North Korea’s Enigmatic behavior

7/29/2019 North Koreas Enigmatic behavior.

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ByronPoli 374Dec. 13th

North Koreas Enigmatic behavior.

Due to the secrecy of the North Korean regime very little is known about its actual

intentions. This makes it difficult to provided explanations for its behavior. To be clear, most

explanations of the Norths intentions are a matter of extrapolation and inference based on

what we perceive as observers from the outside. The challenge is to overcome this

epistemological barrier in order to come to some conclusion regarding the actions of the

North. As outside observers we are given very little evidence to work with; what little we

have consists largely in their inconsistent relations with other countries, their ownership of

nuclear weapons and their maintenance of a massive military.

In this essay I will address different scholars interpretations of North Koreas actions.

I will first address the stability of the North Korean regime and the potential that the

maintenance of the large military and nuclear arms is intended to maintain the regime. Next, I

will examine the hypothesis that the North Korean diplomacy and limited use or threat of

force is a calculated strategy by which the DPRK intends to gain concessions and economic

aid from the outside. Contrastingly I will briefly examine arguments suggesting that the

North Korean government wishes to normalize relations with the United States. Finally, I will

examine arguments that utilize a frame work similar to game theory to explain North Koreas

maintenance of a large military and possible actions the regime might take. It is important to

clarify that by dividing up the arguments into the categories I have my intention is not to

create a false dilemma. That is, the categories are inherently highly interrelated and by-in-

large each argument is not intrinsically exclusive of the others.

The stability or lack thereof, of the North Korean government is a large factor

determining the intentions of the government. To be more specific, by stability I mean to

address the governments ability to maintain order and public support. This portion is not

meant to address stability in terms of consistency of government decisions or the perceived


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irrationality behind their actions. A number of authors make arguments against the stability of

the North Korean regime. James J. Przystup in North Korea: Challenges, Interests, and

Policy takes the instability of the regime for granted stating the pending transfer of power

in Pyongyang and the potential for instability as the process plays out were grounds for

concern given the nations nuclear arms. He makes no furtherjustification or argument for

the country being unstable. It is prudent not to make assumptions regarding the nations

stability, therefore it is important to look deeper and consider more in depth arguments. The

significant factors contributing to instability are First, the chronic economic disaster will

challenge them The second challenge is the impact of economic reforms Third, the

society is undergoing a generational change. (Jae-Cheon Lim pg 177-178) Additionally, the

issue of what Scott Snyder calls coalitional struggle is also a potential cause for instability.

Furthermore the main security problem is not America, but the prosperity of the other

Korean Statethe Text would never survive the North Korean masses realization it was

their own blood brothers and not the Yankees who had been blocking reunification all along.

(B.R. Myers pg 167)

The first challenge to Kim Jung Ils government is the deplorable state of the North

Korean economy. Such is the poor state of their economy that North Koreas gross national

income in 2001 is estimated by the bank of Korea to be $15.7 billion. (David Kang pg 104)

Furthermore, during the mid-nineties the country suffered from a series of famines caused by

floods and the change in the former Soviet Union and Chinas food support arrangements. To

provide comparison, Victor Cha cites the CIA stating through the mid-1970s, (the)

calculated GNP per capita for the two Koreas was roughly equal) (pg 29) Whereas the 2009

estimates are for the two countries were $40 billion for North Korean and 1.459 trillion for

South Korea. (CIA World Fact Book)The economy of North Korea is negligible, being


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comparatively less than 3% of the South Korean economy. It is generally agreed that poor

economic performance can undermine the perceived legitimacy of a state. Interestingly, B. R.

Myers suggests that Just because Kim is exempted from criticism for the nations difficulties

does not mean that he is denied credit for its successes. The difference to the Kim Il Sung cult

is that the Generals leadership is non-military areas is presented mainly as a matter of

inspiration by example (Myers pg 123) This suggests that Kim Jung Il has found an

ideological loophole that aids in the stability of his regime.

Since coming to power Kim Jung Il has made a number of significant economic

reforms. The famine had a largely unexpected consequence; because the central government

was unable to provide goods for certain counties within the DPRK some North Koreans

discovered the true meaning ofJuche... The necessity to procure food and other essentials

spurred the development of markets in the mid-1990s (Snyder pg 44) Farmers markets

became a significant part of the North Korean economy. Additionally, David Kang goes to

great length outlining the market and outwardly oriented changes the DPRK undertook in the

early 2000s. He states some estimates suggest as much as one-quarter of North Koreas

economy is now private. (pg 105) These economic policy changes are important for the

stability of North Korea for two primary reasons. First, depending on the success of these

changes it could either bolster or undermine the publics faith in the regime. Second, the

further the regime moves toward free market structures the more it undermines the regime

ideologically. That is, if the state has adopted by-and-large free market policies it would

appear that Kim Jung Il has capitulated to the imperialism of the Yankees.

The third challenge to the stability of the DPRK, the generational shift, intuitively

makes sense, though data for it is lacking. Lim argues that the current generation did not


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grow up witnesses the regimes previous prosperity and has greater and greater exposure to

the outside world and consequently has a markedly different attitude (Lim pg 177-178).

While he doesnt provide empirical evidence, the possibility of its truth is significant.

Generation shifts have the potential to lead to instability as the population becomes

disillusioned with the regime and consequently agitates against it.

Coalitional struggles also pose a threat to Kim Jung Ils regime. While he does not

provide a definition, coalitional struggle can be summarized as conflict that arises within a

government resulting from factional differences. Scott Snyder suggests there are potentially

two levels of coalitional struggle within North Korea. The first that he suggests is a division

of the central government along the lines ofpragmatists and technocrats in contrast to the

military and nuclear establishment. (Snyder pg 42) He further suggests that if this type of

struggle exists, that the parties are not diametrically opposed, but rather both acting to make

the regime more malleable to the effects of globalization. The next type of struggle he

suggests is the decentralization of power caused by the famine. (Snyder pg 44) Coalitional

struggle has the potential of destabilizing a regime if it results in new discourses that pull

authority away from the governing center. For example if large bodies of the government

advocate an international policy that promotes cooperation with South Korea and the US it

could delegitimize Kim Jung Il. Snyders framework of coalitional struggle is problematic as

he provides little evidence to edify his argument, it seems largely speculation.

The final factor contributing to instability is the growing knowledge North Koreans

have of the lives of South Koreans. As stated by B. R Myers the inevitable spread of public

awareness that for all their anti-Americanis, the South Koreans are happy with their own

republic and do not want to live under Pyongyangs rule. There is no way for the Text to


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make sense of this truth (pg 169) Myers makes a strong case that the crux of the DPRK

propagandas message is one of national purity and that all Koreans North and South want to

live united as one nation. The DPRK in its media is dismissive of the legitimacy of the ROK

suggesting its government is merely a puppet for the Americans. (Myers pg 152-154) Under

this frame work the North Korean government is the only legitimate government that is

actively seeking to reunite the two Koreas according to the desires of the Korean nation. If

this foundation to Kim Jung Ils legitimacy is removed, it could severely destabilize the

regime. Furthermore, it is suggested by Lim that the North Korean people are no longer

living in a cave. Since the mid-1990s the have been able to receive information from the

outside world. (Lim pg 177) This destabilizing effect could be comparable to the destruction

of certain national narratives created in the United States. For example the American Dream

or the lack of viable alternatives to liberal democracy and free market capitalism. Depending

on how these narratives or ideas were undermined or destroyed, the legitimacy of the

government would be undermined and instability would ensue. One might argue that because

the destruction of the American Dream was protracted that the effect of its loss was

mitigated, resulting only in the Tea party and the Occupy movements. Another analogy might

be the Catholic Church and the growth of science. Given the gradual progress of science the

Catholic Church was able to modify its dogmas to suit the times. In contrast, if the knowledge

produced by science came about quickly and was widely accepted, it is likely the Church

would not have survived in nearly the same size or shape. This suggests that it is important to

look at the way that the DPRK regime is compensating for the growing awareness of the

South and whether they will be able to modify their national narrative to avoid the potential

instability. In contradiction to his own argument Myers also notes that because the ROK is

now condemned almost exclusively on ethnocentric and moralistic grounds, the Text is free


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not only to concede the rival states economic affluence but even to exaggerate it, the evident

aim being to inoculate the masses against future revelations (Myers pg 154-156)

Despite all these factors potentially acting to undermine the regime there is some

evidence to suggest the DPRK is not having a bout of internal instability, furthermore I have

found little evidence to suggest that a lack of stability or perceived potential for instability

motivate the regimes military priority, obtaining of nuclear arms or its sporadic international

relations. To begin with B. R. Myers clearly states The Kim Jung Il regime has always

enjoyed a higher degree of uncoerced mass support than the outside world is willing to

recognize. (Myers pg 117) While he does not evidentially support this claim it is important

to consider given evidence from other authors. David Kang boldly asserts that (pg 104):

Given the horrible shape of the North Korean economy, it might seem surprising that I

argue that the North Korean leaders do not see imminent collapse of their regime. Yet

there is evidence that the North Korean leadershipfar from having lost all hope and

going into a bunker mentalityhas been actively pursuing a number of options

through which it can survive into the future

In other words the economic behavior of North Korea suggests, to David Kang, that the

North Korean Leadership does not see imminent instability. Rather, they are trying to be

proactive in order to strengthen their position and the economy. Additionally, it is important

to wrap our heads around the DPRKs use of its military. It is extremely likely, bordering on

certainty that the North Korean regime maintains prison camps where forced labor takes

place. The journalist, Bradley Martin, in his voluminous workUnder the Loving Care of the

Fatherly Leaderrecords numerous interviews with former prisoners. Furthermore, Lim

quotes a North Korean remarking on the militarys involvement in society (Lim 151):


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A number of agricultural farms and industrial factories have been put under the direct

control of the military. Military soldiers stand guard watching grains and vegetables in

the farms. The peasants are engaged only in farming without harvesting [the military

harvests]. In train stations, the soldiers check train tickets

On a different note, I have not encountered any evidence that suggests that the military is

being used against the population in the violent suppression of riots nor armed insurrection.

While it is possible that the military acts as a deterrent to prevent insurrection there is another

alternative. While this may come across as naive, there is the possibility that the military is

being used in much the same way that we use our National Guard units in times of natural

disaster, in this case a national economic disaster. There are similar parallels that we can

draw upon from other nations and time periods that may shed some light on what this might

look like. In the Revolution BetrayedLeon Trotsky discusses his use of military brigades in

mining operations in the Urals to bolster the economy; if you have 1.2 soldiers standing

around you might as well put them to work. Along a similar line, Lim also states Together

with the police, the military became a domestic security force and began to crack down on

non-socialistic phenomena in normal situations. (pg 151) This, in itself, is not altogether

abnormal. From my personal experience, it is not uncommon to see Ukrainian military

personnel in train stations performing security roles. Similarly, the Irish Military, though

small, can be seen in the streets outside of the bank of Ireland securing large money transfers.

Furthermore, Russian military Special Forces are commonly depicted fulfilling the SWAT-

paramilitary equivalent role of assisting police in dire situations. The point being that there is

not necessarily a correlation between a regimes maintenance of a large army, its use in the

civilian sphere and the intent to forcibly maintain regime stability. Considering that the

military is acting as an extension of the police, it suggests that the police would already be


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cruelly throwing people into prison camps regardless of having military assistance.

Consequently, it is less certain that there is a correlation between the DPRKs behavior and

the possibility of instability.

The next explanation for the erratic behavior of the DPRK is the possible intent to

coerce benefits from other nations with their sporadic use of force and threat of nuclear arms.

It has been clearly stated that North Korea had engaged in exploratory talks because its

leaders were eager for food, fuel, currency and economic aid from other countries. (Bumiller

Oct 27th2011) The article continues, shortly later, reiterating the North Koreans were

talking simply to extract concessions without planning to give up their nuclear weapons. In

summation the defense secretary stated there is a history here of accommodation and

provocation. (Bumiller) Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of its subsidized

food arrangements with China and Russia, North Korea has had endemic food shortages

which are largely attributed to a lack of arable land, collective farming practices,

poor soil quality, insufficient fertilization, and persistent shortages of tractors and fuel. (CIA

World Factbook) Correlatively, the DPRK has sporadically entered and left aid agreements

over the last decade and a half. Narushige Michishita claims that the DPRK has become more

calculating with its exteriorly perceived sporadic use of force. He summarizes taken as a

whole, North Korean leaders have been highly rational and moderately successful high-risk

takers with idiosyncratic policy objectives (pg 189) He builds later stating the reason

behind this is the dilemma that North Korea faces. It could obtain large gains if it were to

abandon its nuclear and missile programs, but if it did so, it would be left with no effective

policy leverage. (Michishita pg 197) Along similar lines, Victor Cha contends (pg 34):


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Depending on how desperate Kim Jong Il assesses the situation, one can imagine

other such incidents in the future. The DPRK might lob several artillery shells into a

Southern city and create chaos each provocation is too minor to prompt all-out war,

but serious enough to raise the incentive for Seoul and Washington to give ground and

negotiate a peaceful resolution to the crisis.

The use of force in order to gain concessions is a strong hypothesis. Its strength is derived

from both our ability to create a coherent and rational narrative for the motivations of the

DPRK regime and the strong evidence supporting this type of behavior over the past decade.

In stark contrast is the argument that the DRPK wishes to normalize relations with the

US. David Kang claims that the answer is a qualified yes He continues, suggesting the

opening up and increased market freedoms of the North Korean economy point in this

direction. (Kang pg 105) Similarly, Narushige Michishita states, referring to the 1990s, that

North Korea attempted to achieve these goals by trying to normalize relations with the

United States and Japan. (pg 187) However, both authors back away from this position.

Kang qualifies it while one might examine only the military and conclude that nothing has

changed in North Korea, in fact the economic sector has changed dramatically. (pg 105)

That is, if we ignore roughly half of the situation, there is the significant possibility that North

Korea wishes to normalize relations. Michishita qualifies his argument stating since the

1990s, North Koreas military-diplomatic campaigns have been about trading military

capabilities for diplomatic and economic gains. (pg 188)

The final explanation is one that frames the DPRKs actions as potentially calculating

the advantages of attacking compared to waiting longer. To begin, this framework the North

Korean regime (in additional to the use of force to coerce international relations) has two


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choices, attacking or waiting. Homer Hodge, unambiguously states the offensive character

of Pyongyangs military strategy is demonstrated by the organization and deployment of its

forces. (pg 73) Similarly Victor Cha sets up a type of game theory approach to the DPRKs

decision making process. The two important factors that he elucidates are the time frame and

the perspective both which form North Koreas decisional frame. He contends that during

the 70s time was on the DPRKs side and that they simply had to wait for the US to leave.

However, as time progressed the situation, economically, has become disadvantageous. He

contends that time is not on their side and the longer they wait the direr their situation

becomes. North Koreas perspective according to him is a very risk oriented one because it is

so precarious. He suggests the regime may analyze the situation centering on loss mitigation

rather than potential gains. This means the regime might look at the slight potential gains of

all out conflict compared to the seeming guarantee of further privation and increased poverty

or potential invasion by the US or the ROK and rashly (though rationally from their

perspective) decide to invade. (Victor Cha, Weak but Still Threatening)

Because no one explanation gives a full account for North Koreas behavior I feel it is

prudent to synthesize the stronger elements of each rational into a larger narrative. Initially, I

was inclined to lean toward instability as the predominant explanation; I have reconsidered

this view. Based on the various arguments and facts presented, it would suggest that while

there is clearly some dissent to Kim Jung Ils rule, it is not large enough to explain the

behaviors in question. It is likely that the dissent, while prevalent, is brutally managed and

kept down through the three oppressive tools of the police, the dynamic and nuanced

propaganda, and the unknown quantity of prison camps. Similarly, in conjunction with the

nuanced propaganda the state is attempting to adapt certain market aspects of its economy

and allow limited foreign investment, as a means of lessening the impact of globalization and


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the growing awareness of the outside world. Next, combining the tactical use of force in

order to gain concessions and the time framework provided by Victor Cha we can create a

convincing narrative of the DPRK as a calculating regime, that is adopting strategies that it

believes will allow it to continue to exist into the foreseeable future. That is, its choices are

not black and white between attack and wait, but rather it is choosing the line of limited

foreign investment and sporadic threats in order to benefit economically. The difficulty is

assessing the regimes ultimate goals. That is, the degree to which the DPRK incorporates the

reunification of Korea in its plans or whether their plans are purely short term and they no

longer actually consider their actions in this framework. Unfortunately, with the DPRK we

find ourselves continually running into the epistemological boundary that limits our abilities

to concretely know. Consequently, we are largely left with speculation as to their actual

intentions.

Word Count: 3,488

Bibliography:

Bumiller, Elisabeth. "North Korea Is Talking, but Panetta Is Skeptical."New York Times. 27Oct. 2011. Web. 11 Dec. 2011..

Cha, Victor D. "Weak But Still Threatening."Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on

Engagement Strategies. New York: Columbia UP, 2003. 21-40. Print.CIA. "CIA - The World Factbook." Welcome to the CIA Web SiteCentral Intelligence

Agency. CIA, 10 Nov. 2011. Web. 12 Dec. 2011..

Hodge, Homer T. "North Koreas Military Strategy." Parameters 03 Spring (2003): 68-81.Print.

Kang, David C. "Why Are We Afraid of Engagement?"Nuclear North Korea: A Debate onEngagement Strategies. New York: Columbia UP, 2003. 103-15. Print.

Lim, Jae-Cheon. Kim Jong Il's Leadership of North Korea. New York, NY: Routledge, 2009.Print.

Martin, Bradley K. Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the KimDynasty. New York: Thomas Dunne, 2004. Print.


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Michishita, Narushige.North Korea's Military-diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008. MiltonPark, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2010. Print.

Myers, B. R. The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves-- And Why It Matters.Brooklyn, New York: Melville House. Print.

Przystu, Jame J. "North Korea: Challenges, Interests, and Policy." Strategic Forum, Institutefor National Strategic Studies National Defense University 250 (2009): 1-5. Print.

Snyder, Scott. "Assessing North Korea's Strategic Intentions and Motivations."North Korea'sForeign Policy Under Kim Jong Il: New Perspectives. Ed. Tae-Hwan Kwak andSeung-Ho Joo. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009. 39-56. Print.

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North Korea’s Enigmatic behavior