Notes

Introduction

See chapters 3---5 in Chi Lo, The Misunderstood China: Uncovering tile Truth Behind the Bamboo Curtain, Pearson Prentice Hall 2004.

1 The New China Threat

Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.

2 Relationship or connection deals. 3 This is simply national income accounting identity, where GDP is equal to the

sum of consumption, investment, government spending and net exports. The last item is total exports net of imports so that at any given level of imports, a rise in exports adds directly to a country's GDP.

4 Economic hard-landing refers to the situation when GDP growth slumps from positive to negative as a result of the government's harsh economic tightening measures.

5 For more details, please see chapter 4 in Chi Lo, The Misunderstood China: Uncoverillg tile Truth Behind the Baiilboo Curtain, Pearson Prentice Hall 2004.

2 A Conspiracy Theory

The MTEs include Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand. Hong Kong is excluded from the group because it is really part of China, with 90% of its exports routed to and from China as re-exports to the rest of the world.

2 For more details on this argument, see chapter 8 in Chi Lo, ~¥hen Asia Meets China in the New lVfillennium, Pearson Prentice Hall 2003.

3 Empirical evidence shows that this is also the level of income where consump­tion begins to shift quickly from basic necessities to discretionary spending.

4 The issues of China's manufacturing threat and competitiveness are dealt with in Chapter 8.

5 Unemployed refers to out of work completely, while underemployed means insufficient work ---typically defined in developed economies as anyone who works less than 40 hours a week.

6 The Asian Tiger economies include Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan.

3 The Outsourcing Threat

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASIAN) consists of ten countries: Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, 1Vfalaysia, Brunei, Singapore and the Philippines.

194

Notes 195

4 The Next Asian Crisis: Made in China?

1 Under China's de facto fixed exchange system, capital intlow will lead to a surge in domestic liquidity. This is because c~pital inflow tends to push up the renminbi (RMB) exch~nge rate as the demand for RMB exceeds supply in the foreign exchange market. But to keep the exchange rate from rising, the PBoC has to sell RMB (i.e. increase RMB supply), thus increasing domestic money supply as a result.

2 \Vhen foreign capital flows in, swelling the foreign reserves and forcing domestic money supply to expand (see note 1), the PBoC sells government bonds (thus laking in cash) to absorb the increase in money supply. This oper· ation is called 'sterilisation' and is commonly used by central banks to offset the impact of rising foreign reserves on domestic money growth under a fixed exchange rale system.

3 Experience in the emerging markets shows that major economic dislocation would happen when an economy's current account deficit goes above S'l'h of GDP for a sustained period of time.

5 The Next Asian Crisis: Self-inflicted?

1 Non-financial public sector debt includes liabilities of the central government, government agencies and non-financial public sector companies.

2 This is gross debt, which includes primarily bonds issued against assets of the Central Provident Fund (CPF). The picture is quite different on a net basis. Singapore's fiscal reserves were estimated at some 230% of GDP in 2003, more than enough to cover the gross debt.

3 China's budget deficit is about 3':V.' of GDP by official estimates. But it is much higher if off-balance sheet spending and hidden debt items are included.

4 The HKD has been pegged to the USD at an exchange rate of HK$7.8 per USD since 1984. The currency link, as it is locally known, is seen as a major factor in dragging Hong Kong into a 6-year deflation spiral after the 199 7-1998 Asian crisis by denying the HKD to depreciate along with the regional currencies.

5 For example, see 'Fiscal Vulnerability and Financial Crisis in Emerging Market Economies', Occasional paper 218, lMI~ 2003.

6 Private sector analysts estimate thai Asia's sterilisation debt burden ranges from a hefty 37% of GDP in Taiwan and 349'o in Singapore to S'.Vo in China and 4% in the Philippines in early 2004.

7 For ex:.::-nnple, see Chi l.,o; When Asia i\Jeets Chiua iu the Ne-w i\1illennium, Pearson Prentice Hall 2003, pp. 26-30.

8 Conglomerates in South Korea are known as chaebol.

6 The External Stresses

The current account includes merchandise trade plus other overseas payments and receipts, such as travel, foreign income, and interests and dividends.

2 Any one of the components of net national savings (personal, corporate and government) could be negative if it is dis-saving.

196 Notes

7 The Real Danger Isn't Another Crisis

1 Except the Chinese renminbi, the Hong Kong dollar and the Malaysia ringgit. ·rhe renminbi has been unofficially pegged to the US dollar since 1994, while the Hong Kong dollar has been pegged to the US dollar since 1985. The ringgit has been pegged to the US dollar since 1998 when the Malaysian authorities wanted to suppress exchange volatility resulting from the Asian crisis.

2 See note 2 in ChapterS. 3 China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines,

Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. 4 Currently, only 3'YcJ of the 3.2 million-strong working population pay over

60'Xl of total salary tax and just l% of Hong Kong firms pays 6()0;6 of total profit lax.

S Insolvency is defined as a situation when a bank has a capital-asset ratio of less than 8%, as required by the Bank of International Settlements.

6 The solvency issue may be relevant to regulators in a developed economy for deciding whether to step in and save a bank from collapsing. Typically, they will only save a solvent bank that is suffering from temporary liquidity prob­lems. An insolvent bank will be allowed to fail, with safety measures, such as deposit insurance, to help minimise the shock to the financial system.

7 China's close capital account forbids short-term portfolio flows. Her foreign debt totalled US$220 billion in 2004, compared to US$61 0 billion in foreign reserves. This means China would have more than enough reserves to repay foreign creditors if they were to withdraw all at once.

8 Short-selling is an investment strategy where an investor borrows a security, such as a bond or a stock, and sells it to the market, hoping to buy it back to cover his/her position when the price of the security falls in a short period of lime.

9 China's pension debt is the present value of promised future payments to existing pensioners. The estimated size of the pension depends on many assumptions, and a small change in these assumptions could make a big dif .. ference. To estimate the debt, one needs to make assumptions on the pen­sioners' life expectancy, the long-term growth rate of average wages, inflation and discount rates. That is why there is such a wide range of estimates (45-75% of GDP) for the size of China's pension shortfalL

l 0 Under the 1973 Mull:ifibre Agreement, developed markets in Europe and the US limited the amount of apparel imported from developing economies. The end of the quota system has opened the garment trade among >NTO members and allowed companies to freely source from the cheapest suppliers.

8 What China Threat?

But of course, the point is that if there were no such inertia, China would have moved even faster up the global economic league.

2 Mr Guo replaced Zhang Enzhao, who resigned as chairman of the China Construction Bank in March 2005 after a kickback scandaL

Notes 197

3 Huijin Investment was sel up by the cenlral government in December 2003 as a special purpose state-owned commercial vehicle to manage the US$45 billion injection to the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank as part of the bank recapitalisalion effort.

4 The purchasing power parity, or PPP, measurement adjusts for relative infla­tion and exchange rates between economies. It states that the exchange rate bel ween two economies should equal to the ratio of their price level of a fixed comparable basket of goods and services. Thus, when a country's domestic price level is rising faster than the other (i.e. it is experiencing higher infla­tion), its exchange rale must depreciate to keep the purchasing power between the two economies constant. The basis for PPP is the 'law of one price'. In the absence of transportation and other transaction costs, competitive markets will equalise lhe price of an identical basket of goods in two economies when the prices are expressed in the same currency. Thus, PPP calculation compares China's GDP with those of the other economies on a like-for-like basis.

5 Soulh Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. 6 Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Tt consists of 10 countries: Myanmar,

Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore and the Philippines.

7 A country has an absolute advantage in producing a good when it can make more of that good with each unit of input than another country. A country has a comparative advantage in making a good when it has lower opportunity costs of making that good than its trading partners; i.e. when it can forgo less resource to make that good than its trading partners. It is not necessary to have an absolute advantage in order lo have a comparative advantage. Gains from trade depend on comparative advantage but not absolute advantage.

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Index

Absolute advantage 174---5, 197 Administrative measures 82, 84, 96 Aggregate profits proxy 98 American dream xi Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

(APEC) 181 /\SEAN 2, 6, 10, 25, 27, 38, SO, 51,

169, 180, 194, 197 ASEAN Economic Community

(AEC) 25 problems 30, 31

ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 30 A-share market 78 Asia growth model 23 Asian crisis xii., xvi, 1, 2, 12, 21, 29,

59, 84, 86, 88, 89, 90, 95---8, 100, 102, 107-09, 118, 127, 133, 136, 137, 139, 143, 145, 174_, 179, 183, 186, 195, 196

cushions xix, xx, xxiii, 65-73, 95, 134-42

external shocks xxi, xxii, 111, 122

next crisis xx, xxi, xxiii, 63, 84, 85, 93, 96, 102, 110, 111, 122, 128, 183, 193

trigger 62-5, 92, 111, 122, 128, 134, 142---50, 183, 186, 187

Asian Development Bank (ADB) 8, 85, 91, 93

Asian Monetary Union (AJvlU) xxiii, 187-8

Asian production chain 50-1 Asian Tigers 36, 38, 64, 168, 169,

170, 173, 176, 178, 194 Asset bubbles xxiii, 84, 86, 95, 103,

104,111,117,118,119,120,124, 128, 186

Balance of payments (BoP) 54, 92, 93, 95, 96, 100, 138, 142, 170, 171

Balance sheet mis-matching 138

Bank recapitalisation 87, 89, 90, 91, 148, 149, 160, 197

Banking crisis 145-8 Banking reform 160---2

vision problem 162 Baosteel 63 Basic balance 93, 171 Big Four 145, 148, 160, 162 Bigger-is-better strategy 185-6 Bilateral trade pact 10, 31, 56 Boom/bust growth xxi, 1, 11-13, 16,

17, 142, 143 Bubble 74, 81, 84, 86, 95, 103, 104,

111, 117, 118, 121, 124 Business cycle 122, 142

Capital account convertibility 143, 173

Capital controls 15, 80, 81, 95, 96, 113, 143

Capital flight 171, 186 Capital market reform 1 SO Central Provident Fund (CPF) 195 Chaebol 186, 195 Cheap currency policy 124, 165, 178 China as growth source 6-9, 23,

65-73, 127, 190, 192-3 China labour shortages 32---5 China shock

global markets xviii, xix, 11, 17 oil market 12 -13

China reform most rapid liberalising economy

181---2 China threa l-

200

As ian crisis xvi boom/bust growth xxi, 1, 11---13,

16, 17 car industry 4 conspiracy theory 19, 25----8, 39,

40,84 demand threat 6-11, 19, 23-5 economic factors xvi, xviii, xix

China threal--- continued exaggerated 189 external discipline 68 geopolitics 13 growth threat 167-70 industry espionage S-6 internal politics xvi, xxi, 1, 13-17, investment threat 1 70-4 manufacturing threat 174-80 perception xi, 2, 30, 133, 157, 183 political lies xiii, 46-51 real estate bubble xxii, 81, 84 semi-conductor industry 't---5 supply threat 1-6

Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) 31

Communist mindset 162 Comparative advantage 23, 36, 39,

44,4-9, 51, 52, 151, 166, 167, 174, 176, 180, 186, 190, 197

Competitive advantage 32, 38, 66, 68, 157, 166, 167, 186

Competitive myth 163-7 low-wage trap "163 unillabour cosl 164---5

Contingent liabilities 89, 90, 91, 93, 140, 141, 149

Core competence 183, 185---7 Creative destruction 2, 44, 54, 68,

143, 158, 181 Credit risk management 143 Cronyism 97, 102, 103, 104, 107,

109, 110, 112, 187 Currency arbitrage 139 Currency link 88, 89, 195 Currency mis-matching 138 Currency risk 137, 138 Current account deficit 56, 84, 86,

95, 99, 111, 117, 122, 132, 133, 134, 137, 195

Current account surplus 93, 95, 96, 99, 122, 134, 141, 173, 191

Cut--throat competition 163, 164

Debt-deficit crisis 90 indicators 92

Debt-deflation spiral 118, 119 Debt-to-GDP ratio 86, 89, 91,

140, 141

Index 201

Deficit--to--CDP ratio 86, 141 Deflation 74, 88, 118, 119, 120, 131,

141, 187, 188, 195 Deleveraging 138 Demand management policy 83 Demand supply mis-match "144 Demand threat 6---11, 19, 23 -5 Destructive destruction 184 Devaluation 13 7, 165 Development model 180-1 Diminishing returns 45 Disinflation 131 Dollar crisis contagion 126 Dollar problem 125 Dow Jones Stoxx Index xx

Economic efficiency 42, 54, 64, 67, 98, 112, 157, 158

Economic hard landing 11, 15, 194 Economic soft landing 14 Economies of scale 4, 22, 176, 178 Election cycle 13 European Monetary Union (EMU)

187, 188 Excess foreign borrowing 138 Excess foreign reserves xx, xxii,

85, 93 Expenditure-switching 176 Export-led growth xii, 21, 49, 92 Externalities 166-7 External shocks

Foreign direct investment (FDI) 112-14

terrorism 128---31 US dollar crisis 122-7 US fiscal deficit ·11 S-1 7

Fertility rate 116, 129, 130 Financial contagion xx, 61, 93, 96,

104, 126 Financialliberalisalion 77, 79, 83,

114, 143, :147, 162 Financial suppression 143 Fiscal deficit xix, xx, xxii, 85, 86, 96,

11:1, 112, :130, 13:1, 132, :133, 141, 142, 195

bank recapitalisation 87, 89 China time bomb 148-50 contingent liabilities 89---91

202 Index

Fiscal deficit--- continued public spending 87-9 U.Stimebomb 115-17

Fixed asset investment 14, 74, 82 Fixed exchange rates 86, 95, 124,

136, 137, 138, 139, 195 Flexible exchange rates 99, 136,

137, 141 Floating rural population 33 Foreign direct investment (FDl)

6, 26, 35, 111, 171-4, 177-8, 191, 192

the dark side of 112---14 Foreign exchange intervention 81-2,

92, 93, 95, 120, 12A, 138, 139 Forwards market 147, 174 Full currency convertibility 173-4 Fundamentals vs bubble 73-80

Cains from trade 44, 49, 54, 175, 176, 197

General Equilibrium approach xiii C ian t sucking sound 65 Global labour arbitrage 41,48 Global supply chain xxii, 57,

167, 191 Globalisation xvi, 41, 48, 55, 64,

121, 153, 181, 192 hypocrites 56

Great Depression 119 Growth threat 167---70 Guanxi 4

Hollowing out xxiii, 1, ,_n, 44, 53, 55,59, 189,190

Southeast Asia's fate 183-5 Hot money 93---5, 134 Housing affordability 76 Housing reform 75, 76, 79 Housing Responsibility System 181 Hub-and-spoke arrangements 10 Hu kou system 78

Import coverage 136 Import elasticity 123, l25 Import penetration 25---6, 65 Inflation 12, 12, 16, 34, 59, 60, 74,

79, 84, 88, 96, 118, 120, 132, 143, 188, 196, 197

Integrated production model 41 Intellectual property rights 166 International division of labour 121,

151, 193 International Energy Agency

(IEA) 13 International labour arbitrage •10,

41,48 International Monetary Fund (IMF)

XX, 28, 86, 91, 104, 108, 138, 140, 181, 195

International trade positive sum game 52 structural change 19, 21,

23-5, 40 inter-provincial competition 63 Interest rate liberalisation 162 Interest rate parity 139 Intra-industry trade 176 Intra-regional trade 20, 192 Investment threat 170-4 invisible costs 27 TT bubble xii, xviii, xx, 21, 28, 44,

88, 96, 177

Jobless economic recovery 121-2

Keiret>u 185, 186 Koomin Bank 101 Korea Inc. ·1 00-02 Krung Thai Bank 104

Labour arbitrage 40, 41, 45, 121 Labour immobility 44, Labour productivity 2, 42, 43,

48, 53, 54, 58-60, 121, 130, 1M---7

Laissez-faire 89 Law of comparative advantage 151 Law of diminishing returns 190 Law of one price 197 Liquidity 80, 90, 95, 118, 120, :124,

195, 196 Loan maturity mis-match 138 Low-wage trap 163

Managed float exchange rate 139 Manufacturing Performance Institute

(MJ'l) 63--4

Manufacturing lhreat 174---80 FDI flows 177-8

Market mechanism 82, 83 Mercantilist policy 181 1\•fiddle class 21-2 Monetary base 81 Monetary union 188 Moral hazard 97 Moral suasion 83, 84 Mortgage market---· China 77 MSCT Emerging Market Index xx Multi-fibre Arrangement on Textiles

(1vlFAT) 133, 151, 152, 153, 154, 196

Multilateral free trade agreements 10 Multinational corporations

(MNCs) 184 Multiplier effect 121

National Congress, China 14 National income identity 194 Nepotism 106 New China threat xxi New economic paradigm 157, 183 Next Asian crisis xx---xxiii, 1, 63, 84,

8~ 93, 9~ 102, 11~ 111, 112, 128, 183, 193

China trigger 62---5, 142--50 cushions 134-42 external shocks 11:1, 131-2 inherent problems 97---100

Non-performing loans (NPLs) 90, 145, 146, 147, 148, 162

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 58

Oil crisis xxi, 111, 132 Opportunity cost 39 Organisation for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD) 58

Original Equipment lVfanufacturers (OEMs) 46

Outsourcing xvi, xxii, 69, 121, 151, 152, 156, 190, 192

hollow--out 53 misguided debate 46-51 myopia 44-6, 59-60

Overheating 74, 84

Index 203

Paternalistic capitalist model lOS Pearl River Delta (I'RD) 32, 35, 62 Pension puzzle "149 People's Bank of China (PBoC) 15,

80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 147, 162, 195 Policy mistakes 17 Portfolio flow 93, 95, 111, 112---14,

120, 134, 196 Post bubble economy 118, 119,

121,141 Product cycle 38-40 Productivity 2, 42, 43, 45, 48, 53,

54, 58---60, 121, 130, 132, 144, 151, 164-7

Protectionism xvi, xxii, xxiii, 41, 44, 46, 55, 56, 57, 59, 132, 133, 150, 151, 153, 155

forcing a China threat 155-6 Public debt 86, 89, 148, 195 Purchasing power parity 168, 197

Qualified Domestic lnstitulional Investors (QDII) 143, 174

Real estate bubble xxii, 81, 84 Real exchange rate 188 Reflation 120 Reform inertia 101----02, 158, 185 Regional integration 20, 187-8 Renminbi 15, 81, 136, 148,

167, 196 full convertibility 173-4 intervention 195

Replacement rate 128, 129 Reserve requirements 15, 82 Return on capital 190 Return on labour 190

Short selling 147, 196 Specialisation 2, 't2, 44, 51, 54, 151,

174, 175, 176 Stagflation 132 Slate-owned enterprises (SOEs) 2, 82,

143-7, 149, 150, 159, 162 Sterilisation 81-2, 95, 96, 195 Structural reform

China, the most rapid liberalising economy 181-2

communist mindset 162---3

204 Index

Structural reform ---continued deficiency x, xxii, 22, 23, 85, 97-9,

"104, 127 external discipline 1, 2 labour productivity 2, 42, 43, 48,

53, 54, 58-60 portfolio inflow distortion 1 12---14 reform inertia 101-02, 158, 185

Subsistence wage 34 Supply threat 1 ---6 Surplus labour 33, 145

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC) 4-5

Temasek ·1 05-06 Terms of trade 180 Terrorism xxi, xxiii, 111, 115, 1 17,

128-31 I 142 Thaksinomics 28, 102---04 Too-big-to-fail 89, 145 Trade deficit ·1 19, 122, 180, 191 Twin deficil xxii, xxiii, 111, 132

Undervalued currency 94, 97, 124, 133,137,139,141,178

United Nations 129, 130 Unit labour cost 164-5

Urbanisation 71, 73, 78, 79 Uruguary Round 154 US dollar crisis 11:1, 117, 122-7, 132 US---Central America Free Trade

Agreement (CAFTA) 155 US-centric global economy 119, 124,

127 US current account deficit 56, 84,

111,132 correction 124---6 global impact 122-7

US fiscal time bomb 115-17

Value-added 4,9, 36, 37, 38, 45, 50, 5:1, 67, 71, LSI, :160, 163, 164, 166, 176, 185, 192, 193

Voluntary Exports Restraints (VER) 55

Wealth destruction 119 World Bank 78, 91, 107, 181 World Trade Organisation (vVTO) 1,

2, 4, 7, 16, 56, 57, 58, 144, 154, 157, 181, 189, 191, 193, 196

car industry in China 4 external discipline l, 2