ZOiS REPORT

THE DONBAS ndash TWO PARTS OR STILL ONETHE EXPERIENCE OF WAR THROUGH THE EYES OF THE REGIONAL POPULATION

No2 2017 middot May 2017

Gwendolyn Sasse

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

2

Content

02 ___ Executive summary

03 ___ Introduction04 ___ Life and attitudes across the frontline04 ______ Personal contacts across the frontline06 ______ Political identities11 ______ Views on the war and the status of the region14 ______ Trust in political institutions and the media18 ______ Foreign policy orientation19 ___ Conclusion

20 ___ Imprint

Executive summary

A ZOiS survey conducted in the Donbas in December 2016 provides insights into life and attitudes across the frontline between the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the occupied territories the self-declared Donetsk Peoplersquos Re-public (DNR) and the Luhansk Peoplersquos Republic (LNR) The two-part sur-vey reveals the differentiated public opinion in the DNR LNR and similari-ties in views shared across the frontline The main results of the two-part survey are

ndash The regional population maintains close contacts across the frontline

ndash In both parts of the Donbas mixed Ukrainian-Russian identities are sig-nificant and counterbalance ethnification and polarization induced by the war

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

3

ndash The attitudes of the population of the DNR LNR are more differentiated than might be expected thereby defying the notion of a region set in its views and lsquolostrsquo by Kyiv

ndash The population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR are fur-thest apart in their views about the future status of the occupied territo-ries The views in the DNR LNR indicate aspirations for the recognition of the regionrsquos special status either within Ukraine or within Russia In the Kyiv-conrolled Donbas opposition to a special status is the majority view

ndash Trust in Ukrainian political institutions is similarly low in both parts of the Donbas

ndash Foreign policy orientations are shared across the frontline while wide-spread opposition to NATO membership in both parts of the Donbas is not surprising respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are nearly as scepti-cal of EU membership for Ukraine (72 percent) as in the occupied territo-ries (82 percent)

Introduction1

The war in eastern Ukraine that started in the aftermath of the Euromaid-an and Russiarsquos annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014 has claimed about 10000 lives to date and made about 28 million people living in the region leave their homes (according to estimates there are about 18 mil-lion internally displaced and about one million who left for Russia)2 The frontline has cut the historical region of Donbas used as a shorthand to de-scribe Donetsk oblast and Luhansk oblast into two parts The self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk Peoplersquos Republics (DNR LNR) supported by Russia include the regional capital cities Donetsk and Luhansk The war appears to be now in an unstable stalemate that is pulling the two parts of the Donbas

1 The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance by Alice Lackner who contrib-uted to the data analysis and prepared the charts

2 For an analysis of the attitudes of the displaced in Ukraine and Russia based on ZOiS sur-vey data see Gwendolyn Sasse The Displaced Ukrainians Who are they and what do they think ZOiS Report Nothinsp1 March 2017

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

4

increasingly apart On the one hand the integration of the DNR LNR into Russian structures is progressing for example through the distribution of Russian passports the introduction of the ruble as the local currency and the renationalization of enterprises On the other hand the Ukraini-nan government has stopped social security payments to the population in the occupied territories and representatives of Ukrainian political parties have enforced a blockade of coal transports from the occupied territories which Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko was forced to endorse as gov-ernment policy

The central questions which this report addresses on the basis of the new ZOIS survey data are whether the increasing physical and political dis-tance between the two parts of the Donbas is reflected in the local popula-tionrsquos lives identities and attitudes Moreover the survey provides insights into the effects of the war on identitities as reported by the respondents By covering the whole Donbas region rather than just the part controlled by Kyiv the survey provides a rare glimpse of the perceptions of people in the occupied territory and thereby allows for a comparison of the attitudes across the frontline

Opinion polls in Ukraine are currently not lsquonationally representativersquo in a strict sense as they exclude the occupied territories The two-part ZOiS-suvey conducted in December 2016 aims to rectify this as much as possi-ble in a situation of war In Kyiv-controlled Donbas face-to-face interviews were conducted based on a multi-stage quota sample (n = 1200 split evently between Donetsk and Luhansk oblast) based on age gender and educational attainment quotas of the urban and rural populations according to the offi-cial state statistics of 2016 In the occupied territories the same quotas were applied as there is no official data on the current residents of this region Due to the difficulties of access and potential security concerns on the part of the respondents the interviews (n = 1200) were conducted by telephone rather than in face-to-face interviews The questionnaire therefore had to be shortened and simplified but the key questions remained the same in both surveys

Life and attitudes across the frontline

Personal contacts across the frontline

Border crossings between the two parts of the Donbas is part of the daily routine of many people living close to the frontline The intensity of con-tact between family members and friends across the frontline is a powerful counterpoint to the actions of the parties to this war Of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 38 percent said they have family members or friends in the DNR LNR On the other side of the separation line the per-sonal linkages are even greater 57 percent of the respondents in the occu-pied territories have family members or friends living in the government-controlled part of the Donbas

Close to 50 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are in touch with family members and friends in DNR LNR on a daily basis

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

5

FIGURE 1 Donbas How often are you in touch with your relativesthinspthinspfriends in the DNRthinspthinspLNR

Source ZOiS

99

362381

128

31

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Every day Once or twice a week

Once or twice a month Once or twice a year

Not at all at the moment

n=423

DonbasHow often are you in touch with your

relativesfriends in the DNRLNR

FIGURE 2 DNRthinspthinspLNR How often are you in touch with your relativesthinspthinspfriends in the Donbas

188

319344

107

43

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Every day Once or twice a week

Once or twice a month Once or twice a year

Not at all at the moment

n=655

DNR minus LNRHow often are you in touch with your

relativesfriends in the Donbas

Source ZOiS

or once twice per week Only about 3 percent report not being in touch at the moment Similarly just under 50 percent of the respondents in the DNR LNR are in touch with family members or friends based in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas on a daily basis or once twice a week Within this refer-ence group the share of those in daily contact is twice as high as that of the respondents in the Donbas in contact with people in the DNR LNR namely close to 20 percent Again only about 4 percent has lost touch for the mo-ment FIGURES 1thinsp+thinsp2

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

6

Political identities

The only way in which a one-off survey can speak to the question of personal identity change is to tap into self-reported changes The ZOiS survey included a deliberately open question which avoided narrowing it to either ethnic or civic identity categories followed by more detailed questions about a range of different identity options As for the first more general question about a change in personal identity as a result of the events of 2013-16 a quarter of the respondents in the occupied territories said that they felt lsquomore Russianrsquo

0109

031818

0603

2207

0102

11343

6648

8978

0507

0305

538532

3774

3557

67114

0 20 40 60Percent

Other

Ukrainianminusspeaking Russian

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Bilingual UkrminusRuss speaker

Russianminusspeaker

Ukrainianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Dual UkrminusRuss citizenship

Russian citizen

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Russian

Ethnic Ukrainian

Now n=1100 Five years ago n=1111

DonbasWhat identity is most important to you today

What identity was important to you five years ago

Identity nowIdentity five years ago

34

261205

85143

204

618

450

020

4060

Perc

ent

More Russian More Ukrainian More strongly both No change

Donbas n=995 DNRLNR n=1141

Donbas minus DNR LNRAs a result of the events 2013minus16 do you feel

DonbasDNRLNR

FIGURE 3 As a result of the events 2013thinspndashthinsp16 do you feelhellip

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 4 Donbas What identity is most important to you today What identity was most important to you five years ago

Identity now (nthinsp=thinsp1100)

Identity five years ago (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp995)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1141)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

7

now ndash and a fifth of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they felt lsquomore Ukrainianrsquo now Interestingly however 14 percent and 20 percent in the Kyiv-controlled and occupied Donbas respectively said that they felt more strongly now that they are lsquoboth Ukrainian and Russianrsquo The majority in both parts of the Donbas reported no change in identity 62 per-cent in the government-controlled Donbas and 45 percent in the self-declared republics Thus while there has been a greater shift in identities in the oc-cupied territories a significant number of respondents reported not only a stable identity but also an increase in a mixed identification FIGURE 3

In the Ukrainian controlled Donbas face-to-face interviews allowed for a more detailed question about identity 53 and 54 percent of the respondents picked Ukrainian citizenship as their primary self-reported identity now and five years ago demonstrating that a civic identity already prevailed over eth-nic or regional identities before the war and has remained intact throughout the war experience Only 7 percent and 4 percent chose lsquoethnic Ukrainianrsquo and lsquoethnic Russianrsquo as their main identity five years ago These figures have risen now to 11 percent and 6 percent respectively Similarly self-identification as lsquomixed ethnic Russian and Ukrainianrsquo has risen from 4 to 7 percent over the last five years Regional identity has grown somewhat in significance as re-flected in the salience of a Donbas identity (up from 8 to 9 percent) and a small drop in identification with the regional sub-units Donetsk and Luhansk oblast (from 7 to 5 percent and from 11 to 4 percent respectively) FIGURE 4

Self-identification as a Ukrainian citizen marks an important difference be-tween the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied territories In the DNR LNR 54 percent reported that they felt less like Ukrainian citizens now compared to before 2013 while only 8 percent stated that they felt more like Ukrainian citi-zens now 38 percent reported no change The previously strong sense of being a Ukrainian citizen in this region has tended to be seriously underestimated in the West This identity is part of the price paid for the war in the occupied territories This previously strong identity however has not been replaced by a clear-cut ethnification or polarization FIGURE 5

80

540

381

020

4060

Perc

ent

More Ukr citizen than before Less Ukr citizen than before No changen=1156

DNR minus LNRAs a result of the events of 2013minus16 do you feel

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 5 DNRthinspthinspLNR (Citizenship) As a result of the events 2013thinspndashthinsp16 do you feelhellip

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

8

When we trace in more detail the shifts between self-reported identity catego-ries in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas area we find that while self-identification as a Ukrainian citizen remains as the most important identity category from five years ago it is now an identity in flux with respondents also shifting from Ukrainian citizenship to Ukrainian ethnicity or a regional Donbas identity

FIGURES 6thinspndashthinsp8

Survey questions about sbquonative languagersquo tend to tap into sentiments about language as an identity marker rather than actual day to day language practice The majority of respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled Donbas (about 50 percent) and the DNR LNR (about 60 percent) identify Russian as their native language The range of answers to this question did not only list mutually exclusive options as is commonly the case in the national census

FIGURE 6 Donbas (Identity now ethnic Ukrainian) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

FIGURE 7Donbas (Identity now mixed ethnic Ukrainian and Russian) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

56

56

08

40

64

40

08

272

08

448

0 10 20 30 40 50Percent

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Russianminusspeaker

Ukrainianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Russian citizen

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=125

DonbasIdentity now Ethnic Ukrainian

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

78

65

117

13

351

299

26

52

0 10 20 30 40Percent

Russianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donbas

Dual UkrminusRuss citizenship

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Russian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=77

DonbasIdentity now Mixed ethnic Ukr amp Russ

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

9

and many standard opinion polls but included the option lsquoboth Russian and Ukrainianrsquo which in turn was chosen by 34 percent and 36 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and in the DNR LNR respectively The self-reported relevance of a bilingual identity is compatible with the expres-sions of a mixed Russian-Ukrainian identity whether defined in ethnic or more civic terms in both the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR and the salience of Ukrainian citizenship as the primary identity in the govern-ment-controlled Donbas

There is anecdotal evidence of people adjusting their language identity and or practice in light of their war experience However no significant change was reported by the respondents themselves about a readjustment of their native language FIGURE 9

501

598

160

43

337 358

02 01

020

4060

Perc

ent

Russian Ukrainian Both Russian and Ukrainian Crimean Tatar

Donbas n=1150 DNRLNR n=1198

What language do you consider your native language

DonbasDNRLNR

24

83

71

536

262

12

12

0 20 40 60Percent

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=84

DonbasIdentity now Person from Donbas

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

FIGURE 8 Donbas (Identity now person from Donbas) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 9 What language do you consider your native language

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1150)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1198)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

10

When asked about actual language practice the picture changes somewhat highlighting that survey respondents interpret a question about lsquonative lan-guagersquo differently A majority ndash 53 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 70 percent in the DNR LNR ndash listed Russian as the dominant language spoken at home Furthermore 18 and 10 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR respectively reported an equal language mix of Ukrainian and Russian at home A further 21 and 17 percent respectively said that their main language at home is Russian but that they occasionally speak Ukrainian at home FIGURE 10

Asked about the primary language spoken at work the picture is similar thereby demonstrating that there is congruence between the occupied

2027

764545

119176

71191

1740

0922

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=962 DNRLNR n=1143

Which language do you typically speak at work

DonbasDNRLNR

0221

694528

173206

104184

2240

0621

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=1187 DNRLNR n=1198

Which language do you typically speak at home

DonbasDNRLNR

FIGURE 10 Which language do you typically speak at home

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 11 Which language do you typically speak at work

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp962)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1143)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1187)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1198)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

11

territories and the rest of the Donbas 76 percent list Russian as the main language of communication at work in DNR LNR compared to 55 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 19 and 7 percent respectively report an equal use of Russian and Ukrainian at work An additional 18 and 12 percent re-spectively said that they speak above all Russian and occasionally Ukrain-ian Both at home and at work the use of Ukrainian alone is negligible (max 2 percent) FIGURE 11

Views on the war and the status of the region

Views on the origins of the war are more similar across the two parts of the Donbas than one might expect The respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are split in their assessment 37 percent blame the outbreak of war on Russia and 10 percent on Ukraine a surprising 30 percent think it was the result of Western intervention and 23 percent see it as a local reaction against the Kyiv government With the exception of the perceived role of Russia the views in the occupied territories are rather similar 50 percent think the war resulted from Western intervention 30 percent see it as a lo-cal reaction against the national government 11 percent blame it on Ukraine and 9 percent on Russia FIGURE 12

However the preferences regarding the future status of the occupied ter-ritories diverge significantly While in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas a clear majority (65 percent) wants them to be part of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast without a special status 26 percent deem a special status within Ukraine necessary and about 9 percent see the future of these territories in Rus-sia The views of the population in the self-declared republics are more di-verse than one might have expected 21 percent want this area to be part of Ukraine without a special status and 35 percent prefer a special status for these territories inside Ukraine Conversely 11 percent want to see the territories as part of Russia without a special status and 33 percent would

304

503

371

92 95 113

231

292

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Result of Western interventionCaused by Russia

Caused by UkraineLocal reaction against nat govt

Donbas n=863 DNRLNR n=1047

Which statement is closestto your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 12 Which statement is closest to your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp863)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1047)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

12

prefer a special status inside Russia Thus the main emphasis among the re-spondents in the DNR LNR is on the recognition of the special status of the territories while there is an even split between those who see this area as part of Ukraine or Russia FIGURE 13

The survey results also indicate that the current experience shapes attitudes about autonomy in the rest of the country Generally the experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia all organized as federations at least on paper has made East Europeans politicians and soci-eties sceptical of federalism The fact that Russia the only socialist-era fed-eration that survived the breakup of the USSR thanks to formal and informal institutional adjustments has advocated federalism for Ukraine during the war in eastern Ukraine has discredited the principle further in the Ukrainian political discourse

While some are willing to contemplate an exception for the DNR LNR espe-cially in neighbouring regions like the Kyiv-controlled Donbas the principle of autonomy remains contested In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas about 24 per-cent agree (lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo) that other regions of Ukraine should have the right to a degree of autonomy 39 percent disagree (among them 30 percent disagree strongly) and 37 percent are undecided or indifferent

By comparison the respondents based in the DNR LNR are consistent in their views about autonomy claiming the right to a special status not only for them-selves but also for other regions of Ukraine This discrepancy suggests a mobi-lizing effect through the regionrsquos experience over the last three years of war A majority of 61 percent of the survey respondents in the DNR LNR strongly or rather agree with the principle of giving other regions in Ukraine a degree of autonomy while 23 percent are opposed (of which 12 percent strongly disa-gree) and only 16 percent are undecided or indifferent The latter figures in particular indicate that the issue of autonomy is most salient among those who live in the occupied territories the status of which is disputed FIGURE 14

267

350

657

206

50114

26

331

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Special autonomy within UkraineParts of Donetsk and Luhansk

Part of Russia wo autonomySpecial autonomy within Russia

Donbas n=1157 DNRLNR n=1021

In your view what should the status of DNRLNR be

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 13 In your opinion what should the status of DNRthinspthinspLNR be

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1157)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1021)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

13

The Normandy format that has facilitated several ceasefires but has not yet delivered on the political and institutional content of the Minsk II Agreement has become a focal point for the frustration of all the involved parties Never-theless all sides keep reiterating that there is no alternative to the process De-spite the lack of tangible political results this general feeling is shared by the population in both parts of the Donbas 59 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 45 percent of the respondents in the DNR LNR lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo agree with the principles of the Minsk Agreement Just over a third in each case exhibits a neutral attitude and only a very small share of the respondents disagrees with the principles of the Minsk Agree-ment The survey question does not disentangle the different interpretations of the agreement and the steps it lays out but it illustrates an overall endorse-ment of a continuing process FIGURE 15

76

337

155

270

92113

303

119130

54

244

107

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agree Rather agree Rather disagree Strongly disagree Hard to say I donrsquot care

Donbas n=1174 DNRLNR n=1180

Would you agree that other regions in Ukraineshould be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 14Would you agree that other regions in Ukraine should be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1174)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1180)

196237

391

213

359

455

45 4809

47

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Strongly agreeRather agree

Neither agree nor disagreeRather disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=443 DNRLNR n=723

Do you agree with the Minsk Agreement

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 15Do you agree with the Minsk agreement

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp443)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp723)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

14

Trust in political institutions and the media

The level of trust in political leaders and institutions is a broad indicator of political stability and regime legitimacy In a situation of war trust is eroded and in flux depending on the respondentsrsquo location and personal experience Given that the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko is gener-ally unpopular across Ukraine where he is held responsible for a too slow reform process it does not come as a surprise that a vast majority of over 87 percent does not trust the Ukrainian president in Kyiv-controlled Donbas (of which 55 percent do not trust him at all) The distrust in the DNR LNR is even higher with 77 percent not trusting him at all FIGURE 16

The picture is the reverse when it comes to trust in the Russian president Vladimir Putin In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 88 percent do not trust the Russian president This does not come as a surprise but the variation in

554

770

319

164110

4817 18

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=1062 DNRLNR n=1152

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian President

DonbasDNRLNR

712

197 171 15896

282

21

363

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=888 DNRLNR n=1090

How much trust do you have in the Russian President

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 16 How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian president

FIGURE 17 How much trust do you have in the Russian president

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1062)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1152)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp888)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1090)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

15

expressions of trust in the DNR LNR is noteworthy while about 64 percent of the respondents rather or generally trust the Russian president about 36 per-cent do not FIGURE 17

When asked about the Ukrainian mass media a clear majority of about 82 per-cent of the respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 86 percent in the DNR LNR expressed their distrust in the main traditional media outlets Oligarchic ownership structures and the reporting (or absence of reporting) about the war are likely explanations for the overwhelming distrust FIGURE 18 Unsurprisingly the population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas similarly dis-trusts the Russian mass media (94 percent) but in the occupied territories the trust and distrust in the Russian mass media is relatively evenly split with about 46 percent of the respondents trusting and 54 percent not trusting the Russian mass media FIGURE 19

446

628

366

232184

109

0331

020

4060

Perc

ent

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=961 DNRLNR n=1120

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

785

234

150

225

57

338

07

203

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=824 DNRLNR n=1085

How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 18How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

FIGURE 19How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp961)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1120)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp824)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1085)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

16

General attitudes about democracy and the economy are shared across both parts of the Donbas Support for democracy is best described as lukewarm 42 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 39 percent in the occupied territories lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquosomewhatrsquo agree with the statement that democracy is still the best possible form of government while 38 and 37 percent respectively are non-committal and neither agree nor disagree FIGURE 20

123

170

297

218

380 368

108 11392

131

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agreeSomewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagreeSomewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=972 DNRLNR n=1136

Democracy is still the best form of government

DonbasDNRLNR

240276

153113

607 611

020

4060

Perc

ent

Return to socialist economy Leave everything as it is Deepen market reforms

Donbas n=738 DNRLNR n=917

What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 20Democracy is still the best form of government

FIGURE 21 What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp972)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1136)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp738)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp917)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

17

As for their economic views 61 percent of the respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied Donbas voiced their preference for deepening economic reforms thereby expressing a general pro-reform attitude Main-taining the status quo was only the declared preference of 15 percent of respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 11 percent in the DNR LNR The lsquoreturn to a socialist economyrsquo was the preferred choice of 24 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and 28 percent in the occupied terri-tories This response is likely to capture not just a specific ideological view about the socialist economic system but rather a general dissatisfaction with Ukrainersquos transition path FIGURE 21

The combination of a lukewarm position on democracy and a general en-dorsement of further economic reforms in both parts of the Donbas should be seen in connection with a further result namely the self-reported change in the level of political interest as a result of the events over the last three years The trends point in opposite directions across the frontline while respondents in the DNR LNR expressed a noteworthy increase in interest in politics (53 percent compared to only 14 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas) 49 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they were now less interested in politics (compared to 24 percent in the DNR LNR) Thus the experience of war has politicized the population of the DNR LNR much more than their counterpart in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas While Kyiv is confronted with a population that seems to be turning away from national politics the population of the occupied territories has become highly politicized though not in one particular direction FIGURE 22

136

526

373

239

491

235

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

More The same Less

Donbas n=1111 DNRLNR n=1167

Are you now more or less interestedin politics than three years ago

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 22 Are you now more or less interested in politics than three years ago

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1167)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

18

Foreign policy orientation

In terms of foreign policy orientation the two parts of the divided Donbas are more similar than one might think while NATO membership was re-jected outright as could be expected by the vast majority in both parts the widespread negative views of the EU in the Donbas might come as a sur-prise 72 percent of respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 82 percent in the self-declared republics are against Ukraine joining the EU FIGURES 23thinsp+thinsp24 While support for the EU in view of a slow reform pro-cess and the inability of Western actors to end the war has cooled off again across Ukraine according to recent polls there has generally been support above 50 percent for EU membership in recent years Thus with regard to the Ukrainian governmentrsquos declared objective of aligning its reform pro-cess with the EU the Donbas is being left behind

279

182

721

818

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=867 DNRLNR n=1063

Should Ukraine join the EU

DonbasDNRLNR

175

69

825

931

020

4060

8010

0Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=928 DNRLNR n=1092

Should Ukraine join the NATO

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 23Should Ukraine join the EU

FIGURE 24 Should Ukraine join the NATO

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp867)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1063)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp928)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1092)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

19

Conclusion

The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities whether rooted in ethnicity native language language use or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and in some cases this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience

On foreign policy issues both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline On the issue of EU membership the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centrersquos main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions Similarly support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR LNR

Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian Western and Russian policy-makers should take note of For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR LNR In line with the local sentiments international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR LNR

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

2

Content

02 ___ Executive summary

03 ___ Introduction04 ___ Life and attitudes across the frontline04 ______ Personal contacts across the frontline06 ______ Political identities11 ______ Views on the war and the status of the region14 ______ Trust in political institutions and the media18 ______ Foreign policy orientation19 ___ Conclusion

20 ___ Imprint

Executive summary

A ZOiS survey conducted in the Donbas in December 2016 provides insights into life and attitudes across the frontline between the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the occupied territories the self-declared Donetsk Peoplersquos Re-public (DNR) and the Luhansk Peoplersquos Republic (LNR) The two-part sur-vey reveals the differentiated public opinion in the DNR LNR and similari-ties in views shared across the frontline The main results of the two-part survey are

ndash The regional population maintains close contacts across the frontline

ndash In both parts of the Donbas mixed Ukrainian-Russian identities are sig-nificant and counterbalance ethnification and polarization induced by the war

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

3

ndash The attitudes of the population of the DNR LNR are more differentiated than might be expected thereby defying the notion of a region set in its views and lsquolostrsquo by Kyiv

ndash The population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR are fur-thest apart in their views about the future status of the occupied territo-ries The views in the DNR LNR indicate aspirations for the recognition of the regionrsquos special status either within Ukraine or within Russia In the Kyiv-conrolled Donbas opposition to a special status is the majority view

ndash Trust in Ukrainian political institutions is similarly low in both parts of the Donbas

ndash Foreign policy orientations are shared across the frontline while wide-spread opposition to NATO membership in both parts of the Donbas is not surprising respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are nearly as scepti-cal of EU membership for Ukraine (72 percent) as in the occupied territo-ries (82 percent)

Introduction1

The war in eastern Ukraine that started in the aftermath of the Euromaid-an and Russiarsquos annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014 has claimed about 10000 lives to date and made about 28 million people living in the region leave their homes (according to estimates there are about 18 mil-lion internally displaced and about one million who left for Russia)2 The frontline has cut the historical region of Donbas used as a shorthand to de-scribe Donetsk oblast and Luhansk oblast into two parts The self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk Peoplersquos Republics (DNR LNR) supported by Russia include the regional capital cities Donetsk and Luhansk The war appears to be now in an unstable stalemate that is pulling the two parts of the Donbas

1 The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance by Alice Lackner who contrib-uted to the data analysis and prepared the charts

2 For an analysis of the attitudes of the displaced in Ukraine and Russia based on ZOiS sur-vey data see Gwendolyn Sasse The Displaced Ukrainians Who are they and what do they think ZOiS Report Nothinsp1 March 2017

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

4

increasingly apart On the one hand the integration of the DNR LNR into Russian structures is progressing for example through the distribution of Russian passports the introduction of the ruble as the local currency and the renationalization of enterprises On the other hand the Ukraini-nan government has stopped social security payments to the population in the occupied territories and representatives of Ukrainian political parties have enforced a blockade of coal transports from the occupied territories which Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko was forced to endorse as gov-ernment policy

The central questions which this report addresses on the basis of the new ZOIS survey data are whether the increasing physical and political dis-tance between the two parts of the Donbas is reflected in the local popula-tionrsquos lives identities and attitudes Moreover the survey provides insights into the effects of the war on identitities as reported by the respondents By covering the whole Donbas region rather than just the part controlled by Kyiv the survey provides a rare glimpse of the perceptions of people in the occupied territory and thereby allows for a comparison of the attitudes across the frontline

Opinion polls in Ukraine are currently not lsquonationally representativersquo in a strict sense as they exclude the occupied territories The two-part ZOiS-suvey conducted in December 2016 aims to rectify this as much as possi-ble in a situation of war In Kyiv-controlled Donbas face-to-face interviews were conducted based on a multi-stage quota sample (n = 1200 split evently between Donetsk and Luhansk oblast) based on age gender and educational attainment quotas of the urban and rural populations according to the offi-cial state statistics of 2016 In the occupied territories the same quotas were applied as there is no official data on the current residents of this region Due to the difficulties of access and potential security concerns on the part of the respondents the interviews (n = 1200) were conducted by telephone rather than in face-to-face interviews The questionnaire therefore had to be shortened and simplified but the key questions remained the same in both surveys

Life and attitudes across the frontline

Personal contacts across the frontline

Border crossings between the two parts of the Donbas is part of the daily routine of many people living close to the frontline The intensity of con-tact between family members and friends across the frontline is a powerful counterpoint to the actions of the parties to this war Of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 38 percent said they have family members or friends in the DNR LNR On the other side of the separation line the per-sonal linkages are even greater 57 percent of the respondents in the occu-pied territories have family members or friends living in the government-controlled part of the Donbas

Close to 50 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are in touch with family members and friends in DNR LNR on a daily basis

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

5

FIGURE 1 Donbas How often are you in touch with your relativesthinspthinspfriends in the DNRthinspthinspLNR

Source ZOiS

99

362381

128

31

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Every day Once or twice a week

Once or twice a month Once or twice a year

Not at all at the moment

n=423

DonbasHow often are you in touch with your

relativesfriends in the DNRLNR

FIGURE 2 DNRthinspthinspLNR How often are you in touch with your relativesthinspthinspfriends in the Donbas

188

319344

107

43

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Every day Once or twice a week

Once or twice a month Once or twice a year

Not at all at the moment

n=655

DNR minus LNRHow often are you in touch with your

relativesfriends in the Donbas

Source ZOiS

or once twice per week Only about 3 percent report not being in touch at the moment Similarly just under 50 percent of the respondents in the DNR LNR are in touch with family members or friends based in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas on a daily basis or once twice a week Within this refer-ence group the share of those in daily contact is twice as high as that of the respondents in the Donbas in contact with people in the DNR LNR namely close to 20 percent Again only about 4 percent has lost touch for the mo-ment FIGURES 1thinsp+thinsp2

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

6

Political identities

The only way in which a one-off survey can speak to the question of personal identity change is to tap into self-reported changes The ZOiS survey included a deliberately open question which avoided narrowing it to either ethnic or civic identity categories followed by more detailed questions about a range of different identity options As for the first more general question about a change in personal identity as a result of the events of 2013-16 a quarter of the respondents in the occupied territories said that they felt lsquomore Russianrsquo

0109

031818

0603

2207

0102

11343

6648

8978

0507

0305

538532

3774

3557

67114

0 20 40 60Percent

Other

Ukrainianminusspeaking Russian

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Bilingual UkrminusRuss speaker

Russianminusspeaker

Ukrainianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Dual UkrminusRuss citizenship

Russian citizen

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Russian

Ethnic Ukrainian

Now n=1100 Five years ago n=1111

DonbasWhat identity is most important to you today

What identity was important to you five years ago

Identity nowIdentity five years ago

34

261205

85143

204

618

450

020

4060

Perc

ent

More Russian More Ukrainian More strongly both No change

Donbas n=995 DNRLNR n=1141

Donbas minus DNR LNRAs a result of the events 2013minus16 do you feel

DonbasDNRLNR

FIGURE 3 As a result of the events 2013thinspndashthinsp16 do you feelhellip

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 4 Donbas What identity is most important to you today What identity was most important to you five years ago

Identity now (nthinsp=thinsp1100)

Identity five years ago (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp995)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1141)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

7

now ndash and a fifth of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they felt lsquomore Ukrainianrsquo now Interestingly however 14 percent and 20 percent in the Kyiv-controlled and occupied Donbas respectively said that they felt more strongly now that they are lsquoboth Ukrainian and Russianrsquo The majority in both parts of the Donbas reported no change in identity 62 per-cent in the government-controlled Donbas and 45 percent in the self-declared republics Thus while there has been a greater shift in identities in the oc-cupied territories a significant number of respondents reported not only a stable identity but also an increase in a mixed identification FIGURE 3

In the Ukrainian controlled Donbas face-to-face interviews allowed for a more detailed question about identity 53 and 54 percent of the respondents picked Ukrainian citizenship as their primary self-reported identity now and five years ago demonstrating that a civic identity already prevailed over eth-nic or regional identities before the war and has remained intact throughout the war experience Only 7 percent and 4 percent chose lsquoethnic Ukrainianrsquo and lsquoethnic Russianrsquo as their main identity five years ago These figures have risen now to 11 percent and 6 percent respectively Similarly self-identification as lsquomixed ethnic Russian and Ukrainianrsquo has risen from 4 to 7 percent over the last five years Regional identity has grown somewhat in significance as re-flected in the salience of a Donbas identity (up from 8 to 9 percent) and a small drop in identification with the regional sub-units Donetsk and Luhansk oblast (from 7 to 5 percent and from 11 to 4 percent respectively) FIGURE 4

Self-identification as a Ukrainian citizen marks an important difference be-tween the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied territories In the DNR LNR 54 percent reported that they felt less like Ukrainian citizens now compared to before 2013 while only 8 percent stated that they felt more like Ukrainian citi-zens now 38 percent reported no change The previously strong sense of being a Ukrainian citizen in this region has tended to be seriously underestimated in the West This identity is part of the price paid for the war in the occupied territories This previously strong identity however has not been replaced by a clear-cut ethnification or polarization FIGURE 5

80

540

381

020

4060

Perc

ent

More Ukr citizen than before Less Ukr citizen than before No changen=1156

DNR minus LNRAs a result of the events of 2013minus16 do you feel

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 5 DNRthinspthinspLNR (Citizenship) As a result of the events 2013thinspndashthinsp16 do you feelhellip

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

8

When we trace in more detail the shifts between self-reported identity catego-ries in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas area we find that while self-identification as a Ukrainian citizen remains as the most important identity category from five years ago it is now an identity in flux with respondents also shifting from Ukrainian citizenship to Ukrainian ethnicity or a regional Donbas identity

FIGURES 6thinspndashthinsp8

Survey questions about sbquonative languagersquo tend to tap into sentiments about language as an identity marker rather than actual day to day language practice The majority of respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled Donbas (about 50 percent) and the DNR LNR (about 60 percent) identify Russian as their native language The range of answers to this question did not only list mutually exclusive options as is commonly the case in the national census

FIGURE 6 Donbas (Identity now ethnic Ukrainian) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

FIGURE 7Donbas (Identity now mixed ethnic Ukrainian and Russian) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

56

56

08

40

64

40

08

272

08

448

0 10 20 30 40 50Percent

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Russianminusspeaker

Ukrainianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Russian citizen

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=125

DonbasIdentity now Ethnic Ukrainian

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

78

65

117

13

351

299

26

52

0 10 20 30 40Percent

Russianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donbas

Dual UkrminusRuss citizenship

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Russian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=77

DonbasIdentity now Mixed ethnic Ukr amp Russ

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

9

and many standard opinion polls but included the option lsquoboth Russian and Ukrainianrsquo which in turn was chosen by 34 percent and 36 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and in the DNR LNR respectively The self-reported relevance of a bilingual identity is compatible with the expres-sions of a mixed Russian-Ukrainian identity whether defined in ethnic or more civic terms in both the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR and the salience of Ukrainian citizenship as the primary identity in the govern-ment-controlled Donbas

There is anecdotal evidence of people adjusting their language identity and or practice in light of their war experience However no significant change was reported by the respondents themselves about a readjustment of their native language FIGURE 9

501

598

160

43

337 358

02 01

020

4060

Perc

ent

Russian Ukrainian Both Russian and Ukrainian Crimean Tatar

Donbas n=1150 DNRLNR n=1198

What language do you consider your native language

DonbasDNRLNR

24

83

71

536

262

12

12

0 20 40 60Percent

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=84

DonbasIdentity now Person from Donbas

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

FIGURE 8 Donbas (Identity now person from Donbas) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 9 What language do you consider your native language

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1150)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1198)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

10

When asked about actual language practice the picture changes somewhat highlighting that survey respondents interpret a question about lsquonative lan-guagersquo differently A majority ndash 53 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 70 percent in the DNR LNR ndash listed Russian as the dominant language spoken at home Furthermore 18 and 10 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR respectively reported an equal language mix of Ukrainian and Russian at home A further 21 and 17 percent respectively said that their main language at home is Russian but that they occasionally speak Ukrainian at home FIGURE 10

Asked about the primary language spoken at work the picture is similar thereby demonstrating that there is congruence between the occupied

2027

764545

119176

71191

1740

0922

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=962 DNRLNR n=1143

Which language do you typically speak at work

DonbasDNRLNR

0221

694528

173206

104184

2240

0621

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=1187 DNRLNR n=1198

Which language do you typically speak at home

DonbasDNRLNR

FIGURE 10 Which language do you typically speak at home

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 11 Which language do you typically speak at work

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp962)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1143)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1187)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1198)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

11

territories and the rest of the Donbas 76 percent list Russian as the main language of communication at work in DNR LNR compared to 55 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 19 and 7 percent respectively report an equal use of Russian and Ukrainian at work An additional 18 and 12 percent re-spectively said that they speak above all Russian and occasionally Ukrain-ian Both at home and at work the use of Ukrainian alone is negligible (max 2 percent) FIGURE 11

Views on the war and the status of the region

Views on the origins of the war are more similar across the two parts of the Donbas than one might expect The respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are split in their assessment 37 percent blame the outbreak of war on Russia and 10 percent on Ukraine a surprising 30 percent think it was the result of Western intervention and 23 percent see it as a local reaction against the Kyiv government With the exception of the perceived role of Russia the views in the occupied territories are rather similar 50 percent think the war resulted from Western intervention 30 percent see it as a lo-cal reaction against the national government 11 percent blame it on Ukraine and 9 percent on Russia FIGURE 12

However the preferences regarding the future status of the occupied ter-ritories diverge significantly While in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas a clear majority (65 percent) wants them to be part of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast without a special status 26 percent deem a special status within Ukraine necessary and about 9 percent see the future of these territories in Rus-sia The views of the population in the self-declared republics are more di-verse than one might have expected 21 percent want this area to be part of Ukraine without a special status and 35 percent prefer a special status for these territories inside Ukraine Conversely 11 percent want to see the territories as part of Russia without a special status and 33 percent would

304

503

371

92 95 113

231

292

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Result of Western interventionCaused by Russia

Caused by UkraineLocal reaction against nat govt

Donbas n=863 DNRLNR n=1047

Which statement is closestto your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 12 Which statement is closest to your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp863)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1047)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

12

prefer a special status inside Russia Thus the main emphasis among the re-spondents in the DNR LNR is on the recognition of the special status of the territories while there is an even split between those who see this area as part of Ukraine or Russia FIGURE 13

The survey results also indicate that the current experience shapes attitudes about autonomy in the rest of the country Generally the experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia all organized as federations at least on paper has made East Europeans politicians and soci-eties sceptical of federalism The fact that Russia the only socialist-era fed-eration that survived the breakup of the USSR thanks to formal and informal institutional adjustments has advocated federalism for Ukraine during the war in eastern Ukraine has discredited the principle further in the Ukrainian political discourse

While some are willing to contemplate an exception for the DNR LNR espe-cially in neighbouring regions like the Kyiv-controlled Donbas the principle of autonomy remains contested In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas about 24 per-cent agree (lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo) that other regions of Ukraine should have the right to a degree of autonomy 39 percent disagree (among them 30 percent disagree strongly) and 37 percent are undecided or indifferent

By comparison the respondents based in the DNR LNR are consistent in their views about autonomy claiming the right to a special status not only for them-selves but also for other regions of Ukraine This discrepancy suggests a mobi-lizing effect through the regionrsquos experience over the last three years of war A majority of 61 percent of the survey respondents in the DNR LNR strongly or rather agree with the principle of giving other regions in Ukraine a degree of autonomy while 23 percent are opposed (of which 12 percent strongly disa-gree) and only 16 percent are undecided or indifferent The latter figures in particular indicate that the issue of autonomy is most salient among those who live in the occupied territories the status of which is disputed FIGURE 14

267

350

657

206

50114

26

331

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Special autonomy within UkraineParts of Donetsk and Luhansk

Part of Russia wo autonomySpecial autonomy within Russia

Donbas n=1157 DNRLNR n=1021

In your view what should the status of DNRLNR be

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 13 In your opinion what should the status of DNRthinspthinspLNR be

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1157)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1021)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

13

The Normandy format that has facilitated several ceasefires but has not yet delivered on the political and institutional content of the Minsk II Agreement has become a focal point for the frustration of all the involved parties Never-theless all sides keep reiterating that there is no alternative to the process De-spite the lack of tangible political results this general feeling is shared by the population in both parts of the Donbas 59 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 45 percent of the respondents in the DNR LNR lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo agree with the principles of the Minsk Agreement Just over a third in each case exhibits a neutral attitude and only a very small share of the respondents disagrees with the principles of the Minsk Agree-ment The survey question does not disentangle the different interpretations of the agreement and the steps it lays out but it illustrates an overall endorse-ment of a continuing process FIGURE 15

76

337

155

270

92113

303

119130

54

244

107

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agree Rather agree Rather disagree Strongly disagree Hard to say I donrsquot care

Donbas n=1174 DNRLNR n=1180

Would you agree that other regions in Ukraineshould be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 14Would you agree that other regions in Ukraine should be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1174)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1180)

196237

391

213

359

455

45 4809

47

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Strongly agreeRather agree

Neither agree nor disagreeRather disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=443 DNRLNR n=723

Do you agree with the Minsk Agreement

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 15Do you agree with the Minsk agreement

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp443)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp723)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

14

Trust in political institutions and the media

The level of trust in political leaders and institutions is a broad indicator of political stability and regime legitimacy In a situation of war trust is eroded and in flux depending on the respondentsrsquo location and personal experience Given that the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko is gener-ally unpopular across Ukraine where he is held responsible for a too slow reform process it does not come as a surprise that a vast majority of over 87 percent does not trust the Ukrainian president in Kyiv-controlled Donbas (of which 55 percent do not trust him at all) The distrust in the DNR LNR is even higher with 77 percent not trusting him at all FIGURE 16

The picture is the reverse when it comes to trust in the Russian president Vladimir Putin In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 88 percent do not trust the Russian president This does not come as a surprise but the variation in

554

770

319

164110

4817 18

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=1062 DNRLNR n=1152

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian President

DonbasDNRLNR

712

197 171 15896

282

21

363

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=888 DNRLNR n=1090

How much trust do you have in the Russian President

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 16 How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian president

FIGURE 17 How much trust do you have in the Russian president

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1062)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1152)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp888)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1090)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

15

expressions of trust in the DNR LNR is noteworthy while about 64 percent of the respondents rather or generally trust the Russian president about 36 per-cent do not FIGURE 17

When asked about the Ukrainian mass media a clear majority of about 82 per-cent of the respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 86 percent in the DNR LNR expressed their distrust in the main traditional media outlets Oligarchic ownership structures and the reporting (or absence of reporting) about the war are likely explanations for the overwhelming distrust FIGURE 18 Unsurprisingly the population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas similarly dis-trusts the Russian mass media (94 percent) but in the occupied territories the trust and distrust in the Russian mass media is relatively evenly split with about 46 percent of the respondents trusting and 54 percent not trusting the Russian mass media FIGURE 19

446

628

366

232184

109

0331

020

4060

Perc

ent

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=961 DNRLNR n=1120

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

785

234

150

225

57

338

07

203

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=824 DNRLNR n=1085

How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 18How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

FIGURE 19How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp961)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1120)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp824)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1085)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

16

General attitudes about democracy and the economy are shared across both parts of the Donbas Support for democracy is best described as lukewarm 42 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 39 percent in the occupied territories lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquosomewhatrsquo agree with the statement that democracy is still the best possible form of government while 38 and 37 percent respectively are non-committal and neither agree nor disagree FIGURE 20

123

170

297

218

380 368

108 11392

131

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agreeSomewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagreeSomewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=972 DNRLNR n=1136

Democracy is still the best form of government

DonbasDNRLNR

240276

153113

607 611

020

4060

Perc

ent

Return to socialist economy Leave everything as it is Deepen market reforms

Donbas n=738 DNRLNR n=917

What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 20Democracy is still the best form of government

FIGURE 21 What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp972)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1136)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp738)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp917)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

17

As for their economic views 61 percent of the respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied Donbas voiced their preference for deepening economic reforms thereby expressing a general pro-reform attitude Main-taining the status quo was only the declared preference of 15 percent of respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 11 percent in the DNR LNR The lsquoreturn to a socialist economyrsquo was the preferred choice of 24 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and 28 percent in the occupied terri-tories This response is likely to capture not just a specific ideological view about the socialist economic system but rather a general dissatisfaction with Ukrainersquos transition path FIGURE 21

The combination of a lukewarm position on democracy and a general en-dorsement of further economic reforms in both parts of the Donbas should be seen in connection with a further result namely the self-reported change in the level of political interest as a result of the events over the last three years The trends point in opposite directions across the frontline while respondents in the DNR LNR expressed a noteworthy increase in interest in politics (53 percent compared to only 14 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas) 49 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they were now less interested in politics (compared to 24 percent in the DNR LNR) Thus the experience of war has politicized the population of the DNR LNR much more than their counterpart in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas While Kyiv is confronted with a population that seems to be turning away from national politics the population of the occupied territories has become highly politicized though not in one particular direction FIGURE 22

136

526

373

239

491

235

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

More The same Less

Donbas n=1111 DNRLNR n=1167

Are you now more or less interestedin politics than three years ago

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 22 Are you now more or less interested in politics than three years ago

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1167)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

18

Foreign policy orientation

In terms of foreign policy orientation the two parts of the divided Donbas are more similar than one might think while NATO membership was re-jected outright as could be expected by the vast majority in both parts the widespread negative views of the EU in the Donbas might come as a sur-prise 72 percent of respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 82 percent in the self-declared republics are against Ukraine joining the EU FIGURES 23thinsp+thinsp24 While support for the EU in view of a slow reform pro-cess and the inability of Western actors to end the war has cooled off again across Ukraine according to recent polls there has generally been support above 50 percent for EU membership in recent years Thus with regard to the Ukrainian governmentrsquos declared objective of aligning its reform pro-cess with the EU the Donbas is being left behind

279

182

721

818

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=867 DNRLNR n=1063

Should Ukraine join the EU

DonbasDNRLNR

175

69

825

931

020

4060

8010

0Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=928 DNRLNR n=1092

Should Ukraine join the NATO

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 23Should Ukraine join the EU

FIGURE 24 Should Ukraine join the NATO

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp867)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1063)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp928)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1092)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

19

Conclusion

The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities whether rooted in ethnicity native language language use or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and in some cases this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience

On foreign policy issues both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline On the issue of EU membership the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centrersquos main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions Similarly support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR LNR

Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian Western and Russian policy-makers should take note of For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR LNR In line with the local sentiments international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR LNR

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

3

ndash The attitudes of the population of the DNR LNR are more differentiated than might be expected thereby defying the notion of a region set in its views and lsquolostrsquo by Kyiv

ndash The population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR are fur-thest apart in their views about the future status of the occupied territo-ries The views in the DNR LNR indicate aspirations for the recognition of the regionrsquos special status either within Ukraine or within Russia In the Kyiv-conrolled Donbas opposition to a special status is the majority view

ndash Trust in Ukrainian political institutions is similarly low in both parts of the Donbas

ndash Foreign policy orientations are shared across the frontline while wide-spread opposition to NATO membership in both parts of the Donbas is not surprising respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are nearly as scepti-cal of EU membership for Ukraine (72 percent) as in the occupied territo-ries (82 percent)

Introduction1

The war in eastern Ukraine that started in the aftermath of the Euromaid-an and Russiarsquos annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014 has claimed about 10000 lives to date and made about 28 million people living in the region leave their homes (according to estimates there are about 18 mil-lion internally displaced and about one million who left for Russia)2 The frontline has cut the historical region of Donbas used as a shorthand to de-scribe Donetsk oblast and Luhansk oblast into two parts The self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk Peoplersquos Republics (DNR LNR) supported by Russia include the regional capital cities Donetsk and Luhansk The war appears to be now in an unstable stalemate that is pulling the two parts of the Donbas

1 The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance by Alice Lackner who contrib-uted to the data analysis and prepared the charts

2 For an analysis of the attitudes of the displaced in Ukraine and Russia based on ZOiS sur-vey data see Gwendolyn Sasse The Displaced Ukrainians Who are they and what do they think ZOiS Report Nothinsp1 March 2017

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

4

increasingly apart On the one hand the integration of the DNR LNR into Russian structures is progressing for example through the distribution of Russian passports the introduction of the ruble as the local currency and the renationalization of enterprises On the other hand the Ukraini-nan government has stopped social security payments to the population in the occupied territories and representatives of Ukrainian political parties have enforced a blockade of coal transports from the occupied territories which Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko was forced to endorse as gov-ernment policy

The central questions which this report addresses on the basis of the new ZOIS survey data are whether the increasing physical and political dis-tance between the two parts of the Donbas is reflected in the local popula-tionrsquos lives identities and attitudes Moreover the survey provides insights into the effects of the war on identitities as reported by the respondents By covering the whole Donbas region rather than just the part controlled by Kyiv the survey provides a rare glimpse of the perceptions of people in the occupied territory and thereby allows for a comparison of the attitudes across the frontline

Opinion polls in Ukraine are currently not lsquonationally representativersquo in a strict sense as they exclude the occupied territories The two-part ZOiS-suvey conducted in December 2016 aims to rectify this as much as possi-ble in a situation of war In Kyiv-controlled Donbas face-to-face interviews were conducted based on a multi-stage quota sample (n = 1200 split evently between Donetsk and Luhansk oblast) based on age gender and educational attainment quotas of the urban and rural populations according to the offi-cial state statistics of 2016 In the occupied territories the same quotas were applied as there is no official data on the current residents of this region Due to the difficulties of access and potential security concerns on the part of the respondents the interviews (n = 1200) were conducted by telephone rather than in face-to-face interviews The questionnaire therefore had to be shortened and simplified but the key questions remained the same in both surveys

Life and attitudes across the frontline

Personal contacts across the frontline

Border crossings between the two parts of the Donbas is part of the daily routine of many people living close to the frontline The intensity of con-tact between family members and friends across the frontline is a powerful counterpoint to the actions of the parties to this war Of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 38 percent said they have family members or friends in the DNR LNR On the other side of the separation line the per-sonal linkages are even greater 57 percent of the respondents in the occu-pied territories have family members or friends living in the government-controlled part of the Donbas

Close to 50 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are in touch with family members and friends in DNR LNR on a daily basis

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

5

FIGURE 1 Donbas How often are you in touch with your relativesthinspthinspfriends in the DNRthinspthinspLNR

Source ZOiS

99

362381

128

31

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Every day Once or twice a week

Once or twice a month Once or twice a year

Not at all at the moment

n=423

DonbasHow often are you in touch with your

relativesfriends in the DNRLNR

FIGURE 2 DNRthinspthinspLNR How often are you in touch with your relativesthinspthinspfriends in the Donbas

188

319344

107

43

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Every day Once or twice a week

Once or twice a month Once or twice a year

Not at all at the moment

n=655

DNR minus LNRHow often are you in touch with your

relativesfriends in the Donbas

Source ZOiS

or once twice per week Only about 3 percent report not being in touch at the moment Similarly just under 50 percent of the respondents in the DNR LNR are in touch with family members or friends based in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas on a daily basis or once twice a week Within this refer-ence group the share of those in daily contact is twice as high as that of the respondents in the Donbas in contact with people in the DNR LNR namely close to 20 percent Again only about 4 percent has lost touch for the mo-ment FIGURES 1thinsp+thinsp2

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

6

Political identities

The only way in which a one-off survey can speak to the question of personal identity change is to tap into self-reported changes The ZOiS survey included a deliberately open question which avoided narrowing it to either ethnic or civic identity categories followed by more detailed questions about a range of different identity options As for the first more general question about a change in personal identity as a result of the events of 2013-16 a quarter of the respondents in the occupied territories said that they felt lsquomore Russianrsquo

0109

031818

0603

2207

0102

11343

6648

8978

0507

0305

538532

3774

3557

67114

0 20 40 60Percent

Other

Ukrainianminusspeaking Russian

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Bilingual UkrminusRuss speaker

Russianminusspeaker

Ukrainianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Dual UkrminusRuss citizenship

Russian citizen

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Russian

Ethnic Ukrainian

Now n=1100 Five years ago n=1111

DonbasWhat identity is most important to you today

What identity was important to you five years ago

Identity nowIdentity five years ago

34

261205

85143

204

618

450

020

4060

Perc

ent

More Russian More Ukrainian More strongly both No change

Donbas n=995 DNRLNR n=1141

Donbas minus DNR LNRAs a result of the events 2013minus16 do you feel

DonbasDNRLNR

FIGURE 3 As a result of the events 2013thinspndashthinsp16 do you feelhellip

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 4 Donbas What identity is most important to you today What identity was most important to you five years ago

Identity now (nthinsp=thinsp1100)

Identity five years ago (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp995)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1141)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

7

now ndash and a fifth of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they felt lsquomore Ukrainianrsquo now Interestingly however 14 percent and 20 percent in the Kyiv-controlled and occupied Donbas respectively said that they felt more strongly now that they are lsquoboth Ukrainian and Russianrsquo The majority in both parts of the Donbas reported no change in identity 62 per-cent in the government-controlled Donbas and 45 percent in the self-declared republics Thus while there has been a greater shift in identities in the oc-cupied territories a significant number of respondents reported not only a stable identity but also an increase in a mixed identification FIGURE 3

In the Ukrainian controlled Donbas face-to-face interviews allowed for a more detailed question about identity 53 and 54 percent of the respondents picked Ukrainian citizenship as their primary self-reported identity now and five years ago demonstrating that a civic identity already prevailed over eth-nic or regional identities before the war and has remained intact throughout the war experience Only 7 percent and 4 percent chose lsquoethnic Ukrainianrsquo and lsquoethnic Russianrsquo as their main identity five years ago These figures have risen now to 11 percent and 6 percent respectively Similarly self-identification as lsquomixed ethnic Russian and Ukrainianrsquo has risen from 4 to 7 percent over the last five years Regional identity has grown somewhat in significance as re-flected in the salience of a Donbas identity (up from 8 to 9 percent) and a small drop in identification with the regional sub-units Donetsk and Luhansk oblast (from 7 to 5 percent and from 11 to 4 percent respectively) FIGURE 4

Self-identification as a Ukrainian citizen marks an important difference be-tween the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied territories In the DNR LNR 54 percent reported that they felt less like Ukrainian citizens now compared to before 2013 while only 8 percent stated that they felt more like Ukrainian citi-zens now 38 percent reported no change The previously strong sense of being a Ukrainian citizen in this region has tended to be seriously underestimated in the West This identity is part of the price paid for the war in the occupied territories This previously strong identity however has not been replaced by a clear-cut ethnification or polarization FIGURE 5

80

540

381

020

4060

Perc

ent

More Ukr citizen than before Less Ukr citizen than before No changen=1156

DNR minus LNRAs a result of the events of 2013minus16 do you feel

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 5 DNRthinspthinspLNR (Citizenship) As a result of the events 2013thinspndashthinsp16 do you feelhellip

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

8

When we trace in more detail the shifts between self-reported identity catego-ries in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas area we find that while self-identification as a Ukrainian citizen remains as the most important identity category from five years ago it is now an identity in flux with respondents also shifting from Ukrainian citizenship to Ukrainian ethnicity or a regional Donbas identity

FIGURES 6thinspndashthinsp8

Survey questions about sbquonative languagersquo tend to tap into sentiments about language as an identity marker rather than actual day to day language practice The majority of respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled Donbas (about 50 percent) and the DNR LNR (about 60 percent) identify Russian as their native language The range of answers to this question did not only list mutually exclusive options as is commonly the case in the national census

FIGURE 6 Donbas (Identity now ethnic Ukrainian) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

FIGURE 7Donbas (Identity now mixed ethnic Ukrainian and Russian) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

56

56

08

40

64

40

08

272

08

448

0 10 20 30 40 50Percent

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Russianminusspeaker

Ukrainianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Russian citizen

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=125

DonbasIdentity now Ethnic Ukrainian

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

78

65

117

13

351

299

26

52

0 10 20 30 40Percent

Russianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donbas

Dual UkrminusRuss citizenship

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Russian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=77

DonbasIdentity now Mixed ethnic Ukr amp Russ

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

9

and many standard opinion polls but included the option lsquoboth Russian and Ukrainianrsquo which in turn was chosen by 34 percent and 36 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and in the DNR LNR respectively The self-reported relevance of a bilingual identity is compatible with the expres-sions of a mixed Russian-Ukrainian identity whether defined in ethnic or more civic terms in both the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR and the salience of Ukrainian citizenship as the primary identity in the govern-ment-controlled Donbas

There is anecdotal evidence of people adjusting their language identity and or practice in light of their war experience However no significant change was reported by the respondents themselves about a readjustment of their native language FIGURE 9

501

598

160

43

337 358

02 01

020

4060

Perc

ent

Russian Ukrainian Both Russian and Ukrainian Crimean Tatar

Donbas n=1150 DNRLNR n=1198

What language do you consider your native language

DonbasDNRLNR

24

83

71

536

262

12

12

0 20 40 60Percent

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=84

DonbasIdentity now Person from Donbas

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

FIGURE 8 Donbas (Identity now person from Donbas) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 9 What language do you consider your native language

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1150)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1198)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

10

When asked about actual language practice the picture changes somewhat highlighting that survey respondents interpret a question about lsquonative lan-guagersquo differently A majority ndash 53 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 70 percent in the DNR LNR ndash listed Russian as the dominant language spoken at home Furthermore 18 and 10 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR respectively reported an equal language mix of Ukrainian and Russian at home A further 21 and 17 percent respectively said that their main language at home is Russian but that they occasionally speak Ukrainian at home FIGURE 10

Asked about the primary language spoken at work the picture is similar thereby demonstrating that there is congruence between the occupied

2027

764545

119176

71191

1740

0922

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=962 DNRLNR n=1143

Which language do you typically speak at work

DonbasDNRLNR

0221

694528

173206

104184

2240

0621

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=1187 DNRLNR n=1198

Which language do you typically speak at home

DonbasDNRLNR

FIGURE 10 Which language do you typically speak at home

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 11 Which language do you typically speak at work

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp962)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1143)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1187)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1198)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

11

territories and the rest of the Donbas 76 percent list Russian as the main language of communication at work in DNR LNR compared to 55 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 19 and 7 percent respectively report an equal use of Russian and Ukrainian at work An additional 18 and 12 percent re-spectively said that they speak above all Russian and occasionally Ukrain-ian Both at home and at work the use of Ukrainian alone is negligible (max 2 percent) FIGURE 11

Views on the war and the status of the region

Views on the origins of the war are more similar across the two parts of the Donbas than one might expect The respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are split in their assessment 37 percent blame the outbreak of war on Russia and 10 percent on Ukraine a surprising 30 percent think it was the result of Western intervention and 23 percent see it as a local reaction against the Kyiv government With the exception of the perceived role of Russia the views in the occupied territories are rather similar 50 percent think the war resulted from Western intervention 30 percent see it as a lo-cal reaction against the national government 11 percent blame it on Ukraine and 9 percent on Russia FIGURE 12

However the preferences regarding the future status of the occupied ter-ritories diverge significantly While in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas a clear majority (65 percent) wants them to be part of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast without a special status 26 percent deem a special status within Ukraine necessary and about 9 percent see the future of these territories in Rus-sia The views of the population in the self-declared republics are more di-verse than one might have expected 21 percent want this area to be part of Ukraine without a special status and 35 percent prefer a special status for these territories inside Ukraine Conversely 11 percent want to see the territories as part of Russia without a special status and 33 percent would

304

503

371

92 95 113

231

292

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Result of Western interventionCaused by Russia

Caused by UkraineLocal reaction against nat govt

Donbas n=863 DNRLNR n=1047

Which statement is closestto your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 12 Which statement is closest to your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp863)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1047)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

12

prefer a special status inside Russia Thus the main emphasis among the re-spondents in the DNR LNR is on the recognition of the special status of the territories while there is an even split between those who see this area as part of Ukraine or Russia FIGURE 13

The survey results also indicate that the current experience shapes attitudes about autonomy in the rest of the country Generally the experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia all organized as federations at least on paper has made East Europeans politicians and soci-eties sceptical of federalism The fact that Russia the only socialist-era fed-eration that survived the breakup of the USSR thanks to formal and informal institutional adjustments has advocated federalism for Ukraine during the war in eastern Ukraine has discredited the principle further in the Ukrainian political discourse

While some are willing to contemplate an exception for the DNR LNR espe-cially in neighbouring regions like the Kyiv-controlled Donbas the principle of autonomy remains contested In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas about 24 per-cent agree (lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo) that other regions of Ukraine should have the right to a degree of autonomy 39 percent disagree (among them 30 percent disagree strongly) and 37 percent are undecided or indifferent

By comparison the respondents based in the DNR LNR are consistent in their views about autonomy claiming the right to a special status not only for them-selves but also for other regions of Ukraine This discrepancy suggests a mobi-lizing effect through the regionrsquos experience over the last three years of war A majority of 61 percent of the survey respondents in the DNR LNR strongly or rather agree with the principle of giving other regions in Ukraine a degree of autonomy while 23 percent are opposed (of which 12 percent strongly disa-gree) and only 16 percent are undecided or indifferent The latter figures in particular indicate that the issue of autonomy is most salient among those who live in the occupied territories the status of which is disputed FIGURE 14

267

350

657

206

50114

26

331

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Special autonomy within UkraineParts of Donetsk and Luhansk

Part of Russia wo autonomySpecial autonomy within Russia

Donbas n=1157 DNRLNR n=1021

In your view what should the status of DNRLNR be

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 13 In your opinion what should the status of DNRthinspthinspLNR be

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1157)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1021)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

13

The Normandy format that has facilitated several ceasefires but has not yet delivered on the political and institutional content of the Minsk II Agreement has become a focal point for the frustration of all the involved parties Never-theless all sides keep reiterating that there is no alternative to the process De-spite the lack of tangible political results this general feeling is shared by the population in both parts of the Donbas 59 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 45 percent of the respondents in the DNR LNR lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo agree with the principles of the Minsk Agreement Just over a third in each case exhibits a neutral attitude and only a very small share of the respondents disagrees with the principles of the Minsk Agree-ment The survey question does not disentangle the different interpretations of the agreement and the steps it lays out but it illustrates an overall endorse-ment of a continuing process FIGURE 15

76

337

155

270

92113

303

119130

54

244

107

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agree Rather agree Rather disagree Strongly disagree Hard to say I donrsquot care

Donbas n=1174 DNRLNR n=1180

Would you agree that other regions in Ukraineshould be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 14Would you agree that other regions in Ukraine should be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1174)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1180)

196237

391

213

359

455

45 4809

47

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Strongly agreeRather agree

Neither agree nor disagreeRather disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=443 DNRLNR n=723

Do you agree with the Minsk Agreement

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 15Do you agree with the Minsk agreement

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp443)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp723)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

14

Trust in political institutions and the media

The level of trust in political leaders and institutions is a broad indicator of political stability and regime legitimacy In a situation of war trust is eroded and in flux depending on the respondentsrsquo location and personal experience Given that the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko is gener-ally unpopular across Ukraine where he is held responsible for a too slow reform process it does not come as a surprise that a vast majority of over 87 percent does not trust the Ukrainian president in Kyiv-controlled Donbas (of which 55 percent do not trust him at all) The distrust in the DNR LNR is even higher with 77 percent not trusting him at all FIGURE 16

The picture is the reverse when it comes to trust in the Russian president Vladimir Putin In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 88 percent do not trust the Russian president This does not come as a surprise but the variation in

554

770

319

164110

4817 18

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=1062 DNRLNR n=1152

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian President

DonbasDNRLNR

712

197 171 15896

282

21

363

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=888 DNRLNR n=1090

How much trust do you have in the Russian President

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 16 How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian president

FIGURE 17 How much trust do you have in the Russian president

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1062)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1152)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp888)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1090)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

15

expressions of trust in the DNR LNR is noteworthy while about 64 percent of the respondents rather or generally trust the Russian president about 36 per-cent do not FIGURE 17

When asked about the Ukrainian mass media a clear majority of about 82 per-cent of the respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 86 percent in the DNR LNR expressed their distrust in the main traditional media outlets Oligarchic ownership structures and the reporting (or absence of reporting) about the war are likely explanations for the overwhelming distrust FIGURE 18 Unsurprisingly the population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas similarly dis-trusts the Russian mass media (94 percent) but in the occupied territories the trust and distrust in the Russian mass media is relatively evenly split with about 46 percent of the respondents trusting and 54 percent not trusting the Russian mass media FIGURE 19

446

628

366

232184

109

0331

020

4060

Perc

ent

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=961 DNRLNR n=1120

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

785

234

150

225

57

338

07

203

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=824 DNRLNR n=1085

How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 18How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

FIGURE 19How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp961)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1120)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp824)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1085)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

16

General attitudes about democracy and the economy are shared across both parts of the Donbas Support for democracy is best described as lukewarm 42 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 39 percent in the occupied territories lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquosomewhatrsquo agree with the statement that democracy is still the best possible form of government while 38 and 37 percent respectively are non-committal and neither agree nor disagree FIGURE 20

123

170

297

218

380 368

108 11392

131

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agreeSomewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagreeSomewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=972 DNRLNR n=1136

Democracy is still the best form of government

DonbasDNRLNR

240276

153113

607 611

020

4060

Perc

ent

Return to socialist economy Leave everything as it is Deepen market reforms

Donbas n=738 DNRLNR n=917

What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 20Democracy is still the best form of government

FIGURE 21 What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp972)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1136)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp738)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp917)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

17

As for their economic views 61 percent of the respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied Donbas voiced their preference for deepening economic reforms thereby expressing a general pro-reform attitude Main-taining the status quo was only the declared preference of 15 percent of respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 11 percent in the DNR LNR The lsquoreturn to a socialist economyrsquo was the preferred choice of 24 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and 28 percent in the occupied terri-tories This response is likely to capture not just a specific ideological view about the socialist economic system but rather a general dissatisfaction with Ukrainersquos transition path FIGURE 21

The combination of a lukewarm position on democracy and a general en-dorsement of further economic reforms in both parts of the Donbas should be seen in connection with a further result namely the self-reported change in the level of political interest as a result of the events over the last three years The trends point in opposite directions across the frontline while respondents in the DNR LNR expressed a noteworthy increase in interest in politics (53 percent compared to only 14 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas) 49 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they were now less interested in politics (compared to 24 percent in the DNR LNR) Thus the experience of war has politicized the population of the DNR LNR much more than their counterpart in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas While Kyiv is confronted with a population that seems to be turning away from national politics the population of the occupied territories has become highly politicized though not in one particular direction FIGURE 22

136

526

373

239

491

235

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

More The same Less

Donbas n=1111 DNRLNR n=1167

Are you now more or less interestedin politics than three years ago

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 22 Are you now more or less interested in politics than three years ago

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1167)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

18

Foreign policy orientation

In terms of foreign policy orientation the two parts of the divided Donbas are more similar than one might think while NATO membership was re-jected outright as could be expected by the vast majority in both parts the widespread negative views of the EU in the Donbas might come as a sur-prise 72 percent of respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 82 percent in the self-declared republics are against Ukraine joining the EU FIGURES 23thinsp+thinsp24 While support for the EU in view of a slow reform pro-cess and the inability of Western actors to end the war has cooled off again across Ukraine according to recent polls there has generally been support above 50 percent for EU membership in recent years Thus with regard to the Ukrainian governmentrsquos declared objective of aligning its reform pro-cess with the EU the Donbas is being left behind

279

182

721

818

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=867 DNRLNR n=1063

Should Ukraine join the EU

DonbasDNRLNR

175

69

825

931

020

4060

8010

0Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=928 DNRLNR n=1092

Should Ukraine join the NATO

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 23Should Ukraine join the EU

FIGURE 24 Should Ukraine join the NATO

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp867)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1063)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp928)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1092)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

19

Conclusion

The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities whether rooted in ethnicity native language language use or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and in some cases this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience

On foreign policy issues both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline On the issue of EU membership the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centrersquos main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions Similarly support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR LNR

Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian Western and Russian policy-makers should take note of For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR LNR In line with the local sentiments international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR LNR

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

4

increasingly apart On the one hand the integration of the DNR LNR into Russian structures is progressing for example through the distribution of Russian passports the introduction of the ruble as the local currency and the renationalization of enterprises On the other hand the Ukraini-nan government has stopped social security payments to the population in the occupied territories and representatives of Ukrainian political parties have enforced a blockade of coal transports from the occupied territories which Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko was forced to endorse as gov-ernment policy

The central questions which this report addresses on the basis of the new ZOIS survey data are whether the increasing physical and political dis-tance between the two parts of the Donbas is reflected in the local popula-tionrsquos lives identities and attitudes Moreover the survey provides insights into the effects of the war on identitities as reported by the respondents By covering the whole Donbas region rather than just the part controlled by Kyiv the survey provides a rare glimpse of the perceptions of people in the occupied territory and thereby allows for a comparison of the attitudes across the frontline

Opinion polls in Ukraine are currently not lsquonationally representativersquo in a strict sense as they exclude the occupied territories The two-part ZOiS-suvey conducted in December 2016 aims to rectify this as much as possi-ble in a situation of war In Kyiv-controlled Donbas face-to-face interviews were conducted based on a multi-stage quota sample (n = 1200 split evently between Donetsk and Luhansk oblast) based on age gender and educational attainment quotas of the urban and rural populations according to the offi-cial state statistics of 2016 In the occupied territories the same quotas were applied as there is no official data on the current residents of this region Due to the difficulties of access and potential security concerns on the part of the respondents the interviews (n = 1200) were conducted by telephone rather than in face-to-face interviews The questionnaire therefore had to be shortened and simplified but the key questions remained the same in both surveys

Life and attitudes across the frontline

Personal contacts across the frontline

Border crossings between the two parts of the Donbas is part of the daily routine of many people living close to the frontline The intensity of con-tact between family members and friends across the frontline is a powerful counterpoint to the actions of the parties to this war Of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 38 percent said they have family members or friends in the DNR LNR On the other side of the separation line the per-sonal linkages are even greater 57 percent of the respondents in the occu-pied territories have family members or friends living in the government-controlled part of the Donbas

Close to 50 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are in touch with family members and friends in DNR LNR on a daily basis

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

5

FIGURE 1 Donbas How often are you in touch with your relativesthinspthinspfriends in the DNRthinspthinspLNR

Source ZOiS

99

362381

128

31

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Every day Once or twice a week

Once or twice a month Once or twice a year

Not at all at the moment

n=423

DonbasHow often are you in touch with your

relativesfriends in the DNRLNR

FIGURE 2 DNRthinspthinspLNR How often are you in touch with your relativesthinspthinspfriends in the Donbas

188

319344

107

43

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Every day Once or twice a week

Once or twice a month Once or twice a year

Not at all at the moment

n=655

DNR minus LNRHow often are you in touch with your

relativesfriends in the Donbas

Source ZOiS

or once twice per week Only about 3 percent report not being in touch at the moment Similarly just under 50 percent of the respondents in the DNR LNR are in touch with family members or friends based in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas on a daily basis or once twice a week Within this refer-ence group the share of those in daily contact is twice as high as that of the respondents in the Donbas in contact with people in the DNR LNR namely close to 20 percent Again only about 4 percent has lost touch for the mo-ment FIGURES 1thinsp+thinsp2

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

6

Political identities

The only way in which a one-off survey can speak to the question of personal identity change is to tap into self-reported changes The ZOiS survey included a deliberately open question which avoided narrowing it to either ethnic or civic identity categories followed by more detailed questions about a range of different identity options As for the first more general question about a change in personal identity as a result of the events of 2013-16 a quarter of the respondents in the occupied territories said that they felt lsquomore Russianrsquo

0109

031818

0603

2207

0102

11343

6648

8978

0507

0305

538532

3774

3557

67114

0 20 40 60Percent

Other

Ukrainianminusspeaking Russian

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Bilingual UkrminusRuss speaker

Russianminusspeaker

Ukrainianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Dual UkrminusRuss citizenship

Russian citizen

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Russian

Ethnic Ukrainian

Now n=1100 Five years ago n=1111

DonbasWhat identity is most important to you today

What identity was important to you five years ago

Identity nowIdentity five years ago

34

261205

85143

204

618

450

020

4060

Perc

ent

More Russian More Ukrainian More strongly both No change

Donbas n=995 DNRLNR n=1141

Donbas minus DNR LNRAs a result of the events 2013minus16 do you feel

DonbasDNRLNR

FIGURE 3 As a result of the events 2013thinspndashthinsp16 do you feelhellip

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 4 Donbas What identity is most important to you today What identity was most important to you five years ago

Identity now (nthinsp=thinsp1100)

Identity five years ago (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp995)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1141)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

7

now ndash and a fifth of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they felt lsquomore Ukrainianrsquo now Interestingly however 14 percent and 20 percent in the Kyiv-controlled and occupied Donbas respectively said that they felt more strongly now that they are lsquoboth Ukrainian and Russianrsquo The majority in both parts of the Donbas reported no change in identity 62 per-cent in the government-controlled Donbas and 45 percent in the self-declared republics Thus while there has been a greater shift in identities in the oc-cupied territories a significant number of respondents reported not only a stable identity but also an increase in a mixed identification FIGURE 3

In the Ukrainian controlled Donbas face-to-face interviews allowed for a more detailed question about identity 53 and 54 percent of the respondents picked Ukrainian citizenship as their primary self-reported identity now and five years ago demonstrating that a civic identity already prevailed over eth-nic or regional identities before the war and has remained intact throughout the war experience Only 7 percent and 4 percent chose lsquoethnic Ukrainianrsquo and lsquoethnic Russianrsquo as their main identity five years ago These figures have risen now to 11 percent and 6 percent respectively Similarly self-identification as lsquomixed ethnic Russian and Ukrainianrsquo has risen from 4 to 7 percent over the last five years Regional identity has grown somewhat in significance as re-flected in the salience of a Donbas identity (up from 8 to 9 percent) and a small drop in identification with the regional sub-units Donetsk and Luhansk oblast (from 7 to 5 percent and from 11 to 4 percent respectively) FIGURE 4

Self-identification as a Ukrainian citizen marks an important difference be-tween the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied territories In the DNR LNR 54 percent reported that they felt less like Ukrainian citizens now compared to before 2013 while only 8 percent stated that they felt more like Ukrainian citi-zens now 38 percent reported no change The previously strong sense of being a Ukrainian citizen in this region has tended to be seriously underestimated in the West This identity is part of the price paid for the war in the occupied territories This previously strong identity however has not been replaced by a clear-cut ethnification or polarization FIGURE 5

80

540

381

020

4060

Perc

ent

More Ukr citizen than before Less Ukr citizen than before No changen=1156

DNR minus LNRAs a result of the events of 2013minus16 do you feel

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 5 DNRthinspthinspLNR (Citizenship) As a result of the events 2013thinspndashthinsp16 do you feelhellip

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

8

When we trace in more detail the shifts between self-reported identity catego-ries in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas area we find that while self-identification as a Ukrainian citizen remains as the most important identity category from five years ago it is now an identity in flux with respondents also shifting from Ukrainian citizenship to Ukrainian ethnicity or a regional Donbas identity

FIGURES 6thinspndashthinsp8

Survey questions about sbquonative languagersquo tend to tap into sentiments about language as an identity marker rather than actual day to day language practice The majority of respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled Donbas (about 50 percent) and the DNR LNR (about 60 percent) identify Russian as their native language The range of answers to this question did not only list mutually exclusive options as is commonly the case in the national census

FIGURE 6 Donbas (Identity now ethnic Ukrainian) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

FIGURE 7Donbas (Identity now mixed ethnic Ukrainian and Russian) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

56

56

08

40

64

40

08

272

08

448

0 10 20 30 40 50Percent

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Russianminusspeaker

Ukrainianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Russian citizen

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=125

DonbasIdentity now Ethnic Ukrainian

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

78

65

117

13

351

299

26

52

0 10 20 30 40Percent

Russianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donbas

Dual UkrminusRuss citizenship

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Russian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=77

DonbasIdentity now Mixed ethnic Ukr amp Russ

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

9

and many standard opinion polls but included the option lsquoboth Russian and Ukrainianrsquo which in turn was chosen by 34 percent and 36 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and in the DNR LNR respectively The self-reported relevance of a bilingual identity is compatible with the expres-sions of a mixed Russian-Ukrainian identity whether defined in ethnic or more civic terms in both the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR and the salience of Ukrainian citizenship as the primary identity in the govern-ment-controlled Donbas

There is anecdotal evidence of people adjusting their language identity and or practice in light of their war experience However no significant change was reported by the respondents themselves about a readjustment of their native language FIGURE 9

501

598

160

43

337 358

02 01

020

4060

Perc

ent

Russian Ukrainian Both Russian and Ukrainian Crimean Tatar

Donbas n=1150 DNRLNR n=1198

What language do you consider your native language

DonbasDNRLNR

24

83

71

536

262

12

12

0 20 40 60Percent

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=84

DonbasIdentity now Person from Donbas

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

FIGURE 8 Donbas (Identity now person from Donbas) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 9 What language do you consider your native language

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1150)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1198)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

10

When asked about actual language practice the picture changes somewhat highlighting that survey respondents interpret a question about lsquonative lan-guagersquo differently A majority ndash 53 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 70 percent in the DNR LNR ndash listed Russian as the dominant language spoken at home Furthermore 18 and 10 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR respectively reported an equal language mix of Ukrainian and Russian at home A further 21 and 17 percent respectively said that their main language at home is Russian but that they occasionally speak Ukrainian at home FIGURE 10

Asked about the primary language spoken at work the picture is similar thereby demonstrating that there is congruence between the occupied

2027

764545

119176

71191

1740

0922

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=962 DNRLNR n=1143

Which language do you typically speak at work

DonbasDNRLNR

0221

694528

173206

104184

2240

0621

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=1187 DNRLNR n=1198

Which language do you typically speak at home

DonbasDNRLNR

FIGURE 10 Which language do you typically speak at home

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 11 Which language do you typically speak at work

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp962)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1143)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1187)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1198)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

11

territories and the rest of the Donbas 76 percent list Russian as the main language of communication at work in DNR LNR compared to 55 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 19 and 7 percent respectively report an equal use of Russian and Ukrainian at work An additional 18 and 12 percent re-spectively said that they speak above all Russian and occasionally Ukrain-ian Both at home and at work the use of Ukrainian alone is negligible (max 2 percent) FIGURE 11

Views on the war and the status of the region

Views on the origins of the war are more similar across the two parts of the Donbas than one might expect The respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are split in their assessment 37 percent blame the outbreak of war on Russia and 10 percent on Ukraine a surprising 30 percent think it was the result of Western intervention and 23 percent see it as a local reaction against the Kyiv government With the exception of the perceived role of Russia the views in the occupied territories are rather similar 50 percent think the war resulted from Western intervention 30 percent see it as a lo-cal reaction against the national government 11 percent blame it on Ukraine and 9 percent on Russia FIGURE 12

However the preferences regarding the future status of the occupied ter-ritories diverge significantly While in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas a clear majority (65 percent) wants them to be part of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast without a special status 26 percent deem a special status within Ukraine necessary and about 9 percent see the future of these territories in Rus-sia The views of the population in the self-declared republics are more di-verse than one might have expected 21 percent want this area to be part of Ukraine without a special status and 35 percent prefer a special status for these territories inside Ukraine Conversely 11 percent want to see the territories as part of Russia without a special status and 33 percent would

304

503

371

92 95 113

231

292

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Result of Western interventionCaused by Russia

Caused by UkraineLocal reaction against nat govt

Donbas n=863 DNRLNR n=1047

Which statement is closestto your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 12 Which statement is closest to your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp863)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1047)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

12

prefer a special status inside Russia Thus the main emphasis among the re-spondents in the DNR LNR is on the recognition of the special status of the territories while there is an even split between those who see this area as part of Ukraine or Russia FIGURE 13

The survey results also indicate that the current experience shapes attitudes about autonomy in the rest of the country Generally the experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia all organized as federations at least on paper has made East Europeans politicians and soci-eties sceptical of federalism The fact that Russia the only socialist-era fed-eration that survived the breakup of the USSR thanks to formal and informal institutional adjustments has advocated federalism for Ukraine during the war in eastern Ukraine has discredited the principle further in the Ukrainian political discourse

While some are willing to contemplate an exception for the DNR LNR espe-cially in neighbouring regions like the Kyiv-controlled Donbas the principle of autonomy remains contested In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas about 24 per-cent agree (lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo) that other regions of Ukraine should have the right to a degree of autonomy 39 percent disagree (among them 30 percent disagree strongly) and 37 percent are undecided or indifferent

By comparison the respondents based in the DNR LNR are consistent in their views about autonomy claiming the right to a special status not only for them-selves but also for other regions of Ukraine This discrepancy suggests a mobi-lizing effect through the regionrsquos experience over the last three years of war A majority of 61 percent of the survey respondents in the DNR LNR strongly or rather agree with the principle of giving other regions in Ukraine a degree of autonomy while 23 percent are opposed (of which 12 percent strongly disa-gree) and only 16 percent are undecided or indifferent The latter figures in particular indicate that the issue of autonomy is most salient among those who live in the occupied territories the status of which is disputed FIGURE 14

267

350

657

206

50114

26

331

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Special autonomy within UkraineParts of Donetsk and Luhansk

Part of Russia wo autonomySpecial autonomy within Russia

Donbas n=1157 DNRLNR n=1021

In your view what should the status of DNRLNR be

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 13 In your opinion what should the status of DNRthinspthinspLNR be

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1157)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1021)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

13

The Normandy format that has facilitated several ceasefires but has not yet delivered on the political and institutional content of the Minsk II Agreement has become a focal point for the frustration of all the involved parties Never-theless all sides keep reiterating that there is no alternative to the process De-spite the lack of tangible political results this general feeling is shared by the population in both parts of the Donbas 59 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 45 percent of the respondents in the DNR LNR lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo agree with the principles of the Minsk Agreement Just over a third in each case exhibits a neutral attitude and only a very small share of the respondents disagrees with the principles of the Minsk Agree-ment The survey question does not disentangle the different interpretations of the agreement and the steps it lays out but it illustrates an overall endorse-ment of a continuing process FIGURE 15

76

337

155

270

92113

303

119130

54

244

107

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agree Rather agree Rather disagree Strongly disagree Hard to say I donrsquot care

Donbas n=1174 DNRLNR n=1180

Would you agree that other regions in Ukraineshould be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 14Would you agree that other regions in Ukraine should be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1174)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1180)

196237

391

213

359

455

45 4809

47

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Strongly agreeRather agree

Neither agree nor disagreeRather disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=443 DNRLNR n=723

Do you agree with the Minsk Agreement

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 15Do you agree with the Minsk agreement

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp443)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp723)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

14

Trust in political institutions and the media

The level of trust in political leaders and institutions is a broad indicator of political stability and regime legitimacy In a situation of war trust is eroded and in flux depending on the respondentsrsquo location and personal experience Given that the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko is gener-ally unpopular across Ukraine where he is held responsible for a too slow reform process it does not come as a surprise that a vast majority of over 87 percent does not trust the Ukrainian president in Kyiv-controlled Donbas (of which 55 percent do not trust him at all) The distrust in the DNR LNR is even higher with 77 percent not trusting him at all FIGURE 16

The picture is the reverse when it comes to trust in the Russian president Vladimir Putin In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 88 percent do not trust the Russian president This does not come as a surprise but the variation in

554

770

319

164110

4817 18

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=1062 DNRLNR n=1152

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian President

DonbasDNRLNR

712

197 171 15896

282

21

363

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=888 DNRLNR n=1090

How much trust do you have in the Russian President

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 16 How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian president

FIGURE 17 How much trust do you have in the Russian president

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1062)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1152)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp888)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1090)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

15

expressions of trust in the DNR LNR is noteworthy while about 64 percent of the respondents rather or generally trust the Russian president about 36 per-cent do not FIGURE 17

When asked about the Ukrainian mass media a clear majority of about 82 per-cent of the respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 86 percent in the DNR LNR expressed their distrust in the main traditional media outlets Oligarchic ownership structures and the reporting (or absence of reporting) about the war are likely explanations for the overwhelming distrust FIGURE 18 Unsurprisingly the population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas similarly dis-trusts the Russian mass media (94 percent) but in the occupied territories the trust and distrust in the Russian mass media is relatively evenly split with about 46 percent of the respondents trusting and 54 percent not trusting the Russian mass media FIGURE 19

446

628

366

232184

109

0331

020

4060

Perc

ent

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=961 DNRLNR n=1120

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

785

234

150

225

57

338

07

203

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=824 DNRLNR n=1085

How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 18How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

FIGURE 19How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp961)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1120)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp824)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1085)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

16

General attitudes about democracy and the economy are shared across both parts of the Donbas Support for democracy is best described as lukewarm 42 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 39 percent in the occupied territories lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquosomewhatrsquo agree with the statement that democracy is still the best possible form of government while 38 and 37 percent respectively are non-committal and neither agree nor disagree FIGURE 20

123

170

297

218

380 368

108 11392

131

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agreeSomewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagreeSomewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=972 DNRLNR n=1136

Democracy is still the best form of government

DonbasDNRLNR

240276

153113

607 611

020

4060

Perc

ent

Return to socialist economy Leave everything as it is Deepen market reforms

Donbas n=738 DNRLNR n=917

What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 20Democracy is still the best form of government

FIGURE 21 What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp972)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1136)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp738)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp917)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

17

As for their economic views 61 percent of the respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied Donbas voiced their preference for deepening economic reforms thereby expressing a general pro-reform attitude Main-taining the status quo was only the declared preference of 15 percent of respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 11 percent in the DNR LNR The lsquoreturn to a socialist economyrsquo was the preferred choice of 24 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and 28 percent in the occupied terri-tories This response is likely to capture not just a specific ideological view about the socialist economic system but rather a general dissatisfaction with Ukrainersquos transition path FIGURE 21

The combination of a lukewarm position on democracy and a general en-dorsement of further economic reforms in both parts of the Donbas should be seen in connection with a further result namely the self-reported change in the level of political interest as a result of the events over the last three years The trends point in opposite directions across the frontline while respondents in the DNR LNR expressed a noteworthy increase in interest in politics (53 percent compared to only 14 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas) 49 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they were now less interested in politics (compared to 24 percent in the DNR LNR) Thus the experience of war has politicized the population of the DNR LNR much more than their counterpart in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas While Kyiv is confronted with a population that seems to be turning away from national politics the population of the occupied territories has become highly politicized though not in one particular direction FIGURE 22

136

526

373

239

491

235

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

More The same Less

Donbas n=1111 DNRLNR n=1167

Are you now more or less interestedin politics than three years ago

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 22 Are you now more or less interested in politics than three years ago

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1167)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

18

Foreign policy orientation

In terms of foreign policy orientation the two parts of the divided Donbas are more similar than one might think while NATO membership was re-jected outright as could be expected by the vast majority in both parts the widespread negative views of the EU in the Donbas might come as a sur-prise 72 percent of respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 82 percent in the self-declared republics are against Ukraine joining the EU FIGURES 23thinsp+thinsp24 While support for the EU in view of a slow reform pro-cess and the inability of Western actors to end the war has cooled off again across Ukraine according to recent polls there has generally been support above 50 percent for EU membership in recent years Thus with regard to the Ukrainian governmentrsquos declared objective of aligning its reform pro-cess with the EU the Donbas is being left behind

279

182

721

818

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=867 DNRLNR n=1063

Should Ukraine join the EU

DonbasDNRLNR

175

69

825

931

020

4060

8010

0Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=928 DNRLNR n=1092

Should Ukraine join the NATO

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 23Should Ukraine join the EU

FIGURE 24 Should Ukraine join the NATO

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp867)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1063)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp928)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1092)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

19

Conclusion

The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities whether rooted in ethnicity native language language use or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and in some cases this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience

On foreign policy issues both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline On the issue of EU membership the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centrersquos main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions Similarly support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR LNR

Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian Western and Russian policy-makers should take note of For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR LNR In line with the local sentiments international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR LNR

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

5

FIGURE 1 Donbas How often are you in touch with your relativesthinspthinspfriends in the DNRthinspthinspLNR

Source ZOiS

99

362381

128

31

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Every day Once or twice a week

Once or twice a month Once or twice a year

Not at all at the moment

n=423

DonbasHow often are you in touch with your

relativesfriends in the DNRLNR

FIGURE 2 DNRthinspthinspLNR How often are you in touch with your relativesthinspthinspfriends in the Donbas

188

319344

107

43

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Every day Once or twice a week

Once or twice a month Once or twice a year

Not at all at the moment

n=655

DNR minus LNRHow often are you in touch with your

relativesfriends in the Donbas

Source ZOiS

or once twice per week Only about 3 percent report not being in touch at the moment Similarly just under 50 percent of the respondents in the DNR LNR are in touch with family members or friends based in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas on a daily basis or once twice a week Within this refer-ence group the share of those in daily contact is twice as high as that of the respondents in the Donbas in contact with people in the DNR LNR namely close to 20 percent Again only about 4 percent has lost touch for the mo-ment FIGURES 1thinsp+thinsp2

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

6

Political identities

The only way in which a one-off survey can speak to the question of personal identity change is to tap into self-reported changes The ZOiS survey included a deliberately open question which avoided narrowing it to either ethnic or civic identity categories followed by more detailed questions about a range of different identity options As for the first more general question about a change in personal identity as a result of the events of 2013-16 a quarter of the respondents in the occupied territories said that they felt lsquomore Russianrsquo

0109

031818

0603

2207

0102

11343

6648

8978

0507

0305

538532

3774

3557

67114

0 20 40 60Percent

Other

Ukrainianminusspeaking Russian

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Bilingual UkrminusRuss speaker

Russianminusspeaker

Ukrainianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Dual UkrminusRuss citizenship

Russian citizen

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Russian

Ethnic Ukrainian

Now n=1100 Five years ago n=1111

DonbasWhat identity is most important to you today

What identity was important to you five years ago

Identity nowIdentity five years ago

34

261205

85143

204

618

450

020

4060

Perc

ent

More Russian More Ukrainian More strongly both No change

Donbas n=995 DNRLNR n=1141

Donbas minus DNR LNRAs a result of the events 2013minus16 do you feel

DonbasDNRLNR

FIGURE 3 As a result of the events 2013thinspndashthinsp16 do you feelhellip

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 4 Donbas What identity is most important to you today What identity was most important to you five years ago

Identity now (nthinsp=thinsp1100)

Identity five years ago (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp995)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1141)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

7

now ndash and a fifth of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they felt lsquomore Ukrainianrsquo now Interestingly however 14 percent and 20 percent in the Kyiv-controlled and occupied Donbas respectively said that they felt more strongly now that they are lsquoboth Ukrainian and Russianrsquo The majority in both parts of the Donbas reported no change in identity 62 per-cent in the government-controlled Donbas and 45 percent in the self-declared republics Thus while there has been a greater shift in identities in the oc-cupied territories a significant number of respondents reported not only a stable identity but also an increase in a mixed identification FIGURE 3

In the Ukrainian controlled Donbas face-to-face interviews allowed for a more detailed question about identity 53 and 54 percent of the respondents picked Ukrainian citizenship as their primary self-reported identity now and five years ago demonstrating that a civic identity already prevailed over eth-nic or regional identities before the war and has remained intact throughout the war experience Only 7 percent and 4 percent chose lsquoethnic Ukrainianrsquo and lsquoethnic Russianrsquo as their main identity five years ago These figures have risen now to 11 percent and 6 percent respectively Similarly self-identification as lsquomixed ethnic Russian and Ukrainianrsquo has risen from 4 to 7 percent over the last five years Regional identity has grown somewhat in significance as re-flected in the salience of a Donbas identity (up from 8 to 9 percent) and a small drop in identification with the regional sub-units Donetsk and Luhansk oblast (from 7 to 5 percent and from 11 to 4 percent respectively) FIGURE 4

Self-identification as a Ukrainian citizen marks an important difference be-tween the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied territories In the DNR LNR 54 percent reported that they felt less like Ukrainian citizens now compared to before 2013 while only 8 percent stated that they felt more like Ukrainian citi-zens now 38 percent reported no change The previously strong sense of being a Ukrainian citizen in this region has tended to be seriously underestimated in the West This identity is part of the price paid for the war in the occupied territories This previously strong identity however has not been replaced by a clear-cut ethnification or polarization FIGURE 5

80

540

381

020

4060

Perc

ent

More Ukr citizen than before Less Ukr citizen than before No changen=1156

DNR minus LNRAs a result of the events of 2013minus16 do you feel

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 5 DNRthinspthinspLNR (Citizenship) As a result of the events 2013thinspndashthinsp16 do you feelhellip

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

8

When we trace in more detail the shifts between self-reported identity catego-ries in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas area we find that while self-identification as a Ukrainian citizen remains as the most important identity category from five years ago it is now an identity in flux with respondents also shifting from Ukrainian citizenship to Ukrainian ethnicity or a regional Donbas identity

FIGURES 6thinspndashthinsp8

Survey questions about sbquonative languagersquo tend to tap into sentiments about language as an identity marker rather than actual day to day language practice The majority of respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled Donbas (about 50 percent) and the DNR LNR (about 60 percent) identify Russian as their native language The range of answers to this question did not only list mutually exclusive options as is commonly the case in the national census

FIGURE 6 Donbas (Identity now ethnic Ukrainian) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

FIGURE 7Donbas (Identity now mixed ethnic Ukrainian and Russian) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

56

56

08

40

64

40

08

272

08

448

0 10 20 30 40 50Percent

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Russianminusspeaker

Ukrainianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Russian citizen

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=125

DonbasIdentity now Ethnic Ukrainian

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

78

65

117

13

351

299

26

52

0 10 20 30 40Percent

Russianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donbas

Dual UkrminusRuss citizenship

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Russian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=77

DonbasIdentity now Mixed ethnic Ukr amp Russ

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

9

and many standard opinion polls but included the option lsquoboth Russian and Ukrainianrsquo which in turn was chosen by 34 percent and 36 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and in the DNR LNR respectively The self-reported relevance of a bilingual identity is compatible with the expres-sions of a mixed Russian-Ukrainian identity whether defined in ethnic or more civic terms in both the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR and the salience of Ukrainian citizenship as the primary identity in the govern-ment-controlled Donbas

There is anecdotal evidence of people adjusting their language identity and or practice in light of their war experience However no significant change was reported by the respondents themselves about a readjustment of their native language FIGURE 9

501

598

160

43

337 358

02 01

020

4060

Perc

ent

Russian Ukrainian Both Russian and Ukrainian Crimean Tatar

Donbas n=1150 DNRLNR n=1198

What language do you consider your native language

DonbasDNRLNR

24

83

71

536

262

12

12

0 20 40 60Percent

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=84

DonbasIdentity now Person from Donbas

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

FIGURE 8 Donbas (Identity now person from Donbas) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 9 What language do you consider your native language

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1150)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1198)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

10

When asked about actual language practice the picture changes somewhat highlighting that survey respondents interpret a question about lsquonative lan-guagersquo differently A majority ndash 53 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 70 percent in the DNR LNR ndash listed Russian as the dominant language spoken at home Furthermore 18 and 10 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR respectively reported an equal language mix of Ukrainian and Russian at home A further 21 and 17 percent respectively said that their main language at home is Russian but that they occasionally speak Ukrainian at home FIGURE 10

Asked about the primary language spoken at work the picture is similar thereby demonstrating that there is congruence between the occupied

2027

764545

119176

71191

1740

0922

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=962 DNRLNR n=1143

Which language do you typically speak at work

DonbasDNRLNR

0221

694528

173206

104184

2240

0621

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=1187 DNRLNR n=1198

Which language do you typically speak at home

DonbasDNRLNR

FIGURE 10 Which language do you typically speak at home

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 11 Which language do you typically speak at work

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp962)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1143)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1187)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1198)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

11

territories and the rest of the Donbas 76 percent list Russian as the main language of communication at work in DNR LNR compared to 55 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 19 and 7 percent respectively report an equal use of Russian and Ukrainian at work An additional 18 and 12 percent re-spectively said that they speak above all Russian and occasionally Ukrain-ian Both at home and at work the use of Ukrainian alone is negligible (max 2 percent) FIGURE 11

Views on the war and the status of the region

Views on the origins of the war are more similar across the two parts of the Donbas than one might expect The respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are split in their assessment 37 percent blame the outbreak of war on Russia and 10 percent on Ukraine a surprising 30 percent think it was the result of Western intervention and 23 percent see it as a local reaction against the Kyiv government With the exception of the perceived role of Russia the views in the occupied territories are rather similar 50 percent think the war resulted from Western intervention 30 percent see it as a lo-cal reaction against the national government 11 percent blame it on Ukraine and 9 percent on Russia FIGURE 12

However the preferences regarding the future status of the occupied ter-ritories diverge significantly While in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas a clear majority (65 percent) wants them to be part of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast without a special status 26 percent deem a special status within Ukraine necessary and about 9 percent see the future of these territories in Rus-sia The views of the population in the self-declared republics are more di-verse than one might have expected 21 percent want this area to be part of Ukraine without a special status and 35 percent prefer a special status for these territories inside Ukraine Conversely 11 percent want to see the territories as part of Russia without a special status and 33 percent would

304

503

371

92 95 113

231

292

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Result of Western interventionCaused by Russia

Caused by UkraineLocal reaction against nat govt

Donbas n=863 DNRLNR n=1047

Which statement is closestto your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 12 Which statement is closest to your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp863)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1047)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

12

prefer a special status inside Russia Thus the main emphasis among the re-spondents in the DNR LNR is on the recognition of the special status of the territories while there is an even split between those who see this area as part of Ukraine or Russia FIGURE 13

The survey results also indicate that the current experience shapes attitudes about autonomy in the rest of the country Generally the experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia all organized as federations at least on paper has made East Europeans politicians and soci-eties sceptical of federalism The fact that Russia the only socialist-era fed-eration that survived the breakup of the USSR thanks to formal and informal institutional adjustments has advocated federalism for Ukraine during the war in eastern Ukraine has discredited the principle further in the Ukrainian political discourse

While some are willing to contemplate an exception for the DNR LNR espe-cially in neighbouring regions like the Kyiv-controlled Donbas the principle of autonomy remains contested In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas about 24 per-cent agree (lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo) that other regions of Ukraine should have the right to a degree of autonomy 39 percent disagree (among them 30 percent disagree strongly) and 37 percent are undecided or indifferent

By comparison the respondents based in the DNR LNR are consistent in their views about autonomy claiming the right to a special status not only for them-selves but also for other regions of Ukraine This discrepancy suggests a mobi-lizing effect through the regionrsquos experience over the last three years of war A majority of 61 percent of the survey respondents in the DNR LNR strongly or rather agree with the principle of giving other regions in Ukraine a degree of autonomy while 23 percent are opposed (of which 12 percent strongly disa-gree) and only 16 percent are undecided or indifferent The latter figures in particular indicate that the issue of autonomy is most salient among those who live in the occupied territories the status of which is disputed FIGURE 14

267

350

657

206

50114

26

331

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Special autonomy within UkraineParts of Donetsk and Luhansk

Part of Russia wo autonomySpecial autonomy within Russia

Donbas n=1157 DNRLNR n=1021

In your view what should the status of DNRLNR be

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 13 In your opinion what should the status of DNRthinspthinspLNR be

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1157)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1021)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

13

The Normandy format that has facilitated several ceasefires but has not yet delivered on the political and institutional content of the Minsk II Agreement has become a focal point for the frustration of all the involved parties Never-theless all sides keep reiterating that there is no alternative to the process De-spite the lack of tangible political results this general feeling is shared by the population in both parts of the Donbas 59 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 45 percent of the respondents in the DNR LNR lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo agree with the principles of the Minsk Agreement Just over a third in each case exhibits a neutral attitude and only a very small share of the respondents disagrees with the principles of the Minsk Agree-ment The survey question does not disentangle the different interpretations of the agreement and the steps it lays out but it illustrates an overall endorse-ment of a continuing process FIGURE 15

76

337

155

270

92113

303

119130

54

244

107

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agree Rather agree Rather disagree Strongly disagree Hard to say I donrsquot care

Donbas n=1174 DNRLNR n=1180

Would you agree that other regions in Ukraineshould be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 14Would you agree that other regions in Ukraine should be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1174)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1180)

196237

391

213

359

455

45 4809

47

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Strongly agreeRather agree

Neither agree nor disagreeRather disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=443 DNRLNR n=723

Do you agree with the Minsk Agreement

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 15Do you agree with the Minsk agreement

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp443)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp723)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

14

Trust in political institutions and the media

The level of trust in political leaders and institutions is a broad indicator of political stability and regime legitimacy In a situation of war trust is eroded and in flux depending on the respondentsrsquo location and personal experience Given that the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko is gener-ally unpopular across Ukraine where he is held responsible for a too slow reform process it does not come as a surprise that a vast majority of over 87 percent does not trust the Ukrainian president in Kyiv-controlled Donbas (of which 55 percent do not trust him at all) The distrust in the DNR LNR is even higher with 77 percent not trusting him at all FIGURE 16

The picture is the reverse when it comes to trust in the Russian president Vladimir Putin In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 88 percent do not trust the Russian president This does not come as a surprise but the variation in

554

770

319

164110

4817 18

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=1062 DNRLNR n=1152

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian President

DonbasDNRLNR

712

197 171 15896

282

21

363

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=888 DNRLNR n=1090

How much trust do you have in the Russian President

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 16 How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian president

FIGURE 17 How much trust do you have in the Russian president

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1062)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1152)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp888)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1090)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

15

expressions of trust in the DNR LNR is noteworthy while about 64 percent of the respondents rather or generally trust the Russian president about 36 per-cent do not FIGURE 17

When asked about the Ukrainian mass media a clear majority of about 82 per-cent of the respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 86 percent in the DNR LNR expressed their distrust in the main traditional media outlets Oligarchic ownership structures and the reporting (or absence of reporting) about the war are likely explanations for the overwhelming distrust FIGURE 18 Unsurprisingly the population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas similarly dis-trusts the Russian mass media (94 percent) but in the occupied territories the trust and distrust in the Russian mass media is relatively evenly split with about 46 percent of the respondents trusting and 54 percent not trusting the Russian mass media FIGURE 19

446

628

366

232184

109

0331

020

4060

Perc

ent

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=961 DNRLNR n=1120

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

785

234

150

225

57

338

07

203

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=824 DNRLNR n=1085

How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 18How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

FIGURE 19How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp961)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1120)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp824)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1085)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

16

General attitudes about democracy and the economy are shared across both parts of the Donbas Support for democracy is best described as lukewarm 42 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 39 percent in the occupied territories lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquosomewhatrsquo agree with the statement that democracy is still the best possible form of government while 38 and 37 percent respectively are non-committal and neither agree nor disagree FIGURE 20

123

170

297

218

380 368

108 11392

131

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agreeSomewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagreeSomewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=972 DNRLNR n=1136

Democracy is still the best form of government

DonbasDNRLNR

240276

153113

607 611

020

4060

Perc

ent

Return to socialist economy Leave everything as it is Deepen market reforms

Donbas n=738 DNRLNR n=917

What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 20Democracy is still the best form of government

FIGURE 21 What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp972)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1136)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp738)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp917)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

17

As for their economic views 61 percent of the respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied Donbas voiced their preference for deepening economic reforms thereby expressing a general pro-reform attitude Main-taining the status quo was only the declared preference of 15 percent of respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 11 percent in the DNR LNR The lsquoreturn to a socialist economyrsquo was the preferred choice of 24 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and 28 percent in the occupied terri-tories This response is likely to capture not just a specific ideological view about the socialist economic system but rather a general dissatisfaction with Ukrainersquos transition path FIGURE 21

The combination of a lukewarm position on democracy and a general en-dorsement of further economic reforms in both parts of the Donbas should be seen in connection with a further result namely the self-reported change in the level of political interest as a result of the events over the last three years The trends point in opposite directions across the frontline while respondents in the DNR LNR expressed a noteworthy increase in interest in politics (53 percent compared to only 14 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas) 49 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they were now less interested in politics (compared to 24 percent in the DNR LNR) Thus the experience of war has politicized the population of the DNR LNR much more than their counterpart in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas While Kyiv is confronted with a population that seems to be turning away from national politics the population of the occupied territories has become highly politicized though not in one particular direction FIGURE 22

136

526

373

239

491

235

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

More The same Less

Donbas n=1111 DNRLNR n=1167

Are you now more or less interestedin politics than three years ago

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 22 Are you now more or less interested in politics than three years ago

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1167)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

18

Foreign policy orientation

In terms of foreign policy orientation the two parts of the divided Donbas are more similar than one might think while NATO membership was re-jected outright as could be expected by the vast majority in both parts the widespread negative views of the EU in the Donbas might come as a sur-prise 72 percent of respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 82 percent in the self-declared republics are against Ukraine joining the EU FIGURES 23thinsp+thinsp24 While support for the EU in view of a slow reform pro-cess and the inability of Western actors to end the war has cooled off again across Ukraine according to recent polls there has generally been support above 50 percent for EU membership in recent years Thus with regard to the Ukrainian governmentrsquos declared objective of aligning its reform pro-cess with the EU the Donbas is being left behind

279

182

721

818

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=867 DNRLNR n=1063

Should Ukraine join the EU

DonbasDNRLNR

175

69

825

931

020

4060

8010

0Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=928 DNRLNR n=1092

Should Ukraine join the NATO

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 23Should Ukraine join the EU

FIGURE 24 Should Ukraine join the NATO

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp867)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1063)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp928)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1092)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

19

Conclusion

The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities whether rooted in ethnicity native language language use or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and in some cases this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience

On foreign policy issues both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline On the issue of EU membership the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centrersquos main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions Similarly support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR LNR

Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian Western and Russian policy-makers should take note of For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR LNR In line with the local sentiments international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR LNR

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

6

Political identities

The only way in which a one-off survey can speak to the question of personal identity change is to tap into self-reported changes The ZOiS survey included a deliberately open question which avoided narrowing it to either ethnic or civic identity categories followed by more detailed questions about a range of different identity options As for the first more general question about a change in personal identity as a result of the events of 2013-16 a quarter of the respondents in the occupied territories said that they felt lsquomore Russianrsquo

0109

031818

0603

2207

0102

11343

6648

8978

0507

0305

538532

3774

3557

67114

0 20 40 60Percent

Other

Ukrainianminusspeaking Russian

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Bilingual UkrminusRuss speaker

Russianminusspeaker

Ukrainianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Dual UkrminusRuss citizenship

Russian citizen

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Russian

Ethnic Ukrainian

Now n=1100 Five years ago n=1111

DonbasWhat identity is most important to you today

What identity was important to you five years ago

Identity nowIdentity five years ago

34

261205

85143

204

618

450

020

4060

Perc

ent

More Russian More Ukrainian More strongly both No change

Donbas n=995 DNRLNR n=1141

Donbas minus DNR LNRAs a result of the events 2013minus16 do you feel

DonbasDNRLNR

FIGURE 3 As a result of the events 2013thinspndashthinsp16 do you feelhellip

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 4 Donbas What identity is most important to you today What identity was most important to you five years ago

Identity now (nthinsp=thinsp1100)

Identity five years ago (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp995)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1141)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

7

now ndash and a fifth of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they felt lsquomore Ukrainianrsquo now Interestingly however 14 percent and 20 percent in the Kyiv-controlled and occupied Donbas respectively said that they felt more strongly now that they are lsquoboth Ukrainian and Russianrsquo The majority in both parts of the Donbas reported no change in identity 62 per-cent in the government-controlled Donbas and 45 percent in the self-declared republics Thus while there has been a greater shift in identities in the oc-cupied territories a significant number of respondents reported not only a stable identity but also an increase in a mixed identification FIGURE 3

In the Ukrainian controlled Donbas face-to-face interviews allowed for a more detailed question about identity 53 and 54 percent of the respondents picked Ukrainian citizenship as their primary self-reported identity now and five years ago demonstrating that a civic identity already prevailed over eth-nic or regional identities before the war and has remained intact throughout the war experience Only 7 percent and 4 percent chose lsquoethnic Ukrainianrsquo and lsquoethnic Russianrsquo as their main identity five years ago These figures have risen now to 11 percent and 6 percent respectively Similarly self-identification as lsquomixed ethnic Russian and Ukrainianrsquo has risen from 4 to 7 percent over the last five years Regional identity has grown somewhat in significance as re-flected in the salience of a Donbas identity (up from 8 to 9 percent) and a small drop in identification with the regional sub-units Donetsk and Luhansk oblast (from 7 to 5 percent and from 11 to 4 percent respectively) FIGURE 4

Self-identification as a Ukrainian citizen marks an important difference be-tween the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied territories In the DNR LNR 54 percent reported that they felt less like Ukrainian citizens now compared to before 2013 while only 8 percent stated that they felt more like Ukrainian citi-zens now 38 percent reported no change The previously strong sense of being a Ukrainian citizen in this region has tended to be seriously underestimated in the West This identity is part of the price paid for the war in the occupied territories This previously strong identity however has not been replaced by a clear-cut ethnification or polarization FIGURE 5

80

540

381

020

4060

Perc

ent

More Ukr citizen than before Less Ukr citizen than before No changen=1156

DNR minus LNRAs a result of the events of 2013minus16 do you feel

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 5 DNRthinspthinspLNR (Citizenship) As a result of the events 2013thinspndashthinsp16 do you feelhellip

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

8

When we trace in more detail the shifts between self-reported identity catego-ries in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas area we find that while self-identification as a Ukrainian citizen remains as the most important identity category from five years ago it is now an identity in flux with respondents also shifting from Ukrainian citizenship to Ukrainian ethnicity or a regional Donbas identity

FIGURES 6thinspndashthinsp8

Survey questions about sbquonative languagersquo tend to tap into sentiments about language as an identity marker rather than actual day to day language practice The majority of respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled Donbas (about 50 percent) and the DNR LNR (about 60 percent) identify Russian as their native language The range of answers to this question did not only list mutually exclusive options as is commonly the case in the national census

FIGURE 6 Donbas (Identity now ethnic Ukrainian) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

FIGURE 7Donbas (Identity now mixed ethnic Ukrainian and Russian) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

56

56

08

40

64

40

08

272

08

448

0 10 20 30 40 50Percent

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Russianminusspeaker

Ukrainianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Russian citizen

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=125

DonbasIdentity now Ethnic Ukrainian

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

78

65

117

13

351

299

26

52

0 10 20 30 40Percent

Russianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donbas

Dual UkrminusRuss citizenship

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Russian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=77

DonbasIdentity now Mixed ethnic Ukr amp Russ

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

9

and many standard opinion polls but included the option lsquoboth Russian and Ukrainianrsquo which in turn was chosen by 34 percent and 36 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and in the DNR LNR respectively The self-reported relevance of a bilingual identity is compatible with the expres-sions of a mixed Russian-Ukrainian identity whether defined in ethnic or more civic terms in both the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR and the salience of Ukrainian citizenship as the primary identity in the govern-ment-controlled Donbas

There is anecdotal evidence of people adjusting their language identity and or practice in light of their war experience However no significant change was reported by the respondents themselves about a readjustment of their native language FIGURE 9

501

598

160

43

337 358

02 01

020

4060

Perc

ent

Russian Ukrainian Both Russian and Ukrainian Crimean Tatar

Donbas n=1150 DNRLNR n=1198

What language do you consider your native language

DonbasDNRLNR

24

83

71

536

262

12

12

0 20 40 60Percent

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=84

DonbasIdentity now Person from Donbas

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

FIGURE 8 Donbas (Identity now person from Donbas) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 9 What language do you consider your native language

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1150)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1198)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

10

When asked about actual language practice the picture changes somewhat highlighting that survey respondents interpret a question about lsquonative lan-guagersquo differently A majority ndash 53 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 70 percent in the DNR LNR ndash listed Russian as the dominant language spoken at home Furthermore 18 and 10 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR respectively reported an equal language mix of Ukrainian and Russian at home A further 21 and 17 percent respectively said that their main language at home is Russian but that they occasionally speak Ukrainian at home FIGURE 10

Asked about the primary language spoken at work the picture is similar thereby demonstrating that there is congruence between the occupied

2027

764545

119176

71191

1740

0922

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=962 DNRLNR n=1143

Which language do you typically speak at work

DonbasDNRLNR

0221

694528

173206

104184

2240

0621

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=1187 DNRLNR n=1198

Which language do you typically speak at home

DonbasDNRLNR

FIGURE 10 Which language do you typically speak at home

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 11 Which language do you typically speak at work

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp962)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1143)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1187)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1198)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

11

territories and the rest of the Donbas 76 percent list Russian as the main language of communication at work in DNR LNR compared to 55 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 19 and 7 percent respectively report an equal use of Russian and Ukrainian at work An additional 18 and 12 percent re-spectively said that they speak above all Russian and occasionally Ukrain-ian Both at home and at work the use of Ukrainian alone is negligible (max 2 percent) FIGURE 11

Views on the war and the status of the region

Views on the origins of the war are more similar across the two parts of the Donbas than one might expect The respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are split in their assessment 37 percent blame the outbreak of war on Russia and 10 percent on Ukraine a surprising 30 percent think it was the result of Western intervention and 23 percent see it as a local reaction against the Kyiv government With the exception of the perceived role of Russia the views in the occupied territories are rather similar 50 percent think the war resulted from Western intervention 30 percent see it as a lo-cal reaction against the national government 11 percent blame it on Ukraine and 9 percent on Russia FIGURE 12

However the preferences regarding the future status of the occupied ter-ritories diverge significantly While in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas a clear majority (65 percent) wants them to be part of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast without a special status 26 percent deem a special status within Ukraine necessary and about 9 percent see the future of these territories in Rus-sia The views of the population in the self-declared republics are more di-verse than one might have expected 21 percent want this area to be part of Ukraine without a special status and 35 percent prefer a special status for these territories inside Ukraine Conversely 11 percent want to see the territories as part of Russia without a special status and 33 percent would

304

503

371

92 95 113

231

292

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Result of Western interventionCaused by Russia

Caused by UkraineLocal reaction against nat govt

Donbas n=863 DNRLNR n=1047

Which statement is closestto your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 12 Which statement is closest to your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp863)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1047)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

12

prefer a special status inside Russia Thus the main emphasis among the re-spondents in the DNR LNR is on the recognition of the special status of the territories while there is an even split between those who see this area as part of Ukraine or Russia FIGURE 13

The survey results also indicate that the current experience shapes attitudes about autonomy in the rest of the country Generally the experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia all organized as federations at least on paper has made East Europeans politicians and soci-eties sceptical of federalism The fact that Russia the only socialist-era fed-eration that survived the breakup of the USSR thanks to formal and informal institutional adjustments has advocated federalism for Ukraine during the war in eastern Ukraine has discredited the principle further in the Ukrainian political discourse

While some are willing to contemplate an exception for the DNR LNR espe-cially in neighbouring regions like the Kyiv-controlled Donbas the principle of autonomy remains contested In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas about 24 per-cent agree (lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo) that other regions of Ukraine should have the right to a degree of autonomy 39 percent disagree (among them 30 percent disagree strongly) and 37 percent are undecided or indifferent

By comparison the respondents based in the DNR LNR are consistent in their views about autonomy claiming the right to a special status not only for them-selves but also for other regions of Ukraine This discrepancy suggests a mobi-lizing effect through the regionrsquos experience over the last three years of war A majority of 61 percent of the survey respondents in the DNR LNR strongly or rather agree with the principle of giving other regions in Ukraine a degree of autonomy while 23 percent are opposed (of which 12 percent strongly disa-gree) and only 16 percent are undecided or indifferent The latter figures in particular indicate that the issue of autonomy is most salient among those who live in the occupied territories the status of which is disputed FIGURE 14

267

350

657

206

50114

26

331

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Special autonomy within UkraineParts of Donetsk and Luhansk

Part of Russia wo autonomySpecial autonomy within Russia

Donbas n=1157 DNRLNR n=1021

In your view what should the status of DNRLNR be

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 13 In your opinion what should the status of DNRthinspthinspLNR be

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1157)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1021)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

13

The Normandy format that has facilitated several ceasefires but has not yet delivered on the political and institutional content of the Minsk II Agreement has become a focal point for the frustration of all the involved parties Never-theless all sides keep reiterating that there is no alternative to the process De-spite the lack of tangible political results this general feeling is shared by the population in both parts of the Donbas 59 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 45 percent of the respondents in the DNR LNR lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo agree with the principles of the Minsk Agreement Just over a third in each case exhibits a neutral attitude and only a very small share of the respondents disagrees with the principles of the Minsk Agree-ment The survey question does not disentangle the different interpretations of the agreement and the steps it lays out but it illustrates an overall endorse-ment of a continuing process FIGURE 15

76

337

155

270

92113

303

119130

54

244

107

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agree Rather agree Rather disagree Strongly disagree Hard to say I donrsquot care

Donbas n=1174 DNRLNR n=1180

Would you agree that other regions in Ukraineshould be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 14Would you agree that other regions in Ukraine should be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1174)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1180)

196237

391

213

359

455

45 4809

47

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Strongly agreeRather agree

Neither agree nor disagreeRather disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=443 DNRLNR n=723

Do you agree with the Minsk Agreement

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 15Do you agree with the Minsk agreement

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp443)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp723)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

14

Trust in political institutions and the media

The level of trust in political leaders and institutions is a broad indicator of political stability and regime legitimacy In a situation of war trust is eroded and in flux depending on the respondentsrsquo location and personal experience Given that the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko is gener-ally unpopular across Ukraine where he is held responsible for a too slow reform process it does not come as a surprise that a vast majority of over 87 percent does not trust the Ukrainian president in Kyiv-controlled Donbas (of which 55 percent do not trust him at all) The distrust in the DNR LNR is even higher with 77 percent not trusting him at all FIGURE 16

The picture is the reverse when it comes to trust in the Russian president Vladimir Putin In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 88 percent do not trust the Russian president This does not come as a surprise but the variation in

554

770

319

164110

4817 18

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=1062 DNRLNR n=1152

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian President

DonbasDNRLNR

712

197 171 15896

282

21

363

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=888 DNRLNR n=1090

How much trust do you have in the Russian President

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 16 How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian president

FIGURE 17 How much trust do you have in the Russian president

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1062)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1152)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp888)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1090)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

15

expressions of trust in the DNR LNR is noteworthy while about 64 percent of the respondents rather or generally trust the Russian president about 36 per-cent do not FIGURE 17

When asked about the Ukrainian mass media a clear majority of about 82 per-cent of the respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 86 percent in the DNR LNR expressed their distrust in the main traditional media outlets Oligarchic ownership structures and the reporting (or absence of reporting) about the war are likely explanations for the overwhelming distrust FIGURE 18 Unsurprisingly the population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas similarly dis-trusts the Russian mass media (94 percent) but in the occupied territories the trust and distrust in the Russian mass media is relatively evenly split with about 46 percent of the respondents trusting and 54 percent not trusting the Russian mass media FIGURE 19

446

628

366

232184

109

0331

020

4060

Perc

ent

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=961 DNRLNR n=1120

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

785

234

150

225

57

338

07

203

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=824 DNRLNR n=1085

How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 18How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

FIGURE 19How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp961)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1120)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp824)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1085)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

16

General attitudes about democracy and the economy are shared across both parts of the Donbas Support for democracy is best described as lukewarm 42 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 39 percent in the occupied territories lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquosomewhatrsquo agree with the statement that democracy is still the best possible form of government while 38 and 37 percent respectively are non-committal and neither agree nor disagree FIGURE 20

123

170

297

218

380 368

108 11392

131

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agreeSomewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagreeSomewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=972 DNRLNR n=1136

Democracy is still the best form of government

DonbasDNRLNR

240276

153113

607 611

020

4060

Perc

ent

Return to socialist economy Leave everything as it is Deepen market reforms

Donbas n=738 DNRLNR n=917

What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 20Democracy is still the best form of government

FIGURE 21 What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp972)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1136)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp738)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp917)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

17

As for their economic views 61 percent of the respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied Donbas voiced their preference for deepening economic reforms thereby expressing a general pro-reform attitude Main-taining the status quo was only the declared preference of 15 percent of respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 11 percent in the DNR LNR The lsquoreturn to a socialist economyrsquo was the preferred choice of 24 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and 28 percent in the occupied terri-tories This response is likely to capture not just a specific ideological view about the socialist economic system but rather a general dissatisfaction with Ukrainersquos transition path FIGURE 21

The combination of a lukewarm position on democracy and a general en-dorsement of further economic reforms in both parts of the Donbas should be seen in connection with a further result namely the self-reported change in the level of political interest as a result of the events over the last three years The trends point in opposite directions across the frontline while respondents in the DNR LNR expressed a noteworthy increase in interest in politics (53 percent compared to only 14 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas) 49 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they were now less interested in politics (compared to 24 percent in the DNR LNR) Thus the experience of war has politicized the population of the DNR LNR much more than their counterpart in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas While Kyiv is confronted with a population that seems to be turning away from national politics the population of the occupied territories has become highly politicized though not in one particular direction FIGURE 22

136

526

373

239

491

235

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

More The same Less

Donbas n=1111 DNRLNR n=1167

Are you now more or less interestedin politics than three years ago

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 22 Are you now more or less interested in politics than three years ago

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1167)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

18

Foreign policy orientation

In terms of foreign policy orientation the two parts of the divided Donbas are more similar than one might think while NATO membership was re-jected outright as could be expected by the vast majority in both parts the widespread negative views of the EU in the Donbas might come as a sur-prise 72 percent of respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 82 percent in the self-declared republics are against Ukraine joining the EU FIGURES 23thinsp+thinsp24 While support for the EU in view of a slow reform pro-cess and the inability of Western actors to end the war has cooled off again across Ukraine according to recent polls there has generally been support above 50 percent for EU membership in recent years Thus with regard to the Ukrainian governmentrsquos declared objective of aligning its reform pro-cess with the EU the Donbas is being left behind

279

182

721

818

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=867 DNRLNR n=1063

Should Ukraine join the EU

DonbasDNRLNR

175

69

825

931

020

4060

8010

0Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=928 DNRLNR n=1092

Should Ukraine join the NATO

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 23Should Ukraine join the EU

FIGURE 24 Should Ukraine join the NATO

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp867)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1063)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp928)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1092)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

19

Conclusion

The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities whether rooted in ethnicity native language language use or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and in some cases this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience

On foreign policy issues both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline On the issue of EU membership the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centrersquos main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions Similarly support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR LNR

Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian Western and Russian policy-makers should take note of For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR LNR In line with the local sentiments international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR LNR

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

7

now ndash and a fifth of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they felt lsquomore Ukrainianrsquo now Interestingly however 14 percent and 20 percent in the Kyiv-controlled and occupied Donbas respectively said that they felt more strongly now that they are lsquoboth Ukrainian and Russianrsquo The majority in both parts of the Donbas reported no change in identity 62 per-cent in the government-controlled Donbas and 45 percent in the self-declared republics Thus while there has been a greater shift in identities in the oc-cupied territories a significant number of respondents reported not only a stable identity but also an increase in a mixed identification FIGURE 3

In the Ukrainian controlled Donbas face-to-face interviews allowed for a more detailed question about identity 53 and 54 percent of the respondents picked Ukrainian citizenship as their primary self-reported identity now and five years ago demonstrating that a civic identity already prevailed over eth-nic or regional identities before the war and has remained intact throughout the war experience Only 7 percent and 4 percent chose lsquoethnic Ukrainianrsquo and lsquoethnic Russianrsquo as their main identity five years ago These figures have risen now to 11 percent and 6 percent respectively Similarly self-identification as lsquomixed ethnic Russian and Ukrainianrsquo has risen from 4 to 7 percent over the last five years Regional identity has grown somewhat in significance as re-flected in the salience of a Donbas identity (up from 8 to 9 percent) and a small drop in identification with the regional sub-units Donetsk and Luhansk oblast (from 7 to 5 percent and from 11 to 4 percent respectively) FIGURE 4

Self-identification as a Ukrainian citizen marks an important difference be-tween the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied territories In the DNR LNR 54 percent reported that they felt less like Ukrainian citizens now compared to before 2013 while only 8 percent stated that they felt more like Ukrainian citi-zens now 38 percent reported no change The previously strong sense of being a Ukrainian citizen in this region has tended to be seriously underestimated in the West This identity is part of the price paid for the war in the occupied territories This previously strong identity however has not been replaced by a clear-cut ethnification or polarization FIGURE 5

80

540

381

020

4060

Perc

ent

More Ukr citizen than before Less Ukr citizen than before No changen=1156

DNR minus LNRAs a result of the events of 2013minus16 do you feel

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 5 DNRthinspthinspLNR (Citizenship) As a result of the events 2013thinspndashthinsp16 do you feelhellip

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

8

When we trace in more detail the shifts between self-reported identity catego-ries in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas area we find that while self-identification as a Ukrainian citizen remains as the most important identity category from five years ago it is now an identity in flux with respondents also shifting from Ukrainian citizenship to Ukrainian ethnicity or a regional Donbas identity

FIGURES 6thinspndashthinsp8

Survey questions about sbquonative languagersquo tend to tap into sentiments about language as an identity marker rather than actual day to day language practice The majority of respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled Donbas (about 50 percent) and the DNR LNR (about 60 percent) identify Russian as their native language The range of answers to this question did not only list mutually exclusive options as is commonly the case in the national census

FIGURE 6 Donbas (Identity now ethnic Ukrainian) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

FIGURE 7Donbas (Identity now mixed ethnic Ukrainian and Russian) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

56

56

08

40

64

40

08

272

08

448

0 10 20 30 40 50Percent

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Russianminusspeaker

Ukrainianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Russian citizen

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=125

DonbasIdentity now Ethnic Ukrainian

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

78

65

117

13

351

299

26

52

0 10 20 30 40Percent

Russianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donbas

Dual UkrminusRuss citizenship

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Russian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=77

DonbasIdentity now Mixed ethnic Ukr amp Russ

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

9

and many standard opinion polls but included the option lsquoboth Russian and Ukrainianrsquo which in turn was chosen by 34 percent and 36 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and in the DNR LNR respectively The self-reported relevance of a bilingual identity is compatible with the expres-sions of a mixed Russian-Ukrainian identity whether defined in ethnic or more civic terms in both the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR and the salience of Ukrainian citizenship as the primary identity in the govern-ment-controlled Donbas

There is anecdotal evidence of people adjusting their language identity and or practice in light of their war experience However no significant change was reported by the respondents themselves about a readjustment of their native language FIGURE 9

501

598

160

43

337 358

02 01

020

4060

Perc

ent

Russian Ukrainian Both Russian and Ukrainian Crimean Tatar

Donbas n=1150 DNRLNR n=1198

What language do you consider your native language

DonbasDNRLNR

24

83

71

536

262

12

12

0 20 40 60Percent

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=84

DonbasIdentity now Person from Donbas

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

FIGURE 8 Donbas (Identity now person from Donbas) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 9 What language do you consider your native language

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1150)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1198)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

10

When asked about actual language practice the picture changes somewhat highlighting that survey respondents interpret a question about lsquonative lan-guagersquo differently A majority ndash 53 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 70 percent in the DNR LNR ndash listed Russian as the dominant language spoken at home Furthermore 18 and 10 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR respectively reported an equal language mix of Ukrainian and Russian at home A further 21 and 17 percent respectively said that their main language at home is Russian but that they occasionally speak Ukrainian at home FIGURE 10

Asked about the primary language spoken at work the picture is similar thereby demonstrating that there is congruence between the occupied

2027

764545

119176

71191

1740

0922

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=962 DNRLNR n=1143

Which language do you typically speak at work

DonbasDNRLNR

0221

694528

173206

104184

2240

0621

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=1187 DNRLNR n=1198

Which language do you typically speak at home

DonbasDNRLNR

FIGURE 10 Which language do you typically speak at home

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 11 Which language do you typically speak at work

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp962)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1143)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1187)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1198)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

11

territories and the rest of the Donbas 76 percent list Russian as the main language of communication at work in DNR LNR compared to 55 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 19 and 7 percent respectively report an equal use of Russian and Ukrainian at work An additional 18 and 12 percent re-spectively said that they speak above all Russian and occasionally Ukrain-ian Both at home and at work the use of Ukrainian alone is negligible (max 2 percent) FIGURE 11

Views on the war and the status of the region

Views on the origins of the war are more similar across the two parts of the Donbas than one might expect The respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are split in their assessment 37 percent blame the outbreak of war on Russia and 10 percent on Ukraine a surprising 30 percent think it was the result of Western intervention and 23 percent see it as a local reaction against the Kyiv government With the exception of the perceived role of Russia the views in the occupied territories are rather similar 50 percent think the war resulted from Western intervention 30 percent see it as a lo-cal reaction against the national government 11 percent blame it on Ukraine and 9 percent on Russia FIGURE 12

However the preferences regarding the future status of the occupied ter-ritories diverge significantly While in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas a clear majority (65 percent) wants them to be part of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast without a special status 26 percent deem a special status within Ukraine necessary and about 9 percent see the future of these territories in Rus-sia The views of the population in the self-declared republics are more di-verse than one might have expected 21 percent want this area to be part of Ukraine without a special status and 35 percent prefer a special status for these territories inside Ukraine Conversely 11 percent want to see the territories as part of Russia without a special status and 33 percent would

304

503

371

92 95 113

231

292

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Result of Western interventionCaused by Russia

Caused by UkraineLocal reaction against nat govt

Donbas n=863 DNRLNR n=1047

Which statement is closestto your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 12 Which statement is closest to your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp863)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1047)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

12

prefer a special status inside Russia Thus the main emphasis among the re-spondents in the DNR LNR is on the recognition of the special status of the territories while there is an even split between those who see this area as part of Ukraine or Russia FIGURE 13

The survey results also indicate that the current experience shapes attitudes about autonomy in the rest of the country Generally the experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia all organized as federations at least on paper has made East Europeans politicians and soci-eties sceptical of federalism The fact that Russia the only socialist-era fed-eration that survived the breakup of the USSR thanks to formal and informal institutional adjustments has advocated federalism for Ukraine during the war in eastern Ukraine has discredited the principle further in the Ukrainian political discourse

While some are willing to contemplate an exception for the DNR LNR espe-cially in neighbouring regions like the Kyiv-controlled Donbas the principle of autonomy remains contested In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas about 24 per-cent agree (lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo) that other regions of Ukraine should have the right to a degree of autonomy 39 percent disagree (among them 30 percent disagree strongly) and 37 percent are undecided or indifferent

By comparison the respondents based in the DNR LNR are consistent in their views about autonomy claiming the right to a special status not only for them-selves but also for other regions of Ukraine This discrepancy suggests a mobi-lizing effect through the regionrsquos experience over the last three years of war A majority of 61 percent of the survey respondents in the DNR LNR strongly or rather agree with the principle of giving other regions in Ukraine a degree of autonomy while 23 percent are opposed (of which 12 percent strongly disa-gree) and only 16 percent are undecided or indifferent The latter figures in particular indicate that the issue of autonomy is most salient among those who live in the occupied territories the status of which is disputed FIGURE 14

267

350

657

206

50114

26

331

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Special autonomy within UkraineParts of Donetsk and Luhansk

Part of Russia wo autonomySpecial autonomy within Russia

Donbas n=1157 DNRLNR n=1021

In your view what should the status of DNRLNR be

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 13 In your opinion what should the status of DNRthinspthinspLNR be

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1157)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1021)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

13

The Normandy format that has facilitated several ceasefires but has not yet delivered on the political and institutional content of the Minsk II Agreement has become a focal point for the frustration of all the involved parties Never-theless all sides keep reiterating that there is no alternative to the process De-spite the lack of tangible political results this general feeling is shared by the population in both parts of the Donbas 59 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 45 percent of the respondents in the DNR LNR lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo agree with the principles of the Minsk Agreement Just over a third in each case exhibits a neutral attitude and only a very small share of the respondents disagrees with the principles of the Minsk Agree-ment The survey question does not disentangle the different interpretations of the agreement and the steps it lays out but it illustrates an overall endorse-ment of a continuing process FIGURE 15

76

337

155

270

92113

303

119130

54

244

107

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agree Rather agree Rather disagree Strongly disagree Hard to say I donrsquot care

Donbas n=1174 DNRLNR n=1180

Would you agree that other regions in Ukraineshould be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 14Would you agree that other regions in Ukraine should be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1174)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1180)

196237

391

213

359

455

45 4809

47

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Strongly agreeRather agree

Neither agree nor disagreeRather disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=443 DNRLNR n=723

Do you agree with the Minsk Agreement

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 15Do you agree with the Minsk agreement

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp443)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp723)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

14

Trust in political institutions and the media

The level of trust in political leaders and institutions is a broad indicator of political stability and regime legitimacy In a situation of war trust is eroded and in flux depending on the respondentsrsquo location and personal experience Given that the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko is gener-ally unpopular across Ukraine where he is held responsible for a too slow reform process it does not come as a surprise that a vast majority of over 87 percent does not trust the Ukrainian president in Kyiv-controlled Donbas (of which 55 percent do not trust him at all) The distrust in the DNR LNR is even higher with 77 percent not trusting him at all FIGURE 16

The picture is the reverse when it comes to trust in the Russian president Vladimir Putin In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 88 percent do not trust the Russian president This does not come as a surprise but the variation in

554

770

319

164110

4817 18

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=1062 DNRLNR n=1152

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian President

DonbasDNRLNR

712

197 171 15896

282

21

363

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=888 DNRLNR n=1090

How much trust do you have in the Russian President

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 16 How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian president

FIGURE 17 How much trust do you have in the Russian president

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1062)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1152)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp888)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1090)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

15

expressions of trust in the DNR LNR is noteworthy while about 64 percent of the respondents rather or generally trust the Russian president about 36 per-cent do not FIGURE 17

When asked about the Ukrainian mass media a clear majority of about 82 per-cent of the respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 86 percent in the DNR LNR expressed their distrust in the main traditional media outlets Oligarchic ownership structures and the reporting (or absence of reporting) about the war are likely explanations for the overwhelming distrust FIGURE 18 Unsurprisingly the population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas similarly dis-trusts the Russian mass media (94 percent) but in the occupied territories the trust and distrust in the Russian mass media is relatively evenly split with about 46 percent of the respondents trusting and 54 percent not trusting the Russian mass media FIGURE 19

446

628

366

232184

109

0331

020

4060

Perc

ent

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=961 DNRLNR n=1120

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

785

234

150

225

57

338

07

203

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=824 DNRLNR n=1085

How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 18How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

FIGURE 19How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp961)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1120)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp824)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1085)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

16

General attitudes about democracy and the economy are shared across both parts of the Donbas Support for democracy is best described as lukewarm 42 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 39 percent in the occupied territories lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquosomewhatrsquo agree with the statement that democracy is still the best possible form of government while 38 and 37 percent respectively are non-committal and neither agree nor disagree FIGURE 20

123

170

297

218

380 368

108 11392

131

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agreeSomewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagreeSomewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=972 DNRLNR n=1136

Democracy is still the best form of government

DonbasDNRLNR

240276

153113

607 611

020

4060

Perc

ent

Return to socialist economy Leave everything as it is Deepen market reforms

Donbas n=738 DNRLNR n=917

What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 20Democracy is still the best form of government

FIGURE 21 What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp972)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1136)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp738)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp917)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

17

As for their economic views 61 percent of the respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied Donbas voiced their preference for deepening economic reforms thereby expressing a general pro-reform attitude Main-taining the status quo was only the declared preference of 15 percent of respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 11 percent in the DNR LNR The lsquoreturn to a socialist economyrsquo was the preferred choice of 24 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and 28 percent in the occupied terri-tories This response is likely to capture not just a specific ideological view about the socialist economic system but rather a general dissatisfaction with Ukrainersquos transition path FIGURE 21

The combination of a lukewarm position on democracy and a general en-dorsement of further economic reforms in both parts of the Donbas should be seen in connection with a further result namely the self-reported change in the level of political interest as a result of the events over the last three years The trends point in opposite directions across the frontline while respondents in the DNR LNR expressed a noteworthy increase in interest in politics (53 percent compared to only 14 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas) 49 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they were now less interested in politics (compared to 24 percent in the DNR LNR) Thus the experience of war has politicized the population of the DNR LNR much more than their counterpart in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas While Kyiv is confronted with a population that seems to be turning away from national politics the population of the occupied territories has become highly politicized though not in one particular direction FIGURE 22

136

526

373

239

491

235

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

More The same Less

Donbas n=1111 DNRLNR n=1167

Are you now more or less interestedin politics than three years ago

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 22 Are you now more or less interested in politics than three years ago

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1167)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

18

Foreign policy orientation

In terms of foreign policy orientation the two parts of the divided Donbas are more similar than one might think while NATO membership was re-jected outright as could be expected by the vast majority in both parts the widespread negative views of the EU in the Donbas might come as a sur-prise 72 percent of respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 82 percent in the self-declared republics are against Ukraine joining the EU FIGURES 23thinsp+thinsp24 While support for the EU in view of a slow reform pro-cess and the inability of Western actors to end the war has cooled off again across Ukraine according to recent polls there has generally been support above 50 percent for EU membership in recent years Thus with regard to the Ukrainian governmentrsquos declared objective of aligning its reform pro-cess with the EU the Donbas is being left behind

279

182

721

818

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=867 DNRLNR n=1063

Should Ukraine join the EU

DonbasDNRLNR

175

69

825

931

020

4060

8010

0Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=928 DNRLNR n=1092

Should Ukraine join the NATO

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 23Should Ukraine join the EU

FIGURE 24 Should Ukraine join the NATO

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp867)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1063)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp928)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1092)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

19

Conclusion

The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities whether rooted in ethnicity native language language use or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and in some cases this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience

On foreign policy issues both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline On the issue of EU membership the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centrersquos main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions Similarly support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR LNR

Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian Western and Russian policy-makers should take note of For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR LNR In line with the local sentiments international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR LNR

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

8

When we trace in more detail the shifts between self-reported identity catego-ries in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas area we find that while self-identification as a Ukrainian citizen remains as the most important identity category from five years ago it is now an identity in flux with respondents also shifting from Ukrainian citizenship to Ukrainian ethnicity or a regional Donbas identity

FIGURES 6thinspndashthinsp8

Survey questions about sbquonative languagersquo tend to tap into sentiments about language as an identity marker rather than actual day to day language practice The majority of respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled Donbas (about 50 percent) and the DNR LNR (about 60 percent) identify Russian as their native language The range of answers to this question did not only list mutually exclusive options as is commonly the case in the national census

FIGURE 6 Donbas (Identity now ethnic Ukrainian) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

FIGURE 7Donbas (Identity now mixed ethnic Ukrainian and Russian) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

56

56

08

40

64

40

08

272

08

448

0 10 20 30 40 50Percent

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Russianminusspeaker

Ukrainianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Russian citizen

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=125

DonbasIdentity now Ethnic Ukrainian

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

78

65

117

13

351

299

26

52

0 10 20 30 40Percent

Russianminusspeaker

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donbas

Dual UkrminusRuss citizenship

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Russian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=77

DonbasIdentity now Mixed ethnic Ukr amp Russ

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

9

and many standard opinion polls but included the option lsquoboth Russian and Ukrainianrsquo which in turn was chosen by 34 percent and 36 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and in the DNR LNR respectively The self-reported relevance of a bilingual identity is compatible with the expres-sions of a mixed Russian-Ukrainian identity whether defined in ethnic or more civic terms in both the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR and the salience of Ukrainian citizenship as the primary identity in the govern-ment-controlled Donbas

There is anecdotal evidence of people adjusting their language identity and or practice in light of their war experience However no significant change was reported by the respondents themselves about a readjustment of their native language FIGURE 9

501

598

160

43

337 358

02 01

020

4060

Perc

ent

Russian Ukrainian Both Russian and Ukrainian Crimean Tatar

Donbas n=1150 DNRLNR n=1198

What language do you consider your native language

DonbasDNRLNR

24

83

71

536

262

12

12

0 20 40 60Percent

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=84

DonbasIdentity now Person from Donbas

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

FIGURE 8 Donbas (Identity now person from Donbas) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 9 What language do you consider your native language

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1150)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1198)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

10

When asked about actual language practice the picture changes somewhat highlighting that survey respondents interpret a question about lsquonative lan-guagersquo differently A majority ndash 53 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 70 percent in the DNR LNR ndash listed Russian as the dominant language spoken at home Furthermore 18 and 10 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR respectively reported an equal language mix of Ukrainian and Russian at home A further 21 and 17 percent respectively said that their main language at home is Russian but that they occasionally speak Ukrainian at home FIGURE 10

Asked about the primary language spoken at work the picture is similar thereby demonstrating that there is congruence between the occupied

2027

764545

119176

71191

1740

0922

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=962 DNRLNR n=1143

Which language do you typically speak at work

DonbasDNRLNR

0221

694528

173206

104184

2240

0621

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=1187 DNRLNR n=1198

Which language do you typically speak at home

DonbasDNRLNR

FIGURE 10 Which language do you typically speak at home

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 11 Which language do you typically speak at work

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp962)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1143)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1187)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1198)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

11

territories and the rest of the Donbas 76 percent list Russian as the main language of communication at work in DNR LNR compared to 55 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 19 and 7 percent respectively report an equal use of Russian and Ukrainian at work An additional 18 and 12 percent re-spectively said that they speak above all Russian and occasionally Ukrain-ian Both at home and at work the use of Ukrainian alone is negligible (max 2 percent) FIGURE 11

Views on the war and the status of the region

Views on the origins of the war are more similar across the two parts of the Donbas than one might expect The respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are split in their assessment 37 percent blame the outbreak of war on Russia and 10 percent on Ukraine a surprising 30 percent think it was the result of Western intervention and 23 percent see it as a local reaction against the Kyiv government With the exception of the perceived role of Russia the views in the occupied territories are rather similar 50 percent think the war resulted from Western intervention 30 percent see it as a lo-cal reaction against the national government 11 percent blame it on Ukraine and 9 percent on Russia FIGURE 12

However the preferences regarding the future status of the occupied ter-ritories diverge significantly While in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas a clear majority (65 percent) wants them to be part of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast without a special status 26 percent deem a special status within Ukraine necessary and about 9 percent see the future of these territories in Rus-sia The views of the population in the self-declared republics are more di-verse than one might have expected 21 percent want this area to be part of Ukraine without a special status and 35 percent prefer a special status for these territories inside Ukraine Conversely 11 percent want to see the territories as part of Russia without a special status and 33 percent would

304

503

371

92 95 113

231

292

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Result of Western interventionCaused by Russia

Caused by UkraineLocal reaction against nat govt

Donbas n=863 DNRLNR n=1047

Which statement is closestto your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 12 Which statement is closest to your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp863)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1047)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

12

prefer a special status inside Russia Thus the main emphasis among the re-spondents in the DNR LNR is on the recognition of the special status of the territories while there is an even split between those who see this area as part of Ukraine or Russia FIGURE 13

The survey results also indicate that the current experience shapes attitudes about autonomy in the rest of the country Generally the experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia all organized as federations at least on paper has made East Europeans politicians and soci-eties sceptical of federalism The fact that Russia the only socialist-era fed-eration that survived the breakup of the USSR thanks to formal and informal institutional adjustments has advocated federalism for Ukraine during the war in eastern Ukraine has discredited the principle further in the Ukrainian political discourse

While some are willing to contemplate an exception for the DNR LNR espe-cially in neighbouring regions like the Kyiv-controlled Donbas the principle of autonomy remains contested In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas about 24 per-cent agree (lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo) that other regions of Ukraine should have the right to a degree of autonomy 39 percent disagree (among them 30 percent disagree strongly) and 37 percent are undecided or indifferent

By comparison the respondents based in the DNR LNR are consistent in their views about autonomy claiming the right to a special status not only for them-selves but also for other regions of Ukraine This discrepancy suggests a mobi-lizing effect through the regionrsquos experience over the last three years of war A majority of 61 percent of the survey respondents in the DNR LNR strongly or rather agree with the principle of giving other regions in Ukraine a degree of autonomy while 23 percent are opposed (of which 12 percent strongly disa-gree) and only 16 percent are undecided or indifferent The latter figures in particular indicate that the issue of autonomy is most salient among those who live in the occupied territories the status of which is disputed FIGURE 14

267

350

657

206

50114

26

331

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Special autonomy within UkraineParts of Donetsk and Luhansk

Part of Russia wo autonomySpecial autonomy within Russia

Donbas n=1157 DNRLNR n=1021

In your view what should the status of DNRLNR be

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 13 In your opinion what should the status of DNRthinspthinspLNR be

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1157)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1021)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

13

The Normandy format that has facilitated several ceasefires but has not yet delivered on the political and institutional content of the Minsk II Agreement has become a focal point for the frustration of all the involved parties Never-theless all sides keep reiterating that there is no alternative to the process De-spite the lack of tangible political results this general feeling is shared by the population in both parts of the Donbas 59 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 45 percent of the respondents in the DNR LNR lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo agree with the principles of the Minsk Agreement Just over a third in each case exhibits a neutral attitude and only a very small share of the respondents disagrees with the principles of the Minsk Agree-ment The survey question does not disentangle the different interpretations of the agreement and the steps it lays out but it illustrates an overall endorse-ment of a continuing process FIGURE 15

76

337

155

270

92113

303

119130

54

244

107

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agree Rather agree Rather disagree Strongly disagree Hard to say I donrsquot care

Donbas n=1174 DNRLNR n=1180

Would you agree that other regions in Ukraineshould be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 14Would you agree that other regions in Ukraine should be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1174)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1180)

196237

391

213

359

455

45 4809

47

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Strongly agreeRather agree

Neither agree nor disagreeRather disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=443 DNRLNR n=723

Do you agree with the Minsk Agreement

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 15Do you agree with the Minsk agreement

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp443)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp723)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

14

Trust in political institutions and the media

The level of trust in political leaders and institutions is a broad indicator of political stability and regime legitimacy In a situation of war trust is eroded and in flux depending on the respondentsrsquo location and personal experience Given that the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko is gener-ally unpopular across Ukraine where he is held responsible for a too slow reform process it does not come as a surprise that a vast majority of over 87 percent does not trust the Ukrainian president in Kyiv-controlled Donbas (of which 55 percent do not trust him at all) The distrust in the DNR LNR is even higher with 77 percent not trusting him at all FIGURE 16

The picture is the reverse when it comes to trust in the Russian president Vladimir Putin In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 88 percent do not trust the Russian president This does not come as a surprise but the variation in

554

770

319

164110

4817 18

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=1062 DNRLNR n=1152

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian President

DonbasDNRLNR

712

197 171 15896

282

21

363

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=888 DNRLNR n=1090

How much trust do you have in the Russian President

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 16 How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian president

FIGURE 17 How much trust do you have in the Russian president

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1062)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1152)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp888)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1090)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

15

expressions of trust in the DNR LNR is noteworthy while about 64 percent of the respondents rather or generally trust the Russian president about 36 per-cent do not FIGURE 17

When asked about the Ukrainian mass media a clear majority of about 82 per-cent of the respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 86 percent in the DNR LNR expressed their distrust in the main traditional media outlets Oligarchic ownership structures and the reporting (or absence of reporting) about the war are likely explanations for the overwhelming distrust FIGURE 18 Unsurprisingly the population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas similarly dis-trusts the Russian mass media (94 percent) but in the occupied territories the trust and distrust in the Russian mass media is relatively evenly split with about 46 percent of the respondents trusting and 54 percent not trusting the Russian mass media FIGURE 19

446

628

366

232184

109

0331

020

4060

Perc

ent

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=961 DNRLNR n=1120

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

785

234

150

225

57

338

07

203

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=824 DNRLNR n=1085

How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 18How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

FIGURE 19How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp961)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1120)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp824)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1085)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

16

General attitudes about democracy and the economy are shared across both parts of the Donbas Support for democracy is best described as lukewarm 42 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 39 percent in the occupied territories lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquosomewhatrsquo agree with the statement that democracy is still the best possible form of government while 38 and 37 percent respectively are non-committal and neither agree nor disagree FIGURE 20

123

170

297

218

380 368

108 11392

131

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agreeSomewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagreeSomewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=972 DNRLNR n=1136

Democracy is still the best form of government

DonbasDNRLNR

240276

153113

607 611

020

4060

Perc

ent

Return to socialist economy Leave everything as it is Deepen market reforms

Donbas n=738 DNRLNR n=917

What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 20Democracy is still the best form of government

FIGURE 21 What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp972)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1136)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp738)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp917)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

17

As for their economic views 61 percent of the respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied Donbas voiced their preference for deepening economic reforms thereby expressing a general pro-reform attitude Main-taining the status quo was only the declared preference of 15 percent of respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 11 percent in the DNR LNR The lsquoreturn to a socialist economyrsquo was the preferred choice of 24 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and 28 percent in the occupied terri-tories This response is likely to capture not just a specific ideological view about the socialist economic system but rather a general dissatisfaction with Ukrainersquos transition path FIGURE 21

The combination of a lukewarm position on democracy and a general en-dorsement of further economic reforms in both parts of the Donbas should be seen in connection with a further result namely the self-reported change in the level of political interest as a result of the events over the last three years The trends point in opposite directions across the frontline while respondents in the DNR LNR expressed a noteworthy increase in interest in politics (53 percent compared to only 14 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas) 49 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they were now less interested in politics (compared to 24 percent in the DNR LNR) Thus the experience of war has politicized the population of the DNR LNR much more than their counterpart in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas While Kyiv is confronted with a population that seems to be turning away from national politics the population of the occupied territories has become highly politicized though not in one particular direction FIGURE 22

136

526

373

239

491

235

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

More The same Less

Donbas n=1111 DNRLNR n=1167

Are you now more or less interestedin politics than three years ago

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 22 Are you now more or less interested in politics than three years ago

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1167)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

18

Foreign policy orientation

In terms of foreign policy orientation the two parts of the divided Donbas are more similar than one might think while NATO membership was re-jected outright as could be expected by the vast majority in both parts the widespread negative views of the EU in the Donbas might come as a sur-prise 72 percent of respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 82 percent in the self-declared republics are against Ukraine joining the EU FIGURES 23thinsp+thinsp24 While support for the EU in view of a slow reform pro-cess and the inability of Western actors to end the war has cooled off again across Ukraine according to recent polls there has generally been support above 50 percent for EU membership in recent years Thus with regard to the Ukrainian governmentrsquos declared objective of aligning its reform pro-cess with the EU the Donbas is being left behind

279

182

721

818

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=867 DNRLNR n=1063

Should Ukraine join the EU

DonbasDNRLNR

175

69

825

931

020

4060

8010

0Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=928 DNRLNR n=1092

Should Ukraine join the NATO

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 23Should Ukraine join the EU

FIGURE 24 Should Ukraine join the NATO

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp867)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1063)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp928)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1092)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

19

Conclusion

The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities whether rooted in ethnicity native language language use or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and in some cases this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience

On foreign policy issues both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline On the issue of EU membership the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centrersquos main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions Similarly support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR LNR

Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian Western and Russian policy-makers should take note of For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR LNR In line with the local sentiments international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR LNR

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

9

and many standard opinion polls but included the option lsquoboth Russian and Ukrainianrsquo which in turn was chosen by 34 percent and 36 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and in the DNR LNR respectively The self-reported relevance of a bilingual identity is compatible with the expres-sions of a mixed Russian-Ukrainian identity whether defined in ethnic or more civic terms in both the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR and the salience of Ukrainian citizenship as the primary identity in the govern-ment-controlled Donbas

There is anecdotal evidence of people adjusting their language identity and or practice in light of their war experience However no significant change was reported by the respondents themselves about a readjustment of their native language FIGURE 9

501

598

160

43

337 358

02 01

020

4060

Perc

ent

Russian Ukrainian Both Russian and Ukrainian Crimean Tatar

Donbas n=1150 DNRLNR n=1198

What language do you consider your native language

DonbasDNRLNR

24

83

71

536

262

12

12

0 20 40 60Percent

Russianminusspeaking Ukrainian

Person from Luhansk region

Person from Donetsk region

Person from Donbas

Ukrainian citizen

Mixed ethnic UkrainianRussian

Ethnic Ukrainian

n=84

DonbasIdentity now Person from Donbas

Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

FIGURE 8 Donbas (Identity now person from Donbas) Which identity would you have chosen five years ago

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 9 What language do you consider your native language

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1150)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1198)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

10

When asked about actual language practice the picture changes somewhat highlighting that survey respondents interpret a question about lsquonative lan-guagersquo differently A majority ndash 53 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 70 percent in the DNR LNR ndash listed Russian as the dominant language spoken at home Furthermore 18 and 10 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR respectively reported an equal language mix of Ukrainian and Russian at home A further 21 and 17 percent respectively said that their main language at home is Russian but that they occasionally speak Ukrainian at home FIGURE 10

Asked about the primary language spoken at work the picture is similar thereby demonstrating that there is congruence between the occupied

2027

764545

119176

71191

1740

0922

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=962 DNRLNR n=1143

Which language do you typically speak at work

DonbasDNRLNR

0221

694528

173206

104184

2240

0621

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=1187 DNRLNR n=1198

Which language do you typically speak at home

DonbasDNRLNR

FIGURE 10 Which language do you typically speak at home

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 11 Which language do you typically speak at work

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp962)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1143)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1187)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1198)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

11

territories and the rest of the Donbas 76 percent list Russian as the main language of communication at work in DNR LNR compared to 55 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 19 and 7 percent respectively report an equal use of Russian and Ukrainian at work An additional 18 and 12 percent re-spectively said that they speak above all Russian and occasionally Ukrain-ian Both at home and at work the use of Ukrainian alone is negligible (max 2 percent) FIGURE 11

Views on the war and the status of the region

Views on the origins of the war are more similar across the two parts of the Donbas than one might expect The respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are split in their assessment 37 percent blame the outbreak of war on Russia and 10 percent on Ukraine a surprising 30 percent think it was the result of Western intervention and 23 percent see it as a local reaction against the Kyiv government With the exception of the perceived role of Russia the views in the occupied territories are rather similar 50 percent think the war resulted from Western intervention 30 percent see it as a lo-cal reaction against the national government 11 percent blame it on Ukraine and 9 percent on Russia FIGURE 12

However the preferences regarding the future status of the occupied ter-ritories diverge significantly While in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas a clear majority (65 percent) wants them to be part of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast without a special status 26 percent deem a special status within Ukraine necessary and about 9 percent see the future of these territories in Rus-sia The views of the population in the self-declared republics are more di-verse than one might have expected 21 percent want this area to be part of Ukraine without a special status and 35 percent prefer a special status for these territories inside Ukraine Conversely 11 percent want to see the territories as part of Russia without a special status and 33 percent would

304

503

371

92 95 113

231

292

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Result of Western interventionCaused by Russia

Caused by UkraineLocal reaction against nat govt

Donbas n=863 DNRLNR n=1047

Which statement is closestto your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 12 Which statement is closest to your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp863)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1047)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

12

prefer a special status inside Russia Thus the main emphasis among the re-spondents in the DNR LNR is on the recognition of the special status of the territories while there is an even split between those who see this area as part of Ukraine or Russia FIGURE 13

The survey results also indicate that the current experience shapes attitudes about autonomy in the rest of the country Generally the experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia all organized as federations at least on paper has made East Europeans politicians and soci-eties sceptical of federalism The fact that Russia the only socialist-era fed-eration that survived the breakup of the USSR thanks to formal and informal institutional adjustments has advocated federalism for Ukraine during the war in eastern Ukraine has discredited the principle further in the Ukrainian political discourse

While some are willing to contemplate an exception for the DNR LNR espe-cially in neighbouring regions like the Kyiv-controlled Donbas the principle of autonomy remains contested In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas about 24 per-cent agree (lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo) that other regions of Ukraine should have the right to a degree of autonomy 39 percent disagree (among them 30 percent disagree strongly) and 37 percent are undecided or indifferent

By comparison the respondents based in the DNR LNR are consistent in their views about autonomy claiming the right to a special status not only for them-selves but also for other regions of Ukraine This discrepancy suggests a mobi-lizing effect through the regionrsquos experience over the last three years of war A majority of 61 percent of the survey respondents in the DNR LNR strongly or rather agree with the principle of giving other regions in Ukraine a degree of autonomy while 23 percent are opposed (of which 12 percent strongly disa-gree) and only 16 percent are undecided or indifferent The latter figures in particular indicate that the issue of autonomy is most salient among those who live in the occupied territories the status of which is disputed FIGURE 14

267

350

657

206

50114

26

331

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Special autonomy within UkraineParts of Donetsk and Luhansk

Part of Russia wo autonomySpecial autonomy within Russia

Donbas n=1157 DNRLNR n=1021

In your view what should the status of DNRLNR be

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 13 In your opinion what should the status of DNRthinspthinspLNR be

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1157)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1021)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

13

The Normandy format that has facilitated several ceasefires but has not yet delivered on the political and institutional content of the Minsk II Agreement has become a focal point for the frustration of all the involved parties Never-theless all sides keep reiterating that there is no alternative to the process De-spite the lack of tangible political results this general feeling is shared by the population in both parts of the Donbas 59 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 45 percent of the respondents in the DNR LNR lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo agree with the principles of the Minsk Agreement Just over a third in each case exhibits a neutral attitude and only a very small share of the respondents disagrees with the principles of the Minsk Agree-ment The survey question does not disentangle the different interpretations of the agreement and the steps it lays out but it illustrates an overall endorse-ment of a continuing process FIGURE 15

76

337

155

270

92113

303

119130

54

244

107

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agree Rather agree Rather disagree Strongly disagree Hard to say I donrsquot care

Donbas n=1174 DNRLNR n=1180

Would you agree that other regions in Ukraineshould be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 14Would you agree that other regions in Ukraine should be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1174)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1180)

196237

391

213

359

455

45 4809

47

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Strongly agreeRather agree

Neither agree nor disagreeRather disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=443 DNRLNR n=723

Do you agree with the Minsk Agreement

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 15Do you agree with the Minsk agreement

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp443)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp723)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

14

Trust in political institutions and the media

The level of trust in political leaders and institutions is a broad indicator of political stability and regime legitimacy In a situation of war trust is eroded and in flux depending on the respondentsrsquo location and personal experience Given that the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko is gener-ally unpopular across Ukraine where he is held responsible for a too slow reform process it does not come as a surprise that a vast majority of over 87 percent does not trust the Ukrainian president in Kyiv-controlled Donbas (of which 55 percent do not trust him at all) The distrust in the DNR LNR is even higher with 77 percent not trusting him at all FIGURE 16

The picture is the reverse when it comes to trust in the Russian president Vladimir Putin In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 88 percent do not trust the Russian president This does not come as a surprise but the variation in

554

770

319

164110

4817 18

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=1062 DNRLNR n=1152

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian President

DonbasDNRLNR

712

197 171 15896

282

21

363

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=888 DNRLNR n=1090

How much trust do you have in the Russian President

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 16 How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian president

FIGURE 17 How much trust do you have in the Russian president

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1062)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1152)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp888)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1090)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

15

expressions of trust in the DNR LNR is noteworthy while about 64 percent of the respondents rather or generally trust the Russian president about 36 per-cent do not FIGURE 17

When asked about the Ukrainian mass media a clear majority of about 82 per-cent of the respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 86 percent in the DNR LNR expressed their distrust in the main traditional media outlets Oligarchic ownership structures and the reporting (or absence of reporting) about the war are likely explanations for the overwhelming distrust FIGURE 18 Unsurprisingly the population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas similarly dis-trusts the Russian mass media (94 percent) but in the occupied territories the trust and distrust in the Russian mass media is relatively evenly split with about 46 percent of the respondents trusting and 54 percent not trusting the Russian mass media FIGURE 19

446

628

366

232184

109

0331

020

4060

Perc

ent

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=961 DNRLNR n=1120

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

785

234

150

225

57

338

07

203

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=824 DNRLNR n=1085

How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 18How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

FIGURE 19How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp961)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1120)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp824)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1085)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

16

General attitudes about democracy and the economy are shared across both parts of the Donbas Support for democracy is best described as lukewarm 42 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 39 percent in the occupied territories lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquosomewhatrsquo agree with the statement that democracy is still the best possible form of government while 38 and 37 percent respectively are non-committal and neither agree nor disagree FIGURE 20

123

170

297

218

380 368

108 11392

131

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agreeSomewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagreeSomewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=972 DNRLNR n=1136

Democracy is still the best form of government

DonbasDNRLNR

240276

153113

607 611

020

4060

Perc

ent

Return to socialist economy Leave everything as it is Deepen market reforms

Donbas n=738 DNRLNR n=917

What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 20Democracy is still the best form of government

FIGURE 21 What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp972)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1136)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp738)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp917)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

17

As for their economic views 61 percent of the respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied Donbas voiced their preference for deepening economic reforms thereby expressing a general pro-reform attitude Main-taining the status quo was only the declared preference of 15 percent of respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 11 percent in the DNR LNR The lsquoreturn to a socialist economyrsquo was the preferred choice of 24 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and 28 percent in the occupied terri-tories This response is likely to capture not just a specific ideological view about the socialist economic system but rather a general dissatisfaction with Ukrainersquos transition path FIGURE 21

The combination of a lukewarm position on democracy and a general en-dorsement of further economic reforms in both parts of the Donbas should be seen in connection with a further result namely the self-reported change in the level of political interest as a result of the events over the last three years The trends point in opposite directions across the frontline while respondents in the DNR LNR expressed a noteworthy increase in interest in politics (53 percent compared to only 14 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas) 49 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they were now less interested in politics (compared to 24 percent in the DNR LNR) Thus the experience of war has politicized the population of the DNR LNR much more than their counterpart in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas While Kyiv is confronted with a population that seems to be turning away from national politics the population of the occupied territories has become highly politicized though not in one particular direction FIGURE 22

136

526

373

239

491

235

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

More The same Less

Donbas n=1111 DNRLNR n=1167

Are you now more or less interestedin politics than three years ago

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 22 Are you now more or less interested in politics than three years ago

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1167)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

18

Foreign policy orientation

In terms of foreign policy orientation the two parts of the divided Donbas are more similar than one might think while NATO membership was re-jected outright as could be expected by the vast majority in both parts the widespread negative views of the EU in the Donbas might come as a sur-prise 72 percent of respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 82 percent in the self-declared republics are against Ukraine joining the EU FIGURES 23thinsp+thinsp24 While support for the EU in view of a slow reform pro-cess and the inability of Western actors to end the war has cooled off again across Ukraine according to recent polls there has generally been support above 50 percent for EU membership in recent years Thus with regard to the Ukrainian governmentrsquos declared objective of aligning its reform pro-cess with the EU the Donbas is being left behind

279

182

721

818

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=867 DNRLNR n=1063

Should Ukraine join the EU

DonbasDNRLNR

175

69

825

931

020

4060

8010

0Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=928 DNRLNR n=1092

Should Ukraine join the NATO

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 23Should Ukraine join the EU

FIGURE 24 Should Ukraine join the NATO

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp867)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1063)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp928)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1092)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

19

Conclusion

The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities whether rooted in ethnicity native language language use or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and in some cases this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience

On foreign policy issues both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline On the issue of EU membership the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centrersquos main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions Similarly support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR LNR

Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian Western and Russian policy-makers should take note of For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR LNR In line with the local sentiments international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR LNR

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

10

When asked about actual language practice the picture changes somewhat highlighting that survey respondents interpret a question about lsquonative lan-guagersquo differently A majority ndash 53 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 70 percent in the DNR LNR ndash listed Russian as the dominant language spoken at home Furthermore 18 and 10 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR LNR respectively reported an equal language mix of Ukrainian and Russian at home A further 21 and 17 percent respectively said that their main language at home is Russian but that they occasionally speak Ukrainian at home FIGURE 10

Asked about the primary language spoken at work the picture is similar thereby demonstrating that there is congruence between the occupied

2027

764545

119176

71191

1740

0922

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=962 DNRLNR n=1143

Which language do you typically speak at work

DonbasDNRLNR

0221

694528

173206

104184

2240

0621

0 20 40 60 80Percent

Other

Only Russian

Mainly Russ occasionally Ukr

Equally Ukr and Russ

Mostly Ukr occasionally Russ

Only Ukrainian

Donbas n=1187 DNRLNR n=1198

Which language do you typically speak at home

DonbasDNRLNR

FIGURE 10 Which language do you typically speak at home

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 11 Which language do you typically speak at work

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp962)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1143)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1187)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1198)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

11

territories and the rest of the Donbas 76 percent list Russian as the main language of communication at work in DNR LNR compared to 55 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 19 and 7 percent respectively report an equal use of Russian and Ukrainian at work An additional 18 and 12 percent re-spectively said that they speak above all Russian and occasionally Ukrain-ian Both at home and at work the use of Ukrainian alone is negligible (max 2 percent) FIGURE 11

Views on the war and the status of the region

Views on the origins of the war are more similar across the two parts of the Donbas than one might expect The respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are split in their assessment 37 percent blame the outbreak of war on Russia and 10 percent on Ukraine a surprising 30 percent think it was the result of Western intervention and 23 percent see it as a local reaction against the Kyiv government With the exception of the perceived role of Russia the views in the occupied territories are rather similar 50 percent think the war resulted from Western intervention 30 percent see it as a lo-cal reaction against the national government 11 percent blame it on Ukraine and 9 percent on Russia FIGURE 12

However the preferences regarding the future status of the occupied ter-ritories diverge significantly While in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas a clear majority (65 percent) wants them to be part of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast without a special status 26 percent deem a special status within Ukraine necessary and about 9 percent see the future of these territories in Rus-sia The views of the population in the self-declared republics are more di-verse than one might have expected 21 percent want this area to be part of Ukraine without a special status and 35 percent prefer a special status for these territories inside Ukraine Conversely 11 percent want to see the territories as part of Russia without a special status and 33 percent would

304

503

371

92 95 113

231

292

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Result of Western interventionCaused by Russia

Caused by UkraineLocal reaction against nat govt

Donbas n=863 DNRLNR n=1047

Which statement is closestto your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 12 Which statement is closest to your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp863)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1047)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

12

prefer a special status inside Russia Thus the main emphasis among the re-spondents in the DNR LNR is on the recognition of the special status of the territories while there is an even split between those who see this area as part of Ukraine or Russia FIGURE 13

The survey results also indicate that the current experience shapes attitudes about autonomy in the rest of the country Generally the experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia all organized as federations at least on paper has made East Europeans politicians and soci-eties sceptical of federalism The fact that Russia the only socialist-era fed-eration that survived the breakup of the USSR thanks to formal and informal institutional adjustments has advocated federalism for Ukraine during the war in eastern Ukraine has discredited the principle further in the Ukrainian political discourse

While some are willing to contemplate an exception for the DNR LNR espe-cially in neighbouring regions like the Kyiv-controlled Donbas the principle of autonomy remains contested In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas about 24 per-cent agree (lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo) that other regions of Ukraine should have the right to a degree of autonomy 39 percent disagree (among them 30 percent disagree strongly) and 37 percent are undecided or indifferent

By comparison the respondents based in the DNR LNR are consistent in their views about autonomy claiming the right to a special status not only for them-selves but also for other regions of Ukraine This discrepancy suggests a mobi-lizing effect through the regionrsquos experience over the last three years of war A majority of 61 percent of the survey respondents in the DNR LNR strongly or rather agree with the principle of giving other regions in Ukraine a degree of autonomy while 23 percent are opposed (of which 12 percent strongly disa-gree) and only 16 percent are undecided or indifferent The latter figures in particular indicate that the issue of autonomy is most salient among those who live in the occupied territories the status of which is disputed FIGURE 14

267

350

657

206

50114

26

331

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Special autonomy within UkraineParts of Donetsk and Luhansk

Part of Russia wo autonomySpecial autonomy within Russia

Donbas n=1157 DNRLNR n=1021

In your view what should the status of DNRLNR be

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 13 In your opinion what should the status of DNRthinspthinspLNR be

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1157)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1021)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

13

The Normandy format that has facilitated several ceasefires but has not yet delivered on the political and institutional content of the Minsk II Agreement has become a focal point for the frustration of all the involved parties Never-theless all sides keep reiterating that there is no alternative to the process De-spite the lack of tangible political results this general feeling is shared by the population in both parts of the Donbas 59 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 45 percent of the respondents in the DNR LNR lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo agree with the principles of the Minsk Agreement Just over a third in each case exhibits a neutral attitude and only a very small share of the respondents disagrees with the principles of the Minsk Agree-ment The survey question does not disentangle the different interpretations of the agreement and the steps it lays out but it illustrates an overall endorse-ment of a continuing process FIGURE 15

76

337

155

270

92113

303

119130

54

244

107

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agree Rather agree Rather disagree Strongly disagree Hard to say I donrsquot care

Donbas n=1174 DNRLNR n=1180

Would you agree that other regions in Ukraineshould be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 14Would you agree that other regions in Ukraine should be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1174)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1180)

196237

391

213

359

455

45 4809

47

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Strongly agreeRather agree

Neither agree nor disagreeRather disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=443 DNRLNR n=723

Do you agree with the Minsk Agreement

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 15Do you agree with the Minsk agreement

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp443)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp723)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

14

Trust in political institutions and the media

The level of trust in political leaders and institutions is a broad indicator of political stability and regime legitimacy In a situation of war trust is eroded and in flux depending on the respondentsrsquo location and personal experience Given that the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko is gener-ally unpopular across Ukraine where he is held responsible for a too slow reform process it does not come as a surprise that a vast majority of over 87 percent does not trust the Ukrainian president in Kyiv-controlled Donbas (of which 55 percent do not trust him at all) The distrust in the DNR LNR is even higher with 77 percent not trusting him at all FIGURE 16

The picture is the reverse when it comes to trust in the Russian president Vladimir Putin In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 88 percent do not trust the Russian president This does not come as a surprise but the variation in

554

770

319

164110

4817 18

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=1062 DNRLNR n=1152

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian President

DonbasDNRLNR

712

197 171 15896

282

21

363

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=888 DNRLNR n=1090

How much trust do you have in the Russian President

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 16 How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian president

FIGURE 17 How much trust do you have in the Russian president

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1062)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1152)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp888)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1090)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

15

expressions of trust in the DNR LNR is noteworthy while about 64 percent of the respondents rather or generally trust the Russian president about 36 per-cent do not FIGURE 17

When asked about the Ukrainian mass media a clear majority of about 82 per-cent of the respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 86 percent in the DNR LNR expressed their distrust in the main traditional media outlets Oligarchic ownership structures and the reporting (or absence of reporting) about the war are likely explanations for the overwhelming distrust FIGURE 18 Unsurprisingly the population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas similarly dis-trusts the Russian mass media (94 percent) but in the occupied territories the trust and distrust in the Russian mass media is relatively evenly split with about 46 percent of the respondents trusting and 54 percent not trusting the Russian mass media FIGURE 19

446

628

366

232184

109

0331

020

4060

Perc

ent

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=961 DNRLNR n=1120

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

785

234

150

225

57

338

07

203

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=824 DNRLNR n=1085

How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 18How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

FIGURE 19How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp961)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1120)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp824)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1085)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

16

General attitudes about democracy and the economy are shared across both parts of the Donbas Support for democracy is best described as lukewarm 42 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 39 percent in the occupied territories lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquosomewhatrsquo agree with the statement that democracy is still the best possible form of government while 38 and 37 percent respectively are non-committal and neither agree nor disagree FIGURE 20

123

170

297

218

380 368

108 11392

131

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agreeSomewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagreeSomewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=972 DNRLNR n=1136

Democracy is still the best form of government

DonbasDNRLNR

240276

153113

607 611

020

4060

Perc

ent

Return to socialist economy Leave everything as it is Deepen market reforms

Donbas n=738 DNRLNR n=917

What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 20Democracy is still the best form of government

FIGURE 21 What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp972)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1136)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp738)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp917)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

17

As for their economic views 61 percent of the respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied Donbas voiced their preference for deepening economic reforms thereby expressing a general pro-reform attitude Main-taining the status quo was only the declared preference of 15 percent of respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 11 percent in the DNR LNR The lsquoreturn to a socialist economyrsquo was the preferred choice of 24 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and 28 percent in the occupied terri-tories This response is likely to capture not just a specific ideological view about the socialist economic system but rather a general dissatisfaction with Ukrainersquos transition path FIGURE 21

The combination of a lukewarm position on democracy and a general en-dorsement of further economic reforms in both parts of the Donbas should be seen in connection with a further result namely the self-reported change in the level of political interest as a result of the events over the last three years The trends point in opposite directions across the frontline while respondents in the DNR LNR expressed a noteworthy increase in interest in politics (53 percent compared to only 14 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas) 49 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they were now less interested in politics (compared to 24 percent in the DNR LNR) Thus the experience of war has politicized the population of the DNR LNR much more than their counterpart in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas While Kyiv is confronted with a population that seems to be turning away from national politics the population of the occupied territories has become highly politicized though not in one particular direction FIGURE 22

136

526

373

239

491

235

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

More The same Less

Donbas n=1111 DNRLNR n=1167

Are you now more or less interestedin politics than three years ago

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 22 Are you now more or less interested in politics than three years ago

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1167)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

18

Foreign policy orientation

In terms of foreign policy orientation the two parts of the divided Donbas are more similar than one might think while NATO membership was re-jected outright as could be expected by the vast majority in both parts the widespread negative views of the EU in the Donbas might come as a sur-prise 72 percent of respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 82 percent in the self-declared republics are against Ukraine joining the EU FIGURES 23thinsp+thinsp24 While support for the EU in view of a slow reform pro-cess and the inability of Western actors to end the war has cooled off again across Ukraine according to recent polls there has generally been support above 50 percent for EU membership in recent years Thus with regard to the Ukrainian governmentrsquos declared objective of aligning its reform pro-cess with the EU the Donbas is being left behind

279

182

721

818

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=867 DNRLNR n=1063

Should Ukraine join the EU

DonbasDNRLNR

175

69

825

931

020

4060

8010

0Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=928 DNRLNR n=1092

Should Ukraine join the NATO

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 23Should Ukraine join the EU

FIGURE 24 Should Ukraine join the NATO

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp867)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1063)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp928)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1092)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

19

Conclusion

The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities whether rooted in ethnicity native language language use or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and in some cases this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience

On foreign policy issues both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline On the issue of EU membership the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centrersquos main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions Similarly support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR LNR

Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian Western and Russian policy-makers should take note of For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR LNR In line with the local sentiments international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR LNR

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

11

territories and the rest of the Donbas 76 percent list Russian as the main language of communication at work in DNR LNR compared to 55 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 19 and 7 percent respectively report an equal use of Russian and Ukrainian at work An additional 18 and 12 percent re-spectively said that they speak above all Russian and occasionally Ukrain-ian Both at home and at work the use of Ukrainian alone is negligible (max 2 percent) FIGURE 11

Views on the war and the status of the region

Views on the origins of the war are more similar across the two parts of the Donbas than one might expect The respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are split in their assessment 37 percent blame the outbreak of war on Russia and 10 percent on Ukraine a surprising 30 percent think it was the result of Western intervention and 23 percent see it as a local reaction against the Kyiv government With the exception of the perceived role of Russia the views in the occupied territories are rather similar 50 percent think the war resulted from Western intervention 30 percent see it as a lo-cal reaction against the national government 11 percent blame it on Ukraine and 9 percent on Russia FIGURE 12

However the preferences regarding the future status of the occupied ter-ritories diverge significantly While in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas a clear majority (65 percent) wants them to be part of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast without a special status 26 percent deem a special status within Ukraine necessary and about 9 percent see the future of these territories in Rus-sia The views of the population in the self-declared republics are more di-verse than one might have expected 21 percent want this area to be part of Ukraine without a special status and 35 percent prefer a special status for these territories inside Ukraine Conversely 11 percent want to see the territories as part of Russia without a special status and 33 percent would

304

503

371

92 95 113

231

292

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Result of Western interventionCaused by Russia

Caused by UkraineLocal reaction against nat govt

Donbas n=863 DNRLNR n=1047

Which statement is closestto your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 12 Which statement is closest to your opinion about the conflict in Donbas

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp863)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1047)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

12

prefer a special status inside Russia Thus the main emphasis among the re-spondents in the DNR LNR is on the recognition of the special status of the territories while there is an even split between those who see this area as part of Ukraine or Russia FIGURE 13

The survey results also indicate that the current experience shapes attitudes about autonomy in the rest of the country Generally the experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia all organized as federations at least on paper has made East Europeans politicians and soci-eties sceptical of federalism The fact that Russia the only socialist-era fed-eration that survived the breakup of the USSR thanks to formal and informal institutional adjustments has advocated federalism for Ukraine during the war in eastern Ukraine has discredited the principle further in the Ukrainian political discourse

While some are willing to contemplate an exception for the DNR LNR espe-cially in neighbouring regions like the Kyiv-controlled Donbas the principle of autonomy remains contested In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas about 24 per-cent agree (lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo) that other regions of Ukraine should have the right to a degree of autonomy 39 percent disagree (among them 30 percent disagree strongly) and 37 percent are undecided or indifferent

By comparison the respondents based in the DNR LNR are consistent in their views about autonomy claiming the right to a special status not only for them-selves but also for other regions of Ukraine This discrepancy suggests a mobi-lizing effect through the regionrsquos experience over the last three years of war A majority of 61 percent of the survey respondents in the DNR LNR strongly or rather agree with the principle of giving other regions in Ukraine a degree of autonomy while 23 percent are opposed (of which 12 percent strongly disa-gree) and only 16 percent are undecided or indifferent The latter figures in particular indicate that the issue of autonomy is most salient among those who live in the occupied territories the status of which is disputed FIGURE 14

267

350

657

206

50114

26

331

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Special autonomy within UkraineParts of Donetsk and Luhansk

Part of Russia wo autonomySpecial autonomy within Russia

Donbas n=1157 DNRLNR n=1021

In your view what should the status of DNRLNR be

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 13 In your opinion what should the status of DNRthinspthinspLNR be

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1157)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1021)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

13

The Normandy format that has facilitated several ceasefires but has not yet delivered on the political and institutional content of the Minsk II Agreement has become a focal point for the frustration of all the involved parties Never-theless all sides keep reiterating that there is no alternative to the process De-spite the lack of tangible political results this general feeling is shared by the population in both parts of the Donbas 59 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 45 percent of the respondents in the DNR LNR lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo agree with the principles of the Minsk Agreement Just over a third in each case exhibits a neutral attitude and only a very small share of the respondents disagrees with the principles of the Minsk Agree-ment The survey question does not disentangle the different interpretations of the agreement and the steps it lays out but it illustrates an overall endorse-ment of a continuing process FIGURE 15

76

337

155

270

92113

303

119130

54

244

107

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agree Rather agree Rather disagree Strongly disagree Hard to say I donrsquot care

Donbas n=1174 DNRLNR n=1180

Would you agree that other regions in Ukraineshould be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 14Would you agree that other regions in Ukraine should be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1174)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1180)

196237

391

213

359

455

45 4809

47

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Strongly agreeRather agree

Neither agree nor disagreeRather disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=443 DNRLNR n=723

Do you agree with the Minsk Agreement

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 15Do you agree with the Minsk agreement

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp443)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp723)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

14

Trust in political institutions and the media

The level of trust in political leaders and institutions is a broad indicator of political stability and regime legitimacy In a situation of war trust is eroded and in flux depending on the respondentsrsquo location and personal experience Given that the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko is gener-ally unpopular across Ukraine where he is held responsible for a too slow reform process it does not come as a surprise that a vast majority of over 87 percent does not trust the Ukrainian president in Kyiv-controlled Donbas (of which 55 percent do not trust him at all) The distrust in the DNR LNR is even higher with 77 percent not trusting him at all FIGURE 16

The picture is the reverse when it comes to trust in the Russian president Vladimir Putin In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 88 percent do not trust the Russian president This does not come as a surprise but the variation in

554

770

319

164110

4817 18

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=1062 DNRLNR n=1152

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian President

DonbasDNRLNR

712

197 171 15896

282

21

363

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=888 DNRLNR n=1090

How much trust do you have in the Russian President

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 16 How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian president

FIGURE 17 How much trust do you have in the Russian president

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1062)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1152)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp888)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1090)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

15

expressions of trust in the DNR LNR is noteworthy while about 64 percent of the respondents rather or generally trust the Russian president about 36 per-cent do not FIGURE 17

When asked about the Ukrainian mass media a clear majority of about 82 per-cent of the respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 86 percent in the DNR LNR expressed their distrust in the main traditional media outlets Oligarchic ownership structures and the reporting (or absence of reporting) about the war are likely explanations for the overwhelming distrust FIGURE 18 Unsurprisingly the population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas similarly dis-trusts the Russian mass media (94 percent) but in the occupied territories the trust and distrust in the Russian mass media is relatively evenly split with about 46 percent of the respondents trusting and 54 percent not trusting the Russian mass media FIGURE 19

446

628

366

232184

109

0331

020

4060

Perc

ent

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=961 DNRLNR n=1120

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

785

234

150

225

57

338

07

203

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=824 DNRLNR n=1085

How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 18How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

FIGURE 19How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp961)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1120)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp824)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1085)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

16

General attitudes about democracy and the economy are shared across both parts of the Donbas Support for democracy is best described as lukewarm 42 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 39 percent in the occupied territories lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquosomewhatrsquo agree with the statement that democracy is still the best possible form of government while 38 and 37 percent respectively are non-committal and neither agree nor disagree FIGURE 20

123

170

297

218

380 368

108 11392

131

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agreeSomewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagreeSomewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=972 DNRLNR n=1136

Democracy is still the best form of government

DonbasDNRLNR

240276

153113

607 611

020

4060

Perc

ent

Return to socialist economy Leave everything as it is Deepen market reforms

Donbas n=738 DNRLNR n=917

What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 20Democracy is still the best form of government

FIGURE 21 What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp972)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1136)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp738)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp917)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

17

As for their economic views 61 percent of the respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied Donbas voiced their preference for deepening economic reforms thereby expressing a general pro-reform attitude Main-taining the status quo was only the declared preference of 15 percent of respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 11 percent in the DNR LNR The lsquoreturn to a socialist economyrsquo was the preferred choice of 24 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and 28 percent in the occupied terri-tories This response is likely to capture not just a specific ideological view about the socialist economic system but rather a general dissatisfaction with Ukrainersquos transition path FIGURE 21

The combination of a lukewarm position on democracy and a general en-dorsement of further economic reforms in both parts of the Donbas should be seen in connection with a further result namely the self-reported change in the level of political interest as a result of the events over the last three years The trends point in opposite directions across the frontline while respondents in the DNR LNR expressed a noteworthy increase in interest in politics (53 percent compared to only 14 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas) 49 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they were now less interested in politics (compared to 24 percent in the DNR LNR) Thus the experience of war has politicized the population of the DNR LNR much more than their counterpart in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas While Kyiv is confronted with a population that seems to be turning away from national politics the population of the occupied territories has become highly politicized though not in one particular direction FIGURE 22

136

526

373

239

491

235

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

More The same Less

Donbas n=1111 DNRLNR n=1167

Are you now more or less interestedin politics than three years ago

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 22 Are you now more or less interested in politics than three years ago

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1167)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

18

Foreign policy orientation

In terms of foreign policy orientation the two parts of the divided Donbas are more similar than one might think while NATO membership was re-jected outright as could be expected by the vast majority in both parts the widespread negative views of the EU in the Donbas might come as a sur-prise 72 percent of respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 82 percent in the self-declared republics are against Ukraine joining the EU FIGURES 23thinsp+thinsp24 While support for the EU in view of a slow reform pro-cess and the inability of Western actors to end the war has cooled off again across Ukraine according to recent polls there has generally been support above 50 percent for EU membership in recent years Thus with regard to the Ukrainian governmentrsquos declared objective of aligning its reform pro-cess with the EU the Donbas is being left behind

279

182

721

818

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=867 DNRLNR n=1063

Should Ukraine join the EU

DonbasDNRLNR

175

69

825

931

020

4060

8010

0Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=928 DNRLNR n=1092

Should Ukraine join the NATO

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 23Should Ukraine join the EU

FIGURE 24 Should Ukraine join the NATO

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp867)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1063)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp928)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1092)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

19

Conclusion

The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities whether rooted in ethnicity native language language use or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and in some cases this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience

On foreign policy issues both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline On the issue of EU membership the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centrersquos main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions Similarly support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR LNR

Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian Western and Russian policy-makers should take note of For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR LNR In line with the local sentiments international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR LNR

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

12

prefer a special status inside Russia Thus the main emphasis among the re-spondents in the DNR LNR is on the recognition of the special status of the territories while there is an even split between those who see this area as part of Ukraine or Russia FIGURE 13

The survey results also indicate that the current experience shapes attitudes about autonomy in the rest of the country Generally the experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia all organized as federations at least on paper has made East Europeans politicians and soci-eties sceptical of federalism The fact that Russia the only socialist-era fed-eration that survived the breakup of the USSR thanks to formal and informal institutional adjustments has advocated federalism for Ukraine during the war in eastern Ukraine has discredited the principle further in the Ukrainian political discourse

While some are willing to contemplate an exception for the DNR LNR espe-cially in neighbouring regions like the Kyiv-controlled Donbas the principle of autonomy remains contested In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas about 24 per-cent agree (lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo) that other regions of Ukraine should have the right to a degree of autonomy 39 percent disagree (among them 30 percent disagree strongly) and 37 percent are undecided or indifferent

By comparison the respondents based in the DNR LNR are consistent in their views about autonomy claiming the right to a special status not only for them-selves but also for other regions of Ukraine This discrepancy suggests a mobi-lizing effect through the regionrsquos experience over the last three years of war A majority of 61 percent of the survey respondents in the DNR LNR strongly or rather agree with the principle of giving other regions in Ukraine a degree of autonomy while 23 percent are opposed (of which 12 percent strongly disa-gree) and only 16 percent are undecided or indifferent The latter figures in particular indicate that the issue of autonomy is most salient among those who live in the occupied territories the status of which is disputed FIGURE 14

267

350

657

206

50114

26

331

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Special autonomy within UkraineParts of Donetsk and Luhansk

Part of Russia wo autonomySpecial autonomy within Russia

Donbas n=1157 DNRLNR n=1021

In your view what should the status of DNRLNR be

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 13 In your opinion what should the status of DNRthinspthinspLNR be

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1157)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1021)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

13

The Normandy format that has facilitated several ceasefires but has not yet delivered on the political and institutional content of the Minsk II Agreement has become a focal point for the frustration of all the involved parties Never-theless all sides keep reiterating that there is no alternative to the process De-spite the lack of tangible political results this general feeling is shared by the population in both parts of the Donbas 59 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 45 percent of the respondents in the DNR LNR lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo agree with the principles of the Minsk Agreement Just over a third in each case exhibits a neutral attitude and only a very small share of the respondents disagrees with the principles of the Minsk Agree-ment The survey question does not disentangle the different interpretations of the agreement and the steps it lays out but it illustrates an overall endorse-ment of a continuing process FIGURE 15

76

337

155

270

92113

303

119130

54

244

107

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agree Rather agree Rather disagree Strongly disagree Hard to say I donrsquot care

Donbas n=1174 DNRLNR n=1180

Would you agree that other regions in Ukraineshould be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 14Would you agree that other regions in Ukraine should be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1174)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1180)

196237

391

213

359

455

45 4809

47

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Strongly agreeRather agree

Neither agree nor disagreeRather disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=443 DNRLNR n=723

Do you agree with the Minsk Agreement

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 15Do you agree with the Minsk agreement

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp443)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp723)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

14

Trust in political institutions and the media

The level of trust in political leaders and institutions is a broad indicator of political stability and regime legitimacy In a situation of war trust is eroded and in flux depending on the respondentsrsquo location and personal experience Given that the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko is gener-ally unpopular across Ukraine where he is held responsible for a too slow reform process it does not come as a surprise that a vast majority of over 87 percent does not trust the Ukrainian president in Kyiv-controlled Donbas (of which 55 percent do not trust him at all) The distrust in the DNR LNR is even higher with 77 percent not trusting him at all FIGURE 16

The picture is the reverse when it comes to trust in the Russian president Vladimir Putin In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 88 percent do not trust the Russian president This does not come as a surprise but the variation in

554

770

319

164110

4817 18

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=1062 DNRLNR n=1152

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian President

DonbasDNRLNR

712

197 171 15896

282

21

363

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=888 DNRLNR n=1090

How much trust do you have in the Russian President

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 16 How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian president

FIGURE 17 How much trust do you have in the Russian president

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1062)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1152)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp888)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1090)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

15

expressions of trust in the DNR LNR is noteworthy while about 64 percent of the respondents rather or generally trust the Russian president about 36 per-cent do not FIGURE 17

When asked about the Ukrainian mass media a clear majority of about 82 per-cent of the respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 86 percent in the DNR LNR expressed their distrust in the main traditional media outlets Oligarchic ownership structures and the reporting (or absence of reporting) about the war are likely explanations for the overwhelming distrust FIGURE 18 Unsurprisingly the population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas similarly dis-trusts the Russian mass media (94 percent) but in the occupied territories the trust and distrust in the Russian mass media is relatively evenly split with about 46 percent of the respondents trusting and 54 percent not trusting the Russian mass media FIGURE 19

446

628

366

232184

109

0331

020

4060

Perc

ent

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=961 DNRLNR n=1120

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

785

234

150

225

57

338

07

203

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=824 DNRLNR n=1085

How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 18How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

FIGURE 19How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp961)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1120)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp824)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1085)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

16

General attitudes about democracy and the economy are shared across both parts of the Donbas Support for democracy is best described as lukewarm 42 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 39 percent in the occupied territories lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquosomewhatrsquo agree with the statement that democracy is still the best possible form of government while 38 and 37 percent respectively are non-committal and neither agree nor disagree FIGURE 20

123

170

297

218

380 368

108 11392

131

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agreeSomewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagreeSomewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=972 DNRLNR n=1136

Democracy is still the best form of government

DonbasDNRLNR

240276

153113

607 611

020

4060

Perc

ent

Return to socialist economy Leave everything as it is Deepen market reforms

Donbas n=738 DNRLNR n=917

What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 20Democracy is still the best form of government

FIGURE 21 What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp972)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1136)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp738)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp917)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

17

As for their economic views 61 percent of the respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied Donbas voiced their preference for deepening economic reforms thereby expressing a general pro-reform attitude Main-taining the status quo was only the declared preference of 15 percent of respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 11 percent in the DNR LNR The lsquoreturn to a socialist economyrsquo was the preferred choice of 24 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and 28 percent in the occupied terri-tories This response is likely to capture not just a specific ideological view about the socialist economic system but rather a general dissatisfaction with Ukrainersquos transition path FIGURE 21

The combination of a lukewarm position on democracy and a general en-dorsement of further economic reforms in both parts of the Donbas should be seen in connection with a further result namely the self-reported change in the level of political interest as a result of the events over the last three years The trends point in opposite directions across the frontline while respondents in the DNR LNR expressed a noteworthy increase in interest in politics (53 percent compared to only 14 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas) 49 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they were now less interested in politics (compared to 24 percent in the DNR LNR) Thus the experience of war has politicized the population of the DNR LNR much more than their counterpart in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas While Kyiv is confronted with a population that seems to be turning away from national politics the population of the occupied territories has become highly politicized though not in one particular direction FIGURE 22

136

526

373

239

491

235

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

More The same Less

Donbas n=1111 DNRLNR n=1167

Are you now more or less interestedin politics than three years ago

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 22 Are you now more or less interested in politics than three years ago

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1167)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

18

Foreign policy orientation

In terms of foreign policy orientation the two parts of the divided Donbas are more similar than one might think while NATO membership was re-jected outright as could be expected by the vast majority in both parts the widespread negative views of the EU in the Donbas might come as a sur-prise 72 percent of respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 82 percent in the self-declared republics are against Ukraine joining the EU FIGURES 23thinsp+thinsp24 While support for the EU in view of a slow reform pro-cess and the inability of Western actors to end the war has cooled off again across Ukraine according to recent polls there has generally been support above 50 percent for EU membership in recent years Thus with regard to the Ukrainian governmentrsquos declared objective of aligning its reform pro-cess with the EU the Donbas is being left behind

279

182

721

818

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=867 DNRLNR n=1063

Should Ukraine join the EU

DonbasDNRLNR

175

69

825

931

020

4060

8010

0Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=928 DNRLNR n=1092

Should Ukraine join the NATO

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 23Should Ukraine join the EU

FIGURE 24 Should Ukraine join the NATO

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp867)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1063)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp928)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1092)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

19

Conclusion

The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities whether rooted in ethnicity native language language use or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and in some cases this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience

On foreign policy issues both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline On the issue of EU membership the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centrersquos main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions Similarly support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR LNR

Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian Western and Russian policy-makers should take note of For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR LNR In line with the local sentiments international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR LNR

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

13

The Normandy format that has facilitated several ceasefires but has not yet delivered on the political and institutional content of the Minsk II Agreement has become a focal point for the frustration of all the involved parties Never-theless all sides keep reiterating that there is no alternative to the process De-spite the lack of tangible political results this general feeling is shared by the population in both parts of the Donbas 59 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 45 percent of the respondents in the DNR LNR lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquoratherrsquo agree with the principles of the Minsk Agreement Just over a third in each case exhibits a neutral attitude and only a very small share of the respondents disagrees with the principles of the Minsk Agree-ment The survey question does not disentangle the different interpretations of the agreement and the steps it lays out but it illustrates an overall endorse-ment of a continuing process FIGURE 15

76

337

155

270

92113

303

119130

54

244

107

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agree Rather agree Rather disagree Strongly disagree Hard to say I donrsquot care

Donbas n=1174 DNRLNR n=1180

Would you agree that other regions in Ukraineshould be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 14Would you agree that other regions in Ukraine should be allowed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1174)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1180)

196237

391

213

359

455

45 4809

47

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

Strongly agreeRather agree

Neither agree nor disagreeRather disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=443 DNRLNR n=723

Do you agree with the Minsk Agreement

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 15Do you agree with the Minsk agreement

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp443)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp723)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

14

Trust in political institutions and the media

The level of trust in political leaders and institutions is a broad indicator of political stability and regime legitimacy In a situation of war trust is eroded and in flux depending on the respondentsrsquo location and personal experience Given that the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko is gener-ally unpopular across Ukraine where he is held responsible for a too slow reform process it does not come as a surprise that a vast majority of over 87 percent does not trust the Ukrainian president in Kyiv-controlled Donbas (of which 55 percent do not trust him at all) The distrust in the DNR LNR is even higher with 77 percent not trusting him at all FIGURE 16

The picture is the reverse when it comes to trust in the Russian president Vladimir Putin In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 88 percent do not trust the Russian president This does not come as a surprise but the variation in

554

770

319

164110

4817 18

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=1062 DNRLNR n=1152

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian President

DonbasDNRLNR

712

197 171 15896

282

21

363

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=888 DNRLNR n=1090

How much trust do you have in the Russian President

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 16 How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian president

FIGURE 17 How much trust do you have in the Russian president

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1062)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1152)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp888)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1090)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

15

expressions of trust in the DNR LNR is noteworthy while about 64 percent of the respondents rather or generally trust the Russian president about 36 per-cent do not FIGURE 17

When asked about the Ukrainian mass media a clear majority of about 82 per-cent of the respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 86 percent in the DNR LNR expressed their distrust in the main traditional media outlets Oligarchic ownership structures and the reporting (or absence of reporting) about the war are likely explanations for the overwhelming distrust FIGURE 18 Unsurprisingly the population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas similarly dis-trusts the Russian mass media (94 percent) but in the occupied territories the trust and distrust in the Russian mass media is relatively evenly split with about 46 percent of the respondents trusting and 54 percent not trusting the Russian mass media FIGURE 19

446

628

366

232184

109

0331

020

4060

Perc

ent

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=961 DNRLNR n=1120

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

785

234

150

225

57

338

07

203

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=824 DNRLNR n=1085

How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 18How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

FIGURE 19How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp961)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1120)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp824)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1085)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

16

General attitudes about democracy and the economy are shared across both parts of the Donbas Support for democracy is best described as lukewarm 42 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 39 percent in the occupied territories lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquosomewhatrsquo agree with the statement that democracy is still the best possible form of government while 38 and 37 percent respectively are non-committal and neither agree nor disagree FIGURE 20

123

170

297

218

380 368

108 11392

131

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agreeSomewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagreeSomewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=972 DNRLNR n=1136

Democracy is still the best form of government

DonbasDNRLNR

240276

153113

607 611

020

4060

Perc

ent

Return to socialist economy Leave everything as it is Deepen market reforms

Donbas n=738 DNRLNR n=917

What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 20Democracy is still the best form of government

FIGURE 21 What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp972)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1136)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp738)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp917)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

17

As for their economic views 61 percent of the respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied Donbas voiced their preference for deepening economic reforms thereby expressing a general pro-reform attitude Main-taining the status quo was only the declared preference of 15 percent of respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 11 percent in the DNR LNR The lsquoreturn to a socialist economyrsquo was the preferred choice of 24 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and 28 percent in the occupied terri-tories This response is likely to capture not just a specific ideological view about the socialist economic system but rather a general dissatisfaction with Ukrainersquos transition path FIGURE 21

The combination of a lukewarm position on democracy and a general en-dorsement of further economic reforms in both parts of the Donbas should be seen in connection with a further result namely the self-reported change in the level of political interest as a result of the events over the last three years The trends point in opposite directions across the frontline while respondents in the DNR LNR expressed a noteworthy increase in interest in politics (53 percent compared to only 14 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas) 49 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they were now less interested in politics (compared to 24 percent in the DNR LNR) Thus the experience of war has politicized the population of the DNR LNR much more than their counterpart in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas While Kyiv is confronted with a population that seems to be turning away from national politics the population of the occupied territories has become highly politicized though not in one particular direction FIGURE 22

136

526

373

239

491

235

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

More The same Less

Donbas n=1111 DNRLNR n=1167

Are you now more or less interestedin politics than three years ago

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 22 Are you now more or less interested in politics than three years ago

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1167)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

18

Foreign policy orientation

In terms of foreign policy orientation the two parts of the divided Donbas are more similar than one might think while NATO membership was re-jected outright as could be expected by the vast majority in both parts the widespread negative views of the EU in the Donbas might come as a sur-prise 72 percent of respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 82 percent in the self-declared republics are against Ukraine joining the EU FIGURES 23thinsp+thinsp24 While support for the EU in view of a slow reform pro-cess and the inability of Western actors to end the war has cooled off again across Ukraine according to recent polls there has generally been support above 50 percent for EU membership in recent years Thus with regard to the Ukrainian governmentrsquos declared objective of aligning its reform pro-cess with the EU the Donbas is being left behind

279

182

721

818

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=867 DNRLNR n=1063

Should Ukraine join the EU

DonbasDNRLNR

175

69

825

931

020

4060

8010

0Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=928 DNRLNR n=1092

Should Ukraine join the NATO

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 23Should Ukraine join the EU

FIGURE 24 Should Ukraine join the NATO

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp867)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1063)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp928)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1092)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

19

Conclusion

The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities whether rooted in ethnicity native language language use or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and in some cases this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience

On foreign policy issues both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline On the issue of EU membership the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centrersquos main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions Similarly support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR LNR

Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian Western and Russian policy-makers should take note of For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR LNR In line with the local sentiments international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR LNR

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

14

Trust in political institutions and the media

The level of trust in political leaders and institutions is a broad indicator of political stability and regime legitimacy In a situation of war trust is eroded and in flux depending on the respondentsrsquo location and personal experience Given that the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko is gener-ally unpopular across Ukraine where he is held responsible for a too slow reform process it does not come as a surprise that a vast majority of over 87 percent does not trust the Ukrainian president in Kyiv-controlled Donbas (of which 55 percent do not trust him at all) The distrust in the DNR LNR is even higher with 77 percent not trusting him at all FIGURE 16

The picture is the reverse when it comes to trust in the Russian president Vladimir Putin In the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 88 percent do not trust the Russian president This does not come as a surprise but the variation in

554

770

319

164110

4817 18

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=1062 DNRLNR n=1152

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian President

DonbasDNRLNR

712

197 171 15896

282

21

363

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=888 DNRLNR n=1090

How much trust do you have in the Russian President

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 16 How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian president

FIGURE 17 How much trust do you have in the Russian president

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1062)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1152)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp888)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1090)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

15

expressions of trust in the DNR LNR is noteworthy while about 64 percent of the respondents rather or generally trust the Russian president about 36 per-cent do not FIGURE 17

When asked about the Ukrainian mass media a clear majority of about 82 per-cent of the respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 86 percent in the DNR LNR expressed their distrust in the main traditional media outlets Oligarchic ownership structures and the reporting (or absence of reporting) about the war are likely explanations for the overwhelming distrust FIGURE 18 Unsurprisingly the population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas similarly dis-trusts the Russian mass media (94 percent) but in the occupied territories the trust and distrust in the Russian mass media is relatively evenly split with about 46 percent of the respondents trusting and 54 percent not trusting the Russian mass media FIGURE 19

446

628

366

232184

109

0331

020

4060

Perc

ent

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=961 DNRLNR n=1120

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

785

234

150

225

57

338

07

203

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=824 DNRLNR n=1085

How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 18How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

FIGURE 19How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp961)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1120)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp824)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1085)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

16

General attitudes about democracy and the economy are shared across both parts of the Donbas Support for democracy is best described as lukewarm 42 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 39 percent in the occupied territories lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquosomewhatrsquo agree with the statement that democracy is still the best possible form of government while 38 and 37 percent respectively are non-committal and neither agree nor disagree FIGURE 20

123

170

297

218

380 368

108 11392

131

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agreeSomewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagreeSomewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=972 DNRLNR n=1136

Democracy is still the best form of government

DonbasDNRLNR

240276

153113

607 611

020

4060

Perc

ent

Return to socialist economy Leave everything as it is Deepen market reforms

Donbas n=738 DNRLNR n=917

What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 20Democracy is still the best form of government

FIGURE 21 What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp972)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1136)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp738)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp917)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

17

As for their economic views 61 percent of the respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied Donbas voiced their preference for deepening economic reforms thereby expressing a general pro-reform attitude Main-taining the status quo was only the declared preference of 15 percent of respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 11 percent in the DNR LNR The lsquoreturn to a socialist economyrsquo was the preferred choice of 24 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and 28 percent in the occupied terri-tories This response is likely to capture not just a specific ideological view about the socialist economic system but rather a general dissatisfaction with Ukrainersquos transition path FIGURE 21

The combination of a lukewarm position on democracy and a general en-dorsement of further economic reforms in both parts of the Donbas should be seen in connection with a further result namely the self-reported change in the level of political interest as a result of the events over the last three years The trends point in opposite directions across the frontline while respondents in the DNR LNR expressed a noteworthy increase in interest in politics (53 percent compared to only 14 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas) 49 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they were now less interested in politics (compared to 24 percent in the DNR LNR) Thus the experience of war has politicized the population of the DNR LNR much more than their counterpart in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas While Kyiv is confronted with a population that seems to be turning away from national politics the population of the occupied territories has become highly politicized though not in one particular direction FIGURE 22

136

526

373

239

491

235

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

More The same Less

Donbas n=1111 DNRLNR n=1167

Are you now more or less interestedin politics than three years ago

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 22 Are you now more or less interested in politics than three years ago

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1167)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

18

Foreign policy orientation

In terms of foreign policy orientation the two parts of the divided Donbas are more similar than one might think while NATO membership was re-jected outright as could be expected by the vast majority in both parts the widespread negative views of the EU in the Donbas might come as a sur-prise 72 percent of respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 82 percent in the self-declared republics are against Ukraine joining the EU FIGURES 23thinsp+thinsp24 While support for the EU in view of a slow reform pro-cess and the inability of Western actors to end the war has cooled off again across Ukraine according to recent polls there has generally been support above 50 percent for EU membership in recent years Thus with regard to the Ukrainian governmentrsquos declared objective of aligning its reform pro-cess with the EU the Donbas is being left behind

279

182

721

818

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=867 DNRLNR n=1063

Should Ukraine join the EU

DonbasDNRLNR

175

69

825

931

020

4060

8010

0Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=928 DNRLNR n=1092

Should Ukraine join the NATO

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 23Should Ukraine join the EU

FIGURE 24 Should Ukraine join the NATO

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp867)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1063)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp928)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1092)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

19

Conclusion

The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities whether rooted in ethnicity native language language use or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and in some cases this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience

On foreign policy issues both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline On the issue of EU membership the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centrersquos main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions Similarly support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR LNR

Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian Western and Russian policy-makers should take note of For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR LNR In line with the local sentiments international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR LNR

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

15

expressions of trust in the DNR LNR is noteworthy while about 64 percent of the respondents rather or generally trust the Russian president about 36 per-cent do not FIGURE 17

When asked about the Ukrainian mass media a clear majority of about 82 per-cent of the respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 86 percent in the DNR LNR expressed their distrust in the main traditional media outlets Oligarchic ownership structures and the reporting (or absence of reporting) about the war are likely explanations for the overwhelming distrust FIGURE 18 Unsurprisingly the population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas similarly dis-trusts the Russian mass media (94 percent) but in the occupied territories the trust and distrust in the Russian mass media is relatively evenly split with about 46 percent of the respondents trusting and 54 percent not trusting the Russian mass media FIGURE 19

446

628

366

232184

109

0331

020

4060

Perc

ent

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=961 DNRLNR n=1120

How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

785

234

150

225

57

338

07

203

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general

Donbas n=824 DNRLNR n=1085

How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 18How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian mass media

FIGURE 19How much trust do you have in the Russian mass media

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp961)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1120)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp824)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1085)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

16

General attitudes about democracy and the economy are shared across both parts of the Donbas Support for democracy is best described as lukewarm 42 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 39 percent in the occupied territories lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquosomewhatrsquo agree with the statement that democracy is still the best possible form of government while 38 and 37 percent respectively are non-committal and neither agree nor disagree FIGURE 20

123

170

297

218

380 368

108 11392

131

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agreeSomewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagreeSomewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=972 DNRLNR n=1136

Democracy is still the best form of government

DonbasDNRLNR

240276

153113

607 611

020

4060

Perc

ent

Return to socialist economy Leave everything as it is Deepen market reforms

Donbas n=738 DNRLNR n=917

What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 20Democracy is still the best form of government

FIGURE 21 What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp972)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1136)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp738)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp917)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

17

As for their economic views 61 percent of the respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied Donbas voiced their preference for deepening economic reforms thereby expressing a general pro-reform attitude Main-taining the status quo was only the declared preference of 15 percent of respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 11 percent in the DNR LNR The lsquoreturn to a socialist economyrsquo was the preferred choice of 24 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and 28 percent in the occupied terri-tories This response is likely to capture not just a specific ideological view about the socialist economic system but rather a general dissatisfaction with Ukrainersquos transition path FIGURE 21

The combination of a lukewarm position on democracy and a general en-dorsement of further economic reforms in both parts of the Donbas should be seen in connection with a further result namely the self-reported change in the level of political interest as a result of the events over the last three years The trends point in opposite directions across the frontline while respondents in the DNR LNR expressed a noteworthy increase in interest in politics (53 percent compared to only 14 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas) 49 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they were now less interested in politics (compared to 24 percent in the DNR LNR) Thus the experience of war has politicized the population of the DNR LNR much more than their counterpart in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas While Kyiv is confronted with a population that seems to be turning away from national politics the population of the occupied territories has become highly politicized though not in one particular direction FIGURE 22

136

526

373

239

491

235

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

More The same Less

Donbas n=1111 DNRLNR n=1167

Are you now more or less interestedin politics than three years ago

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 22 Are you now more or less interested in politics than three years ago

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1167)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

18

Foreign policy orientation

In terms of foreign policy orientation the two parts of the divided Donbas are more similar than one might think while NATO membership was re-jected outright as could be expected by the vast majority in both parts the widespread negative views of the EU in the Donbas might come as a sur-prise 72 percent of respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 82 percent in the self-declared republics are against Ukraine joining the EU FIGURES 23thinsp+thinsp24 While support for the EU in view of a slow reform pro-cess and the inability of Western actors to end the war has cooled off again across Ukraine according to recent polls there has generally been support above 50 percent for EU membership in recent years Thus with regard to the Ukrainian governmentrsquos declared objective of aligning its reform pro-cess with the EU the Donbas is being left behind

279

182

721

818

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=867 DNRLNR n=1063

Should Ukraine join the EU

DonbasDNRLNR

175

69

825

931

020

4060

8010

0Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=928 DNRLNR n=1092

Should Ukraine join the NATO

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 23Should Ukraine join the EU

FIGURE 24 Should Ukraine join the NATO

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp867)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1063)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp928)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1092)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

19

Conclusion

The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities whether rooted in ethnicity native language language use or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and in some cases this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience

On foreign policy issues both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline On the issue of EU membership the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centrersquos main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions Similarly support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR LNR

Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian Western and Russian policy-makers should take note of For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR LNR In line with the local sentiments international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR LNR

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

16

General attitudes about democracy and the economy are shared across both parts of the Donbas Support for democracy is best described as lukewarm 42 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 39 percent in the occupied territories lsquostronglyrsquo or lsquosomewhatrsquo agree with the statement that democracy is still the best possible form of government while 38 and 37 percent respectively are non-committal and neither agree nor disagree FIGURE 20

123

170

297

218

380 368

108 11392

131

010

2030

40Pe

rcen

t

Strongly agreeSomewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagreeSomewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Donbas n=972 DNRLNR n=1136

Democracy is still the best form of government

DonbasDNRLNR

240276

153113

607 611

020

4060

Perc

ent

Return to socialist economy Leave everything as it is Deepen market reforms

Donbas n=738 DNRLNR n=917

What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 20Democracy is still the best form of government

FIGURE 21 What type of economy should exist in Ukraine

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp972)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1136)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp738)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp917)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

17

As for their economic views 61 percent of the respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied Donbas voiced their preference for deepening economic reforms thereby expressing a general pro-reform attitude Main-taining the status quo was only the declared preference of 15 percent of respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 11 percent in the DNR LNR The lsquoreturn to a socialist economyrsquo was the preferred choice of 24 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and 28 percent in the occupied terri-tories This response is likely to capture not just a specific ideological view about the socialist economic system but rather a general dissatisfaction with Ukrainersquos transition path FIGURE 21

The combination of a lukewarm position on democracy and a general en-dorsement of further economic reforms in both parts of the Donbas should be seen in connection with a further result namely the self-reported change in the level of political interest as a result of the events over the last three years The trends point in opposite directions across the frontline while respondents in the DNR LNR expressed a noteworthy increase in interest in politics (53 percent compared to only 14 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas) 49 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they were now less interested in politics (compared to 24 percent in the DNR LNR) Thus the experience of war has politicized the population of the DNR LNR much more than their counterpart in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas While Kyiv is confronted with a population that seems to be turning away from national politics the population of the occupied territories has become highly politicized though not in one particular direction FIGURE 22

136

526

373

239

491

235

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

More The same Less

Donbas n=1111 DNRLNR n=1167

Are you now more or less interestedin politics than three years ago

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 22 Are you now more or less interested in politics than three years ago

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1167)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

18

Foreign policy orientation

In terms of foreign policy orientation the two parts of the divided Donbas are more similar than one might think while NATO membership was re-jected outright as could be expected by the vast majority in both parts the widespread negative views of the EU in the Donbas might come as a sur-prise 72 percent of respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 82 percent in the self-declared republics are against Ukraine joining the EU FIGURES 23thinsp+thinsp24 While support for the EU in view of a slow reform pro-cess and the inability of Western actors to end the war has cooled off again across Ukraine according to recent polls there has generally been support above 50 percent for EU membership in recent years Thus with regard to the Ukrainian governmentrsquos declared objective of aligning its reform pro-cess with the EU the Donbas is being left behind

279

182

721

818

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=867 DNRLNR n=1063

Should Ukraine join the EU

DonbasDNRLNR

175

69

825

931

020

4060

8010

0Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=928 DNRLNR n=1092

Should Ukraine join the NATO

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 23Should Ukraine join the EU

FIGURE 24 Should Ukraine join the NATO

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp867)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1063)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp928)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1092)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

19

Conclusion

The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities whether rooted in ethnicity native language language use or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and in some cases this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience

On foreign policy issues both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline On the issue of EU membership the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centrersquos main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions Similarly support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR LNR

Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian Western and Russian policy-makers should take note of For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR LNR In line with the local sentiments international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR LNR

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

17

As for their economic views 61 percent of the respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied Donbas voiced their preference for deepening economic reforms thereby expressing a general pro-reform attitude Main-taining the status quo was only the declared preference of 15 percent of respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 11 percent in the DNR LNR The lsquoreturn to a socialist economyrsquo was the preferred choice of 24 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and 28 percent in the occupied terri-tories This response is likely to capture not just a specific ideological view about the socialist economic system but rather a general dissatisfaction with Ukrainersquos transition path FIGURE 21

The combination of a lukewarm position on democracy and a general en-dorsement of further economic reforms in both parts of the Donbas should be seen in connection with a further result namely the self-reported change in the level of political interest as a result of the events over the last three years The trends point in opposite directions across the frontline while respondents in the DNR LNR expressed a noteworthy increase in interest in politics (53 percent compared to only 14 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas) 49 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they were now less interested in politics (compared to 24 percent in the DNR LNR) Thus the experience of war has politicized the population of the DNR LNR much more than their counterpart in the Kyiv-controlled Don-bas While Kyiv is confronted with a population that seems to be turning away from national politics the population of the occupied territories has become highly politicized though not in one particular direction FIGURE 22

136

526

373

239

491

235

010

2030

4050

Perc

ent

More The same Less

Donbas n=1111 DNRLNR n=1167

Are you now more or less interestedin politics than three years ago

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 22 Are you now more or less interested in politics than three years ago

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp1111)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1167)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

18

Foreign policy orientation

In terms of foreign policy orientation the two parts of the divided Donbas are more similar than one might think while NATO membership was re-jected outright as could be expected by the vast majority in both parts the widespread negative views of the EU in the Donbas might come as a sur-prise 72 percent of respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 82 percent in the self-declared republics are against Ukraine joining the EU FIGURES 23thinsp+thinsp24 While support for the EU in view of a slow reform pro-cess and the inability of Western actors to end the war has cooled off again across Ukraine according to recent polls there has generally been support above 50 percent for EU membership in recent years Thus with regard to the Ukrainian governmentrsquos declared objective of aligning its reform pro-cess with the EU the Donbas is being left behind

279

182

721

818

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=867 DNRLNR n=1063

Should Ukraine join the EU

DonbasDNRLNR

175

69

825

931

020

4060

8010

0Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=928 DNRLNR n=1092

Should Ukraine join the NATO

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 23Should Ukraine join the EU

FIGURE 24 Should Ukraine join the NATO

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp867)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1063)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp928)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1092)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

19

Conclusion

The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities whether rooted in ethnicity native language language use or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and in some cases this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience

On foreign policy issues both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline On the issue of EU membership the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centrersquos main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions Similarly support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR LNR

Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian Western and Russian policy-makers should take note of For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR LNR In line with the local sentiments international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR LNR

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

18

Foreign policy orientation

In terms of foreign policy orientation the two parts of the divided Donbas are more similar than one might think while NATO membership was re-jected outright as could be expected by the vast majority in both parts the widespread negative views of the EU in the Donbas might come as a sur-prise 72 percent of respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 82 percent in the self-declared republics are against Ukraine joining the EU FIGURES 23thinsp+thinsp24 While support for the EU in view of a slow reform pro-cess and the inability of Western actors to end the war has cooled off again across Ukraine according to recent polls there has generally been support above 50 percent for EU membership in recent years Thus with regard to the Ukrainian governmentrsquos declared objective of aligning its reform pro-cess with the EU the Donbas is being left behind

279

182

721

818

020

4060

80Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=867 DNRLNR n=1063

Should Ukraine join the EU

DonbasDNRLNR

175

69

825

931

020

4060

8010

0Pe

rcen

t

Yes No

Donbas n=928 DNRLNR n=1092

Should Ukraine join the NATO

DonbasDNRLNR

Source ZOiS

Source ZOiS

FIGURE 23Should Ukraine join the EU

FIGURE 24 Should Ukraine join the NATO

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp867)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1063)

Donbas (nthinsp=thinsp928)

DNRLNR (nthinsp=thinsp1092)

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

19

Conclusion

The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities whether rooted in ethnicity native language language use or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and in some cases this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience

On foreign policy issues both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline On the issue of EU membership the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centrersquos main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions Similarly support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR LNR

Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian Western and Russian policy-makers should take note of For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR LNR In line with the local sentiments international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR LNR

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

19

Conclusion

The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities whether rooted in ethnicity native language language use or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and in some cases this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience

On foreign policy issues both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline On the issue of EU membership the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centrersquos main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions Similarly support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR LNR

Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian Western and Russian policy-makers should take note of For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR LNR In line with the local sentiments international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR LNR

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

20

Imprint

AuthorGwendolyn Sasse

Published bycopy Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraszlige 6010117 Berlininfozois-berlindewwwzois-berlinde

CitationSasse Gwendolyn The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one ZOiS Report 2 2017 (httpswwwzois- berlindefilead-minmediaDateienZOiS_ReportsZOiS_Report_2_2017pdf)

ISSN 2512-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

21

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

22

• Executive summary
• Introduction
• Life and Attitudes across the Frontline
• • Personal contacts across the frontline
  • Political identities
  • Views on the war and the status of the region
  • Trust in political institutions and the media
  • Foreign policy orientation
  • • Conclusion
    • Imprint

ZOiS Report 22017 The Donbas ndash Two parts or still one

22

• Executive summary
• Introduction
• Life and Attitudes across the Frontline
• • Personal contacts across the frontline
  • Political identities
  • Views on the war and the status of the region
  • Trust in political institutions and the media
  • Foreign policy orientation
  • • Conclusion
    • Imprint