systemintegration and launcher equipment. Accord-ing to German industry sources, the PAC-3will include local content, but the extent ofU.S. industry involvement has yet to be de-cided. The German government created afunding plan for the PAC-3 program in itsfive-year budget. Germany wants to deployPAC-3 to replace its current Patriot inven-tory within 12 months of the first U.S. PAC-3unit equipped. The United States completedthe PAC-3’s critical design review earlier in1996 and plans to equip its first unit with themissile by Fiscal Year 1999. At the GermanAir Defense School at Fort Bliss, Texas, aGerman Patriot launcher has already beenoutfitted with a PAC-3 missile enhancedlauncher electronics system.


GREECE

GREECE WITH UNITED STATES

8/96*The Greek government asked if it can pur-chase 40 Army Tactical Missile System(ATACMS) battlefield-support missiles, withlaunching assemblies and support equip-ment, from the U.S. Army at a cost of $60million. ATACMS is produced by LockheedMartin Vought Systems. In addition, theGreek government asked the U.S. Air Force

for 84 Texas Instruments AGM-88B high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARM) and50 Hughes/Raytheon AIM-120B AdvancedMedium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles(AMRAAM) worth a total of $90 million.

Jane’s International Defense Review, 8/96, p. 13(6529).

HUNGARY


8/3/96*According to Brigadier General NandorGruber, head of the Hungarian DefenseMinistry’s Defense Management Main De-partment, Scud missile warheads cannot bedestroyed in Hungary, and they will have tobe dismantled abroad.

Baltic Times, 8/1/96-8/7/96, p. 7 (6591). PeterMatyuc, Nepszabadsag (Budapest), 8/3/96, pp.1, 4; in FBIS-EEU-96-152, 8/3/96 (6591).

INDIA


7/16/96Indian Defence Minister Mulayam SinghYadav said India’s self-reliance in defenseproduction is one of the government’s toppriorities. By 2005, India’s 10-year self-reli-ance plan aims for 70 percent of the country’sweapons requirements to be met domesti-cally. Currently, the Defence Research andDevelopment Organisation (DRDO) meets 30percent of India’s defense needs, accordingto DRDO officials.

Vivek Raghuvanshi, Defense News, 7/29/96-8/4/96, p. 46 (6663).

Early 8/96The DRDO requested the Indian cabinet’sapproval to begin initial operational testingof the projected 2,500 km-range Agni IRBM.


8/2/96Indian Prime Minister Deve Gowda approvedthe Technology Vision 2020 plan developedby the Technology Information Forecastingand Assessment Council (TIFAC). The planis designed to promote domestic develop-ment of technology in key industrial sectors.In the defense sector, the plan calls for de-velopment of high-integrity, real-time soft-ware engineering and fusion; modeling andsimulation; smart structures; aircraft propul-sion; guidance and control; materials andprocess technologies; signature control;aerodynamics and microelectronics for usein strategic industry; and electronic warfaresystems. The plan emphasizes the need toincrease India’s self-reliance in high-technol-ogy weapon systems and defense equipmentbecause of problems the country has experi-enced in acquiring high-technology from theWest. India is a target of Western export con-trol restrictions such as those embodied inthe MTCR. The plan did not say how muchthe program would cost, and it is unclear howthe government intends to finance it.TIFAC’s plan outlines the current state oftechnology in India, the government’s goalsover the next 25 years, and the short- andlong-term strategies that will be implementedto accomplish these objectives. To developthe plan, TIFAC spent two years collectingsuggestions from 500 experts in industry,government, academia, and the scientificcommunity. TIFAC is an independent insti-tution that was established in 1988 to assessfuture technologies in fields of particular sig-nificance for India, and to monitor India’scritical industries.


8/7/96DRDO Director General Abdul Kalam gavethe Professor Y. Nayudamma Memorial Lec-ture on Technology Vision at the Indian In-stitute of Chemical Technology, organizedby the Andhra Pradesh Academy of Sci-ences. Kalam said that by 2005 India wouldbe indigenously producing 70 percent of itsmilitary equipment, in contrast to the current30 percent. Kalam said India’s Vision 2020program envisaged the growth of the coun-try in all areas “from farming to missile tech-nology.” According to Kalam, a hi-tech

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gallium foundry will be built over the nextfive years to supply materials needed for themanufacture of India’s missiles, aircraft, andother defense equipment. S. L. Nacharyulu,director of the Defence Metallurgical Re-search Laboratory (DMRL), said that con-struction had already begun on the galliumarsenide foundry, which is a joint venturebetween DMRL and the Semi ConductorComplex of Chandigarh. Kalam said Indiaintends to invest in critical technologies andcomponents in order to meet future needs,including “a city-based defense laboratoryto develop [a] supercomputer of one giga-flops capacity.”

Indian Express (Delhi), 8/8/96, p. 9; in FBIS-NES-96-155, 8/8/96 N/A (6602). Hindu (Ma-dras), 8/8/96, p. 5; in FBIS-NES-96-155, 8/8/96(6602).

8/8/96Abdul Kalam requested permission from theprime minister to conduct further develop-ment flights of the Agni IRBM. Kalam saidthere was no chance that India would cancelthe project. The two-stage Agni completedprototype testing in 1995.

Indian Express (Delhi), 8/8/96, p. 9; in FBIS-NES-96-155, 8/8/96 (6602). Washington Times,8/10/96, p. A7 (6602).

8/15/96Deve Gowda said India would continue de-veloping the short-range Prithvi missile andthe Agni IRBM, which the United States hascriticized because it believes these programscould increase tensions in South Asia. Ac-cording to Gowda, India has made headwayin its tank, fighter aircraft, and missile pro-grams, including the 250 km-range (140 mi)Prithvi and the 2,500 km-range (1,400 mi) Agnimissiles. Gowda said these programs wouldproceed according to “the earlier determinedpolicy.” Gowda said he wanted to assure theIndian people that the country’s securityneeds would be his foremost priority and thePrithvi and Agni programs would continue.Abdul Kalam said India will deploy the AgniIRBM once the government gives the offi-cial go-ahead. General Shankar RoyChoudhary, Indian army chief of staff, didnot comment when asked if and when thePrithvi missile would be deployed. IndianForeign Minister Inder Kumar Gujral deniedthat India would begin testing the Agni IRBM

again after a two-year lull.Reuter, 8/19/96; in Executive News Service, 8/19/96 (6662). Nelson Graves, Reuter, 8/15/96;in Executive News Service, 8/15/96 (6662). JohnF. Burns, New York Times, 8/17/96, pp. A1, A3(6662). B. R. Srikanth, Asian Age (Delhi), 8/21/96, p. 4; in FBIS-NES-96-163, 8/21/96 (6662).Michael Battye, Reuter, 8/21/96; in ExecutiveNews Service, 8/21/96 (6662).

8/19/96The Indian Defence Ministry’s 1996 annualreport stated that India would continue itsmissile programs in response to stockpilingby other countries in the region. The reportstressed the need for India to keep open itsoption to deploy the Prithvi ballistic missileand to develop the Agni IRBM in order tocounter new missile threats in the region.According to the report, advanced weaponsin China and Pakistan and Beijing’s sale ofmissiles to Islamabad compelled India to “re-main on guard.” The report said New Delhiwill keep its options open on deploying mis-siles as warranted by India’s national secu-rity requirements. The report emphasized thatIndia must make adequate provisions tocounter missile proliferation in the region,despite international pressure regarding itsballistic missile and nuclear weapons pro-grams. According to the report, India mustmodernize existing conventional weaponsand indigenously develop new weapon sys-tems. The report said the Indian Army in-tends to procure improved multi-barrel rocketlaunchers. Also, the Integrated Guided Mis-sile Development Project (IGMDP) is mak-ing headway and a number of domesticallydesigned corvettes, frigates, missile boats,and survey ships are being built for the In-dian Navy. These boats include the mostmodern communications, propulsion, sur-veillance, and weapons systems.

Reuter, 8/19/96; in Executive News Service, 8/19/96 (6662). Vivek Raghuvanshi, Defense News,8/26/96-9/1/96, p. 14 (6606).

8/20/96-8/21/96The Nishant unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV),India’s first indigenously developed un-manned surveillance aircraft, completed suc-cessful flight tests at Kolar, near Bangalore,according to an announcement by the In-dian Defence Ministry. The Nishant is de-signed to conduct reconnaissance ofbattlefields, including target acquisition. The

Defence Ministry said the test flights dem-onstrated the UAV’s ability to navigate ac-curately to designated target points forextended missions of several hours to carryelectro-optic and photographic payloads.The UAV is being developed jointly by sev-eral DRDO laboratories “with the aeronauti-cal development establishment.” Theministry said that several significant mile-stones were reached during the flight tests.The Nishant is scheduled to enter servicewith the Indian Army in 1998.

Washington Times, 8/24/96, p. A7 (6526). HinduInternational Edition, 8/31/96, p. 16 (6558).

8/20/96Abdul Kalam said the first phase of devel-opmental testing for the Agni had been com-pleted and operational testing could beginas soon as the government gave the go-ahead. The Agni was last tested in 2/94, whenit traveled 1,400 km and landed in the Bay ofBengal. Future tests of the 21 m tall, 19 MTAgni will focus on achieving the missile’sprojected range of 2,500 km. Deve Gowda’sgovernment has “in principle” accepted theDRDO’s request for $16.6 million to financeanother five flight tests of the Agni. Accord-ing to senior DRDO officials, the next phaseof the project will involve developing facili-ties for missile production and an emphasison operations and extensive exercises. Twoof Agni’s three previous tests were success-ful, and cost a total of $11.6 million. A singleAgni launch costs $3.3 million. Accordingto Indian defense scientists, DRDO must testthe Agni another six to eight times to perfectthe missile’s accuracy. DRDO officials saidthe nuclear-capable Agni can carry a one-ton payload and has a terminal accuracy of300 m. The Agni consists of a modified Prithviballistic missile fitted on top of an SLV-3 sat-ellite launching rocket. According to Indiansources, the Agni project was designated a“technology demonstrator” in response toU.S. missile nonproliferation concerns andpressure. India’s All-party Standing Commit-tee on Defence said the government should“expeditiously” re-evaluate the Agni pro-gram in response to South Asia’s evolvingsecurity environment. India is concernedabout Pakistan and China, who are modern-izing their armed forces at a rapid rate andcooperating in the missile and nuclear fields.



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Indian defense chiefs believe the Agni’s2,500 km-range is a significant deterrentagainst Chinese aggression. According to areport released by the committee, India needsthe Agni to counter the threat from Pakistanand China.

Vivek Raghuvanshi, Defense News, 8/26/96-9/1/96, p. 14 (6690). Rahul Bedi, Jane’s DefenceWeekly, 9/11/96, p. 21 (6690).

8/22/96United News of India quoted Indian DefenceMinistry sources as saying that India intendsto begin manufacturing three missile systemsin 1997. These include the medium-rangeAkash (Sky) SAM, the short-range Trishul(Trident) SAM, and the third-generation Nag(Serpent) anti-tank missile.

Washington Times, 8/24/96, p. A7 (6523).

8/26/96*Deve Gowda said India will maintain its mis-sile programs and added that the country’sIGMDP is proceeding as planned. Gowdasaid the technology involved has been testedsuccessfully and the decision tooperationalize missile systems will be madein the future.

M. D. Nalapat, Times of India (Bombay), 8/26/96, p. 11; in FBIS-NES-96-167, 8/26/96 (6500).

8/26/96*India allocated the largest share of its 1997space budget, for the period 4/1/96 through3/31/97, to its satellite launch program, in-cluding development of the Geosynchro-nous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). TheGSLV is designed to launch communicationssatellites weighing up to 2,500 kg into geo-synchronous transfer orbits. The first launchof the rocket is scheduled for 1997 or 1998.The GSLV has a budget of Rs2 billion in 1997,up from Rs1.4 billion in 1996. In 1997, India’sproject to develop a cryogenic upper stagefor the GSLV will receive Rs490 million, downfrom Rs530 million in 1996. India’s Polar Sat-ellite Launch Vehicle project will receiveRs840 million in 1997, while the VikramSarabhai Space Center, a space technologyresearch and development facility atThiruvananthapuram in southern India, willreceive Rs840 million. ISRO’s Liquid Propul-sion Systems Centre (LPSC), which devel-ops auxiliary propulsion systems forsatellites and SLVs, and cryogenic and liq-

uid stages for SLVs, will receive Rs236 mil-lion. Indian space scientists said ISRO willbegin competing commercially in the nearfuture by marketing ground-station equip-ment, launches of low-Earth-orbit satellites,satellite testing services, and remote-sens-ing data. Yogendra Alagh, Indian minister ofstate for science and technology, told parlia-ment that India will launch six additional sat-ellites by 2000, the first of which is scheduledto be put into orbit in late 1996. The first twodevelopment launches of the GSLV will beused to orbit experimental communicationssatellites. The GSAT-1 will be launched in1997-98, and the GSAT-2 will be launched in“1989-99” [1998-99].

Vivek Raghuvanshi, Space News, 8/26/96-9/1/96,p. 9 (6652).

9/2/96*The DRDO plans to strengthen the country’sdefense capabilities and to develop a “paral-lel subsystems manufacturing base” by mar-keting 1,500 technologies developedspecifically for the Indian government. Se-nior DRDO scientists have identified a num-ber of sophisticated technologies withcommercial spin-offs, such as the SlottedWaveguide Array (used in ship-, air-, andland-based radar systems), which has po-tential as a civilian navigational aid. DRDO’sdecision to market these technologies is anelement of its Atmabodh plan, which is de-signed to streamline the organization and toassess the market potential of DRDO tech-nologies. Although DRDO established amarketing organization called C-TECH in1992 to assess this potential, the group hasmade little progress. According to one DRDOofficial, the successful sale of Indian defensetechnology will require the government toprovide concessions, permission for exports,and long-term order guarantees. DRDO offi-cials said major progress had been made inthe development of a defense technologybase, including manufacturing and techni-cal expertise. According to scientists, Indiacontinues to confront difficulties in acquir-ing spare parts. DRDO experts said the gov-ernment is increasingly aware that Indiadesperately needs to become self-sufficientin the production of sophisticated defensetechnology and missile systems. Accordingto scientists, the Atmabodh project will con-

centrate on improving India’s ability to meetdomestically the current and projected needsof the armed forces, including the develop-ment of critical systems and technologies thatit does not have access to on the interna-tional market. The scientists revealed that,as part of DRDO’s Component Developmentprogram, India developed approximately 25critical technologies that Western countrieshave prevented India from acquiring. Ac-cording to the scientists, India has been de-nied access by the MTCR states toapproximately 150 items and technologiescritical to its space and missile programs. TheDRDO’s self-reliance implementation coun-cil supports India’s current systems by de-veloping domestic sources for vital spareparts and the upgrades needed for capabil-ity enhancements and service-life exten-sions. In addition, the program reducesIndia’s reliance on importing defense itemsfrom abroad. The program’s future emphasiswill shift to the development of electronicand information warfare technology.


9/12/96Abdul Kalam said India will conduct one ortwo more tests of the 250 km-range versionof the Prithvi surface-to-surface missile(SSM) before the end of 1996. Kalam did notspecify exactly when the test(s) would takeplace. The DRDO tested the 250 km-rangePrithvi on 1/27/96. India is developing thisversion for the air force. The DRDO has con-ducted 14 successful tests of the PrithviSSM, “including two flight trials of the 150km-range variant.” The Indian Army ordered75 of these missiles, production of which iscurrently underway. Kalam said the Indiangovernment had not yet taken a decision onthe Agni IRBM and added that “we have todecide on using it and how to use it.” TheDRDO has tested the Agni on three occa-sions.

Dinesh Kumar, Times of India (Bombay), 9/13/96, p. 1; in FBIS-NES-96-180, 9/13/96 (6598).

9/26/96ISRO conducted the 14th and final test of anindigenously designed, 1 MT cryogenic en-gine at LPSC in Mahendra Giri, Tamil Nadu.The 1 MT engine is a sub-scale version ofthe 7.5 MT engine to be used in the third

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stage of the GSLV. During the successful two-minute test, the engine used liquid oxygenand liquid nitrogen as required for the work-ing version of the engine.

Gayatri Chandrashekar, Doordarshan TelevisionNetwork (Delhi), 10/7/96; in FBIS-NES-96-197,10/7/96 (6590). All India Radio Network (Delhi),10/7/96; in FBIS-NES-96-197, 10/7/96 (6590).

10/9/96*Military planners in India are considering asignificant doctrinal shift that has been in-fluenced by the potential nuclear capabili-ties of Pakistan and India and the integrationof ballistic missiles into the Indian artillery.As a result, the Indian artillery is being re-oriented away from providing combat sup-port for infantry and armored vehiclestowards performing direct support andcounter-bombardment duties, and “indepen-dent operational taskings.” India’s Field Ar-tillery uses Soviet-designed, 20.4 km-range,122 mm-caliber BM-21 Grad multiple rocketlaunchers (MRL) for counter-battery andgeneral support purposes. The DRDO hasdeveloped the 40 km-range, 12 barrel, 212mm-caliber, Pinaka MRL, which is undergo-ing final user trials and will probably enterservice in 1997. India produces ammunitionfor the Grad and manufactures a 100 kg war-head for the Pinaka rocket. India is currentlydeveloping a high-explosive fragmentationwarhead and a cluster submunition for thePinaka. The 150 km-range Prithvi SS-150 SSMis the Field Artillery’s longest-range system.The Prithvi has a 1,000 kg payload capabilityand will equip the newly established 333Missile Group at Secunderabad. The pro-posed organization of the 333 Missile Groupincludes: a missile group headquarters; a me-teorological troop; a survey troop; a com-munications battery; a support sub-groupwith warhead-change vehicles and missilereloads; and a SSM sub-group with a com-mand post, four Prithvi launchers, missilereload vehicles, a survey section, and a me-teorological section. The Field Artillery hasattached a high priority to procuring UAVs.India’s UAV command posts will be locatedwith the divisional and/or corps counter-bombardment command posts. Because theIndian government has not attached a highpriority to acquiring artillery locating radars,the Field Artillery plans to acquire bettermeans for target analysis and standardiza-

tion of maps and computer-based C2 sys-tems.

Pravin Sawhney, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 10/9/96,p. 35 (6609).

INDIA WITH :

Canada, 140China and Pakistan, 141

INDIA WITH ISRAEL

7/30/96Indian Air Force Chief Satish Kumar Sareenarrived in Israel for discussions with air forceofficials and representatives from the de-fense industry. India has begun talks withIsrael on a range of upgrade packages for itsarmed forces. If the negotiations are success-ful, the resulting deal would end India’s reli-ance on Russian technology and hardware.A deal with India could provide Israeli in-dustry with more than $400 million worth ofcontracts to supply sub-systems and tech-nology to upgrade New Delhi’s Russian-de-signed weapon systems. According toIndian sources, the Indian Air Force askedthe Tamam division of Israel Aircraft Indus-tries Ltd. to install new integrated tacticalinertial navigation and Global PositioningSystems on board its Mirage 2000H and MiG-27M aircraft. Also, the Indian Navy is cur-rently negotiating the purchase of 12 BarakSAMs from the Israeli firm Rafael. The mis-siles will be fitted on board the warship INSDelhi, which is being built at Mazagon Dockin Bombay. Abdul Kalam visited Israel on 6/29/96 to examine the potential for integratingIsraeli technology into India’s 20-30-year-oldmilitary plants. Israel and India establisheddiplomatic relations in 1992, but the two coun-tries have cooperated on nuclear and defenseprojects for over three decades, accordingto Indian and Israeli sources.

Pakistan Link, http://www.kaiwan.com/~pakistan,8/9/96 (6604). Vivek Raghuvanshi, Defense News,8/5/96-8/11/96, pp. 3, 18 (6665).

10/96According to officials in Jerusalem and NewDelhi, Israel was close to concluding nego-tiations to participate in India’s military mod-ernization program. Indian officials said thegroundwork was being laid for the Israeli andIndian defense ministers to discuss poten-tial areas for cooperation. According to these

officials, India will try to conclude agreementswith Israel on weapons and technology trans-fer. However, one official in New Delhi saidIsraeli-Indian relations will be restricted tothe “purchase of select equipment with tech-nology transfer.” According to P. R.Kumaraswamy, an Indian citizen conductingresearch at Hebrew University’s Truman In-stitute, conclusion of the talks would allowNew Delhi to evaluate Israeli requests to getinvolved in India’s modernization program.A number of Israeli defense firms have mar-keted defense equipment in India. Thisequipment has included command, control,and communications systems, electroniccountermeasures, radar, and satellite navi-gation aides. Israel Aircraft Industries andSilver Arrow are competing to sell UAVs toIndia. Kumaraswamy said the appointmentof a defense attaché to the Indian embassyin Tel Aviv will strengthen the military rela-tionship between India and Israel. Accord-ing to diplomats, since India establishedcomplete diplomatic relations with Israel in1992, the two countries have conducted de-fense cooperation talks in secret. Both coun-tries have denied that such cooperation hasoccurred. Kumaraswamy doubted that Israelwould be granted contracts for a “signifi-cant portion” of India’s modernization pro-gram because Western firms and new playerslike South Africa are competing for bids, es-pecially for MiG upgrades. Close ties be-tween India and Russia are an additionalobstacle in the way of Israel’s expansion intothe Indian market. Kumaraswamy said Rus-sia had a considerable advantage, becauseIndia hopes to reschedule its estimated $12-15 billion defense debt to Russia. Accordingto Kumaraswamy, India’s close ties with theMuslim world are a further factor workingagainst Israeli interests. Indian experts ac-knowledge that certain characteristics of Is-raeli foreign policy make India uncomfortable,including Israel’s campaign against Islamicfundamentalism and its close defense rela-tionship with China, which has strong de-fense ties with Pakistan.

Steve Rodan and Vivek Raghuvanshi, DefenseNews, 10/21/96-10/27/96, p. 27 (6653).



148

INDIA WITH RUSSIA

7/96Defense officials in India and Russia workedto strengthen their bilateral relationship andto negotiate a package of proposals cover-ing weapons technology transfer and thejoint production of aircraft. The officials planto have the package ready for approval by11/15/96. According to officials, the three-year program could begin in 1997, if ap-proved. Officials in Moscow said Russia maylicense ordnance technology and aircraft forjoint production with India. Co-productionof defense equipment would suit the plansof India’s new United Front government tostrengthen the country’s defense industry.


7/22/96Rosvoorouzhenie spokesman ValeryPogrebenkov said Russia has solid armstrade links with India, which is one ofRussia’s two principal customers. Data main-tained by Rosvoorouzhenie, the state-runarms export agency, indicates that Russiaproduced 70 percent of the equipment usedby India’s armed forces, including 12Tunguska anti-aircraft systems, 10 MiG-29fighter aircraft, and 400 MiG-21 fighter air-craft. Moscow and New Delhi have signedmilitary contracts worth $2 billion, and $7billion worth of upgrades are plannedthrough 2000. A senior Rosvoorouzhenieofficial said co-production was a new ele-ment in Russia’s relationship with India andcould prove very profitable. The official didnot specify the type of technology thatwould be involved. According to Indian of-ficials, a plan under negotiation calls for gen-eral military cooperation, including personnelexchanges for training purposes, informationexchange, joint military exercises, technol-ogy transfer, and the joint production of cer-tain defense equipment. Indian officials saidRussia is ready to grant India licenses to pro-duce fighter aircraft and ordnance systems,which could involve the transfer of technol-ogy for anti-missile systems, air-defensesystems, Su-30 aircraft, ammunition, torpe-does, and other support equipment for land-, sea-, and air-based weapon systems.


INDIA WITH SLOVAKIA

10/96On a two-day trip to Slovakia, Indian Presi-dent S. D. Sharma obtained a pledge fromSlovakian Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar thathis country would not sell arms to Pakistan.Because Slovakia inherited most ofCzechoslovakia’s defense industry follow-ing the country’s breakup, the Indian del-egation was interested in cementing defenselinks between the two countries “in the mat-ter of spare-parts and equipment.” Kuchar,director general of the Political Section ofthe Slovak Republic’s Foreign Ministry, saidhis country understood India’s defenseneeds and that India was a reliable partner.Sharma’s visit produced an agreement to in-crease scientific and technological coopera-tion between India and Slovakia, which wassigned by Maqbood Dar, India’s minister ofstate in the Union Home Ministry, and EvaSlavkovska, Slovakia’s minister of education.The five-year agreement is renewable forthree-year periods and provides for the ex-change of scientific and technological infor-mation, and the establishment of a jointcommittee to facilitate scientific cooperation.A group of business representatives travel-ing with Sharma reached agreement with theSlovak Chamber of Commerce on six propos-als, including three involving the joint mar-keting and manufacture of chemicals andpesticides.

Harish Khari, Hindu, http://www.webpage.com/hindu, 10/11/96 (6603).

IRAN


8/20/96Iranian President Akbar H. Rafsanjani inau-gurated Isfahan’s Alloy Steel Complex, whichwas built by Iranian experts and engineers.The complex is expected to produce 30,000tons of various types of alloy steel each year.The steel will be used in the defense, air-craft, ship-building, heavy machinery, oil,and gas industries, as well as in construc-tion materials, pipe, moulding, and springproduction. Rafsanjani said the Iranian De-

fense Industries Organization (DIO) recog-nized the need for an alloy steel plant duringthe war with Iraq, “when some countries re-fused to sell alloy steel to Iran.” Rafsanjanisaid destroyed artillery and tank scraps willbe salvaged from battlefields to be convertedto steel in the plant. He added that an addi-tional alloy steel plant is being built in Iran’ssouthern province of Yazd.

Iran Business Digest, http://www.neda.net/ibd, 8/22/96 (6556).

9/9/96*Iranian sources revealed that Iran has initi-ated a new ballistic missile program code-named the Zelzal (“Earthquake”). Pentagonofficials who track Iranian weapons pro-grams said that, although they are aware ofZelzal, Iran’s intentions and achievementsin missile development “remain unclear.”Since 1991, the Zelzal program has producedthe solid-fuel Zelzal-1 missile with a range of100-150 km, and the solid-fuel Zelzal-2 mis-sile with a range of 350-400 km. Both Zelzal-1 and Zelzal-2 “bear some resemblance toknown Chinese missiles.” Most recently,engineers from Iran’s Revolutionary GuardCorps used technology from Russia, China,North Korea, and Germany to design theZelzal-3 ballistic missile. The RevolutionaryGuard Corps is designing the Zelzal-3 to“meet specific Iranian military requirements.”The Zelzal-3 is designed to have a range of1,000-1,500 km and will be capable of strikingIsrael. Iran hopes to have a prototype avail-able for a test launch by 1998. The Zelzal-3resembles North Korea’s No-dong missile.However, the No-dong is believed to use liq-uid fuel, while the Zelzal program is basedon solid-fuel technology that Iran receivedfrom Germany and China. Also, while the No-dong-1 has a range of 1,000 km, and the No-dong-2 has a range of 1,500 km, the range ofthe Zelzal-3 falls between these two missiles.Although Iranian sources said a major bal-listic missile test launch was scheduled inIran on 8/16/96, these reports have not beenconfirmed. The Zelzal program is managedby the Self-Sufficiency Department of theRevolutionary Guard, which also overseesseveral research-and-development facilitiesthroughout Iran, including the factories inIsfahan and Tabriz where the Zelzal-1 andZelzal-2 are produced. The majority of the

149



research and development for the Zelzal pro-gram is being conducted by the DefenseTechnology and Science Research Center(DTSRC), a unit of Iran’s Defense IndustriesOrganization. DTSRC’s main facility is lo-cated in Karaj, near Tehran. DTSRC devel-ops guidance systems, propellants, andsolid- and liquid-fuel engines, and also con-ducts “aerodynamics and wind-tunnel stud-ies.” The Zelzal program has also beensupported by a computer research center inthe Lavizan military district north of Tehranand by a missile test facility in the suburbsof Semnan. The Iranian sources report thatseveral problems have delayed the develop-ment of the Zelzal-3, including the casting oflarge, solid-fuel rocket motors, and the manu-facture of composites needed for the re-en-try vehicle. Chinese experts have beenproviding assistance in the development ofguidance systems and solid-fuel technologyfor the Zelzal-3, while Russian experts arebelieved to be providing assistance with thedesign of the Zelzal. Russian experts are alsoconducting theoretical classes on compos-ites at DTSRC, Sharif University, Amir KabirUniversity, and the Science and IndustryUniversity. The Iranian sources say thatIran’s design of the Zelzal-3 calls for a “rus-tic” missile, which uses simple guidance com-ponents that have been purchased fromGerman and Swiss companies. The Zelzal-3has a circular error probable (CEP) of 4 km.Information is not available on possible pay-loads for the Zelzal-3. Iran could develop aradiological warhead using spent nuclear fuelfrom its U.S., Chinese, and Russian reactors,or it could produce warheads using the bio-logical warfare agents the U.S. Central Intel-ligence Agency has claimed Iran isproducing.

Iran Brief, 9/9/96, pp. 1-2 (6520). Iran Brief, 10/1/96, p. 3 (6520).

9/22/96The deputy commander of the Naval Forcesof the Islamic Republic of Iran in charge ofcoordination, Second Rear AdmiralMohammed Husayn Shafi’i, told a group ofcorrespondents that Iran is currently work-ing on the design and construction of a de-stroyer, which will be armed withanti-submarine, anti-surface, and anti-aircraftsystems, as well as a missile-equipped heli-

copter. The 1,000 MT, 88 m-long destroyerwill be capable of 30 knots. According to theIranian newspaper Jomhuri Islami, Shafi’isaid Iran is “conducting research on land,sea and air missiles.”

Resalat (Tehran), 9/23/96, p. 1; in FBIS-NES-96-191, 9/23/96 (6521). Washington Post, 9/24/96, p. 14 (6521).

IRAN WITH :

China, 141

IRAN WITH ISRAEL, LEBANON, AND

SYRIA

8/13/96Israel’s Chief of Staff Lt. General AmnonShahak informed the Foreign Affairs andDefense Committee of Israel’s parliament thatLebanon-based Hezbollah guerrillas maypossess 1,000 unguided rockets, most ofwhich were airlifted from Iran via DamascusAirport in Syria. Thirty of the rockets werereported to be Iranian-produced 240 mm-cali-ber models with a range of 40 km, sufficientto reach the Israeli coastal cities of Haifa andAcre. Some Israeli officials believe the 240mm-caliber rockets will be launched frommore secure sites north of the Israeli-occu-pied “security zone” in southern Lebanon.Although Lebanese sources were unable toconfirm that Hezbollah possessed 240 mm-caliber rockets, the guerrillas have warnedthey possess longer-range systems.Hezbollah’s reported stockpile of 1,000 un-guided rockets consists primarily of 120 mm-caliber and 127 mm-caliber models with amaximum range of 22 km, which would allowthe guerrillas to hit towns and settlementson Israel’s northern border, but not majorurban areas. Hezbollah has not launched anyKatyusha rockets into northern Israel since4/27/96, after possibly exhausting its arsenalby launching 750 rockets into northern Is-rael and the “security zone” earlier in themonth. Shahak said that Hezbollah has neverpossessed as much weaponry before and theguerrillas pose “a significant threat” to Is-rael.

James Bruce, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8/21/96, p.3 (6475).

IRAN WITH NORTH KOREA

10/16/96*Japanese news agency, Jiji, and NHK televi-sion reported that North Korea is planningto test-launch a 1,000 km-range No-dong-1missile into the Sea of Japan. According toJiji, representatives from the Iranian militarywere present at the proposed launch site,apparently to observe the missile’s perfor-mance prior to purchase. There are reportsthat Iran assisted North Korea with the fund-ing of its No-dong-1 program, and expectsto receive 150 No-dong-1s, along with manu-facturing equipment, when the program isfinished. In 3/96, Commander-in-Chief of U.S.Central Command General Binford Peaystated that Iran was building tunnels alongits coast for either the storage or launchingof No-dong-1 missiles.

Reuter, 10/16/96 (6561). Nicholas D. Kristof,New York Times, 10/22/96, p. A11 (6561).

IRAN WITH NORTH KOREA AND

UNITED STATES

6/12/96The U.S. published its imposition of sanc-tions against North Korean and Iranian enti-ties for their violation of the U.S. Arms ExportControl Act and the Missile TechnologyControl Regime (MTCR). The sanctions, ef-fective from 5/24/96 to 5/24/98, prohibit U.S.businesses and government entities fromengaging in missile-technology-related ex-ports with: Changgwang Credit Company(North Korea), the Ministry of DefenseArmed Forces Logistics (Iran), and the StatePurchasing Office of Iran.

Federal Register, Vol. 61, No. 114, 6/12/96, p.29785. Pak Tu-sik, Choson Ilbo (Seoul), 6/30/96, p. 1; in FBIS-EAS-96-127 (6569).

IRAN WITH RUSSIA

8/27/96Mehdi Safari, Iran’s ambassador to Russia,said that Russia had agreed to help Iran pro-duce and launch the country’s first satellitewithin the next three years. Safari did notcomment on the purpose or type of satellitebut said that an agreement had been signed,“according to which the technology to builda satellite will be transferred to Iran in threestages.”

Washington Report On Middle East Affairs, 10/96, p. 31 (6555).



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IRAQ


7/1/96UNSCOM chief Rolf Ekeus told a news con-ference in Kuwait City that Iraq may be con-cealing between six and 16 long-rangeballistic missiles capable of delivering con-ventional, biological, or chemical warheads.Ekeus said Iraq claimed it destroyed the mis-siles in 1991, but had failed to provide evi-dence proving this. According to Ekeus,UNSCOM was concerned that Iraq contin-ued to conceal prohibited items and to givethe commission false information. Ekeusemphasized that UNSCOM will increase itsscrutiny of Iraq if Baghdad does not cooper-ate. During his visit to Kuwait, Ekeus metwith the Emir of Kuwait, Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah, Prime Minister Sa’d al-’Abdallah al-Sabah, and several other officials, to discussrecent developments concerning Iraq’sWMD program.

Washington Times, 7/2/96, p. A12 (6616). Kuna(Kuwait), 7/1/96; in FBIS-NES-96-128, 7/1/96(6616). Sulayman al-’As’usi, MBC Television(London), 7/1/96; in FBIS-NES-96-128, 7/1/96(6616). Al-Quds Al-’Arabi (London), 7/2/96, p.15; in FBIS-NES-96-129, 7/2/96 (6616). Reuter,7/1/96; in Executive News Service, 7/2/96 (6616).

7/96In an interview with the Washington Times,General Wafiq al-Sammara’i, former head ofIraqi external military intelligence who de-fected to Syria in 11/94, said Iraq possessedapproximately 40 Scud SSMs, and not six to16 as the United Nations Special Commis-sion (UNSCOM) had estimated. Al-Sammara’isaid Iraq’s Special Security Apparatus pur-chased 50 flatbed trucks in 7/96 to movephysical evidence away from areas whereUNSCOM inspectors might discover it.UNSCOM spokesman Ewen Buchanan saidthe United Nations knew Iraq was usingflatbed trucks to conceal banned material.According to al-Sammara’i, Iraq would re-main a threat even if UNSCOM eliminated allof its prohibited weapons because the coun-try would retain the manufacturing facilitiesfor them. Al-Sammara’i said he was part of

the Iraqi opposition movement before hedefected to Damascus from Iraq. A U.S. gov-ernment official said that al- Sammara’i wasnot a central figure in the Iraqi oppositionmovement and that he was attempting to builda future for himself. However, the officialadmitted that al-Sammara’i was one of nu-merous Iraqis the U.S. government consultedabout weapons information and that he was“in a position to know a lot of things.” Theofficial added that there was a great amountof uncertainty over exactly what Iraq washiding. In an interview with the London-based Al-Majallah newspaper, al-Sammara’isaid Iraq might be able to conceal Scud mis-siles by burying them in containers after de-taching sensitive components because “it isnot possible to scan the entire territory forradioactivity” using satellites. Al- Sammara’isaid many of Iraq’s missiles are armed withchemical or biological warheads. Al-Sammara’i told the newspaper that the So-viet Union exported approximately 1,000 Scudmissiles to Iraq and the range of these mis-siles was increased from 300 to 600 km toproduce a modified version known as Al-Hussein. According to al-Sammara’i, Iraqlater indigenously produced these missilesand their engines. Al-Sammara’i said Iraq’spossession of a small number of long-rangemissiles confirmed Saddam Hussein’s desireto possess biological weapons. Accordingto al-Sammara’i, Iraq will be capable of pro-ducing long-range missiles once UNSCOMinspectors have been withdrawn from thecountry for a prolonged period. Al-Sammara’iadded that the regime’s relations with theWestern firms that provided Iraq with WMD-related technology and materials “are essen-tially there.” He added that the Iraqi regimewould resume these contacts once the nec-essary funds became available.

Paige Bowers, Washington Times, 7/31/96, p.15(6617). Ghalib Darwish, Al-Majallah (London),7/28/96-8/3/96, pp. 30-31; in FBIS-NES-96-149,8/3/96 (6617). Nicole Tannuri, MBC Television(London), 7/7/96; in FBIS-NES-96-131, 7/7/96(6617).

7/7/96Wafiq al-Sammara’i told London-based MBCtelevision that Iraq’s 40 Al-Hussein missilesare armed with conventional, chemical, andbacteriological warheads, and that Iraq pos-sessed 250 biological shells. He added that

UNSCOM inspectors had approached himmore than once, and that the Iraqi opposi-tion movement will do anything “to rescuethe region from all these dangers and fromdespotism.”

Paige Bowers, Washington Times, 7/31/96, p. A15(6617). Nicole Tannuri, MBC Television (Lon-don), 7/7/96; in FBIS-NES-96-131, 7/7/96(6617).

7/14/96*During an interview in London, Iyad ‘Allawi,secretary-general of the Iraqi National Ac-cord Movement, said the Iraqi governmentcontinues to hide long-range SSMs andWMD. ‘Allawi said Iraq has 13 missilesmounted on board trucks that continuallymove around Iraq. ‘Allawi speculated that arecent dispute between Iraq and U.N. weap-ons inspectors may have occurred becausethey had acquired information about one ofthese missiles. According to the NationalAccord Movement’s military members, Iraq’smissiles can be armed with nuclear and bio-logical warheads. ‘Allawi said SaddamHussein is hiding Iraq’s missiles for threereasons: to defeat internal military rebellion;to deter or to attack other countries in theregion; and to preserve Saddam’s remainingmass destruction weapons. According to‘Allawi, the National Accord Movement be-lieves the U.N. inspectors have not found allof Iraq’s WMD. ‘Allawi said that Iraq maybe hiding documents on WMD at locationsin Iraq, including houses, and that Saddamis trying to buy time to conceal additionalweapons. According to ‘Allawi, Iraq’s ac-cess to weapons technologies could be re-stricted further if neighboring countries werebriefed on Iraq’s WMD documents and al-lowed to examine the remaining weaponsthreat. ‘Allawi said Kuwait, Dhahran, andRiyadh should be more involved becausethey are vulnerable to Iraq’s missiles, whileFrance, the United Kingdom, and the UnitedStates are not.

Ghalib Darwish, Al-Majallah (London), 7/14/96-7/20/96, pp. 33-34; in FBIS-NES-96-138, 7/17/96 (6582).

7/16/96UNSCOM inspectors in Iraq were stoppedon the road to Saddam Hussein InternationalAirport because they had entered a “presi-dential area.” The team was attempting to

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inspect a suspected weapon storage site nearthe airport, which UNSCOM had first at-tempted to access in 6/96. Iraq’s oil minister,Lieutenant General Mohammed Rasheed,accompanied the team and was allowed toproceed through road blocks but only afterthe UNSCOM inspectors were delayed forover two hours. It is feared that the Iraqismoved prohibited materials from the suspectsite during the delay. According to RolfEkeus, Iraq conceals weapons and relatedmaterials by transporting them around onrailway cars and trucks when UNSCOM in-spectors are about to arrive at a suspect site.

UPI, 8/23/96; in Executive News Service, 8/26/96 (6660). Evelyn Leopold, Reuter, 8/22/96; inExecutive News Service, 8/26/96 (6660).

7/17/96Rolf Ekeus said Iraq refused to allow U.N.weapons inspectors to search an installationnear Baghdad on 7/16/96. The inspectors hadplanned to look for remnants and documen-tation from Iraq’s missile and chemical andbiological weapons programs at the installa-tion. On 6/22/96, Ekeus and Tariq Aziz, Iraq’sdeputy prime minister, agreed that U.N. in-spectors would be given unconditional ac-cess after they were denied entry to severalIraqi sites. According to Ekeus, Iraq claimedit had dismantled all of its prohibited weap-ons but had failed to present any evidenceto prove this.

New York Times, 7/18/96, p. A5 (6583).

7/18/96UNSCOM inspectors called off their missionafter they were refused access to the instal-lation near Baghdad for 60 hours. In re-sponse, U.N. Security Council PresidentAlain Dejammet ordered Nizar Hamdoon,Iraq’s delegate to the United Nations, to ac-count for his country’s actions for the sec-ond time in a week.

New York Times, 7/18/96, p. A5 (6583). New YorkTimes, 7/20/96, p. A4 (6583).

7/19/96The U.N. Security Council ordered Iraq togrant UNSCOM unrestricted access to itsweapons facilities. Iraq claimed the inspec-tors were not obstructed from searching thefacility near Baghdad, and they were onlybarred from using a presidential highway toreach it. Rolf Ekeus said the United Nations

had established a special mission to studythe techniques used by Iraq to hide weap-ons.

New York Times, 7/20/96, p. A4 (6583). New YorkTimes, 7/23/96, p. A4 (6583).

7/22/96Nikita Smidovich, a Russian ballistic missileexpert, and his team of 34 UNSCOM inspec-tors departed from Iraq.

New York Times, 7/23/96, p. A4 (6583).

8/23/96The Security Council issued a statement insupport of Ekeus and his weapons inspec-tors prior to a scheduled visit to Baghdad.Ekeus will be accompanied by NikitaSmidovich who led most of the teams thathave been in standoffs with the Iraqis. Thestatement said Iraq must provide UNSCOMwith “immediate, unconditional and unre-stricted access to any and all areas, facili-ties, equipment, records and means oftransportation which they wish to inspect,and Iraqi officials whom they wish to inter-view.” According to the statement, the Se-curity Council was very concerned that Iraqhad failed repeatedly to meet its obligationsunder the terms of the U.N. resolutions re-lated to the 1990-91 Gulf War. Ekeus said hedid not believe Iraq’s claim to have destroyedthe missile, chemical, biological, and nuclearitems that remain unaccounted for. The Se-curity Council warned Baghdad that onlycomplete compliance with its weapons obli-gations would result in the lifting of sanc-tions that were imposed on Iraq after the1990-91 Gulf War.

UPI, 8/23/96; in Executive News Service, 8/26/96 (6660). Evelyn Leopold, Reuter, 8/23/96; inExecutive News Service, 8/26/96 (6660). EvelynLeopold, Reuter, 8/22/96; in Executive News Ser-vice, 8/26/96 (6660).

8/26/96Rolf Ekeus traveled to Baghdad with a Secu-rity Council declaration demanding that Iraqprovide U.N. weapon inspectors with unre-stricted access to military installations in theirsearch for prohibited materials. UNSCOMinspectors complained previously that Iraqprevented them from searching several in-stallations and disrupted interviews on weap-ons issues. According to U.N. officials, thefirst series of confrontations reached a crisispoint when Iraqi anti-aircraft guns tracked a

U.N. helicopter in an effort to prevent it frominspecting a suspect installation.

AFP (Paris), 8/28/96; in FBIS-NES-96-169, 8/28/96 (6658).

8/28/96Rolf Ekeus departed from Baghdad and toldreporters in Bahrain he had received assur-ances that Iraq would not block futuresearches. Ekeus said he discussed helicop-ter operations and the movement of inspec-tors with the Iraqis, as well as measures “onhow to proceed with interviews.” Accord-ing to Ekeus, UN ballistic missile and chemi-cal and biological weapon experts will travelto Iraq in 9/96 to test Baghdad’s pledge torefrain from hindering the activities ofUNSCOM.

AFP (Paris), 8/28/96; in FBIS-NES-96-169, 8/28/96 (6658).

9/96‘Abd-al-Baqi al-Sa’dun, a member of the Re-gional Command of the ‘Aflaqite [Ba’th] Partyin Iraq, said the Iraqi regime had positionedlong-range missiles with chemical warheadsin Diyala Governorate in order to launch themagainst Kuwait “if Iraq faces a direct threatfrom the U.S.” The missiles are mounted ontrucks and are constantly on the move toavoid U.S. air-strikes. Al-Sa’dun made theseremarks at a private meeting of leading fig-ures of the regime’s party in al-Basrah andal-Nasiriyah Governorates. Al-Sa’dun addedthat during the war with Iran, Iraq had a simi-lar plan to launch missiles armed with chemi-cal warheads against Tehran if Iranian forcesreached Baghdad. According to sourcesfrom the Islamic revolution mujahedin in al-Basrah, trailers carrying surface-to-surfacemissiles set up camp north of al-‘Amarahalong with the 130th Artillery Brigade. Thesources said Republican Guard armoredunits and several missile launchers had beendeployed in the Gulf area in Umm Qasr Dis-trict, and some units had been moved toSanam Mountain on Iraq’s border with Ku-wait.

Voice of Rebellious Iraq (Clandestine), 9/16/96;in FBIS-NES-96-182, 9/16/96 (6546).

9/3/96The Security Council voted to maintain eco-nomic sanctions against Iraq after Rolf Ekeusreported that Baghdad had given the com-



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mission “conscientiously misleading state-ments” on the concealment and movementof documents related to its proscribed weap-ons programs. According to Ekeus, Iraq’sDeputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz admittedthat Iraq had concealed and moved docu-ments. Ekeus informed the council he wasnot satisfied that Iraq had disclosed every-thing about its long-range missiles, its chemi-cal and biological weapons programs, andthe related documentation.

Anthony Goodman, Reuter, 9/3/96; in ExecutiveNews Service, 9/4/96 (6659).

10/11/96Rolf Ekeus submitted UNSCOM’s semi-an-nual report on Iraq’s missile and WMD pro-grams to the U.N. Security Council.According to the report, Iraq has still notfully accounted for all of its banned weap-ons, items, and capabilities in its ballisticmissile program. U.S. intelligence officialssaid they concurred with this assessment ofIraq’s missile program. UNSCOM accusedIraq of “systematically concealing” pro-scribed weapons. In recent months, Iraq pre-vented U.N. weapons inspectors on severaloccasions from inspecting suspected weap-ons-related installations under control ofIraq’s Special Republican Guard. Accordingto the report, U.N. inspectors were delayedwhile unidentified items, including “objectsresembling Scud ballistic missiles,” were re-moved from these installations on trucks. In7/96, UNSCOM inspectors saw a convoy oftrucks leave a Special Republican Guard in-stallation carrying what the Iraqis admittedlooked like prohibited Scud missiles. Accord-ing to the report, Iraq did not allow UNSCOMto inspect the objects in question. The re-port said UNSCOM “continues to believethat limited but highly significant quantities(of arms) may remain, as Iraq has not beenable to account for a number of proscribedmissiles and certain high-quality chemicalwarfare agents.” The report said UNSCOMhad destroyed 48 operational missiles, sixmobile missile launchers, 14 conventionalwarheads, and other equipment. However,the report said Iraq’s policies and actions ofconcealment had impeded the rapid imple-mentation of UNSCOM’s objectives. Ekeussaid he thought most of Iraq’s missiles hadbeen found, although the accounting pro-

cess had not been completed.Evelyn Leopold, Reuter, 10/11/96; in ExecutiveNews Service, 10/15/96 (6657). R. Jeffrey Smith,Washington Post, 10/12/96, p. A25 (6657). Wash-ington Times, 10/12/96, p.A8 (6657).

10/21/96At the end of a three-day trip to Baghdad,Ekeus said Iraq did not provide any new in-formation on its weapons programs. How-ever, Ekeus said the Iraqis agreed to discussthe issue of prohibited weapons that remainunaccounted for. According to Ekeus,UNSCOM had neutralized Iraq’s ballistic mis-sile program, but had yet to account for“hopefully not more than 16 missiles.” Ekeusmet with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad,including Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz,Foreign Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf,presidential advisor General Saadi Tu’maAbbas, and Oil Minister MohammedRasheed, who previously headed Iraq’s Mili-tary Commission. According to UNSCOMDeputy Chief Charles Duelfer, Iraq’s disclo-sures since its 6/96 pledge to provide thecommission with unrestricted access to sus-pected weapons sites have been “flawed andincomplete.” Baghdad submitted nine lettersto UNSCOM in an attempt to clarify theseissues.

Hassan Hafidh, Reuter, 10/21/96; in ExecutiveNews Service, 10/21/96 (6656). Leon Barkho,Reuter, 10/20/96; in Executive News Service, 10/21/96 (6656). Washington Times, 10/22/96, p.12(6656).

IRAQ WITH ISRAEL

9/3/96After a series of meetings with Israeli De-fense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, the Israelidefense establishment determined there wasa low probability that Iraq would attack Is-rael with Scud missiles. This conclusion wasbased on repeated declarations by SaddamHussein that Iraq does not possess Scudmissiles or launchers. If Iraq launched Scudsat Israel, this would prove that SaddamHussein had lied about his missile capabili-ties to the U.N., and would damage hischances of improving his status within theinternational community. An unnamed “se-nior defense establishment source” said Iraqwas capable of firing Scud missiles but “theassessment is that this capability is very low.”According to the source, Israeli intelligence

is monitoring the situation in Iraq and theIsraeli Air Force is on normal alert status.The Israeli defense establishment instituted“a series of technical steps” to ensure thatIsrael will not be taken by surprise in theevent of a Scud missile attack, according toa senior Israeli defense official. Also, Israelnow has direct access to data from U.S. sat-ellites to provide early warning of any mis-sile attack. The direct line from the satellitesensor will increase Israel’s warning time ifIraq launches Scud missiles against Israel.Israel had been denied direct access to thisinformation in the past. During the 1990-91Gulf War, Israel received early warning infor-mation on Iraqi missile launches from U.S.satellites via Washington, where the data wasstored and then transmitted through normalcommunications channels. This process wastime consuming.

Eytan Rabin and Amnon Barzilay, Ha’aretz (TelAviv), 9/4/96, p. A1; in FBIS-NES-96-172, 9/4/96 (6522).

ISRAEL


7/96*Rafael’s Moab missile is designed to be partof the Israeli Boost-phase Intercept System(IBIS), which is intended to intercept theaterballistic missiles (TBMs) shortly after launchusing missiles mounted on board UAVs fly-ing at high altitudes. The Moab will have arange of 100 km when fired from an altitudeof 50,000 ft and a range of 80 km when firedfrom 30,000 ft. The Moab will be based onRafael’s Python-4 air-to-air missile, but willincorporate a new booster to accelerate theround to a velocity of 1.5-2 km/s. Sources atRafael said that existing technology has beentaken to its limits to develop a system ca-pable of destroying TBMs at a reasonablecost. Because the speeds of engagement willbe kept just below the aeroheating thresh-old, the Moab will not need a protective capand it will not be necessary to cool the infra-red seeker or dome. Costs will be kept downbecause the Moab locks onto its target afterlaunch and does not require a datalink. Pro-

153



duction of the Arrow anti-tactical ballisticmissile system recently took priority over theMoab project. The U.S. Ballistic Missile De-fense Organization is currently giving theIsraeli firm Wales further funding to initiate a“risk-mitigation effort for IBIS as a whole.”This decision resulted from a recent U.S.-Israeli agreement on ballistic missile defense.Wales will produce prototypes of critical sub-systems for demonstration, including com-ponents of the UAV, Moab, search-and-tracksensors, and the related command, control,communications, and intelligence systems.

Jane’s International Defense Review, 7/96, p. 5(6584).

7/11/96Doron Rotem, general manager of Tamam, adivision of Israel Aircraft Industries’ (IAI)Electronics Group, announced that the com-pany is looking to export electro-optical sys-tems and payloads developed by the TadiranSystems Division, which IAI purchased on6/16/96. Products offered will include a widerange of sensors and observation systemsfor UAVs, helicopters, aircraft, and other plat-forms. The acquisition of Tadiran providesYehud-based Tamam with products such aslong-range standoff systems, the Mokedfamily of payloads used on the Pioneer UAV,and the Night Targeting System used on theU.S. Marine Corps AH-1W Cobra attack he-licopter. In 1995, more than 60 percent ofTamam’s $120 million total product sales camefrom exports of electro-optic products.Tadiran’s annual sales of electro-optic prod-ucts since 1990 have totaled approximately$5 million.

Defense News, 7/29/96, p. 40 (6473).

I SRAEL WITH :

China, 141India, 147Iran, Lebanon, and Syria, 149Iraq, 152

ISRAEL WITH SYRIA

8/19/96Israeli Channel Two television reported thatSyria tested a Scud-C missile several weeksearlier with the objective of confirming theSyrian Army’s ability to perform an opera-tional launch. According to Channel Two,

the 600 km-range Scud-C can carry a pay-load of 500 kg and is capable of attackingheavily populated areas in Israel. The sta-tion reported that Syria has 20 Scud-C launch-ers, hundreds of Scud-C missiles, and thecapability to manufacture them. An Israelimilitary spokeswoman said she was notaware of any Syrian missile tests. Accordingto Israeli Prime Minister BenjaminNetanyahu, Syria is attempting to produceScud missiles indigenously instead of buy-ing them from foreign suppliers. Netanyahusaid Syrian-produced Scuds have the samecapabilities as those produced elsewhere.Avihu Bin Nun, former commander of theIsraeli Air Force, said Syria’s missile testswere routine. Israeli Cabinet Secretary DaniNave said Syria’s Scud-C missiles do not af-fect the strategic balance because the Scud-C program dates back several years.

Reuter, 8/19/96; in Executive News Service, 8/20/96 (6618). Sami Aboudi, Reuter, 8/20/96; inExecutive News Service, 8/20/96 (6618). Col-leen Siegel, Reuter, 8/20/96; in Executive NewsService, 8/20/96 (6618). Avi Lipschitz, IDF Ra-dio (Tel Aviv), 8/21/96; in FBIS-NES-96-163, 8/21/96 (6618). Kinda Jayoush, Reuter, 8/21/96;in Executive News Service, 8/21/96 (6618).Reuter, 8/19/96; in Executive News Service, 8/21/96, (6618).

I SRAEL WITH TURKEY

8/96The election of a Muslim government in Tur-key threatened to derail approximately $1 bil-lion worth of defense contracts betweenTurkey and Israel. David Ivry, director gen-eral of the Israeli defense ministry, postponeda visit to Turkey at which he was scheduledto sign a cooperation agreement between theIsraeli and Turkish defense industries. Israelis now reconsidering any transfer of ad-vanced weaponry because of the Turkishgovernment’s moves to forge a closer rela-tionship with Iran. In addition, Israel’s elec-tion of a right-wing government could affectfuture defense cooperation between the twocountries. Prior to the election of the newgovernment in Turkey, Israeli-Turkish rela-tions had improved to the point where theIsraeli air force was conducting training ex-ercises in Turkish airspace. In addition, Tur-key had awarded the Israeli firm Rafael a $50million contract for Popeye stand-off mis-siles. Also, Israel and Turkey were discuss-

ing the sale of Rafael’s Python-4 infraredguided missiles and upgrading Turkey’sNorthrop F-5 aircraft. Israel is currently work-ing out the financial details of a $600 millioncontract to upgrade the Turkish Air Force’sMcDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom aircraft.The Turkish armed forces, particularly theair force, support the establishment of closerties with Israel.


I SRAEL WITH UNITED KINGDOM

10/2/96*Senior officials from the Israeli firm Rafaeland the Israeli defense ministry held secrettalks with their counterparts in the UnitedKingdom. As a result of these talks, Rafaelmay be hired as a subcontractor for the pro-duction of the U.K.’s cruise missile of thefuture. Rafael previously lost a bid to de-velop and supply the missile itself. Rafaeloffered the British Ministry of Defence anadvanced version of its Popeye air-to-sur-face missile, which is operational in both Is-rael and the United States. In part, Rafaelfailed to win the contract because it did notsign a production and cooperation agreementwith a British company before the winner wasannounced. During the talks, it was agreedthat British Aerospace (BAe), which won thecruise missile contract, would draw up a com-prehensive framework for industrial coopera-tion with Rafael. As part of the plan, Rafaelmay receive contracts to develop and sup-ply assemblies, which could be worth around18 percent of the deal. In addition, Rafael willmarket its products in Europe and other coun-tries with the assistance of BAe, and bothfirms will cooperate in related fields. The Is-raeli and U.K. representatives discussed sev-eral new projects during the talks. Officialsfrom the U.K. expressed their dissatisfactionregarding the “lack of balance in defenseexports between the two countries,” claim-ing that Israel sold eight times as much weap-onry to the U.K. than it bought over the pasttwo years.

Sharon Sade, Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), 10/2/96, p.A10; in FBIS-NES-96-193, 10/2/96 (6650).

I SRAEL WITH UNITED STATES

7/14/96Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahusaid Israel and the United States had agreed



154

“to develop and implement an early warningsystem in Israel against ballistic missiles.”Netanyahu made his comments on his re-turn from a trip to the United States.Netanyahu also announced that Israel andthe United States had set a date for the jointdevelopment of the Nautilus laser system de-signed to intercept Katyusha-type rockets.

Qol Yisra’el (Jerusalem), 7/14/96; in FBIS-NES-96-136, 7/14/96 (6586).

7/16/96Benjamin Netanyahu told his cabinet aboutthe agreement under which Israel will obtaindata from U.S. satellites to provide earlywarning of ballistic missile launches againstIsrael. According to Netanyahu, U.S. Presi-dent Bill Clinton said Israel should be linkedto the U.S. satellite system by the end of1996.

Qol Yisra’el (Jerusalem), 7/14/96; in FBIS-NES-96-136, 7/14/96 (6586). Government Press Of-fice (Jerusalem), 7/16/96; in FBIS-NES-96-138,7/16/96 (6586).

8/12/96*The U.S.-Israeli project to develop a portable,high-energy laser for destroying short-rangeartillery rockets was accelerated when Israelcontributed $22 million and pledged another$7.5 million in funding for the project. TheU.S. Congress pledged additional funds inthe next fiscal year. The Israeli funds will fi-nance the initial costs of an $89 million con-tract that was awarded to TRW Inc. by theU.S. Army in 7/96 for the development andtesting of a single Tactical High-Energy La-ser (THEL) demonstrator. THEL is plannedas a follow-on to the stationary U.S.-IsraeliNautilus system.

Joseph C. Anselmo, Aviation Week and SpaceTechnology, 8/12/96, p. 31 (6619). Flight Inter-national, 7/10/96-7/16/96, p. 20 (6619). Jane’sDefence Weekly, 7/10/96, p. 3 (6619). Flight In-ternational, 7/31/96-8/6/96, p. 18 (6619).

8/19/96*The U.S. firm Lockheed Martin Electronicsand Missiles initiated a joint venture withIsrael’s Rafael to market the AGM-142 “pre-cision guided air-to-ground missile.” TheIsraeli Air Force already deploys a versionof the AGM-142 called Popeye. LockheedMartin and Rafael have equal stakes in thenew venture which is called Precision GuidedSystems US (PGSUS), a limited liability com-

pany. Lockheed Martin and Rafael are con-sidering production of a 2,500 lb Have Liteversion of the AGM-142 for use on boardU.S. F-16 and F/A-18 fighter aircraft, and aPopeye-2 version to equip fighter aircraftfrom other countries. Israeli F-4 and F-15fighters and U.S. B-52H bombers are alreadyfitted with the standard 3,000 lb version ofthe missile. In 1988, Lockheed began pro-ducing approximately 10 percent of all AGM-142 missiles under license from Rafael. TheU.S. Air Force also designates the AGM-142as the Have Nap.

James T. McKenna, Aviation Week & Space Tech-nology, 8/19/96, p. 88 (6477).

8/20/96The joint U.S.-Israeli Arrow-2 anti-tacticalballistic missile (ATBM) successfully inter-cepted a Scud-type missile, equipped with adummy chemical warhead that had beenlaunched from a ship in the MediterraneanSea. According to Israeli Defense Ministryofficials, the Arrow-2 was fired from an Is-raeli airbase south of Tel Aviv, four minutesafter the target missile was launched. TheArrow-2 “tracked, struck and destroyed aScud-type target missile” over the Mediter-ranean Sea. Video footage showed that theArrow-2 traveled for most of its flight at aspeed of approximately Mach 5, and Israeliofficials said the missile accelerated to a“closing velocity” of eight times the speedof sound. The Arrow-2 intercepted the tar-get “just under 30 km at a range of 50 kmfrom the launch site.” The test representedthe first time a missile has been interceptedat such speeds and altitudes. The GreenPines radar system was used to track theArrow-2 and the target missile. This was thethird test launch of the Arrow-2. However, itwas the first of four launches in which theArrow-2 will attempt to intercept actual tar-gets. The Arrow-2’s homing sensors are de-signed to detect the target and direct theinterceptor missile to within range of its frag-mentation warhead. According to PamRogers, spokesperson for the U.S. Army airand missile defense program, “metal hitmetal” during the test. Following the suc-cessful launch, officials from the U.S. andIsrael disagreed on the future developmentof this joint U.S.-Israeli program. JosephButler, U.S. manager of the Arrow project,

said that he wanted to “consider skippingseveral tests” and to focus instead on “de-veloping an entire operational anti-missiledefense system.” Butler said little remainedto be proved about the missile’s capabilityand, after one more successful test, the pro-gram could focus on the entire system. How-ever, Israeli defense sources were skepticalabout speeding up the program, despite theintention of Israeli officials to complete theArrow-2 system by 2000. An Israeli defensesource said that one or two launches wouldnot be sufficient to complete this stage ofthe Arrow-2 program. Butler said futurelaunches of the Arrow-2 will test the missile’sinterception capabilities against different tar-gets at various altitudes. The next launch ofthe Arrow-2 may take place in 11/96. If thistest is successful, the U.S.-Israeli Arrow-2team may focus efforts on the entire system.

Steve Rodan, Washington Times, 8/21/96, p. A12(6512). Barbara Opall, Defense News, 9/2/96, p.24 (6512). Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8/28/96, p. 19(6512). Flight International, 9/4/96-9/10/96, p.32 (6512). Barbara Opall, Defense News, 7/22/96, p. 6 (6512). Steve Rodan, Defense News, 8/26/96-9/1/96, p. 4 (6533).

8/26/96*The U.S. Congressional Budget Office sug-gested in its annual report that $3.5 billioncould be saved over six years if the UnitedStates ended its funding for Israel’s ArrowATBM program, and terminated the NavyUpper Tier anti-missile system and the space-based Brilliant Eyes tracker.

James R. Asker, Aviation Week & Space Technol-ogy, 8/26/96, p. 19 (6481).

8/28/96Israeli Arrow program officials told U.S.Army Lieutenant General Lester Styles, di-rector of the U.S. Ballistic Missile DefenseOrganization (BMDO), that the Arrow’s sys-tems and the warhead’s fuzing mechanismfunctioned properly during the test on 8/20/96. Israel Defense Minister YitzhakMordechai said the launch puts Israel “inthe global front of technological know-how.”Encouraged by the successful test, the Is-raeli government may exclude the Arrow-2’sfunding from budget cuts and has designatedthe system as a high priority for prototypedevelopment, according to Israeli sources.IAI is beginning advance production of the

155



Arrow-2 at its Lod production facility andplans to commence serial production by 8/97. According to Israeli sources, the IsraeliAir Force should receive at least 50 Arrow-2missiles by 2/98.

Steve Rodan, Washington Times, 8/21/96, p. A12(6512). Barbara Opall, Defense News, 9/2/96, p.24 (6512).

ITALY

I TALY WITH :

Germany, Netherlands, Turkey, andUnited States, 143

JAPAN

JAPAN WITH UNITED STATES

7/96*The United States will supply the JapaneseDefense Agency (JDA) with data from itsmissile warning satellites as an incentive forJapan to participate in a joint anti-missilewarning system. The U.S. Department ofDefense (DOD) wants Japan to participatein a theater missile defense (TMD) system,which the United States suggested in 1995following North Korea’s launch of a No-dong-1 ballistic missile into the Sea of Ja-pan. According to officials in Tokyo, Japanwould have to spend ¥1 trillion—20 percentof the country’s annual defense budget—tofully deploy such a system. Beyond this fi-nancial aspect, Japan will need to considerthe fact that some advanced TMD technolo-gies have yet to be proven, China opposesU.S.-Japanese TMD cooperation, and the riskthat TMD technologies might proliferate tocountries such as China, South Korea, andRussia.

Indian Defence Review, 7/96-9/96, p. 77 (6608).

7/17/96The U.S. DOD informed Congress that itplans to enhance Japan’s SM-2 Block IIStandard SAMs to the Block III configura-

tion.Flight International, 7/17/96-7/23/96, p. 14(6470).

8/7/96-8/8/96Officials from the Japanese Foreign Minis-try and the JDA were scheduled to meet withofficials from the U.S. DOD in Washington,D.C., to discuss the proposed TMD system.The working-level meeting is the sixth in aseries held since the TMD project was initi-ated by the Clinton administration in 1993.The first meeting occurred in 12/93, and themost recent meeting took place in Tokyo in3/96. The JDA allocated 440 million yen forTMD research and development under thefiscal year (FY) 1996 national budget. Japanhas not yet decided if it will join the TMDproject, but will probably make a decision inFY 97, according to JDA officials. Althoughthe United States possesses the technologyto intercept ballistic missiles at high altitudes,it requires the “support of its allies to deploythe system.” The U.S. DOD does not expecta final decision from Japan until “well into1997.”

Kyodo (Tokyo), 8/5/96; in FBIS-EAS-96-151,8/5/96 (6514). Wall Street Journal, http://interactive6.wsj.com, 8/16/96 (6514).

9/19/96U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry askeda Japanese delegation in Washington for aquick decision on the TMD system, describ-ing it as a good opportunity for the twocountries to cooperate. Japan’s 4th Air De-pot currently has six SAM units equippedwith Patriot missiles. Each Patriot unit is as-signed to a specific air-defense sector, andthe 4th Air Depot coordinates all six withother elements of Japan’s air-defense sys-tem. Although Japan does not have enoughSAM groups to defend the entire country,units could be moved from less dangeroussectors to the main battle area in a futureconflict. The Japanese Air Self-DefenseForce (JASDF) is fielding Patriot AdvancedCapability-2 (PAC-2) product improvementsin response to the evolving threat.

Kyodo (Tokyo), 0/21/96; in FBIS-EAS-96-185,9/21/96 (6666). Lt. Col. Hisashi Kasahara, AirDefense Artillery, 7/96-8/96, pp. 26-29 (6666).

9/20/96JDA Director General Hideo Usui said Japan

would decide in the summer of 1997 whetherto participate in the TMD system with theUnited States. Although Usui said Japanneeded a TMD system to maintain its secu-rity, he added that the project would costtoo much. The estimated cost of the TMDsystem would probably exceed the ¥25.15trillion allocated for Japan’s defense budgetsin the midterm defense program for fiscalyears 1996-2000.

Kyodo (Tokyo), 0/21/96; in FBIS-EAS-96-185,9/21/96 (6666). Lt. Col. Hisashi Kasahara, AirDefense Artillery, 7/96-8/96, pp. 26-29 (6666).

Late 10/96*Officials from the U.S. and Japanese foreignand defense ministries met in Tokyo to ex-amine the technical aspects of the proposedTMD system. The next round of talks isscheduled for early 1997. According to JDAofficial Tatsuo Yamamoto, the next subjectfor discussion will be Japan’s TMD require-ments. The U.S. firm Lockheed Martin andthe Japanese firms Mitsubishi Heavy Indus-tries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries wouldbe the most likely contractors for the TMDsystem.

Gwen Robinson, Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/archive, 10/30/96 (6651).

KUWAIT

KUWAIT WITH UNITED STATES

9/30/96Kuwaiti Minister of Defense Ahmad al-Hamud al-Sabah signed a contract for theconstruction of a facility to “build, set up,and maintain” U.S. Patriot “missile launch-ing pads at various sites” in Kuwait. Thecontract was signed with “the representa-tive of the company that will be carryingout the project.” The Kuwaiti Ministry ofDefense did not provide details about thecontract or the firm that will implement it.

Kuna (Kuwait), 9/30/96; in FBIS-NES-96-191,9/30/96 (6530).



156

LEBANON

LEBANON WITH :

Iran, Israel, and Syria, 149

MALAYSIA

MALAYSIA WITH TURKEY

8/17/96Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakanannounced that Turkey and Malaysia maycooperate in the “fields of military electron-ics industry, optical equipment, ammunitionproduction, and missile systems.” Erbakanmade this remark in a statement issued aftermeeting Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathirbin Mohammed in Kuala Lumpur.

TRT Television Network (Ankara), 8/17/96; inFBIS-EAS-96-161, 8/17/96 (6517).

MISSILE TECHNOLOGYCONTROL REGIME

(MTCR) DEVELOPMENTS

7/96The United States hosted an MTCR Seminaron Transshipment Issues in Washington,D.C. The seminar was attended by foreignpolicymakers and specialists from 12 MTCRmember states and seven non-MTCR coun-tries. During the seminar, a “productive ex-change of ideas on how to impedeproliferators’ misuse of transshipment” tookplace. The participants identified a numberof issues for potential future deliberation.

White House Press Release, http://library.whitehouse.gov, 11/12/96 (6674).

9/96U.S. officials said Ukraine’s inventory ofScud-B missiles prohibits a needed U.S. en-

dorsement for Ukraine to join the MTCR.Ukraine has been attempting to join the 28-member regime for several years. Ukrainianmembership will probably be discussed at a10/96 meeting of the member states inEdinburgh, United Kingdom. In late 9/96, U.S.officials said that although Ukraine’s exportpolicies are in line with MTCR guidelines, itsarsenal of Scud-B missiles is not. Accordingto a U.S. State Department official, Ukrainehas so far “not been prepared to accept” theU.S. position that new members must giveup their offensive missiles before joining theregime. U.S. officials are optimistic thatUkraine will eventually sacrifice its Scud-Bmissiles in order to join the MTCR. By join-ing the MTCR, Ukraine would prove its com-mitment to nonproliferation and gainopportunities to cooperate with the West inthe commercial space launch market. In 1994,Ukraine agreed to bring its missile exportpolicy in line with MTCR guidelines. U.S.officials said they are willing to allow Ukraineto maintain its missile production facilitiesto develop SLVs.

Jeff Erlich, Defense News, 9/30/96-10/6/96, p.46 (6669).

9/19/96The Clinton administration’s National Sci-ence and Technology Council released a factsheet on U.S. National Space Policy. Accord-ing to the fact sheet, MTCR guidelines arenot designed to hinder national or interna-tional space programs unless they contrib-ute to delivery systems for weapons of massdestruction. However, the United States will“retain a strong presumption of denialagainst exports of complete SLVs or otherCategory I components.” In addition, theUnited States will continue its policy of “notsupporting the development or acquisitionof SLV systems in non-MTCR states.” TheUnited States “will not encourage new SLVprograms” in MTCR member states whichraise questions from a proliferation and eco-nomic standpoint, “but will consider thetransfer of MTCR-controlled items to thesecountries.” The United States could considerextra safeguards for such exports “where ap-propriate.” According to the fact sheet, anyexports would continue to be subject to thenon-transfer measures included in the Stra-tegic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and

the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)Treaty. The United States will continue towork to restrict the proliferation of advancedspace technology to unapproved destina-tions. When initiating space-related technol-ogy development and transfer agreementswith other nations, U.S. executive depart-ments and agencies will take into accountwhether such nations promote fair and freetrade in the commercial space sector.

The White House, National Science And Tech-nology Council, http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/OSTP/NSTC, 9/19/96 (6686).

9/25/96Volodymyr Horbulin said Ukraine “retainsthe right to develop missiles with a range ofup to 500 km for its own purposes.” Accord-ing to Horbulin, this range limit does not vio-late the INF Treaty. Horbulin said Kiev willhonor its international obligations, butUkraine’s security interests could result in a“review of certain accords.”

Uryadovyy Kuryer (Kiev), 9/24/96, p. 2; in FBIS-SOV-96-188, 9/24/96 (6670). Itar-Tass (Mos-cow), 9/25/96; in FBIS-SOV-96-188, 9/25/96(6670).

10/7/96-10/11/96During the 1996 MTCR Plenary Meeting inEdinburgh, United Kingdom, the partnerssupported U.S. initiatives to follow up onthe success of the meetings. The partnersagreed to “be proactive in encouraging” keynon-MTCR transshipers to adhere to theMTCR Guidelines and Annex, and to givethem “practical assistance” to implementtransshipment controls on missile technol-ogy. The member states agreed on steps thatcould be taken to improve the regime’s ef-fectiveness in restricting missile proliferationin South Asia and the Persian Gulf. In addi-tion, the partners agreed to increase thetransparency of the regime’s objectives andactivities, and to pursue dialogues with non-MTCR countries to encourage their volun-tary adherence to the regime’s guidelines.

White House Press Release, http://library.whitehouse.gov, 11/12/96 (6674).

157



NETHERLANDS

NETHERLANDS WITH :

Germany, Italy, Turkey, and UnitedStates, 143

NORTH ATLANTICTREATY ORGANIZATION

NATO WITH RUSSIA

7/96In an interview with Denmark’s BerlingskeWeekendavisen, Danish Defense MinisterHans Haekkerup said NATO and Russiacould counter the threat posed by unpre-dictable countries that might possess “mis-sile technology, biological warfare materiel,and a nuclear capability” by “jointly build-ing up a missile defense system.” Haekkerupadded that NATO could “certainly use someof the high-tech items” that Russia pro-duces.

Gennadi Kulbitsky, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 9/22/96;in FBIS-WEU-96-185, 9/22/96 (6532). JensMaigard, Berlingske Weekendavisen(Copenhagen), 7/19/96-7/25/96, p. 6; in FBIS-WEU-96-167, 7/25/96 (6532).

8/25/96German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe wasquoted in Germany’s Bild Am Sonntag assaying that NATO-Russian cooperation inthe future could include the “developmentof a joint defense system against newthreats—against long-range missiles carry-ing weapons of mass destruction, for in-stance.” Ruehe said this system would bedirected against “blackmailing attempts andnuclear terrorism from the South—threatsfrom Islamic fundamentalism, for example.”According to Ruehe, this would demonstratethat NATO expansion was not directedagainst Russia, and there was an opportu-nity to establish a “special partnership” be-tween the alliance and Russia.

Gennadi Kulbitsky, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 9/22/96;

in FBIS-WEU-96-185, 9/22/96 (6532). F.Weckbach-Mara, Bild Am Sonntag (Hamburg),8/25/96, pp. 2-3; in FBIS-WEU-96-167, 8/25/96 (6532).

NORTH KOREA


9/25/96South Korea’s Unification Ministry issued astatement saying that North Korea producesapproximately 100 Scud-B and -C ballisticmissiles annually, and has exported approxi-mately 400, primarily to the Middle East.According to the statement, between 1980and 1993, arms exports accounted for ap-proximately 30 percent ($20.4 billion) of allNorth Korean exports, and Scud sales arenow about $500 million annually. The minis-try also said North Korea has exported mis-sile production facilities and technology toSyria and Iran.

Reuter, 9/25/96 (6677).

10/16/96*Japanese news agency, Jiji, and NHK televi-sion reported that North Korea is planningto test-launch a 1,000 km-range No-dong-1missile into the Sea of Japan. Clues that atest-launch was imminent were provided bya U.S. satellite which tracked the movementof a No-dong-1 launch platform from an as-sembly plant to a position on the country’seast coast. Defense officials in Japan notedthat all preparations for the launch have beenmade, including the prepositioning of NorthKorean vessels in the Sea of Japan to moni-tor the missile in its terminal phase. Althoughsimilar indications were picked up in 7/96without an ensuing launch, the U.S. re-sponded to these new developments bysending an RC-135 reconnaissance aircraftfrom Kadena Air Base in Okinawa to monitorthe region. The No-dong-1 has been underdevelopment since 1993, and “some expertsbelieve that it will be deployed in the comingmonths.”

Reuter, 10/16/96 (6561). Nicholas D. Kristof,New York Times, 10/22/96, p. A11 (6561).

NORTH KOREA WITH :

Iran, 149Iran and United States, 149

NORTH KOREA WITH PAKISTAN AND

TAIWAN

3/96Two hundred barrels of ammonium perchlo-rate shipped from North Korea were detainedin Taiwan en route to Pakistan’s Space andUpper Atmosphere Commission(SUPARCO).

Bruce Gilley, Far Eastern Economic Review, 10/3/96, p. 20 (6675).

NORTH KOREA WITH SYRIA

9/12/96Customs officials seized 18 cargo containersthat had arrived at Hong Kong’s Kwai ChungContainer Terminal on 8/22/96 from NorthKorea, and which were bound for Syria. On9/16/96, a search of the containers’ contentsfound howitzer guns and spare parts. TheIran Brief reported that North Korea intendedto have the guns’ optics upgraded at aFrench-built munitions plant in Syria and re-turned to North Korea, as an offset for pastdeliveries of Scud-C missiles. Conventionalweapons transfers between North Korea andSyria are not illegal, but countries shippingweaponry through Hong Kong must notifythe Trade Department. The Trade Depart-ment had no notice documentation. Customshas not yet opened all of the containers, andit is “not impossible” that the remaining con-tainers may contain “parts for Scud missiles.”

Ng Kang-Chung and John Flint, South China Sun-day Morning Post (Hong Kong), 9/15/96, p. 1;FBIS-CHI-96-180 (6676). Glenn Schloss andSimon Beck, South China Morning Post (HongKong), 9/17/96, p. 3; in FBIS-CHI-96-181 (6676).Iran Brief, 10/1/96, p. 6. Jane’s Defence Weekly,10/2/96, p. 15 (6676). Glen Schloss and StellaLee, South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 9/16/96, p. 3; in FBIS-CHI-96-180 (6676).

NORWAY

NORWAY WITH RUSSIA, UKRAINE , AND

UNITED STATES



158

7/22/96*The U.S. firm Space Systems/Loral of Cali-fornia has placed an order with the joint Nor-wegian-Russian-Ukrainian-U.S. Sea LaunchCo. for five unspecified satellite launches tobe made between late 1998 and 2001. Thecompanies did not release financial detailsof the contract. The Boeing-led Sea Launchventure has now secured orders for 15launches, including 10 from Hughes Spaceand Communications. Sea Launch intendsto use Ukrainian Zenit rockets to launch sat-ellites from a converted offshore oil platform.The platform will be located in the PacificOcean, and the first launch is scheduled totake place in 6/98. Sea Launch’s first pay-load will be a HS-702 model satellite, Hughes’Galaxy 11 communications satellite. In late 8/96, Sea Launch is scheduled to start build-ing facilities at its home port. This project isexpected to cost $20 million and reachcompletion by 10/97. The plan entails: remod-eling existing buildings to be used as offices,storage, and warehouse space; building twonew structures for processing spacecraft;and modifying a 333 m-long pier “to accom-modate the Sea Launch command vessel shipand launch platform.” On 7/26/96, the UnitedStates and Ukraine signed an agreement tolaunch satellites on board Ukrainian ZenitSLVs. The parties signed two contracts: the“Global Launch” program will involve thelaunch of 36 communication satellites onboard three Zenit SLVs, and the “SeaLaunch” program will begin operation in1998.

Space News, 7/22/96-7/28/96, p. 16 (6496).Space News, 8/12/96-8/18/96, p.2 (6496). Unian(Kiev), 7/27/96; in FBIS-SOV-96-146, 7/27/96(6465).

PAKISTAN

PAKISTAN WITH :

Afghanistan, 138

China, 141China and India, 141North Korea and Taiwan, 157

RUSSIA


7/15/96Two strategic nuclear-powered submarinesfrom Russia’s Northern Fleet test launchedRSM-40 (SS-N-8 “Sawfly”) and RSM-54 (SS-N-23 “Skiff”) SLBMs. The missiles werelaunched from the Barents Sea. The warheadshit their pre-designated targets in the PacificOcean and on the Kamchatka peninsula.According to sources at the Russian De-fense Ministry, the missiles were taken outof long-term storage for the exercise.

Andrey Yurkin, Itar-Tass World Service (Mos-cow), 7/15/96; in FBIS-SOV-96-137, 7/15/96(6489). Vasiliy Belousov, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 7/15/96; in FBIS-SOV-96-137, 7/15/96 (6489).

7/25/96The Russian Defense Ministry announcedthat Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF)launched an ICBM from the Plesetsk testingrange near Arkhangelsk on 7/25/96. The mis-sile hit its target with “a high degree of preci-sion.” The test was part of Russia’s programto develop the new Topol-M ICBM. GeneralIgor Sergeyev, SRF commander-in-chief, saidthe project was initiated in 1993 and its firststage was completed in 1995. According toSergeyev, the project was in its final stagesand the trials had been a success. RussianDeputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshinsaid the launch demonstrated that enterprisesof the military industrial complex could co-operate effectively and that they will initiateserial production of the new missile. Kokoshinsaid a government resolution had laid thegroundwork for this cooperation to ensurethat the “necessary material basis” existedfor the missile to be produced. Kokoshin saidthe missile would form the “nucleus ofRussia’s strategic missile troops in the fore-seeable future.” The test was the third launchof the Topol-M despite funding problems.

Anatoliy Yurkin, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 7/25/96;

in FBIS-SOV-96-145, 7/25/96 (6600).

8/14/96Mikhail Gerasov, deputy director ofMoscow’s USA-Canada Institute, said thatproduction of Russia’s new Topol-M ICBMhad not yet begun, making its deployment in1997 doubtful. According to officials in Mos-cow, a lack of funding will probably delayindefinitely Russia’s deployment of theTopol-M, despite several successful tests ofthe missile. The Russian Defense Ministryhad planned to operationalize 10 solid-fuelTopol-M ICBMs by the end of 1997. Accord-ing to Gerasov, Russia’s 1996 defense bud-get did not include funds for Topol-Mproduction and there was a two-year delayin fulfilling the missile program. Some U.S.Congressmen and officials from the U.S. De-partment of Defense believe the Topol-Mprogram—an enhanced version of the road-mobile SS-25 ICBM—is evidence that Rus-sia is hedging on the issue of START IIratification, which the Russian parliament iscurrently considering. Russian national se-curity advisor Aleksandr Lebed and othersin the Russian government support theTopol-M program. Russian officials view re-tention of a credible nuclear force as guaran-teeing continued status as a superpower,particularly when Moscow cannot afford toacquire new advanced conventional weap-ons. Since 12/94, the Topol-M has been testedsuccessfully on three occasions from theMirny testing grounds at Arkhangelsk innorthern Russia, most recently on 7/25/96.Although the Russian Defense Ministry in-tended to conduct 20 test launches of theTopol-M over the past two years, officialssaid funding problems had slowed the test-ing program.

Pyotr Yudin, Defense News, 8/19/96, pp. 1, 18(6605). Susanne M. Schafer, Washington Times,8/25/96, p. A7 (6605).

8/22/96*Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a de-cree titled, “On Monitoring the Export Fromthe Russian Federation of Equipment, Mate-rials, and Technologies Used in the Creationof Missile Weapons.” The decree establishedan export-control list for equipment, materi-als, and technologies that can be used in thedevelopment and production of missiles. The

159



list is subject to alteration or adjustment.Requests to export items included on the listwill need to be approved by the Russiangovernment after examination by experts.Yeltsin directed the government “to bringnormative acts into line with this edict” fol-lowing Moscow’s adherence to the “Agree-ment on the Nonproliferation of Space RocketTechnologies” and “with a view to comply-ing with Russia’s obligations on the non-proliferation of rocket systems” capable ofdelivering WMD.

Rossiyskiye Vesti (Moscow), 8/22/96, p. 1; in FBIS-SOV-96-164, 8/22/96 (6548).

8/23/96General Eugene Habiger, commander-in-chiefof the U.S. Strategic Command, said Russia’snuclear force will fall to START II levels by2005, regardless of Russian intentions, be-cause of a lack of funds to pay for modern-ization. Habiger said Russia is currentlyworking on four nuclear systems, but onlythe work on a single-warhead SS-27 ICBM isproceeding smoothly. Without providingdetails, Habiger said Russian projects to de-velop a submarine-launched nuclear missile,a nuclear-missile-firing submarine, and anuclear armed cruise missile were among theless successful projects. He said that even ifthese projects were successful, the Russianswould not have the capability, the money, orthe resources “to bring up their force struc-ture... that’s going to just run out of shelf lifeor capability.”

Jim Adams, Reuters, 8/23/96 (6488). Pyotr Yudin,Defense News, 8/19/96, pp. 1, 18 (6605). SusanneM. Schafer, Washington Times, 8/25/96, p. A7(6605).

10/96The Russian Navy was scheduled to launchits first satellite on board the Shtil booster.The Shtil is a converted SS-N-23 “Skiff”SLBM. The Skiff became operational in 1986.The Shtil was scheduled to launch the 70 kgKompas research satellite into a 400 km, cir-cular, 78 degree inclination orbit from aNorthern Fleet nuclear submarine located inthe Barents Sea. In 6/95, the Shtil launched a105 kg German re-entry capsule during a sub-orbital flight.


10/2/96

During a training exercise of the NorthernFleet, Russia’s naval strategic nuclear forcessuccessfully tested an SLBM from a strate-gic guided missile submarine under the com-mand of Captain First Class AnatoliyYevtodyev. The exercise was conducted un-der the leadership of the Russian defenseminister, and the command to launch theSLBM was transmitted via military satellitefrom Moscow. The test was considered a“presidential launch” because the “nuclearbriefcase” was used in the command-and-control process.

Vladimir Gundarov, Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow),10/4/96; in FBIS-SOV-96-194, 10/4/96 (6601).

10/3/96Russia launched an RS-12M Topol-classICBM from the Plesetsk testing range. Themissile successfully hit its target. GeneralIgor Sergeyev said problems in the armedforces had not interfered with the SRF’s abil-ity to preserve “their combat capacity at aproper level” and to carry out their duties.Sergeyev said that if sufficient funding weremade available, the RS-12M and the updatedTopol-M ICBM could guarantee the secu-rity of Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent“at the beginning of the next century.” Rus-sia also test launched two 3,000 km-rangenuclear-capable air-launched cruise missiles(ALCM). According to Major General VasiliyMaloshitskiy, deputy head of the long-rangeair force’s combat training department, bothALCMs hit their targets. The missilelaunches were part of Redut-96, a series ofexercises designed to review the combat ca-pabilities of all kinds of troops, fleets, andmilitary districts, and to “practice manage-ment of the Russian Armed Forces.” Accord-ing to Maloshitskiy, Russian Prime MinisterViktor Chernomyrdin observed the exercisesfrom the missile-launch control center at thegeneral headquarters of the Russian ArmedForces.

Vladimir Gundarov, Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow),10/4/96; in FBIS-SOV-96-194, 10/4/96 (6601).Andrey Galkin, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 10/3/96; inFBIS-SOV-96-194, 10/3/96 (6601). SergeyOstanin, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 10/3/96; in FBIS-SOV-96-194, 10/3/96 (6601).

10/3/96The Russian Government Presidium consid-ered the LIBTON program, which was estab-

lished jointly by the Ministry of the Economyand the Ministry of Atomic Energy to createa complex in Russia “for the extraction andproduction” of rare metals, including beryl-lium, lithium, niobium, and tantalum. Beryl-lium is used in the production of guidancesystems for rockets and spacecraft, ceram-ics in the electronics industry, light alloysfor aerospace equipment, and nuclear muni-tions. After the dissolution of the SovietUnion, the production facilities for many ofthese rare metals were located outside Rus-sia in Estonia, Kazakstan, Ukraine, andUzbekistan. The objective of the LIBTONprogram is to establish an autonomous pro-duction complex for these rare metals in Rus-sia based on the Chita mining andenrichment combine. Prime Minister ViktorChernomyrdin approved the program, whichwill run through 2012 at a cost of R6.6 tril-lion. The Russian federal exchequer and theMinistry of Atomic Energy will each fund 20percent of the program; the Chita OblastAdministration will fund 10 percent of theprogram, and the remaining 50 percent willbe funded through commercial investment.

Vladimir Kucherenko, Rossiyskaya gazeta (Mos-cow), 10/4/96; in FBIS-SOV-96-194, 10/4/96(6614).

10/16/96*The SRF prepared a solid-fuel Start-1 SLV tolaunch the first satellite from the newSvobodny cosmodrome in the Far EasternAmur region of Russia. The rocket is sched-uled to place the Zeya small demonstrationsatellite into orbit in 12/96. Moscow’s Insti-tute of Thermal Technology converted anSS-25 “Sickle” ICBM to produce the Start-1SLV, which also incorporates hardware fromthe SS-20 ballistic missile. STC Complex ismarketing four- and five-stage versions ofthe Start-1 SLV.


10/28/96*The Moscow-based firm Granit, which pro-duces anti-aircraft missile systems and elec-tronics, was selected to pioneer a Russianeffort to set up multinational arms produc-tion and export firms. Granit will receive alicense allowing it to export arms indepen-dently of Rosvoorouzhenie, Russia’s state-run arms export agency. At present,



160

Rosvoorouzhenie handles 90 percent ofRussia’s arms exports, which were worth $2.7billion in 1995. According to Russian PrimeMinister Viktor Chernomyrdin, the Russiangovernment is willing to spend R50 billion($9.2 million) to help Granit through the tran-sition process. Chernomyrdin said Granit wasa perfect choice for the “core of a joint ven-ture” because it imports most of the spareparts that it uses from neighboring CIS coun-tries. According to Rosvoorouzhenie data,Granit will be one of 16 Russian firms licensedto export arms if the project proceeds. Alongwith Moscow-based MiG aircraft manufac-turer VPK MAPO, Granit will be the secondRussian firm to develop, manufacture, andexport its own products. According to crit-ics in Russia and other CIS countries, lack offunding is the primary obstacle to Moscow’splan to establish new defense giants.

Pyotr Yudin, Defense News, 10/28/96-11/3/96,p. 4 (6654).

RUSSIA WITH :

Australia and Thailand, 138Belarus, 138Brazil and United States, 139Bulgaria and United States, 140China and Ukraine, 141Cyprus, United Kingdom, and UnitedStates, 142Egypt, 142Finland, 143France, 143India, 148Iran, 149NATO, 157Norway, Ukraine, and UnitedStates, 157

RUSSIA WITH SINGAPORE

9/4/96*According to regionally based intelligencesources, defense officials from Singapore areinterested in purchasing Russia’s S-300 (SA-10 “Grumble”) air-defense system. The S-300is a ground-based, solid-fuel, short-rangetheater defense missile system comparableto the U.S. Patriot. In early 1993, Russiabriefed Singapore on the OTR-21/9M79Tochka (SS-21 “Scarab”) surface-to-surfacemissile (SSM). The single warhead SS-21 is a

solid-fuel, mobile, short-range ballistic mis-sile. Because the SS-21 has an estimatedrange of 150 km and a maximum payload ca-pability of 482 kg, it falls below the MTCR’s300 km and 500 kg parameters. No country inSoutheast Asia currently possesses SSMs,even short-range types like the SS-21. Theunpublicized 1993 meeting between defenseofficials from Russia and Singapore was thefirst of its kind between the countries be-cause of the latter’s staunch anti-communismand its alignment with the United States dur-ing the Cold War. Singapore’s defense min-istry did not respond to inquiries aboutcontacts with Moscow. Russia has attemptedto establish new markets for its defense prod-ucts in Southeast Asia since the late 1980s.


RUSSIA WITH UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

7/24/96*The UAE purchased the 300 mm-caliberSmerch multiple launch rocket system fromRussia. According to Middle Eastern diplo-matic sources in Moscow, the UAE pur-chased one Smerch battery, which includesthe Vivariy automated fire-control system, six9T234-2 loader- transporter vehicles, and six9A52-5 transloader vehicles with 12-tubelaunchers. The UAE made an undisclosedpayment to Russia and is awaiting deliveryfrom the Splav manufacturing plant in Tula.Although Russia offered the full range ofrockets for the Smerch system, the UAE hasyet to choose a specific type of projectile.The contract does not specify where UAEpersonnel will be trained to operate theSmerch system, but this will probably takeplace in Russia.


RUSSIA WITH UNITED STATES

10/7/96*The U.S. firm McDonnell Douglas success-fully conducted the first test launch and pow-ered flight of an MA-31 aerial target at theU.S. Naval Air Warfare Center’s test groundat Point Mugu, California. Representativesfrom McDonnell Douglas, the U.S. Navy, andthe Russian missile manufacturer Zvezda-Strela modified an X-31A supersonic anti-ship/anti-radar missile to create the MA-31.

Zvezda-Strela’s X-31A has been used by theRussian Air Force since 1988. In 5/95,McDonnell Douglas was awarded a $4.7 mil-lion contract to assess four different aerialtargets with an option to acquire up to 20.According to John Reilly, manager of theMA-31 program, Russian participants re-ceived approximately $1.7 million of the total$4.7 million. The U.S. Navy needs a super-sonic sea-skimming missile to test ship-based missile defense systems. Accordingto Reilly, the X-31A possessed the desiredcapabilities. Reilly said this unprecedentedproject began in 1993 and constituted thefirst time this type of military-industrial co-operation had taken place between theUnited States and Russia.

Defense News, 10/7/96-10/13/96, p. 21 (6689).

10/23/96*Two U.S. firms have selected Russia’s NK-33 liquid-oxygen/kerosene engine to powerre-usable SLVs. Kistler Aerospace ofKirkland, Washington, wants to use the NK-33 in its K-1 re-usable SLV, while Kelly Spaceand Technology of San Bernardino, Califor-nia, wants to use the engine in its EclipseAstroliner sub-orbital spaceplane. The U.S.firm Aerojet is modifying and marketing theNK-33, which was developed originally topower Russia’s N1 Moon rocket.

Tim Furniss, Flight International, 10/23/96-10/29/96, p. 23 (6599).

SINGAPORE

SINGAPORE WITH :

Russia, 160

SLOVAKIA

SLOVAKIA WITH :

India, 148

161



SOUTH KOREA


6/5/96*The 1/96 issue of Kukbang Kwa Kisul re-ported that South Korea’s accession to theMTCR would not adversely affect its exportof missile technology, and would in fact boostits access to advanced technologies, thatcould be “grafted” to indigenous projects.On 4/17/96, a magazine entitled ChuganMaeyong editorialized that the U.S.-ROKmemorandum on missile control, which pro-hibits South Korea from developing missileswith ranges beyond 180 km, is a “stumblingblock” to South Korean aerospace advances.Currently, South Korea is developing a two-stage rocket. The first stage is 3.57 m in lengthand weighs 0.71 tons, while its second stagemeasures 7.47 m and weighs 1.22 tons. Fuelaccounts for 396 kg of the first stage and 580kg of the second, and 150 kg comprises thepayload. The first stage burns for 6.7 sec-onds with an average of 23.4 tons of thrust.At 7 seconds the stages separate and thesecond stage burns for 20.2 seconds with8.7 tons of thrust. At 60 seconds, approxi-mately 73.4 km in altitude, the nose faringseparates. The rocket reaches maximum ve-locity in 28.2 seconds. The Korea AerospaceResearch Institute (KARI) manages the two-stage program, particularly engine develop-ment, while a number of agencies and firmscontribute to specific aspects of the project,including: the Korea Research Institute ofStandards and Science (payload design), theAgency for Defense Development (launchequipment and test facilities), Korea Explo-sives (engines), Samsung Aerospace,Hankook Tire Mfg., Korea Fiber Glass (com-posite and heat- resistant materials), DoowonHeavy Industries (airframe and launcher),Ace Antenna (communications), Danam Ind.(payload electronics), and Seoul NationalUniversity (research). Cho Kwang-nae, chiefof KARI’s medium-rocket group, indicatedin the 4/17/96 Chugan Maegyong article thata three-stage follow-on to the two-stagerocket would not be difficult. As early as 4/

14/93, Chugan Maegyong reported that athree-stage rocket would be operational by1999. A 10/11/95 article, also in ChuganMaeyong, identifies the program’s ultimategoal: to launch of a 500-700 kg payload intoa 600-800 km orbit by 2009.

FBIS Special Memorandum: ROK Rocket De-velopment, 6/5/96 (6574).

10/2/96*South Korea has developed a dry-tuned gy-roscope (DTG), which will “soon be com-mercialized.” The Korea Institute for DefenseAnalysis and the Special Automatic ControlResearch Center of Seoul National Univer-sity jointly designed and assembled the gy-roscope; Daewoo Heavy Industries (SouthKorea) processed its constituent parts, andthe Special Automatic Control ResearchCenter tested it. The gyroscope operates at14,000 revolutions per minute, has a 5 cmdiameter, and a 5 cm height. Only seven coun-tries have produced such gyroscopes, andtransfer of the technology is generally re-stricted. Professors from Seoul National Uni-versity that participated in the DTG’sdevelopment are: Yi Chang-kyu, the projectchair (Electronic Engineering department) ,Yi Tong-nyon (Material Engineering depart-ment), Kim Yong-hyop (Aerospace depart-ment), and Chong Hyon-kyo (ElectricEngineering department). Yi said that nextthey “will develop an ultra-mini gyroscopewith a diameter and height of less than 1 cm.”

Mael Kyongje Sinmun (Seoul), 10/2/96, p. 16; inFBIS-EAS-96-194 (6681).

SYRIA

SYRIA WITH :

Iran, Israel, and Lebanon, 149Israel, 153North Korea, 157

TAIWAN


9/11/96*Taiwanese military officials disclosed thearmy’s plan to test its first surface-to-sur-face missile by the end of the year. Militarysources say that the “Sky Halberd” has beendeveloped so that Taiwan’s military forceswill have first-strike capabilities. The programis based on the Model-2 “Sky Bow” missile.Sources estimate the missile’s range to beapproximately 300 km. The Chungshan In-stitute of Science and Technology producesthe missile. The guidance system can useGlobal Positioning System (GPS) technology,but to take advantage of the GPS, Taiwanwill need access to a satellite.

Lu Chao-Lung, Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao (Taipei),9/11/96, p. 1; in FBIS-CHI-96-180 (6642).

TAIWAN WITH :

North Korea and Pakistan, 157

TAIWAN WITH UNITED STATES

8/22/96*According to Taiwanese military sources,U.S.-built Patriot missiles will be a crucial partof Taiwan’s missile defenses. By 10/96, theUnited States will deliver three Patriot sys-tems, and from 2/97 until 6/98, they will bedeployed by the Taiwanese Army’s AviationLogistics Department. The General StaffHeadquarters is working on the purchase ofapplicable mobile equipment from the UnitedStates that would include an integratedphased-array radar capability to upgrade thepresent Patriot system. To date, the UnitedStates has not agreed to sell this technol-ogy.

Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao (Taiwan), 8/22/96, p. 1; inFBIS-CHI-96-165 (6644).

THAILAND WITH :

Australia and Russia, 138



162

TURKEY

TURKEY WITH :

Israel, 153Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and UnitedStates, 143Malaysia, 156

TURKEY WITH UNITED STATES

11/6/96*Turkey will purchase 72 Army Tactical Mis-sile System (ATACMS) missiles worth $48million from the U.S. firm Lockheed MartinVought Systems. The U.S. Congress ap-proved the transaction earlier in 1996; this isthe first sale of ATACMS outside the UnitedStates. Lockheed Martin will deliver all themissiles to Turkey by 4/98. Turkey alreadyhas 12 Multiple Launch Rocket System(MLRS) launchers, which can be used tolaunch ATACMS missiles. Turkey is ex-pected to eventually purchase up to 120ATACMS missiles at a cost of $130 million.


UKRAINE


7/2/96-7/3/96The SAM and radiotechnical troops ofUkraine’s Air Defense (PPO) Forces con-ducted the first test firings of S-300 and S-125 air-defense systems in Ukraine at theState Aviation Firing Range in Crimea. An S-300 system destroyed a target over the BlackSea, which had traveled between 80 and 85km at an altitude of 800 meters and a speedof 900 km/h. The S-300 intercepted the targetat a range of 67 km. According to LieutenantGeneral Oleksandr Stetsenko, Ukraine’sdeputy minister of defense and commanderof the PPO Forces, the S-300 was expectedto have a maximum interception range of 50km. During the second test, two S-125 mis-

siles were fired separately at a second tar-get. The first missile hit the target at a rangeof 40 km. When the target caught fire andbegan to fall, the second missile completelydestroyed it. According to Stetsenko, the air-defense missiles and radar installations weremanufactured in Ukraine. The missile targetsused during the exercise had small radar sig-natures and flew at a low altitude. The air-defense personnel “demonstrated goodcombat proficiency and teamwork” duringthe exercises and the weapon systems “op-erated in stable fashion.” A Buk air-defensesystem was also scheduled to be tested, butStetsenko said this was postponed becauseenough material had been collected for analy-sis. According to Stetsenko, the exercisedemonstrated that live firings of SAM sys-tems could be conducted in Ukraine. In ad-dition, the exercises proved the effectivenessof Ukraine’s air-defense systems and theneed to develop an air-defense firing rangein Crimea. Stetsenko added that past test fir-ings of the S-300 and S-125 systems onlyoccurred in Kazakstan. The next exercises atthe State Firing Range in Crimea are sched-uled for fall 1996. During these exercises, “allof the types of weaponry in the PPO Forcesare planned to be used.” The fall 1996 drillswill focus on “ensuring the fulfillment of thechief mission of the troops—covering theentire territory of the nation.” The State Fir-ing Range will be equipped with “everythingnecessary” in the near future. In response toa question regarding Ukraine’s agreement touse practice ranges in Russia, Stetsenko saidthe Ukrainians had been denied fuel. Accord-ing to Stetsenko, lack of fuel made it expen-sive to conduct live firings outside Ukraine.Stetsenko said that in addition to assemblingand testing S-125 and S-300 systems, a Ukrai-nian plant is “working on a new missile.”

Ruslan Tkachuk, Narodna Armiya (Kiev), 7/9/96, p. 1; in FBIS-UMA-96-158-S, 7/9/96 (6693).Intelnews (Kiev), 7/8/96; in FBIS-TAC-96-008,7/8/96 (6693).

UKRAINE WITH :

Africa, 138China and Russia, 141Germany, 143MTCR, 156Norway, Russia, and United States, 157

UKRAINE WITH UNITED STATES

7/96The U.S. firm Rockwell and Ukraine’s NPOYuzhnoye signed an agreement to providelaunch services on board the three-stageTsyklon SLV. The Tsyklon was developedfrom the first and second stages of the SS-9ICBM, with a third stage added specificallyto launch satellites. The Space Systems Di-vision of Rockwell will provide sales, mar-keting, and payload integration for the rocket.The Tsyklon can launch 2,000 kg payloads“at an inclination of 82.5 degrees to a circu-lar orbital altitude of 1,500 km,” or payloadsweighing up to 3,600 kg “with a launch incli-nation of 73.5 degrees to an altitude of 200km.” According to Flight International, theTsyklon is capable of launching 1,360 kg pay-loads into low- or medium-Earth orbits. Rob-ert Minor, president of Rockwell’s SpaceSystems Division, said the Tsyklon has anexcellent reliability record. The SLV has a 97percent success rate. Minor added that theagreement with Yuzhnoye was “vital for pos-sible future cooperation.” Tsyklon is signifi-cantly larger than both versions of theLockheed Martin Launch Vehicle and OrbitalSciences’ Pegasus and Taurus vehicles.Rockwell officials said they do not plan torequest permission to launch the Tsyklon inthe United States. According to the officials,Rockwell is satisfied with launching therocket from the Baikonur Cosmodrome inKazakstan and the Plesetsk Cosmodrome innorthern Russia.

Bruce A. Smith, Aviation Week & Space Technol-ogy, 7/29/96, p. 19 (6671). Flight International,7/31/96-8/6/96, p. 5 (6671). Ben Iannotta, SpaceNews, 8/5/96-8/11/96, pp. 10-11 (6671).

7/26/96U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense HaroldSmith told a press conference inDnepropetrovsk, Ukraine, that the UnitedStates was not in favor of Ukraine’s sugges-tion to convert SS-24 ICBMs into SLVs. Smithsaid that the ICBMs are “too expensive tomaintain” and should be destroyed. Smithalso said that four U.S. firms were currentlydeveloping cost-effective ways to destroythese ICBMs. He added that the United Stateswould welcome a Ukrainian decision to de-stroy the ICBMs and would be willing to pro-vide assistance for Kiev to do this. According

163



to Stanislav Konyukhov, chief designer atUkraine’s Pivdenmash, the optimum methodto recycle SS-24 ICBMs is to convert theminto SLVs. Konyukhov added that Ukrainehad not considered destroying its SS-24ICBMs.

Uniar (Kiev), 7/27/96; in FBIS-SOV-96-146, 7/27/96 (6465).

UNITED ARAB EMIR-ATES

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES WITH :

Russia, 160

UNITED KINGDOM

UNITED KINGDOM WITH :

Cyprus, Russia, and United States, 142Israel, 153MTCR, 156

UNITED STATES


9/12/96An unclassified report published by the U.S.General Accounting Office (GAO) stated thatNational Intelligence Estimate 95-19 (NIE 95-19)—which concluded that the United Stateswill not be threatened by a new ballistic mis-sile for the next 15 years—was flawed. NIE95-19 reported that “no country other thanthe major declared nuclear powers will de-velop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missilein the next 15 years that could threaten thecontiguous 48 states or Canada.” The Con-gressional report stated that NIE 95-19’s con-clusion “was worded with clear, 100 percentaccuracy.” However, the GAO said NIE 95-19 “failed to give clear judgments, did not

identify the basis for its conclusions, anddid not explore worst-case scenarios for fu-ture missile developments among foreignnations.” According to the GAO, the NIE’slevel of certainty was exaggerated, “basedon the caveats and the intelligence gapsnoted in NIE 95-19.” According to the GAO,the NIE did not identify its “critical assump-tions.” Defense analysts define critical as-sumptions as “debatable premises” used tosupport arguments and the validity of as-sessments. The GAO said five assumptionswere incorrectly presented as “fact-basedjudgments.” Among them was the NIE’s as-sertion that the MTCR will “significantlylimit” international missile sales and no na-tion that possesses ICBMs will sell them.The GAO contested the NIE’s basis for con-cluding that “three unidentified countries”will not attempt to produce long-range bal-listic missiles and that it takes five years offlight testing to develop an ICBM. The GAOidentified the NIE’s conclusion that aseaborne cruise missile attack against theUnited States was feasible but not very likelyas another unsupported premise. Congress-man Floyd D. Spence, chairman of the HouseNational Security Committee, requested theGAO report and said it questioned the Clintonadministration’s “sanguine attitude” regard-ing the increasing missile threat to the U.S.Congressman Curt Weldon said the GAOreport supported the Republican assertionthat the administration had “politicized theintelligence process.” However, the GAO didnot consider whether the NIE was manipu-lated to support the Clinton administration’smissile defense policy. The current defenseauthorization bill, which is expected to beenacted soon, requires that an independentintelligence review be conducted to investi-gate the objectivity of the NIE’s findings.The CIA did not cooperate with the GAOand made no remarks about the report.

Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 9/12/96, p. A7(6685).

UNITED STATES WITH :

Australia, 138Brazil, 140Brazil and Russia, 139Bulgaria and Russia, 140China, 142Cyprus, Russia, and United

Kingdom, 142Egypt, 142Germany, 144Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey,143Greece, 144Iran and North Korea, 149Israel, 153Japan, 155Kuwait, 155MTCR, 156Norway, Russia, and Ukraine, 157Russia, 160Taiwan, 161Turkey, 162Ukraine, 162

WASSENAARARRANGEMENT

7/12/96Representatives from over 30 nations con-cluded negotiations on the Wassenaar agree-ment to control the trade in conventionalweapons and dual-use technology. Theagreement is designed to prevent weaponsfrom reaching countries like Iran and Libyawhere they could prove destabilizing. In 12/95, 28 countries agreed on an outline for thisagreement to replace the Coordinating Com-mittee on Multilateral Export Controls(COCOM), which was created by the Westduring the Cold War to prevent the transferof arms and military technology to Commu-nist countries. According to a U.S. official,the new system would become mandatorybefore the end of 1996, with voluntary infor-mation exchange beginning on 9/1/96.

New York Times, 7/13/96, p. 2 (6547).

Documents

NPR 4.2: BALLISTIC, CRUISE MISSILE, AND MISSILE DEFENSE ... · Missile Developments 134 BALLISTIC, CRUISE MISSILE, AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS: TRADE AND SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS,