NOTE · Norte and Masbate provinces in the Philippines Bicol region ... a substantial body of literature that argues that the main ... (ILO Worst Forms of Child

38291-jle_49-1 Sheet No. 95 Side A 11/02/2016 10:58:58

38291-jle_49-1 Sheet N

o. 95 Side A

11/02/2016 10:58:58

\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\49-1\JLE106.txt unknown Seq: 1 17-OCT-16 12:32

NOTE

ERADICATION OF CHILD LABOR IN THE PHILIPPINES:SHIFTING THE FINANCIAL BURDEN OF CHILD LABOR

LAW VIOLATIONS FROM PARENTSTO EMPLOYERS

Daheuin Ju*

INTRODUCTION

Dennis, a fourteen-year-old boy who lives in the Philippines,aspires to be a policeman because he wants to help people.1 He isin his first year of high school, but he is absent from school as oftenas two times per week because he has no money to pay for necessi-ties, such as food, and he must work to support his family.2 Hestarted working in a small-scale gold mine3 when he was twelveyears old and remembers the fear he felt when he “dove” underwa-ter for the first time.4 Diving underwater is part of a dangerouspractice called compressor mining, which is common in the coastalareas of the Philippines where gold deposits lay beneath the watertable.5 Miners, including children like Dennis, dive into ten-meter-deep underwater shafts for several hours while receiving air from atube attached to an air compressor.6 Dennis was frightened by thedarkness, depth, and potential collapse of the underwater shaft ashe shoveled a mixture of mud and stones that might contain gold.7Like many child miners, Dennis suffers from skin infections, such

* J.D. expected 2017, The George Washington University Law School; B.A. 2014,Colgate University.

1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHAT . . . IF SOMETHING WENT WRONG: HAZARDOUS CHILD

LABOR IN SMALL-SCALE GOLD MINING IN THE PHILIPPINES 25 (2015) [hereinafter HRWREPORT]. The names of children who were interviewed have been replaced with pseud-onyms. Id. at 4.

2. See id. at 25.3. Small-scale gold mining refers to mining with minimal machinery and a large

workforce. Id. at 6.4. Id. at 25.5. Id. at 11. In March 2015, the Philippine government prohibited the use of com-

pressor mining. Id. at 6 (citing Phil. Dep’t of Env’t & Nat. Res., Admin. Order No. 2015-03(Mar. 16, 2015)).

6. Id. at 11.7. Id. at 25.

175

38291-jle_49-1 Sheet No. 95 Side B 11/02/2016 10:58:58


o. 95 Side B

11/02/2016 10:58:58


176 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 49

as romborombo,8 which can cause discomfort and pain.9 Dennis’sstory underscores the hazardous working conditions of child labor-ers in the Philippines, the negative impacts on their health andeducation, and the reality that many of them must work to contrib-ute to their poverty-stricken households.10

Child labor remains prevalent in the world today, especiallyamong countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.11 Dennis isone of sixty-five children who were interviewed by Human RightsWatch (HRW) during HRW’s investigation of child labor in small-scale gold mines in two provinces of the Philippines.12 This investi-gation resulted in a thirty-nine-page report by HRW (HRW Report)that condemned the Philippine government for failing to protectchildren who are forced by poverty to work in small-scale goldmines and refocused international attention to the exploitation ofchild labor in the Philippines.13

The HRW Report studied just one of the many sectors thatemploy child labor in the Philippines. In 2011, the Philippine Sta-tistics Authority (PSA) reported that there were 2.1 million chil-dren in the Philippines engaged in child labor and that twomillion—approximately ninety-five percent—of those childrenwere involved in hazardous labor.14 Approximately sixty percent ofthese child laborers work in agriculture, namely, in the productionof sugarcane, bananas, coconuts, corn, hogs, palm oil, rice, rubber,and tobacco.15 Others work in industries such as mining and fish-

8. Romborombo is a local term used to describe the itchy and infected skin caused byworking in water for extended periods of time. Id. at 11.

9. Id. at 25.10. See id. at 24–27.11. See An Estimated 150 Million Children Worldwide Are Engaged in Child Labour,

UNICEF, http://data.unicef.org/child-protection/child-labour.html [https://perma.cc/XQ8M-LKLS] (last updated June 2015).

12. HRW REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. The interviews were conducted in the Camarines RNorte and Masbate provinces in the Philippines’ Bicol region. Id.

13. See Philippines: Children Risk Death to Dig and Dive For Gold, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

(Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/29/philippines-children-risk-death-dig-and-dive-gold [https://perma.cc/3Y62-JNXD].

14. PHILIPPINE STATISTICS AUTHORITY, ESTIMATED NUMBER OF WORKING CHILDREN 5 TO

17 YEARS OLD WHO WORKED DURING THE PAST WEEK WAS 3.3 MILLION (2015), https://psa.gov.ph/content/estimated-number-working-children-5-17-years-old-who-worked-during-past-week-was-33-million [https://perma.cc/HYD5-BS9S] [hereinafter PSA RELEASE].This survey defines “child labor” as children who work in a hazardous environment for anyamount of time, or children who work long hours, specifically twenty hours per week forthose who are five to fourteen years old and forty hours per week for those who are fifteento seventeen years old. Id.

15. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR’S BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS, 2014 FINDINGS ON THE

WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR: PHILIPPINES 1 (2014) [hereinafter DOL 2014 FINDINGS].



o. 96 Side A

11/02/2016 10:58:58


2016] Eradication of Child Labor in the Philippines 177

ing, while some—particularly girls—are trafficked to urban areasfor domestic work and commercial sexual exploitation.16 Stillothers are forcibly recruited as child soldiers by antigovernmentand terrorist organizations.17

While child labor is a complex issue with many contributing fac-tors, poverty is widely identified as the primary cause.18 As the2014 study by the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education andResearch (EILER) underscored, children from poor families arecompelled by necessity to contribute to the family income by work-ing.19 Moreover, child labor perpetuates poverty because it inter-feres with education.20 For example, the 2014 EILER study foundthat sixty percent of child laborers left school before sixth grade.21

This premature termination of education, in turn, negativelyimpacts the future employment prospects of child laborers andlimits their potential for upward social mobility.22 Specifically, chil-dren who were engaged in child labor are more likely to have“lower earnings, insecurity, and unemployment spells” and, asadults, are more likely to depend on their children to work andcontribute to the household, which leads to a multigenerational,perpetual cycle of poverty.23

The Philippine government has instituted an ambitious legalregime to tackle the exploitation of child labor, and this Notefocuses on one of the key measures, Republic Act No. 9231(Republic Act or Act).24 The Republic Act implements three prin-

16. Id. at 1–2.17. Id. at 2.18. See, e.g., Kaushik Basu et al., Child Labor and Household Wealth: Theory and Empirical

Evidence of an Inverted-U, 91 J. DEV. ECON. 8, 8 (2010) (emphasis in original) (“There is nowa substantial body of literature that argues that the main cause of child labor is poverty . . . .[P]arents do not like to send their children to work if they can afford not to.”); Resource forSpeakers on Global Issues: Child Labour, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/briefingpapers/childlabour [https://perma.cc/7LN9-BEEN] (last visited Aug. 17, 2016)(“Poverty emerges as the most compelling reason why children work.”).

19. Joe Torres, Chronic Poverty is Fueling Child Labor in the Philippines, UCA NEWS (Jan.29, 2015), http://www.ucanews.com/news/chronic-poverty-is-fueling-child-labor-in-the-philippines/72891 [https://perma.cc/4V3P-AT7J].

20. International Labour Standards on Child Labour, INT’L LABOUR ORG. [ILO], http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-standards/child-labour/lang—en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/UHF8-W6WN] (last visited Aug. 19,2016) [hereinafter International Labor Standards].

21. Torres, supra note 19. R22. International Labor Standards, supra note 20. R23. ILO, World REPORT ON CHILD LABOUR 2015: PAVING THE WAY TO DECENT WORK

FOR YOUNG PEOPLE 6 (2015) [hereinafter WORLD REPORT ON CHILD LABOR].24. See Act Providing for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor and

Affording Stronger Protection for the Working Child, Rep. Act No. 9231 (2003) (Phil.)



o. 96 Side B

11/02/2016 10:58:58



cipal international conventions against child labor: the Interna-tional Labour Organization Convention No. 138 on the MinimumAge (ILO Minimum Age Convention),25 the International LabourOrganization Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of ChildLabour (ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention),26 and theUnited Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child(UNCRC).27 Specifically, the Act establishes fifteen as the mini-mum age for employment, prohibits anyone under the age of eigh-teen from engaging in the worst forms of child labor, andestablishes a schedule of penalties for parents and employers whoviolate child labor laws.28

Although the Republic Act satisfies many important interna-tional obligations concerning child labor, it does not address thefundamental issue of poverty, which drives parents to pull theirchildren out of school to work and contribute to the householdincome.29 Instead, the Republic Act effectively places the blame onparents and exacerbates the financial burden on poor families bygiving Filipino courts discretion to impose a fine on parents foundto violate the child labor provisions of the Act.30 At the same time,the penalty for employers who violate these provisions is only mar-ginally higher and is unlikely to make an employer’s use of childlabor cost inefficient.31 This Note argues that Republic Act No.9231 should be amended to shift the financial burden of childlabor law violations from parents to employers by: (1) eliminatingall penalties imposed on parents of child laborers, and (2) impos-ing higher monetary penalties for employers who use child labor.

Part I of this Note examines the problem of child labor on aglobal scale and specifically in the context of the Philippines, aswell as the applicable international and domestic legal framework.Part II explains this Note’s recommendation to amend the Repub-

[hereinafter Rep. Act No. 9231] (amending certain sections of Act Providing for StrongerDeterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination,and For Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992) (Phil.) [hereinafter Rep. Act No.7610]).

25. See ILO, C138 Minimum Age Convention, ILO No. 138, June 26, 1973 [hereinaf-ter ILO Minimum Age Convention].

26. See ILO, C182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, ILO No. 182, June 17,1999 [hereinafter ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention].

27. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [herein-after UNCRC].

28. Rep. Act No. 9231 §§ 2–3, 6.29. See Torres, supra note 19. R30. See Rep. Act No. 9231 § 6 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 16(f)).31. See id. (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 16(a)–(b)).



o. 97 Side A

11/02/2016 10:58:58



lic Act’s penalty structure for child labor law violations so as todeter employers and cease to exacerbate the adverse financial situ-ation of poor families. This Note concludes that the recom-mended amendment to the Republic Act and shift of the financialburden from parents to employers would maximize enforcementof child labor laws in the Philippines.

I. BACKGROUND

First, this Part defines child labor, examines the exploitation ofchild labor in the world, and explains the harmful impact on thevictims. Next, it discusses the problem of child labor in the Philip-pines and the interconnected issue of poverty. Third, it explainsthe principal international conventions that seek to eradicate childlabor, to which the Philippines is a signatory: the ILO MinimumAge Convention, the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Conven-tion, and the UNCRC. Finally, it assesses how the Philippines hasimplemented the mandates of the international conventionsthrough the Republic Act.

A. The Exploitation of Child Labor

This Section explores how child labor affects the internationalcommunity and the Philippines in particular. First, it examines theproblem of child labor on a global scale. It summarizes the defini-tions of child labor adopted by the International Labour Organiza-tion (ILO) and the U.N. Secretary-General. Next, it demonstratesthat too many children in the world remain trapped in child labor,and proceeds to explore the physiological and psychological conse-quences of child labor on the victims.

Then, this Section elaborates on the exploitation of child laborin the Philippines. It summarizes the definition of child laboradopted by the Philippines and compares it to the internationallyaccepted definitions of child labor. Next, it explains the preva-lence of child labor in the Philippines and the sectors that unlaw-fully employ child laborers. Third, it describes how the widespreadpoverty in the Philippines contributes to the problem of childlabor. Finally, it shows how the exploitation of child labor in thePhilippines can affect the international community through inter-national supply chains.



o. 97 Side B

11/02/2016 10:58:58



1. Child Labor on a Global Scale

a. The Internationally Accepted Definition of Child Labor

Children participate in many types of work, and not all work per-formed by children should necessarily be labeled as child laborand targeted for elimination. For example, helping parentsaround the home or in the family business, or earning some moneyduring school holidays, in moderation, are thought to be beneficialfor the growth and development of children.32 Instead, the term“child labor” often refers to a specific kind of work done by chil-dren, namely, “work that deprives children of their childhood,their potential and their dignity, and that is harmful to physicaland mental development.”33

Although the precise definition varies from country to country,the ILO provides that child labor refers to work that has the follow-ing characteristics: “[Work that] is mentally, physically, socially ormorally dangerous and harmful to children; and interferes withtheir schooling by: depriving them of the opportunity to attendschool; obliging them to leave school prematurely; or requiringthem to attempt to combine school attendance with excessivelylong and heavy work.”34 Similarly, the U.N. Secretary-General hasdefined child labor as the following:

[W]ork that is unacceptable because the children involved aretoo young and should be in school, or because even though theyhave attained the minimum age for admission to employment,the work that they do is unsuitable for a person below the age of[eighteen]. Many children are victims of the worst forms ofchild labor . . . which is likely to harm their health, safety ormorals.35

Both definitions of child labor adopted by the ILO and the U.N.Secretary-General emphasize that child labor disrupts children’seducation and negatively impacts their health and personaldevelopment.36

32. ILO, INT’L PROGRAMME ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOUR, What is ChildLabour, http://www.ilo.org/ipec/facts/lang—en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/6ZKN-FPBJ] (last visited Aug. 17, 2016) [hereinafter IPEC].

33. Id.34. Id.35. U.N. Secretary-General, Status on the Rights of the Child, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc A/64/172

(July 27, 2009).36. See id.; see also IPEC, supra note 32. R



o. 98 Side A

11/02/2016 10:58:58



b. The Prevalence of Child Labor Worldwide

The most recent global estimate on child labor by the ILO statesthat in 2012, 168 million children between the ages of five andseventeen were engaged in child labor.37 This estimate representsapproximately eleven percent of the overall global population ofchildren, which underscores the prevalence of child labor acrossthe world despite the substantial progress made to eradicate thispractice.38 Almost half of the child laborers—eighty-five million—are engaged in hazardous work that “directly endangers theirhealth, safety and moral development.”39 Particularly, childrenbetween the ages of five and eleven make up the largest portion ofall child laborers—around seventy-three million, which accountsfor forty-four percent of all child laborers.40

Regionally, the Asia-Pacific region and sub-Saharan Africa arethe two largest sources of child labor, the former having the largestnumber—77.7 million, which accounts for 9.3 percent of theregional child population—and the latter having the highestrate—fifty-nine million, which accounts for over twenty-one per-cent of the regional child population.41 A majority of child labor-ers across the world work in the agriculture sector (ninety-eightmillion), while many others can be found in the services (fifty-fourmillion) and industry (twelve million) sectors.42 Taken together,these data suggest that too many children in the world remaintrapped in child labor, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region andsub-Saharan Africa, and that eradicating the exploitation of childlabor is an urgent challenge facing the global community.43

c. Negative Effects of Child Labor on Victims

Child labor has many recognized, negative physiological and psy-chological impacts on the victims.44 Regarding the physiologicaleffects, child laborers face many risks to their health and safety.45

37. ILO, MARKING PROGRESS AGAINST CHILD LABOUR: GLOBAL ESTIMATES AND TRENDS

2000–2012, 3 (2013) [hereinafter GLOBAL ESTIMATES].38. Id. The number of children engaged in child labor has declined by one-third

since 2000, from 246 million to 168 million child laborers. Id.39. Id.40. Id. at 6.41. Id. at 4.42. Id. at 8.43. See id. at vii–ix.44. See generally Sarita Bharti & Shalini Agarwal, Physical & Psychological Hazards Faced

by Child Labour, 13 IOSR J. HUM. & SOC. SCI. 29, 29–33 (2013) (statistical analysis of impactof economic activity on children’s health).

45. GLOBAL ESTIMATES, supra note 37, at 12. R



o. 98 Side B

11/02/2016 10:58:58



Specifically, physical stresses of work can have serious, and evenpermanent, effects on children because their bodies are still devel-oping.46 For example, child laborers who carry heavy loads candevelop deformation of the pelvis or the spinal column.47 Further-more, victims of child labor are vulnerable to communicable dis-eases due to “malnutrition, anemia, hard labor, fatigue, andinadequate sleep.”48 Moreover, a growing body of studies suggeststhat children have a greater risk of physical injury than adults whoperform the same work because children are more likely to be sus-ceptible to “fatigue, inattention, poor judgment, and insufficientknowledge of work processes.”49

Beyond the harmful physiological consequences, child labor alsocompromises a child’s psychological development by decreasingthe likeliness of the child either staying in school or deriving bene-fit from the time she does spend in school.50 This interruption ineducation, in turn, makes child laborers more vulnerable to unem-ployment or low earnings as adults.51 As a result, child labor isoften passed down to the next generation because impoverishedadults are more likely to rely on their own children for additionalincome.52 Thus, unsurprisingly, poverty is widely identified as theprimary contributing factor to the perpetuation of child labor.53

2. Child Labor in the Philippines

a. The Definition of Child Labor Adopted by the Philippines

The Philippine Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)defines child labor as “any work or economic activity performed bya child that subjects him/her to any form of exploitation or isharmful to his/her health and safety or physical, mental orpsychosocial development.”54 Notably, unlike the definitions ofchild labor adopted by the ILO and the U.N. Secretary-General,DOLE’s definition does not expressly include work that interferes

46. See Jennifer Bol, Using International Law to Fight Child Labor: A Case Study of Guate-mala and the Inter-American System, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1135, 1144 (1998).

47. Id.48. Id.49. Id. at 1143.50. See GLOBAL ESTIMATES, supra note 37, at 12. R51. WORLD REPORT ON CHILD LABOR, supra note 23, at 6. R52. Id.53. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 35, at ¶ 43. R54. PHIL. DEP’T OF LABOR & EMP’T, DOLE PROVIDES DEFINITION OF CHILD LABOR-

RELATED TERMS (June 26, 2012) http://www.dole.gov.ph/news/view/1789 [https://perma.cc/R467-78FK] [hereinafter DOLE DEFINITION].



o. 99 Side A

11/02/2016 10:58:58



with a child’s education.55 However, the phrase “any work or eco-nomic activity performed by a child that . . . is harmful to his/her. . . psychosocial development”56 could arguably include work thatdisrupts a child’s education. Moreover, DOLE’s definition of childlabor includes work that negatively impacts a child’s health andpersonal development, an element of the definitions adopted byboth the ILO and the U.N. Secretary-General.57 Thus, the Philip-pines has defined child labor in a way that conforms to the interna-tionally accepted definitions of child labor.

b. The Prevalence of Child Labor in the Philippines

According to the most recent Survey on Children in 2011,approximately 3.3 million Filipino children between five and sev-enteen years old worked for at least one hour in 2011.58 Out of the3.3 million children who worked for at least one hour, around 2.1million children were engaged in child labor.59 Two million ofthese child laborers—approximately ninety-five percent—wereengaged in hazardous labor.60 This estimate represents approxi-mately eight percent of all Filipino children between the ages offive and seventeen,61 which reveals the prevalence of child labor inthe Philippines and the urgent need to eradicate the practice.

More than half of the child laborers (54.1 percent) areemployed in the agriculture sector,62 where children risk injury asa result of “exposure to infection, heavy lifting and lack of protec-tive clothing.”63 The U.S. Department of Labor’s List of Goods Pro-duced by Child Labor or Forced Labor (TVPRA List) labels thefollowing agricultural goods from the Philippines as produced bychild labor: bananas, coconuts, corn, hogs, rice, sugarcane, rubber,and tobacco.64 These agricultural goods make up eight out of the

55. Compare IPEC, supra note 32, and U.N Secretary-General, supra note 35, ¶ 7, with RDOLE DEFINITION, supra note 54. R

56. DOLE DEFINITION, supra note 54. R57. Compare IPEC, supra note 32, and U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 35, ¶ 7, with R

DOLE DEFINITION, supra note 54. R58. PSA RELEASE, supra note 14. R59. Id.60. Id.61. Id. There are approximately 26.6 million children between the ages of five and

seventeen in the Philippines.62. DOL 2014 FINDINGS, supra note 15, at 1 fig.1. R63. UNDERSTANDING CHILDREN’S WORK PROGRAMME, JOINING FORCES AGAINST CHILD

LABOR: INTER-AGENCY REPORT FOR THE HAGUE GLOBAL CHILD LABOUR CONFERENCE OF 2010¶ 157 (May 2010).

64. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR’S BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS, LIST OF GOODS PRODUCED

BY CHILD LABOR OR FORCED LABOR 1, 5 (Dec. 1, 2014) [hereinafter TVPRA LIST]. The



o. 99 Side B

11/02/2016 10:58:58



thirteen goods from the Philippines that the TVPRA List labels asproduced by child labor, underscoring the significant incidence ofchild labor in the Philippines’ agriculture sector.65

The services sector has the second largest incidence of childlabor in the Philippines and unlawfully employs around 40.5 per-cent of Filipino child laborers.66 This sector includes work askasambahays, or domestic workers.67 Domestic work often involveslong hours, denies children access to education, and isolates chil-dren from their homes, which creates an environment conduciveto sexual harassment, as well as verbal and physical abuse.68 Childlaborers who work in the Philippines’ services sector also scavengein dumpsites and engage in street work, such as begging.69

Approximately 5.3 percent of Filipino child laborers work in theindustry sector, which includes gold mining.70 As the HRW Reportdemonstrates, gold extraction exposes child laborers to serioushealth risks, such as long term spinal damage from carrying heavyloads, lifelong disability from contact with mercury, and increasedrisk of lung cancer from carbon monoxide emitted by diesel aircompressors.71 Furthermore, the TVPRA List includes three otherindustrial goods—fashion accessories, fish, and pyrotechnics—pro-duced by child labor in the Philippines,72 illustrating the breadthof the problem of child labor in the Philippines’ industrial sector.

c. Poverty and Child Labor in the Philippines

Although child labor is attributable to many factors, poverty isconsidered one of the principal causes of child labor.73 In the Phil-

TVPRA List is an effort by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of International LaborAffairs (ILAB) to publish a list of “goods produced by forced labor or child labor in viola-tion of international standards, or both.” Id. at 1. The ILAB considers five factors to deter-mine whether it has “reason to believe” that the goods are produced using forced or childlabor: nature of information, date of information, source of information, extent of corrob-oration, and significant incidence of child labor or forced labor. Id. at 20.

65. See id. at 5.66. See DOL 2014 FINDINGS, supra note 15, at 1 fig.1. R67. Id. at 1–2.68. Id. at 2.69. See id. at 1–2 tbl. 2.70. Id. at 1–2.71. HRW Report, supra note 1, at 11–12, 14, 16. R72. TVPRA LIST, supra note 64, at 5; see DOL 2014 FINDINGS, supra note 15, at 1–2, R

Table 2.73. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 35, ¶ 43. Other causes of child labor include R

“public indifference, discrimination . . . , social exclusion, the impact of the HIV/AIDSpandemic on children, violence against children, and the consequences of increasedmigration and mobility.” Id.



o. 100 Side A

11/02/2016 10:58:58



ippines, poverty remains a serious problem. According to the PSA,approximately one quarter of the population, 26.3 percent, fellbelow the poverty threshold in the first semester of 2015, whichindicates an increase of 0.5 percentage points from 25.8 percent inthe first semester of 2014.74 The poverty threshold signifies theminimum income required to meet basic food needs, as well as“basic non-food needs such as clothing, housing, transportation,health, and education expenses.”75 In 2015, a family of five neededan average of 9,140 pesos (approximately US$196.77)76 per monthto meet the poverty threshold.77

Moreover, the PSA reports that in the first semester of 2015,approximately 12.1 percent of Filipinos fell below the food thresh-old, which indicates an increase of 1.6 percentage points from 10.5percent in the first semester of 2014.78 The food threshold signi-fies the minimum income required to meet basic food needs, andthis threshold is used to measure extreme or subsistence poverty.79

In 2015, a family of five needed an average of 6,365 pesos (approxi-mately US$137.03) per month to meet the food threshold.80 Thesedata suggest that poverty is prevalent in the Philippines and thepoverty incidence is not declining.

Widespread poverty likely contributes to the problem of childlabor in the Philippines.81 Many parents who are poor and unableto support their families are driven by financial need to send theirchildren to work.82 Children who must work to contribute to thehousehold income are likely to be deprived of the education thatthey need.83 This interruption in education often makes childlaborers more susceptible to unemployment or low earnings as

74. PHIL. STATISTICS AUTHORITY, POVERTY INCIDENCE AMONG FILIPINOS REGISTERED AT

26.3%, AS OF FIRST SEMESTER OF 2015 (Mar. 18, 2016) https://psa.gov.ph/content/poverty-incidence-among-filipinos-registered-263-first-semester-2015-psa [https://perma.cc/MXT6-Y39L] [hereinafter PSA POVERTY 2015]; PHILIPPINE STATISTICS AUTHORITY, POVERTY

INCIDENCE AMONG FILIPINOS REGISTERED AT 25.8%, AS OF FIRST SEMESTER OF 2014 (Mar. 6,2015) https://psa.gov.ph/content/poverty-incidence-among-filipinos-registered-258-first-semester-2014-psa-0 [https://perma.cc/J6EX-B269] [hereinafter PSA POVERTY 2014].

75. PSA POVERTY 2015, supra note 74. R76. All conversions of Philippine Peso to U.S. Dollar in this Note were calculated on

http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter as of Mar. 20, 2016.77. PSA POVERTY 2015, supra note 74. R78. Id.; PSA POVERTY 2014, supra note 74. R79. PSA POVERTY 2015, supra note 74. R80. Id.81. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 35, ¶ 43 (identifying poverty as one of the R

principal causes of child labor).82. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, POVERTY IN THE PHILIPPINES: CAUSES, CONSTRAINTS,

AND OPPORTUNITIES 55–56 (2009).83. Id. at 56.



o. 100 Side B

11/02/2016 10:58:58



adults.84 As a result, when the child laborers themselves becomeadults, poverty will likely drive them to rely on their own childrenfor additional income.85 Thus, the generational cycle of poverty isinterconnected with the perpetuation of child labor in thePhilippines.

d. The Impact of Filipino Child Labor on Global Supply Chains

The exploitation of child labor in the Philippines is an impor-tant problem for the international community, because as one ofthe largest growth economies, the Philippines poses a high risk ofexposing supply chains of multinational corporations to unlawfulchild labor.86 Companies can be implicated in violations of childlabor laws if child laborers “are found to be working within theiroperations.”87 Growth economies present a distinct risk for childlabor complicity because they are primary sources for raw materialsand manufactured goods, and form “critical links within multina-tional supply chains.”88 A 2012 study by risk analysis firmMaplecroft warned that supply chains of companies are particularlyexposed to the risk of child labor in large growth economies andclassified the Philippines as “extreme risk” with respect to thisissue.89 Thus, the problem of child labor in the Philippines is notlimited to the nation itself, but also affects the international com-munity through multinational supply chains.

B. The Legal Framework Governing Child Labor

First, this Section examines the international legal frameworkthat governs the problem of child labor. Specifically it explains thethree principal international conventions that seek to eradicatechild labor, to which the Philippines is a signatory: the ILO Mini-mum Age Convention, the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Con-vention, and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child

84. WORLD REPORT ON CHILD LABOR, supra note 23, at 6. R85. Id. at 6.86. Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and Philippines Expose Companies to High Levels of Sup-

ply Chain Risk, VERISK MAPLECROFT, http://maplecroft.com/about/news/child_labour_2012.html [https://perma.cc/WZY8-PS9L] (last visited Aug. 17, 2016). Supply chainrefers to the “network between a company and its suppliers to produce and distribute aspecific product.” “Supply Chain,” INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/supplychain.asp [https://perma.cc/N6VR-4SKV] (last visited Aug. 17, 2016).

87. See VERISK MAPLECROFT, supra note 86. R88. Id.; Climate Change Will Push More Children Into Work, VERISK MAPLECROFT, https://

maplecroft.com/about/news/child-labour-index.html [https://perma.cc/6EBG-FTBS](last visited Aug. 17, 2016).

89. See VERISK MAPLECROFT, supra note 86. R



o. 101 Side A

11/02/2016 10:58:58



(UNCRC). Next, this Section assesses how the Philippines hasimplemented the mandates of the international conventionsthrough Republic Act No. 9231.

1. International Conventions on Child Labor

Child labor is widely recognized as a significant violation ofhuman rights, and three principal international conventions estab-lish standards for the definition and regulation of child labor.90

First, the ILO Minimum Age Convention sets fifteen as the generalminimum age for employment and prohibits children under theage of eighteen from engaging in hazardous labor.91 Second, theILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention requires ILO Mem-ber States to remove all children under the age of eighteen fromthe worst forms of child labor.92 This mandate has received specialattention from the ILO and its constituents, as demonstrated bythe Global Action Plan and the Hague Roadmap.93 Third, theUNCRC establishes the right of every child to be protected fromchild labor and specifies measures that U.N. States Parties musttake to ensure this right.94 All three conventions require the ratify-ing countries to establish a provision of appropriate penalties toensure enforcement.95

Most countries in the world, including the Philippines, have rati-fied all three instruments.96 A convention is a legally binding inter-national treaty, and ratifying countries “commit themselves toapplying the convention in national law and practice.”97 Thus, thethree international conventions governing the prohibition of childlabor establish binding standards on ratifying countries, and theU.N. Secretary-General has confirmed that “any work carried outby children in conditions below those established by the [UNCRC]or by ILO standards should be considered as economicexploitation.”98

90. WORLD REPORT ON CHILD LABOR, supra note 23, at 7. R91. See infra Part I.B.1.a.92. See infra Part I.B.1.b.93. See id.94. See infra Part I.B.1.c.95. See infra Part I.B.1.a–c.96. See id.97. See ILO, Conventions and Recommendations, http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/

introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-and-recommendations/lang—en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/5RR2-SLWY] (last visited Aug. 17, 2016).

98. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 35, ¶ 9. R



o. 101 Side B

11/02/2016 10:58:58



a. The ILO Minimum Age Convention

The ILO Minimum Age Convention, adopted in 1973, calls onILO Member States to adopt a national policy to ensure the “effec-tive abolition” of child labor.99 Most importantly, the ILO Mini-mum Age Convention sets the general minimum age foremployment at fifteen years.100 However, it allows for the possibil-ity of initially setting the general minimum age at fourteen for ILOMember States whose economy and educational facilities are insuf-ficiently developed.101 Furthermore, the convention allows chil-dren between the ages of thirteen and fifteen to do light work,which is “not likely to be harmful to their health or development”and does not interfere with schooling.102 On the other hand, forhazardous work, which is “any type of employment or work whichby its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out is likelyto jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young persons,” theconvention sets the minimum age at eighteen years.103

To date, 168 countries have ratified this convention, includingthe Philippines.104 The ratifying countries must take “all necessarymeasures, including the provision of appropriate penalties,” toenforce a minimum age for admission to employment according tothe principles established by the convention.105

b. The ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention

The second key instrument, the ILO Worst Forms of ChildLabour Convention, was adopted in 1999 to complement the ILOMinimum Age Convention and calls on ILO Member States to takeimmediate and effective measures to eliminate the worst forms ofchild labor as a matter of urgency.106 The convention first definesa “child” as a person under eighteen years of age.107 Furthermore,for the purposes of this convention, the “worst forms of childlabor” include all forms of slavery, prostitution, illicit activities, andany work that is “likely to harm the health, safety or morals of chil-

99. ILO Minimum Age Convention, supra note 25, art. 1. R100. Id. art. 2.3.101. Id. art. 2.4.102. Id. art. 7.1.103. Id. art. 3.1.104. See ILO, Ratifications of C138–Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138), http://

www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312283 [https://perma.cc/AX3K-XS9R] (last visited Aug. 17, 2016).

105. ILO Minimum Age Convention, supra note 25, art. 9.1. R106. ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, supra note 26, pmbl., art. 1. R107. Id. art. 2.



o. 102 Side A

11/02/2016 10:58:58



dren.”108 The convention specifically requires ILO Member Statesto remove children from the worst forms of child labor and pro-vide for their rehabilitation and social integration.109 The rehabili-tation process requires ensuring access to free basic education and,in certain situations, providing vocational training for childrenremoved from the worst forms of child labor.110

To date, 180 countries have ratified this convention, includingthe Philippines.111 The ratifying countries must “take all necessarymeasures,” including the provision of penal sanctions, to eliminatethe worst forms of child labor according to the principles estab-lished by the convention.112

Constituents of these two ILO conventions have continued topay special attention to the exploitation of the worst forms of childlabor, as illustrated by the Global Action Plan in 2006113 and theHague Roadmap in 2010,114 which call on ILO Member States,including the Philippines,115 to substantially increase efforts toeliminate the worst forms of child labor by 2016.116 First, theGlobal Action Plan provided an initial strategic framework toachieve this 2016 target, which included working with ILO Mem-ber States towards a universal ratification of the ILO Minimum AgeConvention and the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Conven-

108. Id. art. 3. The full definition of worst forms of child labor is as follows:All forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and traffickingof children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, includ-ing forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; theuse, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of por-nography or for pornographic performances; the use, procuring or offering achild for illicit activities, in particular for the production and trafficking of drugsas defined in the relevant international treaties; [and] work which, by its natureor the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safetyor morals of children. Id.

109. Id. art. 7.2(b).110. Id. art. 7.2(c).111. See ILO, Ratifications of C182—Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No.

182), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312327:NO [https://perma.cc/39KM-V3J7] (last visited Aug.17, 2016).

112. ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, supra note 26, art. 7. R

113. See INT’L LABOUR OFF., THE END OF CHILD LABOUR: WITHIN REACH, 83–85 (2006).114. See The Hague Global Child Labour Conference 2010, Roadmap for Achieving

the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour by 2016 (Jan. 5, 2010) [hereinafterHague Roadmap].

115. See ILO, Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries (186 Countries), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm [https://perma.cc/J3R7-U5MS] (last updated Nov. 24, 2015).

116. GLOBAL ESTIMATES, supra note 37, at 12. R



o. 102 Side B

11/02/2016 10:58:58



tion.117 Then, in recognition of a need for new momentum, theILO Member States adopted the Hague Roadmap to accelerateaction at the national level to eliminate the worst forms of childlabor leading up to the 2016 target date.118 Specifically, theroadmap identifies certain policy priorities to guide governmentaction, including, inter alia, national legislation and enforcementconcerning child labor.119 Although it is clear that the 2016 targetdate will not be met,120 the Global Action Plan and the HagueRoadmap demonstrate that the ILO and its member states placeparticular importance on elimination of the worst forms of childlabor.

c. The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child

Finally, the UNCRC, adopted in 1989, broadly recognizes thehuman rights of every child, defined as a person under the age ofeighteen years, unless the relevant laws recognize an earlier age ofmajority.121 Specifically with respect to child labor, the UNCRCrequires U.N. States Parties to recognize “[every child’s right] to beprotected from economic exploitation and from performing anywork that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’seducation, or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical,mental, spiritual, moral or social development.”122

To ensure the right of children established by this provision, theUNCRC calls on U.N. States Parties to provide a minimum age foremployment, regulation of hours and conditions of employment,and penalties or sanctions to ensure enforcement.123 As of thedate of this Note, 194 countries have ratified the UNCRC, includ-ing the Philippines.124 The ratifying countries must, inter alia, take

117. See ILO, 2010 GLOBAL ACTION PLAN AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION PRIORITIES

(2010).118. Hague Roadmap, supra note 114, at 1. R119. See id. at 3–4.120. GLOBAL ESTIMATES, supra note 37, at 12. This report predicts that the goal of R

eliminating the worst forms of child labor by 2016 will not be met. Id. The report esti-mates that even reaching the goal in 2020, four years after the target date, would requirean increase in the annual rate of decline in child labor and hazardous work from thecurrent 6.5 percent to 24 percent. Id.

121. UNCRC, supra note 27, arts. 1–2. R122. Id. art. 32.1.123. Id. art. 32.2.124. 25th Anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

(Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/17/25th-anniversary-convention-rights-child [https://perma.cc/57XF-WD6H].



o. 103 Side A

11/02/2016 10:58:58



legislative measures to protect children from child labor accordingto the principles established by the UNCRC.125

2. Filipino Domestic Child Labor Law: Republic Act No. 9231

The Philippines’ Republic Act No. 9231, subtitled “An Act Pro-viding for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor andAffording Stronger Protection for the Working Child,” implementsthe three principal international conventions that seek to eradicatechild labor.126 First, Sections 2 and 3 of the Republic Act codify themandates of the ILO Minimum Age Convention to establish fifteenas the minimum age for general employment and eighteen as theminimum age for employment in hazardous work.127 Second, Sec-tions 3 and 4 of the Republic Act satisfy the requirement of theILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention to take measures toeliminate the worst forms of child labor.128 Third, Sections 2 and 3of the Republic Act implement the child labor provisions of theUNCRC by establishing a minimum age for employment, prohibit-ing the worst forms of child labor, and providing a regulation onhours of employment.129

The ILO Minimum Age Convention, the ILO Worst Forms ofChild Labour Convention, and the UNCRC uniformly require rati-fying countries to adopt a provision on penalties, to ensureenforcement of the respective conventions.130 Section 6 of theRepublic Act fulfills this obligation by imposing a schedule of pen-alties on parents and employers who violate child labor provisionsof the Act.131 The penalties on the parents impose additionalfinancial burdens on those driven by poverty to send their childrento work.132 This penalty is structurally similar to the criminaliza-tion of homelessness, which imposes additional burdens on thosedriven by poverty to live in public spaces.133 At the same time, fineson employers who exploit child labor are only marginally higherthan the ones imposed on parents.134 The amount of the mone-tary sanctions is particularly important because it is the principal

125. UNCRC, supra note 27, art. 32.2. R126. See Rep. Act No. 9231.127. See infra Part I.B.2.a.128. See infra Part I.B.2.b.129. See infra Part I.B.2.c.130. ILO Minimum Age Convention, supra note 25, art. 9.1; ILO Worst Forms of Child R

Labour Convention, supra note 26, art. 7; UNCRC, supra note 27, art. 32.2. R131. See infra Part I.B.2.d–e.132. See infra Part I.B.2.d.133. Id.134. See infra Part I.B.2.e.



o. 103 Side B

11/02/2016 10:58:58



factor that determines the effectiveness of the penalty to punishand to deter.135

a. The Republic Act’s Adoption of the ILO Minimum AgeConvention

Section 2 of the Republic Act satisfies the mandate of the ILOMinimum Age Convention to set the general minimum age ofemployment at fifteen years by establishing that “[c]hildren belowfifteen . . . years of age shall not be employed.”136 This Section alsodefines the term “child” as all persons under the age of eigh-teen.137 Furthermore, Section 3 of the Republic Act codifies theILO Minimum Age Convention’s requirement that no personsunder the age of eighteen shall engage in hazardous work.138 Spe-cifically, Section 3 prohibits all children from engaging in the worstforms of child labor, which includes work that is “hazardous orlikely to be harmful to the health, safety or morals of children.”139

Unlike the ILO Minimum Age Convention, the Republic Act doesnot explicitly allow children between the ages of thirteen and fif-teen to do light work (which does not interfere with schooling orharm health or development).140 However, this provision of theconvention is phrased as a guideline rather than as a mandate—“[n]ational laws . . . may permit the employment . . . of persons[thirteen] to [fifteen] years of age on light work.”141 Thus, theRepublic Act implements the requirements of the ILO MinimumAge Convention to establish fifteen as the age for general employ-ment and eighteen as the age for employment in hazardous work.

b. The Republic Act’s Adoption of the ILO Worst Forms ofChild Labour Convention

Section 3 of the Republic Act meets the Philippines’ obligationunder the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention by pro-

135. Id.136. Compare ILO Minimum Age Convention, supra note 25, art. 2.3, with Rep. Act No. R

9231 § 2 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 12). The prohibition in the Republic Act againstemploying children below the age of fifteen is subject to the following exceptions: where achild works within her family and is supervised by her parents or guardian and where achild’s work in public entertainment or information is essential. Rep. Act No. 9231 § 2(amending Rep. Act No. 7610 §§ 12(1)–(2)).

137. Rep. Act No. 9231 § 2 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 12(2)(c)).138. ILO Minimum Age Convention, supra note 25, art. 3.1. R139. Rep. Act No. 9231 § 3 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 12-D(4)).140. Compare ILO Minimum Age Convention, supra note 25, art. 7.1, with Rep. Act No. R

9231.141. ILO Minimum Age Convention, supra note 25, art. 7.1 (emphasis added). R



o. 104 Side A

11/02/2016 10:58:58



viding that “[n]o child shall be engaged in the worst forms of childlabor.”142 Like the convention, Section 3 of the Republic Act estab-lishes that the “worst forms of child labor” refers to slavery, prosti-tution, illicit activities, and any work that is “hazardous or likely tobe harmful to the health, safety or morals of children.”143 The Sec-tion provides, as examples of work that is hazardous or harmful tochildren, work that, inter alia, degrades children; is performedunderground or underwater; and exposes children to physical dan-ger or emotional abuse.144

Additionally, Section 4 meets the ILO Worst Forms of ChildLabour Convention’s requirement to ensure the rehabilitation andsocial integration of child laborers by providing access to educationand training for working children.145 Specifically, Section 4 pro-vides that “[n]o child shall be deprived of formal or non-formaleducation,” and requires the employer to provide a working childwith “access to at least primary and secondary education.”146

Although the Republic Act lacks wording that reflects the urgencyof the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (as well asthe Global Action Plan and the Hague Roadmap),147 it neverthe-less implements the convention mandates to take measures to elim-inate the worst forms of child labor.

c. The Republic Act’s Adoption of the UNCRC

Sections 2 and 3 of the Republic Act codify the UNCRC’srequirements148: Section 2 establishes fifteen as the minimum agefor employment,149 and Section 3 prohibits children from engag-ing in the worst forms of child labor.150 Moreover, Section 3 of theRepublic Act implements the UNCRC’s mandate to regulate hoursof employment by specifying that children below the age of fifteenmay not work for more than twenty hours per week and more thanfour hours per day, and children between fifteen and eighteenyears of age may not work for more than forty hours per week and

142. Compare ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, supra note 26, art. 1, with RRep. Act No. 9231 § 3 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 12-D).

143. Compare ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, supra note 26, art. 3, with RRep. Act No. 9231 § 3 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 §§ 12-D(1)–(4)).

144. See Rep. Act No. 9231 § 3 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 12-D(4)).145. Compare ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, supra note 26, art. 7.2, R

with Rep. Act No. 9231 § 4 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 13(a)).146. Rep. Act No. 9231 § 4 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 13(a)).147. See supra note Part I.B.1.b.148. UNCRC, supra note 27, art. 32.1. R149. Rep. Act No. 9231 § 2 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 12).150. Id. § 3 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 12-D).



o. 104 Side B

11/02/2016 10:58:58



more than eight hours per day.151 Thus, the Republic Act incorpo-rates the requirements of the UNCRC by establishing a minimumage for employment, prohibiting the worst forms of child labor,and regulating the hours of employment.

d. Imposition of Penalties on Parents of Child Laborers

The ILO Minimum Age Convention, the ILO Worst Forms ofChild Labour Convention, and the UNCRC uniformly require rati-fying countries to adopt a penalty provision to ensure enforcementof the respective conventions.152 Section 6 of the Republic Actendeavors to meet this obligation by establishing a penal structurefor violations of the child labor provisions of the Act.153 One cate-gory of people who can be held liable for civil money penaltiesunder Section 6 are “[p]arents, biological or by legal fiction, andlegal guardians” (generally here, parents).154 If parents are foundin violation of the Republic Act provisions that establish the mini-mum age for employment or the regulation of hours for employ-ment, Filipino courts must impose a fine between 10,000 and100,000 pesos (approximately US$215.29–2,152.85), communityservice between thirty days to one year, or both, at the court’sdiscretion.155

Furthermore, Section 6 provides that if “any person” is found inviolation of the worst forms of child labor provision of the Act, Fili-pino courts must impose a fine between 100,000 and 1,000,000pesos (approximately US$2,152.85–21,528.50), imprisonment oftwelve years to twenty years, or both, at the court’s discretion.156

The term “any person” is general and does not specifically exclude

151. Compare UNCRC, supra note 27, art. 32.2, with Rep. Act No. 9231 § 3 (amending RRep. Act No. 7610 § 12-A).

152. ILO Minimum Age Convention, supra note 25, art. 9.1; ILO Worst Forms of Child RLabour Convention, supra note 26, art. 7; UNCRC, supra note 27, art. 32.2. R

153. See Rep. Act No. 9231 § 6.154. Id. (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 16(f)).155. Id. Violation of two other Republic Act provisions by parents can also result in a

fine, community service, or both. See id. Parents will be penalized if found in violation ofthe provision that establishes that the income of the working child belongs to the child andmust be set aside primarily for the child’s support, and “not more than twenty percent ofthe child’s income may be used for the collective needs of the family.” Id. § 3 (amendingRep. Act No. 7610 § 12-B); see id. § 6 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 16(f)). Likewise,parents will be penalized if found in violation of the provision that requires the parents ofa working child below the age of eighteen to set up a trust fund to hold at least thirtypercent of the child’s income if the child earns at least 2,000 pesos (US$43.06) per year.Id. § 3 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 12-C); see id. § 6 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610§ 16(f)).

156. Id. § 6 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 16(b)).



o. 105 Side A

11/02/2016 10:58:58



parents.157 Thus, parents who violate the worst forms of childlabor provisions of the Act are subject to liability under this provi-sion.158 In effect, Section 6 imposes an additional financial burdenon parents who, driven by poverty, send their children to work tocontribute to the household income.159

This structure of penalization of the victim is similar to the phe-nomenon of criminalization of homelessness in the United States.Homeless people have been forced to live outside by the lack ofavailable affordable housing, shelter, and other resources.160 How-ever, U.S. cities continue to penalize those who have been forcedto live outdoors and in public places by prohibiting activities suchas “sleeping[,] camping, eating, sitting, [and] begging in publicspaces,” and imposing penalties for violations of these laws.161

Some of these laws are premised on the idea that criminalization ofhomelessness will make “less likely that homeless persons will‘choose’ to live on the streets.”162 However, homeless people areforced to sleep, sit, and eat in public spaces because they have noalternative private or public indoor space in which to performthese activities.163 Accordingly, criminalization of these activities isan affront to the “basic human dignity” of those who are home-less.164 Moreover, criminalizing homelessness leads to arrests andthe creation of criminal records, which makes finding employmentsubstantially more difficult for homeless people.165 Thus, criminal-ization of homelessness imposes additional burdens on thosedriven by poverty to live in public spaces, similar to Section 6 of theRepublic Act, which imposes financial penalties on parents drivenby poverty to send their children to work. In both cases, the pen-alty structure punishes the victim and fails to address the funda-mental cause of homelessness and child labor—poverty.

157. See id.158. See id.159. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 82, at 55–56. R160. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, CRIMINALIZING CRISIS: THE

CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 15 (Nov. 2011) [hereinafter CRIMINALIZ-

ING CRISIS].161. Id.162. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE: THE CRIMINALIZA-

TION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 16 (July 16, 2014) [hereinafter NO SAFE PLACE].163. CRIMINALIZING CRISIS, supra note 160, at 15. R164. Id. at 30.165. Id. at 31.



o. 105 Side B

11/02/2016 10:58:58



e. Imposition of Penalties on Employers of Child Laborers

Section 6 of the Republic Act also penalizes employers for violat-ing child labor provisions of the Act.166 If a court finds anemployer in violation of the Republic Act provisions that establishthe minimum age for employment or the regulation of hours foremployment, the court must impose a fine between 50,000 and300,000 pesos (approximately US$1,076.43–6,458.55), imprison-ment of six months to six years, or both, at the court’s discre-tion.167 The fine amount is only marginally higher than monetarypenalties for the same violations imposed on parents of childlaborers.168

Furthermore, Section 6(b) provides that the “employer of thesubcontractor who employs, or the one who facilitates the employ-ment of a child” in the worst forms of child labor, will suffer a finebetween 100,000 and 1,000,000 pesos (approximatelyUS$2,152.85–21,528.50), imprisonment of twelve years to twentyyears, or both, at the Filipino court’s discretion.169 Thus, employ-ers who violate the worst forms of child labor provisions of the Actare subject to liability under this provision, which equally applies toparents who commit the same violation.170

Monetary sanctions, such as the ones imposed on employers whoviolate child labor laws, ultimately aim to punish and to deter.171

The most important factor in achieving this goal is the amount ofthe fine.172 Specifically, the fine “must not be so low that anemployer finds it easier to pay the fine” than comply with thelaw.173 On the other hand, the fine must not be so high that itcould jeopardize the company and the job security of its employ-ees.174 Furthermore, the fine must reflect aggravating circum-stances, such as unlawful exploitation of children in the worstforms of child labor, by, for example, multiplying the fine by the

166. Rep. Act No. 9231 § 6 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 16(a)).167. Id. Employers found in violation of the Republic Act provision that prohibits

employing a child as a model in any advertisement promoting alcoholic beverages,tobacco, gambling, violence, or pornography will also result in a fine, community service,or both. See id.; see also id. § 5 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 14).

168. See supra Part I.B.2.d.169. Rep. Act No. 9231 § 6 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 16(b)).170. See id.; see also supra Part I.B.2.d.171. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FINES FOR BREAKING EU COMPETITION LAW 1 (Nov.

2011).172. MARIA LUZ VEGA & RENE ROBERT, ILO, LABOUR INSPECTION SANCTIONS: LAW AND

PRACTICE OF NATIONAL LABOUR INSPECTION SYSTEMS 15 (2013).173. Id. at 14.174. Id. at 15.



o. 106 Side A

11/02/2016 10:58:58



number of workers affected.175 Although the main purpose ofimposing monetary penalties is to compel compliance, they canalso be used to subsidize labor inspection activities.176 For exam-ple, several countries, such as Argentina, have used collected finesto fund the costs of labor inspection and equipment.177

The European Commission’s (EC) factors for determining finesfor breaking E.U. competition law exemplifies considerations insetting fine amounts.178 First, the EC establishes the starting pointfor the fine as “a percentage of the company’s annual sales of theproduct concerned by the infringement.” This percentage can beas high as thirty percent and should depend on the seriousness ofthe violation.179 Next, the EC multiplies this percentage by the“number of years and months the infringement lasted.”180 Finally,the EC establishes the maximum on the fine as ten percent of the“overall annual turnover of the company.”181 A policy of factors todetermine the appropriate fine, as opposed to a predeterminedrange of fines, allows the regulator to cover a variety of factualcircumstances.182

In conclusion, the Republic Act incorporates the principal man-dates of the ILO Minimum Age Convention, the ILO Worst Formsof Child Labour Convention, and the UNCRC by establishing aminimum age for employment, a regulation of hours for employ-ment, a prohibition on the worst forms of child labor, and a provi-sion for penalties.183 However, the Act penalizes parents driven bypoverty to send their children to work and, at the same time, onlyimposes marginally higher penalties on employers who exploitchild labor.184

II. ANALYSIS

Part II articulates this Note’s recommendation that the RepublicAct’s penalty structure should be amended to shift the financialburden of child labor law violations from parents to employers.First, it proposes that Section 6 of the Republic Act should be

175. Id.176. Id. at 17.177. Id.178. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 171, at 1–2. R179. Id. at 1.180. Id.181. Id.182. Id. at 2.183. See supra Part I.B.2.184. See supra Part I.B.2.d–e.



o. 106 Side B

11/02/2016 10:58:58



amended to eliminate all penalties imposed on parents of childlaborers, because these penalties fail to adequately account for pov-erty. It proceeds to argue that Section 6 of the Republic Act shouldbe amended to impose higher monetary penalties for employers,so as to make cost inefficient employer exploitation of child labor.

A. Proposed Section 6 Amendments to Eliminate All Penalties Imposedon Parents

Section 6 of the Republic Act is misguided in placing the burdenof child labor violations on parents of child laborers, because itfails to adequately account for the underlying cause of child labor:poverty. Parents found in violation of the Act’s provisions thatestablish the minimum age and regulation of hours for employ-ment can be subject to a civil money penalty between 10,000 and100,000 pesos (approximately US$215.29–2,152.85).185 Further-more, parents found in violation of the provision of the Act thatprohibits the worst forms of child labor can be subject to a finebetween 100,000 and 1,000,000 pesos (approximatelyUS$2,152.85–21,528.50).186 These fines represent a significantfinancial burden on parents of child laborers, who are likely to bepoor.187

In 2015, around 26.3 percent of the Filipino population failed tomeet the poverty threshold of 9,140 pesos (approximatelyUS$196.77) per month and around 12.1 percent of the populationfailed to meet the food threshold of 6,365 pesos (approximatelyUS$137.03) per month.188 These data demonstrate that parents ofchild laborers, who likely fall into one of these two groups,189

would not be able to afford to pay the Act’s fines because even thelowest possible penalty of 10,000 pesos (approximately US$215.29)is higher than either the poverty or food threshold.

Imposing civil money penalties on parents of child laborers whoare unable to pay serves as an additional financial burden on thechild laborers’ families and exacerbates their financial condition,which created the need for the children to work in the firstplace.190 This additional burden is similar to the one created byU.S. statutes that penalize homeless people, who are driven by pov-

185. Rep. Act No. 9231 § 6(f) (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 16(f)).186. Id. § 6(b) (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 16(b)).187. See supra Part II.A.2.188. See PSA POVERTY 2015, supra note 74. R189. See supra Part I.A.2.190. See supra Part I.A.2.



o. 107 Side A

11/02/2016 10:58:58



erty to live outside.191 Like the criminalization of homelessness,the Republic Act’s penalty structure wrongly places the burden onthe victims of poverty.192

Beyond the moral implications of punishing the victims, theRepublic Act’s imposition of civil money penalties on parents ofchild laborers does not further the Republic Act’s goal of eradicat-ing the exploitation of child labor.193 Instead, the fines on parentspush the child laborers’ families deeper into poverty. This wors-ened financial state, in turn, drives parents to send their childrento work again, which interrupts the children’s education.194 A dis-ruption in education makes the child laborers more susceptible tounemployment or low earnings as adults and, as adults, they willlikely rely on their own children for financial support.195 In sum,penalizing the parents of child laborers fuels the perpetuation ofchild labor, rather than eradicating it.

Furthermore, the imposition of community service and, for vio-lations involving the worst forms of child labor, imprisonment onparents of child laborers196 similarly exacerbates the financial dis-tress of the family. Parents found in violation of the Act’s provi-sions that establish the minimum age and regulation of hours foremployment can be required to render community service forbetween thirty days and one year.197 This penalty likely forces par-ents of child laborers to take time away from work, which nega-tively affects the financial stability of child laborers’ families.Furthermore, parents found in violation of the provision of the Actthat prohibits the worst forms of child labor can be imprisoned fortwelve to twenty years.198 Not only would imprisonment eliminatethe parents’ source of income for twelve to twenty years, the result-ing criminal record would make finding employment upon releasesubstantially more difficult for the parents.199 Therefore, Section 6of the Republic Act should be amended to eliminate all penalties,rather than only the fines, on parents of child laborers.

Moreover, the negative impact of the current structure of penal-ties explained above outweighs the potential deterrent effect on

191. See supra Part I.B.2.192. See id.193. See Rep. Act No. 9231 § 1 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 2).194. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 82, at 56. R195. See WORLD REPORT ON CHILD LABOR, supra note 23, at 6. R196. See Rep. Act No. 9231 § 6 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 §§ 16(b), (f)).197. Id. (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 16(f)).198. Id. (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 16(b)).199. See CRIMINALIZING CRISIS, supra note 160, at 31. R



o. 107 Side B

11/02/2016 10:58:58



parents of child laborers. Some might justify the imposition ofpenalties with a similar argument to that used by defenders of thecriminalization of homelessness—that the penalties encourage par-ents to “choose” not to send their children to work.200 However,like the homeless people who have no alternative but to sleep, sit,and eat in public places, the parents of child laborers are forced bypoverty to send their children to work.201 Therefore, the penaltiesare unlikely to have a deterrent effect on the parents because theywould not “send their children to work if they can afford not to.”202

For the foregoing reasons, Section 6 of the Republic Act should beamended to eliminate all penalties—fines, community service, andimprisonment—on the parents of child laborers.

B. Proposed Amendments to Impose Higher Monetary Penalties onEmployers

Section 6 of the Republic Act fails to adequately deter employersfrom exploiting child labor through its provision of penalties.Employers found in violation of the Act’s provisions that establishthe minimum age and regulation of hours for employment can besubject to a civil money penalty between 50,000 and 300,000 pesos(approximately US$1,076.43–6,458.55).203 This range of fines isonly marginally higher than that imposed on the parents of childlaborers—between 10,000 and 100,000 pesos (approximatelyUS$215.29–2,152.85)—especially taking into consideration thatmost of the parents are likely to have low socioeconomic status.204

Furthermore, employers found in violation of the provision of theAct that prohibits the worst forms of child labor can be subject to afine between 100,000 and 1,000,000 pesos (approximatelyUS$2,152.85–21,528.50).205 For this violation, employers and par-ents are subject to the same range of monetary penalties.206 Thissimilarity between the fines imposed on parents, who were drivenby poverty to send their children to work, and employers, wholikely have greater access to resources, indicates that the RepublicAct’s schedule of penalties does not effectively punish and deterchild labor law violations.207 The monetary penalties on employers

200. See NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 162, at 16. R201. CRIMINALIZING CRISIS, supra note 160, at 15; see supra Part I.A.2. R202. Basu et al., supra note 18, at 1. R203. Rep. Act No. 9231 § 6 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 16(a)).204. Id. (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 16(f)).205. Id. (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 16(b)).206. See id.; supra Part I.B.2.d.207. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 171, at 1. R



o. 108 Side A

11/02/2016 10:58:58



who unlawfully use child labor are “so low that an employer [likely]finds it easier to pay the fine” than to obey the child labor provi-sions of the Act.208 Thus, Section 6 of the Republic Act must sub-stantially increase the fines imposed on those who exploit childlabor.

This Note does not make a numerical suggestion regardingexactly how much to raise the monetary penalties on employers.However, legislators in the Philippines should consider certain fac-tors, namely those identified by the EC,209 in increasing theamount of fines on employers. First, the starting point for the fineon employers could be a percentage, as high as thirty percent, ofthe violator’s annual sales of the product tainted by child labor.210

This percentage should depend on the seriousness of the viola-tion,211 which means that violations of the worst forms of childlabor should carry the highest percentage.212 Second, Philippinelegislators should include a provision that would multiply this per-centage by the number of months the violation lasted and thenumber of child laborers found working for the company.213

Finally, the Act should establish a maximum on the fine onemployers as a certain percentage of the company’s annual prof-its.214 These guidelines will help prevent child labor by making itcost inefficient for employers to violate child labor laws and, at thesame time, are flexible enough to cover varying factualcircumstances.

The lack of data on how often inspectors have imposed finesunder the Republic Act might indicate enforcement problems,which in turn underscores the importance of the proposed amend-ments. Indeed, “enforcement of child labor laws remains challeng-ing [in the Philippines] due to the limited number of inspectorsand lack of resources for inspections.”215 Upon substantiallyincreasing the fines on employers who violate child labor provi-sions of the Republic Act, the Philippines could use the collectedfines to refocus the initiative to eliminate child labor and subsidize

208. Vega & Robert, supra note 172, at 14. R209. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 171, at 1. R210. Id.211. Id.212. The ILO Member States paid special attention to the ILO Worst Forms of Child

Labour Convention, as indicated by the development of the Global Action Plan and theHague Roadmap, which set 2016 as the target date to eliminate the worst forms of childlabor. See supra Part I.B.1.b.

213. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 171, at 1; Vega & Robert, supra note 172, at 15. R214. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 171, at 1. R215. DOL 2014 FINDINGS, supra note 15, at 1. R



o. 108 Side B

11/02/2016 10:58:58



labor inspection operating costs.216 The use of collected monetarypenalties would bolster enforcement of the Republic Act and theeffort to eradicate child labor.

CONCLUSION

Although the Republic Act incorporates the three principalinternational legal regimes governing child labor—the ILO Mini-mum Age Convention, the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Con-vention, and the UNCRC—the Act’s penalty structure fails toaccount for the underlying problem of poverty that drives childlabor or make violations of child labor laws cost-inefficient foremployers.217 This Note proposes that Section 6 of the RepublicAct should be amended to eliminate all penalties imposed on par-ents of child laborers and to impose higher monetary penalties foremployers.218 The recommended amendments would shift thefinancial burden of violating child labor laws from parents toemployers. Thus, this shift in the burden would help to avoid exac-erbating the financial situation of child laborers and their families,while, at the same time, deterring employers from exploiting childlabor. Although “legislation alone cannot eradicate [the exploita-tion of] child labour,” it is an essential piece in the fight againstthis urgent global problem.219

Under the current Republic Act’s provision of penalties, Den-nis’s parents and the small-scale gold mine that employs him couldbe fined.220 Because small-scale mining is performed underwater,it would qualify as hazardous work, which would subject his parentsand employer to the same penalty: between 100,000 and 1,000,000pesos (approximately US$2,152.85–21,528.50).221 Dennis’s familylikely fails to meet the food threshold of 6,365 pesos (approxi-mately US$137.03) per month.222 Thus, even if the Filipino courtimposed the minimum fine on Dennis’s parents, it would be a sig-nificant burden on his family and would exacerbate the financialsituation that drove him to work in the gold mine in the firstplace.223 Dennis would be forced to look for work somewhere else

216. The ILO has accepted this use of collected fines as a “reasonable approach” forfunding labor inspections. Vega & Robert, supra note 172, at 17. R

217. See supra INTRODUCTION, Part II.218. See supra Part II.219. UNDERSTANDING CHILDREN’S WORK PROGRAMME, supra note 63, ¶ 177. R220. See Rep. Act No. 9231 § 6 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 16(b)).221. Id.; id. §3 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 12-D(4)(c)).222. PSA POVERTY 2015, supra note 74, at 1; see supra INTRODUCTION. R223. See supra Part II.A.



o. 109 Side A

11/02/2016 10:58:58



and remain trapped in child labor. In contrast, the same finewould have been so marginal to the employer that the employerwould not be deterred from continuing to employ children in thegold mine.224

Under the proposed amendments of this Note, however, Den-nis’s parents would not be fined.225 Furthermore, the substantiallyincreased fine on the small-scale gold mine would encourage themine to comply with the child labor provisions of the Act.226 Thus,Dennis could still work for his employer and earn money to con-tribute to his household, but his work would be limited to non-hazardous work.227 He would also work for fewer than eight hoursper day and fewer than forty hours per week, giving him time toattend school and study towards fulfilling his dream of becoming apoliceman.228

224. See supra Part II.B.225. See supra Part II.A.226. See supra Part II.B.227. See Rep. Act No. 9231 § 3 (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 12-D).228. See id. (amending Rep. Act No. 7610 § 12-A); supra INTRODUCTION.

Documents

NOTE · Norte and Masbate provinces in the Philippines Bicol region ... a substantial body of literature that argues that the main ... (ILO Worst Forms of Child