1

No Thirst for Policy Change:

Regulating Ontario’s Alcohol Market

Justin Khorana-Medeiros

Ontario Legislative Internship Programme

05/22/2015

Dr. Henry Jacek

2

Introduction

Ontario has one of the most unique regulatory and legislative frameworks

regarding the retail sale of beverage alcohol in the developed world.1 Whether the

comparative standard is the OECD, the Commonwealth, the G7, or North American

jurisdictions, Ontario’s approach to this domain of social and economic policy is almost

without parallel. Even on an intra-Canadian comparison, Ontario has one of the most

controlled and centralized alcohol markets, especially amongst the larger provinces

(Alberta, British Columbia, and Quebec).2

Moreover, the system has survived a series of pressures that could have easily led

to massive change. First, since 1980, all three provincial parties have promised or

attempted to liberalize it at one time or another, sometimes even after having won

government. All were either unsuccessful or abandoned their campaign promises during

their tenure in office. Second, it is surprising that Ontario’s monopoly system survived

the increasingly intense economic and political globalization of the last three decades, as

well as the rise of neoliberalism and ‘Third Way’ politics, reified in Ontario by the Harris

Progressive Conservatives.3 This was a period marked by free-trade agreements and the

liberalization of certain economic sectors, often supported by parties traditionally thought

to be ‘centre-left’. In North America there was a gradual decline in alcohol control in

most jurisdictions, with dramatic changes such as full privatization of alcohol retail sales

in several US states and one Canadian province, and an erosion of government-run

systems in several other jurisdictions.4 From whence comes Ontario’s puzzling policy

persistence?

Journalists and politicians have speculated over the years. Common explanations

include tax revenue, the protection of minors, concern for public health, fear of labour

unrest, a lack of a constituency for change, and interest group lobbying, among others.5

This paper will draw from and build on the historical institutionalist (HI) school.6

Scholars under this theory have argued that institutions can become entrenched,

regardless of whether they have outlived their usefulness.7 Their tendency to justify their

own importance and the sunk costs associated with their initial instalment create a

situation of path dependency, thereby limiting future governments’ ability to pursue

rational or partisan policies that disrupt these historical institutions.

However, this does not mean they retain a static configuration; instead they may

expand or shift their policy scope incrementally through ‘bureaucratic creep’. Their

goals, design, rules, methods, and tools may mutate organically over time, rather than as

the result of any legislative intent. They may attempt to adapt to a new and hostile

1 The claim holds true for production, importation, distribution, and consumption as well, but due to space

limitations this paper will only analyze the retail channel. 2 Though the U.S. has 18 ‘control states’, Pennsylvania is the only American jurisdiction of comparable

size (by population and GDP) that is close to Ontario on the Controlled—Liberalized range; the rest allow

some degree of private retailing while maintaining a monopoly on wholesaling, or are too idiosyncratic

(like Utah with its high levels of religiosity) to be fit for comparison. 3 Pond (2005); Rodrik (2000); Lee Mudge (2011).

4 Vingilis E., Mcleod A.I., Stoduto G., Seeley J., and Mann R.E (2007).

5 Flavelle (2008); Malcolm (2014); Brennan (2014); Cohn (2014);

6 Mahoney & Thelen (2000); Patashnik (2003).

7 Thelen (1999).

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political, economic, or cultural environment. Ontario’s two primary alcohol vending

organizations, the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) and Brewer’s Retailers Inc.

(known commercially as The Beer Store, henceforth TBS), can be traced in a linear

fashion back to Ontario’s prohibitionist or temperance era.8;9

They are today almost

unrecognizable when compared to their original forms, in spite of a relative lack of major

legislative change over time, and thus appear prima facie an excellent case study for this

theory.

However the institutional side will not be the sole focus. Provincial politics and

government will make up the other half of the story, given that the LCBO and indirectly

TBS are beholden to the Ministry of Finance, and ultimately, to the government of the

day. Over the last 35 years the issue has been heavily politicized and yet almost zero

legislative change has occurred. An historical analysis of issue salience demonstrates a

general trend that health concerns have given way to fiscal concerns for politicians over

the 20th

century.

Based on this analysis, I argue that in Ontario’s contemporary10

economic

paradigm (low, unpredictable growth, high debt and deficits) public institutions can no

longer simply rely on their historical effectiveness. They must adapt to new service

orientations and improve their performance if they are to survive privatization. However,

this explanation fails to completely explain the lack of institutional change in this policy

field, particularly during Liberal governments; other, non-fiscal issues have seemed to

rise and fall in prominence, creating a complicated and contradictory picture. Therefore

further avenues for research are proposed.

The paper originally concluded with an analysis of the present moment, which

was widely believed to be susceptible to significant institutional change. I made a

prediction based on the research. However, events overtook the paper. The Wynne

government recently announced its reform plans, and the opposition parties have stated

their official reactions. Consequently, the MPP interviews I conducted can now be used

not only to determine issue salience but also to assess the actual decision making process

during the 41st Parliament’s reform effort.

It is hoped that the arguments and data presented here will be useful to future

analyses of the resilience or mutability of political institutions in Ontario, and perhaps

Canada more widely.

8 Indeed, the LCBO has even maintained the same name since its inception almost 100 years ago, a truly

astonishing feat given the tendency of victorious political parties to rename ministries and agencies. 9 Of course, the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario is undoubtedly the province’s ‘third’ liquor

controlling agency, but as it is concerned solely with licensing establishments (restaurants, bars, etc.) for

on-premise consumption, it is beyond the scope of this paper and will not be addressed. Given the Wine

Rack’s more recent inception and smaller market share, it will also be left out my analysis. 10

1990-present.

4

From Prohibition to the Present: Path Dependency in Ontario

The history of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario can be traced to 1927, when it

was established to control the sale of wine and spirits, explicitly with the mandate of

“preserving social order”.11

This transpired after the failure of the prohibition movement

to curb alcohol consumption and the associated social problems, which itself coincided

with the waning of the temperance movement as a political force in Ontario. It was

admitted that prohibition merely created consumption without tax revenue in an

underground economy. Thus the LCBO permitted the sale of wine and spirits, but only so

long as careful records were kept as to who was drinking and how much. The new idea

was ‘disinterested management’: the LCBO would replace the saloons and illegal

drinking spaces of Prohibition by recreating the idea of proper consumption and

obtainment of alcohol, a classic demonstration of Foulcaultian governmentality.12

The

new ‘citizen-drinker’ would understand the importance of moderation.13

This was the

original ethos of the LCBO as an institution.

This ethos continued for several decades, until the general loosening of mores that

occurred over the 60s and 70s. In spite of growing data and understanding of alcoholism,

it was construed in the 60s and 70s as an individual problem, to be blamed on the ‘man’

rather than the ‘bottle’.14

This is a somewhat surprising story, considering that the

government (in concert with its federal counterpart) displayed great zeal for outlawing or

raising penalties for other recreational drugs such as opiates, marijuana, LSD, and

cocaine. It was thought that these other substances had to be utterly eradicated in the

interests of public safety, in spite of the relative lack of evidence of ‘harm to society’

compared to alcohol. This conception of course continues to dominate thinking about

alcohol in comparison to other recreational drugs, both among policymakers and the

population at large. As Greg Marquis puts it,

This makes it all the more interesting that Ontario continues to feel the need to

use such a uniquely heavy-handed policy as total monopoly over alcohol sales as

a prophylactic against alcohol-induced social harms. If indeed the responsibility

lies with the problem drinker his or herself, the logical policy would be heavy

spending on educational and rehabilitation programs, but not a reduction in

accessibility to the general populace.15

This became all the more true when the LCBO ceased keeping track of its customers’

purchases and began displaying the merchandise openly on the shop floor, meaning a

customer (or potential problem drinker) could come in and make a purchase 10 times a

day without difficulty. This signals an abandonment of the original purpose of the

institution. Abandonment was followed by reversal in the Harris era, when the LCBO

began actively encouraging higher consumption, as we will see below.

11

Malleck (2011:124). 12

Foucault (1991). 13

Malleck (2011:125). 14

Marquis (222) in Montingy (2011). 15

Ibid.

5

The Beer Store’s genesis and lineage is a slightly more complex story however. It

begun as the privately owned ‘Brewers Warehousing Company Limited’, which was

essentially an Ontario brewers’ co-operative. Since beer had a lower alcohol content, it

was thought that hundreds of small-and-medium sized brewers could be entrusted with

wholesaling, warehousing, and distributing their products to private retailers. However, in

1940 the brewers bought out the stores, changing their name to Brewers Retail Inc. The

stores were later renamed The Beer Store.

What followed is well-known: waves of consolidation and conglomeration, during

which, by the 1990s, the beer industry became concentrated to the point of being

composed of only a few multinationals. By 2006, TBS was completely owned by foreign

beer companies,16

while composing just over 80 per cent of beer sales in Ontario.17

Thus,

TBS had become something it was never intended to be; a few large corporations with a

legislatively-supported quasi-monopoly. Unsurprisingly, it became a magnet for

allegations of unfair businesses practices from other stakeholders, including small-to-

medium local brewers, the Ontario Convenience Store Association (OCSA), and

Restaurants Canada. These will be discussed below.

Ironically however, TBS attracted far less political attention during the period

under examination. This is partly because of public ignorance; polls conducted in 2013

and 2005 show that a significant majority of Ontarians think that TBS is a government

agency rather than a private, foreign owned enterprise.18;19

This number was almost

certainly lower in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, before the craft beer explosion and

the attempts by that industry group to draw attention to the issue. Even citizens who are

aware of the ownership are unlikely to understand the market fairness and consumer

experience implications, unless they are industry insiders or experts.

In addition, since the Harris government was concerned with wasteful and

inefficient public bodies, it didn’t concern itself with TBS. The media and government

reaction to the 2005 Ministry of Finance report focused almost entirely on the

recommendation to privatize the LCBO, though the report did make recommendations

that dramatically affected TBS operations as well. This may have been due to the fact the

LCBO took up a larger share of overall beverage alcohol retailing, or because the revenue

implications to privatizing the LCBO are far more significant than any policy regarding

TBS could ever be (the majority of TBS profits are already ‘lost’ to the private sector in a

way they are not in jurisdictions with total government control, like Saskatchewan).

For these reasons, TBS will be mentioned sparingly in the ensuing analysis until

we arrive at the Wynne era. The term ‘liberalize’ is used throughout the paper to imply an

extension of beverage alcohol vending to all and any private retailers who meet licencing

qualifications. As mentioned this is the norm in most jurisdictions of useful comparability

to Ontario, and is opposed to the present system in which one government and three large

corporations control almost all retailing. It is this latter system that is signalled when the

term ‘institution’ is used; that is, both LCBO and TBS together as a ‘controlled alcohol

market’.

16

AB Inbev through Labatt (49%), Molson-Coors (49%), and Sapporo through Sleeman (2%). 17

Beverage Alcohol System Review Panel (2005:3) 18

Cohn (2013). 19

BASR (2005:30).

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1985 and the Peterson Liberals – The Debate Begins

Though it was necessary to delve into Ontario’s history in order to fully

comprehend the subject, this paper will focus on the post-1985 period. This is due to a

number of factors. First, the fact that the same party, the “Big Blue Machine” or

Progressive Conservatives, ruled Ontario from 1943-1985, makes this period somewhat

less puzzling. Since they did not campaign on alcohol reform as an issue nor act on it

significantly during their first few governments, one could assume this party had a

preference for the status quo. Where things get interesting is when Ontario’s electoral

politics become more volatile in the 1985-2014 period, when we witness a series of

dramatic swings in electoral support for different parties, as well as the alcohol market

issue becoming heavily politicized. Nonetheless, in spite of significant legislative activity

in other areas, no serious reforms are made.

Furthermore, this period is widely regarded as heralding a new era for Western

governments, Ontario no less than others. The three decades of high postwar-growth had

ended, energy prices had spiked thanks to the oil crises, the Bretton Woods system had

collapsed, and economic globalization had intensified so that economies and industries

were far more susceptible to foreign competition. Ontario saw a number of dramatic

changes as a result of these exogenous processes, including major reforms of the energy

sector, privatization of public assets, reforms of collective bargaining agreements,

ballooning deficits and public debt, and so on.

Neoliberalism ascended to primacy among right-wing parties, and arguably even

amongst centrist parties. This point should not be overlooked, since neoliberalism

stresses ‘best practice’ (by definition a comparative concept) and most other jurisdictions

either had liberal alcohol markets or were obtaining them. The Harris government was an

excellent example of this new, taxpayer-focused, generally labour-unfriendly ideology.20

Yet through all this upheaval, the situation for the LCBO and TBS remained almost

completely untouched. Successive Ontario governments, comprised of parties claiming to

be utterly distinct from each other, were convinced that Ontario virtually alone among

countless other OECD jurisdictions had found ‘best practice’ with regards to beverage

alcohol regulation.

The 1985-87 Peterson government is the one exception to these remarks, since

they are the only party that, when in power, made a concerted attempt to expand alcohol

retailing. Bill 134 (session 33:2) ‘An Act to amend the Liquor Licence Act’ attempted to

do so by putting beer and wine in grocery stores. As they were in a minority government,

and were unable to convince other parties of the wisdom of the policy, the legislation did

not pass. This was curious, given that the NDP had attempted to enact virtually the same

legislation with a series of private member’s bills in the late 1970s and early 1980s.21

Even more curiously, when the Peterson government won a majority in 1987, the

Liberals did not renew their effort to pass this legislation. They could have very easily

20

Pond, 2005. 21

See for example Mr. George Samis (NDP), second reading Bill 126, An Act to amend the Liquor Control

Act. Session: 32:2 Date: 1982/06/24

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done so, since the motion had already been drafted and debated, and they had just won a

significant electoral mandate. The process would have been near-automatic.

Gregg Sorbara, a cabinet minister at the time, claims that the Peterson government

backed off because of the “power of the big players” and the “free trade agreement that

was coming in”, arguing that there would have been pressure to allow all US beers equal

access to grocery stores.22

This seems a bit odd in retrospect, given that since then all of

Ontario’s major breweries have been bought up by international consortiums, much of

this occurring during Sorbara’s tenure as Minister of Finance in the McGuinty cabinet,

and with little to no protest from the government.

Furthermore, it is telling that Mr. Sorbara claimed the broad economic

implications of liberalization as the decisive factor, not the social responsibility aspect.

The latter was a salient issue during the 1985-87 minority government debates. The

Progressive Conservatives warned of higher consumption levels, easier access for

underage drinkers, an increase in liquor store robberies, and more impaired driving.23

However they also voiced economic concerns in equal measures. They argued that

government revenues would be reduced and even that law would be in violation of article

3 of the GATT, under which the US and EC would challenge Ontario. Finally, arguments

were made that that the consumer experience would be diminished (by shabbier

storefronts and poorly trained staff), that public opinion was against it, and prices would

increase due to higher distribution costs.24

The NDP opposed the measure for many of the same reasons: concern for social

and health harms, increased underage drinking, etc. Interestingly they also argued

specifically for the economic value of The Brewers’ Warehousing system, stating that it

was “significantly more cost-efficient than the distribution system in any of the other

provinces”, because of its consolidated distribution and administration.25

On the

consumer side, the NDP favoured expanding agency stores as an alternative to boost

convenience, and warned of a potential price increase for Northern Ontarians.26

Finally,

they added that the proposed legislation was out of touch with the trend in other

jurisdictions (an empirically incorrect claim).

The Liberals defended themselves against all charges, arguing against and

diminishment of government revenue or consumer experience, as well as any

augmentation of social and health harms. Like the PC and NDP members, they were able

to produce studies, jurisdictional comparisons, Gallup polls, constituency petitions, etc. to

support their positions.27

Their unique contributions to the debate included the common

sense argument that ‘border Ontarians’ (East and South) are in effect already living under

the proposed law, since they can drive into other jurisdictions to purchase privately-sold

alcohol on a daily basis. Their lives are not substantially different from those of other

22

“Governing the Gin”. The Agenda with Steve Paikin. 15 May 2014; Toronto. Television. 23

Robert Runciman (PC). Debate on Bill 134 ‘An Act to Amend the Liquor Licence Act’ Session: 33:2

Date: 1986/10/28. 24

Mr. J. M. Johnson (PC); Robert Runciman (PC). Ibid. 25

Mr. Swart (NDP). Debate on Bill 134 ‘An Act to Amend the Liquor Licence Act' Session: 33:2 Date:

1986/10/28. 26

Mr. Swart (NDP); Mr. Wildman (NDP). Ibid. 27

Mr. Kwinter (LIB); M. Poirier: (LIB). Debate on Bill 134 ‘An Act to Amend the Liquor Licence Act’

Session: 33:2 Date: 1986/10/28.

8

Ontarians. They also noted the economic benefits for small, independent grocery-

business owners, which could raise incomes and generate job growth.

These arguments would repeat themselves almost identically in the 1990s and

2000s. Indeed, many of them had already been articulated years earlier, in 1982, when the

NDP had tried to enact the same reform through a private member’s bill.28;29

There was a

role reversal here, in that the Liberals and NDP had joined forces against a PC

government who opposed it. The NDP at this time championed the rights of small

business against big corporate chain stores, of “free enterprise” against “monopoly

control”30

. Mr. Samis, the bill’s sponsor, decried the argument that public opinion was

against it, speaking of pubic ignorance (many Ontarians had no experience of living

under a more liberal regime and feared the unknown) and pointing to opinion polls in

selected ridings and among certain business groups that showed favourable responses. He

argued that tougher social regulations could be enacted to curb a potential rise in

consumption, even considering the possibility of a total ban on television beer

advertising. Mr. Di Santo (NDP), unwittingly anticipating neoliberal ‘best practice’

arguments, noted that in international comparisons alcohol rates were no higher on

average (in some cases even lower) in European countries where there was less legal and

moral anti-drinking compulsion.

The Liberals at the time largely echoed these sentiments, pointing out additionally

the “hypocrisy of a government living off the avails of liquor and beer sales” to criticize

the opposition bill on moral grounds31

, and that responsibility to inculcate healthy

drinking habits lay primarily in civil society (family and church) not the state.32

If there is

one clear lesson from the 1980s, it is that just about every argument possible was dragged

out for and against a restrictive alcohol market, with seemingly no unifying theme. This

would not be the case in the 1990s.

The Harris Era - Ready, Aim…Never Mind

The issue lay dormant for some time,33

until it exploded onto the popular

consciousness again with the publication of Mike Harris’ ‘Common Sense Revolution’,

the official 1995 PC party platform. The document noted in no uncertain terms: “We will

sell off some assets, such as the LCBO and surplus government land, to the private

28

Mr. Samis (NDP): “This is a bill I have been introducing since 1974; it has almost become an annual rite

to introduce this bill”. Mr. Samis is referring to Bill 126, An Act to amend the Liquor Control Act. Second

reading, session: 32:2; 1982/06/24. 29

Mr. Mitchell (PC) and Mr. Treleaven (PC) making the classic arguments of increased distributions costs,

underage drinking, health & social problems, etc. Mr. Mitchell added, in an interesting twist, that juice and

milk sales might decline as a result of the bill(!), thus harming the province's agricultural sector. Debate on

bill 126, ‘An Act to amend the Liquor Control Act’. Session: 32:2; 1982/06/24. 30

Ibid. 31

Mr. Boudria (LIB). Ibid. 32

Mr. Nixon (LIB). Ibid. 33

With the exception of a Liberal attempt to cut some red tape for restaurants and bars in June of 1990 (Bill

175, ‘An Act to revise the Liquor Licence Act and to amend the law relating to Liquor’). Some of the

debates of the 1980s were revived, but on-premise consumption is a distinct issue beyond the scope of this

paper.

9

sector”.34

This particular platform plank received immense media attention, and the

Progressive Conservatives ended up winning a large majority mandate in the 1995

election. In addition, the Liberals also remained open to grocery and corner store vending

during the campaign, and garnered the second highest vote share.35

Surely the bell was

tolling for the LCBO/TBS duopoly.

As we know, this was not the outcome. Modern versions of historical

institutionalism teach us that institutional change can emerge not only from exogenous

shocks, but also from the design and modification of incentive structures, producing

changes in the behavior of the members of the institution.36

The story of the LCBO in the

1990s is a model example of this phenomenon.

Between 1989 and 1993, LCBO sales declined by 7.5%, and operating expenses

went up 22.5%.37

One journalist described it as a “typical bloated bureaucracy”.38

Almost immediately after the 1995 election, Consumer Services Minister Norm Sterling

called selling the LCBO “a priority”.39

Four months later, he set up a commission to

study the issue, but then called it off before it had a chance to report. What happened?

The LCBO, which in the late 1980s had finally begun tinkering with the idea of

modernizing its retail operation to make it more attractive to consumers, radically

accelerated this process in the 1990s. They recruited a new management team entirely

from the private sector40

and redefined the goal of the organization. In the words of Andy

Brandt, former Tory cabinet minister and import/export businessman appointed LCBO

chair in 1991 (and reappointed by Harris twice), “we are not going to operate like a

bureaucracy. We’re operating this like a business”.

The LCBO, perhaps sensing danger, took several steps to improve its

performance during the run up to the (seemingly inevitable at the time) Harris

premiership and especially after Harris’ election. I measure ‘improved performance’ as

net revenue dollars delivered to the provincial treasury and positive public opinion of the

organization. For instance, the LCBO opened up agency shops in rural grocery stores and

began to permit Sunday openings in 1996, the latter being a policy that had long been

opposed by its labour union (but was no longer at the time of the decision).

Mr. Harris took note. When asked about his dithering on this campaign promise in

1996, he responded: “We're not in a big hurry. We want to do it right. We want to do it

only when it makes sense - only when we’ll get better service for a better price…In the

meantime, Hydro, LCBO and TVO are all operating more efficiently than when we took

office”.41

Practice and performance suddenly trumped ideology. In 1998 the LCBO

introduced longer opening hours, and made $16 million worth of investments in store

improvements and improved efficiencies.42

34

p.17, The Common Sense Revolution. Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario. 1994. 35

Wright (1995). 36

Mahoney & Thelen (2009). 37

Toronto Star “Harris dream may be tough to swallow”. C2; 24/06/1995. 38

Ibid. 39

Toronto Star “Tory Privatization Plans Lack Logic” F2; 04/05/1997. 40

Two prominent examples being Nancy Cardinal, VP of marketing communications, who came from

Marks and Spencer, and Executive Vice-President Larry Gee, who came from the U.S. grocery business. 41

Wright (1996). 42

Deverell (1998).

10

The results were dramatic and almost immediate. The LCBO put $20 million

more into provincial coffers in 1997 than 1996, its Vintages (wine and spirits) program

alone growing from $20 million sales in 1991 to $130 million in 2000.43

The LCBO

generated $667 million in revenues for the government the year Harris was elected; this

rose by nearly 50% to a $1 billion in the year 2000.44

In December 2000, Andy Brandt

joyfully announced a fifth straight record dividend to the province.45

No wonder then that Harris decided to spare this institution from the Common

Sense Revolution after all? Paying attention to historical context, in fact, it was quite

remarkable. Harris enunciated a clear ideological programme: “History has shown that

the private sector can use such assets more efficiently and provide better service to the

public”.46

As one journalist put it at the time

The Harris government showed immense zeal in executing most of the CSR, no

matter how controversial...amalgamating school boards and municipalities, laying

off public servants, cutting income taxes, repealing labour and employment equity

laws, cutting welfare, etc.47

To this we may add radically reducing the number of MPPs and redrawing the electoral

map (the Fewer Politicians Act). Additionally, some rural members in his own party were

protesting that their ridings were underserved and were asking for at least some mild

licensing of private liquor stores to fill the gap.48

Finally, it is worth noting that Mr.

Harris had legendary battles with various public unions, the teachers most notably, and

was not one to back down. The common argument that the LCBO/TBS’ unionized

workforce scares governments away from reform does not hold water in this case.

Nevertheless, Harris clearly changed his tune over the course of his first

premiership. In April of 1997 the Harris government released a report on privatization

plans, and shift in tone was noticeable. Suddenly more consultations were needed, more

public input, and there was less talk of a ‘mandate theory’ of government (i.e. electoral

victory implies almost unlimited leeway).49

By the time the second Mike Harris majority government got underway, the party

was merely pledging to “actively review and evaluate everything that the government

owns” but no promises were made to sell off the LCBO this time, indeed some journalists

cited party insiders as saying there was no chance of a sell off.50

Harris himself noted that

“liquor stores have improved dramatically in recent years in terms of service, selection

and prices as LCBO management responded to the threat of possibly being sold to the

private sector”.51

However the LCBO and TBS monopolies were not completely in the clear.

Harris’ Finance Minister Jim Flaherty stated repeatedly that LCBO had asset values that

43

Deverell (1999). 44

Girard (1999). 45

Deverell (2000). 46

p. 2, The Common Sense Revolution. Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario. 1994. 47

Urquhart (1997). 48

Ibid. 49

Pond (2005). 50

Urquhart (1997). 51

Mallan & Brennan (2001)

11

were not being realized.52

And even Harris himself occasionally spoke of “concentrating

on those services in government that we must necessarily deliver”, listing education,

health, and transport.53

The ideology of the CSR seemed to live on if in a diminished

form, and the LCBO could return to the chopping block at any moment, in spite of its

impressive gains in performance.

Indeed the PC government in the post-2000 period remained under strong

financial pressures to sell it. Economic growth had slowed and revenue was down. This is

partly why Premier Harris appointed an optimization task force led by Roger Martin,

Dean of Rotman School of Management and a leading expert on competitiveness. To

anyone who has followed Ontario politics in recent decades this will sound extremely

familiar; it was done again later by the McGuinty and Wynne governments.

In spite of the Harris government’s hostility, the LCBO was not without friends.

The media in particular was almost always decidedly against governmental reformist

plans.54

Even business reporters, generally favourable to market solutions, came out

strongly against a loosening of the alcohol market.55

Finally, there may be a personal

story here that eludes academic analysis. Andy Brandt, the chairman of the LCBO during

this entire period, was a former Cabinet Minister in the Davis government, and remained

an MPP throughout the 1980s. He and Harris were caucus mates, and had a good

relationship beyond mutual professional respect and ideological affinities. One can only

imagine what might have happened if a former New Democrat or Liberal or even a senior

bureaucrat had been in control of the LCBO when Harris won his majority mandate in

1995. Had they attempted to make their case for the LCBO’s survival on the basis of

social responsibility rather than fiscal windfalls and dramatic reform, if they did not know

how to speak the language of the CSR and neoliberalism, Premier Harris may very well

have followed through on his campaign promise.

The McGuinty Years – See No Evil, Hear No Evil

In what would become an enduring trend, the Liberal government of Dalton

McGuinty (2003-2013) would also appoint an expert panel to investigate the wisdom of

the government-sponsored monopoly in the alcohol market. Tellingly, the Ministry of

Finance was selected for this task; the ministries of health, justice, education or any other

policy fields that pertain to alcohol usage were not officially included in the panel (in

spite of the fact that public and political debates, as we have seen, tend to focus on many

non-fiscal issues). The issue was defined straightforwardly as one of economic

efficiencies and provincial revenue; that is, were they being maximized by the LCBO and

TBS?

The panel, to the surprise of the reigning Liberals, came to a startlingly blunt

conclusion:

52

Flaherty was so anti-LCBO that during his Tory leadership bid in 2001, he nailed a ‘for sale’ sign to the

front of an LCBO store as a publicity stunt. 53

Ibid. 54

Jones (1995); Walkom (1995); Giese (2002). 55

Israelson (1995). A full page article, with graphics, on the front page of the business section no less.

12

The [present] system is inflexible and there are many anomalies and inequities. If

we could go back to the drawing board, no one would design an ideal system this

way…the challenge you put to us was to determine if the beverage alcohol system

is delivering the maximum benefits to the people of Ontario. It is not.56

The panel went on to say that the current system “falls considerably short of generating

the maximum return for taxpayers.”57

This was because its uncompetitive, monopolistic

character was stifling economic value creation and holding back innovation, leaving

untapped revenue ‘on the table’. They estimated this revenue to be in excess of $200

million annually (not to mention hundreds of millions of dollars in one-time windfall

from a liquidation of LCBO assets). And the panel knew how to appeal to the McGuinty

government, given its ambitious plan to restore the ‘healthcare deficit’ left from the

Harris/Eves years: it specifically mentioned in its report that $200 million was equal to “a

new 300 bed hospital each year”.58

The panel did acknowledge that the market for alcohol cannot be ‘completely’

free, and that given the unique nature of the product, government would always have a

role to play in ensuring its socially responsible sale and use. However, they were quite

firm that this role did not necessitate government ownership of retail and wholesale

facilities, but rather could be effected “through modern regulatory tools such as pricing

policies and active enforcement”.59

Thus the final recommendation was clear: the report

called on the government to create a regulated, competitive market for retail and

wholesaling that would “expand opportunities for producers, improve convenience and

selection for consumers, extract the government from commercial risks and increase

revenues for the public purse”.60

And there was a necessity to act with haste because “the

LCBO will find it financially challenging to keep pace with broader consumer and retail

trends over the long term while maintaining or increasing its dividend to the province”.61

This is worth reflecting on. Politicians rely on experts in the bureaucracy for

policy advice, and no government department in Ontario is more venerable than the

Ministry of Finance. Furthermore, the report made strong, unambiguous

recommendations that should have been music to the Liberal government’s ears. The

McGuinty government, like the Harris and Eves governments before it, was cash-

strapped. It was faced with a surprise deficit that had been hidden by the previous

administration, was forced to make unpopular healthcare cuts and tax hikes, and had an

ambitious educational reform agenda. Indeed, these were likely the reasons that the

Review Panel had been initiated in the first place. Surely the LCBO was on its deathbed

once again?

In fact, all of the report’s recommendations were completely ignored. Why? For

the same reason Mike Harris reversed course? Very likely. The LCBO’s performance

was unquestionably still strong; it continued to expand, to implement the latest trends in

marketing and retailing, to win consumer satisfaction awards, and, above all, to bring in

record dividends every year for the provincial treasury (at time of writing, 2014, it has

56

Beverage Alcohol System Review Panel (2005:iii). 57

Ibid. 58

Beverage Alcohol System Review Panel (2005:iv). 59

Ibid. 60

Ibid. 61

(Beverage Alcohol System Review Panel (2005:2).

13

reported 18 consecutive record sales years).62

Finance Minister (2003-2007) Greg

Sorbara, who commissioned the panel as one of his first actions in government, disputed

the core argument of the report – that it would increase revenue. He stated that following

the policy recommendations (which included breaking up the LCBO’s wholesaling

function) “may have serious revenue implications for the government”.63

Mr. Sorbara

also faulted the panel’s recommendation that private sector beer stores be included in the

auction process, because it would require the government to confiscate assets.64

These

statements seem to continue the neoliberal paradigm the Premier Harris had set in the

1990s for assessing beverage alcohol retailing in Ontario. The LCBO and TBS could

remain as they were, provided they were operating at maximal efficiency.

However, Mr. Sorbara later eschewed neoliberal ‘efficiency’ rationales when

asked to explain his wholesale rejection of the expert review panel. When discussing the

decision in his post-political life, he claimed that “year after year polling showed high

satisfaction that with the LCBO, there was no appetite for change”, and that “there’s no

appetite for forcing people with good jobs and good pensions to start working for 13 or

14 dollars an hour”.65

He suggested that there was “no appetite for someone to say ‘I

need to be able to buy a bottle of gin someplace at 4’o clock in the morning’…that’s not

really important to the people of the province”.66

Finally he inveighed against idea that

the Liberal government thought of itself as some kind “moral preacher government that

tells people to drink less”. He made no other arguments on this occasion. This suggests

that consumer convenience, employment, and above all public opinion were the most

salient issues for the McGuinty government. Maximizing government revenue and

concern for public health were not priorities. This more multifaceted view shows more

continuity with the Peterson era, particularly the public opinion component.

As McGuinty would be elected to a minority government in his third election, it is

worth considering what the opposition party positions were. NDP leader Howard

Hampton (1996-2009), in a televised roundtable discussion, claimed the LCBO “works

quite well” in terms of maximizing provincial revenue through “tremendous prices,

tremendous economies of scale, and tremendous efficiencies”.67

He argued that since the

government was so dependent on these revenues to fund other social programs, the

LCBO ought to be left alone. He echoed Mr. Sorbara’s arguments about declining wages.

Noticeably, he focused far more on public safety issues (denying underage teens, drunk

driving, and liquor store hold-ups) than either the Liberal or PC participants.

In the same roundtable discussion MPP Peter Shurman (2007-13), former PC

Finance Critic, emphasized consumer convenience to a greater degree than his

counterparts (for instance shift workers who need flexible retail access) and diminished

the social responsibility aspect (citing it as more of a problem for bars than retail outlets).

He argued that if the Ontario government retained wholesaling functions, as the Alberta

government did, its revenue would remain neutral, or even improve.

62

http://www.lcbo.com/content/lcbo/en/corporate-pages/about.html 63

Howlett (2014). 64

Howlett (2014). 65

Ibid. 66

Ibid. 67

“Governing the Gin”. The Agenda with Steve Paikin. 15 May 2014; Toronto. Television.

14

Ultimately the Liberal government decision remains puzzling, all the more so

given Mr. Sorbara’s contradictory post-hoc explanations. The 2005 MoF report was

produced through roundtables and one-on-one interviews with advisors, consultants, and

18 stakeholders, as well as hundreds of written submissions. Given the strength of its

recommendation, it seems clear that a sizeable chunk of the ‘public’ was of the opinion

that some change was needed. However if there is one line of continuity between

Premiers Harris and McGuinty, it is that both were afraid of what a post-restricted market

might look like, especially with regard to government revenue. This fear of the unknown,

of abandoning an entrenched institution that is able to make a strong case for itself, is

exactly what historical institutionalism predicts as a barrier to policy change.

The Wynne Premiership – Change in the Air?

What of the present moment? The Wynne-led provincial government, unlike their

1980s and 90s counterparts, did not campaign on a promise, or even an openness, to

reform Ontario’s alcohol market. This means they do not have specific mandate from the

electorate to radically alter policy in this area. Nonetheless, the issue, in line with Ontario

tradition,68

has once again exploded in the public forum.69

This is partly a result of

Premier Wynne’s own actions, having initiated an ‘Advisory Council on Government

Assets’, and including Ontario’s alcohol market in its purview. However, interestingly,

Premier Wynne specifically instructed the panel not to consider dramatic changes such as

full-scale privatization or convenience store retailing. She limited the range of policy

options to mere alterations in the regulatory structure.

This may not have reflected and underlying policy preference however. It is just

as likely that Ms. Wynne, remembering 2005 (she was part of the McGuinty government

at the time), was making a strategic decision. McGuinty and Sorbara had put themselves

in a sticky situation by commissioning a panel of experts to do a comprehensive study of

the beverage alcohol retailing system. They had to face questions not only from the

media about why they chose to ignore the recommendations of their own panel but also

accusations from opposition parties of having wasted taxpayer money (the report cost

$500,000).70

In recent decades, conservative voices in the press have been highly critical of the

present legislative framework, calling it everything from “archaic” to “bizarre” 71

. In the

2014 election, the leader of the Progressive Conservatives did make the alcohol market a

campaign issue, promising to liberalize it, but then reversed course. By election day, no

major party was promising action on the matter. The NDP is typically pro-status quo,

expressing a well-founded fear of declining wages in a liberalized market, among other

arguments. Thus the PC party has become, since the Harris era, almost synonymous with

the idea of liberalizing alcohol sales. Indeed today’s younger Liberal and NDP staffers

are often shocked when they are made aware that their parties went just as far if not

68

The tradition: every ten years a Premier directly or indirectly resuscitates the LCBO/TBS issue.

1985 (Peterson), 1995 (Harris), 2005 (McGuinty), 2015 (Wynne). 69

Selley (2014); Lafleche (2014); Morrow (2014). 70

Howlett (2014). 71

Malcolm (2014)

15

further to liberalize the alcohol market, having brought legislation to the floor of the

House to do so on more than one occasion.

The political side has thus become quite stale. On the institutional side however,

the opposite is true. In recent years there has been surprisingly impressive growth in new

domestic distilleries, wineries, and especially in the craft beer industry. While Ontario’s

craft brewing industry technically resuscitated in the early 1980s with Brick Brewing Co.,

growing modestly in the 1990s with occasional media attention,72

the true renaissance of

Ontario craft beer began in the 2000s.73

Indeed, the craft brewers have arguably

superseded the OCSA and major grocery chains as the main special interest pressuring

the government for reform.

Although they lack the financial resources and political ties of the latter two lobby

groups, the craft brewers have a unique appeal to the public and to politicians. First, they

are domestic stakeholders, at a time when ‘going local’ is trending politically, and at a

time when the province is in an economic slump, creating sympathy for groups that are

authentically ‘Ontarian’ rather being branches of international or national conglomerates.

This optic is all more the powerful given the unfair advantage the three TBS foreign

brewers hold over their domestic competitors. Furthermore, they have already achieved

mild success: the 2004 budget included the “Ontario Microbrewers Strategy”, which

allotted $1 million in financial assistance to microbreweries. Combined with tax breaks,

these government initiatives have played no small part in the current craft brewing

renaissance.

If the craft brewers succeed where other pressures have failed it will likely be in

large part because of their strong case against unfairness. Since the 1980s (but now with a

much louder voice) some non-TBS brewers have complained about how much visibility

their products can get when the majority of retailing is managed by their competitors.74

Even in its retail design75

, TBS discourages browsing; one must decide what to buy based

purely on (expensive) national advertising campaigns and brand recognition. Many craft

breweries resent having to pay exorbitant listing fees to a direct competitor to distribute

their product, which incidentally involves handing over competitive data (what they are

selling by type, package size, geographic location, price, etc.). Proponents of reform often

hold Quebec up as a good comparator, given its rough equivalence to Ontario in size.

Shelf space there is allotted by merit and what the market demands. Finally, brewers (as

well as wineries and distilleries) have complained of the large amounts of red tape that go

a long with Ontario’s highly centralized system. Unlike arguments about health impacts

or economic benefits, the evidence for the craft brewer’s case is decidedly less mixed.

Over the last decade, Ontario’s craft brewers banded together and embraced

traditional lobbying (including hosting an annual Queen’s Park reception), as well as

grassroots campaigns. As Peter Chiodo, owner of Flying Monkeys put it, “Hopefully,

growing public awareness and social pressure fostered by Ontario’s beer writers and craft

72

Bellis (1997). 73

As of 2012, over 40 breweries across the province, more than 700 direct brewery jobs, and about $72

million in taxes paid from the industry 74

Flying Monkey, Kensington Brewing Company, and Steamwhistle have all recently criticized the notion

of “vendor neutrality” at TBS and claimed that it does not give equal access to prime retail shelf space. See

Johnson (2014); Mckenna (2014); Lenardon & Wykes (2014). 75

For those not familiar: most of the product is located behind a wall, with customers ordering from a

menu, unlike most shops where the customer has direct access to the goods on sale.

16

beer culture will influence small brewers’ infiltration of the system.”76

From the

government side, one could argue that these ‘shelving and retailing’ problems inhibit

sales which inhibits tax revenue, job growth, reinvestment, and other positive economic

effects.77

Ontario now boasts 90 craft breweries that control less that 5 per cent of the

provinces beer market but account for roughly 30% of jobs and the bulk of the industry’s

growth in coming years.78

For these reasons the craft beer industry represent an interesting new variable, a

new pressure on the system, that could influence a more radical departure from the status

quo than has been seen in past instances when the alcohol market became heavily

politicized. As Howlett and Cashore put it,

“Perturbations” occurring outside of an institutionalized policy subsystem, often

characterized as some type of societal or political upheaval or learning, are critical

for explaining the development of profound and durable policy changes which are

otherwise limited by ‘‘endogenous’’ institutional stability.79

Nonetheless, TBS is not doomed. As learned from the story of the LCBO, public

institutions can survive even the fiercest attacks from the fiercest opponents if they

adjust. TBS executives point out that 20 per cent of the more than 400 brands sold in their

stores are Ontario craft beers, whose sales through TBS have grown by 67 per cent since

2008.80

If TBS adapts and improves its performance on the equity and pricing fronts, it

too may survive this tumultuous time. Ed Clark, Chair of Premier Wynne’s Advisory

Council on Government Assets, seems to have overtly stated as much in saying that if the

TBS monopoly continues it must “be required to treat all producers equally”.81

Whatever the Wynne government’s decision, one can reasonably predict that

health and social harm concerns will play a small role. In his official press release

nominating Edward Waitzer as Chair of the LCBO, Minister of Finance Charles Sousa

stated simply that “Mr. Waitzer would lead LCBO’s board of directors as the agency

continues to provide an important annual financial contribution to the provincial

economy.” 82

Indeed Mr. Waitzer’s background includes tenures as a professor of

business law and a securities regulator. He has no significant background in health,

education, public safety, youth policy, or any of the other alleged non-fiscal purposes for

the LCBO’s existence.83

76

Johnson (2014). 77

Though it must be noted that some craft breweries prefer the visibility of TBS’ centralized system rather

than being hidden away in the back of convenience stores, and worry that distribution prices will increase

significantly when they have to ship to more vendors. 78

McKenna (2014). 79

Howlett & Cashore (2009). 80

Johnson (2014). 81

McKenna (2014). 82

News Release - Ontario Newsroom. <http://news.ontario.ca/mof/en/2013/07/minister-nominates-new-

chairs-of-olg-and-lcbo.html> 83

Though it is worth mentioning that the LCBO itself maintains a “dedication to preventing sales to minors

and intoxicated adults” and undertaking several initiatives encouraging responsible consumption (e.g. an

advertising campaign to combat impaired driving). LCBO website. “Corporate Social Responsibility”.

17

A Quick Note on Recent Events:

The Wynne government announced its reform plans in mid-April, 2015.

Ultimately, these reaction quotes sum up the situation perfectly:

“Although liberalizing a few aspects of liquor distribution, it continues Ontario's tradition

of very strange and complex over-management of alcohol distribution.” 84

- Dr. Dan Malleck, Brock University

“There are serious public health implications related to this expansion that haven’t been

discussed in much of the coverage to date.” 85

- Kate Richards, The Centre for Addiction and Mental Health

“It’s a good day for our economy and for job creation.” 86

- Kathleen Wynne, Ontario Premier

The reaction from the other parties has been interesting: scorn for having

announced the reforms simultaneously with the proposed Hydro One sell-off. Whether or

not the beer announcement was indeed meant as ‘distraction’ from a more controversial,

big-ticket policy, the reaction from the PCs was especially surprising, given that they

have generally supported liberalizing the beverage alcohol market in recent decades. It

will be very interesting whether either of the opposition parties debate the beverage

alcohol issue in-depth in the House. Thus far it seems unlikely, as other budget items

have taken precedence.

My own assessment of the situation leading up to the reform proved correct on

some accounts, incorrect on others. Featuring a bevy of arbitrary and bizarre rules,87

the

reform does not fundamentally change Ontario’s beverage alcohol market. It does not

offer a retailing license to any citizen who is willing to comply with a set of regulations,

nor does it open up distribution networks or fundamentally change wholesale and import

rules. It appears that the craft brewers did not create a sufficient ‘perturbation’ to

significantly alter Ontario’s historically-entrenched beverage alcohol institutions.

Finally, the official pronouncement, as expected, focus heavily on ‘unlocking

value’ and other economic concepts, with only a nod to health and social concerns.

Though this follows the pattern outline above, it becomes quite surprising when

examining the results of my survey of MPP attitudes.

84

Toronto Star. A14, 17/04/2015. 85

Ibid. 86

Ibid. 87

No price competition will be allowed between TBS and grocery stores, grocery stores will only be

allowed to sell 6 packs, only 450 grocery stores over 5 years will be licensed, and the LCBO will still be

prohibited from selling 24 packs, to name just a few.

18

MPP Interviews

Design:

I designed an interview programme to verify whether the official finance-focused

rhetoric of last 20 years actually indicates underlying MPP preferences. As we have, seen

MPPs have tended to bring out everything but the kitchen sink when arguing for or

against alcohol market liberalization. They emphasize one thing at one time and other at

another time, if they emphasize anything at all. Thus the questions were designed to force

MPPs to reveal which aspects of this admittedly complex issue really mattered most to

them.

Unfortunately the issue became politicized quite rapidly and unforeseeably during

the time of writing. First, Ed Clark’s Advisory Panel issued a number public statements

before the actual report was revealed, causing rampant speculation about what reforms

over the beverage alcohol market might be in the pipeline, and forcing parties to

formulate a response. Then Martin Regg Cohn of the Toronto Star broke a story in which

a whistleblower revealed questionable collusion between the LCBO and TBS over the

issue of selling 12 and 24 packs of beer. Both these stories were ongoing headline news,

and as a result the author was faced with substantive (and understandable) reluctance

from some MPPs to discuss the issue.

As a result, I offered anonymity as a means of securing the trust and cooperation

of potential participants. The unhappy consequence is that it makes for bad social

science: my data cannot be broken down by age, gender, ethnicity, length of party

membership or elected office, riding, or any other of the innumerable categories that

could be useful in a multivariate regression analysis. Furthermore, I was only able to

secure interviews with 58 sitting MPPs. My survey is therefore meant merely as a

suggestive sample of MPP attitudes, not a conclusive record.

Nevertheless, all three parties were surveyed with a mind to demographic

diversity (age, ethnicity, gender) as well as professional experience (rookie, experienced,

and veteran MPPs were interviewed, including several cabinet ministers). I was able to

secure an excellent, varied cross-section of individuals with respect to each of these

categories. Additionally, I was able to record party affiliations, which enables us to track

how the parties have evolved on the issue over time.

Each interview was conducted in person and normally ranged from 15-20

minutes, though on occasion they would extend almost to an hour in length (MPP’s

schedule permitting). MPPs were initially asked a general question about their view of

Ontario’s beverage alcohol market, then asked to rank the following priorities when

thinking about this policy field: protecting Ontarians from health and social harms,

maximizing the consumer experience, ensuring economic benefits for the province, and

public opinion. Finally, MPPs were asked about their own purchasing habits. For more

details and a replica of the actual question sheet, please see Appendix A.

19

Hypotheses:

Given the trend in government messaging since the 1990s and the province’s dire

fiscal situation at present, I predicted that most MPPs would rank economic benefits at

the top. Given the significant increase in lobbying by wineries, breweries, and distilleries

in recent years, as well as the concomitant growth in consumer awareness and

expectations, I predicted consumer concerns would rank second.

The issue of health and social harms has certainly waned since the prohibition

days, and the relative lack of outcry during the 1990s when the LCBO began actively

promoting consumption to increase sales underlines this fact. Given the success and

publicity of organizations like MADD, not only in terms of directly warning the public of

potential dangers but also legislatively forcing alcohol advertisers to include safety

messages in their ads and labels, citizens are more informed now about the dangers of

alcohol than ever before. Correspondingly, one could expect a decrease in paternalistic

attitudes among policymakers as citizens can now make responsible consumption

choices. I predicted therefore that this issue would rank third on average.

Public opinion is one sense the number one priority for every elected official. If

there is a large public outcry, even the most hardline, ideological government will reverse

course. Yet for issues which are only intermittently politicized (as opposed to say

healthcare or the economy), it is most often a non-determinative input on public policy.

The lack of action on capital punishment, in spite of consistent polling showing a

majority of Canadians in favour it, is an example. As mentioned, Ontario’s alcohol

market only gets put on the political map every 10 years, and public knowledge of the

complexities of the subject is poor, so I predicted this answer would be most often ranked

last.

Results: (see Appendix B for complete data summary)

Ultimately, most MPPs were open to some measure of liberalization, though the

scope and degree varied widely, as did the motivations. Does this predict imminent

policy change? In fact, at various points in Ontario’s history, there was a cross-party

consensus to change the beverage alcohol market – the 1995 election being an instructive

example. In Ontario, openness and enthusiasm among elected officials does not

necessarily entail policy change.

Breaking down the results by party, a few interesting observations can be made.

First, the lack of concern for the consumer perspective among Liberals (75% ranked it

3rd

-4th

) was unsurprising, given that throughout both the McGuinty and Wynne eras little

has been done to improve the dismal situation for Ontario’s beverage alcohol

consumers.88

The emphasis Liberal MPPs placed on economic benefits and protecting

Ontarians from health and social harms (75% ranked both 2nd

or better) matches up very

well with their official pronouncements on the subject over the last decade.

However, it does not match up perfectly. In Liberal public statements and actions,

the provincial treasury is almost always mentioned first and foremost, with ‘social

responsibility’ appearing somewhat the afterthought, if at all. The survey results seem to

flip that order. This suggests perhaps the desire to not appear as if moralizing concerns

88

Sen (23/04/2015); Strauss (23/04/2015); Keenan (08/04/2015); National Post (18/03/2015).

20

are interfering with economic policy decisions. Conversely more cynical observers might

have assumed public comments about social responsibility were made merely to appease

certain interest groups, such as MADD or medical professional associations. This appears

not to be the case. Among Progressive Conservatives, the significant (though not dominant) concern

for public safety and health was surprising, given the traditional association of that party

with self-reliance, individualism, and personal responsibility in a free market context.

Indeed, that ethos was overtly mentioned by several PC interviewees. I predicted

‘consumer experience’ to take top billing for Conservatives given their general approach

to market forces, and also because many in the party had business backgrounds.

Surprisingly, PC members ranked this in a highly varied fashion, with no overly strong

tendency.

Conversely, the strongest trend for the PCs by far was ‘economic benefits’ (82%

ranked it 1st or 2

nd). This was due to a variety of reasons. Sometimes MPPs felt that local

brewers, distillers, or wineries were treated unfairly by the current market structure.

Other times there was a view that more revenue and value could be realized for the

province or jobs could be created by liberalizing the market, with outside jurisdictions

cited as evidence.

Among New Democrats there was strong support for prioritizing public health

and social harms (88% ranked 1st-2

nd, 63% ranking it 1

st), which was surprising. Problem

drinking is largely a ‘social’ or ‘cultural’ problem, and the NDP is traditionally quite

liberal on such issues. From regulating the sex trade to penalties for illicit substance

possession and so forth, New Democrats are not consistently receptive to arguments

curbing individual freedoms in the interest of ‘harm to society’. On this particular issue

for some reason, there seems to be a sanctimonious streak in the party.

Furthermore, the common wisdom around Queen’s Park is that the NDP is

beholden to organized labour on this issue; liberalizing beverage alcohol retailing would

almost certainly weaken the LCBO/TBS unions and result in dramatic wage decline.

Thus one would expect them to rank ‘economic benefits’ (under which I grouped

‘employment, wages, etc.’) highest. Not so, though admittedly 69% still ranked it 2nd

.

The consistent lack of concern for the consumer perspective was interesting (all

but 1 respondent ranked it 3rd-4th), not least because the NDP have a strong mix of rural

and urban MPPs. Rural communities tend to suffer more on the ‘access/convenience’

metric given the virtual freeze on agency store expansion since the early 2000s.

Nonetheless, New Democrats rarely if ever heard convenience complaints from

constituents, or felt it in their own lives. Finally, the NDP base is typically seen as

‘working class’. It is often argued that high or inflated alcohol prices are regressive since

they eat up a higher share of the income of poorer people in society (without doing much

to combat social problems, since both alcoholic and teenage consumption is price

inelastic89

). However, pricing concerns did not feature prominently in responses.

As for general remarks pertaining to the entire sample, the low priority given to

public opinion across party lines was unsurprising, and all MPPs generally gave the same

justifications: that public opinion is easily manipulated and misled by politicians, interest

groups, and the media, that the issue is extremely complex and the average citizen has

neither the time nor the resources which are at the disposal of legislators, and that public

89

Breakenbridge (2013).

21

opinion is fickle, and often changes from favourable to negative or vice-versa once a

policy is actually introduced and its effects felt. However, it should be noted virtually all

MPPs acknowledged that if public opinion was overwhelmingly in favour of or against

reform, as elected representatives they would accede to their constituents’ desire. The

question was worded specifically to suggest that public attitudes were generally (not

strongly) supportive of one position or another. Another point of general consensus was

that the system could definitely be improved; however very few MPPs from any party

thought dramatic change was necessary.

As to the final question: MPPs were asked how often they interact with Ontario’s

beverage alcohol market (i.e. purchase something at an LCBO, Wine Rack, or Beer

Store). Only 5 of the 58 MPPs interviewed claimed they never bought beverage alcohol,

while 33 (57%) said they occasionally purchased beverage alcohol (1-3 times a month)90

.

19 (33%) said they purchased beverage alcohol frequently (3+ times a month). It was

stressed that this question bore had relation to actual drinking habits; MPPs typically

have very busy social schedules, and often bring beverage alcohol as a gift. The point

was to measure how much Ontario’s legislators actually interact with the system and

framework that only they are empowered to reform. Contrary to expectations, no

correlation was found between frequency of interaction and desire to liberalize the

system.

Further Avenues for Research

The LCBO’s ability to satisfy the demands of a new neoliberal context helps

explain the static nature of Ontario’s alcohol market. However neoliberalism has been

ascendant across the jurisdictions of the ‘West’91

and yet Ontario continues to buck the

trend by having an extraordinarily high government presence in beverage retailing. Did

the LCBO simply have more competent managers than public firms in other

jurisdictions? Possibly. However, while economic benefits have been dominant principles

for all governments since the Harris era, it is clear that they were not the only principles

in play.

I have mounted evidence that other concerns – principally health and social

harms, optimizing the consumer experience, and public opinion – tend to exercise an

influence over political elites as well. Yet when these same arguments are raised in other

jurisdictions they lead to policy change in a liberal direction or retention of an already

liberal system. Still Ontario remains unique. What other factors might be at play?

Culture & History:

A cultural-historical argument is sometimes invoked to help explain Ontario’s

rigid alcohol controls. Some have suggested the puritanical values of conservative Upper

Canadian loyalists have persisted in Ontario government and society over the years.92

90

A handful of MPPs stated that 1-3 times a year was more accurate; I included this under the category of

‘occasional/infrequent’. 91

Those countries and regions who’s regulatory regimes are typically compared to Ontario. 92

Dr. Craig Heron, York University, quoted in Lenardon, Peter; Straight Up: The Issue of Alcohol in

Ontario.

22

Dan Malleck goes so far as to argue “the Liquor Control Act was drafted to control and

shape the drinking cultures within a framework defined by white, middle-class, Anglo-

Saxon, and Christian values”.93

While Ontario’s population has diversified, and its capital

is often touted as the most multicultural city in the world, when one looks at a list of

Ontario’s Premiers, and even its cabinet ministers, one notices a striking ethnic

homogeneity.

Though they are difficult to ‘prove’ in a social scientific sense, the temperance-

culture arguments have some appeal, especially when one takes a broad view and looks at

other aspects of alcohol regulation. The consumptive act itself is an instructive example:

interdictions against the consumption of alcohol in public spaces (i.e. ‘open container’

laws) are either non-existent (Japan, Korea) or largely unenforced (Europe) in most

OECD countries. Outside of the majority Muslim countries, the same can be said for

most of the developing world. The casual tourist to any of these regions notices the

difference almost immediately.

Yet in Ontario, such laws are highly popular. One major divergence between

Ontario and these other jurisdictions is the historical experience of the temperance

movement. One can thus plausibly draw a line from this most basic aspect of alcohol,

putting the bottle to one’s lips, through the retailing, distribution, wholesaling and

importation aspects of the commodity, and notice one commonality throughout: a high

degree of control. Control for the purpose of preserving social order, among others.

Indeed, there was a ‘new restrictionist movement’ in the 1970s and 1980s among

North American social scientists and other addiction researchers, dubbed ‘neo-

temperance’, that was, according to Marquis, “most evident in Ontario”.94

It called for

increased controls on alcohol, a freeze on further liberalization, discouragement of

‘lifestyle’ liquor ads, strong education and awareness efforts, a health-centred pricing

policy, and an increase in the legal drinking age.95

Furthermore, public opinion around

the world is often more supportive of less intrusive measures to combat alcohol’s social

harms, like education; they are less supportive of intrusive policies like raising taxes or

restricting points of availability.96

Ontario stands out in this respect.

Given an age of mass tourism and globalization, it seems unlikely most Ontarians

are unaware of the uniqueness of their situation, and yet as is often pointed out, there has

never been a large constituency for change in the province. This in spite of the fact that

beverage alcohol is an accepted and significant part of Ontarian society: nearly 80% of

Ontarians report drinking alcohol in the previous year, most without harm to themselves

or others.97

Furthermore, thousands of jobs and substantial government revenues depend

on the production, distribution and sale of beverage alcohol.98

This issue is certainly

‘salient’ in the lives of Ontarians, if not in their political views.

It seems thus difficult to argue that the temperance movement has been

completely eradicated from the consciousness of the population. It may make Ontarian

citizens and elites more receptive to anti-liberal arguments, particularly of the health and

93

Malleck, 125, 2011. 94

Marquis (2011:229) 95

Ibid. 96

Bergin (2013:105) 97

BASR (2005:24) 98

Ibid.

23

social harm variety, and more deferential to authority when it comes to regulating this

dangerous substance. A cultural anthropologist or sociologist may be able to marshal a

strong argument in this direction, but no such study has yet been attempted. My own

limited survey suggests that health and social concerns remain dominant among political

elites of all partisan stripes: it was by far the most popular ‘top priority’ (43% of all

MPPs), with 65% of MPPs ranking it 1-2. It appears that the ‘puritan spirit’ is alive and

well in Ontario.

Lobbying:

Political scientists tend to look at Ontario’s alcohol market, particularly on the

beer side, and see a classic case of ‘diffused costs, concentrated benefits’.99

Consumers

might want more convenience, better selection, etc.100

but they are ultimately a very

poorly organized group. Moreover these benefits are quite weak compared to the

opportunity costs of community organizing, writing letters, knocking on doors, etc.

Conversely, for public sector unions and the three multinationals who own the beer store,

the stakes are incredibly high. Employment, wages and millions in profits are at risk.

They are thus highly organized, effective lobby groups that make a large mark on the

political system. Ontario’s alcohol market could be a classic case of narrow interests

dominating policy inputs because the stake they have in the issue causes them to invest

significant resources to influence politicians. In a cyclical fashion, the benefits they

receive have large monetary value, which means they have greater resources with which

to attempt to influence policymakers.

While this argument undoubtedly has some truth to it, it strikes me as insufficient.

Patashnik and others have argued convincingly that efforts towards broad-based policy

reform can take place in the fact of intense clientele opposition.101

Furthermore, the

OCSA and large grocery chains have been interested in alcohol vending for decades.

They too are composed of multimillion dollar companies with great resources to invest in

lobbying efforts. They have gotten nowhere on this file, despite their efforts. Thus the

question becomes why one set of ‘narrow interests’ continuously prevail over another.

There appears to be something else at play here besides monetary influence.

Public Opinion vs. Public Ignorance:

Bergin argues, on the basis of a cross-national analysis, that “public opinion’s

influence is not always dominant in the alcohol policy process”.102

My own research

verifies this in the case of Ontario; by far the most common statement I heard during

interviews was that the issue was not heard ‘at the doors’, either at or in between

elections (except for rare periods of intense politicization, noted above). Nonetheless, it

has from time-to-time featured at least nominally in debates on the issue. For instance,

according to a poll published in 1999, when asked about the Conservative government

suggestion to privatize the LCBO Ontarians were 46% opposed, 27% neutral, and 23%

99

Becker (1983). 100

This is not necessarily the case; polling data is very mixed on this point. 101

Patashnik (2003). 102

Bergin, 105; 2013.

24

supportive.103

One former cabinet minister under Harris told me that the unpopularity of

the initiative was indeed a major reason for the reversal.

There is a wrinkle in the ‘no constituency for change’ claim. Public opinion on

this subject is not terribly well-informed. For example, in a poll conducted in the summer

of 2014, six out of 10 people thought TBS was a government entity.104

Some polls put

that number as high as 87%.105

This problematizes an oft-heard argument; that the public

sector can be better entrusted to refuse service to underage drinkers, and thus the status

quo should be maintained. In fact, the private sector has been entrusted with this

responsibility for decades, and will continue to be so long as the status quo remains. As

the Beverage Alcohol System Review put it:

With greater recognition that these stores are owned by major corporations,

Ontarians would see that the private sector can do a good job in maintaining

social responsibility –especially when backed up by active government

enforcement and appropriate pricing.”106

This ‘greater recognition’ may come from increased education efforts by the nascent craft

brewing industry, as well as concerted journalistic efforts from all major newspapers in

light of recent events. Thus the public opinion variable at this point in time is anything

but constant.

Combing in the previous two categories, it must be noted that politicians are not

the only ones lobbied. Stakeholders makes appeals to the public as well. In spite of the

fact that most of the official discourse revolves around economic concerns, curiously,

beverage alcohol stakeholders that support the status quo often spend their advertising

dollars making health and social arguments to oppose liberalization.107

Perhaps, in

accordance with the neo-temperance arguments above, these ads are persuasive to the

electorate. Voters then tend to vote for anti-liberal parties, even if health and social harms

are not front-and-centre in their campaigns. A media scholar could study the

effectiveness of these ads, which would be helpful in understanding this potential effect

on the policy process. It is possible this had an impact, for instance, on the recent 2014

election, drawing voters away from the PC party which alone was flirting with

liberalization.

Regionalism:

The issue of rural inequality is often raised by rural MPPs. Since the rural regions

of Ontario, particularly in the North, are sparsely populated, there is a concern they

would be underserved by a pure free market. Poor selection and higher prices are the

103

Toronto Star “Don't Sell TVO, LCBO Ontarians tell Harris”; A6 02/06/1999. 104

Brennan (2014). 105

Cohn (17/09/ 2014). 106

BASR (2005:29) 107

Obviously, ads by Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) fit this bill, but much less obviously, TBS’

also focuses on this theme. See their infamous ‘It’s just not right for our kids’ ads during the 2014 election.

25

logical corollaries of regions with weak demand. Since the 1990s, the LCBO has largely

addressed rural inequality by permitting ‘agency stores’108

and equalizing prices across

the province regardless of the cost of distribution. Indeed many of the rural MPPs I

interviewed claimed they and their constituents were well-satisfied by these two policies,

which obviated the need for market liberalization. From their point of view, any attempt

to liberalize the market would have to be accompanied by some kind of subsidy program

for rural alcohol vendors in order to offset their extra distribution costs. This is one more

barrier to reform, and could cost significant political capital, thus reinforcing a historical

institutionalist reading.

A Regrettable Conflation

As Martin Regg Cohn has tirelessly pointed out over the years,

109 the LCBO and

TBS are really separate and distinct issues, and ought to be treated as such. Nonetheless,

at the risk of incurring the ire of those well-versed on the issue, I have somewhat lumped

these two issues together under the umbrella notion of a ‘liberalized alcohol market’.

The LCBO is a government-owned beverage alcohol importing, wholesaling,

distribution, and retailing operation, which is actually quite common across Canadian

provincial jurisdictions. The merits and demerits of such a system are a subject over

which reasonable people may disagree. TBS is a unique, government-endorsed, foreign-

owned monopoly with few defenders aside from those who are directly employed by it. It

remains, an historical accident, never envisioned as a good policy by any government,

and offering few benefits to either the government or the Ontarian citizenry.

Ultimately however if the LCBO were ever ordered to start selling private

retailing licenses, TBS’ monopoly would effectively be broken as well. It is almost

unthinkable that any government of Ontario would abscond from its own monopoly and

leave TBS’ intact (presumably by only granting wine and spirit sales to grocery and

convenience stores; a situation unseen anywhere in the world, given that beer has the

lowest alcohol content). It is especially unlikely at time of writing, given the pressure

TBS is under pressure from a growing craft beer industry, highly unfavourable recent

media coverage, and a negative report by the Premier’s Advisory Council on Government

Assets. Therefore, since fundamental reform implies a change to both entities, I have

largely combined the LCBO and TBS in my discussion of ‘liberalizing Ontario’s alcohol

market’.

108

Essentially a private retailer, like a convenience store or a small grocer, is given a licence to set aside a

section of his store as a sort of ‘mini-LCBO’, using the official LCBO logo and selling LCBO beverage

alcohol products. Thus the LCBO avoids the cost of maintaining a store in a low-volume area. 109

“Governing the Gin” (2014); “Backing Off the Booze Business” (2013).

26

Conclusion – Nothing Lasts Forever?

The interjurisdictional study performed by the BASR commission, examining 19

jurisdictions across the globe, noted that only one – Nova Scotia – has a stronger

government presence in the beverage alcohol marketplace than does Ontario.110

Over the

span of four decades, various Ontario governments and parties have considered

liberalization of the alcohol market. They each espoused different ideologies, relied on

distinct electoral bases, and emphasized different arguments, yet arrived at the same exact

location in the end: rejection of major reform. To call this mere coincidence begs

credulity.

From the political side, this issue ought to be susceptible to change, even for the

most risk-averse politicians The literature on the subject is extensive, frequently-updated,

and always comparative in nature. The results of one policy framework over another are

hardly unknown; there is no ‘jumping into the void’ for any Ontarian government in this

policy field. Nevertheless politicians of all stripes have been reluctant to follow through

on recommendations and proposals.

Part of the explanation has to do with institutional resistance. I have argued that

changes in Ontario’s political landscape have both threatened dominant stakeholders in

the beverage alcohol market as well as offered them opportunities to preserve themselves.

Classic historical institutionalist theory teaches that thoroughly entrenched institutions

are able to survive and thrive due to sunk costs, self-justification, and governmental fear

of the unknown. However given the radical change in behaviour during the course of the

LCBO’s lifespan, modern versions of the theory that account for institutional change are

necessary. In a neo-liberal era where governments expect efficient results, not just

customer service, the LCBO needed to dramatically improve its performance.

A useful study might compare it to institutions that did get privatized in the last

30 years, such as Hydro One and Hwy. 40. TBS is currently facing its ‘change’ moment,

and the government has made clear that its privileged monopoly position is entirely

contingent on its willingness to evolve. This dovetails perfectly with the pattern in

Ontario: episodes of heavy politicization, followed by an adaptation by the relevant

institutional bodies. What one does not see is massive overhaul; the behavioural

modification by the institution often heads off change from the government, making it

seemingly redundant.

Still, HI does not fully satisfy the inquiry. For that reason I spoke to policymakers

to try to understand what other issues might be in play. The most revealing inference to

be made from my survey of 58 MPPs is certainly the continued salience of health and

social harm arguments. For all the attention those arguments derive from melodramatic

advertising campaigns, they do not exert significant influence on policymakers outside of

Ontario. This trend is likely to continue, as the evidence is extremely mixed on whether

heavy government controls improve health and social outcomes.111

Indeed the World

110

BASR (2005:18) 111

For instance, some argue that increasing availability and decreasing price tends to encourage

consumption and thereby encourage the associated health and social problems (cancer, cirhhosis, problem

drinking, etc.) (Holder & Griffith, 1995:2). Alternatively, Alberta’s per capita consumption rates have not

significantly increased above other Canadian jurisdictions in spite of privatization (BASR 2005:28). In

27

Health Organization’s 2010 Global Strategy advocated the international adoption of price

incentives and minimum age limits, but noticeably not governmental monopolies. I have

suggested that historical-cultural factors may help explain the eternal Ontarian emphasis

on this aspect of beverage alcohol policy.

In spite of this emphasis, the economy still plays a key role. In every year of the

1980s government revenues grew, in most years in excess of 10%. For the first time in

decades, revenues actually declined in both 1991 and 1992.112

A new economic reality

had set in. Furthermore, provincial debt more than doubled from $42 billion to $97

billion between 1990 and 1995.113

Indeed, Ontario has yet to recover the impressive

balance sheets and GDP growth statistics of the postwar boom era. This makes politicians

nervous to tinker with a massive revenue-generating agency like the LCBO (even when

their own experts tell them there is greater revenue to be had from liberalization). A

majority of MPPs expressed this line of thinking in interviews.

Tellingly, Ontario’s only serious attempt to liberalize beverage alcohol retailing

came in the mid-1980s, as the Peterson government was presiding over a prosperous

Ontario. Alberta privatized its alcohol industry in the mid-1990s, during its own period of

economic prosperity. We may conclude from this that high-control jurisdictions, like

Nova Scotia, Pennsylvania, and Ontario are unlikely to liberalize unless economic

fortunes greatly improve. This unfortunately tells us nothing of jurisdictions without a

history of heavy governmental control, since those governments have not come to see

themselves as dependant on revenue derived from beverage alcohol retailing.

However, Ontario might not have a choice. Some predict that globalization will

cause cross-national harmonization of alcohol policy frameworks.114

Indeed, although

some exceptions were grandfathered into GATT and NAFTA, those agreements still

limited the ability of Ontario wineries and TBS to sell only domestic products.115

Moreover, Canada has already experienced having to alter legislation in response to

lawsuits from foreign companies,116

and is in talks to establish new trade agreements with

both Asian and European partners. Given Ontario’s pathological resistance to change in

this policy field, it seems only fitting that transformation come from outside, if it comes

at all.

addition, vehicular deaths related to alcohol per 100,000 in Quebec (liberal system) are identical to those in

Ontario, while the death rate from alcohol related accidents is actually lower in New York State (liberal):

1.8 per 100,000 to Ontario’s 2 per 100,000. 112

Wiseman (1997:423-24). 113

Wiseman (1997:423-24). 114

Bergin (2013:83). 115

BASR (2005:30). 116

Barlow & May (2004:355).

28

Appendix A – Interview Sheet

*** MPP's remain anonymous, though ideally I could note their party affiliation, since

my paper is partly an exploration of parties’ changing stances on the issue over time.

Introduction Script

This paper is about the resilience of Ontario’s legislative approach to beverage

alcohol retailing, which is one of the most unique in the developed world. The Liquor

Control Act has survived attacks by all three parties, free trade agreements, the rise of

neoliberalism, and bucked a general North American trend towards liberalization. Why?

Part of the explanation lies within the behaviour of the institution itself (the

LCBO/TBS duopoly), and this makes up half the paper. The other half has to do with

politicians’ attitudes towards beverage alcohol retailing. I have analyzed these attitudes

via Hansard debates, press releases, interviews etc. from the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.

Since the paper concludes with the Wynne era, interviews will be useful to establishing

the prevailing priorities of elected Members of Provincial Parliament today, in order to

complete the picture.

Questions

Q1 - Do you think the current regulatory regime concerning the beverage alcohol market

in Ontario is adequate, or ought to be changed? If the latter, in what way?

Q2- In what order would you rank 1-4 the following priorities when thinking about

beverage alcohol policy:

* Protecting Ontarians from health and social harms.

* Achieving the best consumer experience (lower prices, wider selection, quality of

service, and more convenient retail access etc.)

* Economic benefits (revenue for the provincial treasury, promotion of local

breweries/wineries/distilleries, promotion of Ontarian convenience/grocery stores,

efficiencies inherent to the current market structure etc.).

* Public Opinion - If public opinion was in favour of or against liberalizing alcohol sales,

would this override the above considerations?

Q3- How often do you purchase beverage alcohol?

Never (0/month), occasionally (1-3 times /month) or frequently (3+ times /month)

29

Appendix B – Interview Results

Ranking / Party Liberal (20) PC (22) NDP (16) All MPPs (58)

Health & Social

Harms 1st

11 / 55% 4 / 18% 10 / 63% 25 / 43%

Harms 2nd

4 / 20% 5 / 23% 4 / 25% 13 / 22%

Harms 3rd

1 / 5% 4 / 18% 2 / 13% 7 /12%

Harms 4th

4 / 20% 9 / 41% 0 13 /22%

Consumer

Benefits 1st

3 / 15% 8 / 36% 1/ 6% 12 / 21%

Consumer 2nd

2 / 10% 4/ 18% 0 6 /10%

Consumer 3rd

9 / 45% 6 / 27% 8 / 50% 23 / 40%

Consumer 4th

6 / 30% 4 / 18% 7 / 44% 17 / 29%

Economic

Benefits 1st

4 / 20% 7 / 32% 3 / 19% 14 / 24%

Economic 2nd

11 / 55% 11 / 50% 11 / 69% 33 / 57%

Economic 3rd

5/ 25% 2 / 9% 2 / 13% 9 / 16%

Economic 4th

0 2 / 9% 0 2 /3%

Public Opinion

1st

2 / 10% 3 / 14% 2 / 13% 7 / 12%

Pub. Op. 2nd

3 / 15% 2 / 9% 1 / 6% 6 /10%

Pub. Op. 3rd

5 / 25% 10 / 45% 4 / 25% 19 /33%

Pub Op. 4th

10 / 50% 7 / 32% 9 / 56% 26 / 45%

30

Appendix C – Raw Data

Party Affiliation

Protecting Ontarians

Best Consumer Experience

Economic Benefits

Public Opinion

NDP 1 3 2 4

NDP 1 4 2 3

NDP 1 4 3 2

NDP 2 4 1 3

NDP 1 3 2 4

NDP 1 4 2 3

NDP 2 1 3 4

NDP 1 3 2 4

NDP 3 4 2 1

NDP 1 3 2 4

NDP 1 3 2 4

NDP 3 4 2 1

NDP 2 4 1 3

NDP 2 3 1 4

NDP 1 3 2 4

NDP 1 3 2 4

PC 4 1 2 3

PC 3 4 2 1

PC 4 2 1 3

PC 1 3 2 4

PC 2 4 3 1

PC 4 1 2 3

PC 1 4 2 3

PC 2 3 1 4

PC 4 1 2 3

PC 2 3 4 1

PC 4 2 1 3

PC 2 4 1 3

PC 4 3 1 2

PC 3 1 2 4

PC 4 1 2 3

PC 4 1 2 3

PC 1 3 4 2

PC 3 2 1 4

PC 3 1 2 4

PC 2 3 1 4

PC 1 2 3 4

31

PC 4 1 2 3

LIB 1 3 2 4

LIB 1 3 2 4

LIB 4 1 3 2

LIB 1 3 2 4

LIB 2 4 1 3

LIB 2 3 1 4

LIB 4 3 1 2

LIB 1 4 2 3

LIB 1 3 2 4

LIB 2 1 3 4

LIB 3 2 1 4

LIB 1 3 2 4

LIB 1 3 2 4

LIB 1 4 2 3

LIB 1 4 2 3

LIB 4 1 2 3

LIB 4 2 3 1

LIB 1 3 2 4

LIB 1 4 3 2

LIB 2 4 3 1

32

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