November 30, 2012

Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk Assessment: State of the Practice

HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

November 30, 2012November 30, 2012

Overview

• The goal of HM-12 is to document the current state of the practice for hazardous materials transportation risk assessment and lay out a path for future efforts.

• Specific project objectives are:

– To identify existing tools, methodologies, approaches, and key sources of data for assessing hazardous materials transportation risks in the public and private sectors

– To characterize the capabilities and limitations of each

– To identify significant gaps and needs in the available tools and approaches

– To recommend paths forward

04/22/23 2HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

Methodology

• Investigate the current state of the practice of hazmat risk assessment involved the following three steps:

1.Literature review– Focused on documents published since 2005

– Included review of TRIS, TRB RIP, TLCat, NTIS, and ITRD

2.Stakeholder interviews– Identified potential participants through recommendations of HM-

10 and HM-12 project panels and participant suggestions

– Contacted 110 organizations, including carriers, shippers, federal and state agencies, international agencies, consulting firms, professional associations, insurers, and research organizations

3.Stakeholder surveys– Dispersed invitations through TRB Hazmat Committee and

stakeholder associations04/22/23 3HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

General Results

• Investigation results indicated that hazmat transportation risk assessment is primarily employed to address one of nine general decision types.

• Models for which enough information was available to allow characterization of model data, components, and applications are presented in the HM-12 Final Report according to the decisions they support.

• Slide 5 lists the decision types and the models that can support them. Slides 6-9 list some basic information about each model.


Results: Decisions & Supporting Models

Decision Applicable Models Identified

Mode choiceCCPS Guidelines (multiple individual models), Anonymous Chemical Manufacturer Framework, RADTRAN, TRAGIS

Route choiceBoston Hazmat Route Evaluation, CCPS Guidelines, Anon. Chem. Mfr. Framework, Fedtrak, GeoCTA, IMESAFR, RADTRAN, RCRMS, TRAGIS, UIUC Tank Car Analysis

Facility siting CCPS Guidelines, IMESAFER

Packaging selectionCCPS Guidelines, Anon. Chem. Mfr. Framework, UIUC Tank Car Analysis

Alternate product selection CCPS Guidelines, Anon. Chem. Mfr. Framework

Emergency management resource planning

GeoCTA, Pipeline Risk Management Manual, RADTRAN, TRACC, RRAS, TSSRA

Operational changesCCPS Guidelines, Anon. Chem. Mfr. Framework, Fedtrak, Pipeline Risk Management Manual, TRACC

Security measure identification, prioritization, and evaluation

CCPS Guidelines, CTRA, Fedtrak, CREATE model, “CREATE model”, TSSRA, THTRA

Security risk situational awareness Fedtrak, TRACC, THTRA04/22/23 5HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

Results: Models


Model Sponsor/Developer Description

Boston Hazmat Route Evaluation

City of BostonA risk-score methodology based on FMCSA guidance; used in assessing routing alternatives

CCPS Guidelines: Qualitative Risk Assessment Process

Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS)

Helps chemical companies manage global transportation risks in a consistent framework; applicable to all modes; facilitates decisions on changes in operations

CCPS Guidelines: Quantitative Risk Assessment Process

CCPSHelps chemical companies manage global transportation risks in a consistent framework; a detailed, data-intensive approach for in-depth analyses

CCPS Guidelines: Risk Prioritization Process

CCPSHelps chemical companies manage global transportation risks in a consistent framework; a high-level screening model that produces generalized risk score outputs

CCPS Guidelines: Security Risk Prioritization Process

CCPSHelps chemical companies manage global transportation risks in a consistent framework; a high-level screening model specifically focused on security risks

CCPS Guidelines: Security Vulnerability Assessment Process

CCPSHelps chemical companies manage global transportation risks in a consistent framework; a broad, largely qualitative security risk assessment method

CCPS Guidelines: Semi-Quantitative Risk Assessment Process

CCPSHelps chemical companies manage global transportation risks in a consistent framework; a semi-quantitative approach that results in risk index or risk matrix output

Results: Models (cont.)



Anonymous Chemical Manufacturer Risk Assessment Framework Process

Large Chemical / Plastics Manufacturer

A process that is invoked when there is a new product, customer, or route option; informs packaging, shipping, and mode decisions; is qualitative unless risks are perceived to be very high, then is quantitative

Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment Process (CTRA)

DHS S&T and Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC)

A comprehensive approach that includes transportation; involves probabilistic risk assessment; focuses on human effects, considering all routes of exposure

FedtrakKentucky Transportation Center (KTC)

Scores highway route safety and security risks; provides real-time situational awareness on individual shipments

GeoCTAORNL Center for Transportation Analysis (CTA)

A transportation-focused, GIS-based tool for estimating consequences to population and infrastructure in support of transportation and emergency response planning

IME Safety Analysis for Risk (IMESAFR)

Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME)

A software tool that calculates explosives risks at fixed facilities; applicable to ports, shipper locations, safe havens, etc.; potential for adapting to in-transit shipments

Pipeline Risk Management Manual Risk Assessment Method

W. Kent MuhlbauerIndustry standard approach for pipeline risk assessment; highly customizable; standard approach produces a failure index and indices for contributing factors




RADTRANDepartment of Energy (DOE), Sandia National Labs

Calculates expected consequences from incident-free or accident-related transportation of radiological materials

Rail Corridor Risk Management System (RCRMS)

Railroad Research Foundation / Association of American Railroads

Rail industry tool for route analysis for high-hazard shipments in compliance with HM-232E; considers safety and security; output includes relative risk scores

Readiness and Resiliency Assessment System (RRAS)

ORNL Center for Transportation Analysis (CTA)

Assesses security risks to transportation assets and systems; considers threats, consequences, and mitigation factors to calculate readiness/resiliency scores

Risk-Based Preventative Radiological / Nuclear Detection Resource Allocation

National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE)

Informs decisions on placement and types of radiological detection equipment within a highway network or at points of entry; outputs are customizable but can include probability of detection and failure, resources costs, etc.

TRACC

ORNL Center for Transportation Analysis (CTA), Mississippi State U.

Tracks barge movement in real-time and alerts stakeholders to potentially high risk behavior or situations based on shipment data and historical paths




Transportation Routing Analysis GIS (TRAGIS)

DOE, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)

Compares potentially exposed populations along route paths; can inform selection of shipment mode

Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment (TSSRA)

DHS, TSA Office of Security Capabilities (OSC)

Supports overarching risk assessment for the transportation sector across all modes; output includes relative risk scores and risk equation component values

Trucking and Hazardous Materials Trucking Risk Assessment (THTRA)

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

A scenario-based approach combining qualitative and quantitative methods; gauges security risks to truck transportation and assesses current security resources and potential upgrades or reallocations

UIUC Tank Car Risk Analysis

University of Illinois–Champaign Urbana (UIUC)

Developed to inform alternative packaging (tank car) selection and is applicable to route choice decisions; applicable to rail and, potentially, highway-rail intermodal


• The HM-12 Final Report presents the following information for each of the 22 identified models:

– Applicable modes and decisions supported

– Central methodology or approach

– Key sources of data for each model component

– Model assumptions, limitations, and biases

– Outputs

– Frequency of and triggers for updates

– How and to whom results are communicated

– Strengths, weaknesses, and desired improvements

– Model availability and potential barriers to implementation


Selected Observations

• Industry analyses are generally very focused and have short time frames; the opposite tends to be true for public-sector analyses.

• Though quantitative analyses are required in some in-depth analyses or high-risk cases, qualitative analyses may be sufficient to produce actionable results.

• Security-focused analyses tend to employ subject matter elicitations or “black box” methods / data to account for a lack of historical likelihood information.

• Qualitative models tend to present results in the form of general categories (e.g., high, medium, low) or as risk matrices.


Selected Observations (cont.)

• The majority of quantitative analyses estimate relative, rather than absolute, risk values.

• Quantitative models generally present results as risk indices, either as scores for individual locations or as a device (such as an F-N curve) that communicates indices for each possible outcome and location.

• Uncertainty is rarely explicitly quantified or qualified.

• The most common approaches to addressing uncertainty are to select conservative model parameters or to employ conservative operational procedures or equipment.


Gaps: Models for Decisions

• Multi-Modal/Intermodal Risk Analyses– Most risk assessments focus on a single mode.

• Validation of Prior Assessments– When hazmat risk analyses utilize the results of previous analyses, that information

is rarely subject to any type of validation.

• Comparability of Model Results– Disparate methodologies and metrics make results from different models

incomparable.

• Uncertainty– While uncertainty is often acknowledged, it is rarely quantified or qualified.

• Route Analysis Tools– A lack of tools exists for finding alternate highway routes and for analyzing barge

shipment routes.


Gaps: Data for Models

• Inadequate Highway Exposure Data and Accident Rates– There is a lack of detailed exposure data on hazmat transportation shipments by

material, packaging type, and operational parameters.

• Conditional Probability Data– There are a limited number of current sources for hazmat release probabilities.

• Disparate Data Quality across Modes– The degree of data accuracy and precision of available risk metric data tend to be

dissimilar across modes.

• Security Assessment Credibility and Transparency– Security models often rely on subjective judgments and proprietary information or

processes, reducing model credibility to external parties.

• Lack of Public Vulnerability and Threat Data– Insufficient data is a common obstacle in hazmat transportation risk assessment.

• Validation of Supporting Data– Available data, particularly GIS data, are often used with little or no validation.


Gaps: Model, Data, or Results Availability

• Formal Risk Management Process– Anecdotal evidence suggests that many hazmat shippers and carriers do not

follow a formal risk assessment process.

• Data Building Blocks for Assessments– No single standard source of supporting spatial data, or implementation

guidelines for their use, exist for hazmat transportation risk analysis.

• Lack of Awareness of Available Data, Tools, and Methods– Hazmat transportation stakeholders are commonly unaware of the full range

of available models and datasets.

• Lack of Public Disclosure of Datasets– The perceived need to withhold data for reasons of safety, security, or

business completion presents a barrier to comprehensive risk analyses.


Recommendations: Model Development

a) Develop a single, common hazmat transportation risk assessment approach, using a standard architecture, across all modes.

b) Develop a highway hazmat route risk assessment tool that considers the FMCSA Hazardous Materials Route Registry and other state and local truck restrictions to suggest candidate routes.

c) Develop a waterway hazmat route risk assessment tool that includes consideration of dam and lock infrastructure restrictions.

d) Develop an approach for addressing low-probability, high-consequence events in hazmat transportation risk models.


Recommendations: Data Development

e) Enhance the BTS’ Commodity Flow Survey and the FHWA’s Freight Analysis Framework to provide national-level hazmat flow data and support improved hazmat-specific highway accident rates.

f) Expand the results of HMCRP project HM-07, to develop conditional release probabilities for different packaging types, with the emphasis on bulk packages.

g) Research the behavior of commercial-scale explosives to enhance modeling for fixed facilities and eliminate the use of less-appropriate military explosives data.

h) Develop a system for calibrating the differences in similar data across modes or other categories.

i) Produce a guidebook describing different types of expert elicitation methods and their applicability to the issues typically addressed in hazmat transportation risk analyses.

j) Research the potential methods, risks, and benefits of governmental sharing of security-sensitive threat and vulnerability data with private sector risk assessors.


Recommendations: Communication and Data / Model Sharing

k) Create a framework document with specific checklists to encourage greater adoption of risk management principles and decision making, including the best practices from both the private and public sectors.

l) Develop a single data repository for transportation network data that have the requisite data elements to support hazmat transportation risk assessment.


Documents

November 30, 2012