Northern Ireland and the International Dimension: The End of the Cold War, the USA and European Integration

Northern Ireland and the International Dimension: The End of the Cold War, the USA andEuropean IntegrationAuthor(s): Paul DixonSource: Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 13 (2002), pp. 105-120Published by: Royal Irish AcademyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30001985 .

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Northern Ireland and the International Dimension: the End of the Cold War, the USA and European Integration

Paul Dixon

School of Economics and Politics, University of Ulster

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that the impact of international developments on the peace process-while difficult to assess-has been exaggerated. Firstly, British policy since the early 1970s has been marked by a considerable degree of continuity, albeit with tactical adjustments. The objectives and the agreements reached in the first peace process (1972-4) and the second peace process (1994-present) are similar and did not require international influence to achieve them. Secondly, the dynamics that produced the peace process were already well under way before the end of the Cold War (1989-91). Thirdly, it was largely shifts within the Republican movement that led to the peace process. Fourthly, where the international dimension was important was in providing the Republican elite with 'stories' to persuade the grass roots to give up armed struggle for unarmed struggle. Fifthly, US intervention was not as strong as is usually thought and to a considerable extent was welcomed by the British government. Finally, the similarities between the Sunningdale Agreement (1973) and the Good Friday Agreement (1998) suggest that the influence of European integration on the peace process has also been exaggerated.

INTRODUCTION: INTERNATIONALISING NORTHERN IRELAND

The emergence of the peace process and the interest of international relations scholars have precipitated a welcome and growing body of literature emphasising the importance of the international dimension in the politics of Northern Ireland.' Leading figures in the field, Frank Wright, Adrian Guelke and Mick Cox, have challenged the insularity of much analysis of the conflict by setting it in a comparative and international perspective.2

1I thank the panellists and participants at the session on 'Northern Ireland: the international dimension' at the British International Studies Association Conference, Edinburgh, 2001. In particular, I thank Mick Cox for generously acting as discussant and for encouraging the development of the paper I presented at that session into this article. The copy-editing of Aisling Flood greatly improved the presentation of this paper.

'Frank Wright, Northern Ireland: a comparative analysis (Dublin, 19857); Adrian GJuelke, Northern Ireland: the international perspective (Dublin, 1988); Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke and Fiona Stephen (eds), A farewell to arms? From 'long war' to long peace in Northern Ireland (Manchester, 2000).

Author's e-mail: [email protected]

Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 13 (2002), 105-120.



106 Irish Studies in International Affairs

The IRA ceasefire of 1994 has generated debate about the reasons for the emergence of the peace process. The international dimension has been cited as playing a key role, if not the key role, in this. It is argued that the end of the Cold War changed the international climate and precipitated moves to end anti-imperialist conflicts in South Africa and the Middle East. These developments made it far more difficult for the Provisional IRA (PIRA) to continue its anti-imperialist military campaign and facilitated the ceasefire. The end of the Cold War also prompted the British government to moderate significantly its attitude to Northern Ireland, making possible an accommodation with Republicans. The end of superpower rivalry allowed the United States to ignore the 'special relationship' with the UK and interfere in the internal affairs of its closest ally. The US was able to overcome British intransigence and push the process forward. The acceleration of European integration broke down distrust between the British and Irish governments and provided models for overcoming conflict. Northern Ireland could not escape the 'irresistible logic of globalisation'.3 This account tends to reinforce nationalist views of the peace process.4

The international dimension has played a significant role in the Northern Ireland conflict. The debate here is not about whether the international dimension has influenced the conflict but, firstly, how much weight should be attached to the international dimension, and, secondly, what are the mechanisms by which the international dimension has played a role. These questions are difficult to assess, but it is possible to cast doubt on some of the arguments of those who overemphasise the international dimension. Instead, more weight is placed here on the internal (Northern Ireland) or 'national' (UK and Ireland) dimensions of the conflict.

AN INTERNAL CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

The dominant academic paradigm for explaining the conflict in Northern Ireland is the internal conflict perspective. This does not dismiss the importance of external forces, but 'it does mean that [these writers] see the biggest source of the problem as lying within Northern Ireland itself'.5 Implicit is the assumption that it is largely by dealing with the internal problem that the conflict will be resolved or managed. Guelke's pioneering Northern Ireland: the international perspective was careful not to exaggerate the role of the international, and he explicitly aligned himself with the internal conflict approach, although this approach has led to the role of the international being underestimated.6 Ten years later, Guelke argued that 'The change in international circumstances provides a large part of the explanation for the success of Northern Ireland's peace process, culminating in agreement at the multi-party talks in Belfast on Good Friday, 10 April 1998'.7 By contrast, it will be argued here that, although international developments may have been in some respects conducive to the peace process (in others they may have been a hindrance), the biggest source of the problem still lies within Northern Ireland, and it is changes within Northern

3Michael Cox, '"Cinderella at the ball": explaining the end of the war in Northern Ireland', Millennium 27 (2) (1998), 325-42: 340.

4Paul Dixon, Northern Ireland: the politics of war and peace (Basingstoke, Hants., 2001). 5John Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland (Oxford, 1990), 194. 6Adrian Guelke, 'British policy and international dimensions of the Northern Ireland conflict',

Regional Politics and Policy 1 (2) (1991), 140-60: 158; Adrian Guelke, 'International dimensions of the Belfast Agreement', in Rick Wilford (ed.), Aspects of the Belfast Agreement (Oxford, 2001), 245-63: 261-2.

7Adrian Guelke, 'Northern Ireland: international and North/South issues', in William Crotty and David E. Schmitt (eds), Ireland and the politics of change (London, 1998), 195-209: 209.



DIxoN-International Influence on Northern Ireland? 107

Ireland, particularly within the Republican movement, that largely explain the peace process. This paper is, therefore, to some extent a defence of the internal conflict perspective but argues that this perspective does not sufficiently capture the dynamics between internal (Northern Ireland), 'national' (UK and Ireland) and international (end of the Cold War, the US, the EU etc.) factors.

The argument presented here contends, firstly, that the influence of the international dimension on British policy and therefore on the peace process has been exaggerated. British policy since the early 1970s has been marked by a considerable degree of continuity, with 'tactical adjustments'. This policy has generally favoured a power-sharing compromise between nationalists and Unionists, along with an Irish dimension. The continuity of British policy can be seen in the similarities between the two peace processes. The first peace process, 1972-4, produced the Sunningdale settlement (power-sharing plus Council of Ireland). The second peace process, 1994-present, led to the similar, but more complex, Good Friday, or Belfast, Agreement of 1998 (power-sharing, plus an Irish dimension, plus an East-West dimension). The international dimension is commonly thought to have had little influence in producing the Sunningdale settlement, which was largely the outcome of negotiations between parties and governments in the UK and Ireland. If international influence was unnecessary to produce the Sunningdale settlement of 1973 (arguably a more pro-nationalist agreement than the Good Friday Agreement), why was it necessary to produce the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 (famously referred to by S6amus Mallon as 'Sunningdale for slow learners')? International pressure may, from time to time, play a role in British policy, but the continuity of policy is largely explained by the internal and 'national' (UK and Ireland) constraints operating on it.

Secondly, it is argued that, rather than the international climate affecting the Northern Ireland peace process, the Sinn F6in leadership used 'stories' (discourses) about changes in the international climate to persuade Republicans to give up the armed struggle for an unarmed one. Stories about the end of the Cold War, the development of peace processes in South Africa and the Middle East, the role of the US in the 'pan-nationalist front' and the development of European integration were used to sell the idea of an IRA ceasefire and participation in a peace process to the Republican grass roots. This is a key mechanism by which the international dimension had and continues to have an impact on the conflict. The international dimension is used by political actors to choreograph a settlement in Northern Ireland; they create a theatrical performance to persuade diverse constituencies to accept accommodation.

This article sets out the key positions of those emphasising the influence of the international dimension on the Northern Ireland conflict and then offers a critique. This it does by showing, firstly, continuity in British policy and similarities between the two peace processes; secondly, that important developments that led to the peace process were already under way before the end of the Cold War; thirdly, that it is shifts within the Republican movement that largely explain the peace process; fourthly, how the Sinn F6in leadership used the changing international climate as part of the script to persuade the Republican grass roots to accept a ceasefire and participate in a peace process; fifthly, the role of the US president in the choreography of the peace process. The last is an important mechanism for the influence of the international but in a way that was probably often welcomed rather than opposed by the British government. Finally, the similarities between the Sunningdale Agreement and the Good Friday Agreement suggest that the influence of European integration on the peace process has also been exaggerated.




BRINGING IN THE INTERNATIONAL

The key texts analysed here are two papers by Mick Cox.8 There are four key areas of argument.

1. The Provisional IRA: from insularity to anti-imperialism

Cox 'does not reject "internalist" explanations for the end of the IRA war but suggests that we cannot isolate the "peace process" in the North from changes taking place in the wider international system'; 'the winding down of the "armed struggle" was also the result of transnational pressures upon the most immediate reason for the conflict: the Provisional IRA'. The PIRA built its movement on 'traditional and authentically Irish lines', and so 'there was no need for republicans to look outside of Ireland for inspiration or guidance' and it was only later that they built international links, particularly with the PLO and the ANC.9

The end of the Cold War, the receding tide of global radicalism after 1989 and the apparent movement toward the resolution of conflicts in the Middle East and South Africa created an international climate that made the resolution of the one in Northern Ireland 'far more likely'. 'In effect, having become part of a wider revolutionary project, Irish republicanism could hardly avoid being affected by its collapse in the latter half of the 1980s.' 'The purpose here...is...to explain how and why the end of a larger competition, which apparently had very little to do with the local conflict in Northern Ireland, has such a big impact upon the theory and practice of the Irish republican movement.'10

Cox argues 'that the conclusion of the Cold War made it far more difficult for the IRA to continue with its military campaign-not because the organisation did not have the capacity to do so, but rather because in the post-Cold War era, its campaign of violence could no longer be so readily justified'." '[T]he fact that the Cold War had drawn to a conclusion made a ceasefire far more likely'; 'by altering completely the global framework within which the IRA campaign had hitherto been conducted, the end of the Cold War made it far more difficult for the organization to legitimize a strategy which by the late 1980s had already reached a dead end'.12 After the collapse of Communism, Republican explanations for Britain's continuing presence in Northern Ireland had less credibility.

2. Britain: 'No selfish strategic or economic interest'

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and in the USSR in 1991 posed enormous problems for the Republican movement's analysis of British interests in Northern Ireland. Traditionally, Republicans had argued that Britain had political, strategic and economic interests in keeping Northern Ireland part of the Union. Britain had a historic attachment to the Union as part of the British nation, and its economic control over Ireland was facilitated by occupation of the North. This also secured Britain's strategic

8Michael Cox, ' "Bringing in the international": the IRA ceasefire and the end of the Cold War', International Affairs 73 (4) (1997), and Cox, 'Cinderella at the ball'.

9Cox, 'Cinderella at the ball', 329, 330, 331. 10Cox, 'Cinderella at the ball', 332, 330-1. 11Cox, 'Cinderella at the ball', 330. 12Cox, 'Bringing in the international', 676, 677.




interests by preventing the emergence of a united and neutral Ireland outside the NATO alliance. The British secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke, made a 'significant intervention' in a 'remarkable speech', declaring in November 1990 that Britain had 'no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland'. According to Cox, the IRA ceasefire 'would have been unthinkable' without this declaration.13

3. The US: no Cold War no special relationship? The end of the Cold War also made it possible for the US to play a far more decisive role in Northern Irish affairs. Because the probability of the Conservative government helping to bring the Republican movement into a 'peace process' 'was never likely to be high', the US role in the early stage of the process 'was to be crucial'. The US backed a 'fairly high level fact-finding delegation to Ireland' and played a 'crucial back stage role supporting Dublin against London in the difficult negotiations that in the end led to the signing of the Downing Street Declaration'. Clinton then gave his support for granting a US visa to Adams in January 1994 against British opposition.14

4. The European Union: the road to post-nationalism? The changing position of Ireland in Europe and changes in the structure of Europe 'as much as anything else...made the peace process possible'. Until Britain and Ireland joined the EEC (European Economic Community, forerunner of the European Union) in 1973 they had few real incentives for cooperating over the management of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Joining the EEC helped to break down distrust between the two countries. The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement and the 1993 Downing Street Declaration could not have occurred 'without the longer term revolution that had transformed Anglo-Irish relations after Ireland and the UK joined the EC back in 1972'. The European example also showed Northern Ireland how 'apparently permanent divisions could be overcome by peaceful means'.15 Elizabeth Meehan, reviewing the impact of the EU on Northern Ireland, argued that 'the language and conventions of EU policy-making have helped to open up a space for contending parties to talk about solutions to old problems in a new way-and to act upon that'.16

CHANGE WITHIN CONTINUITY: THE FIRST AND SECOND PEACE PROCESSES

At the heart of the defence of the internal conflict perspective is an argument about the continuity of British policy toward Northern Ireland since the early 1970s. The second peace process (1994-present) during the recent 'Troubles' in Northern Ireland is too seldom seen in the context of the first peace process (1972-4), which produced the Sunningdale Agreement (1973). The Good Friday, or Belfast, Agreement (1998) is a more sophisticated document than Sunningdale, but they are comparable in that

13Cox, 'Cinderella at the ball', 334. 14Cox, 'Cinderella at the ball', 335, 336. 15Cox, 'Cinderella at the ball', 337, 339. 16Elizabeth Meehan, ' "Britain's Irish question: Britain's European question?" British-Irish relations

in the context of European Union and the Belfast Agreement', Review of International Studies 26 (2000), 83-97: 96.




at the heart of both lies, firstly, power-sharing and, secondly, the all-Ireland dimension.17

In the case of the first peace process it is usually argued that the international dimension-influences outside Britain and Ireland-played little part in bringing about the Sunningdale Agreement.'8 On the other hand, it is claimed that the international dimension played an important, even vital, role in the second peace process. The question remains: why, if the international dimension is so important, did the British and Irish governments manage to reach agreement in 1973 but the British had to be coerced by the international dimension into the Good Friday Agreement of 1998?

The British did not have to be coerced into the Sunningdale Agreement because- regardless of international influence-this was the likely ground on which a stable settlement to the conflict was to be found. British policy toward Northern Ireland since the early/mid-1970s can be seen as exhibiting a considerable degree of continuity in the pursuit of this twin-track (power-sharing/Irish dimension) settlement but with tactical adjustments.19 There was no radical departure in British policy in the late 1980s or early 1990s. Peter Brooke's speeches merely reiterated in a stark way what had been stated before: that there was no purely military solution to the conflict and that Britain had no selfish, strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland.20 The British government played an active role in the peace process. There is evidence of this in the back-channel contacts with Sinn F6in (1990-3) and the overtures of Brooke and his successor, Peter Mayhew, to the Republicans. The signing of the Downing Street Declaration (1993), the Joint Framework Document (1995) and the Good Friday Agreement (1998) are all evidence of British determination to push the process forward. The problem for the British was how to do this without alienating the Unionists, who would have to be brought to the negotiating table with Sinn F6in.

British policy and the government's approach to conflict resolution in the first and second peace processes are similar.

* The British made assumptions about the existence of a moderate silent majority in Northern Ireland.

* Contrary to myth, the British government did conduct negotiations with paramilitaries to bring them into the democratic process. * The British declared that they would accept the will of the majority in Northern Ireland if it favoured Irish unity and effectively that Britain had 'no selfish strategic or economic interest'.

* There was also close cooperation between the British and Irish governments at Sunningdale, to the extent that Unionists were probably pushed too far in the negotiations. * The British were caught between reassuring Unionists of their support for the Union and declaring themselves neutral between the contending parties.

17Dixon, Northern Ireland: the politics of war and peace. 18John Dumbrell, A special relationship: Anglo-American relations in the Cold War and after

(Basingstoke, Hants., 2001), 199-201. 19Paul Dixon, 'British policy towards Northern Ireland 1969-2000: continuity, tactical adjustment

and consistent "inconsistencies" ', British Journal of Politics and International Relations 3 (3' (2001) 340-68.

20Dixon, Northern Ireland: the politics of war and peace, 285, 144-7.




* This arose out of a perceived need to 'balance' Unionist and nationalist claims if an agreement was to be achieved.21

The continuities in British policy toward Northern Ireland suggest that the impact of the international dimension was not as significant as has been suggested. It may also be that the international dimension is important less for its impact on the conflict than for the way actors in the conflict, particularly the Sinn F6in/IRA leadership, have used it to legitimise their tactics to the Republican grass roots.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE ORIGINS OF THE PEACE PROCESS

The internationalisation of the Provisional IRA?

Although the Republican movement was not short of home-grown heroes,22 there is evidence that Republicans looked abroad to anti-imperialist movements for inspiration and propaganda in what they saw as their war against the British. The anti-imperialist movement was at its height in the 1960s and 1970s. The successes of anti-imperialist movements in forcing Britain's withdrawal from the Empire and the victory of the Viet Cong against the US in Vietnam seemed to suggest that anti- imperialism was surfing the tide of history and British defeat inevitable. According to Stephen Howe, in Ireland and Empire:

To link the Ulster conflict with Third World anticolonial struggle was to associate it with revolutionary glamour, with movements which commanded massive sympathy amongst the young and radical in advanced capitalist states including Britain itself, with new and imaginative models of social development, perhaps above all with success.23

The Republicans attempted to depict Northern Ireland as Britain's Vietnam. Sedn Mac Stiofiin, the PIRA's chief of staff during 1970-2, saw the struggle as an anti- imperialist one: 'the struggle for Ireland's freedom was only part of the worldwide struggle against imperialism. Therefore I and other Republicans rejoiced at the successes of any other movement fighting a true revolutionary war, and we mourned their defeats.' He took heart from the battle of Dien Bien Phu (the defeat of the French colonial power by the Vietnamese in 1954): 'we knew what it meant. The tide of history was beginning to turn, and the decaying colonial powers could not hope to brazen out humiliating military defeat like that for very long...The colonial era appeared to be doomed, but it would not be finally destroyed without fierce fighting and bitter sacrifice.' Mac Stioftiin had been imprisoned with Cypriot 'terrorists' in the 1950s and had learnt from them methods of opposing British rule. He was also an observer of other anti-imperialist struggles.24 According to Maria Maguire, the main examples followed by the PIRA in its terrorist campaign against the British army were Cyprus and Aden.25 There was a belief among the Provisionals that, like other anti-imperialist movements, if they could inflict

21Dixon, 'British policy towards Northern Ireland 1969-2000'. 22Joanne Wright, Terrorist propaganda: the Red Army Faction and the Provisional IRA, 1968-86

(London, 1991), 223. 23Stephen Howe, Ireland and Empire (Oxford, 2000), 170. 24Sedin Mac Stiofiin, Memoirs of a revolutionary (Edinburgh, 1975), 52-3, 70, 52. 25Maria Maguire, To take arms: a year in the Provisional IRA (London, 1973), 74.




sufficient casualties on the British army, they could provoke a withdrawal. Republican hopes and Unionist fears of forcing a British withdrawal were not without some substance.26 Martin McGuinness negotiated on behalf of the IRA in London in 1972; he refused accommodation with Unionists, arguing that they had to get rid of the British. This was best achieved by violence, 'as proved all over your Empire. You will get fed up and go away.'27 According to Liam 0 Ruairc, during the 1970s Sinn F6in made common cause with 'Third World' countries including Tanzania, Cuba, Libya and Algeria. In the 1980s Sinn F6in showed interest in Nicaragua, SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation) in Namibia and Angola, North Korea and South Africa.28

The propaganda war was seen as an integral part of the PIRA's struggle against 'British imperialism'. The portrayal of Republicans as part of an international and successful anti-imperialist movement was likely to be a useful but not necessary part of the campaign against Britain. International sympathy may have been useful and helped to increase pressure on the British government. The portrayal of the Republican movement as part of a wider international movement may also have helped sustain Republican morale and determination, but were they necessary? If Republicans were, as Cox argues, insular at the beginning of the 1970s, then they were able to sustain their struggle during the height of the violence without international legitimacy. As the Middle Eastern peace process has faltered, it could become an example for Republicans to return to violence. The South African peace process has left the ANC the dominant force in South Africa, while in Northern Ireland Sinn F6in is one element in a power-sharing coalition. In other words, is it that the fate of these other peace processes impinges on the Republican movement, or the way these international examples, and the international dimension, are used by the Republican leadership to justify their political strategy, that is important here?

THE ORIGINS OF THE PEACE PROCESS?

While the search for a single point of origin for the peace process may be futile, there are strong arguments that developments that resulted in the peace process were already under way before the end of the Cold War. These include:

* Sinn F6in's shift to the 'long war' in the late 1970s, setting the Republican movement down a more political path.

* The further emphasis on political and electoral struggle during and after the hunger strikes (1981), leading to the 'ballot box and armalite' strategy.

* The Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985), which gave the Irish government a say in the running of Northern Ireland. The British government's determination to face down Unionist resistance to the Agreement suggested that Unionists were not simply the dupes of British imperialism.

* In terms of Republican ideology Sinn F6in's decision to end abstentionism in 1986 was a major development, provoking a split in the movement and the formation of Republican Sinn F6in.

* Irish government contacts with Sinn F6in (1987).

26Dixon, Northern Ireland: the politics of war and peace, chap. 5. 27PeterTaylor, 'McGuinness was "man to watch" in 1972', Daily Mail, 3 May 2001. 28See O Ruairc's interesting series of articles at http://lark.phoblacht.net




* By the mid- to late 1980s there was evidence that the Republican movement had fought itself, both politically and militarily, into a stalemate with the British government.29

* The Hume-Adams talks (1988) initiated a debate within nationalism, with the SDLP arguing that the British had no military or economic interests in Northern Ireland and were effectively neutral. They proposed a 'pan- nationalist front' to bring national and international pressure to bear on the British to persuade Unionists into a united Ireland.

In other words, there were major developments in Republican thinking before the end of the Cold War, whether this is dated from 1989 and the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe or 1991 and the end of the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War was unexpected, so developments in Republican thinking were not even in anticipation of the collapse of Communism, and Sinn F6in was not an advocate of Soviet-style socialism.

The end of the Cold War did appear to have some impact on the willingness of the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, to make overtures to the Republican movement. In November 1989 Peter Brooke, secretary of state for Northern Ireland, gave an important interview in which he claimed that, although the security forces could contain the IRA, he found it 'difficult to envisage' their military defeat. He indicated that the British would negotiate if the IRA stopped its violence. Twelve months later Brooke declared that Britain 'had no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland'. Margaret Thatcher had approved this last speech, whereas before the end of the Cold War she had had reservations. She also gave her personal approval to secret talks with Sinn F6in in October 1990 in order to find out what was happening in the Republican movement.30

Whether Thatcher's attitude toward the end of the Cold War and toward Britain's strategic interests in Ireland was more widely reflected in British ruling circles can be doubted. In the early to mid-1970s the British government's willingness to contemplate withdrawal (and Irish unity or independence) suggested that it is unlikely that Britain had overriding strategic, 'Cold War' interests in Northern Ireland that could only be preserved by military occupation. The 'Cold War' argument misses the continuities of British policy and exaggerates the significance of developments in British policy in 1989-90. The British had long accepted that there was no purely military solution and that Britain had 'no selfish strategic or economic interest' in Northern Ireland. This had been argued by the SDLP since the early 1970s and accepted by some leading Provisionals in the mid-1970s.31 Brooke's speeches in 1989-90 were restatements of British policy rather than major developments. But these speeches and the end of the Cold War may have been deliberately presented as a new departure and were important for stimulating further ideological developments among Republican activists.

Public knowledge of developing peace processes in South Africa (1990, the lifting of the ban on the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela) and the Middle East (1993, the Oslo Accord) also came after the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. The emphasis placed on these fellow national liberation movements in Republican ideology-particularly in the more propaganda-friendly case of South Africa-may well have accelerated an ideological rethink, but they have to be seen

29Henry Patterson, The politics of illusion (London, 1997), 210. 30Anthony Seldon, John Major (London, 1997); Guardian, 16 October 1999. 31Dixon, Northern Ireland: the politics of war and peace, chaps 5 and 6.




in the context of developments before 1989. The apparent upsurge of 'ethnic conflict' after the end of the Cold War provided an alternative explanation of the conflict in Northern Ireland, though less flattering to the Republican movement, because comparisons with former Yugoslavia and other 'ethnic conflicts' suggested that the IRA was engaged in a communal war rather than a movement for national liberation.

The argument that British policy shifted at the end of the Cold War was also useful for the Sinn F6in leadership to deploy in trying to convince Republicans that the way forward was unarmed struggle. They could claim that in response to a shift in British policy they could now contemplate a new unarmed strategy-it was the British who had moved and not they.32 This discourse disguises the fact that the British and the SDLP had long claimed that the British had 'no selfish strategic or economic interest' in Northern Ireland. This dates back at least to the Green Paper of October 1972, in which the British government stated that:

No UK Government for many years has had any wish to impede the realisation of Irish unity, if it were to come about by genuine and freely given mutual agreement and on conditions acceptable to the distinctive communities.33 The British did not seem to have any overriding strategic interest in Northern

Ireland that could not have been accommodated by an Irish government in the event of a United Ireland. The interests of Britain seem primarily to have been in the stability of Ireland, and it was prepared to contemplate any settlement likely to achieve that. This was apparent after Bloody Sunday and again in the mid-1970s, when even Conservative politicians were willing to consider a range of options including repartition and Irish unity if they were likely to stabilise Ireland.34. In fact there was considerable continuity in British policy arising from what were perceived to be the requirements of conflict resolution.35 There is evidence that the Republican leadership's thinking on British interests in Northern Ireland developed after Margaret Thatcher had taken on Unionist opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 rather than just at the end of the Cold War.36 Republican ideology had generally portrayed the Unionists as the dupes of British imperialism, but the conflict between the British Conservative (and Unionist) government and Ulster Unionism casts doubt on this assumption (again).

THE US DIMENSION

It is arguable that the Conservative government played an important, active role in pushing the peace process forward before US pressure was brought to bear. The problem for the British is that publicly claiming this role was likely to destabilise the Unionist population of Northern Ireland, who have been highly sceptical of the peace process. It was Margaret Thatcher, who, shortly before her resignation in 1990, authorised back-channel contacts with Sinn F6in and who had tolerated Brooke's overtures to the Republican movement. The Brooke speech and the operation of the back channel both pre-date Clinton's influence and 'the Greening of the White

32Quoted in Cox, 'Cinderella at the ball', 334-5. 33Northem Ireland Office, The future of Northern Ireland: a paper for discussion (Belfast, 1972),

para. 52. 34Dixon, Northern Ireland: the politics of war and peace, 120, 158-62. 35Dixon, 'British policy towards Northern Ireland 1969-2000'. 36Eamonn Mallie and David McKittrick, The fight for peace (London, 1997).




House'.37 The succeeding British prime minister, John Major, developed the process, with conciliatory speeches from the secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Patrick Mayhew, and the continuation of the back channel. In spite of a diminishing majority, Major signed the Downing Street Declaration in 1993 and the Joint Framework Document in 1995-the latter more particularly seen as a 'Green' document.

While the US undoubtedly played a more active role during the peace process (although it had involved itself in Northern Ireland before), it may have been that this was to some extent with the connivance of the British government. If the British wanted to see the peace process move forward they had an interest in helping the Sinn F6in leadership persuade its grass roots of the importance of pursuing unarmed struggle. This was partly to be achieved by creating the illusion of a pan-nationalist front in which the US played an important symbolic role. The pan-nationalist front was principally a charade constructed by the Irish government, the SDLP and the US government to persuade Republicans that they could pursue their goals more effectively through unarmed rather than armed struggle. The power of the pan- nationalist front was to be demonstrated by apparent victories over the British government. The British government also created the illusion of a pan-Unionist front to counter the image of pan-nationalism and to reassure Unionists that their interests would be protected in any peace process.38 As a 'senior British source' explained, 'It is the job of the British government to push the Unionists to a line beyond which they will not go; it is the job of the Irish government to pull the Republicans to a line beyond which they will not come'.39

There is evidence that the decision to grant Gerry Adams a second visa for entry to the United States in 1995 was choreographed, with a charade acted out by the British and US governments to reassure important interests in Northern Ireland and take the peace process forward. In 1995, six months after the ceasefire, Adams wanted to visit the US again and this time to raise funds for Sinn F6in. The British again publicly opposed such a move and wanted the US government to use its leverage with Sinn F6in to make progress on the decommissioning of IRA weapons before all-party talks could take place. In private, however, Mayhew told US officials that he wanted Sinn F6in to 'seriously discuss decommissioning' rather than there having to be a handover of weapons before they could enter talks. Nancy Soderberg, deputy national security adviser, described 'a complete disconnect' between what Mayhew asked of the US government in private and his stronger public statements for decommissioning later the same day when he announced the 'Washington Three'.40

Patrick Mayhew's failure to emphasise to the Americans the importance of an arms handover could be seen as a complete blunder. Or else the British government may have believed that it had room to push Unionists further by taking steps to water down the conditions necessary to bring Sinn F6in into talks. Privately, the British government may not have been too distressed at the decision by the US president to lift the ban on Adams and allow him to raise funds. This decision would bolster the credibility of the Sinn F6in leadership's unarmed strategy in the eyes of the Republican grass roots. The ceasefire would be entrenched by appearing to demonstrate the support of the most powerful government in the

37Sinn Fdin, Setting the record straight (Belfast, 1994). 38Paul Dixon, 'Political skills or lying and manipulation? The choreography of the Northern Ireland

peace process', Political Studies 50 (3) (2002), 725-41. 390bserver, 5 February 1995. 40Conor O'Clery, The Greening of the White House (Dublin, 1996), 191.




world for pan-nationalism. As the British secretary of state had said to a private meeting, 'To some extent we have got to help Mr Adams carry with him the people who are reluctant to see a ceasefire'41

The British government's publication of the Joint Framework Document and its weakening of the decommissioning conditions in the 'Washington Three' resulted in rising Unionist and Conservative backbench dissent. In view of this, John Major needed to reassure Unionists by playing his role as 'champion of the Union'. Major made a public show of his fury at Clinton's decision over the Adams visa and refused to take the US president's telephone calls for five days. Later, Clinton praised Major for taking 'brave risks' in making peace 'within the context in which he must operate'.42 According to a source close to Clinton, within weeks 'the President had developed a genuine respect for Major and figured he was trying to do the right thing and understood why Major might need to make a gesture by not taking a phone'call'.43

The US president's high-profile rejection of the British government underlined the potential power of the pan-nationalist front and seemed to show Republicans the influence they could have through 'unarmed struggle'. At the same time, Major's public display of anger at Clinton demonstrated to Unionists that the British government was fighting its corner and maintaining pan-Unionist unity. The US government was believed to have won Adams his first visa to the US in 1994. But, as the former taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, commented, it was the appearance of a pan-nationalist victory that was more important than the reality: 'if we could be seen to win a diplomatic argument [over the British] on the world stage, supported by Washington...it would have been a big step forward' (my emphasis).44 Reynolds commented later on the granting of the first visa:

John Major told me he was taking a very strong stand on it, and I could understand that. Let Washington decide who they want to support. I convinced Washington that it was important as part of the demonstration [to Republicans] of the strategy of non-violence, that it could succeed, of having a few victories here and there. Having said that, John had to be seen to be winning at times as well. We all recognised that.45 The image of the US president coercing the British government into the peace

process against its will appears to be far from accurate. The dynamics of the peace process were already under way long before Clinton's presidency. While US influence may have exerted some pressure on the British, particularly over Adams's first visa application, its effect has been deliberately exaggerated.46 The key role played by the US president was symbolic, in giving credence to the Sinn F6in leadership's strategy that the Republican movement could more effectively advance its goals through the pan-nationalist front (including the USA) and the unarmed struggle than the armed struggle.

The dynamics of pan-nationalism have altered. Northern and Southern nationalists who brought the Republican movement into the peace process have become uneasy, as they are threatened by the rising tide of Sinn F6in support. Sinn

41Irish Times, 9 January 1995. 42Daily Telegraph, 18 April 1995. 430'Clery, The Greening of the White House, 219. 44Endgame in Ireland, BBC 2 television, 8 July 2001. 45Reynolds interview with Eamonn O'Kane cited in his paper 'The Republic of Ireland and Northern

Ireland: the international dimension as a policy tool', in this volume, pp 121-33. 46Dumbrell, A special relationship, 210-11.




F6in emerged as the leading nationalist party in Northern Ireland at the British general election of 2001 and made significant gains in the Republic at the general election of May 2002. The new, Republican US president, George W. Bush, has also become more sceptical of an organisation associated with terrorism, particularly after the revelation of the IRA's links with the FARC movement in Colombia and the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001. The pan-nationalist front has demanded IRA decommissioning as payback from Republicans for their 'leg-up' into democratic politics. Unionist support for the Good Friday Agreement has slipped, but Bush's right-wing presidency may provide some reassurance to Ulster's Unionists that the nationalist, or at least Republican, tide is ebbing. Of course, there are still both loyalist and Republican 'terrorists' for whom the international dimension, rather than the British-Irish dimension, appears to have little importance.

THE EUROPEAN UNION

There are at least three ways that the European Union is held to have impinged on the peace process.

1. The British and Irish governments joined the EEC in 1973, and this gave them incentives to cooperate over Northern Ireland, which helped to break down distrust between the two countries. This brought about a transformation in British-Irish relations. 2. The example of the European Union and the institutions themselves provided an illustration to Northern Ireland of the ways in which conflict could be overcome by peaceful means. 3. The process of European integration has had an ameliorating impact on identity in Northern Ireland and helped to create an environment in which a peace process could come to a successful conclusion.

These arguments are questionable given the experience of the early 1970s. Firstly, during this period there was close cooperation between the British and Irish governments in their unsuccessful attempt to construct a power-sharing settlement. In September 1971 the British prime minister met the taoiseach, symbolising Britain's recognition of the Republic's legitimate interests in Northern affairs. The Green Paper of October 1972 maintained that 'it was clearly desirable that any new arrangements for Northern Ireland should, whilst meeting the wishes of Northern Ireland and Great Britain, be, so far as possible, acceptable to and accepted by the Republic of Ireland'.47 In fact there is evidence that British-Irish cooperation was even too close. The London correspondent of the Irish Times reported that the Irish 'entered enthusiastically into negotiations, and from this point onwards the British kept them very closely informed, usually in advance, of their proposals. Relations, recently so chilly, soon became warm, even excessively cosy.'48 There appears to have been a cooling in British-Irish relations from 1974 to 1979. Since the Dublin summit of 1980 a new activism developed in the relationship, which has produced the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985), giving the South role in the affairs of the North, the Downing Street Declaration (1993), the Joint Framework Document (1995) and the Good Friday Agreement (1998).

47Northern Ireland Office, The future of Northern Ireland, para. 78. 48James Downey, Britain, Ireland and the Northern question (Dublin, 1983), 125.




The second claim for EU influence is its impact on the construction of the institutions of the Good Friday Agreement, yet little evidence is produced to support this claim, and the British already had experience of setting up power-sharing institutions in the retreat from Empire. The Sunningdale Agreement, it has been argued, bears a close resemblance to the Good Friday Agreement. As no one has argued that the EEC influenced the structure of the Sunningdale institutions, it seems more likely that the general institutional framework of the Good Friday Agreement (power-sharing and an Irish dimension) was influenced more by what are perceived to be the requirements of conflict resolution than the example of the European Union.

The impact of Europe on identity in Northern Ireland is difficult to prove or disprove. Modernisation theory and 'hyper-globalisers' have argued that functional cooperation and integration, of the type promoted by the EU, will replace national identity or else dissipate national identities as a European identity emerges alongside them. Some have argued that Northern Ireland is moving into a post-nationalist or postmodern era. There appears to be little evidence to support the idea that European integration is ameliorating the conflict. The peace process has been elite-driven; opinion polls and surveys do not suggest that politicians are being compelled by any movement from below toward accommodation. The spectre of European integration has been used by nationalists to claim the inevitability of Irish unity. Unionists have tended to accept these functionalist assumptions and consequently have come to oppose European integration and be very sceptical of the EU. Although the Republican movement is highly sceptical of European integration and modernising assumptions that it will result in Irish unity, it is another discourse that the leadership can use to sell the peace process to its grass roots. During the secret back-channel contacts between Sinn F6in and the British government, the British representative claimed that European integration made Irish unity inevitable.49

The development of the EU may well have had an impact on the conflict; the problem is in attempting to assess the extent of this impact. It is difficult to be precise, but we can cast doubt on some of the excessive claims of the 'Euro- enthusiasts'. The aspirations of Euro-enthusiasts-attractive as they may be-have clouded their analysis of the problems facing the realisation of those aspirations, resulting in an over-optimistic view of the demise of the state and nationalism. In 1988 Guelke surveyed the impact of Europe on the conflict and concluded that:

The hopes of liberal Unionists and nationalists that common membership of the Community would make the Border less of a political issue in Northern Ireland and that sectarian divisions might wither as a result have proved false. The Community dimension has failed to transcend sectarianism. The Unionist and nationalist blocs have remained intact, though internally divided. The EEC, far from dissolving the conflict, has internationalised it. This has worked politically to the benefit of constitutional nationalism, though not from the bottom up, but from the top down.50

In the British general election of June 2001 John Hume and his brand of 'post- nationalism' were defeated by the 'Euro-sceptical' nationalists of Sinn F6in, one of the few parties in the Republic to oppose the Nice Treaty and therefore be on the winning side in the referendum. Similarly, the extremely Euro-sceptical DUP is

49Paul Dixon, 'European integration and Irish unity?', in Sean Byrne and Cynthia L. Irwin (eds), Turning points in ethnopolitical conflict (West Hartford, Conn., 2000), 174-89.

50Guelke, Northern Ireland: the international perspective, 164.




gaining ground on the merely Euro-sceptical UUP. The depth of the Republic's Europhilia has been thrown into question by the rejection of the Nice Treaty in 2001. Euro-enthusiasts have exaggerated the impact of the EU on the conflict in Northern Ireland. They have confused prescription with description; they may desire to see a post-nationalist future, but that should not be mistaken for a belief that that future has arrived.

CONCLUSION

An influential academic case has been made emphasising the influence of the international dimension and relegating the role of internal factors. The strength with which this case has been argued is an important corrective to insularity, but it has exaggerated the role of the international dimension in the peace process. The argument presented here is that the international dimension does indeed have an impact on the conflict in Northern Ireland. The aspect emphasised here is the role that the international has had in providing discourses for deployment in the propaganda war. It has been argued that, while there are great difficulties in assessing the impact of the international, we can at least cast doubt on some of the more excessive claims for its influence.

Firstly, the continuities in British and Irish policy toward Northern Ireland suggest that the impact of more recent developments-such as the end of the Cold War or European integration-has not been so significant. Rather than these events having directly pressurised the British government or ended British strategic interests in Northern Ireland, the British have long been without any overriding interest in the island of Ireland beyond stability and have actively pursued the peace process. This record could not be proclaimed for fear of undermining Unionist confidence in the British government as a guarantor of their place in the Union.

Secondly, it was not as much shifts in British policy as developments within the Republican movement that raised the prospect of an IRA ceasefire and made the peace process possible. These developments were already under way but may have been accelerated by the end of the Cold War and the South African and Middle Eastern peace processes. It should be remembered that, while a discourse associating the IRA with anti-imperialist struggles may be useful in the propaganda war, this is probably not a necessary resource for sustaining a violent struggle.

Thirdly, the key influence of the international has been in providing a set of discourses (Europe and the inevitability of Irish unity; the end of the Cold War and anti-imperialist struggles moving into peace processes; the power of the US and pan- nationalism to push the British government etc.) that has been used in an attempt to persuade the rank and file of the Republican movement to pursue unarmed rather than armed struggle.

Fourthly, the impact of the US on the peace process has been exaggerated to reassure Republicans. This has disguised the fact that the British government actively pursued the peace process and probably, often privately, welcomed at least some US interventions. The 'theatrical' nature of politics makes it difficult to see whether what is played out on stage is a charade, not reflecting 'backstage' political realities, and this has to be taken into account in assessing the political process.51

This exaggeration of international influence gives credence to discourses on the peace process offered by nationalists and Republicans deployed in the propaganda

51Dixon, 'Political skills or lying and manipulation?'.




war and exaggerates the powerful forces ranged against an isolated Unionism. These discourses may have facilitated nationalist and Republican participation, but they may also have hindered the prospects of Unionists participating in a process that appears to be driven by international forces that are powerfully biased against them.

This raises the question of whether the international dimension has hindered rather than helped the peace process. In 1988 Guelke concluded his book Northern Ireland: the international perspective by arguing that 'internationalisation has made the conflict more intractable because of the role that external factors have played in the legitimisation of violence':

It is evident that far from providing the basis of new political departures in Northern Ireland, internationalisation has made the conflict more intractable, and entrenched rather than eroded sectarian divisions.52

He argued wisely that this may not always be the case, but perhaps some consideration and evaluation of an alternative, more Unionist perspective on the impact of the international would provide a counter-balance to nationalist claims. This might emphasise the problems that the exaggeration of the international dimension has on the ability of Unionists to continue to participate in a peace process that they perceive to be stacked against them. Unionists have long feared that the process of European integration would undermine the Union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and have been critical of 'interference' from US presidents who have an electoral incentive to appease a hostile Irish-American constituency. The widespread international portrayal of the conflict as an imperialist or 'settler- colonial' one from which the British should withdraw, possibly taking their 'colons' with them, further underlines Unionist concern at external influences. Internation- alisation may have compounded the Unionist sense of isolation and vulnerability, sapping the confidence of Unionism and inhibiting the ability of its political leadership to sustain involvement in the peace process and accommodation with nationalists.

The argument presented here is that the international dimension does indeed have an impact on the conflict in Northern Ireland. The aspect emphasised here is the role that the international has had in providing discourses for deployment in the propaganda war. It has been argued that, while there are great difficulties in assessing the impact of the international, we can at least cast doubt on some of the more excessive claims for its influence.

Finally, there are problems with the internal conflict perspective. For example, is the British state or the Irish state 'internal' or 'external'. Is the Republic of Ireland part of the 'international dimension' or not? While I sympathise with the view that the biggest source of the problem lies within Northern Ireland itself, this simplification cannot do justice to the complexity of the conflict. It should not leave out the possibility that external actors-such as the British government-have been, or could be, 'the biggest source of the problem' if their policy was particularly malign. In understanding the dynamics of the Northern Ireland conflict we need a view that allows for variance in the role and influence of internal, British, Irish or international factors over time and that allows for the interplay between these various dimensions of the Northern Ireland conflict, both 'internal' and international.

52Guelke, Northern Ireland: the international perspective, 195, 205.



Documents

Northern Ireland and the International Dimension: The End of the Cold War, the USA and European Integration