Notes

Chapter 1 Complicity, Ethics, and Resistance

1. Throughout this work, the use of the term “ethics” will be premised on thisdefinition. Starting in chapter 2, however, two variants of this term will beused to highlight the distinction between currently existing concepts and theone I work to develop here. “Ethics” (capital E) will be used to refer to thiskind of rule-bound morality captured in philosophical and religiousdiscourses that contain within them a clearly defined set of prescriptions ofrules of conduct. “ethics” (lower-case E) will be used to refer to the notiondeveloped throughout this work, namely that of a practical mode of conductintended to attain a particular state of affairs rather than merely fulfill therequirements of a set of rules. I apologize for any confusion on this matter.

2. Other thinkers take a variety of approaches to deal with these kinds of criti-cism of Ethics and ethical thought and deal with issues paralleling those dealtwith in this book, including: Martha Craven Nussbaum, CultivatingHumanity (1998: Harvard University Press) and Sex and Social Justice (2000:Oxford University Press); Ted Honderich, After the Terror (2002: EdinburghUniversity Press); Onora O’Neill’s Constructions of Reason: Explorations ofKant’s Practical Philosophy (1990: Cambridge University Press) and Bounds ofJustice (2000: Cambridge University Press); and Peter Singer’s How Are We toLive? Ethics in an Age of Self-Interest (1995: Prometheus Books) and OneWorld: The Ethics of Globalization (2002: Yale University Press).

3. Some examples of these paradigmatic approaches to resistance (and this listis by no means exhaustive) include: Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: SovereignPower and Bare Life (1998: Stanford University Press); Judith Butler’s ThePsychic Life of Power: Theories of Subjection (1997: Stanford University Press)and Gender Trouble (1999: Routledge); Nick Dyer-Witheford, Cyber-Marx:Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High-Technology Capitalism (2000:University of Illinois Press); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire(2001: Harvard University Press); John Holloway, Change the World WithoutTaking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today (2002: Pluto Press); AntonioNegri’s Time for Revolution (2003: Continuum Publishing Group); ThedaSkocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France,Russia and China (1979: Cambridge University Press); Amory Starr, Namingthe Enemy: Anti-Corporate Movements Confront Globalization (2001: ZedBooks). These are certainly not the only perspectives on resistance, rebellion,

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and revolution; however, I see works such as these as being indicative of thegeneral approaches taken by scholars of resistance.

4. Fraser (1998), however, in Justice Interruptus is able to grapple with the inter-section of Butlerian post-structuralist resistance and the “redistributionproject” of Marx. However, Fraser’s primary difficulty in that work is herreliance on groups subordinated on the basis of identity (i.e., nonwhites,women, etc.) as the norm, without realizing that this reproduces dominantsocial structures precisely through their “resistance.” While I do not have thespace to fully detail what groups in the world merit the term “oppressedpeoples,” I can suggest that there is a wide range of forms of oppression, anddepending upon the particular exigencies of a sociohistorical situation,certain groups will be brutally oppressed in one situation and “relatively free”in another.

5. Noam Chomsky would be an obvious exception to this claim; hisManufacturing Consent is devoted specifically to the examination of the waysin which “consent” has been constructed in a way that actually eliminates thepossibility for us to positively agree to the rules of our social order in anymeaningful way.

Chapter 2 As Fragile as Glass: Balancing the Individual and the Social

1. This same idea of “existence precedes essence” appears, in mutated form, in theworks of Lyotard, Harvey, Butler, and many others, all of whom claim thatas a result of the “death of metanarratives,” all “essence” is gone, left to the individual to remake at will—exactly what we will see in Being andNothingness.

2. “Our review would like to contribute, on its modest part, to the constitutionof a synthetic anthropology. But it finds itself not only . . . preparing progressin the domain of ‘pure knowledge’: the long-term goal upon which we arefixed is a liberation.”

3. “The pure future of the imperative is neither knowable or predictable. Itscharacter as pure future, that is to say as the future that no one has prepared,that no one can help realize, is in fact a future to be made.”

Chapter 3 Methods, Not Recipes: Rethinking Ethics In (and Through) Resistance

1. “To say it better, he does not oppose—as if it were a value to other values—that is his need that is opposed to the order of things in reclaiming for menagainst things the reality of man. On the one hand, the mutilated man, subor-dinating men to things; on the other, the oppressed man subordinatingthings to man as a means to restoring the human.”

2. In the case of the African National Congress, though, this is precisely whatwas hoped: the ANC called on Western trading partners of South Africa todivest from and boycott the country’s economy in order to bring the country

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to a standstill. The ANC, in other words, realized the importance of ashort-term sacrifice in the name of the destruction of the apartheid system.

3. Unlike other forms of ethical thought, such as contractualism and utilitarian-ism, the types of evaluations one might make in an existential ethics are notthose of a cost/benefit analysis based upon a set of first-order moral rules. First,contractualism and utilitarianism seek to formulate rules to be applied at alltimes in all situations, such as “in conflict, the rule should be to minimizehuman casualties at all costs.” In many cases, this is historically inconceivableand might actually be subverted by one’s enemy. Second, if first-order moralrules are not formulated, then the cost/benefit analysis can be utilized withoutan ethical basis in some larger project. This is necessarily a slippery issue, onethat to my mind utilitarianism in particular often tries to avoid, while an exis-tential ethics explicitly takes it into account.

4. The discussion here contains, at least to my knowledge, the first English-language sociological treatment of the unpublished Conférence à l’InstitutGramsci (the Rome Lectures, as it is known to English-language scholars) andNotes for the Cornell Lectures, prepared for a conference at Cornell Universityin 1965, but canceled in protest of America’s involvement in the VietnamWar. Neither manuscript has been published due to the wishes of ArletteEl-Kaïm Sartre (his adopted daughter and owner of the copyrights); however,sections have been published (see Contat and Rybalka 1970, e.g.).

5. “Morality is a certain relation of one man to another. But this relation doesnot have as its origin an inert relation of interiority. This is an active relationof reciprocity that is passivised and made eternal (an eternity of the instant)by the mediation of worked material.”

6. “In the imperative of the custom, the content of the norm fixes a destiny for me:I must produce myself through my action. The interiority is from time to timethe subject of my possible act and the possibility that I could produce myself asa subject, in a word, the possibility of an indifferent determination from my pasthaving no relation with my act. One echoes the past and the imperative is adiscovery of the future as much as it is a disqualification of the past.

But, simultaneously, this future that poses the unconditional possibilitythat I produce myself as interiority, poses as well as the imperative that hasalready been respected by individuals in preceding generations. For the menof the past, this was a future. In reality, this future is for them also a futureanterior : for the moral agent that I am today, it announces itself as my futureas well as a repeated fact.”

7. “The imperative is therefore the thing dictating its laws to praxis while it ismaintained by the action of others. If one wishes, praxis crystallizes and congealsin the sense where the same human is imprisoned by the manufactured product.”

8. “Every particular and dated ethic is historical in its content.Every particular and dated ethic presents itself as an overtaking of history.Every particular and dated ethic is a stoppage of history and maintains

a society by repetition.Every particular and dated ethic is overtaken by history.Every particular and dated ethic is alienation (man as the product of his

products, man as the son of man). . . .

Every particular and dated ethic radically takes hold of and locally explodes history from a double point of view: the future (integrationwith death); the past (repetition against evolution).”

9. “Ethics as alibis: ‘one must, when one loves, etc.’ In this sense, superstruc-tures, but they are . . . disguises for real conduct, only these real conducts arethemselves ethical (e.g., an ethic of austerity or generosity can hide a practicalinterest. But the interest can be as well an imperative, one could say a moral(as a simple verbalism) in hiding another ( . . . the reign of simple fact).”

10. “One understands that past praxis, inscribed in the inertia of exteriority,dissolves itself if it is not maintained by those who profit by it. It is there-fore through the class struggle (because they maintain it against those whofrustrate it) and in the same movement of history that is the imprisonment ofthe unconditioned and conceivable ethical future.”

11. Many thanks to David McNally for helping me clarify this position.12. Interestingly, Alexander claims the existence of an opposition of violence to

reason in twentieth-century thought, arguing that Aron’s History and theDialectic of Violence is the only work to really deal with the theme ofviolence in Critique of Dialectical Reason, a theme he takes as a philosophi-cal truth of existentialism. Alexander argues that the philosophical justifi-cation of violence is something that most thinkers are unwilling to pursue,partly because of its opposition to reason, and partly because of “theomnipresence of violence in this century’s life” (Alexander 1995: 86n7). Iwould argue, though, that Alexander’s desire to maintain the dominance ofreason goes farther to explain his characterization of the Critique as an“apologia for violence” (loc. cit.) than does the antirationality of Sartre’swork. On the contrary, I would argue that this aspect of Sartre’s work—thisclaim that violence can be and often is ethical—is not apologetic, but ratheraware of the historical exigencies of the situation. Sartre’s point is not toargue that violence is the only means to liberation, but rather one that isfrequently a necessary consequence of the situation one finds oneself in(Alexander 1995: 72).

13. Merleau-Ponty, in fact, went so far as to help draft the final version of the“Manifesto of the 121,” the French intellectuals’ statement against the insti-tution of conscription for the Algerian War, and elicited Raymond Aron’ssignature on the manifesto. See Whiteside (1988: 233).

14. The details of the very public debate between Sartre and Camus, inwhich their friendship was ended because of Camus’s refusal to take astand with regard to the Algerian Revolution, are well documented else-where. To provide the short version: Camus stated that both the Frenchcolonial forces and the Front de la libération nationale were engaged in anunjust fight, and that negotiations between the two sides were necessary.Sartre’s critique, issued in Les temps modernes, was predicated on Camus’sbook The Rebel, in which he argued that oppressors, oppressed, and allthose who stand “on the sidelines” were implicated in the historical situa-tion; further, Camus’s call for negotiations was an attempt, according toSartre, to abdicate his own historical responsibility for the Algerian war. SeeSartre 1965.

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15. By now, it should be clear that there are two ways in which ethics have beendiscussed in this chapter, one in the present, and one in the future. Thepresent “ethics,” better indicated as “morality” save for the polemic over-tones of the term, is one that prevents the full potential of humanity frombeing developed, as it requires that our action be oriented to the reproduc-tion and maintenance of the status quo. The other, a more future-orientedconception of ethics, is the one that Sartre and Merleau-Ponty wish to seebrought into the world through ethical radicalism, revolutionary liberatoryaction, and whatever other means necessary to create the possibility for agenuine “humanity.”

16. “Or, if one prefers, the unconditioned future or the human future of manand the identification of morality in the sense of history cannot beproduced as such by the class that denies history. This rigorous normis produced by the exploited classes inasmuch as their human projectof producing humans is in contradiction with the inhuman conditions thatmake them facts.”

17. “We have seen the contradiction of ethics. We have seen the proper motiffor ethics: the will of sovereignty in reciprocity” (Sartre 1964b: 445).

18. “The fraternal man can demand negatively in looking backward (suicide),[or] positively by revolutionary praxis, by really being in their birth theproduct of man. . . . That is to say, a society where the practico-inert isunceasingly dissolved to the extent that it is formed by a union of menagainst the mediation of the inert; society without structure, an economyproducing man without institutions (the State) or alienated morality.”

19. “The unconditional normative is here also the foundation of the imperative.The transformation of the fundamental structures of the system . . . bymaking terror useless does not suppress its means but the unconditionedend is discovered anew and praxis takes it as goal, starting with the real revo-lutionary goal of liquidating the limits of terrorism.”

Chapter 4 Turning Ourselves on Our Heads: Hegemony and the Colonized Habitus

1. Sartre’s notion of exis and Bourdieu’s concept of hexis are, in essence, thesame concept, differing only in the use of the sometimes-silent h. Bothconcepts work to convey the notion of the habitual aspects and actions ofthe human body and one’s sense of the propre (both “proper” and “one’sown”) place in the social order.

2. The connection between Bourdieu’s work and existentialism hearkens backto 1962, when one of Bourdieu’s first articles, “Les relations entre les sexesdans la société paysanne,” appeared in Les temps modernes. As Davies reportsin his history of Les temps modernes, this article, along with “Les sous-prolétaires algériens” that appeared in August 1962, shows Bourdieu’s workis close to both the methodological concerns of Sartre (and, if one canattribute concerns posthumously, to those of Merleau-Ponty) as well as toSartre’s projected development of a “synthetic anthropology.” Bourdieu

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relied upon a phenomenological approach to these studies, which gave thesepieces the fieldwork-oriented content that the journal needed in light of itsconcerns with the interconnections between sociology, ethnography, andcolonialism (Davies 1987: 98). As Les temps modernes began its move towarda more structuralist perspective under the editorial leadership of JeanPouillon, Bourdieu’s work continued to play an important part in the devel-opment of the journal’s project, though Bourdieu’s structuralist emphasisleans away from Sartre’s chosen emphasis on praxis (ibid.: 143). AndBourdieu’s later work in the sociology of education helped develop Les tempsmodernes’ analysis of the position of intellectual vis-à-vis the student move-ments of the mid- to late 1960s; Bourdieu’s pieces deriving from his moveinto the sociology of education analyze the “phenomenology of need, sharedby staff and students, to imagine that communication takes place betweenthem” (Davies 1987: 187), showing that the engagement that members ofthe French academy professed contained within it a type of “terror” that isenacted upon the students, a terror that in some way reproduces the form ofthe relationship of “le ‘bon colon’ à des ‘indigènes’ ” (Bourdieu and Passeron1965: 441; in Davies 1987: 187). As such, Bourdieu’s work contributed agreat deal to the development of Les temps modernes and provides a useful coun-terpoint to the developing work of Sartre; as Davies points out, “Sartrepredictably holds closer to the Gramscian concept of hegemony than toBourdieu’s ideas on habitus and cultural legitimation” (Davies 1987: 182–183).

The posthumously published collection of Bourdieu’s essays from Lestemps modernes and other forums, Interventions 1961–2001, includes anumber of Bourdieu’s contributions and commentaries on the relationshipbetween his work and that of Sartre. In particular, Bourdieu argues thatSartre served more as a model of the ideal intellectual than as an intellectualcomrade; however, in later years, it was Sartre’s contribution to the myth ofthe “free intellectual” that Bourdieu found annoyance with: “. . . même s’il estencore beaucoup trop grand pour les plus grands des intellectuels, le mythede l’intellectuel et de sa mission universelle est une de ces ruses de la raisonhistorique qui font que les intellectuels les plus sensibles aux séductions etaux profits d’universalité peuvent avoir intérêt à contribuer, au nom de moti-vations qui peuvent n’avoir rien d’universel, au progrès de l’universel” (“. . . ifhe is still the most grand of the grandest of intellectuals, the myth of theintellectual and of their universal mission is one of these ruses of historicalreason that makes it so that the intellectuals most sensitive to seduction andto the profits of universality can have an interest in contributing, in the nameof motivations that can have nothing universal, to the progress of the univer-sal”) (Bourdieu 2002: 47).

3. To quote at some length from Bourdieu and Sartre regarding the possibilitiesfor “escape” from what I call the colonized habitus:

In short, to the great despair of the philosopher-king who, by assign-ing an essence to them, claims to enjoin them to be and do what bydefinition they are meant to be and do, classified and lowly classifiedmen and women may reject the principle of classification which givesthem the worst place. In fact, as history shows, it is almost always

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under the leadership of those seeking a monopoly over the power tojudge and to classify, who may themselves quite often be classified, atleast from certain points of view, in the dominant classification, thatthe dominated are able to break out of the grip of the legitimate clas-sification and transform their vision of the world by liberating them-selves from those internalized limits that are the social categories ofperception of the social world. (Bourdieu 1990b: 180)

First, as you know, for me there is no a priori essence; and so what ahuman being is has not yet been established. We are not completehuman beings. We are beings who are struggling to establish humanrelations and arrive at a definition of what is human. At this momentwe are in the thick of the battle, and no doubt it will go on for manyyears. But one must define the battle: we are seeking to live togetherlike human beings, and to be human beings. So it’s by means ofsearching for this definition, and this action of a truly human kind—beyond humanism, of course—that we will be able to consider oureffort and our end. In other words, our goal is to arrive at a genuinelyconstituent body in which each person would be a human being andcollectivities would be equally human. (Sartre and Lévy 1996: 67)

4. “This structuration of quotidian life is arranged by hegemony: not so muchin a whole of ‘alien’ ideas about the dependency or inferiority of the popularsectors as in a change interiorizing social inequality, below the level of uncon-scious dispositions, inscribed in one’s own body, in the consciousness of whatis possible and what is attainable.”

5. “That which—local or infrastructural—comes to systemic men from structuresand that which—undefined in the times—indicates humanity as humanity to bemade to each man in the system; not just in the construction of a system (evenif it were the socialist system), but in the destruction of each system.”

6. “The practico-inert (imperative) demands the maintenance of structures; acontradiction, but not moral: in fact, one can ceaselessly reorganize in keep-ing these very men in their place.”

Chapter 5 Dirty Hands and Making the Human: Fanon, the Algerian Revolution, and an Ethics of Freedom

1. France 1843: 1–2; cited in Ruedy 1992: 49.2. France 1834: 333–334; cited in Ruedy 1992: 50.3. “If the colonial expeditions obey a given and known schema—the necessity

of imposing order on the barbarians; protection of the European countries’concessions and interests; generous supplies from Western civilization—onehas not sufficiently shown the stereotypical means used by the metropolitansto cling to their colonies.”

4. Here, note the racialization of the terms, a tactic that Fanon uses to illustrateboth the universality of the colonial situation and the racialization that heknows, as one who is embedded in the colonial system as both subject ofthe system and warrior against it, to be part and parcel of the constitution ofthe colonise ’s consciousness.

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5. “The object of racism is no longer the particular man, but a certain form ofexistence. . .”; “. . . the time-honored call of the ‘cross against the crescent.’”

6. The obvious parallel is to Marx’s “Alienation and Social Classes,” in whichhe argues that the proletariat feels their alienation from themselves andothers more profoundly than does the bourgeoisie, which experiences it as“a sign of their power” (Marx 1978: 133).

7. The Manichaeism of the colonial situation presented by Fanon and Sartrein their works may very well be hyperbolically stated by them in order tomake this larger point: that the structure of colonial society was drawnbroadly along racial lines in the first instance, with deviations along classlines permitted occasionally. Regardless of its literary value, though, thisManichaeism becomes reality as the revolution proceeds, ultimately takinghold over the Algerian situation in toto.

8. As a personal conversation with Ron Aronson (2004b) has highlighted,there may even be a fourth position within Algerian society, namely thatoccupied by Muslim Algerians who also felt themselves to be fully French.Mouloud Feraoun might be most indicative of this position, being highlyeducated within the French system, having loyalties to France and toAlgeria as “parent countries,” much in the same way that a citizen ofSwitzerland might see themselves as a member of their national group(German, French, or Italian) and Swiss and equally feel loyalties to each.The existence of this fourth position, though, would not seem to changethe analysis here much; those who could throughout their adult life main-tain a loyalty to both France and Algeria without feeling betrayed by eitherwould not be likely to join in the revolution (though Feraoun certainlymaintained connections with the FLN, in large part as a manifestation ofhis fealty to Algeria), while those who felt betrayed by France would bemore likely to rebel against continued colonial rule.

9. As Horne notes, the early phase of the Revolution after the All Saint’s Dayuprising was dismal for the fortunes of the revolutionaries, at least in termsof the measures of efficacy they might have laid out for themselves. Theinnocents who were rounded up (and perhaps inspired to join theRevolution after their arrest) were an asset, but only “a potential one”; andsoon after the uprising, the pieds-noirs, the focal audience for the uprisingbeyond the French colonial and metropolitan government, returned to astate of normalcy for a time. In large part, this ignorance of the FLN left itunable to further its revolutionary activity, leaving its support base small forthe early part of the Revolution (Horne 1977: 96, 104).

10. “The colonial society is a system where it is important to comprehend thelogic and the internal necessity of the fact that it constitutes the context inreference which makes sense of all the behaviors, and in particular therelations, between the two ethnic communities. To the transformationsinevitably resulting from contact between two profoundly different civiliza-tions, as much in the economic domain as in the social domain, coloniza-tion adds the confusion knowingly and methodically provoked to assurethe authority of the dominant power and the economic interests of itsnationals.”

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11. “One says willingly that man is endlessly questioning himself, and that hedisowns himself when he pretends that he no longer exists.”

12. Muslim Algerians were legally defined as French subjects, not French citizens,and in order to gain citizenship were required to renounce their rights tomaintain their Islamic religion and cultural practices. As such, making theleap toward French citizenship legally as well as ontologically required alien-ating oneself from their culture, religion, and heritage, as well as theircommunity; and the obstacles that were frequently placed in the way ofMuslim Algerians who did want to obtain French citizenship—and, by 1936,only 2,500 had worked to obtain it—meant that the French would beunlikely to genuinely accept these évolués as “truly French” (Horne 1977: 35).

13. Whether this is the result of Fanon’s ethnographic efforts or his propagan-distic work is in the end almost immaterial. The intent behind the writingsFanon did for El Moudjahid was to create the perception of a burgeoningnation in revolt; and if métropole or colon officials read that as an accuratepresentation of the situation, or if non-revolutionary Algerians saw theopportunity to read themselves into this “narrative of liberation,” the effectis the same: a mutually reinforcing cycle of increasing involvement ofAlgerians in the Revolution, increased efforts by French officials at pacifi-cation, and increased dissatisfaction in l’Hexagone.

14. “This event, commonly known as ‘alienation,’ is naturally very important.One finds it in official texts under the name ‘assimilation.’

But this alienation is never totally successful. It would be because theoppressor quantitatively and qualitatively limits the evolution, unforeseen,disparate phenomenon manifest themselves.

The inferiorized group had admitted, the force of reason being relent-less, that its misfortunes followed directly from their racial and culturalcharacteristics.”

15. As Tillion points out, primarily in reference to her own work but also refer-ring to the work of the ethnographer in general, “Ethnographers shouldhurry up and have a look at them, for in a little while it will be too late”(Tillion 1958: 28–29). It is part of the task of the ethnographer to engagein a kind of reportage, one that, in situations such as the colonial, requiresa certain kind of advocacy. One could argue—and ethnographers certainlywould argue in their behalf—that the reportage of “foreign” situations isimportant both for the preservation of human situations and for increasingthe awareness of the world at large that the way they do things is just as“foreign” as the practices depicted in the ethnography.

There is also some issue surrounding the position of Fanon as ethnogra-pher. Because of Fanon’s clear relationship and solid involvement with theFLN, it could be argued that the representation of the Algerian situationserves a propaganda purpose—namely, that Fanon intentionally constructedthe representation of the situation in Algeria in order to satisfy the needs ofthe FLN to motivate the population to revolt against French colonialism.On this issue, one could say, “But of course! That was his job with the FLN,after all.” In the end, though, the question should not be whether or notFanon was the FLN’s propagandist, but whether or not what Fanon wrote

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while working with the FLN (a) served the purposes for which it wasintended, and (b) in some way represented the existential experience ofAlgerians prior to and during the Revolution. To my mind, the response to(b) is in the affirmative.

16. This discussion of the tensions between the overall revolutionary goals ofthe FLN and the particular tactics utilized to attain those goals parallelsMichel de Certeau’s discussion of “strategy” versus “tactics” in The Practiceof Everyday Life (1984, University of California Press), in which strategyrefers to the larger-scale motivations and goals of some program of socialaction, while tactics describes the particular ways in which those goals areattained through action. This tension also parallels the discussions earlier inthis work (chapters 2 and 3) of the bond between means and ends as under-stood by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. As we will see, the latter parallel willbecome more important for the course of this analysis.

17. A statement more on the organizational problems of the FLN than the will-ingness of the revolutionaries to hold to their promises, an attack on Frenchcivilians in 1955 by FLN soldiers in Philippeville resulted in the deaths of71 Europeans and 52 Algerians, including a number of Algerian politicians(Le Sueur 2001: 30). It appears that the decision to pursue this attack waseither made by the “army over the fence” in Cairo, or independently by theleader of wilaya 2, Youssef Zighout (Horne 1977: 118–119; Clark 1959:152, 172). Following the Philippeville attacks, dramatic reprisals againstAlgerians (totaling between 1,273 and 12,000 Algerian deaths) and theresultant flocking of Algerians to the FLN demonstrated the likelihood thatFLN attacks on French civilians would ultimately strengthen their hand.

18. To be more faithful to Hutchinson’s text, she utilizes the general term “revo-lutionary terrorism” to talk about all forms of violence utilized against non-military persons during a revolutionary war, and identifies each of the typesof violence I discuss herein as “terrorism” (Hutchinson 1978: 21). However,this unproblematized description of revolutionary violence as “terrorism” isdoubly loaded, as she herself later recognizes. First, it involves a moral valu-ation; to describe a form of violent political action as “terrorist” necessarilynegates any perception of its legitimacy as a tool for those who utilize it.Second, Hutchinson later (Crenshaw 1983: 2–3) argues for a “neutraldescriptive definition,” to be utilized in conjunction with a “normativevaluation” to determine the actual legitimacy of the violence. In order toseparate the description of the violent tactics utilized by the FLN from anykind of ethical valuation—the ultimate point of the chapter—I have electedto refer to the various types of political violence Hutchinson labels as“terrorism” simply as “violence” or “tactics.”

19. The MNA was the reformulated version of Messali Hadj’s MTLD, made tosound tougher after the establishment of the FLN (Horne 1977: 128).Because the politics of both groups was so similar—both deriving theiroriginal positions from Messali, fiercely nationalist, and opposed to anycontinued French rule over Algeria—the main issue became the commit-ment the FLN had to political violence, not entirely shared by the MNA.The MNA’s slight moderation made them an appealing interlocutor for

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de Gaulle; and it was this perceived threat to FLN dominance that resultedin the internecine conflict that resulted in as many as 10,000 Algeriandeaths—even more than the number of French killed during the war(Crenshaw 1995: 483).

20. Following from recent discussions over the differences, particularly in Sartre’sdiscussions of the justness of political violence, between the “justification” ofpolitical violence and its “endorsement” (Aronson 2002, 2004a; Santoni2002, 2003), I want to make clear here that this analysis proceeds alongjustificatory lines. That is, I see the ways in which the revolutionary practicesof the FLN could be justified, given their particular social, political,economic, and military position during the Revolution. That said, I am notendorsing their use of certain tactics that would generally fit under the head-ing of “terrorism” (cf. Hutchinson 1978; Crenshaw 1983), and certainly donot endorse the FLN’s settling of scores after independence was gained. Thisin no way means that I could not see other forms of political violence asjustified or endorsable, given the parameters discussed throughout this work.

21. Some have posed the issue of Camus’s call for a civilian truce in terms of a“was he right or wrong” question, which would tend to lock theorists andscholars into a “Camus versus Sartre” debate. To my mind, the point is notwhether or not Camus was correct to ask for a truce against both pied-noirand Algerian civilians—to his mind, he was correct on this point, despite thefact that, as Aronson (2004a) notes, this was Camus’s philosophical “blindspot,” that element of his public pronouncements that did not coincide withhis philosophical oeuvre. The fact that Camus’s call for a civilian truce coin-cides with the FLN’s Soummam Conference (1956) shows that whenviolence came to roost on pieds-noirs, only then was it time for him to speakout for the protection of civilians on both sides. The point is that by the timeCamus did make his pronouncement, the essential contradictions of theAlgerian colonial system had already been laid bare; the reciprocal violencebetween Algerians and French soldiers and civilians had already begun to heatup; and there appeared to all sides to be no way back from it.

22. Merleau-Ponty’s Humanism and Terror was originally published in 1947, ata time in which France was recovering from the German Occupation andWorld War II and the Soviet Union was expanding its control over much ofCentral and Eastern Europe. Thus, its historical context is one in which thequestion of which form of violence—bourgeois or Communist—was more“just.” However, Merleau-Ponty moved away from support of Communistforms of violence by 1950, and with the publication of “Sartre andUltrabolshevism” in 1953 had seemed to move completely away from anysupport of revolutionary violence. However, Merleau-Ponty remainedcommitted to the humanization of the world, even if through violent means;further, his position moved closer to the first of these quotations than thesecond with the discovery of the gulags in the Soviet Union. Still, his wordsearly on can still inform our perspective on the violence in the AlgerianRevolution. See Le Sueur (2001: 210, 227–228).

23. “But the object of value is already homogenous to the moment of inertia inpraxis: because, in the synthetic unity of praxis, I make myself inert to

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combat the inertia of the world, the inertia of the object and their unity inthe false interiority returning to me my own inertia and its practical unifica-tion condensed and made passive. In fact, I make myself an instrument(contra-inertia) and the object makes me into an instrument. Thus the firsttime of a value—an object silently implicating the idea of myself as a valueas much as power, that is to say forged inertia.”

24. “In fact, the contradiction of the revolutionary morality is that it is the onlyone to be determined in the function of the integral man; but also limits itsgoal in itself in the service of the exigencies of the struggle, and produces atthe same time praxis-process of morals highly esteemed that are alienated inthe process.

The problem is therefore in knowing how to produce the dialecticalmovement that comes in posing these alienated morals that contest theirlimits in service of the same goal they seek to attain.”

25. “In a word, the ethical possibility or norm (that is to say, the action produc-ing its own means) is the sens of historical praxis: that one, correcting with-out end its deviations, appears as penetrated; in effect of a sort . . . whereone sustains and nourishes itself, whatever the objective, and by relation towhich it seems to control itself without end, it corrects its deviations andceaselessly reshapes its practical field, poses the overtaking by invention, andrefuses its practical limits of invention in perpetual reorganization as if bythis temporal development (perpetually reshaping itself ) it would have toclimb on board with historical time as an a priori to praxis, that is to say, theunconditional action, or if one prefers, the end created by free inventionarises through its own ends.”

Chapter 6 “For Everyone, Everything”: Social Ethics, Consent, and the Zapatistas

1. Some of the finer examples of case studies of the EZLN include VictorCampa Mendoza’s Las insurrecciones de los pueblos indios en México: la rebe-lión en Chiapas (n.d.: Ediciones Cuéllar); George Collier’s edited Basta!Land and the Zapatista Rebellion (1994: Food First Books); Héctor Díaz-Polanco’s La rebelión zapatista y la autonomía (1998: Siglo VeintiunoEditores); Neil Harvey’s The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land andDemocracy (1998: Duke University Press); Tom Hayden’s anthology, TheZapatista Reader (2001: Thunder’s Mouth Press); Elaine Katzenberger (ed.),First World, Ha Ha Ha! The Zapatista Challenge (1995: City Lights Books);June Nash’s Mayan Visions: The Quest for Autonomy in an Age ofGlobalization (2001: Routledge); John Ross, The War Against Oblivion:Zapatista Chronicles, 1994–2000 (2000: Common Courage Press); JanRus’s edited volume Mayan Lives, Mayan Utopias: The Indigenous Peoples ofChiapas and the Zapatista Rebellion (2003: Rowman and Littlefield); BillWeinberg, Homage to Chiapas: The New Indigenous Struggles in Mexico(2002: Verso); and John Womack’s anthology, Rebellion in Chiapas (1999:New Press).

284 / notes

2. “In this sense, this revolution will not conclude with a new class, classfraction or group in power, but in a free and democratic ‘space’ of politicalstruggle. . . . A new politics located in the base will not be a confrontationbetween political organizations, but a confrontation of their politicalproposals with these distinct social classes . . .”

3. “It is only a discursive body that relates more to a methodology of construc-tion than to a proposed shape; that is to say, it is about an invitation madeto all those spaces of otherness to manifest their existence and begin toweave a worldwide network of resistances that permit the strengthening ofa discontinuous front against power.”

4. “On the other side, the project of the transition to democracy; not a tran-sition made with the power that simulates a change in which all would bethe same, but a transition to democracy as a project of the reconstructionof the country; the defense of national sovereignty; justice and hope asyearnings; truth and mandar obedeciendo as a rule of leadership; the stabil-ity and security that gives democracy and liberty; dialogue, tolerance andinclusion as new forms of making politics.”

5. “The particularity of the Zapatista discourse is that it puts in questionmoral discipline and definitions from another ethics and other definitionsbased in societies not ‘previous’ or past, but currently living in the Mexicanterritory. Starting from this existence, they do not propose a regress to someother past but rather opening a dispute on the content and definition of thispresent modernity in which they also exist.”

6. “. . . a platform of complex interactions between modern civil rights andantique conceptions of the world, heart that can revitalize a West guided bya distinct modernity, one that puts to pasture the idea-force of progress atall costs, of univocality and homogeneity of ‘development,’ imposing ratio-nal limits (in human terms) on instrumental reason.”

7. “There are practices anchored in community life and encompass theirforms of organization, political form, the imparting of justice and otherincreases in human relations. In their attention to weaving these processes,they join the very best of Indian peoples and coincide with the quest forrural and urban citizenship organizations. They coincide as well with theold dream of self-governance, with anarchistic provisions, or with theapproaches of Deleuze, Foucault, as well as Ivan Illich.”

8. “For us, pain and anguish; for us, joyous rebellion; for us, the negatedfuture; for us, insurrectionary dignity. For us, nothing.”

9. “To the minds of many, Zapatismo is the best example of the new revolu-tionary thought; it must not either convert itself into a new ‘official ideol-ogy’ of revolutionaries, nor must it be able to institutionalize itself.”

10. “This imaginative form of doing politics is not without its risks. It requiresforce and security to include many disparate positions in its bosom, allproviding debates and discussions that will be accessible. . . . The generousand inclusive Zapatista proposal—to locate power as useful if it has theallotted outline and is articulated like a fabric—it has an enormous poten-tial because it submits the process of conformation and continuity to the

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organization: order is not imposed, it is encountered, it is discovered, it iswoven: ‘to join moments in a single heart, a heart of all, it will make us allsages, a little more to confront that which will come. Only between us alldo we know all’—so said a Huichol shaman.”

11. “To expand our world defending the right of other worlds to exist impliesmodifying substantial characteristics of our own culture. Not only to rela-tivize it, to take a critical distance from it, but also, for example, to askabout the forms of human knowledge. Somehow, we should be concernedwith constructing a heuristic mass that permits us to know without evadingresponsibility for knowing the actual state of things in the world, outlinedas the problem of generating notions that deconstruct dominant cognitiveparadigms to open spaces for diverse life experiences, that of the manyworlds that inhabit the world, and that today, we hope, redefine humanity.”

12. “In Zapatista discourse, human emancipation supposes the elimination ofalterity but not of diversity. All worlds are possible because none imposesitself on the others, because each one occupies its own space, becauserespecting difference is like attaining equality.”

13. Recent works on developing a radical form of democracy include: PeterBachrach and Aryeh Botwinick, Power and Empowerment: A Radical Theoryof Participatory Democracy (1992: Temple University Press); Stephen EricBronner, Imagining the Possible: Radical Politics for Conservative Times(2002: Routledge); Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright’s DeepeningDemocracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Government(2003: Verso); Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s classic Hegemony andSocialist Strategy: Toward a Radical Democratic Politics (2001: Verso);C. Douglas Lummis’s Radical Democracy (1997: Cornell University Press);Chantal Mouffe’s edited Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism,Citizenship, Community (1996: Verso); Ewa Ziarek Plonowska, An Ethics ofDissensus: Postmodernity, Feminism, and the Politics of Radical Democracy(2001: Stanford University Press); David Trend’s anthology RadicalDemocracy: Identity, Citizenship and the State (1996: Routledge); RobertoMangabeira Unger’s False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in theService of Radical Democracy (2002: Verso), and Democracy Realized: TheProgressive Alternative (1998: Verso); and Howard Zinn’s Disobedience andDemocracy: Nine Fallacies on Law and Order (2002: South End Press).

Chapter 7 Toward a Resisting Social Ethics

1. This is not to suggest that I rely upon or even agree with a rational choicetheory of resistance. Rather, I take this quote to say that only a fewchanges in our current sociohistorical field—the proverbial “one paycheckfrom poverty,” for example—would make it “rational” within this newcontext for people to revolt.

2. One reading of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Centerand Pentagon would take exactly this tack; namely, those who had beenused for the exercise of American foreign policy interests and were then leftbehind were now exacting their revenge on the symbols of that foreign

286 / notes

policy—capitalism and military might. While the more important elementsof my argument—namely, the reclamation of agency and freedom throughan ethically revolutionary project—are not at all embodied by Al Qaeda orother terrorist entities fighting against American imperialism, the directionof anti-American propaganda and attacks is clear—this is seen as a strugglefor someone’s freedom, even if not those who actually do the fighting.

3. To those who might argue that voting does constitute a form of consent,I would respond in this way: if voting were truly a form of consent, we wouldnot simply elect people (and even the word “elect” posits an oligarchical rela-tionship between our representatives and ourselves), but would have the abil-ity to vote for the continued existence of a certain institution. There are ways,for example, to radically democratize U.S. federal policy-making; however,this possibility will never be presented to us, either directly (for our represen-tatives would know the result in advance) or through our representatives, whowould never vote themselves and the representative body out of existence.

4. This, of course, presumes that we act in good faith with regard to the impor-tance that others have for us in the world. A venture capitalist, for example,who might claim that the amassing of large amounts of capital for investmentin multinational corporations is intended to further the freedom of others tohave a good standard of living, and so on would not be acting in good faithby my analysis. The presumption of venture capitalism is, of course, the“never-ending pie”—the idea that money can be created ex nihilo and that theamassing of wealth doesn’t impact negatively on others. As Marx’s analysis ofthe impact of capitalism on workers and environmental disasters such as thedemise of the rain forest show us, though, the creation of capital does nega-tively impact on others, whether on particular individuals suffering underpoor working conditions or on the climate of the entire planet.

5. Sartre’s own footnote to this quote illuminates the distinction betweenpotential and actual freedom: “But it is very important not to conclude thatone can be free in chains. Freedom is a complete dialectical development,and we have seen how it can become alienated or bogged down or allow itselfto be caught by the traps of the Other and how simple physical constraint isenough to mutilate it. But still even the most oppressed slave, simply in orderto be obedient to his master, both can and must perform a synthesis of thepractical field” (Sartre 1985 [1960]: 578n68). Here, Sartre’s intent is tocontradict his early formulations of the freedom of a slave; in Being andNothingness, for example, a good deal of space is given over to a discussion ofhow a slave is able to formulate an escape from their condition (the quint-essential goal of Sartre’s early notion of freedom). This, though, is potentialfreedom until actualized through escape, a rebellion, or the murder of themaster. In the Critique, Sartre is here arguing that the slave must act in orderto obey their master, but that this praxis is not free because it comes throughthe compulsion of another to whom the individual has not freely pledged themselves. Note, then, that it is the sociohistorical condition thatdetermines the quality of freedom in this case.

6. In some sense, though, this runs directly counter to the argument Merleau-Ponty makes in “Sartre and Ultrabolshevism,” in which he claims “Those who

notes / 287

will be shot would understand tomorrow that they did not die in vain; the onlyproblem is that they will no longer be there to understand it. Revolutionaryviolence insults them most grievously by not taking their revolt seriously: theydo not know what they are doing” (Merleau-Ponty 1973b: 130). Here,Merleau-Ponty’s critique is directed against Sartre’s seemingly unqualifiedsupport of the Parti Communiste Français and their Stalinist methods; putanother way, Merleau-Ponty criticizes not revolutionary violence in toto, butrather the arbitrary use of violence within the liberatory movement. Thecontradiction is resolved, though, when one considers Merleau-Ponty’sperspective on history: sometimes the pursuit of social freedom of humanityrequires the abandonment of some human beings; or, put another way, “Thecontingency of the future, which accounts for the violent acts of those inpower, by the same token deprives these acts of all legitimacy, or equally legit-imates the violence of their opponents. The right of the opposition is exactlyequal to the right of those in power” (Merleau-Ponty 1969: xxxvi). Overall,though, I see Merleau-Ponty’s position as this: “When one has the misfortuneor the luck to live in an epoch, or one of those moments where the traditionalground of a nation or society crumbles and where, for better or worse, manhimself must reconstruct human relations, then the liberty of each man is amortal threat to the others and violence reappears” (Merleau-Ponty 1969: xvii;cf. Sartre and Lévy 1996).

7. “Morality is a certain relation of person to person. But this relation is not at itsfoundation an inert relation of interiority. It is an active rapport of reciprocitythat is passivized and eternalized (the eternity of the instant) by the mediationof worked matter. Morality changes inasmuch as the worked matter changesand as (behaviorally) our relations change with worked matter.”

288 / notes

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Index

Aabsolute foundation, 46absolute freedom, 17action, 83, 93, 198, 200

and alienation, 84and ambiguity, 75, 261and concrete freedom, 88and consequences, 34, 42–5, 60,

63, 68, 71–3, 75, 79, 89, 92,96, 195, 202, 245, 266, 268

and spontaneity, 36, 58, 62,107–8, 112, 113, 163, 187,195, 251

and unintended consequences,44–5, 89, 96

avoidance of, 73collective, 39, 97, 264counterrevolutionary, 76–7, 175motivations for, 35orientation to, 41paradox of boycott, 70–2, 163, 274violence, 10, 47–55, 62–3, 65, 67,

71, 75–7, 86, 88, 90–5, 99,132, 135–6, 138, 142–5,152–3, 162–3, 165–8,171–3, 175–6, 178, 182–9,191–4, 201–2, 206, 238,261, 263, 268–9, 276,282–3, 288

African National Congress, 270, 274–5Agamben, Giorgio, 273agency, 6, 8, 9, 14, 23, 25, 30, 33,

42, 48, 52, 55, 68, 85, 87, 94,

100, 105–6, 112, 119, 121,127, 131, 133, 145, 168,182–3, 185, 192, 197–9, 228,249–53, 257, 259–60, 263,265, 267, 269, 271

and being-with-others, 249and freedom, 182and habitus, 119and hegemony, 119and reproduction of status quo,

106as process, 250collective, 180loss of, 136, 144, 147, 150, 152,

155, 173, 252preservation of, 249reclamation of, 10, 127, 131, 182,

249–52, 268, 287agency/structure problem, 25Aguascalientes, 216, 230–1, 233Alessandrini, Anthony, 181Al Qaeda, 287Alexander, Jeffrey, 90, 276Algeria, 10–1, 21, 26, 77, 127,

129–32, 138, 146–50, 152–69,172–4, 176–7, 179, 182–3,185–98, 201–3, 221, 238, 242,247–9, 257, 264, 269, 276,279–83

and French colonialism, 10, 131,155, 193

and impôts arabes, 148Beni oui-oui (“yes-men”), 154

Algeria—continuedbourgeoisie in, 149colonial system, 77–8, 131, 138–9,

143, 146, 148, 151, 154,157, 176, 249

exploitation of labor, 151French colonial rule of, 157Islamic education in, 149Kabylia, 158, 168, 170, 197national movements in, 149nationalist movements, 154,

158, 167CRUA (Comité révolutionnaire

d’unité et d’action), 159, 162MTLD (Mouvement pour le

triomphe des libertésdémocratiques), 159, 161,184, 187, 282

OS (Organisation spéciale), 159PPA (Parti Populaire d’Algérie),

158–9Organic Statute of 1947, 148pieds-noirs (French citizens born in

Algeria), 151–3, 160, 162,165–6, 184–5, 194, 196,201, 280, 283

political culture in, 152, 172boulitique, 152, 167, 169, 193méfiance, 152, 168–9, 193

post-independencecivil war, 2, 169–70, 194, 203,

244disenfranchisement of Algerians

(al-hagra), 197failure of Algerian Revolution,

196FLN dominance, 10, 170, 196formation of government,

169–70possibilities for existential social

ethics in, 264possibility for authentic

existence, 179

revenge against “collaborators,”166, 169

pre-independencearmed rebellion as last resort,

151assimilation policies, 137, 139,

143, 150, 154, 281Blum-Viollette Bill (1938), 150disenfranchisement of Algerians,

150, 171, 206economic situation, 149, 174elections in, 148métropole reforms in, 150proletarianization of Algerians,

149, 162relations between colons

(colonizers) and métropole,150, 184

resistance to French colonialrule, 157

use of Arabic language, 151, 167recognition of humanity in, 154,

176, 281resistance to French colonial rule,

132Sétif uprising (1945), 158settler colonialism in, 184spread of revolution, 147wilayas, 167, 282

Algerian Revolution, 10–11, 26, 127,129–31, 147–8, 153, 162,165–6, 172–3, 182, 192,194–8, 201–3, 221, 242, 257,269, 276, 279, 283

and Camus’s call for “civiliantruce,” 185

and “collaborators,” 164and creation of authenticity, 179and ethics of freedom, 173, 182and material conditions, 174and objectification of individuals,

185and the “disappeared,” 164

300 / index

as war for independence, 195attacks on civilians, 185Battle of Algiers (1956), 165–6civilian targets, 162, 164compliance tactics, 163, 190conception of humanity in, 173,

175counterinsurgency troops in, 161creation of unity, 187creation of unity in, 155–6,

161–2, 173, 175, 183, 186,188

endorsement tactics, 164, 167ethical evaluation of, 193–5ethical failure of, 172, 191, 201FLN manifesto, 159–60FLN targets, 162, 167, 282French negotiations with FLN,

166, 169French use of “collective

responsibility,” 161, 164French use of torture, 176internationalization of, 165–7, 209means/ends relation in, 193mobilization of public, 153–4,

161–2, 187motivation for revolutionary

action, 153, 164, 187, 193national liberation as goal, 160nationalist movements

Mouvement National Algérien(MNA), 163, 168, 184,187, 282

Organisation Politico-Administrative (OPA), 163

relations between, 167necessity of French reprisals, 162OAS (Organisation Armée Secrète),

166, 185, 192, 201ontological aspects of, 173paratroopers in, 161, 163, 176,

188Philippeville attacks, 282

prevention of betrayal, 162reciprocal violence between French

and Algerians, 165–6, 283resistance operations, 162, 186start of, 147, 153, 159, 163, 173,

193–4, 280use of French revolutionary

discourse, 173Algiers

surrender of, 129al-hagra (disenfranchisement), 197alienation, 85, 93, 96, 117–18

and colonisés (colonized persons),143, 146–7, 153, 155, 157,179

Ethics (capital E) as, 82–3, 277in Algeria, 147, 154

al-Qadir, Abd, 158alterity, 3, 6, 22, 38, 40, 47–9, 55–7,

62–3, 82–3, 130, 133, 141–2,144, 149, 153, 169, 182, 186,201, 229, 263, 273, 287

and colonialism, 142and fused group, 53, 56–8and praxis, 55and reciprocity, 56and series, 77orientation to, 30, 46, 48,

69–72, 74, 77, 86, 98, 152,202, 258

ambiguity, 31, 41–5, 59, 63, 70–1,73–9, 88–9, 255, 261, 268

and ethical radicalism, 94and harm, 71and responsibility, 45and revolutionary action, 94, 124and revolutionary activity, 88and unintended consequences,

44–5, 89, 96orientation to, 73–4

American Indian Movement (AIM), 254

Amnesty International, 3

index / 301

Anderson, Thomas, xii, 19, 21, 37,85, 86

Anthony, Douglas, xi–xii, 133apartheid, 75, 244, 275Arabic (language), 151, 167Armée Nationale du Peuple Algérien

(ANPA), 168Armée Nationale Populaire (ANP),

196Aron, Raymond, 276Aronson, Ronald, xii, 185, 257,

280, 283Arquilla, John, 211Aussaressess, Paul, 176Australia, x, 244Austria, xauthenticity, 30–1, 41–2, 45–6, 96,

125, 177, 180–1, 199and decolonization, 177and postcolonial situation, 181and resistance, 46

BBachrach, Peter, 286bad faith, 14, 19, 30, 36, 41, 45–7,

54, 68–9, 70, 93, 96, 102,177–9, 181, 189, 199, 247,253, 259, 268

and freedom, 85Barber, Benjamin, ixBarreda, Andrés

and Ceceña, Ana Esther, 206, 208Battle of Algiers (1956), 165–6Bauman, Zygmunt, 5, 7Beckett, Paul, 152, 163, 172, 175,

183–4, 195Being, 9, 13–22, 29, 31, 32, 39, 48,

85–6, 249, 259, 274, 287being-for-others, 47, 49–56, 60, 62,

65, 68–70being-in-the-world, 16, 42, 106, 119being-with-others, 30, 47, 49–52, 57,

60, 64, 68–70

and agency, 249and resistance, 254

Ben Bella, Ahmed, 169–71Ben Khedda, Ben Youssef, 169–70Bennett, Ronan, 243, 254, 270–1Berlin, Isaiah, 174, 223, 261Bhabha, Homi, 130, 143Bill of Rights (U.S.), 159Blair, Tony, xbleus (Algerians working for French

Army), 168, 196Blum, Léon, 150body, 24, 33, 49, 80, 107, 182Bost, Jacques-Laurent, 27Botwinick, Aryeh, 286Boudiaf, Mohammed, 170Boumedienne, Hourai, 169–70Boumendjel, Ali, 176Bourdieu, Pierre, 9, 102–20, 123–6,

133, 136, 141, 146, 151, 189,193, 226, 248, 269, 277–9

and habitus, 9, 10, 102–27, 131,146, 151, 156–7, 161, 172,175, 177–9, 185, 189–90,193, 235, 248, 255, 265,267, 278

and Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 104,106–7

and Passeron, Jean-Claude, 278and Sartre, Jean-Paul, 104and Wacquant, Loïc J. D., 108–9La Distinction, 108

Bowman, Elizabeth, xiiand Stone, Robert, 63, 80, 84, 95,

97, 122, 199, 200boycott, 70, 72, 163, 274Bronner, Stephen Eric, 286“brother tax,” 231Brysk, Alison, 209, 212, 213,

222Burbach, Roger, 206, 209, 226Butler, Judith, 274“bystander” position, 182, 248, 249

302 / index

Ccaciques, 206Camus, Albert, xii, 28, 94–5, 185,

188, 257, 276, 283and call for “civilian truce,” 185debate with Sartre, 276

Canclini, Nestor Garcia, 110capitalist development, 4, 245Caputo, John, 6–7caracoles

and relations with non-governmentalorganizations, 232

caracoles (EZLN “encounter spaces”),230–1, 233–4

Casbah, 129Catholicism, 149, 176Ceceña, Ana Esther, 206, 208, 215,

218, 220, 224, 229and Barreda, Andrés, 206, 208

Chechnya, rebellion in, 2Chiapas (Mexico), 11, 205–6,

211–14, 221–2, 229, 236, 284

and caciques, 206and material conditions, 232indigenous peoples, 125, 205–7,

216, 222, 236, 241disenfranchisement of, 206material conditions, 206

material conditions in, 222choice, 8, 11, 18–19, 22, 25, 29,

32–4, 40, 42, 44–6, 50, 54,56, 60, 69, 74, 94–5,100–1, 139–40, 143, 170–2,177–82, 185, 199, 203, 210,219, 237, 256, 259, 261,267–8, 272, 286

civil society, 208–9, 211, 219–20,227, 230–2

and National DemocraticConvention (CND), 216

and solidarity between socialmovements, 209–10

as basis for revolutionary action,209

as political force, 216Clark, Michael, 282class condition, 103class consciousness, 35–6, 39–40,

65–6, 126, 155Clinton, Bill, 205COCOPA Laws, 231cogito, 13, 16–17, 29, 32Cohen, William, 169Cold War, 28“collective responsibility,” 161, 164collective unfreedom, 85, 267Collier, David

and James E. Mahon, 102colonial domination, 138, 145colonial system, 77, 133, 175, 188,

193colonial violence, 131–2, 145–7,

157, 175, 180, 186colonialism, 72, 77, 130, 132–60,

163, 171–3, 175, 177–8,180–1, 183–4, 186, 190–1,196, 247, 253, 278–81

and bad faith, 181and civilizing impulse, 129, 134,

136–7, 139, 157, 281paradox of, 139, 178

and complicity, 182and construction of alterity, 142and desire for recognition,

140, 179and distinction (la distinction), 137and “good intentions,” 135and imposition of culture, 139–40,

143–4, 155, 180and maintenance of, 182and mutual recognition, 143and objectification of individuals,

185and “passing,” 136and practico-inert, 139, 157

index / 303

colonialism—continuedand psychological violence,

139–40and race, 151and racism, 134and structural double bind,

138–44, 146–7, 153–5, 157,175, 179–80, 272

and “tokenism,” 143as elimination of freedom, 136,

181as violence against humanity,

141–2, 178bifurcation in, 145, 151, 181,

190, 280construction of paths of resistance,

148, 157, 183denial of humanity, 155“divide and conquer,” 170, 187,

189domination of colons and colonisés,

135, 181elimination of, 130, 177ethical implications of, 132experience of, 153, 155, 157habitus in, 125–6, 131, 150, 177,

250, 278implications of terminology, 133imposition of culture, 136, 137intersubjectivity in, 145inversion of violence of, 175legitimation of, 77, 135, 137loss of agency in, 150maintenance of, 134

by colonisés (colonized persons),188

ontology of, 132phenomenology of, 153, 156practico-inert in, 151preexistence of meaning, 139prevention of free projects, 180removal of agency, 155, 161, 178reproduction of, 133

reproduction of social structures,157, 190

resistance to, 130, 132, 145, 153,156–7, 161, 182–3

ontological motivation for, 147structure/superstructure, 156tripolarity in, 146–7violence in, 131–2, 145–7, 157,

162, 175, 180, 186colonisés (colonized persons), 21,

77–8, 90, 131–3, 137–41,143–4, 146, 148, 151, 154,157, 175–6, 183, 249, 279

and abandonment of colonisésociety, 131, 140, 144

and “black resignation,” 150, 157and double alienation, 143, 146–7,

153, 155, 157, 179, 280and “inferiority complex,” 140,

172évolués, 146, 150, 153, 154, 281implications of terminology, 133,

154relation with own culture, 138

colons (colonizers), 21, 78, 131–2,137, 139, 141–4, 146, 148–51,157–9, 161, 165, 175, 180,183–6, 189–90, 249, 278, 281

and “superiority complex,” 142as structural position, 185

Committees of Good Government( Juntas de buen gobierno), 204,231–4, 240

and consensus building, 232and democracy, 232and material conditions, 232–3and relations with non-

governmental organizations,232–3

as embodiment of Zapatismo, 233as extension of preguntando

caminamos, 232as interlocutor, 232

304 / index

relations between communities, 232relations with EZLN, 234

complicity, 2, 11, 71, 105–6, 124,131, 136, 181–2, 188–91,244–6, 248, 257, 261, 270–2

and colonialism, 182Compton, John J., 32–3concrete freedom, 11, 30, 32, 40,

55, 62, 84, 85–91, 93,98–9, 102, 104, 112, 120–1,125, 127, 173–4, 183, 188,193, 197–9, 230, 236,239–40, 247, 253, 256–60,262–4, 267–8, 272

and development of project, 259,262

and future generations, 264and praxis, 262and resisting social ethics, 258and solidarity, 266as process, 257, 262, 264increase in, 122, 253, 262support for, 248

consciousness, 15–17, 28, 31–2, 34,39, 45, 48–9, 52, 65–6, 76, 93,101–2, 105, 107–8, 110,114–15, 117–21, 123–4, 137,139, 141, 154–5, 175, 186–7,206, 212, 256, 265, 279

and language, 137consent, 8, 116, 150, 239, 250–1,

253, 257, 260, 265, 268–9, 271

and EZLN, 220as process, 230, 239, 251–2, 260,

265, 268and voting, 287reactivation of, 250tacit, 67, 124, 250to hegemonic order, 124

consequences, 44, 75, 76consequentiality, 190

and resisting social ethics, 253

Contat, Micheland Rybalka, Michel, 46, 81, 122,

275counterhegemony, 103, 115–16, 118,

122, 125, 175and habitus, 116

Crenshaw, Martha, 162–8, 171, 184,185, 282–3

CRUA (Comité révolutionnaire d’unitéet d’action), 159, 162

cultural capital, 104, 110, 144

DDas, Veena, 243–5David, Comandante, 232Davies, Howard, 27, 28, 277–8de Beauvoir, Simone, 23, 27–8, 43,

67, 73–4and “ends-in-themselves,” 74The Ethics of Ambiguity, 73

de Certeau, Michel, 282de Gaulle, Charles, 163, 167, 283

putsch against, 166Debray, Regis, 235decolonization, 245

and Algeria, 174and authenticity, 177and freedom, 182and intersubjectivity, 182and mutual recognition, 181and subjectivity, 174, 178–81, 196of habitus, 173–81, 196, 248, 263

prevention of, 204through force, 249

dehumanization, 93, 132, 137, 145,220, 245

Deleuze, Gilles, 223, 285democracy, 170, 173, 193, 198, 205,

210, 215–16, 218, 223–4,227–30, 232, 234, 237–8,240–2, 251–2, 285–6

appearance among subalterns, 237collective participation in, 252

index / 305

deontological ethics, 72Descartes, René, 14, 16, 18, 20, 29

and cogito, 13, 16–17, 29, 32and dualism, 13, 21, 31

desire, 17, 41, 54, 111, 140, 147,160, 222, 255–6, 267, 271

direct, 210–11, 221, 234, 238directionality, 72“dirty hands,” 11, 94, 182, 191, 255,

257, 271, 272as condition of existence, 257

distinction (la distinction)in colonial system, 137

domination, 51, 106, 115, 119,126–7, 130, 134–6, 181,196, 248

dominion, 60doxa, 106, 113–15, 127, 197

and dissent, 114and habitus, 113

Dubar-Ortiz, Roxanne, 211Dufrenne, Mikel, 19, 93, 97, 260,

268Durkheim, Emile, 20, 27, 50, 61,

114, 266and social facts, 20, 50and social solidarity, 114, 266

Dyer-Witheford, Nick, 273

EEagleton, Terry, 246Edinburgh-Chiapas Solidarity Group,

234Egypt, 167El Moudjahid (FLN journal), 154,

281embodiment, 103, 106

and habitus, 109–10, 120emulation

and distinction (la distinction), 112rejection of by subalterns, 115

endsof action, 19

relation to means, 74, 193, 203,204, 215, 223, 237, 238

revolutionary, 97, 122unconditioned ( fin

inconditionnée), 97engagement, xii, 23, 24, 26–8, 103–4,

129, 178, 269, 278process of, 26–7, 29

Enlightenment rationality, 149en-soi (in-itself ), 15–17, 20, 31,

34–5, 37, 42, 48, 49, 106–7equality, 3, 126, 150, 152, 156, 160,

168, 173, 175–8, 193, 229, 286Algerian assertion of, 184

ethical action, 3and consequences, 76and historicity, 76and situatedness in social situation,

257paradoxes of, 9, 81, 198sens as legitimation, 256with others, 89

ethical orientation, 10, 14, 27, 30,32, 35, 41–2, 45–6, 48, 68–75,77, 79, 85–6, 88–9, 95,98–100, 143, 152, 190, 202,247–9, 256, 258–9, 261, 271

and project development, 253and resistance, 255and sacrifice, 255and social relations, 259impossibility of purity, 257to resistance, 98, 99, 245–7, 263Western orientation to

EZLN, 236ethical radicalism, 4, 9, 94, 96–7,

121–2, 193, 197–8, 200, 202,235, 240, 253, 263, 277

and ambiguity, 94and collective participation, 252and EZLN, 208, 220, 223,

239–40as process, 263

306 / index

as resistance, 97need for vigilance, 200

ethical transit, 131, 140, 144Ethics (capital E), 1, 4–7, 9, 13,

67–8, 73, 75, 79, 81, 83, 85–6,89, 90, 95–6, 98, 100, 103,120, 129, 173, 184, 186, 200,203, 221, 243, 246–7, 252,254, 257, 271, 273–6, 279,284, 286

and alienation, 82–3, 97, 277and habitus, 121and norms, 11, 29, 67, 79–83,

103, 122, 227–9, 236–41,249–51, 271, 274–5,277, 284

and practico-inert, 5, 6, 68,79–82, 84–5, 92, 98, 103,121, 252

and reproduction of social order,83

and resistance, 198as “alibi,” 83, 276as inertia, 6, 9, 59, 67, 79, 81–4,

91, 96, 97, 127, 274–7, 279in consolidation of group, 198, 200

ethics (lower-case E), 79, 82, 84–6,96, 200

and action, 68and choice, 180and history, 89and material basis of, 81, 262and resistance, 9, 91, 95–6, 98–9,

173, 202, 255, 269and violence, 90, 95as historical tool, 80as social relation, 80, 262dialectical, 94evaluation of action as, 96lack of larger societal impact, 204prioritization of values, 257

ethics of freedom, 10–11, 68, 85,88–9, 93, 127, 130–1, 173,

177, 179, 181–3, 194, 196,203, 221, 223, 225, 242, 247

and ethics of violence, 172, 183and EZLN, 221, 225and Fanon, Frantz, 173and FLN, 131as motivation for Algerian

Revolution, 182ethics of recognition, 179–80ethics of resistance, 9, 98–9, 199, 252ethics of violence, 91, 95–6, 183

and ethics of freedom, 172, 183endorsement vs. justification, 283

ethnicityuse of by EZLN, 212

ethos, 4, 179, 203, 236Évian negotiations, 169évolués (“advanced” Algerians), 146,

150, 153–4, 281exis, 54, 91–2, 120, 235, 277

conversion of praxis into, 91existence

and appearance, 14and Being, 9, 13–17, 19–22, 29,

31–2, 39, 48, 85–6, 249,259, 274, 287

and choice, 8, 11, 19, 22, 25, 29,32–4, 40, 42, 44–6, 50, 54,56, 60, 69, 74, 94–5, 100–1,139–40, 143, 170–2,177–81, 185, 199, 210,219, 256, 259, 261, 267–8,272, 286

and facticity, 185and meaning, 33, 139and narrative construction, 35and Nothingness, 15–16, 21–2,

33–4, 43, 55, 86, 122, 143,179, 223

and situatedness, 25–6, 29, 33–5,48, 50, 71, 79, 85, 88, 105,126, 178, 179

as action, 98

index / 307

existence—continuedas social action, 24authenticity, 30–1, 41–2, 45–6,

125, 177, 180–1, 199being-for-others, 47, 49–56, 60,

62, 65, 68–70being-in-the-world, 16, 42,

106, 119being-with-others, 30, 47, 49–52,

57, 60, 64, 68–70burdens of, 29colonial, 135condition of, 9, 21, 95, 103, 181,

245global, 207in colonialism, 142in neoliberalism, 207

facticity, 14, 17–18, 20, 34–5,37–8, 40, 43, 48–51, 83, 87,182, 189

for-itself ( pour-soi), 15–17, 20, 31,34, 37, 42, 46–9, 106–7

forms of being, 16, 42, 106, 119foundation for, 17–18, 48, 51in-itself (en-soi), 15–17, 20, 31,

34–5, 37, 42, 48–9, 106–7meaninglessness, 29modes of, 16, 30, 42, 47, 49–52,

57, 60, 68–70, 106, 119orientation to, 15, 24, 70orientation to others, 30, 46, 48,

69, 71–2, 77, 86, 98, 152,202, 258

precedes essence, 16, 25, 274social basis for, 5, 9, 22, 26, 53,

65, 87, 258existential ethics, 9, 23, 68–70, 73,

75–7, 79, 96, 266, 275and resistance, 77

existential project, 18, 58, 71and collective self-determination,

266and concrete freedom, 262

and ends, 11, 19, 21, 30, 61, 73,76, 86, 88, 147, 173, 183,193–4, 200, 202, 215, 221,224, 235, 237–8, 240–2,253, 270, 282, 284

and praxis, 262as self-determination, 1, 3, 21, 88,

166, 173, 174, 193, 202,210, 222–4, 228, 240, 251,253, 259, 267–9

group development of, 59–60historical perspective on, 74

existential social ethics, 11, 31, 79,90, 104, 122, 131, 204, 225,227, 236, 242, 247, 249,250–3, 255–6, 263, 266,268–9, 271

and historical praxis, 284and processuality, 253

existential social theory, 22, 68existentialist ethics, 66–7exploitation of Algerian labor, 151exteriority, 38, 84, 276exteriorization, 38, 276EZLN (Ejército Zapatista por la

Liberación Nacional ), 3, 10–11,125, 127, 202–42, 245, 252,265, 284–6

1994 declaration of war, 2191999 plebiscite on peace talks, 227Aguascalientes, 216, 230–1, 233and alterity, 229and autonomy, 241and “brother tax,” 231and civil society, 209, 213, 216,

230as political force, 216

and collective participation,219, 222, 226, 229–30,237, 252

and communication technologies,211

and conception of power, 235, 241

308 / index

and concern for identity issues,213, 220, 228–9, 241

and consent, 220and critique of “development,” 222and democracy, 225, 241and dignity, 213, 220–1, 228–9,

241and direct democracy, 214–15,

218–19, 221, 234and diversity within collective, 229and Don Antonio, 206and ethical radicalism, 208, 220,

223, 233, 239–40and freedom, 240and indigenous autonomy, 231–3,

237and institutionalization of

rebellion, 233and leadership, 235and material conditions, 232and means/ends relationship, 215,

223, 225and membership, 241and New Zapatismo Movement

(NMZ), 209, 216and patria, 208and “permanent interrogation,”

215–16, 219, 235, 239, 241and positive freedom, 223and processual consent, 230and processual freedom, 223–5,

230and relations with non-

governmental organizations,232

and relations with non-revolutionaries, 222

and relations with socialmovements, 209

and revolutionary goals, 210, 216,221, 222, 227–8, 236

and revolutionary thought, 224–5,231, 234

and sacrifice, 224–5and self-determination, 220–3,

225, 227–9, 236, 239–41and social liberation, 10, 172, 230,

235, 242and solidarity, 209–11, 221, 224,

227–8and sovereignty, 227and struggle against neoliberalism,

207and “vanguardism,” 206–7, 215,

225, 235as “Cinderella,” 230as ethical model, 236, 241as interlocutor, 211, 224as interlocutors, 207as “plough,” 215, 228, 235balance between individual and

social, 229, 240, 249caracoles, 230–1, 233–4CCRI-CG (Comité Clandestino

Revolucionario Insurgente-Comandante General ), 208,214, 217, 219, 224, 231, 233

and indigenous social structure,215

“charity” towards, 230civil society

as power base, 219collective participation, 239Committees of Good Government

( Juntas de buen gobierno),231–4, 240

creation of, 233relations between communities,

232communiqués from, 204, 208,

211, 213, 217–18, 221, 224comparison with Che Guevara, 235comparison with FLN, 217, 230,

238–9, 242conception of power, 210, 214,

218–20, 222, 234, 240, 263

index / 309

EZLN—continuedconcern for identity issues, 213concern for position of women, 213critique of neoliberalism, 223ethical evaluation of, 172, 211,

230, 235–6, 238, 241–2ethics of freedom in, 221, 225history of, 205influences on, 206Intergalactic Conference for

Humanity and againstNeoliberalism, 209

“justice, freedom, and democracy,”205, 210

mandar obedeciendo (to commandby obeying), 10, 217–18,220, 222, 224–8, 232–3,236–7, 240–1, 249, 265, 285

means/ends relationship, 204, 217,237–8, 240

National Democratic Convention(CND), 216

preguntando caminamos (askingwhile we walk), 226, 235

preservation of agency, 249prevention of practico-inert, 239prevention of Terror in, 225relations between individuals,

225–6relations with Mexican government,

207, 216, 227, 230–1relations with non-governmental

organizations, 230–1relations with non-revolutionaries,

209, 228relations with “official

municipalities,” 231–2relations with “the peoples of the

world,” 205relations with social movements,

224, 228, 230relations with Zapatista

communities, 231, 233–4

restructuring of Zapatismo, 234revolutionary action

as process, 215–16, 220, 241revolutionary goals, 210, 225, 241revolutionary thought, 217, 229,

240revolutionary thought of, 208,

210, 230–5, 285social structure of, 204, 210, 212,

214, 218–26, 231, 234–5,239–40, 249

as process, 220, 230, 233–4,236, 240–1

basis in indigenous practices,215, 222

consent to, 239struggle for civil society,

208–9, 211, 219–20,227, 230–2

struggle for social liberation, 208“todo por todos, nada por nosotros,”

207unity of political and civil society,

219–20use of ethnicity, 212–13, 236Western affinity for, 236Zapatista Autonomous

Municipalities in Rebellion(MAREZs), 231–4, 240

and “brother tax,” 231Zapatista Stories, 206

Ffacticity, 14, 17–18, 20, 34–5, 37–8,

40, 43, 48–51, 83, 87, 182, 189and reciprocity, 38

fair trade, 3Fanon, Frantz, 10, 21, 129–48,

150–61, 163, 171–81, 183,186–9, 195–7, 199, 201, 235,242, 254, 264–6, 270, 279–81

and characteristics of decolonizedsociety, 265

310 / index

and conception of human subject,135

and ethics of freedom, 173and necessity of social liberation,

195and race, 132, 135–7, 139–40,

142–5and Sartre, Jean-Paul, 135–6and spontaneity of masses, 195and whiteness, 3, 131, 135,

138–45as FLN interlocutor, 153, 156Black Skin, White Masks, 132necessity of “mass party,” 195phenomenology of colonized

habitus, 156relations between political party

and public, 195, 235, 264The Wretched of the Earth, 197,

264“turn white or disappear,” 139–40,

143–4, 155, 180FARAC (Fédération des Amicales

Régimentaires et des AnciensCombattants), 169–70

Feraoun, Mouloud, 280FFS (Front des Forces Socialistes),

170–1field of action (champ du pratique),

38, 62, 64, 74, 77, 82–4, 93,200, 259, 262, 267, 284, 287

and habitus, 107First Nations, 3FLN (Front de Libération Nationale),

10, 131–2, 146–7, 153–4,159–73, 175–7, 184–90,192–7, 201–2, 204, 230,235–6, 239, 242, 248, 255,269, 271, 280–3

1954 Declaration, 159–60, 168,171

and betrayal of revolutionarypotential, 194, 196

and changes in revolutionarytactics, 164

and choice of tactics, 172and “collaborators,” 164, 166,

168–70, 192–3, 196and collective reprisals, 164, 185and Fanon, Frantz, 153and Islam, 160, 163and lack of political consistency,

195and mobilization of public, 164,

195, 281and motivation for Algerian

Revolution, 193and relations with Algerians, 195and stated goals, 131, 191, 193Armée de Libération Nationale

(ALN), 163, 169, 171, 196as voice of Algeria, 161, 164–5,

167, 170, 201attacks on civilians, 282betrayal of revolutionary goals,

171, 191, 201CCE (Comité de Coordination et

d’Exécution), 165, 167changes in revolutionary tactics,

162, 165, 167, 171, 282–3comparison with EZLN, 217, 230,

238–9, 242consolidation of Algerian

Revolution, 168El Moudjahid (journal), 154, 281ethical evaluation of, 165, 172,

191, 193, 195–6factions within, 167formation of government, 171justifications for violence, 192lack of political consistency, 170maintenance of dominance, 10,

170, 185, 187–8, 194, 196,235, 283

maintenance of internal control,167

index / 311

FLN—continuedmeans/ends relation in actions,

193mobilization of Algerian public,

186, 190mousseblin (auxiliary fighters), 163original members (Comité de 22),

146, 153, 154post-independence

power struggle, 170revenge against “collaborators,”

170refusal to use torture, 176relations with Algerian

public, 179relations with other nationalist

movements, 167, 187sacrifice of Algerians, 164, 168use of international media, 165violence against Algerians, 168,

186–7, 192–3wilayistes (regional leaders), 167

“floating hegemony,” 112–13Food Not Bombs, 254Foucault, Michel, 223, 285Fox, Richard

and Starn, Orin, 125France, 1, 26, 52, 131, 136, 148–50,

154–5, 158–60, 163, 165–71,176, 184, 273, 279–80, 283

and “collective responsibility,” 161,164

army, 129, 146, 157characterization of Algerian

revolutionary action as“terrorism,” 161

colonial rule over Algeria, 10, 131,133, 155, 193

conquest of Algeria, 157counterinsurgency troops, 161cultural discourses, 149, 176disavowal of Algerian collaborators

(harkis, bleus), 169–70

establishment of Fifth Republic,166

gendarmerie, 163, 168–9, 185, 188government of, x, 1military treatment of Algerians,

129Nazi occupation of, 26, 28, 53negotiations with FLN, 166Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS),

166, 185, 192, 201paratroopers, 161, 163, 176, 188prohibition of Algerian Muslim

citizenship, 148, 157relations with pieds-noirs, 184revolutionary ideals, 152, 159, 172use of Algerians during Revolution,

168–70, 193, 196use of torture, 176

Fraser, Nancy, 250, 274fraternity terror, 60, 63, 89, 97, 99,

186–7, 198, 263Free Trade Area of the Americas

(FTAA), 1freedom, 8–11, 16–21, 23, 29–35,

37–8, 40, 43, 45–51, 53,56–68, 70–1, 74, 77–8, 84–91,93–100, 104–6, 119, 121, 125,127, 129, 131, 135–6, 147,149–50, 153, 173–4, 179–83,188, 192–4, 196–8, 201, 203,205–6, 216, 221–5, 228–30,235, 237–41, 246–72, 287–8

absence of, 2, 36, 46absolute, 17and action, 89and agency, 182and bad faith, 85and being-with-others, 249and collective action, 88and decolonization, 182and inertia, 87and intentionality, 32and intersubjectivity, 182

312 / index

and praxis, 260and racialization, 135and relations between individual

and collective, 88and Sartre’s example of prisoner,

18, 21as commodity, 88, 262as primary value, 19as process, 87, 200, 221, 223–5,

230, 250, 257, 258as situated, 287bourgeois, 18concrete, 11, 32, 60, 84, 85,

87–90, 93, 98, 102, 120,127, 173, 188, 193, 198–9,230, 236, 247, 253, 256–7,260, 262–3, 267–8, 287

existential, 9, 20–1, 34, 79, 85, 91,122, 197, 242

interdependence and, 64material basis for, 174, 222Merleau-Ponty’s conception of, 32–3processual, 8, 11, 87–8, 93, 97–8,

133, 223, 230, 236, 239,251–2, 258, 260, 265,268, 271

reclamation of, 145through group praxis, 59

French Revolution, 55, 78–9, 238fundamentalism, x, 2Fung, Archon, 286fused group, 53, 56–8, 60–2, 64

and freedom, 56transition to pledged group, 58

future, orientation to, 41

GGastarbeiter (Turkish guest workers), 1gathering, 55–6, 58

and collective praxis, 55Geras, Norman, 257Germany, government of, x, 1Giddens, Anthony, 25, 266

structuration, 25, 104–5, 119,139, 279

Gilly, Adolfo, 207, 217globalism, 6God, 14, 17, 22God complex, 17, 22Gordon, Lewis, 54, 93, 177–9, 181,

201, 247, 253Gorz, André, 64GPRA (Gouvernement Provisoire

de la République Algérienne),167, 169

Gramsci, Antonio, 10, 80, 96,102, 104, 116–23, 126, 137,139, 275

analytic framework, 123, 278and organic intellectuals, 118

group cohesion, 59

Hhabitus, 9–10, 102–13, 115, 118–27,

131, 146, 151, 156–7, 161, 172,175, 177–9, 185, 189–90, 193,235, 248, 255, 265, 267, 278

and agency, 119and class fraction, 125and complicity, 115and consumption of social goods,

110–11, 124and dissent, 114–5and distinction (la distinction),

108, 110–12and doxa, 113and embodiment, 109–10, 120and ethical radicalism, 122and field of action (champ du

pratique), 107and freedom, 105and generative capacity, 105, 107and hegemonic order, 125, 177and intersubjectivity, 111and maintenance of status quo,

106, 110, 115, 121

index / 313

habitus—continuedand misrecognition

(méconnaissance), 104, 105,109–10, 113, 115, 122, 251

and practico-inert, 120–1and site of hegemony, 120and situatedness of social life, 108and social structures, 107, 109, 123and socialization process, 103–4,

109, 119–20and the body, 106and transcendence, 106as colonization of consciousness,

102, 121as colonized, 125–6, 131, 150,

248, 250, 278as locus of social relations, 107as physical marker, 103, 120, 136as practical logic, 107decolonization of, 108, 115–16,

122–3, 125–7, 173–81, 196,248, 263

ethical evaluation of, 121reinstitution of colonized habitus,

204reproduction of, 126

“halfies,” 130Hardt, Michael, 273Harvey, David, 274Harvey, Neil, 284harkis (Algerians in French

gendarmerie), 168, 169, 170,193, 196

harm, 3, 44, 70–2, 261Hayim, Gila J., 24Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich,

48, 143master/slave dialectic, 48

hegemony, 9–10, 80, 102, 110, 112,115–20, 123–6, 134, 136, 142,160, 175, 177, 225, 246,249–50, 255, 264, 267, 269,278–9

and agency, 119and class alliances, 116and “common sense,” 117and consciousness, 102, 117, 120and habitus, 125and language, 136and maintenance of the status quo,

117and practico-inert, 120and ruling-class ideas, 117–18, 124and subjectivity, 119and war of position, 124distance of ideas from everyday

life, 117, 118“floating,” 108link between thought and praxis,

117, 119Heggoy, Alf Andrew, 166–7, 170–1Hellman, Judith Adler, 211hexis, 54, 91–2, 120, 235, 277historicity, 24, 34, 42, 68, 72, 74,

101, 205, 265and action, 76and ethical orientation, 76and normativity, 82

History, 42–5, 73, 75, 192, 276and ethics (lower-case E), 89and the project, 74as ambiguity, 44

Hoare, Quentinand Smith, Geoffrey, 123

Holloway, John, 208, 213, 217,219–21, 223, 227–9, 273

Honderich, Ted, 273Honneth, Axel, 48, 65, 179hope, 41, 72, 75, 205, 212, 216, 285–6Horne, Alistair, 148–50, 157, 160,

162, 165–6, 168–70, 176, 280–2human nature, 14human potential, 24, 93, 132–3,

153, 189, 257humanity, 90, 122, 130, 141, 209,

224, 273

314 / index

and decolonization, 181and EZLN, 229and resistant action, 252and whiteness, 142colonial denial of, 155creation of, 277, 279European conception of, 133–4, 173violence against, 132, 143, 145Western conception of, 247

Hutchinson, Martha Crenshaw, 162–5,167–8, 171, 184–5, 282–3

IIllich, Ivan, 223immanent critique, 124immigrants, suspicion of, 1immoralism, 93–4, 198, 200, 255,

257, 265and revolutionary action, 94

imperative, 6, 46, 59, 79, 81–3, 91,96–7, 127, 274–7, 279

impôts arabes (“Arab taxes”), 148indigeneity

as “fuzzy” identity, 213as language for social movements,

222indigenous peoples, 125, 205–7,

211–13, 216–17, 222, 229,231, 236–7, 241

and autonomy, 231–3, 237modes of social organization, 215

individualism, 5, 23, 203, 248and Ethics (capital E), 86–7as starting point for resisting social

ethics, 258inertia, 2, 9, 38, 59, 61, 63, 67–8,

76, 79, 84–5, 87, 91–2, 101–3,127, 135, 189, 258–9, 262–3,276, 283–4

and Ethics (capital E), 67, 121inhumanity, 29innocence, loss of, 21, 29, 94, 129,

186, 201

institutionalization, 80institutions, 1–3, 8, 24, 33, 47, 52,

66, 80, 97, 110, 127, 150, 159,162, 165, 193, 231–2, 235,242, 267, 277

integral humanity, 21, 199–200,202, 257

intentionality, 32, 36, 40, 44–5, 55,60, 65, 68, 71–2, 86, 89, 95–6,98–9, 105, 123, 127, 135, 145,158, 167, 190, 255, 268

and resisting social ethics, 255group, 60

interdependence, 33, 64, 71Intergalactic Conference for

Humanity and againstNeoliberalism, 209

interiority, 82, 263, 275, 284, 288intermonde, 31–4, 47, 64–5, 71, 102,

107, 132International Monetary Fund, 1intersubjectivity, 34–5, 48, 50, 52,

64–6, 71, 77, 78, 103, 153, 285and colonialism, 135and dialogue, 50, 52, 66, 215–16,

219, 226–7, 230and revolutionary action, 182

Iraqpeople of, 3

Islam, 129, 143, 158and puritanism, 163

Israel, 3Italy

imposition of single language, 117Risorgimento, 117working class in, 116

JJameson, Frederic, 124

KKabylia

riots in (2001), 197

index / 315

Kant, Immanuel, 13, 20–1, 29–30,45, 85–7, 246, 273

and categorical imperative, 6, 30,86–7

Katzenberger, Elaine, 284Khider, Mohammed, 170Kleinman, Arthur, 243–5Krim, Belkacem, 170Kyoto Protocols, 1

LLaclau, Ernesto, 286language as membership marker, 137Le Sueur, James, 168, 282–3Les Temps modernes (journal), 27–8

and synthetic anthropology(anthropologie synthétique),27–8, 274, 277

Lévy, Bennyand Sartre, Jean-Paul 41, 69,

89–90, 99, 236, 245, 256,279, 288

Lewis, William, 169–71Leyva Solano, Xochitl, 206, 209–10,

212, 214, 216liberation, 2, 4, 7–8, 10, 72, 75–6,

88, 90–2, 115, 118, 123, 131,137, 160, 171–3, 176, 181,186, 192, 196, 199–200, 202,206–7, 213, 216, 240, 245,247, 255, 258, 261, 263–5,267–71, 274, 276, 281

and Algerian Revolution, 195and EZLN, 229and possibility of alienation, 200and processuality, 268basis for, 126revolutionary action as “midwife,”

202social, 10, 172, 230, 235, 242

Liberia, rebellion in, 2Liège (Belgium) infanticides, 94“literature of commitment,” 27

Lock, Margaret, 243–5Locke, John, 20, 67, 250Lorenzano, Luis, 210, 214–15, 219,

225–6, 239Löwy, Michael, 209, 228Lyotard, Jean-François, 274

MMacLeod, Jay, 105Mahon, James E.

and Collier, David, 102mandar obedeciendo (to command by

obeying), 10, 217–18, 220, 222,224–8, 232–3, 236–7, 240–1,249, 265, 285

as inversion of current social order,218

use by Western societies, 238Maoism, 205, 212Maran, Rita, 176Marcos, Subcomandante, 205–19,

222, 224–5, 227, 230–4,236–8, 240

and Don Antonio, 206entry into Chiapas, 205subordination to EZLN

membership, 214Marx, Karl, 113–15, 117, 126, 152,

219, 274, 280, 287Marxism, 36, 71, 73, 75, 86, 90,

112, 134, 212, 261master/slave dialectic, 48, 143McBride, William, 27–8, 46McManus, Susan, xi, 205, 220, 237,

241–2McNally, David, xi, 211, 237–8, 276McWorld, ixmeaning

collective development of, 67field of, 25, 49–50, 64, 66, 83, 93,

267, 269preexistence of, 139pre-existence of, 33, 36, 93

316 / index

meansrelation to ends, 74, 193, 203–4,

215, 223, 237–8membership, 11, 53–4, 56–8, 63, 66,

137, 141, 164, 213, 215,222–3, 237, 240–1

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 9, 14, 20,22–36, 38–45, 47–53, 63–6,68–9, 71, 73–6, 78, 80, 85–92,94–8, 101–9, 119, 126, 133,153, 176, 182, 185, 188,191–4, 202–61, 265, 267, 269,276–7, 282–3, 287–8

and Bourdieu, Pierre, 104, 106–7and conception of freedom, 32–3and embodiment, 33, 49, 80,

107, 182and “ethics of the flesh,” 103and example of the cube, 31–2and fields of meaning, 25, 49–50,

64, 66, 83, 93, 267, 269and immoralism, 94, 257, 265and intentionality, 32and intersubjectivity, 35, 48, 50,

52, 64–6, 71, 215–16, 219,226–7, 230, 285

and l’intermonde, 31–4, 47, 64–5,71, 102, 107, 132

and membership in La Résistance,26–7, 147, 176

and obstacles to freedom, 18, 38,40, 51, 79, 153, 193, 281

and revolutionary violence, 96, 191and temporality, 33–4, 36, 42–3,

56, 75, 96, 117, 284and the body, 24being-for-others, 49, 65being-with-others, 30, 47, 49–52,

57, 60, 64, 68–70Darkness at Noon, 71, 76, 80“figure-background”

relationship, 35Humanism and Terror, 42, 191, 283

mediation between consciousnessand world, 24

The Phenomenology of Perception,35, 38, 49, 107, 108

political engagement of, 269“yogi and commissar,” 97,

259–60Mexico

1999 plebiscite on peace talks, 227Chiapas, 11, 205–6, 211–14,

221–2, 229, 236, 284government of, 125, 205, 207–8,

212, 219, 227, 231, 233,237, 240

relations with EZLN, 207, 216,227, 230, 231

voters in, 125Millán, Márgara, 219, 221–2, 225,

228–9, 236“minimum utopia” (Geras), 257missionaries, 136MNA (Mouvement National Algérien),

163, 168, 184, 187, 282Morice Line, 169Morocco, 159, 167, 171

war for independence, 159Moscow Trials, 42, 71, 76, 80MTLD (Mouvement pour le triomphe

des libertés démocratiques), 159,161, 184, 187, 282

multinational corporations (MNCs),4, 287

mundane, 91, 106, 120, 247mutual recognition, 65–6, 77, 78,

103, 143, 153, 179–80absence of in colonialism,

140, 144and decolonization, 181and violence, 176

Nnation

as fuzzy identity, 213

index / 317

national consciousness, 5, 114, 137,155, 161, 177

in Algerian Revolution, 154National Democratic Convention

(CND), 216negation, 15, 33–4, 38, 43, 46, 55,

122, 133, 143, 179, 223neoliberalism

absence of dignity in, 220absence of social relations in,

248–9and state of freedom, 263complicity with, 249conditions of existence in, 207,

244consequences of, 245EZLN as struggle against, 207EZLN critique of, 222loss of agency in, 252

Netherlands, x“Netwar,” 211New Zapatismo Movement (NMZ),

209, 216Nolasco, Patricio, 218, 220–1norms, 11, 29, 67, 79–83, 95, 103,

122, 200, 227–9, 236–41,249–51, 271, 274–5, 277, 284

and practico-inert, 83North American Free Trade

Agreement (NAFTA), 205North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), 166French withdrawal from, 166

nothingness, 6, 15–17, 20Nussbaum, Martha Craven, 273

OOAS (Organisation Armée Secrète),

166, 185, 192, 201Instruction no. 29, 166

obstacles to freedom, 18, 38, 40, 51,79, 153, 193

Omi, Michael, 134OPA (Organisation Politico-

Administrative), 163oppression, 4, 7–8, 10–11, 29–30,

40, 46, 69–70, 73, 77, 85, 88,91–5, 98–101, 116–19, 126–7,134, 153–6, 161, 173, 177,179, 181–3, 188–9, 191, 195,198–201, 203, 207, 211, 213,226, 237, 241, 248, 255, 258,262, 267, 274, 276, 281, 287

and practico-inert, 91OS (Organisation spéciale), 159Ottoman Empire, 158

PPalestinian intifada, 3, 5Passeron, Jean-Claud

and Bourdieu, Pierre, 278Passy, André Dewavrin (Col.), 146“past-future” (futur antérieur), 81–3Paulson, Justin, 220PCF (Parti Communiste Français),

269, 288phenomenology, 15, 23–5, 69, 102,

107, 153, 155, 163, 172, 198,278

“pidgin,” 134, 136pieds-noirs (French citizens born in

Algeria), 151–3, 160, 162,165–6, 184–5, 194, 196, 201,280, 283

as legitimate FLN targets, 184sympathy to Algerian nationalist

cause, 184pledge, 58–61, 63, 174–5, 258, 260,

268pledged group, 58, 60–1, 99, 174–5,

199, 251, 258, 263and alienation, 57, 61–2, 250and freedom, 59authority in, 60loss of freedom through, 62

318 / index

maintenance of unity, 8, 61–2, 163pledge as violence against

individuals, 63reproduction of, 61, 238

Plonowska, Ewa Ziarek, 286pollo ex nihilo, 16postcolonial situation

and social construction, 181postmodern ethics, 14postmodernism, 125postmodernity, 5–7, 14, 124, 130pour-soi (for-itself ), 15–17, 20, 31,

34, 37, 42, 46–9, 106–7powerlessness, 2, 213PPA (Parti Populaire d’Algérie), 158–9practico-inert, 9–11, 23, 25, 36–44,

47, 53, 58, 62–3, 65, 68, 70–2,77, 79–80, 82–4, 87, 90–4,97–8, 101–2, 105–8, 115, 119,121–3, 127, 132, 134–5, 157,182, 198–200, 235, 248, 250,252–4, 258–9, 264, 267, 269,271, 277, 279

and colonialism, 157and Ethics (capital E), 82, 197and normativity, 80and oppression, 91and racialization, 135construction of paths of resistance,

148, 183maintenance of, 85, 106, 121,

122, 248, 251, 279reproduction of, 120, 151resistance to, 90, 96, 200, 225,

239, 252praxis, 10, 24–6, 30–1, 34, 36–42,

44–7, 53–63, 69, 72, 75, 78,80–5, 88–9, 91–2, 95–8,104–7, 116, 123, 131, 135,173, 192, 194, 197–8, 200,202, 204, 220, 249, 255, 257,259–60, 262–3, 266, 275–8,283–4, 287

and alterity, 55and concrete freedom, 262and development of project, 262and group, 59and practico-inert, 84and processual freedom, 260and spontaneity, 36, 58, 62,

107–8, 112–13, 163, 187,195, 251

and the collective, 55, 67, 70, 78as “bottom-up,” 208, 226and violence, 51, 91conversion into exis, 91conversion into practico-inert, 41,

60, 82, 91, 200, 259, 275emphasis on content of

action, 257group, 41, 47, 56–7, 60–2historical, 200, 284liberatory, 48, 91, 97, 102, 168,

194, 196, 252–4, 257, 277Marxist definition of, 36resistance to practico-inert, 87,

225, 235, 252thought and hegemony, 117

preguntando caminamos (asking whilewe walk), 11, 217, 219–20, 222,225–8, 233, 235–41, 249

use by Western societies, 238pre-reflection, 16, 31, 33, 64privatization of social welfare, xproletarianization, 149, 162public intellectualism, xii, 23–4,

26–8, 103–4, 129, 178, 269,278

pure future (le futur pur), 46, 84,85, 274

QQuandt, William, 146–8, 152, 167,

169quietism, 11, 20, 30, 41, 45–6, 70,

246, 248, 271

index / 319

Rracialization, 134–5, 139–40, 151,

155as elimination of freedom, 135

racism, 77, 133–5, 213, 222, 180and subhumanity, 138as legitimation of colonialism, 134

radical democracy, 11, 241, 252, 265reciprocity, 37–8, 54, 56, 62, 81,

96–7, 103, 262, 275, 277–8and alterity, 56and facticity, 38

recognition, struggle for, 48reflection, 15–17, 34, 48reflexivity

and embodiment, 109relations between individual and

social, 107, 131Rémy, Gilbert Renault (Col.), 146repetition, 81–3, 85, 121–2, 248,

251, 267refusal of, 95

resistance, x, 5, 7–11, 13, 22–3,25–6, 28, 31, 36, 39–41, 77–9,87, 90, 95, 98–103, 115–17,119, 124–7, 130–2, 137, 139,141, 143, 145, 148, 155,157–8, 160–2, 177, 182,188–90, 197–8, 203–4, 209,211, 221, 224, 227, 235,240–2, 245–7, 252–3, 255,257, 262–3, 268–9, 271,273–4, 286

and authenticity, 46and being-with-others, 254and collective meaning, 77and ethical orientation, 255and ethics (lower-case E), 9, 91,

95–6, 99, 255, 269and existential ethics, 77and hegemony, 124and immoralism, 255and mutual recognition, 77

and “pastiche attitude,” 124as process, 98, 252construction of paths, 157, 183construction of paths for, 148, 246ethical orientation to, 245necessity of, 253

resisting social ethics, 11, 98, 172–3,190, 194, 202–3, 221, 230,255, 257, 269

and agency, 249–51and ambiguity, 255–6and “bottom-up” governance,

264–5and collective self-determination,

5, 8, 227–8, 258, 265and concrete freedom, 258and consent, 250–1, 265–6and decolonization of the habitus,

261and democracy, 251and “dirty hands,” 255, 257, 272and Ethics (capital E), 256and fact of choice, 75, 261and flexibility of social

order, 269and immoralism, 255–6and integral humanity, 21,

199–202, 257and material conditions, 262and “minimum utopia,” 257, 264and obligation/requisition, 256and processuality, 253, 268and resistance to serialization, 258and sacrifice, 261, 269and situatedness in History, 257,

265and situatedness of social life, 65,

257, 258and social distance, 255and solidarity, 265–7and status quo, 254and violence, 261as political engagement, 269

320 / index

balance between freedom andHistory, 261

balance between individual andsocial, 258–9, 261–2

characteristics of, 257development of, 263emphasis on content of action, 257ethical orientation to, 255goals of, 269paradoxes of, 130, 254–6, 284practical implementation of, 257

responsibility, 14, 27, 29–31, 41–8,60, 63, 68, 71–3, 93, 159, 185,191, 199, 248, 253, 255, 259,261, 266, 268, 271, 276, 286

and ambiguity, 45and consequences, 34, 43–5, 60,

63, 68, 71–3, 76, 79, 89, 92,96, 195, 202, 245, 266

and “ripple effect,” 44, 75and unintended consequences,

44–5, 89, 96denial of, 14, 19, 30, 36, 41, 45–7,

54, 68–70, 93, 96, 102,177–9, 181, 189, 199, 247,253, 259, 268

revolution, 7, 8, 10, 27–8, 42, 45–6,79–80, 97, 99, 125, 130, 132,142, 146–7, 152–4, 156, 160,162, 168–9, 173–5, 177, 179,181–2, 187, 189, 191,193–201, 205–6, 208, 210–12,215, 217, 225, 228, 235,238–41, 261, 264, 269, 274,280, 285

revolutionary actionand ambiguity, 88and authenticity, 178and ends, 96, 131, 191and individual and collective

agency, 180, 249and intersubjectivity, 182and means/ends relationship, 215

and self-instrumentalization, 200and situatedness in violence, 183and unity in, 99, 236, 245as “bottom-up,” 208, 226as creation of humanity, 145, 178,

191as “midwife” (Sartre), 208as process, 215–16, 220, 226basis in civil society, 209consolidation of power,

168, 208constructed by status quo, 183emphasis on content of, 252emphasis on content of revolution,

239ethical orientation to, 247ethicality of, 238EZLN approach to, 208not as terrorism, 99ontological aspects of, 174strategy vs. tactics (de Certeau),

282revolutionary movement, 75, 90,

153, 162, 171, 187–8, 206,208, 228, 240

revolutionary tacticsattacks on civilians, 282compliance tactics, 163, 190endorsement tactics, 164, 167mobilization of support, 162need for unity, 187prevention of betrayal, 162sacrifice of Algerians, 164vengeance tactics, 166, 169, 193

revolutionary violence, 71, 91, 94,96, 147, 153, 165, 180, 185–6,191, 193, 201, 282–3, 288

and humanity, 96, 191as tool for unification, 183differences with terrorism, 282ethical legitimation of, 184

“ripple effect,” 44, 75Roberts, Hugh, 196

index / 321

Rojo Arias, Sofia, 219–20, 223, 229Ronfeldt, David, 211Ross, John, 233, 284Ruedy, John, 136, 146–50, 154,

157–62, 164, 175, 190, 279Rybalka, Michel

and Contat, Michel, 46, 81, 122,275

Ssacrifice, 75, 95, 130, 164, 182, 211,

221, 224, 255, 259, 261, 275Salinas de Gortari, Carlos, 205San Andres Accords, 231Santoni, Ronald, 194, 201–2, 283Sardar, Ziauddin, 125Sartre, Arlette El-Kaïm, 275Sartre, Jean-Paul, ix, xii, 9, 13–39,

41, 45–50, 53–70, 73, 77–91,93–9, 101, 104–7, 119, 121–2,126–7, 133–6, 142, 156, 168,176–7, 179–81, 183, 186,188–9, 193–4, 198–202, 217,225, 235–6, 239, 245–6,248–9, 250–2, 256–60, 262–3,269–70, 275–80, 282–3, 287–8

and Algeria, 135and Bourdieu, Pierre, 104and “city of ends,” 86, 87and example of prisoner, 18, 21and Fanon, Frantz, 135–6and “first ethics,” 19–21, 86and fused group, 56–8, 60–2, 64and hope, 41, 72, 75, 205, 212,

216, 285–6and integral humanity, 21,

199–200, 202, 257and Lévy, Benny, 41, 69,

89–90, 99, 236, 245, 256,279, 288

and Liège (Belgium) infanticides, 94and membership in La Résistance,

26–7, 147, 176

and pure future (l’avenir pur), 46,84, 274

and scarcity, 21, 30, 86, 152and “second ethics,” 20–1, 34and seriality, 53–8, 60–3, 77–9,

99, 150, 153, 174–5, 189,205–6, 209, 211, 263

and social ensembles, 53–64,77–80, 98–9, 150, 153,174–5, 189, 205–6, 209,211, 263

and “spirit of seriousness,” 24, 36,106

and the gathering, 55–6and unconditioned future, 81, 84,

277Anti-Semite and Jew, 54Being and Nothingness, 9, 13–17,

19–22, 32, 48, 85–6, 259,274, 287

Cornell Lectures, xii, 198, 275Critique of Dialectical Reason, 22,

36, 64, 97, 105, 107, 198,250, 258, 276

debate with Camus, 276literature of commitment, 27pledged group, 58, 60–1, 99,

174–5, 199, 251, 258, 263political engagement of, 269Rome Lectures (Conférence à

l’Institut Gramsci), xii, 21, 79,121, 183, 275

synthetic anthropology(anthropologie synthétique),27–8, 274, 277

The Wretched of the Earth, 156scarcity, 21, 30, 86, 152Schaffer, Scott, 239Schalk, David

process of engagement, 26–7, 29Schalk, David L., 26Scott, James C., 4, 124, 137, 160Sekyi-Otu, Ato, xi, 145–6, 154, 156

322 / index

and bifurcation of colonial system,145, 181

self-determination, 1, 3, 21, 46, 84,94, 98, 127, 166, 173–4, 193,202, 210, 222–4, 228, 240,250, 267–9

and existential project, 88and EZLN, 220, 229as process, 215collective, 21, 57, 59–62, 221, 223,

237, 239, 241, 250–2, 264prevention of, 92

prevention of, 251sens (sense or meaning), 31, 35, 38,

82–3, 94, 95, 151, 200, 256–7,261, 267, 284

and history, 71, 95, 255, 262September 11, 2001, 1, 5, 286–7seriality, 53–8, 60–3, 77–9, 99, 150,

153, 174–5, 189, 205–6, 209,211, 263

Sétif, 158settler colonialism, 184Sewell, William, 25, 121singularized universal, 72, 89SIPAZ, 232, 234situatedness of social life, 5, 9, 25–6,

29, 33–5, 37, 48, 50, 53, 65,71, 79, 85–8, 95, 103, 105,108, 126, 136, 178–9, 181,246, 258, 263, 269, 271, 274

and ethical action, 257and freedom, 86, 182, 253and habitus, 108and orientation to, 69and resisting social ethics, 65, 258and revolutionary action, 182

Skocpol, Theda, 273Smith, Geoffrey

and Hoare, Quentin, 123social action, 24

as repetition, 248reception of, 71

social changeefficacy of, 125

social contract, critique of, 13, 20,250–1

social ensembles, 53–8, 60–2, 77–8,80, 98–9, 153, 174–5, 189, 263

anarchist, 204and fraternity-terror, 59–61, 63,

200, 225, 238, 258, 263–4,273

and maintenance of unity, 80and membership, 11, 53–4, 56–8,

63, 66, 137, 141, 164, 213,215, 222–3, 237, 240–1

and relations between individuals,63, 224–5

and third party, 53, 56–8balance between individual and

social, 249, 263cohesion of, 59fused group, 56–8, 60–2, 64group praxis, 41, 47, 56–7, 60–2“hippie” communes, 204horizontal organization and

EZLN, 225leadership in, 58, 60maintenance of unity, 8, 61–2, 163paradox in formation of, 63, 200pledged group, 58, 60–1,

99, 174–5, 199, 251,258, 263

project development, 59–60relations with individuals, 64, 88series, 53–6, 58, 63, 79, 150,

205–6, 209, 211transition from fused group to

pledged group, 58social ethics, 3, 10–11, 22–4, 64, 68,

90, 130, 203–4, 221, 225, 242,248, 252–3, 259, 269

social justice, x, 1, 2, 4, 202, 210,216, 225, 236, 242

social liberation, 180

index / 323

social life, 3, 4, 47–50, 184, 215,219, 226, 228, 239, 244, 252,259, 262, 269, 271

social movements, 254and concerns of resisting social

ethics, 253and resistant action, 248and solidarity, 209anticapitalism, 204, 209, 236antiglobalization, 5, 209, 211,

236, 245, 254bases for organizing, 213infiltration of, 211new social movements, 212“pro-humanity,” 209

social order, 3–10, 20–3, 25, 30,35–6, 39, 47, 49–50, 52–4, 63,65–7, 70–1, 76–9, 81–92, 94,96–9, 101–16, 118–21, 123,125–7, 131, 135–6, 138–41,143–5, 149–50, 174, 179,181–3, 191, 195–9, 201,203–4, 207–11, 214, 216–19,222, 224–6, 229–30, 232,236–41, 243–4, 246–7,249–53, 255, 258–9, 261–7,269, 275, 277, 279–80, 288

as field of meaning, 25, 49–50, 64,66, 83, 93, 267, 269

as form of violence, 11, 19, 70, 90,92, 223, 247–8, 255, 267,269, 271

as repetition, 85violence in, 52, 92

social problems, 76–7, 90, 167,243–6, 287

as basis for social life, 244representation of, 244

social relationsabsence of, 248–9and ethical orientation, 259and habitus, 107and resistance, 255

and social distance, 255and symbolic capital, 111–12renegotiation of, 269

social structures, 6, 11, 22, 25, 66,80, 82, 84, 106, 109, 121, 127,182, 203–4, 220, 235, 250,252, 255, 264, 274

and domination, 113and habitus, 107, 109, 123and hegemony, 113bodily reaction to, 109maintenance of, 121

social suffering, 90, 167, 243–7, 287complicity with, 246ethical orientation to, 245

socialism, 27–8, 35, 76, 80, 85, 90,122, 193, 205, 228, 279

sociality, 5, 9, 26, 53, 65, 87, 101,258

and ethical action, 89solidarity

and agency, 267and being-with-others, 267and situatedness of social life, 267as process, 268

Soummam Conference (1956), 162,165, 167, 283

sovereignty, 27, 58–62, 97–8, 160,166, 173, 195–6, 210, 212,218, 250, 253, 259–60, 262,268, 277, 285

and EZLN, 227in Algerian Revolution, 195

spontaneity, 36, 58, 62, 107–8,112–13, 163, 187, 195, 251

Spurling, Laurie, 25Stalinism, 64, 66, 288Starn, Orin

and Fox, Richard, 125Starr, Amory, 273status quo

and bad faith, 93and domination, 106, 126

324 / index

and habitus, 106and hegemony, 117and normativity, 80and prevention of projects, 77, 83,

92, 271and violence, 77, 88complicity with, 247inversion of violence of, 94, 175maintenance of, 92, 106, 110,

115, 127, 211, 246–7, 249,251, 279

prevention of projects, 121, 250

reproduction of, 77resistance to, 127, 254

Stewart, Jon, 21Stone, Robert

and Bowman, Elizabeth, 63, 80,84, 95, 97, 122, 199, 200

subalterns, 3, 11, 110, 116–18, 123,125, 137, 145, 148, 154, 177,208, 212

subhumanity, 85, 89–90, 93, 95,132, 137–8, 140–1, 145, 175,178, 186, 193, 220, 245, 274

and colonialism, 140–1, 144and hatred, 142and racism, 138

subjectivity, 81and colonial system, 143–4colonial elimination of, 140–1,

144Fanon’s conception of, 135

subordination, 7, 177, 214, 240, 274

sweatshop labor, 70, 72symbolic capital, 110–12, 119

and consumption of social goods,110–11, 124

and distinction (la distinction), 112and emulation, 112

synthetic anthropology (anthropologiesynthétique), 27–8, 274, 277

TTalbott, John, 146–9, 154, 159, 169,

176Taylor, Patrick, 137temporality, 33–4, 36, 42–3, 56, 75,

96, 117, 284terrorism, 5, 161, 163, 171, 211,

263, 277, 282–3, 287differences with revolutionary

violence, 282rationality of, 172

Tillion, Germaine, 146, 149–51,154, 157, 281

and “black resignation,” 150, 157totalization, 57–8transcendence, 173–4, 177transcendence (of situation), 17–18,

78, 126, 176, 181, 189Tunisia, 159, 167

war for independence, 159

Uunconditioned future (possibilité

inconditionnée, avenirinconditionnée), 81, 84, 277

unfreedom, 2, 36, 46, 61, 183, 199,259, 267

unintended consequences, 44–5, 89,96

United Kingdom, government of, 1United Nations, 1, 160, 165–6, 209

Resolution 1514(XV) (Declarationof the Granting ofIndependence to ColonialCountries and Peoples), 166

United Statesand Vietnam conflict, 26Congress, 205government of, 1, 26, 166, 205,

211, 254hegemony of, 208

Universal Declaration of HumanRights (UDHR), 3, 166, 262

index / 325

universalization, 37utopia-as-process (McManus), 220,

241

VVera Herrera, Ramón, 210, 223,

226, 228violence, 10, 47–55, 62–3, 65, 67,

71, 75–7, 86, 88, 90–5, 99,132, 135–6, 138, 142–5,152–3, 162–3, 165–8, 171–3,175–6, 178, 182–94, 201–2,206, 238, 261, 263, 268–9,276, 282–3, 288

against colonized cultures, 136–7against humanity, 132, 137–41,

143, 144–5, 155, 180,220, 245

and being-for-others, 54and praxis, 51as language, 157, 183ethical legitimation of, 90,

95, 183in colonialism, 131–2, 145–7,

157, 175, 180, 186in social order, 52, 90, 92, 183psychological, 139–40revolutionary, 71, 91, 93–4, 96,

147, 153, 165, 172, 180,

185–6, 191, 193, 201,282–3, 288

use against social structure, 94

Wwar of position, 102, 123–4

and hegemony, 124Weinberg, Bill, 284West Indians, 1Whiteside, Kerry, 28–9, 32, 50, 52,

65, 87, 276Winant, Howard, 134Wolin, Richard, 25Wood, Ellen Meiksins, 251–2World Bank, 1World Trade Organization,

1, 245

ZZapatismo, 208, 230–5, 285

Committees of Good Government(Juntas de buen gobierno) asembodiment of, 233

Zapatista Autonomous Municipalitiesin Rebellion (MAREZs), 231–4,240

Zedillo Ponce de Léon, Ernesto, 205

Zighout, Youssef, 282

326 / index