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Summary .......................................................................................................................................... 1

Sources of information ................................................................................................................. 2

Northern L

Northern Tide

The Vessel

Northern L

- Outline drawing .............................................................................................. 3

- General arrangement - Profile ..................................................................... 4

- General Arrangement - Plan ........................................................................ 5

- Northern Tide ................................................................................................... 6

- Northern L ........................................................................................................ 8

- Fire control plan ........................................................................................... 10

13The crew ........................................................................................................................................

The voyage .................................................................................................................................... 14

Extract from chart BA 967 - Palwan ....................................................................................... 16

Comment and Analysis - General ......................................................................................... 18

- The fire .......................................................................................... 18

- Containing the fire ................................................................... 20

- The foundering ......................................................................... 22

Diagram of Northern L tank arrangements ......................................................................... 24

General observations ................................................................................................................. 25

Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 26

Attachment: Particulars of Ship .............................................................................................. 28

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In the early hours of 30 November1991, while on a positioning voyagefrom Singapore to Cebu City in thePhilippines, the Australian registeredfishing vessel Northern L caught fire.The six crew were unable to fight thefire and abandoned the vessel inapproximate position latitude 8degrees 03 minutes North, longitude118 degrees 34 minutes East, takingwith them an emergency radio and thevessel’s 406mHz emergency positionindicator radio beacon (EPIRB). Atabout 0500 explosions were heardcoming from the vessel, which sankshortly after.

At sunrise the crew took stock of theirsurroundings and activated thevessel’s EPIRB.

At about 0830, the Australian MarineRescue Coordination Centre received adistress alert from the United StatesMRCC, Washington that a distressbeacon belonging to the Australian

registered fishing boat had beendetected in position 8 degrees 02minutes North 118 degrees 33minutes East.

These details were passed to WestpacMRCC in Japan, and Manila MRCC inthe Philippines.

At 1130 (UTC+8) the Liberianregistered tanker Nagasaki Spirit, enroute from Dulang, Malaysia, toSantan, Indonesia, was requested byWestpac MRCC to proceed to a position08 degrees 03.3 minutes North and118 degrees 34.3 minutes East toinvestigate the EPIRB signal. At 1245the Nagasaki Spirit sighted an orangecanopy and by 1340 the six survivorshad been taken on board the tanker.

The master of the Northern L (aPhilippine national), the mate (anIndian national) and the two engineers(both Indonesian nationals) werelanded in Santan. The two Australiancrew remained with the Nagasaki Spirituntil the ship arrived off Brisbane on14 December.

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Information was provided by:

The Australian crew members of theNorthern L

Karina Fisheries Pty Ltd, Port Lincoln

Lukin International Fisheries Ltd,Singapore

The Australian Maritime SafetyAuthority

- Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre

- Ship and Personnel Safety Branch

- The Registrar of Ships

Singmarine Dockyard and EngineeringPly Ltd, Singapore

The Master, m t Nagasaki Spirit

The American Bureau of Shipping

Tidewater Port Jackson Marine Pty Ltd

The Master of the Northern Lresponded to a letter sent by theInspector, supplying certain detailedinformation.

The Inspector also gratefullyacknowledges the assistance of theDirector of Marine, Marine Department,Singapore and the Department ofScientific Services, Singapore.

Times:Unless otherwise indicated all times aregiven in the ship’s time kept on theNorthern L.

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The Northern L was an Australianregistered fishing vessel owned byKarina Fisheries Pty Ltd, of PortLincoln. Originally the Northern Tide, itwas purchased from Tidewater PortJackson Marine Pty Ltd, in January1988 and fitted out for purse-seinefishing. The vessel was registered ashaving changed name and undergonealterations in February 1989.

The Northern Tide

The vessel was built as the NorthernTide in 1973, in Newcastle, New SouthWales, as an off-shore support vessel.It was classed with the AmericanBureau of Shipping (ABS) with classnotations “+A1E”, “+AMS” and built toconform with the Corn-monwealthNavigation (Construction) Regulationsand the Navigation (Fire Appliances)Regulations.

As the Northern Tide, the vessel wasoriginally 49.6m in length overall,12.22m maximum breadth, 5.09mmoulded depth and had a summerdraught of 4.242m. The forecastledeck extended from the stem (frame84) to frame 58 and carried a deckhousing, containing accommodationfor the officers, and the wheelhouse.Further crew accommodation wasbeneath the forecastle deck at maindeck level (tween deck) and below themain deck (lower tween deck),forward of frame 58. Access to theaccommodation at the main deck levelwas by a hinged weathertight doorlocated to port of the centre line atframe 58. The main deck betweenframe 45 and 58 was partiallyenclosed by stores, the starboard

funnel casing and the air conditioningplant on the starboard side, and onthe port side, by the port funnelcasing, the crew laundry, stores andthe CO2 store for engine-room firesmothering. The towing winch was inthe open deck space between thesestores. Just aft of the towing winchand slightly to starboard of the centreline between frames 42 and 45, anaccess hatch (1.52m x lm) flush withthe deck, provided access to theengine-room for equipment. Aft offrame 45 the deck was open for30.175m to the stern, providing anunencumbered working space.

Below the main deck, the vessel wasdivided into five main watertightcompartments by watertight bulk-heads at frames 14,51/52 (steppedbulkhead at forward end of engine-room), 64 and 77 (the collisionbulkhead). Access between the engine-room and the spaces immediatelyforward and aft of it was by way oflocally and remotely operated slidingwatertight doors at frames 14 and 51,the remote controls for both the slidingdoors were above the bulkhead deck,on the main deck at frame 56 on thecentre line. The approved stability dataunder “watertight integrity” stated:

"As the stability of this vessel relieson the watertight integrity of the

forecastle and side houses, as well asof the hull, the doors giving access

from the deck to the fan rooms, deckstores and forward accommodationand down to the lower decks are tobe kept closed at all t imes when thevessel is at sea."

Normal access between theaccommodation and the engine-roomwas by way of a space on the port side

of the main deck (that doubled as thelaundry) via the stairs to a crossalleyway and thence through thewatertight door at frame 51. In additionto the normal access doors, there wasan emergency escape from the engine-room through a dogged door into thestarboard coffer-dam space and, byladder, through a hatch on to the maindeck. The aftermost compartment,connected to the engine-room by thewatertight door at frame 14, containedthe steering gear. Escape from thiscompartment was by a dogged hatchon the starboard side.

The engine-room extended from frame14 to frame 51. The vessel was poweredby two General Motors 16.645E2 dieselengines producing 2869kW driving twovariable pitch propellers. Each enginewas connected through a gear box to ashaft driving the respective propeller.Electrical power was supplied by threediesel generators, two General MotorsDetroit diesels type 6-71 and oneCaterpillar type D353. Two main firepumps were located on the port side ofthe engine-room.

The Northern Tide’s fuel tanks wereadjacent to the engine-room space.Three sets of tanks were arranged oneither side of the engine-room betweenthe subdivision bulkheads at frame 14and 52, extending from the underside ofthe main deck to the bottom plating andwere 1.829m in width. At the fore endof the engine-room, between frames 42and 47, a series of further fuel storagetanks, including the daily service tank,were arranged between the side tanks,with a further double bottom tank (No3) between frames 47 and 52.

The vessel’s engine-room space wasnot equipped to operate in an

unmanned machinery space mode, norwas it required that the space shouldbe fitted with a fixed fire detectionsystem. Accordingly, no such systemwas fitted.

In the event of fire, the engine-roomcould be isolated and fuel to machineryshut off by a series of emergencycontrols remote from the engine space,situated at the main deck level betweenframe spaces 47 and 56. The fuel oilquick-closing controls were accessiblefrom the open deck in way of the portfunnel casing. The main engines couldalso be stopped from the bridge.

The remote stops for the engine-roomand accommodation fans, the generalservice bilge and ballast and oil fuel-transfer pumps were situated in thelaundry space. The CO2 fire-smotheringcontrols were also in the laundry,adjacent to a stairwell providing accessto the engine-room and tank spacesforward of the engine-room.

The ship was equipped with a bow-thrust propeller for manoeuvring thevessel, the diesel engine for whichcould be started and controlled fromthe bridge. The bow thrust enginespace was situated forward, betweenframes 73 and 77. The space could bereached through the lower crewaccommodation via companion waysand the alleyways, or by two verticalladders through three watertighthatches, that provided an escape routefrom the spaces in the forecastle to theforecastle head deck. The bow thrustengine also powered the emergency firepump, but to operate the pump it hadto be clutched into the engine by aclutch mechanism, which could only beoperated from the bow-thrust spaceitself. The batteries for starting the bow

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thrust engine and the diesel fuel tankfor that engine were both located in thebow-thrust space.

The Northern L

In November 1987 the Northern ‘Kdewas sold to Karina Fisheries Pty Ltd,and later the vessel was converted to apurse-seine fishing vessel and thename changed to Northern L. It wasreclassed with ABS and assigned classnotations “+AlE Fishing Service,+AMS (class notation for hull andmachinery of a fishing vessel). Theconversion to a fishing vessel wasoverseen by ABS to conform to theirrules and the vessel subsequentlyremained in class.

Marine Orders Part 31 (Ship Surveyand Certification 31.21.3) providesthat:

* A fishing vessel regisrered inAustralia in respect of which there isin force a valid classificationcertificate for the hull and machineryissued by a survey authority, isexempt from survey under subsection193(l) of the Navigation Act inrespect of those items of the vessel.

To convert the offshore support vesselto a purse-seine fishing vessel,significant modifications wereundertaken for Karina Fisheries, in1988 by Singmarine Dockyard andEngineering Pty Ltd, Singapore,resulting in the vessel being assigned anew overall length of 55.02m.

Vessels built under the provisions ofthe Navigation Act 1912 must conformto Marine Orders Part 12 (ShipConstruction) and Marine Orders Part15 (Ship Fire Protection, Fire Detection

and Fire Extinction) if the keels of thevessels were laid or they were at asimilar stage of construction on or after25 May 1980. But, as the Northern Lwas an existing vessel, built before 25May 1980, the provisions of theNavigation (Construction) Regulationsand the Navigation (Fire Appliances)Regulations apply to it and to anysubsequent conversion.

Below the main deck the engine-roomspace was modified by reducing thefuel capacity and converting theaftermost port and starboard fuel tanks(frame 14 to frame 24) to carry freshwater and the small tank spaces aboveand either side of the daily service tankwere converted to oil overflow tanks.

Under ABS rules for fishing vessels,only three watertight bulkheads wererequired below the main deck. Thewatertight door at the forward part ofthe engine-room was not required tomeet the subdivision standard.According to the Australian MaritimeSafety Authority (AMSA) , a plan wassubmitted to remove the watertightdoor at frame 51 and plate over theentrance. The Authority’s surveyorsstate that this door was removed atconversion and a subsequentdeficiency report issued during surveyon 30 April 1991 refers to the engine-room watertight door in the singular.However, the ABS surveyor whoattended the vessel in Singaporeadvised that as far as he couldrecollect, “the watertight door at frame51 was not removed at the time of theconversion”. From statements made bythe Australian crew it seems that thedoor was not removed.

However, the hatch between the maindeck and the engine-room between

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frames 42 and 45 was modified toeffectively make it the normal engine-room access. The original access by thecross alleyway to the port side of thevessel forward of frame 51, waspartially obstructed by new pipework.

Other modifications outside the enginespace involved the crew accom-modation and other tank spaces.

The conversion involved creating anupper deck by extending the forecastledeck to the stern of the ship, so that itterminated at a net well and ramp aft offrame 5. This deck became thebulkhead deck. As a fishing vessel, theNorthern L was not required to beassigned a load line. However, themodifications resulted in a significantincrease in draught. A maximumpermissable was assigned by theDepartment of Transport andCommunications, stipulating that thevessel should not be loaded deeperthan a draught of 6.172m at midships,an increase of 1.93m, bringing thedeepest permissable water-line abovethe main deck level.

The positions of the existing remoteemergency controls (engine-room CO2,fuel and pump shut offs andventilation fan stops) were retained onthe main deck as originally built. Theposition of the remote control for thewatertight door or doors also remained

the same, although in the modifiedvessel the controls were below the newbulkhead deck.

The enclosed main deck space wassubdivided by four watertightbulkheads and associated watertightdoors, the existing door to theaccommodation at frame 58 and newhinged watertight doors at bulkheadsin way of frames 40, 14 and 2. Theoriginal stern structure was removedand the vessel’s length extended bysome 3m.

A series of 18 brine tanks (nine portand nine starboard) were created totake the fish catch. The original cementtanks and chain locker spaces below themain deck, between frames 47 and 64,were converted to brine tanks, four newtanks were constructed on the maindeck, and the stabiliser tank and deeptank at the after end of the engine-roomhad also been converted. Accesshatches (or necks) to all but the threesets of the forward brine tanks were letinto the upper deck to allow the loadingof fish. Access to the three forwardbrine tanks below the main deck wasby way of a hatch constructed in theupper deck, on the centre line, betweenframes 49 and 53, with dimensions ofabout 2m x 1.4m. Fish were loaded intothe converted tanks, from the maindeck, by “necks” let into the main deckforward of frame 47.

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The brine tanks were of double steelplate construction separated by woodenbeams fixed to existing steel stiffeners.The space between the plates was filledwith injected foam insulation.

An additional refrigeration compressorunit was fitted aft, above the steeringgear space and below the net well.Originally designed to service the blastfreezer, the unit had been connected tothe overall system and could be used,together with the forward compressor,as refrigeration plant for the brinetanks. Both systems worked on theinert refrigerant gas, Fluoron.

The escape hatch from the steering-gear compartment was sealed and anew escape hatch was cut in way offrames 1 and 2, just to the port side ofthe centre line immediately adjacent tothe door between the steering gearcompartment and the tunnel to theengine-room.

Among other modifications a fashionplate was fabricated around theaccommodation on the forecastle deckand two sets of derricks for fish and nethandling were fitted in way of frames52 and 33. The towing winch on thefore part of the deck was removed.

A 7.1 m aluminium self-propelled skiff,stowed on the starboard quarter on theramp to the net-well, was used fordeploying the purse-seine net. Thiswas winched on to the ramp andsecured by ropes and shackles.

Two 25-man capacity SOLAS standardliferafts were carried, one either side ofthe wheelhouse.

The original trim and stabilityinformation book was withdrawn and a

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new book containing intact stabilityinformation was submitted byconsultant naval architects andapproved by the Department ofTransport and Communications. Withthe changed operating criteria requiredof a fishing vessel, reference to therequirement to keep weather-tight doorsclosed was omitted. The new bookdetailed operating conditions relating tothe maximum allowable draught andthe number of brine tanks permitted tobe “slack” at any one time.

The vessel was remeasured for tonnageafter the modifications and re-enteredservice early in 1989.

The ship was surveyed by an AMSAsurveyor at Rabaul, Papua NewGuinea, in June 1989 for annualendorsement of the Certificate ofSurvey for a Fishing Vessel, whichexpired in June 1990. The shipcontinued in service with an expiredcertificate until surveyed by AMSA atPort Lincoln in April and May 1991.This survey took place before thevessel returned to Singapore for drydocking and refit. Deficiency noticeswere issued on 30 April and 17 May,detailing outstanding items that neededto be rectified before the issue of asurvey certificate.

On 23 May 1991, the deficienciesrecorded had been addressed and areport of survey completed, effectivelyrecommending the issue of a certificate,conditional on:

- "CO2 cylinders one additionalcylinder to connect to manflold atdry docking

- Daily service tank quick closing (in-stanter) valve to renew at dry dock. ”

A Certificate of Survey for a FishingVessel was issued on 2 July 1991.

The Northern L went into dry dock atSembawang Maritime Ltd, Singaporeon 18 October 1991, to carry outpainting to the hull, the ranging ofboth anchors and cables, and for workto the tail shaft. The vessel undeckedon 24 October and moved to a repairberth where further work, includingmaintenance of the engine-room,compressed air receivers, the startingsystem on the bow-thrust/emergencyfire pump, opening up the emergencyfire pump for survey and formaintenance on the main andauxiliary engines.

It is not clear from the records relatingto the refit whether or not the twooutstanding deficiencies of 23 May,

relating to the CO2 bottle and theremote closing of the daily service tankon which the issue of the certificate ofsurvey was conditional, were rectified.

In the second half of 1991, KarinaFisheries made the decision that theNorthern L should reposition to CebuCity in the Philippines, after thevessel’s refit, where the fishing crewwould be recruited.

A new fire-control plan was preparedby consultants on behalf of theowners, but this was not approved byAMSA before the vessel sailed fromSingapore on 24 November. This plan,together with the other drawings ofthe vessel after conversion, was basedon the original drawings of theNorthern Tide and their accuracy cannot be relied on.

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As a fishing vessel on overseasvoyages, the Northern L was requiredto conform to the provisions of MarineOrders Part 51, (Fishing Vessels) inrespect to the qualification of the crew.

Marine Orders Part 51 give effect toInternational Maritime OrganizationResolution A.539 (13), that requires aperson in charge of a navigationalwatch, and the chief and secondengineers of a fishing vessel to bequalified to the satisfaction of the flagstate authority, in accordance with thetable of qualifications in the Appendixto the Orders.

Six crew were engaged to make thepositioning voyage from Singapore tothe Philippines. The master and twoAustralian “deck hands” were regularcrew members. A mate (an Indiannational), and a chief and secondengineer (Indonesians) were engagedfor the voyage.

The master, a Philippine national, helda mates certificate of competency for avessel of any gross tons, issued by theBoard of Manila, Philippines Thiscertificate, together with details ofservice and certificates relating tocourses completed in accordance withthe provisions of the InternationalConvention on the Standards ofTraining, Certification and Watch-keeping for Seafarers 1978, was

accepted by AMSA as meeting thequalification requirements of theMarine Orders, for a fishing vessel ofover 24m.

According to the owners the mate, andthe chief and second engineers allheld certificates of competency,consistent with their duties, issued bytheir respective national marineadministrations.

One of the two deck hands was alsothe owners’ representative. He had 13years experience as a commercialfisherman and had sailed on theNorthern L for the preceding two years,some of that time as mate when thevessel was in Australian waters. Heheld a qualification as Skipper grade 1and Marine Engine Driver Grade 1 bothissued in 1980 by the South AustralianDepartment of Marine and Harbours.As a Marine Engine Driver Grade 1, hewas qualified to sail as secondengineer on fishing vessels withengine power of less than 3000kW.Although entered in the crew list as an“Able Seaman” for the purposes of thepositioning voyage, he kept an engine-room watch. When fishing, he wasnormally in charge of the purse-seining operation.

The other seaman was the regular skiffcoxswain. He had not undertaken amarine survival course and did nothold any formal marine qualificationas either a navigational watchkeeperor engineer.

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On 21 November 1991, the Northern Ltook delivery of 200 metric tonnes ofdiesel (gas) oil, with an API gravity of0.864 at 15 degrees Centigrade and aflash point of 80 degrees Centigrade. At1305 local time on 24 November 1991,the vessel sailed from Singapore boundfor Cebu, a distance of 1355 miles.

Initially the ship was operated with bothmain engines on reduced power, but itwas decided to use only one engine,which gave a speed of 7.5 knots.

Those on board divided into a threewatch system, with the master, mateand the unqualified deck hand keepinga four-on eight-off bridge watch andthe two engineers and the owners’representative maintaining the sameregime in the engine-room.

A little after 1800 on 29 November, theNorthern L cleared the Balabac Straitand entered the Sulu Sea. At 0000 on30 November, the master took over thenavigation watch from the unqualifiedseaman and the owner’s representativetook over the engine-room watch. Thewind was north-easterly, with a lightbreeze and slight sea.

During the 0000 to 0400 watch theowner’s representative decided that heshould start to chill down brine tanks7,8 and 9. At about 0230, he left theengine-room and went to the aftercompressor room, leaving the engine-room unattended. Before starting thechilling process he decided to changethe oil in the after compressor and alsocheck the bearings, becasue they hadnot been checked for some time. Heisolated the compressor, drained the oil

and opened up the inspection covers.While he was completing this operationhe was alerted by a smell and noticedsmoke coming from the hatch betweenthe compressor room and the steeringflat below.

He began along the main deck levelbetween the brine tanks to warn theother crew but as he moved forwardthe smoke increased and becameoverpowering. He was forced to gainthe upper deck through the escapehatch on the starboard side to theupper deck. Once on the upper deck hesaw flames and smoke coming fromthe open unloading hatch. As hearrived at the accommodation he metthe master and he recalled that the firealarm was sounding. He continuedinto the accommodation and wentdown to the mess deck to rouse theother crew members. Shortly after thealarms were sounded, the shipblacked out.

Brief, sworn statements were made tothe master of the Nagasaki Spirit on 1December 1991, by all six survivorsfrom the Northern L.

According to a statement made by themaster of the Northern L, at about0330 he noticed flames and smokecoming out of the unloading hatch thatlead to the main deck and the engine-room space. He immediately soundedthe fire alarm and manoeuvred thevessel’s bow into the wind and stoppedthe engine.

Except for the two people on watch, allcrew members were in their respectivecabins asleep. They were all woken bythe fire alarm, and smelt and sawsmoke. One Australian seaman openedhis cabin door and found the galley

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area filled with smoke. He heard theother Australian seaman calling himand he grabbed an extinguisher and,clad in only shorts and a T-shirt, hehurried with the other crew out on tothe open upper deck aft of theaccommodation. All the crew reportedsmoke and flames coming from thehatch to the main deck level. The deckabove the engine-room space,particularly in the area adjacent to thehatch to the main deck and engine-room space, was too hot to stand onand all six men retreated to the stern ofthe vessel.

Both Australians described the smokeas thick. but white.

The master secured all the passports,together with the log book, EPIRB andportable emergency radio. One of thepassports was subsequently lost.

Neither the watertight door or doors,nor the ventilation system were closed,nor was the CO2 system activated. Thefire pump was not running and therewas, therefore, no water pressure onthe fire main. The emergency forwardpump was not started. The vessel wasequipped with self-contained breathingapparatus, but this was not secured.

The crew waited at the after end of thevessel to see if the fire would burnitself out. At a time put by the Masteras 0445 the crew abandoned theNorthern L by the skiff positioned at

the net ramp. The crew transferred the406 mHz EPIRB and portableemergency radio, then boarded andwaited off the vessel to allow the fireto burn out. The fire seemed to engulfthe bridge.

The survivors waited in the skiff about1OOm from the Northern L. After alapse of time, put at about 10 or 15minutes, two explosions were heard.Although it was still dark, the owner’srepresentative stated that hisimpression was that the vessel settledwith a list to starboard andsubsequently sank stern first.

Shortly afterwards, the survivors sawlights close at hand and discovered thatthe liferafts secured on board byhydrostatic releases, had floated to thesurface. The liferafts were recoveredand the stores and water subsequentlytransferred to the skiff. Attempts tobring the liferafts on board the skiffwere eventually successful, and thecanopy of one raft was cut free to coverthe exposed skiff and provide shelterfor the survivors.

With sunrise, at about 0604 local time(2204 UTC), the survivors took stockof the situation and activated the 406EPIRB. They had by this time motoredin a north-westerly direction awayfrom the area of the sinking and anydebris from the Northern L would havedrifted south in the prevailingsoutherly current.

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At 0732 Eastern Australian Summertime (2232 UTC) on 29 November 1991,the Australian MRCC received a distressalert from the United States RescueCoordination Centre in Washington andthe French RCC in Toulouse.

MRCC identified the code number asthe Northern L and passed theinformation to the Japanese RCC(WESTPAC/RCC) at Kadena AirforceBase and Manila RCC.

At 0945 local time (UTC +8, 0145UTC), the Nagasaki Spirit, a Liberiantanker en route between Dulang,Malaysia and Santan, Indonesia,detected a faint distress message on2182 kHz. The position was uncertainbut seemed to lie along the tanker’scourse line. The tanker was at thistime in approximate position 07degrees 57.1 minutes North, 117degrees 38.4 minutes East on a courseof 092 degrees.

At 1130 local time (0330 UTC), theNagasaki Spirit received a telex fromWESTPAC/RCC giving the search andrescue satellite coordinates from thesignal transmitted by the Northern L’sEPIRB, requesting that the tanker go toposition 08 degrees 03.3 minutesNorth, 118 degrees 34.3 minutes East.

The Nagasaki Spirit altered course to076 degrees, in calm seas, with a lightbreeze and good visibility.

At 1245, the Nagasaki Spirit sightedan orange canopy and informedWESTPAC/RCC. Five minutes later,distress flares and orange smoke weresighted. At 1300 VHF radio contactwas established between the NagasakiSpirit and the Northern L survivorsand it was confirmed that there wereno injuries and all were safe.

At 1315, the Nagasaki Spiritmanoeuvred alongside the skiff and by1340 all six survivors were aboard theNagasaki Spirit and the skiff andliferafts were recovered using thetanker’s hose handling crane.WESTPAC/RCC was informed andpassed the information to MRCC.

The master, mate and the twoengineers were landed at Santan inIndonesia and subsequentlyrepatriated.

On 14 December, the Nagasaki Spiritanchored off Brisbane and the twoAustralian survivors were landedashore. Arrangements were also madeto land the aluminium skiff and thelife rafts.

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General

Evidence that the fire occurred islimited to the written statements madeby the master and crew members of theNorthern L aboard the Nagasaki Spirit,and to the statements made by the twoAustralian crew to the Inspector. Themaster of the Nagaski Spirit stated thatby the time the tanker rescued thefishing vessel’s crew there was nodebris or other evidence of theNorthern L, other than the survivors,

the aluminium skiff, the liferafts andthe documents the survivors hadsecured. Examination of the liferafts bya liferaft technician, about 15 daysafter the incident, showed no obvioussigns of damage by fire or diesel oil.Similarly the vessel’s log book showedsigns of water damage, but had notbeen affected by fire or smoke.

Therefore, there is no hard evidence asto the cause of the fire that forced theabandonment and subsequent loss ofthe Northern L. All real evidence waslost with the vessel. No definitivestatement can be made as to the causeof the fire or the cause of the sinking.But it is considered that the two eventsare linked.

Only two of the six crew were availableto the Inspector for interview. Althoughthe Northern L was an Australianregistered vessel, the master (a foreignnational) did not return to Australiaand could not be interviewed. It isunderstood that he subsequently left

the employ of Karina Fisheries.Similarly the mate, chief engineer andsecond engineer did not return toAustralia. All had left the company’semploy and could not be interviewed.Other evidence is essentiallycircumstantial, based on the knownconfiguration of the ship and itsequipment and documents relating tothe vessel’s surveys and repairs.

The times of the events are notreliable. The Northern L wasmaintaining a zone time of UTC +8. Inthe position of the sinking of thevessel, civil twilight would have beenat 0542 and sunrise at 0604.

The fire

The owner’s representative stated thatwhen he left the engine-room, at atime put at about 0230, the port mainengine and other machinery wererunning normally. All temperaturesseemed normal and there was nothinguntoward. He was not a smoker andhe could not recall whether the otherengineers smoked or not.

He first detected smoke coming fromthe after hatch to the steering gearapproximately one hour after he hadleft the engine-room. It is apparentfrom subsequent statements relating toflames and the heat on the deckadjacent to the accommodationhousing and the hatch to the engine-room, that the seat of the fire wasbelow the main deck, in the engine-room, and could not have been ineither the steering flat, or in the aftercompressor room, or the tunnel spaceleading to the engine-room.

Descriptions of the smoke suggestedthat it was white and there was no

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recollection of taste or any othersensation. This would suggestvirtually complete combustion. Itwould seem to exclude thepolyurethane insulation of the brinetanks, any solid carboniferousmaterial, oil soaked lagging or oil thatwas not substantially mixed with air,all of which would generate heavilydiscoloured smoke and distinctivefumes. The refrigerant gas, fluoron, isinert and will not burn.

There was conflicting evidencebetween the two seamen interviewedas to whether there was any weldinggas stored either in a store on themain deck or in the engine-room. Anoxy-acetylene set was moved from themain deck and secured on the

forecastle deck with the bottles lashedto the housing before the vessel sailedfrom South Australia to Singapore. Itis not known whether the oxy-acetylene was removed from its stowedposition during the refit and possiblytaken to the engine-room, or whetherany additional spare bottles werecarried and, if so, where they werecarried.

Based on the limited evidenceavailable, it is most probable that thefuel feeding the fire was diesel oilmixed with air, and that the seat ofthe fire was in the engine-room. Themost likely fuel source would havebeen from a fracture in a pressurisedfuel line to either the main engine orthe diesel generator. The mostprobable source of ignition would be ahot surface, such as an exhaustmanifold. While a static electricalcharge could theoretically have beengenerated by escaping diesel oil andcaused ignition, it is consideredunlikely.

The two main engines were situatedaft of frame 36. According to theGeneral Motors diesel, 16.645E2service manual:

“the engine fuel system consists ofthe fuel injectors, fuel pump, theengine mounted fuel filter and fuelsupply and return manifolds.

Components external to the enginesuch as the fuel tank, fuel suctionstrainer and connecting linescomplete thefue system.

In operation, fuel from the fuel tank is drawn up by the fuel pump through a suction strainer and isdelivered to the engine mounted

filter. It then passes through thefilter elements to the fuel manifold supply line and injector inlet filter ateach injector is pumped into thesmall portion of the fuel supplied toeach injector is pumped into thecylinder at VW high pressure,through the needle valve and spraytip of the injector."

Fuel to the engines is at relatively lowpressure of a maximum of 345 kPa(50 psi). The fuel oil pump and supplylines enter the system at the fore partof the engine and are relatively clear ofany hot surface connected with theexhaust system.

All high pressure oil to the mainengines is contained within the topcover (enclosing the cylinder heads andinjectors). If any pipe containing thevery high pressure oil at the injectorwere fractured, any spray would havebeen contained by the top cover. It isprobable that the top cover for theengine was in place, for if the engine isrun without the cylinder head covers in

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place, lubricating oil would have beensprayed extensively, and could not gounnoticed.

The auxiliary machinery running at thetime included at least one of the dieselgenerators. The main engine wasstopped by the master at about 0330,when he realised that the vessel wason fire. However it would appear thatthe fuel source continued to feed thefire, which burned very fiercely.

The ship blacked out shortly after themaster sounded the alarms. It cannotbe established whether this was due tothe electrical circuit failing, throughthe electric cable insulations beingburnt through and shorting, or thegenerators stopping. However, with the

loss of power, the emergency batteriesshould have automatically supplied24-volt power for emergency lightingand the alarms, however the crew wereall on the main deck and with the fireuppermost in their minds were not in aposition to note whether the emer-gency lighting and alarms were, infact, activated.

The engine-room should have beenattended by a qualified individual at alltimes. The Northern L was not classedor equipped to operate with anunmanned machinery space and therewas no remote sensing system to alertthe vessel’s staff to an emergency inthe engine space. By leaving theengine-room unattended there wasneither a human nor a remote firedetection system to warn of theignition of the fire.

The evidence given by the two crewmembers interviewed, was that allwatertight doors, connecting spacesabove and below the main deck, were

open. It is also apparent that the hatchbetween the upper deck and the maindeck, and the engine-room accesshatch between the main deck and theengine-room space, were also open.

Containlng the fire

Apart from securing a water chargedfire extinguisher, no equipment wasused to fight the fire: the fuel systemwas not shut down, or the engine-roomisolated to prevent the spread of thefire.

Once the fire had started, the engine-room would have filled with smokevery quickly and within a few minutes,with the heat trapped by the deckhead,the temperature would have risen to alevel that would have made access tothe engine-room to fight the fireimpossible. The only option was toisolate the engine-room, closing alldoors, hatches and ventilation. Withthis achieved, release of the CO2should have extinguished the fire, orfailing this, the space would have beenstarved of oxygen. Either of theseactions, coupled with boundary coolingmight have saved the Northern L.

When the vessel was converted to afishing vessel, the remote stops for theventilation fan and engine-roompumps, the remote quick closing fueloil valves, the CO2 and watertight doorcontrol were all enclosed by the upperdeck. With the smoke filling theaccommodation, the reported ferocityof the fire and the heat at the upperdeck hatch area, it would not havebeen possible to gain entry to the areain which the remote controls werewithout breathing apparatus, firehoses and personnel proficient in theiruse. The breathing apparatus, stowed

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at the entrance to the mess room, andfiremen’s apparatus, kept underneaththe ladder leading from the upper deckto the wheelhouse, had also been cutoff by the flames and heat.

There is little doubt that theunrestricted spread of the fire wasaccelerated by air being supplied to thefire through the open watertight doors,which in turn allowed the spread offlame outside the engine-room space.The open engine-room door and accesshatch to the upper decks provided anatural chimney accelerating the effectof the fire. Unless these openings hadbeen secured, the release of CO2 intothe engine-room would in allprobability have had a limited andshort-lived effect.

The position of the remote controls forclosing off the fuel and ventilation,and for stopping the fuel pump wererequired to conform to the Navigation(Fire Appliance) Regulations. Therequirements under the Regulationswere that the controls should beoutside the space protected.

Under the Navigation (Fire Appliance)Regulations the release of CO2 had to be:

“capable of being controlled byvalves or cocks:

b) that are readily accessible

c) that are not readily cut off fromuse by the outbreak of fire."

In the event, the CO2 controls and themeans for isolating the engine-roomand stopping the fuel supply were cutoff by fire and smoke. With the hatchto the engine-room unsecured, themain deck was effectively common

with the engine-room and theconditions for the remote controls toisolate the engine and release the CO2were not met.

The regulations do not specify that thecontrols for the engine-room CO2 firesmothering system should be outsidethe space protected. The requirement isas quoted above, together with theneed for a warning apparatus to allowtime for people in the space to escape.

Further, if the door at the forwardengine-room bulkhead (frame 51) waseither removed or was left habituallyopen, the engine-room space waseffectively extended to the crewaccommodation bulkhead at frame 64and, by way of the transverse alleyway(in way of frames 51/52), to the crewlaundry in which the remote stops forthe fans and engine-room pumps weresituated. Under such circumstances,these remote controls were effectivelywithin the engine-room, contrary tothe regulations.

Under the provisions of sub-regulation45 (1) of the Navigation (Construction)Regulations (Number 25 of 1968),remote manual controls for slidingwatertight doors are required to beplaced above the “bulkhead” deck. Inthe regulations the “bulkhead” deck isdefined as the deck of the shipdetermined by the Minister to be thebulkhead deck. With the constructionof the sub-divided upper deck and theincreasein the vessel’s maximumpermissable draught, the upper deckbecame the logical “bulkhead” deckand the American Bureau of Shippingassumed it to be so. Therefore, afterconversion, on a strict reading of theregulations, the remote watertight doorcontrols were incorrectly sited.

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It should be stated that while thewatertight doors are a subdivisionrequirement, they also form part of abulkhead, which when closed, restrictthe ingress of oxygen and the spreadof fire.

Had the watertight doors been closedduring passage and the engine-roomhatch been secured, it is likely that theremote controls in the crew laundryand the remote fuel stops in way of thefunnel casing would not have been cutoff, at least in the initial stages of thefire, notwithstanding the position ofthe controls in the enclosed maindeck area.

Similarly, access to the bow-thrustspace to start and clutch in the

emergency fire pump was through thesmoke filled accommodation, either bycompanion ways and alleyways, or viathe emergency escape ladders andwatertight hatches forward. Anyattempt to start the emergency firepump would not have been a practicalproposition, without breathingapparatus worn by properly drilledindividuals, supported by a proficientback-up team.

Without water for the fire hoses andthe lack of containment, as a result ofopenings in the engine-roombulkhead and deckhead not beingsecured, there was little that the crewcould do to fight the fire. Only three ofthe crew had sailed on the vesselbefore, and it seemed frominterviewing the two Australian crewmembers that neither they nor theother crew members, eitherunderstood or had a full knowledge ofthe fire fighting systems orequipment, nor had they undertakenany effective fire drills or training.

While the cause of the fire cannot beestablished with certainty, thefracturing of a pipe on the oil deliverysystem would seem the most consistentwith the description of the initial stagesof the fire as described by theAustralian crew members.

The foundering

For the Northern L to sink, thewatertight integrity of the hull had tobe breached. The owner’s represen-tative stated that he heard severalexplosions and soon afterwards,possibly 10 minutes, the ship listedslightly to starboard and then sank bythe stern.

The Northern L was not built withdouble bottoms in the engine-roomspace, but was constructed with sidetanks. This effectively meant theship’s bottom was of single-skinconstruction and its side waseffectively a double hull.

Tests conducted by the Department ofScientific Services, Singapore, on thesamples of oil from the bunkeringoperation on 21 November,established the flash point of thesample of the diesel oil bunkerssupplied in Singapore as 96 degreesCentigrade (205 degrees Fahrenheit)and within the delivery specificationof 80 degrees Centigrade. Given thatthe fire had burnt unchecked for atime put at over two hours, it isprobable that the tank bulkheadswithin the engine-room would havebecome distorted and might haveruptured. Also the temperature of theoil in bunker tanks adjacent to theengine-room would have been raisedto its flash point. In this event,conditions for an explosion might

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have occurred within one or more ofthe fuel tanks, particularly the dailyservice tank situated on the centreline at the forepart of the engine-room. It is possible that any explosionwithin the ship side tanks could havebreached the hull.

Diesel gas oil of the type on board hasan auto-ignition point of between 350degrees Centigrade and 360 degreesCentigrade. The rise in temperature inthe engine-room would have beenextreme causing a marked rise intemperature in the surrounding spacesand the possibility of the oil in thevessel’s fuel tanks being raised toauto-ignition temperature cannot be

to the engines. Four air receiver reliefvalves had been removed andoverhauled in Singapore. Oncesurveyed, they had been reassembledand, according to the repair yard’srecords, the relief valves had beentested. In view of the work carried outon the air receivers and thesubsequent tests, the relief valvesshould have operated, and it isunlikely that the air receivers(cylinders) exploded.

discounted. However, in the case ofthe ship side bunker tanks, the rise intemperature would have been offset toa certain extent by the cooling effectof the sea water on the shell plating. Itseems unlikely that the auto ignitiontemperature would have been reachedby the diesel oil in the side tanks.

There were a number of possiblesources for the explosions on board theNorthern L, reported by the survivors.It is not possible to determine whetherthe explosions originated from any ofthe causes outlined, or from someother cause.

It was stated that the oxygen andacetylene bottles had been removedfrom the enclosed decks and stowedagainst the deck housing. TheInspector accepts that this informationwas given in good faith, but thepossibility remains that some bottles ofgas might have been taken to theengine-room during the refit inSingapore and not removed. Any gascylinder in the engine-room is likely tohave exploded because of the intenseheat, causing damage to thesurrounding structures, includingbreaching the surrounding fuel tanks.

The cooling water system to theengines relied on flexible couplings onthe line between the sea inlet on theraw salt water delivery line. It ispossible that one or more of these weredestroyed in the intense heat of thefire, resulting in the ingress of water.In this event, the flooding under thisscenario would have probably beenrelatively slow.

Another possible source of explosionwas the compressed air receivers,primarily for supplying compressed air

It is not possible to determine whetherthe sinking was brought about by thehull being breached by the explosions,or whether the flexible couplings onthe raw salt water line failed allowingan ingress of water, or whether thesinking was the result of some othercause. However, with the watertightdoors on board open, the engine-roomwas common with the spaces eitherside of it, from the after end of thesteering flat (frame C) to frame 64, andsinking of the vessel was inevitableonce the hull was breached.

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In issues of basic safety, there shouldbe no differentiation between theobligations placed on the owners,masters and crew of a trading vesseland a fishing vessel. Both are subjectto the same basic rules of seamanship,collision avoidance and stability. Whencircumstances are beyond their control,both have a right to expect assistance

from other ships and shore authorities,as was rendered in this incident. Inturn, both should be expected to dotheir utmost to follow basic safetyprocedures and maintain their vessel insuch a way that it is not put at risk orcauses risk to others.

This requires proper management ofthe ship at all levels to direct andensure safe operation of the vessel. Itwas apparent that the owners of theNorthern L had not issued anycomprehensive instructions with regardto the vessel’s operational proceduresother than for fishing.

Under Marine Orders Part 51, forfishing vessels over 24m in length, allmasters and persons in charge of awatch, whether navigational or engine-room should have attended anapproved fire fighting course and havea knowledge of fire fighting systemsand procedures. The master held acertificate certifying that he hadcompleted a course in fire fighting andfire prevention in accordance with theInternational Convention on theStandards of Training, Certification andWatchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978.However, the Inspector gained the firmimpression that those on board the

Northern L had neither a full grasp ofthe fire fighting equipment on board,nor had they carried out drills tofamiliarise themselves with theequipment. In the event, with no firepump operating and access to theemergency fire pump effectively deniedthem, this lack of knowledge andtraining did not affect the outcome.

The Inspector considers that theincident was affected by the generaloperational standards that prevailedaboard. It was admitted that thewatertight doors were habitually leftopen, the reason given simply that itwas “a fishing boat”. The Northern Lwas a large ocean going fishing vesselcertificated to carry a crew of 24people, whose safety depended uponthe watertight integrity of the hull, theforecastle space and the side-housesand, in the event of fire, the preventionof the spread of flames and smokebetween spaces. This was apparentlynot appreciated by any of the crew,including the owner’s representative,who had sailed as mate on certainvoyages.

Notwithstanding the Inspector’s viewthat the primary spread of the fire wasthrough the open hatch between theengine-room and the enclosedmaindeck (frames 42-45), the status ofthe door at the forward end of theengine-room (Frame 51) raises animportant issue relating to theimplementation and control ofstandards on fishing vessels. The factthat neither the AMSA nor theAmerican Bureau of Shipping couldconfirm with certainty whether or notthe door was removed suggests a lackof liaison between the two bodies and alack of definition regarding theirrespective responsibilities.

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1 The circumstances describedand without evidence to thecontrary it is concluded that theloss of the vessel was due tofire and the unrestrictedflooding of the engine-room andthe adjacent spaces below themain deck.

2 It is concluded that the fireoriginated in the engine-room. Itis not possible to determine withcertainty the cause of the fire orthe reason for the sinking.However, the most likely causemay be attributed to the escapeof diesel oil from a fractured fuelline spraying on to a hotmachinery surface, igniting theoil and causing intense heat inthe confined spaces of theengine-room. Fuel from thebunker fed the fire.

3 The outbreak of fire occurredwhile the engine-room wasunattended. Had the person onwatch been in the engine-roomthe fire would have beendetected at an early stage andtherefore it is probable that itcould have been controlled andextinguished.

4 The supply of air to the fire andthe fire’s rapid unrestrainedspread were the direct result ofthe engine-room not beingisolated from the spaces eitherside of it or above it. It wasaccepted practice on board tooperate with all doors, watertightor not, open.

5 Access to the remote controls tothe engine-room fuel supply, thevessel’s ventilation units and theengine-room CO2 fire smotheringsystem was cut off by the fire,due to the engine-room notbeing secured and the access tothe engine-room at frame 51being open.

6 It is not possible to determinethe source or sources of theexplosions reported by thesurvivors. It is possible that theexplosions were as a result ofthe rupturing of pressure vesselsand/or the fuel in the tanksbeing heated to a level wherebythe oil’s flash point was reached.

7 Whatever the level of proficiencyof the master and crew, theabsence of any water on the firemain, compounded by theinability to secure any breathingapparatus, rendered the crewtotally unable to fight the fire.Evacuation of the vessel to awaitthe outcome of the fire was theironly option.

8 The quality of the operationalprocedures and standardspractised (or not practised)aboard the Northern L createdthe conditions in which accidentswere more likely to occur, andwhere emergencies were morelikely to get out of hand.

9 The position of the controls forthe remote shutting down of thefuel supply from engine-roomfuel tanks and the release of theengine-room CO2 flre smotheringsyste.m were in accordance withthe relevant legislation, notwith-

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standing that on this occasionaccess to them was cut off by thefire. However, their positionwithin the enclosed main deckwas not an optimum position,given the construction of theupper deck at conversion.

10 If the engine-room door at frame51 had been removed, or wasleft open as a standard practice,the remote stops for ventilationand engine-room pumps werepositioned contrary to theregulations.

11 The controls for the watertightdoors were not above the

bulkhead deck, as required bythe regulations.

12 The diesel gas oil shipped inSingapore was within thedeclared specifications.

13 The liaison in 1989, between theDepartment of Transport andCommunications, and sub-sequently the AustralianMaritime Safety Authority, andthe American Bureau of Shippingwas deficient in ensuring thatthe converted vessel met theletter or spirit of the Austrahanregulations in respect of firecontrol and subdivision.

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ATTACHMENT

Name

Flag

Lloyd’s Number

Call Sign

Owners

Class Society

Builder

Year of Build

Converted

Type of Conversion

Shipyard

Length

Breadth

Depth

Maximum Draught

Gross Tonnage

Net Tonnage

Engine

Engine Power

Generators

Propeller

Bow Thrust

Crew maximum

Crew actual

Northern L (ex Northern Tide)

Australian

7333652

VNTKarma Fisheries Ply Ltd

American Bureau of Shipping

Carrington Slipways Pty Ltd,Newcastle, NSW.

1974

1988

Purse-seine

Singmarine Dockyard Pty LtdSingapore

55.02m

12.2m

8.76m

6.172m

1211

363

Two General Motors 16.645E2

2869kW

Two General Motors 6-71,one Caterpillar D353

Two variable pitch

One

24

6

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