NOVEMBER 2016 TRAINING PACKET - Clay Fire Trainingclayfiretraining.com/.../uploads/2016/11/November-2016-Training-Packet.pdf · As the weather gets colder, the likelihood of getting

Date Time11/21 830

Date Time12/1 830 & 103012/2 830 & 103012/5 830 & 1030

Date Time11/13 90011/12 90011/19 900

Date Time

11/2 800-1600Instructor(s): 11/9 800-1200

11/3 800-160011/7 800-120011/1 800-160011/8 800-1200

11/29 11/30 11/28

7. Hose coupling identification**Please Complete By 12/31/16**

1. Deploy a straight ladder2. Deploy a 24'/28' extension ladder3. Tie a halyard4. Water can- operate and return to service5. Deploy a 2.5" as a 250' handline

11/16

11/17

6. SCBA familiarization

All ALS Personnel

Training Website

www.clayfiretraining.com

Instructor(s): EMS Captains Day 1: Classroom; Day 2: Practical Skills

7. HIPAA: Target Solutions

Investigating Fatal FiresINVESTIGATOR

8. QRS Complex & ECG Rhythms

INSPECTONS

5. Rail Car Identification

Know Your Flow/Engine Co. Ops

6. Buildings Under Construction

QUICK DRILLS1. Chimney Fires2. Firefighter PPE Contamination

4. Cincinnati LODD Review3. Gross Decontamination Kits

Monday, November 7th (800-1700)

NOVEMBER 2016 TRAINING PACKET

SENIOR STAFF MEETING

Topic: Advanced Cardiac Life Support MONTHLY EMS: ACLS

QUARTERLY TRAINING OUTLOOK

Location:MONTHLY FACILITIES TRAINING

COMMAND TRAINING

TRT MONTHLY DRILL

October: Live Burns; Quick Drills; Minimum Company Standards, TRT Quarterly Drill, St. Pius Walk Through, Company Inspections, Command Training

November: Extrication; ACLS, TRT Monthly Drill, Quick Drills, Minimum Company Standards

December: Transpo Training, Minimum Company Standards, Command Training, Quick Drills, Air Monitoring Training, TRT Monthly Drill

Location: CTC Doors 2-3Instructor(s): Huth

Instructor(s): TRT Shift Instructors

Location: CTC Door #2

Location: Training Grounds

Topic: Windows & Doors

UPCOMING EVENTS

1800

MINIMUM COMPANY STANDARDS

Session 2: E23/E25/T21/M21/B4

Huth

Session 1: E21/E22/E24/M25/B2

Topic(s): Extrication

UPCOMING EVENTS

900 & 1100

Training Grounds

11/17

900 & 1100900 & 1100

11/18

QI Sessions: Tuesday, November 8th @ 0900 (MHSB) Wednesday, November 9th @ 1900 (SJRMC) Wednesday, November 16th @ 0900 (MHSB) Thursday, November 17th @ 0900 (SJRMC) Target Solutions User Group: Thursday, November 10th (1100-1600) Blue Card IC Certification Course: Monday, November 28th-Wednesday, November 30th

Chimney Fires

As the weather gets colder, the likelihood of getting called out for a chimney fire increases. Most of the time, these fires are contained within the walls of the chimney but in some cases, the walls of the chimney have been compromised and you have extension into the structure. Even though it is dispatched as a chimney fire, a good size-up and 360 helps to ensure the exact size and location of the fire. A chimney fire might be obvious if you see flames, sparks, or dense smoke coming from the chimney. On the other hand, a chimney fire might not be visible from the exterior. Sometimes, homeowners call because they hear a cracking or popping sound near the

walls of the chimney. Because of this, a thermal imaging camera is an important tool that is needed when you are dealing with a chimney fire. It is certainly possible that the walls of the chimney have been compromised and if this has happened, fire extension can turn a minor problem into a full blown residential fire. All members need to be thinking ahead while en route about what tools are needed for a chimney fire. Should we stretch a handline to the front door? Should a CO detector be brought inside for air monitoring? Also, if you have a multi-story structure, you need to have crews verify that there is not extension on all floors of the structure including the attic. If you are sent to the roof, think about what size ladder you will need to access the roofline. In addition, you should bring a roof ladder with you. These ladders offer an excellent means of support while working on the roof. Snow and ice buildup is typical during the winter months and can be especially dangerous at night. Hand tools might be needed if you have to remove the chimney cap. Lastly, you should never use the chimney as a means of support. The chimney might not be structurally sound and if you lean or grab onto it you could cause the chimney to fail and you could fall off the roof. All front line Clay Fire apparatus carry Chimfex for these types of fires. This drill includes the manufacturers instructions on how to properly use Chimfex. In addition, please take the time to locate these on your apparatus so they can be accessed quickly if needed. Once the incident has been terminated, air monitoring should be completed prior to allowing the occupants of the residence to re-enter. PPV might be needed if there is smoke in the residence and the CO monitor indicates elevated readings. Also, the homeowner should be advised to have their chimney inspected by a certified chimney inspector and also they should have it cleaned before they use it again.

Full PPE and SCBA must be worn at all times!

Click on the picture to the right to watch the manufacturer

video

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oE4QYNFPUcA

10/28/2016 Off-Gassing Contaminants from Firefighters' Personal Protective Equipment - Fire Engineering

http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/print/volume-168/issue-9/features/off-gassing-contaminants-from-firefighters-personal-protective-equipment.html 1/7

Off-Gassing Contaminants fromFirefighters' Personal ProtectiveEquipment

By Kenneth W. Fent, Gavin P. Horn, Katherine M. Kirk, and Michael B. Logan

Firefighter personal protective equipment (PPE) provides excellent protection from environmentalhazards during firefighting, but the protective ensembles often become contaminated with combustionby-products while serving this purpose. Few scientific research studies have attempted to quantify thiscontamination, which may consist of nonvolatile, semi-volatile, and volatile compounds. At normalenvironmental conditions, nonvolatile compounds exist primarily as solids; semi-volatile compoundsare found as both condensed (liquid or solid) and gas phase; and volatile compounds readily generatevapors that can be inhaled because of their high vapor pressure. As examples, flame retardants aregenerally nonvolatile, whereas low molecular weight polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) aresemi-volatile and single-ring aromatic hydrocarbons (like benzene and toluene) are volatile organiccompounds (VOCs).



(1) Enclosure used by NIOSH to sample off-gassing PPEensembles. After closing the lid, the metal canister collectedVOCs for analysis. (Photo courtesy of the National Institute forOccupational Safety and Health.)

During firefighting, nonvolatile contaminants present an exposure hazard mainly through firefighterscoming in physical contact with the substances and subsequent dermal absorption and hand-to-mouthingestion. Volatile and semi-volatile contaminants may also present an exposure hazard through theinhalation route, whereby the PPE acts as a temporary adsorptive material for airborne contaminants(gases and particles) that may then be released into the air during postfire activities. Theseevaporating contaminants may be inhaled after a firefighter doffs his self-contained breathingapparatus (SCBA).

This potential inhalation route of exposure has not been previously investigated. Hence, investigatorsfrom the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) in the United States andQueensland Fire and Emergency Services (QFES) in Australia separately set out to study theaccumulation and off-gassing of combustion by-products on firefighters' PPE ensembles. Results fromthese two independent studies were recently published in the same issue of the peer-reviewed Journal

of Occupational and Environmental Hygiene (June 2015).

Table 1 describes the similarities and differences of these two studies. The basic premise of bothstudies was the same-to test PPE ensembles for off-gassing contaminants before and after being wornwhile fighting fires in structures with typical room-and-contents furnishings (NIOSH) or commontraining fuels (QFES). QFES investigators also tested PPE ensembles after laundering permanufacturer's recommendations to determine whether off-gas concentrations returned to normalbackground levels.



ResultsInvestigators in both studies measured elevated levels of a variety of VOCs off-gassing from PPEensembles postfirefighting (compared to prefirefighting levels), with similar findings for benzene,toluene, ethyl benzene, xylenes, and styrene (Table 2). QFES investigators also measured elevatedlevels of methyl isobutyl ketone, acetaldehyde, crotonaldehyde, benzaldehyde, and hydrogen cyanide(HCN). HCN was measured at concentrations up to 10× higher than any other compound. NIOSHinvestigators found a relationship between off-gas concentrations and exhaled breath concentrations ofbenzene, toluene, ethyl benzene, xylenes, and styrene. QFES investigators found that most off-gasconcentrations returned to normal background levels after laundering.



(2-3) The enclosure used by QFES to sample off-gassing structuralfirefighting ensembles. The ensembles shown are post-laundering.After sealing the enclosure, sampling pumps were operated throughthe plastic enclosure (photo 3) to commence sampling. (Photoscourtesy of Queensland Fire and Emergency Services.)

DiscussionInhalation exposures are likely to occur when firefighters are not wearing SCBA or alternative forms ofrespiratory protection and they do the following:

Continue to wear a turnout coat and trousers when packing up and loading the apparatus.Rehab near used PPE ensembles or, if PPE is not fully doffed, in the rehab area.Change air cylinders between work cycles on the fireground.Wear or store PPE ensembles in the cab of the apparatus or personal vehicle.Spend time in a location at the firehouse where unlaundered PPE ensembles are stored.

Off-gas exposures are likely to be highest immediately following use of PPE in a fire, when firefightersare in close proximity to PPE, and especially if firefighters and their PPE are in an enclosed space.

The findings from these studies are important because they demonstrate that off-gassing from

contaminated PPE can extend exposure time beyond the fireground and, therefore, represents another

source of exposure for firefighters that should be managed. Off-gassing air concentrations in bothstudies were below applicable occupational exposure limits, although higher concentrations may have



been measured if testing occurred immediately after firefighting and culminated within 15 minutesthereafter.

Potential exposures from off-gassing PPE, albeit typically brief, consist of multiple compounds,including known irritants (e.g., aldehydes), chemical asphyxiants (e.g., HCN), and carcinogens (e.g.,benzene). The potential additive or synergistic effects of these multiple exposures are largely unknown.Irritants can cause inflammation in the lungs, and chemical asphyxiants reduce the oxygen-carryingcapacity of the blood. In addition to the effects on the respiratory system, both irritants and chemicalasphyxiants can place added stress on the cardiovascular system.

Firefighters appear to have a higher risk of various types of cancer and, therefore, should minimizetheir exposures to potential carcinogens as much as possible. Appropriate storage and timely

laundering of PPE could substantially reduce cumulative exposures to these compounds over the

duration of a firefighting career.

The significant relationship between off-gas concentrations and exhaled breath concentrations foundby NIOSH suggests that contaminated PPE contributes to firefighters' absorbed dose even during theshort time (few minutes) firefighters doff gear. However, the exhaled breath concentrations measuredby NIOSH could also be partially attributed to direct uptake of VOCs through the skin duringfirefighting. Further research is required to determine the relative effects contributed by each of theseexposure pathways.

Both studies focused primarily on measuring volatile substances. Semi-volatile and nonvolatilecompounds could also contaminate firefighters' PPE ensembles and potentially transfer to the skin offirefighters where they could be absorbed dermally or ingested. Unlike VOCs, which will mostlyevaporate from surfaces within a few hours, semi-volatile compounds could evaporate over muchlonger periods of time and pose a longer duration inhalation hazard. Furthermore, PAHs and othercarbonaceous substances that contaminate PPE may act like activated carbon, adsorbing VOCs in thefire atmosphere and then slowly releasing them over time.



Research aimed at a greater understanding of where and why the highest firefighter exposures occurduring fire response activities may assist in lowering PPE contamination levels. Further research isneeded to fully characterize the magnitude and composition of contamination on firefighters' PPEensembles, with an emphasis on highly persistent compounds like flame retardants, dioxins, andphthalates. An assessment of the effectiveness of decontamination and laundering at removing suchcontamination is also needed.

The following resources contain additional information on this topic:

Kirk KM and Logan MB. (2015) "Structural Fire Fighting Ensembles: Accumulation and Off-gassing of Combustion Products," J Occup Environ Hyg, 12:6, 376-383.Fent KW, Evans DE, Booher D, Pleil JD, Stiegel MA, Horn GP, and Dalton J. (2015) "VolatileOrganic Compounds Off-gassing from Firefighters' Personal Protective Equipment Ensemblesafter Use," J Occup Environ Hyg, 12:6, 404-414.NIOSH (2013) "Health Hazard Evaluation Report: Assessment of Dermal Exposure to PolycyclicAromatic Hydrocarbons in Fire Fighters." http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/hhe/reports/pdfs/2010-0156-3196.pdf.

The two independent studies by NIOSH and QFES clearly demonstrate that a variety of volatilesubstances can accumulate and subsequently off-gas from firefighters' PPE ensembles. The off-gassing compounds could result in inhalation exposure for firefighters if they remove SCBA and remainin close proximity to their PPE postfirefighting, particularly if this occurs within an enclosed space.Firefighters and fireground support personnel should take measures to minimize these exposures.These measures include rehabbing away from their used ensembles; storing their ensembles indedicated, well-ventilated areas; and, if possible, transporting ensembles outside the apparatus cab orpersonal vehicle after responding to a structure fire. Prompt laundering of ensembles after use instructural firefighting operations is an additional effective measure in reducing postfirefightingexposures to volatile products of combustion.

KENNETH W. FENT, PhD, CIH, is a research officer at the National Institute for Occupational Safetyand Health and a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Public Health Service. He has performednumerous evaluations of firefighters' chemical exposures.

GAVIN P. HORN, PhD, is the director of IFSI Research at the Illinois Fire Service Institute-University ofIllinois at Urbana-Champaign and a volunteer firefighter/engineer with the Savoy (IL) Fire Department.He has performed many studies focused on firefighter health and safety.

KATHERINE M. KIRK, PhD, was a scientific officer with Queensland Fire and Emergency Services for10 years, providing operational support for hazardous materials emergencies. She works at QIMRBerghofer Medical Research Institute and is a volunteer firefighter. Her research interests include



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analysis of emergency responder exposures to by-products of fire, firefighter respiratory protection,and hazard prediction modelling.

MICHAEL B. LOGAN, PhD, is the director of the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services (QFES)Research and Scientific Branch. The Research and Scientific Branch responds to about 450 incidentseach year and undertakes a research program investigating firefighter exposures and other areas ofinterest to emergency preparedness and response.

IFSI Study Underway on Firefighter Health Firefighter Health and Safety: Report: Firefighters' Hoods Seen as Cancer Risk Reducing the Incidence of Cancer Among Firefighters: Jacksonville's Best Practices Firefighter Health and Safety: Report Focuses on Firefighter Gear , Cancer

Prior to reading this drill, all members should have read Quick Drill #2: Firefighter PPE Contamination. That article shows the danger of the toxic products of combustion found on our PPE. On of the most dangerous routes of exposure is via inhalation. Inhaling toxic products of combustion can occur when respiratory protection such as that from an SCBA is not worn. It can also occur when we take our PPE off and we inhale the toxins as our equipment off-gasses. The primary toxins that have been looked at include irritants (aldehydes), chemical asphyxiants (HCN), and carcinogens (benzene). One of the best ways to limit our exposure to dangerous chemicals is to practice good decontamination habits post-fire. One of the quickest things we can do on the fireground to limit our exposure is to perform gross decontamination of our PPE. To make it easier to accomplish this task, all front line Clay Fire engines as well as the truck are equipped with gross decon kits. These kits are located in the second compartment Engineer’s side of the rig with the only exception being Engine 21 and Truck 21. Engine 21’s decon kit is located in the rear compartment on the top shelf. On Truck 21, the kit is located on the drivers side in the first lower compartment behind the rear wheels. Once the fire is out, members can use the soap and brushes along with water and the garden hose adapter to wash/scrub off the large contaminants. Trash bags have also been provided so contaminated gear may be bagged to prevent contamination of the apparatus cab. SCBA’s also hold large amounts of contaminants which off-gas just like turnout gear so these should be decontaminated as well. With winter approaching, getting hosed/scrubbed off might not be the best idea so the recommendation is to at least scrub off the large material using a scrub brush and then doing a complete decon when you return to the station. **Remember– Baby wipes are also helpful in cleaning up post fire.

The following drill contains information from the NIOSH report generated from a firefighter fatality in Cincinnati, Ohio as well as the internal Cincinnati Fire Department Report. This drill also incorporates some information from our SOP’s so members know what to do when conditions such as this are encountered at an incident. The following information on this page is taken directly from SOG 201: Incident Command System. 3.3: Information management presents complex challenges during most working incident operations. Information must be quickly received, processed, interpreted and acted upon. In some case, certain factors can be observed from the command post, while others can only be determined from different locations inside and outside of the structure/incident area. 3.3.3 - Recon information Information the IC can’t gather visually from their fast-action or command-post position is typically acquired from personnel assigned to standard geographic and functional positions. Information can come from Divisions dealing with specific problems and locations who then transmit their information reports to the IC. It also can come from other sources, such as owners/occupants, technical representatives, other agencies, law enforcement or media video feeds. When the IC assigns companies and Division Officers to key operating positions, they must report back regarding the conditions in their assigned areas. With this information, the IC builds a strategic picture of what is happening around the entire incident site. The IC uses this “big picture” to keep the strategy and attack plans current and to keep all hazard-zone workers connected. The IC is responsible for understanding the overall situation, incident resources, and organizational and operational statuses. Division Officers concentrate on information that supports tactical operations, integration and coordination. Companies must deal with the details required for direct task-level effectiveness. Simply, the level of required information (details) gets cut into smaller pieces as it moves toward the task level. 3.5.3 - Safety “Red Flags” Red flags are pieces of information that needs to be we must addressed. The IC should always take a pessimistic approach when sizing-up, assuming the worst until determining otherwise. A red flag will not necessarily change the overall incident strategy or incident action plan, but it should be identified and addressed by the IC and the rest of the hazard zone team. Some examples of red flags include: Fire in the attic space Fire in a basement Operating above a fire (basements, floor above the fire) Zero visibility Encountering high heat Reports of, “We can’t find the fire” Reports that state “fire control,” but you can still see active fire conditions from the command post Victim(s) located Wind-driven fires Smoke/fire showing from cracks in walls. OPEN/UNSECURED ELEVATOR SHAFTS...more on this in subsequent pages

Executive Summary On March 26, 2015, Cincinnati Fire Department Fire Apparatus Operator Daryl Gordon died in the line of duty after falling into an open elevator shaft at a 4 Alarm fire in a 5-story, 38 unit apartment building at 6020 Dahlgren St. Seemingly a “routine” alarm, fire companies initially expected to find yet another minor “food-on-the-stove” incident. Even though smoke was not visible upon arrival, a fire had been growing for a significant period of time. Asleep when the fire started, the occupant of Apartment 27 awoke and attempted to fight the fire prior to calling 911. After vacating the apartment, the door remained opened due to a faulty self-closing mechanism, allowing smoke and fire to spread throughout the building. While not reflective of operations at every incident, first arriving fire companies did have significant fireground operational issues, including crew integrity, hose deployment, ventilation, search, and radio communications. Difficulties with fire control efforts and endangered occupants required Command to request a 2nd Alarm. A total of 21 civilians were rescued from the fire building. Rescue 14, with FAO Gordon, responded on the 2nd Alarm, arrived on scene thirty minutes after the original 911 call, and was ordered to assist with the primary search of the 5th floor. FAO Gordon, while donning his Self Contained Breathing Apparatus face piece, became separated from his crew. As the remainder of his company searched, they discovered an outward-swinging elevator door with an inoperable interlock mechanism leading to an open elevator shaft. The elevator door opened freely without force, even though the elevator car was not present. Rescue 14 marked the door with a black marker, “Do Not Enter Open Shaft.” Rescue 14 communicated this finding to a District Chief on the 5th Floor, but this information was not broadcast over the radio. Sometime later, while the rest of his crew was searching elsewhere, FAO Gordon opened this elevator door and fell into the elevator shaft, causing his untimely death. It took over ten minutes to realize that FAO Gordon was missing. Once located, he was extricated from the elevator shaft quickly. FAO Gordon succumbed to his injuries at the hospital.

Key Recommendations Ensure that crew integrity is properly maintained by sight, voice or radio contact when operating in an immediately

dangerous to life and health (IDLH) atmosphere.

Train and empower all fire fighters to report unsafe conditions to Incident Command.

Ensure that appropriate staffing levels are available on scene to accomplish fireground tasks and be available for unexpected emergencies.

Review standard operating procedures used to account for all fire fighters and first responders assigned to an incident.

Ensure that interior attack crews always enter a hazardous environment with a charged hoseline.

Integrate current fire behavior research findings developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Underwriter’s Laboratories (UL) into operational procedures by developing or updating standard operating procedures, conducting live fire training, and revising fireground tactics.

Consider ways to block open shafts and other fall hazards.

Structure The structure involved in this incident was a five-story brick and concrete multi-family apartment building built in 1962. The 31,000 square-foot structure contained 38 separate apartments. The ground floor (Floor 1) contained offices, a mechanical room, storage space and six individual apartments. Floors 2 through 5 contained 8 apartments (both one and two bedroom) and a laundry room. Floors 2 through 5 had identical floor plans. A centrally located hydraulic elevator provided access to floors 1 through 5. Two stairwells were located near the B/C and C/D corners. Both stairwells provided access to each floor and also ground-level exterior access (see Photo 1, Photo 2 and Diagram 1). Due to the sloping hillside behind the building, the two apartments on Floor 2 on Side C had patios that were extended outward at ground level into the hillside (see Photo 2). The Side C rooms on Floor 1 were actually below grade.

The Elevator The elevator is a hydraulic elevator equipped with outward swinging doors similar to doors found in standard doorways of commercial buildings. The doors are equipped with self closing mechanisms, are recessed back more than a normal door, have interlock mechanisms that are designed to keep the door closed when an elevator is not present, have a standard handle, and have windows to allow occupants to see if the elevator is present. In addition, the elevator control panels are to the left of the doorway on each level. A defective elevator door interlock mechanism was the major contributing factor leading to the death of FAO Gordon on March 26, 2015. The 5th floor elevator door freely opened with minimal effort at least four times by fire personnel during the incident. The first time the door was opened was by Rescue 14 FF#2, who was searching the 5th floor. Rescue 14 FF#2 found an outward swinging door, opened it, sounded the floor and realized there was no floor. He determined it was an open shaft, notified his officer (Rescue 14 Acting Officer) and they notified District 3, who was coordinating search efforts inside the building. Rescue 14 FF#2 marked the door with a marker “Open Shaft Do Not Enter.” The second time the door was opened was by Rescue 14 personnel to show District 3 the shaft. The third time the door was opened was by FAO Gordon, who fell into the shaft after opening the door. The fourth time the door was opened was by Rescue 14 personnel looking for FAO Gordon after they realized he was missing.

Two of the biggest issues with this fire was the delayed time it took to get water on the fire as well as the communication of safety concerns to all members operating on the fireground. In training, we have stressed the importance of getting the first line in place. Depending on the stretch, a second company may be needed to assist with the first line. The fol-lowing information is directly from the internal report which talks about getting the first line in place. Lesson #2 Hose Deployment Lesson Learned or Reinforced Proper hose deployment is crucial to saving lives, protecting occupants, protecting fire fighters, and, ultimately, fire control. “A well-placed, appropriately staffed hose line putting water on the fire saves more lives than any other action performed by the fire department.” CFD Standard Operating Procedures for structure fires are detailed in Operations Manual 203.01 Structure Fires. The CFD dispatches two (2) Engine Companies as “working” companies on the majority of 1-Alarm responses in the city. For High Hazard structures or occupancies, a third Engine Company is added to the complement. Multiple buildings, like 6020 Dahlgren St, exist citywide which are not targeted for a three engine response. The first-due Engine Company must advance the initial attack line to the seat of the fire. The second-due Engine Company must ensure the efficient stretch and proper deployment of the first attack line and then deploy a backup line (from an independent source of water). The third-due Engine Company, if dispatched, should deploy a backup line (if not done so already) and then place a third attack line where needed. 1. First-due Engine 49 was unable to deploy the initial attack line to the seat of the fire. a. Engine 49 had significant issues deploying the primary attack line and never made it to the fire apartment. b. Faced with a moderately difficult stretch (that became extremely difficult for the Acting Officer operating alone due to a lack of crew integrity), both first-due Engine 49 and second-due Engine 31 should have worked together to ensure the efficient and timely stretch of the first attack line. c. Engine 49’s attack line wedged in the stairwell between the stair tread and the wall, impeding the ability to advance the attack line to the seat of the fire. d. Engine 49 did not communicate hose deployment issues or the delay in getting water on the fire to Command or other responding companies. e. Crew integrity and control of personnel are crucial to ensuring that there is enough support to properly deploy and advance an attack line. Engine 49 FF#1 left his officer, did not communicate his actions, did not communicate the location of the fire, and did not rejoin his company. f. Engine 49’s attack line stopped at Apartment 26 and did not reach the fire apartment. The fire continued to burn uncontrolled for over 20 minutes after the fire department’s arrival, increasing the spread of heat and smoke to the rest of the building. (see image to right) g. Fire fighters must deploy and operate attack lines; company officers should assist while assessing conditions, supervising personnel, communicating to Command, recognizing issues and directing all other actions. Engine 49 Acting Officer was forced to deploy the initial attack line by himself. Traditionally, CFD Engine Companies start their hose stretch and operation with (1) firefighter and (1) officer (the other firefighter secures a water supply and the 4th firefighter is the Driver/Operator). 2. Second-due Engine 31 did not ensure the efficient and timely stretch of Engine 49’s attack line. a. Engine 31 was not successful in assisting the first-due engine with their hose advancement or ensuring the attack line was operational. b. Engine 31 did not communicate primary attack line deployment issues or the delay in getting water on the fire to Command or other responding Companies. 3. Second-due Engine 31 did not deploy a backup line to the seat of the fire when Engine 49’s line became wedged in the stairwell. a. Engine 31 did stretch a backup line to the “C/D” side, but the backup line was dropped in a bundle onto the exterior retaining wall. b. When Engine 49’s attack line became wedged between the stair tread and wall, members were not able to deploy Engine 31’s backup line to the seat of the fire due to tangles and kinks. It too progressed no farther in the hallway than Apartment 26. c. Engine 31 did not communicate backup line deployment issues or the delay in getting water on the fire to Command or other responding companies.

4. Engine 49 and Engine 31 did not recognize or overcome hose deployment issues (an “engine company emergency”). a. In order to overcome a hose deployment issue or an “engine company emergency,” someone first must recognize the problem exists. i. Engine 49 Acting Officer did not recognize the attack line was stuck. ii. Engine 31 did recognize Engine 49’s line was wedged, but did not communicate the issue to Command or Engine 49. Engine 31 was unable to free the wedged line. iii. Engine 49 FF#2 recognized the line was wedged, but was unable to free the wedged line. iv. Engine 49 FF#2 attempted to deploy Engine 31’s line, but it was tangled and kinked. b. Engine 49’s Acting Officer, by himself to this point, had prolonged exposure to intense heat conditions in the hallway and had to eventually exit the building. i. Engine 49 Acting Officer didn’t flow water down the hallway to cool the environment. Engine 49 Acting Officer stated in testimony “We don’t spray water into smoke.” c. Engine 49 FF#1 left his officer, forcing the Engine 49 Acting Officer to deploy the attack line by himself. This action caused Engine 49 Acting Officer to concentrate on tasks functions versus supervisory functions. The key to overcoming a hose deployment issue is to focus on recognizing, communicating, and solving the problem. d. Engine 31 was unable to free the hose wedged in the small space between the stair tread and wall. There was no attempt to add additional hose to the attack line or appropriately deploy the backup line. In our system, the inability to locate or get to the seat of the fire is identified as priority traffic. This traffic can go through either a division officer or through the IC. It’s at this time that the IC can make the choice to ask for an alert tone so all companies know what is going on. Lesson #7 Dangerous Conditions and Emergency Radio Traffic Lesson Learned or Reinforced All personnel operating at a structure fire must be made aware of dangerous conditions that exist or may occur during the incident. Any firefighter who witnesses signs of these events shall notify their supervisor immediately. Supervisors shall notify Command and take appropriate action to protect personnel. Transmissions involving critical events would fall under “Emergency” communications. The Incident Commander, upon hearing the “Emergency” declaration, shall immediately repeat the “Emergency” traffic and issue orders to rectify or retreat from the situation. CFD Operations Manual 203.01.G.5.a Structure Fire Safety and 202.08.D Emergency Condition detail specific situations where Emergency Traffic radio transmissions are required. Personnel should be aware of specific building features that might indicate a dangerous condition or non-ordinary situation when performing operations in limited visibility. If you say to yourself, “This doesn’t seem right,” or, “This is different,” exercise additional caution and notify your supervisor immediately. Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St. 1. Rescue 14 FF #2 opened an outward-swinging door with a diamond-shaped window and “D” handle on the 5th floor.

Rescue 14 FF #2 realized this door was different than the other doors, so he sounded the floor ahead with his tool after opening the door, finding NO floor. The door led to an open elevator shaft; the interlocking mechanism was not working correctly. The fire fighter notified his Acting Officer face-to-face and, collectively, they notified District 3 (Search & Rescue Branch) face-to-face. Members were concerned about the danger of the open shaft and marked on the door “DO NOT ENTER OPEN SHAFT.” There was never an “Emergency” radio transmission to Command about the hazard (or any radio transmission). (see image to right)

a. Command should have been notified of the dangerous condition, and “Emergency” traffic should have been broadcast notifying all personnel on the scene of the hazardous condition. b. Personnel did mark the door to the elevator shaft, but there were no other efforts to secure the door 2. In multiple dwelling units like this, doors that open towards the fire fighter (outward swinging) are not stairwell or living units doors. These are generally doors to utility rooms, laundry rooms, equipment rooms, garbage chutes or elevator shafts. Doors with different layouts, such as larger door jambs, lack of standard locking mechanisms, irregular windows or different handles, should be considered something out of the ordinary, and firefighters should use caution. 3. At this incident, the smoke conditions were reported to be moderate on Floor 5, with visibility of a few feet. Firefighters from Heavy Rescue 14, Engine 8 and Truck 32 were on air as they operated on the 5th floor. It may have been difficult to read the warning marked on the elevator door. When dangerous conditions are found in a limited visibility environment, it is imperative to communicate these hazards to the Incident Commander, post a guard if conditions allow, attempt to render the hazard safe, and await further orders from the Incident Commander.

Although we typically don’t encounter uncontrolled, open elevator shafts, we do encounter safety concerns that affect everyone on the fireground. In this case, the elevator shaft was not communicated to everyone on the fireground (although the door was marked). Safety is everyone’s responsibility so this can be transmitted as a priority traffic message. The IC can then choose whether or not to broadcast an emergency traffic tone designed to get everyone’s attention about the safety issue. Both the NIOSH report and the internal report are great training reports to read and discuss with your crewmembers. The links are provided below: https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face201506.pdf http://cincinnati-oh.gov/cityofcincinnati/assets/File/FAO%20Gordon%20LODD%20Report%20FINAL%205-14-16(1).pdf Fireground Audio: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=21_3UzmMOY4 Mayday occurs around 6:50

https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face201506.pdf�

http://cincinnati-oh.gov/cityofcincinnati/assets/File/FAO%20Gordon%20LODD%20Report%20FINAL%205-14-16(1).pdf�

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=21_3UzmMOY4�

While the flow of trains along the CN rail line which runs through Battalion 4 is constant, emergency response for a rail issue rarely occurs. These types of incidents can be classified as high risk/low frequency events that tax the responders and resources of that jurisdiction and in our case, Clay Fire Territory. With any rail incident, CN who is the owner of the rail must be notified immediately but until they arrive on scene, it is our job to be able to safely secure the scene. To complete this task, it might require us to span a large distance and may require a large number of personnel to complete. We must also remember to begin our operations from a safe distance, upwind, and uphill when possible. Once the scene is secure, it is important to try to identify the hazard. The ERG will most likely be your best resource for the initial response. In addition, the train crew/conductor will be a valuable source of information about the contents on the train. Remember that for rail emergencies, the consist should be with the conductor and should contain information about each product being carried. Other factors to consider when completing a site assessment include utilities that run adjacent to the railroad. Downed signal and communication lines, power lines, buried utilities, and above ground switch heating systems can all pose serious danger to responders. In addition to utilities, pipelines also run either under or adjacent to the CN rail line so multiple agencies might have to be contacted in the event of an emergency. The following pages provide some valuable information on how to identify what type of rail car you are dealing with and also how to read a train consist. Please take some time to understand these products and the hazards that might exist should a problem occur. The two main types of rail cars that carry liquids are pressure and nonpressure rail cars.

Nonpressure tank cars are also known as General Service, Low Pressure, and General Purpose tank cars. They have a test pressure range between 60 psi to 100 psi and transport liquid commodities. The tank is typically 7/16 to 1/2 inches thick. The carrying capacities of these tank cars can vary from 6,000 to 33,500 gallons. Materials in the following hazard classes may be transported in nonpressure tank cars: Nonpressure tank cars differ from pressure tank cars in that they are a horizontal tank with flat or nearly flat ends. The fittings and valves will be visible on the top of the car. They can have up to 6 compartments inside the tank with each compartment having its own set of fittings. There is often a bottom unloading valve. If there are corrosives being transported within the tank, you will find a wide band of corrosion-resistant paint running vertically at the manway. The built in safety features of the cars include pressure and vacuum relief valves, shelf couplers, head shields, and thermal protection.

Nonpressure/General Service Rail Car

Pressure tank cars can be readily identified by its cylindrical shape with rounded ends. These cars can be insulated or thermally protected. A pressure car without insulation or jacketed thermal protection must have the top two thirds painted white. Another way to tell that you are dealing with a pressure tank car is the fittings and valves will be enclosed in a protective housing with a cover. The tank test pressure ranges from 100 to 600 psi. The carrying capacities range from 4,000 to 45,000 gallons and the capacity can be determined by the markings on the side of the tank. There are many safety features included in pressure tank cars. They include: pressure relief protection, excess flow valves, shelf couplers, and head shields. If the car is transporting flammable liquefied gases, there must be thermal protection. The following commodities are typically found in a tank car: Any type of railroad response is dangerous due to the participating equipment as well as our lack of familiarity with these types of responses. The following items must be taken into account if you happen to be working at a railroad incident: Basic Safety: “Expect a train or rail equipment to move on any track from either direction at any time.” Personnel Safety:

NEVER step on the rail. Step over the rail. Slips, trips, and falls are the number 1 cause of injuries associated with railroad response.

Never stand between the rails.

If climbing equipment, always use 3 points of contact.

Plan on using your own ladders; however, the locomotive steps are considered ladders.

Never climb or walk on the roof of a locomotive. Incident Scene Safety:

Contact CN at the emergency number 1-800-465-9239 and report the emergency. Remember, you could be work-ing a traffic accident or another incident which is not associated with the railroad but you might have to stop train traffic. If this is the case, you should do this immediately.

Be aware for bent or stressed rail which can lash out suddenly.

Never park emergency vehicles on or too close to the tracks.

A spotter should be used when working near the railroad to ensure the safety of all responders. Responding to a Railroad Emergency:

Secure the area. This may require a large number of personnel to complete.

Find the train crew.

Ask for the consist so you know what you are dealing with.

Establish proper hazard zones using the ERG.

Begin a site assessment from a safe distance, upwind, and uphill.

Look for mile post markers to give CN a proper incident location.

Use air monitoring equipment to ensure scene safety.

Be aware for pipeline involvement as these may run parallel to the tracks. As you approach the scene, you must have your ERG and begin the identification process. Each car will be placarded or stenciled with the commodity. From there, you can begin to isolate the scene.

Hazard Class Number Example Commodities

2 Butane, Propane, Ammonia, Chlorine, Vinyl Chloride

3 Natural Gas

Commodity Flow Studies: 3 Years

The following list shows the top 5 commodities that flow through our area over 3 different years. You can see that certain products fluctuate in the amount of product shipped. Every year, this information is requested from CN so we know exactly what products are flowing through our area.

2011

1 LP Gas

2 Sulfuric Acid

3 Ethanol & Gasoline Mixture

4 Sodium Hydroxide

5 Vinyl Chloride

2014

1 Crude Oil

2 LP Gas

3 Sulfuric Acid


5 Hydrocarbons, Liquid, N.O.S.

2015

1 LP Gas

2 Sulfuric Acid

3 Crude Oil

4 Hydrocarbons Liquid, N.O.S.


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Pre-Incident Planning

1 | P a g e

This document will explain each section of the Pre-Incident Plan for Commercial Occupancies for Clay Fire.

Occupancy ID, Name and Address

Building Information

Building Size and Fire Flow

Pre-Plan Information

Cont. Pre-Plan Information

Hydrant Information

Contact Information


2 | P a g e

Property is used for Multi-unit buildings. This Occupancy ID listed here related to the overall of the building. The building owner’s information will be part of this unit.

This “Occupancy:” has the Occupant ID and the name of the Occupancy. The first number (47) refers to the grid the occupancy resides in. The second part of the number (104) refers to the number listed in Firehouse (FH). The names should be the name of the business. Please verify that the name is correct.

This “Address:” includes the street address, a suite, City, State and Zip code. Please verify everything is correct, especially the zip code.

The “Contact Information:” should include the business phone number and a fax number. If the business has no fax it will show all 0 (ex. 000-000-0000)

1

2

3 4

Occupancy ID, Name and Address

1

2

3

4


3 | P a g e

This area has information about the building. Prop Use describes the building use. Mixed Use describes if there are differt

types of uses in the building. Struct Type describes the type of structure the building. Prop Ownrshp describes the type of owner of the building. The Bldg Stat show the status of the building. Note this one is wrong. Bldg Class shows the building class from the building code like A, B, E, H, I M & R Classes. Roof Cover and Const Type describes the

type of roof and the building construction type. Detectr Type & Pwr describes the Fire alarm system

and type. AES Type is for the Automatic Extinguishing System.

This area shows the station and response area for the location of the building. Inspection District is set up for the quarter that the inspection is done. The 2-4Q shows that this inspection is done 2nd and 4th quarters. The floors above and below shows the numbers of floors.

All this informtion can be found in FH under the Occupancy tab under building.

Building Information

5

6

5

6


4 | P a g e

The length and width are for the building size. If the business is a suite part of multi-unit building, then the length and width should be for that unit only and not the whole building.

The Required Fire flow is figured in FH as seen in the picture below.

The Dist Btwn Bldgs in important to fire flow and helps the BC know how close the next building is located. Please verify this data.

7

8

9

Building Size and Fire Flow

7

8

9


5 | P a g e

This area is where we are missing a lot of data. What we are looking for is pre-plan information that can be documented for the BC and to help the crews locate key locations.

The pre-plan codes that we are looking for are listed below. If they are not listed on the sheet, add them if the building as it.

Every building should have minimum of an Electrical Meter Disconnect, Electrical Panel, Water Shut Off and Water source location.

The information located below the Pre-plan Code describes the location. If it is blank, then information is NEEDED. (Example under ELEM, no description was listed.

If we need to add addition codes, this can be done.

Pre-Plan Information


6 | P a g e

Under the Hydrant information, we are looking for the 2 closest water sources.

Under Contact Information, we need to have this contact information verified. We need to have after hour contact information like mobile and home numbers. Email are also important for sending of inspection report and information to business.

You may see *Owner*, *Occupant*, and *Keyholder* next to the name. These are the only one ones that show on the iPad’s. The iPads only allow for 3 contacts to show up. It is important

to know who these 3 people are if there are more than those 3.

Other information needed:

Chemicals

Storage Tanks

On-Site Materials

Defining the QRS Complex

The Wave Form

P wave- the arch preceding the QRS complex.

Q wave- the first negative (downward) deflection of the complex. In some leads, it will not be present. In some cases, the complex begins with an R wave.

R wave- the first positive (upward) deflection of the QRS complex. It will sometimes be preceded by a Q wave.

S wave- any negative (downward) deflection following an R wave.

T wave- the arch following the QRS complex.

The Electrical and Mechanical Equivalents

P wave- this represents atrial depolarization. It is followed by an isoelectric segment, which is due to a conduction delay at the AV node.

QRS- the complex represents the depolarization of the ventricles. This is followed by an isoelectric segment.

T wave- this represents ventricular repolarization.

Atrial Contraction- the atria mechanically contract starting at the beginning of the P wave, until the beginning of the QRS complex.

Ventricular Contraction- the ventricles mechanically contract from the start of the QRS complex until the end of the T wave.

The EKG Paper

The EKG paper is divided into large boxes, which are further divided into smaller boxes. Each large box is demarcated by thick black lines. Within the borders of one large box lie five smaller boxes. On the horizontal axis, one large box represents 0.2 seconds (see figure directly above). On the horizontal axis, each small box represents 0.04 seconds. On the vertical axis, each small box represents 1 millimeter.

References:

Dubin D. Rapid Interpretation of EKG’s. 6 th Ed. Tampa: Cover Publishing, 2000.

Grauer K. 12-Lead ECG’s: A “Pocket Brain” for Easy Interpretation. 2 nd Ed. Gainesville: KG/EKG Press, 2001.

Lilly LS. Pathophysiology of Heart Disease: a Collaborative Project of Medical Students and Faculty. 3 rd Ed. Baltimore: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2003.

Podrid PJ. ECG tutorial: Approach to Interpretation. www.uptodate.com, 2005.

NORMAL SINUS

SINUS BRADYCARDIA

SINUS TACHYCARDIA

VENTRICULAR TACHYCARDIA

VENTRICULAR FIBRILLATION

No correlating pulse

P.E.A

Documents

NOVEMBER 2016 TRAINING PACKET - Clay Fire Trainingclayfiretraining.com/.../uploads/2016/11/November-2016-Training-Packet.pdf · As the weather gets colder, the likelihood of getting