7-

No Lieutenant Golumboin Mexico GityBy Irlse Pease

any researchershave felt that theMexico City epi-sode provides im-portant clues tothe true role of

Oswald in the assassination ofPresident Kennedy. The documentmost researchers call "The lopez Report,,goes a long way towards answering key ques-tions and asking several others. But why hasit taken until 1996 to seethese major puzzlepieces unveiled at last? And equally impor-tantl, why is there no equivalent investiga-tion in the records of the WarrenCommission?

On August 13th of this year, the reportof former Warren Commission counsel WDavid Slawson's investigative trip to MexicoCity, wriften over 32 years ago, was finallyreleased. The only remaining redactions con-sist offour instances ofthe name that wouldreveal the identity ofJohn Scelso, the MexicoCity Desk offrcer responsible fo! the CIA sodginal invesdgation into the Kennedy as-sassinadon. Slawson's trip report does notcome anywhere near matching the sophisti-cacion and depth of rhe repon Eddie Lopezand Dan Hardway wrote years later. H;w-ever, instead of revealing much aboutOswald in Mexico Ciry, Slawson's report ismore of a tip-offto the Commission,s built-in predisposirions and gullibility-if one canattribute what follows to simple naivet6.

. To understand what happened to thisoriginal investigation, one need look no fur-ther thar a representarive sampling of thatold TV series chestnur, "Columbo,,. Everyepisode had the same formula. The chiefsuspect (who always tumed out to b€ theactual culprit) would artempt to befriendLieutenant Columbo, offering to help"guide" him through the murlg mitteq, hoping to lead Columbo cway from his or herown guilt toward another, however inappro-priate, conclusion. Unfortunately for history,the Warren Commission employed noColumbo. Instead they had the followrngsituation. Bear in mind that Slawson toldthe HSCA he did nor rule out the CIA as a

suspect at first. Letting Slawson,s wordsspeak for themselves;

At 3:30 jn the afternoon l john Scelso] ofthe CIA came to the Commission off icesand conferred there with Slawson, Wil lensand Coleman. This conference grew out ofa suggestion made by Mr. Richard Helmsof the CIA about wvo weeks previous, inwhich he had mentioned that i t would bea good idea if a representative gf his agencymet with those persons from the Commis-sion who planned to go to Mexico iust be-fore they left , in order to ensure that theCIA could properly advise us of any last,minute arrangements and properly alert i tspeople in Mexico of our arr ival.

We discussed whether we would journeyto Mexico off icial ly and openly or com-pletely incognito, and Mr. lscelsol offeredto make arrangements to get us into Mexacocompletely unnoticed i f we desired to doso... .We outl ined to Mr. lscelso] our entireproposed plan...and asked for his com-menls on how best to achieve our goals.His reply in every instance was thar weshould deal on the spot with the CIA rep-resentative. He repeated what Mr Helmsof the CIA had said a while ago that thereis no substi tute for the "case off icer" beins"on the soot."1Once inside Mexico Ciw, the Warren

Commissioners allowed themselves to beguided in their investigation by ClarkeAnderson, the FBI's legal attach6 and closeassociate ofDavid Atlee Phillips,, along withanother close friend and associate of DavidPhillips-the CIA Mexico City Station ChiefWin Scott (referred to in the report, exceptfor a single slip, as "Mr. A').

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Of Mexico City itsell David Arlee philliDsonce called it "a hugger-mugger metropoiisot cloak-and-dagger conspirators,', fi lledwith "a conglomeration of inLelligence of-ncets, agents, sples, provocateurs, and theshadowy figures ofthose who manage finan-cial and communication nets to sufpon in-temarional intrigue,"3 Slawson remarked insimilar fashion on this to the HSCA, sayng:

The CIA told me that Mexico City was kindof spy headquarters so to speak for lots ofcountries, l ike lstanbul used to be in de-tective thri l lers, the spies alwavs met atlstanbul . Supposedly, Mexico Ci ty wassomewhat in truth l ike that in the early1960's and late 1950's.4

Oswald's visit there was always signifi-cant on this basis alone. And for tJte WarrenCommissionels to go there with t}le CIA astheir guide seems t}te height of narvere, roput it mildly. How could one evaluate thepossibility that Oswald was rhere on an in-telligence mission ifone was surrounded byintelligence operatives?

In later years, the HSCA questionedSlawson on this point, asking ifhe had everenterained the idea that the CIA might pos-sibly have been involved in rhe assassina-tion. He responded:

No, I don't think I entertained very long thepossibil i ty that lJames Angleton,s ctosestdeputy Raymondl Rocca or anybody else Ihad known in the CIA was involved in anvway in k i l l ing Kennedy.. . l d id not have thatfeeling about the ClA...My judgment oftheir character and so forth was far differ-ent I think from the judgment I made ofthe anti-Castro Cuban conspiracy groups inthe United States.5Slawson was, of course, wholly unin-

formed of the CIA's maripularion and con-trol ofthese same anti-Castro Cuban groups.But had he been told, it might still nor havematteled. Slawson readily admitted his af-finity for his CIA friends such as Rocca, andAllen Dulles. Of Rocca he said, ,,I came toknow one man particularly well, RaymondRocca, and I came to like him and trust himboth."6 Of Dulles he was even more effu-sive:'Allen Dulles and I became fairlv close.I think....he was very smart and I liked himvery much."7 When asked more pointedlyabout his feelings towards the Cia, Stawson said that working for the CIA ,.was some-thing I briefly considered myself.,,3

As we've leamed by 1996, the CIA wasanything but forthcoming ofwhat they knewabout Oswald. Slawson's friend Ray Roccaneglected to impress upon Slawson thesignficant fact that his very own unit in CIAhad a pre-assassination file on Oswald soclosely held it was resricted, with accessstrictly monitored. But that's a topic for an-other article.

Where Columbo would have keot hisdistance, Slawson reached our

""g.rly to

accept the "guidance" profened by the FBland CIA.

Despite Evidence to theGontrary

Perhaps ir was this ser ofpredispositionsthat allowed Slawson to write a reDon whichbore conclusions not supponed 6y rhe evi-dence presented. Consider the followingaccoun!:

illgBE ![ovember-D€cember, 1996

Larson lanother FBI agenr in Mexico City]and Anderson then went into a discus5ionof the Hotel del Comercio investigation.Here, it appears that the conclusion of theMexico investigators that no one at thehotel remembered Oswald and that theonly evidence of his stay there was his nameon the register was incorrect, Larson, afterseveral interrogations, had found that themaid at the hotel did remember Oswaroand was able to give some bits of info.ma-tion about him. For one thint, she, as didother witnesses, confirmed that he was al-ways alone when she saw him....Larson hadalso found out that the proprietress of theIitt le restaurant next door to the hotel wasable to identify Oswald, although Larsonwas not completely certain how much shereally remembered and how much she mayhave picked up by suggestion from news-paper reporters. v

In other words, it took Larson severaltrips to find anyone would could idenri!/Oswald, ard ofthose two, he had his doubtsabout one ofrhem. Yet [o Slawson's discem-ing mind, rhis was wonh recording as evi-dence that Oswald had been seen in Mexico.Nevermind, too, that when Larson et al. in-terviewed people from more than 300 silvershops trying to find rhe shop that made thesilver bracelet on which "Marina" was in-scribed, not one person could identifyOswald, and "subsequenr investigation hasshoram that such bracelets are probably notsold in Mexico at all because they are madein Japa! and rhe duty on importing theminto Mexico would make their price non-competitive with local products."'o

Undeterred, Slawson went on to reponthat Gutierrez, rhe supposed witnesi roOswald having been at rhe Cuban embassy,had failed to identifu rhe photo of Oswaldleafleting in New Orleans as the man he hadseen.ri

Still with little evidence of Oswald hav-ing been in Mexico, Slawson then turned tothe topic of Silvia Duran. Dutifully noringthat the FBI representative had called Durana "Mexican Pepper Pot" and "sexy",', Slaw-son could not resist taking a moment in thisolficial document on rhe Kennedy assassi-nation to include: "The CIA later showedus some pictures ofher which substantiallyconfi rmed this description."'3

Slawson also recorded how Coleman"jokingly" menrioned how much theywouldlike to have lunch with Duran ro LuisEchevarria. who responded in kind. salngthey would not have "as much fun as wethought because Duran was not a goodJook-ing Cubaa but only a Mexican."ra This, froma Mexican official, again duly recorded by a

supposedly serious investigator of rheKennedy assassination. In light of this,Liebeler's illicit advances on Silvia Odio looklike less of an aberradon from the behaviorof his fellow investigators.

Aside from their libidos, the interesr theWarren Commission had in Duran was madeexplicit by Slawson: "Ir is only on detailssuch as Oswald's physical appearance, saidcomments or remarks he may have made,etc., that we would like to interogate Mrs.Duran funher" No wondet since Duran'sdescription of Oswald did nor fir the personthe world saw killed byJack Ruby in Dallas.Her Oswald was "blond, short, and dressed

According to Slowson, theWoren Commission hodevidence thot Oswold hoddeported New Orleons wifhfwo suitcoses. But by olloccounts, he relurned withonly one, o sinEle, smoll, bluezippered bog.

unelegantly [sic] and whose face tumed redwhen angry."r5

After giving a brief rundo'.n ofthe FBI,sleads on Oswald, Slawson determined thatofall of them, Gutierrez's was the most cred-ible. Remember, Gutierrez failed to identifya picture of Oswald as the man he had seen,yet this lead was "the only one that stillseemed serious."t6

Having exhausted Clarke Anderson,sleads, Slawson and company returned toWin Scott. Scott gave them "acomplete nar-rative of the CIAS acrivit ies in connecdonwith Lee Harvey Oswald, beginning in Sep-tember 1963 when [hey first picked up in-formation that Oswald had appeared at theRussian and Cuban Embassies."rT

Slawson records that Scott "utderstoodthat all three ofus had been cleared for TopSecret and that we would not disclose be-yond the confines of the Commission andits immediate staff the information we ob-tained through him without first clearing itwith his superiors in Washington." Can youimagine Columbo agreeing to such terms?"We agreed to this," Slawson reponed.'3

Notwithstanding Slawson's credulity,some interesting tidbits are nonetheless re-vealed in this report. One such tidbit, wor-thy of more follow-up than the Commissiongave it, was, in Slawson's own words, the"rwo-sui tcase probJsrn." ts According to

Slawson, the Warren Commission had evi-dence that Oswald had depaned New Or-leans with two suitcases. But by all accounts,he retumed with only one, a single, small,blue zippered bag. Whar happened ro theother bag(s)? Are we ro believe Oswald rrav-eled aweek in Mexico with onlya small zip-pered bag to carry his clothes?

Another tidbir comes from Scott, whotold Slawson they had "picked up the nameof Lee Harvey Oswald fiom commercial ra-dio broadcasts and had begun compiling in-formation on him fiom its Mexican files evenbefore being requested to do so by CIA inWashington."'?o What was the nature of thisinformation? Where is ir now? Why did rheMexico Ciry Srarion nor ger official sancrionfor such actions? What did they know thatheadquaners didn't?

The Hotel del Gomercio andthe Delgado Problem

This next revelation is recolded, rhenignored, by Slawson. He wrote of the dis-tance between the Hotel and the embassies,and of the difficulties getting fiom one tothe other:

The em bassies, a l though theoret ical lyreachablc hom the Hotel del Comercio orthe inter-city bus stations by local bus, arean practice so located that reaching themby bus would be much too complex forsomeone who was not familiar with the busl ines in Mexico Ci ty and especial ly forsomeone who did not speak Spanish flu,ently enough to get precise directions.rlThis brings up a familiar problem. lf

Oswald did not speak Spanish and did nordrive and was alone, how did he find andget to the Embassies from his hotel? Accord-ing to Raul Luebano, the inspector in chargeof the Mexican Immigration station at NuevaLaredo, Oswald crossed into Mexico in a carwith a man and wo women, none of whomspoke English. According to one of his in-spectors, Oswald was dressed as a sailor andclaimed to be a photographer.,, Accepringthat account would solve the problem ofgetting Oswald to the embassy. Bur it alsoopens a huge can of worms as to who hewas with and why. In facr, the FBI had al-ready wondered aloud to the press howOswald could have afforded to travel toMexico alone, given his lack ofemploytnenr,as well as his problems meedng his rem.r3

And if Oswald spoke Spanish, that be-came a problem in and of itselfto the War-ren Commission. The witness who told themOswald dr'd speak some Spanish was one they

conttnued on pa,ge 28

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November-December, 1996 iltQilE

Slawson inMexico Gitycontirwed from page 15

didn't want to give credit to for a number ofreasons: Nelson Delgado. Delgado was withOswald in the Marines. He gave the WarenCommission an incredible set of revelationswhich they, and apparently the FBI (whoDelgado charged during his swom tesrimonywith altering his statements), needed to dis-credit.

Delgado said he taught Oswald someSpanish. Then he told ofa trip he had takento Mexico where he realized Oswald hadbeen there before and knew his way around.According to Delgado, Oswald was a lousyshot and seldom passed rifle inspection.Delgado related a selret meeting Oswald hadin ttle wee hours one night with men in suitson the base. And he said Oswald receivedmail with an official seal from the CubanConsul in Los Angeles. He noted Oswaldalways had a lot ofcash available. When heasked Oswald about the papers he receivedin Russian, Oswald made a point ofexplain-ing the paper was a White Russian pubLica-tion, not Communist. Delgado mentionedOswald's comments on supponing Castro(this was in 1959 when the CIA itself wassuppofting Castro), Oswald's inrerest in theDominican Republic (another CIA target atthat time), and rhar Oswald had talked ofgoing to a school in Switzerland. Probe read-ers will recall that this school in Swirzer-land was so secret that it took the FBI andthe Swiss govemment months to find it,begging the question of how Oswald hadleamed ofit. And ofcourse, Delgado assuredthe commission that all the people in hisunit held "Secrer" clearance, includingOswald.

In short, it was easier to presume Oswalddid not speak Spanish than to give Delgadoany credibility. This in spite of the fact thatmuch ofwhat Delgado alleged could be cor-roborated.

The Mexican TapescapadeAs most researchers of the Kennedy as-

sassination know, there have been conflict-ing stories as to the existence of tapes ofOswald in Mexico City. David Phillips andRichard Helms have both stated that anvtapes theyhadwere destroyed before the as-sassination. But the FBI reported that twoof their agents had listened to such a tapea/t.r the assassination and concluded thatthe voice on the tape was not Oswald.

Slawson makes ar interestinscomment which relates tostatements he made yearslater. Iftrue, this is yet moreevidence ofthe deliberate andcontinued deception over timeby both Phil l ips and Helms.Slawson wrote,

"A"s narrat ive plus the materials we wereshown disclosed immediately how incorrectour previous informat ion had been onOswald's contacts with the Soviet andMexican Embassies. Apparently the distor-t ions and omissions to which our informa-t ion had been subjected had entered someplace in Washington, because the CIA in-formation that we were shown by A. wasunambiguous on almost al l crucial points. , ,What was this "unambiguous,, evidence

that didn't surface until Slawson went to theCIA in Mexico City? ln the 1993 Frontlinespecial Who Wos Lee Hartey Oswald, Slawsonmade the following statement:

My best recol lect ion is they offered to usto l isten. They said to us-irwas Win Scottthat-"Would you l ike to l isten ro thetapes" of th is part icu lar one. I can,t remem-ber now whether i t was a wiretap or a bug.And Eil l lcolemanl and I thought about i t aminute and said, "Well , what are they l ike?,,And so they played a l i t t le bit of i t for us.14

"Slowson sqys the topewos of poor quolify onddifficulf to understqnd. Hecould not idenlify Osrold,srrolce."

The narrator added, "Slawson says thetape was ofpoor quality and difficult to un-derstand. He could not identifi' Oswald'svoice." Slawson has made similar comrnenrsin the past, including this, to researcher GaryRowell: "Yes, we had access to the CIA taDeof Oswald in Mexico Ciry. I do not remem-ber whether the voice sounded like his."Slawson added, "It puzzles me how youthink I should know anyway since I nevermethim. Hewas killed, you know in 1963."15This, despite the availability to Slawson ofOswald's voice recorded for all time in hisdebate with Bringuier by INCA. Bill Cole-man also confirmed having listened to a tapefrom the CIA to Kennedy researchers, say-ing "We read the transcripts of what wasactually said and we heard the words beingspoken."'6 Coleman added thar he thoughr

the tapes were in the National Archives.When Rowell uied ro pursue rhe issue

further with Slawson, he received the fol-lowing curious reply:

I have forgotten the answers to most of thequestions, and I do not think it proper orpertinent to any legitimate historical re-search to give yo! the few answers I do re-member."27

GonclusionThe significance of this repon by Slaw-

son is that it once again shows in stark de-tail the kind of evidence available to theCommission that they deliberately ignored,played down, or misrepresented. There aresome, such as David Lifton, who have con-cluded that the Warren Commission wasmade up of"honorable men" who were sim-plymisled. But Slawson's report shows oth-erwise. They had significant facts at theirdisposal that they chose to avoid or ignoreor twist to fit their preordained conclusion.And after all these years, we are told it isnot "proper or pertinent ro any legitimarehistorical research" to be told the real an-swers to these mystedes.

America needed a Columbo. We weregiven only a David Slawson. S

Notes:I Slawson's Report ofthe Warren Commission'str ip to Mexico City, JFK Record #104-10010-10250, 4/22/64, CIA file of a Warren Commis-sion-originated document, hereafter called the"Slawson Trip Report," page 5.'zDavidAtlee Phillips, T,teNtit y'lat.h (New York:Ballantine Books, 1977), pp. 163. Phillips calledAnderson "affable" and "capable". Besides work,

Juet ms nors questioh,Mr, Helns.,.

Ffg3E llonember-December, 1996

ing closely togerher in Mexico Ciry, Anderson andPlillips were togerher again in Sanro Domingo,during which time, according to phillips, they haddaily meerings- In Mexico Ciry Andelson andPhillips sprl{g a trap for a retired milirary manwho appeared about to give military seclets tothe Cubans- Theepisode Phillips derails matchesclosely the case ofEldon Hensen, the account ofwhich for some reason resid€d in Oswald's ser offiles. See Oswald and rft? CL4 bt' John Newman,pp.506-7 and p. 362, and compare wirh phillips,account in lle Niglr Watch, 162-164.3 Phillips, p. 145a HSCA Vol- XI, p. 173.5 Ibid., p. s2.6 lbid., p. 1s0? lbid., p. 1493lbid., p. 149.e Slawson Trip Report, pp. 13-14'o Ibid., p. ls'r lbid., p. ls', Ibid., p. 16'3 lbid., p. 16I{ Ibid., p. 3215 From Silvia Duren's l0page signed staremenl,forwarded ro the CIA'S Mexico City Station onI l/27/63, rcp llted in rhe topez Reporr, p. t8616 Slawson Trip Repon, p. 18'? Ibid., p. 1813lbid., p. 19'' Ibid., p. 43?o Ibid., p. 20" Ibid., pp. 25-2612 New York Herald.?ibune, ll/26/63. In tne samearticle, Eugene Pugh, U.S. agent in charge oftheCustom's ofhce on the American side of the bor-der, said Oswdd had been checked ar the borde.by American Immigration officials. He said thiswas'hot normal" as Ame cans were not requiredto check in with immigration, addi;g "bur U.S.immigration has a folder on Oswald,s trip',. probehopes the ARRB will pursue rhis folder.4 lbid.2'From Frontline special which aired 11,/16/93.a The Investigator Special Edihon #1, p.1915lbid. , p. 2 l1, tbid., p. 20

The Paines and Gocaine Gontratlre Minox and. the Mediacontinwd. from page 23

one ofwhich contained film.'5 Dallas FBI field oftice file, #100-1046l, Odumrepolt of 1/30/64 interview with Ruth dictaedon 1/31/64 and, typed, on 2/3/64' Ibid." FBI #105-82555,/#10G1046I, report of 1,/31l64 interview with Rurh Paine, dictated on 1/31l64 a'ld q/q1ed on 2/1/64', FBI #105-82555,/#100-10461, repon of 1/31,/64 interview with Michael Paine, dictated on l/3l/64 and typed, on 2/3/64,0 lbid., rbid.,, Ibid.zr rbid.,4 FBI #105-82555/#100-10461, Bulky ExhibitInventory Receipts, two versiods, dated l/31/64a[fi.2/8/64x 2/2/64 cover letter with Airmail from Dallasto FBI Lab'6 FBI # 105-82555/#100- 10461, report of 1,/31,/64 intelview with Michael, dictated on l/3I,/64ar\d, q',!1ed, on 2/3/64'7 See Wa$en Commission Exhibir #2003 at Vol.24, p. 333.13 FBt #705-8255s/#100-10461, teletype datedr/3r/644 Assignment: Oswald, p.86, by James p Hosty30 See Waffen Commission Vol. 9, p.4443rSee Warren Commission Vol. lb, p.313 andp-325. It is not clear if Shasteen,s relationshipwith Odum originated with the FBI invesrigatio;into the assassination o! if it was pre-existing.3'] See HSCA, Vol. 12, p. 37333 See HSCA, Vol. 12, p. 390r See p. 2l I of Gary Savage's book,,lFKj Firsr DdlEvidnce and Dalla Morning Naws repons by EarlGo)z dared 6/ l5/7 8 eJJ.d 8/7 /78.

continued from page 26

Oswald's possible association with the KGBor Cuba. So Pincus' present artempt to hosedown more fires sholld have been expected.

Because of this built-in resistance, borhby ClA-allied newspapers, ard politicians,we at Pmbe suggesr an investigarion alongthe l ine that Maxine Waters was wtseenough to suggest. That is, one without com-promised Congressmen. She suggested a"Citizens Commission," one similar to theUnited Nations Tiuth Commission which

-"This current scondol isreolly obout our U.S.govemment-sonclionedco\rert oclions ond fhereol horm fhot some offhem do, nol only to thetorgets bul io our countryond fhe peoplel trust ingovernment .... unless weexpond this deboie foinclude lhe overoll role ofogencies like the ClA,we'll be bock here ogoinsomefime nexl yeor.',

reported so accurately on the El Mozotemassacre in El Salvador. As peter Kombluh,who has investigated the lran/Contta scan-dal for ten years, has stated:

This current scandal is really about our U.S.government-sanctioned covert actjons andthe real harm that some of them do, notonly to the targets but to our country andthe people's trust in government. . . .t canalmost guarantee you thal unless we ex_pand this debate to include the overall roleof agencies l ike the ClA, we,ll be back herea8ain sometime next year.We agree. Like In Tluse lines, we would

like to see the CIA abolished, or ar least itscovert action arm. But if there is to be aninquest, let it be a broad, real, and honestone. If not, both rhe Agency and its covertapparatus will survive. This time, let,s besure the multi-headed hydra is slain. +

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November-December, I 996 |E|e3E