Normative & Analytical_Jurisprudence

5/27/2018 Normative & Analytical_Jurisprudence

1/33

Analytical NormativeJurisprudence

Agus BrotosusiloFaculty of Law University of Indonesia

1Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.


2/33

.

.

Agus Brotosusilo, 1992. 2

.

NormativeJurisprudence



3/33

.

.


Normative Jurisprudence A philosophical system of legal and moralprinciples purportedly deriving from a

universalized conception of human natureordivine justice rather than from legislative orjudicial action; moral law embodied inprinciples of right and wrong .

Tending to establish a standard ofcorrectness by prescription of rules;evaluativerather than descriptive. Normativeethics---any system dictatingmorally correctconduct---is distinguished from meta-ethics---the discussion ofthe meaningof moral terms

without issuing directives. 3Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.


4/33

.

AnalyticalJurisprudence



5/33

Analytical JurisprudenceA method of legal study thatconcentrates on the logicalstructure of law; themeanings and uses of itsconcepts; and the formalterms and the modes of itsoperation.



6/33

A wider variety of Analytical

Jurisprudence (Summers, 1966):

Analysis of the existing conceptualframeworkof and about law;

Construction of new conceptualframeworks with accompanyingterminologies;

Rational justificationof institutions andpractices, existingand proposed; and

Purposive Implication, the tracing outof what the acceptance of socialpurposes implies in terms of socialarrangements and social ordering.



7/33

The Modern Analytical Jurisprudence:

Raz (1975) in MacCormick (1983)

The best defence yet offered for the

positivist thesis on the conceptual

independence of law from morality

(MacCormick , 1983):



8/33

Razs breaks in legal thinking:

One result of pursuit of reason for

action is to direct our attentionwhenlooking of a concept like obligation--,

to the kinds of reasons we address

when contemplating an actual orsupposedobligation to act.

Raz shows that there is a differencebetween there being some sound

reasons for conduct being legally

obligatory and its actuallybeing so.8Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.


9/33

Raz, 1975:

When we considering whether

todo Xshould be an obligation,we are at the deliberative

phase of practical reasoning.

When an authoritative decisions

is taken that to do X isobligatory, further deliberationis

excluded.



10/33

e reason o acin external forces

Even H.L.A. Hart (The Concept of Law),Austinsmost trenchant contemporary

critic, sought the reason in external

serious social pressure.

John Austin: habitual obedience

The continuity of law

H.L.A. Hart: the rule of recognition.10Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.


11/33

Analytical Jurisprudence:Visser t Hooft, 1988.

Aliran Filsafat Hukum yang

dengan bantuan misalnya

pemahaman-pemahaman FilsafatBahasa berupaya untuk

menjelaskan pengertian-

pengertian yang digunakandalam Ilmu Hukum Praktikal

(Practische Rechtswetenschap).



12/33

.

TOPIK-TOPIK MENARIKDALAM WACANA HUKUMThe Concept of Law;

A Theory of Right;The Economic Analysis of Law;

Libertarianism;A Theory of Justice.12Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.


13/33

The Concept of Law:Law is a system of rules (Hart)

Primary Rules Secondary Rules

(duty imposing (power-conferring

rules citizens) rules officials)

Rules of Adjudication

Rules of ChangeRules of Validity



14/33

Harts Rules of Adjudication:

Rules which confer

competence on officials to

pass judgement and toenforce law



15/33

Hart:

The minimum contentof Natural Law:

Persons

The Minimum form of Protection of Property

Promises



16/33

on u er:The Morality of Law, 1969.

8 (eight) procedural quality of legalsystem:

1. Generality;

2. Promulgation;3. Prospective;

4. Clear & Intelligible;

5. Free of Contradiction;6. Not require the impossible;

7. Constant in time;

8. Binding power.Agus Brotosusilo, 1992. 16

R ld D ki


17/33

Ronald Dworkin:

Taking Rights Seriously, 1978.

Dworkins attacks on the model of

positivism represented by Harts

Concept of Law began as an assault

on its theory of adjudication.

Dworkin was concern with the

inadequacies of positivistic

explanations of how disputes were

determined when, as is so often the

case, we run out of rules. 17Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.


18/33

Dworkin:

moral - rules

Dworkin has attempted to

construct a theory of law out of

theory of adjudication.

He shows that Judge use, and

must use, moralconsiderations in

addition to rules found in

legislation and case law.


D ki Th l d t


19/33

Dworkin: The law does notjust consists of rules

Dworkin argues that these moralconsiderations are integral to the

moral theory justifying the enacted

and case lawbinding on Judges.

The law does not just consists of

rules, as positivists such a Hartmaintain, but there is no reason why

a positivists theory should not be

constructed to embrace other

standards than rules.19Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.

R ld D ki


20/33

Ronald Dworkin:Laws Empire, 1986.

In Laws Empire (1986), Dworkinbegin with question that is at the

heart of the whole legal system: in

difficult cases, how do (and how

should) Judge decide what the law

is?

He shows that Judge must decide

hard cases by interpreting rather

than simply applying past legal

decisions. 20Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.

D orkins general theor


21/33

Dworkins general theoryof interpretation

Dworkin produces a general theory of

what interpretation is---in literature as

well as in law---and of when one

interpretation is better than the

others.


wor n s ree eor es on


22/33

wor n s ree eor es onthe General Character of Law

Reflected in Legal Interpretation:

1. The law of a community to be only

what the established conventions of

that community say it is.

2. Legal practice is best understood as

an instrument of society to achieve

its goals.

Dworkin argues forcefully and

persuasively against both these

views. 22Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.

Dworkins concept of


23/33

Dworkins concept of

political and legal integrity

3.Dworkin insist that the mostfundamental point of law is notto report

concensusor provide efficient meansto

social goals, but to answer the

requirementthat political community actin a coherent and principled manner

toward all its member.

Dworkin systematically demonstrate

that his concept of political and legal

integrity is the key to Anglo-American

le al theor and ractice.Agus Brotosusilo, 1992. 23


24/33

Hart vs. Dworkin

Hart demonstrated the need for

those interested in the concept oflaw to appreciates the insights of

analytical, particularly linguistic

philosophy.

Dworkin has place the issue of

jurisprudence backwhere they werein the days of Bentham--, in the realm

of the moral andpolitical philosophy.


D ki k ti l f


25/33

Dworkins skeptical of

The Economic Analysis of Law

Dworkinscontribution to jurisprudence arematched by his contribution to the

development of a liberalpolitical theory.

It is his view that the right to equal concern

and respect is the fundamental principle of

moral theory (and of American

constitutional law), and that utilitarianism

is no substitute for a theory committed toTaking Rights Seriously.

As a critic of utilitarianism Dworkin is

naturally skeptical of The Economic

Analysis of Law 25Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.


26/33

A Theory of Right .



27/33

Hart:

Rights-based theories individualinterest

Goal-based theories communityinterest


Tentang hakekat Right


28/33

Tentang hakekat Right

dikenal 2 (dua) teori:

Teori yang menekankan will

atau choice (Hart); dan

Teori yang menekankan interest

atau benefit.


Will/Ch i Th


29/33

Will/Choice Theory:

Hart

Pendukung will/choice Theory, misalnyaHart (1955): tujuan hukum adalah untukmenjamin sarana yang memungkinkanekspresi diri seluas-luasnya bagi individu,tingkat maksimum pengejawantahan-diriindividu.Teori ini terkait sangat erat dengan idekedaulatan; Satu-satunya jalan untukpenyelesaian perbedaan kehendak adalahdengan merumuskan kehendak yangsuperior,yang mengatasi semua posisi.

Teori ini juga berhubungan erat dengan ideindividualism-moral. Berdasarkan teori inidiskresi individuel adalah ciri tunggal darikonsep Right. 29Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.

/ f


30/33

The interest/benefittheory:Lyons, McCormick, Raz, Campbell

Sebaliknya, para pendukung theinterest/benefit theory berpendapat

bahwa tujuan Right bukan untuk

melindungi pengejawantahan-diri

individu, tetapi untuk melindungikepentingan-kepentingan tertentu.Rightadalah kepentingan-kepentinganyang dijamin untuk pribadi-pribadi olehaturan-aturan yang mengatur hubungan-hubungan sosial dalam masyarakat. 30Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.

K k t t d i


31/33

Kekuatan utama dari

the interest benefitth oryKekuatan utama dari theinterest benefit th ory adalahbahwa teori ini mencakup semua

type Right, termasuk (a.l. hakuntuk pendidikan, perawatan

kesehatan, pemukiman yang

layak), tidak hanya terbatas padaapa yang disebut sebagai

liberties.31Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.


32/33

Related discussion:

The Economic Analysis of Law;

(4THCourse)A Theory of Justice.

(including: Libertarianism)(7THCourse)


.


33/33

.

.

.

.


.

.

Agus Brotosusilo 2005 33

.

Agus Brotosusilo 2002 33

.

Documents

Normative & Analytical_Jurisprudence