Introduction:

I. The difference between pure and empirical knowledge

That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt, for how is it possible that the inherent capability of mind of thinking could start than by any other means than by objects which affect our senses and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding to compare connect or separate objects and convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects which we term experience? In respect of time therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience but begins with it. But though all our knowledge begins in experience it by no means follows that all our knowledge comes from experience.

He defines empirical knowledge to be, a compound of that which we receive through impressions and that which the inherent capability of mind supplies from itself an addition which we cannot distinguish until long practice has made us attentive to and skillful in separating it. It is therefore a question which requires close attention and is not to be answered at first sight whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience and even of all sensuous impressions? Knowledge of this kind is called a priori in contradistinction to empirical knowledge which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in experience. But the expression, a priori is not as yet definite enough adequately to indicate the whole meaning of the question above stated. For in speaking of knowledge which has its sources in experience, we are wont to say that this or that may be known a priori because we dont derive this knowledge immediately from experience but from a general rule, which however we have itself borrowed from experience (32). Thus if a man undermined their house we may say, he might know a priori that the house would have fallen; that is, he needed not to have waited for the experience that it did actually fall. But still, a priori, he could not know even this much. For, that bodies are heavy, and consequently that they fall when their supports are taken away must have been known to him previously by means of experience. By the term knowledge a priori, therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only a posteriori, that is through experience. Knowledge a priori is either pure or impure. Pure knowledge a priori is that which no empirical element is mixed up. For example, the proposition, Every change has a cause, is a proposition a priori, but impure because change is an idea which can only be derived from experience.

II. The Human intellect, even in an unphilosophical state is in possession of certain thinkings a priori.

The question now is as to a criterion, by which we may securely distinguish a pure from an empirical thinking. Experience no doubt teaches us that this or that object is constituted in such a way, but not that it could not possibly exist otherwise. Now in the first place, if we have a proposition which contains the ide of necessity in its very conception, it is a if, moreover it is not derived from any proposition, unless from one equally involving the idea of necessity, it is absolutely a priori. Secondly, an empirical judgment never exhibits strict and absolute, but only assumed and comparative universality (by induction). Therefore the most we can say is- so far as we have hitherto observed, there is no exception to this or that rule. On the other hand if a judgment carries with it strict and absolute universality, that is, admits of no possible exception, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely a priori. Empirical universality is therefore, only an arbitrary extension of validity from that which may be predicted of a proposition valid in most cases to that which is asserted of a proposition which holds good in all; as for the example, All bodies are heavy. When, on the contrary, strict universality characterizes a judgment it necessarily indicates another peculiar source of knowledge, namely a faculty of thinking a priori. Necessity and strict universality, therefore, are infallible tests for distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge and are inseparably connected with each other. But in the use of these criteria the empirical limitation is sometimes more easily detected than the contingency of the judgment, or the unlimited universality which we attach to a judgment is often a more convincing proof than its necessity it may be advisable to use the criteria separately each being by itself infallible.

Now, that in the area of concern of thinking we have judgments which are necessary, and in the strictest sense universal, consequently pure a priori, it will be an easy matter to show. If we desire an example from the sciences, we need only take any proposition in mathematics. If we cast our eyes upon the commonest operations of the understanding, the proposition, Every change must have a cause, will amply serve our purpose. In the latter case, indeed, the idea of a necessity of connection with an effect and of a strict universality of the law that the very notion of a cause would entirely disappear were we to derive it like Hume from a frequent association of what happens with that which precedes and the habit thence originating of connecting representations- the necessity inherent in the judgment being therefore merely subjective. Refuting empiricism.

Space and substance are a priori conceptions (34).

III. Philosophy stands in need of a science that will determine the possibility, principles and extent of human knowledge a priori.

Of far more importance than all that has been above said is the consideration that certain of thinking rise completely above the area of concern of all possible experience, and by means of ideas, to where no corresponding object can be found in experience seem to extend the range of our judgments beyond its bounds.

He states that a priori reason evaluates the information we already have from experience, and this is where we often err (37 left).

IV. Difference between analytic and synthetic judgments:In all judgments wherein the relation of a subject to the predicate is formed in thought for affirmative judgments can be formed analytically and synthetically. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as somewhat which is containted (though covertly) in the formed idea, A; or in the predicate B lies completely out of the formed idea of A, although it stands in connection with it, I term the judgment analytical and the latter synthetical. Analytic judgments (affirmative), are therefore those judgments in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is formed in mind through identity; those which are formed in thought without identity are termed synthetic judgments. The former may be called explicative the latter augmentative judgments; because the former add in the predicate nothing to the conception of the subject, but only analyse it into its constituent conceptions which were thought already in the subject although in a confused manner; the latter add to our conceptions of the subject a predicate which was not contained in it, and which no analysis could ever have discovered therein. For example, All bodies are extended is an analytical judgment. For I need not go beyond the idea of a body in order to find extension connected with it, but merely analyse the formed idea, that is become conscious of the manifold properties which I think in that idea in order to discover the predicate in it: it is therefore an analytical judgment. On the other hand, when I say, All bodies are heavy, the predicate is something totally different from that which I think in the mere conception of a body. By the addition of such a predicate, therefore, it becomes a synthetical judgment. Judgments of experience as such are always synthetical

He states experience is a synthesis of intuitions and that all synthetic judgments are grounded in experience, not conceptions.

Propositions in natural science are a priori synthetical, same with metaphysics.

Intuitions are given to the understanding by sensibility?

Human knowledge relates to objects through understanding.

IntroductionI. On the difference between pure and empirical thinking:

There is no doubt whatever that all our thinking begins with experienceAs far as time is concerned, then, no thinking in us precedes experience, and with experience every thinking begins (136 B2).

Though all thinking begins with experience it doesnt follow that all knowledge comes from experience. For it could well be that even our experiential thinking is a combination of that which we receive through impressions and that which our own cognitive faculty (merely prompted by sensible impressions), provides from itself which addition we cannot distinguish from that fundamental material until long practice has made us attentive to it and skilled in separating it out. It is therefore at least a question requiring closer investigation, and one not to be dismissed at first glance, whether there is any such thinking independent of all experience and even of all sense impressions of the senses. One calls such thinkings a priori and distinguishes them from empirical ones, which have their sources a posteriori, namely in experience. The former expression is nevertheless not yet sufficiently determinate to designate the whole sense of the question stated before us. For it is customary to say of it or partake in it a priori because we dont derive it immediately from experience, but rather from a general rule that we have nevertheless itself borrowed from experience.

II. We are in possession of certain a priori thinkings, and even the common understanding is never without them.

At issue here is a mark by means of which we can securely distinguish a pure thinking from an empirical one.

If a proposition is thought along with necessity, it is an a priori judgment; if it is moreover, also not derived from any proposition except one that is in turn is valid as a necessary proposition, then it is absolutely a priori. Universality.

There are pure a priori judgements.

The idea of Transcendental Philosophy

Now it is easy to show that in human thinking there actually are such necessary and in the strictest sense universal, thus pure a priori judgments.

Every alteration must have a cause. He states, the concept of a cause so obviously contains the concept of a necessity of connection with an effect and a strict universality of rule that it would be entirely lost if sought as Hume did , to derive it from a frequent association of that which happens with that which precedes and a habit (thus a merely subjective necessity) of connecting representations arising from that association.

140- how reason goes a flight with no bearing on experience

A great part, perhaps the greatest of the business of our reason consists in analyses of the concepts that we already have of objects. This affords us a multitude of thinkings that although they are nothing more than illuminations or clarifications of that which is already thought in concepts

It appears that he wants to distinguish between thinking that clarifies concepts, and gains knowledge of the external world, and reason that works with this information and connects concepts purely and synthetically.

All judgments that combine a subject and a predicate in thought do so analytically or synthetically. Either the predicate lies in the concept or outside of it. One could call the former judgments of clarification and the later judgments of amplification. I. The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements. He states that gravity or weight in the statement, All bodies are heavy cannot be found within the concept of a body (142).

V.Synthetic a priori judgments are contained as principles in all theoretical sciences of reason.

Mathematical Judgments are all synthetic

He states people who study reason previously erred in assuming mathematics is based on the principle of contradiction.

Mathematical statements invoke intuition and synthetically add them onto concepts.

He states that physics

He states concerning metaphysics on p.146, we want to amplify our thinking a priori; to this end we must make use of such principles that add something to the given concepts that was not contained in them, and through synthetic a priori judgments go so far beyond that experience itself cannot follow us that far, e.g., in the proposition The world must have a first beginning, and others besides, and thus metaphysics, at least as far as its end is concerned, consists of purely synthetic a priori propositions.

VI. The general problem of pure reason

How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?

VII. The idea and division of

That metaphysics has until now remained

P 140; Even less can one expect First Part. Transcendental Aesthetic

SS I. Introductory.

In whatever way and through whatever means a thought may relate to objects, that through which the thought relates immediately to them and, at which all thought is directed as an end, is intuition. Intuition takes place only insofar as the object is given to us; but this in turn is possible only if the objects affect the mind in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility. Objects are therefore given to us by means of sensibility, and sensibility alone affords us intuitions; but intuitions are thought through the understanding, and from intuitions arise concepts.

All thought has to be related to intuitions and sensibilities since there is no other way objects can be given to us.

The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation. That Intuition that is related to the object through sensation is called empirical. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance. I call all that which in the appearance corresponds to sensation the sensations matter, but that which allows for the manifold of appearance to be ordered in relation among objects I call the formIn whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which it immediately relates to the objects is by means of intuition (49). An intuition can take place only insofar as the object is given to us. This, again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone leaves us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. But a thought must directly or indirectly relate to intuitions;

The effect of an object on the faculty of representation (sensibility), so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical sensation (50).

The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation is matter. That which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations I call its form.

The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility (49). By means of sensibility, therefore objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. Representations of objects, (sensibility)- intuitions which by the understanding are thought and from them arise conceptions. But a thought must directly, or indirectly by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to intuitions; consequently with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us. The effect of an object on the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of intuition which relates to an object that relates to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical intuition. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter; but that which effects the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain conditions I call its form.

That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation I term its matter; but that which effects the content of the phenomena can be arranged under certain relations called its form

It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us a posteriori; the form must lie ready a priori for them in the mind, and consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation

I call all representation pure in the transcendental meaning of the word where nothing is met with that belongs to sensation

The science of all the principles of sensibility a priori, I call the transcendental asthetic (50).

Two pure forms of sensuous intuition; space and time:

Section I. Of Space:SS 2. Metaphysical exposition of this conception

He argues space is part of a priori intuition and not a representation.

SS 3. Transcendental exposition of the conception of space:

For neither absolute nor relative determinations of objects can be intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they belong, and therefore not a prior:

b. Space is nothing else than the form of all phenomena of the external sense, that is, the subjective condition of the sensibility, under which alone the external intuition is possible

Transcendental Aesthetic

3. Transcendental Exposition of the concept of space:

I understand by a transcendental exposition, the explanation of a concept as a principle