No change in Uruguay: the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections

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El Mercurio Electronico. 2000, 6 January.Ercilla, 2000, 7–20 February, 130.Gideon, R., Sznajder, M., 1998. Electoral engineering in Chile: The electoral system and limited democ-

racy. Electoral Studies 17 (4), 429–442.La Tercera, 2000. 12 January; http://www.latercera.clPlumb, D., 1998. El Partido por la Democracia: The birth of Chile’s postmaterialist catch-all left. Party

Politics 4 (1), 93–106.The Guardian, 2000, 18 January.

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No change in Uruguay: the 1999 presidentialand parliamentary elections

Roberto Espındola *

Department of European Studies, University of Bradford, Bradford BD7 1DP, UK

The first round of Uruguay’s presidential election on 31 October 1999 producedan unprecedented result. Tabare Vazquez, candidate of the centre–left coalitionEncuentro Progresista–Frente Amplio (EP–FA), won a plurality of votes, but fellshort of outright victory. Therefore, for the first time in a Uruguayan presidentialcontest, a second round was held, on 28 November 1999. This returned a no-changeverdict, with the presidency remaining in the hands of the Partido Colorado (PC).Finally successful in his fifth attempt to become President, Jorge Batlle led a centre–right coalition to victory over Vazquez, by 54.1% to 45.9%. The elections were alsocharacterised by a very high turnout: 91.8% of the electorate went to the polls.

The success of EP–FA in the first round led to frantic negotiations between tra-ditional rivals on the right, the PC and the Partido Nacional (PN).1 The dealing anddiscussion continued right up to the date of the second round; finally the coalitionwas able to block Vazquez’s path to the presidency.

Despite their ultimate defeat, these were the best results for the centre–left since1971. The EP–FA won 40 out of 99 seats in the lower house, the Chamber of Depu-

* Tel.: +44-1274-233823; fax:+44-1274-235550.E-mail address: [email protected] (R. Espındola).

1 Those following the PN are also known as blancos (whites) as opposed to the PN’s colorados (Reds).

650 Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 20 (2001) 643–659

ties. However, although the centre–left Nuevo Espacio (NE) won four seats and couldarrive at an understanding with EP–FA, the right still controls the lower house with33 PC and 22 PN deputies. The distribution of Senate seats is similar: the EP–FAis the largest party, with 12 seats, but can be outvoted if the PC (10 seats) and PN(7 seats) combine. The NE won the single remaining seat of the 30-member Senate.

1. The parties

Since the end of military dictatorship in 1984, the main parties in Uruguay havebeen the PC, the PN, and the EP–FA. The ruling PC is largely a liberal and secularparty, relying mainly on urban support, whilst their traditional PN rivals representa more conservative option, closely associated with rural areas and the Catholicchurch. The EP–FA has its origins in the 1971 Frente Amplio (FA) electoral allianceof Christian democrats, socialists and communists. In 1984, the Christian democratsleft the FA; ten years later, a broad centre–left coalition was re-established as EP–FA, choosing the mayor of Montevideo and FA leader, Tabare Vazquez, as theirpresidential candidate. The principal new party, the NE, is a centre–left group witha social democratic outlook. It is led and controlled by senator Rafael Michelini, theson of a victim of the military regime.

2. The new electoral system

The elections took place under the new electoral system established by the consti-tutional reform of 1996.2 Until 1996, political parties were entitled to put forwardseveral presidential candidates, under the system of ‘banners’ and ‘sub-banners’(lemas and sublemas) known as double simultaneous voting (DSV). Factions (sub-banners) within a party could present their own candidates under the party’s regis-tered banner, and voters could then mark a preference both for a party and for acandidate. Under this plurality system, the party that achieved—from the sum of itscandidates’ votes—the plurality at the national level would win the election, and thecandidate from this party with the highest number of preferences would becomePresident. Thus it was possible for a candidate with the largest personal vote not towin the presidency, if his or her party accumulates a total vote lower than that ofanother party.3 A PR version of the same system was applied at parliamentary andlocal government elections, which were held on the same day as the presidentialones. However, the system explicitly prevented ticket-splitting.

The DSV system—which still applies to Senate and local government elections—still has its advocates. They argue that it produces a two-party system, thus facilitat-ing competition between broad-based coalitions, such as the EP–FA, or umbrella

2 The ninth reform of the constitution that in 1830 established a presidential regime in Uruguay.3 See Blais and Massicote (1996, p. 53).


parties, such as the traditional PC and PN. It is also argued to serve the purpose ofa primary election, since the electorate at the same time selects a party and one ofthe alternatives offered by faction of that party. Critics of the system counter that itlacks democratic transparency, since policy and ideological differences between fac-tions may be very wide, and voters may end up aiding a candidate vastly differentfrom the one that they actually supported. Another criticism is that the banner systempromotes factionalism within parties, although arguably it simply reflects rather thancauses such divisions.

Under the new electoral system, a political party or coalition must now chooseits presidential candidate via a primary, six months before the election. Candidatesnominated can then choose their running mates for the vice-presidency. At the presi-dential election, any slate winning over 50% of the first-round vote is elected; other-wise, the two slates with the most votes in the first round fight a second round fourweeks later.

The 1996 reform was largely prompted by the growth of the EP–FA vote, whichat the 1994 elections led to an almost exact three-way split between the main parties:the EP–FA (30.6%) and the PN (31.2%) were very close behind the victorious PC(32.7%). Those supporting the reform argued that a two-round system would allowthe traditional right-wing parties to join forces if necessary in the second round, thuspreventing a centre–left victory. Another argument pointed to the need to give thePresident greater parliamentary support, by promoting broad electoral coalitions. Thepre-1996 system meant that the President could only count on the parliamentarysupport of his own faction, having constantly to negotiate for support from otherfactions from within his own party, or from the opposition benches.

The reform has certainly forced parties to engage in internal negotiation over theirprogrammes and prospective presidential candidates. By contrast, until 1996, a partycould avoid such difficult decisions by allowing all factions to nominate candidatesto stand under its banner, with all their votes counting towards the party’s total andvoters’ preferences determining which of the candidates was to hold the seat.

3. Presidential primaries

All the parties and coalitions held primary elections on 25 April 1999. Overall,the primary campaigns managed to mobilise 53.7% of the electorate. According tothe 1996 electoral reform, in order to win a party’s presidential nomination a candi-date must win either a majority in the primary, or at least 40% of the vote providedthat the nearest challenger is at least 10 percentage points adrift. If neither conditionis met, then the choice is left to the party’s national convention.

Ideological divisions and personality clashes marked the PN primary, in whichfive prospective candidates competed: former President Luis Alberto Lacalle, formerinterior minister Juan Andres Ramırez, former foreign secretary Alvaro Ramos, for-mer PN president Alberto Volonte, and deputy Alan Garcıa. In the end, the primarybecame a two-way contest between Lacalle and Ramırez. The former was identifiedwith neo-liberal economic policies, but his policy stances continued to be over-


shadowed by (unproven) accusations of corruption dating from his period in office(1989–94). Ramırez’s platform was based on decentralisation and social justice, andhe had the support of provincial governors. In the primary poll, Lacalle won with48.2% of the votes, comfortably ahead of the 32.2% polled by Ramırez. But theacrimony of the primaries’ campaign left the PN bitter and divided; Ramırez, backedup by his centrist supporters, turned down the offer to stand for the vice-presidency,and Lacalle had to settle for his former foreign secretary, Sergio Abreu, as a run-ning mate.

For the EP–FA, a key problem was the role and complex composition of the FA.Within the wider coalition, the FA is itself formed by eight different groups or organ-ised tendencies, ranging from the moderate, centre–left Asamblea Uruguay led bySenator Danilo Astori, to the left where the Partido Socialista, Partido Comunista,and Corriente de Izquierda represent two-thirds of FA members. In late November1998, the FA’s national convention had decided, by a vote of 96.2%, to nominateTabare Vazquez as the FA candidate for the EP–FA primaries. However, after muchwrangling, the FA decided to allow Astori to stand in the primaries. The other mem-bers of the EP–FA, two Christian democratic groups, were expected to supportAstori, who claimed that this potential to attract moderate voters gave him the bestchance of a second-round victory.

Nonetheless, the EP–FA result was never in doubt and Vazquez had no difficultyin getting the nomination, winning 82.4% of the votes. Just as with the PN, thechoice of vice-presidential candidate reflected the bitterness of the primary campaign.Vazquez refused to offer the post to Astori, giving it instead to Rodolfo Nin, theleader of the Christian democrats.

Unlike the PN and EP–FA, the ruling PC used the primary to its advantage, despitebeing split into two major factions, both equally strong. The crucial difference wasthat the PC primary involved mainly a choice between candidates, rather than rivalideologies or policy stances. The confrontation was between the Foro Batllista, con-trolled by incumbent President Julio Marıa Sanguinetti, and the Lista 15 group, ledby Jorge Batlle. Although Batlle was at the time just a senator, he was neverthelessa very familiar figure, as the son, grand-nephew and great-grandson of former Presi-dents and PC leaders, and, of course, as a previous candidate for Uruguay’s presi-dency. Sanguinetti sought a candidate who would ensure the continuity of his admin-istration and his policies, particularly the opening up of the economy to internationaltrade. Accordingly, he chose his interior minister, Luis Hierro, who resigned hisportfolio to fight the primary. Hierro ran a sophisticated campaign, with a messageand symbols that appealed not only to PC voters but also to a much wider audience.

Batlle’s campaign, in contrast, appealed mainly to the traditional PC voter. Heabandoned the programmatic approach taken in 1994, preferring instead an emphasison his family background and personal qualities. He avoided a confrontational toneand defended the achievements of the Sanguinetti administration. His campaign tar-geted floating voters, particularly those less informed about politics who werethought to be more influenced by the campaign.

By mid-April 1999, a week before the primaries, opinion polls placed both Batlleand Hierro at about 48%, but anticipated a Hierro victory by a small margin. This


predicted result did not materialise. Batlle won the nomination with 55.1% of thevote. Hierro polled 44.9%. As soon as the results were announced, Batlle offeredHierro the vice-presidential slot, which was accepted after some persuasion fromPresident Sanguinetti.

Opinion pollsters’ difficulties in anticipating the results of the primaries may havebeen due to a large proportion of the electorate—some one-fifth, according to theFactum national survey of May 1999—making up their mind within the last weekof the campaign. The same survey suggested that, amongst last-minute PC voters,some 60% chose Batlle.

4. The campaign and results

Once the candidates had been selected, the presidential campaign quickly becamea two-horse race between Batlle and Vazquez. The primary campaign had alreadygone a long way towards establishing the image and approach of each candidate.Batlle’s highly personalised campaign contrasted with Vazquez’s emphasis on hisreputation as an efficient and responsive mayor of Montevideo. Lacalle had difficult-ies in differentiating himself from the Sanguinetti administration that the PN hadsupported, while also defending the controversial record of his own period in office.

Lacalle and Batlle, as members of the previous government, both claimed to rep-resent policy continuity, particularly since Sanguinetti’s fiscal, exchange, and foreignpolicies met with general support amongst their (respective) natural constituencies.The key difference was that Batlle, without expressing any major disagreement withPresident Sanguinetti, centered the PC’s campaign around his own personality.Meanwhile, Lacalle could not shake off the image, generated by the primary, of adeeply and bitterly divided PN.

Vazquez was the clear winner of the first round with 40.1% of the vote (see Table1). Lacalle was the principal loser, with 22.3%, much lower than the 31.2% supportfor the PN in 1994. The campaign for the second round began as soon as the resultsof the first emerged, with both Batlle and Vazquez seeking out support and votesfrom unsuccessful candidates. Vazquez could confidently count on NE support, but

Table 1Distribution of votes in Uruguay’s presidential elections, 31 October and 28 November 1999

First round Second roundVotes (%) Votes (%)

Tabare Vazquez (EP–FA) 40.1 45.9Jorge Batlle (PC) 32.8 54.1Luis Alberto Lacalle (PN) 22.3Rafael Michelini (NE) 4.6Luis Pieri (Union Cıvica) 0.2Total 100.0 100.0

Sources: Electoral Court, and La Republica (1999, 4 December).


the key to second round victory was the PN vote. Batlle was able to negotiate thesupport of the PN leadership, but that was not necessarily enough to ensure thattheir voters would follow them and support their traditional rivals.

A belligerent campaign ensued, with Batlle taking the offensive and seeking toscare PN voters away from the EP–FA candidate. He accused Vazquez of being aMarxist who would tax wage-earners, pensioners, the professional middle class, sav-ing-account holders, and small entrepreneurs. Vazquez had campaigned very effec-tively in the first round, focusing on the crisis affecting the economy and the risinglevels of unemployment. He promised not only change but ‘Uruguayan-style change’(Cambio a la uruguaya), implying that it would take place gradually and in a contextof moderation and tolerance. In the second round, he added an emphasis on inclus-iveness, making much use of Uruguay’s flag. This was insufficient to counter Batlle’snegative campaigning, and Vazquez was forced onto the defensive, being obligedto deny plans for massive new taxes (Cardarello, 2000). The effectiveness of Batlle’stactics is clearly illustrated by the fact that, in the second round, Vazquez receivedbarely more than his first-round vote plus those from the EN.

Both rounds were characterised by widespread participation: turnouts were highand surprisingly similar, with 91.78% of the registered electorate voting on the firstround, and 91.76% on the second round.4 Spoilt and blank ballots accounted for just3% of first round and 4.2% of second round votes.

5. Parliamentary results

The parliamentary elections, held on the same date as the first round of the presi-dential poll, mirrored its results; because the system prevents ticket-splitting, thedivision of the votes in the parliamentary elections exactly matches the division inthe presidential contest. The EP–FA became the largest political force in parliament,with a gain of nine seats in the lower chamber and three in the Senate. Again, thesegains came principally at the PN’s expense: the latter lost nine seats in the Chamberof Deputies and three in the Senate (see Table 2).

On the other hand, a coalition government with PN participation could in theorycount on a parliamentary majority, except in making key appointments and speciallaws that require more than a simple majority. But that would ignore the frac-tionalised nature of Uruguayan party politics, shown in the greater identification ofparliamentarians with the faction or sub-banner under which they were elected thanwith their party.

Whilst there were just five presidential candidates, the five parties or alliancesnominating them presented 32 different lists or sub-banners for the parliamentaryelections, some as national lists, other at the departmental level: the EP–FA presented

4 The number of votes cast on the first round was of 2,204,662, as compared with 2,204,174 on thesecond, according to final figures issued by the Electoral Court on 4 December 1999; the total electoratewas of 2,402,160 for both rounds.


Table 2Distribution of parliamentary seats following elections of 31 October 1999

Chamber of Deputies SenateSeats Seats

Encuentro Progresista–Frente Amplio 40 12Partido Colorado 33 10Partido Nacional 22 7Nuevo Espacio 4 1Total 99 30

Source: La Republica (1999, 2 November).

12 lists, the PC six, the PN six, NE three and even the minute Union Cıvica presentedfive. Not all are represented in the new congress, but there is sufficient fragmentationto make coalition-building a complex task.

The EP–FA success in the parliamentary elections also reflected their strongestever showing in the provinces. The centre–left coalition won 51.8% of the votes castin Montevideo, its traditional stronghold, but for the first time it won in the secondmost important department, Canelones, as well as in the departments of Paysanduand Maldonado. Until these elections, the PC and PN had controlled more than 80%of the provincial vote; now the EP–FA won 28.5% of that vote, compared to thePC’s 33.7% and the PN’s 30%.

Within the EP–FA, the greatest success was enjoyed by the socialist Espacio 90list: it won the plurality of EP–FA votes in 11 departments (including Montevideo),and doubled its parliamentary representation, winning fourteen of the forty EP–FAseats in the Chamber of Deputies (up from seven in 1994) and four of the twelveEP–FA senatorial benches (up from two in 1994). The moderate Asamblea Uruguayremained the second strongest force within the EP–FA, yet it lost seats, going from17 deputies and four senators in 1994 to seven deputies and two senators in 1999.While Asamblea Uruguay may have paid a price for its leader’s insistence on com-peting with Vasquez for the presidential nomination, the Christian democratic listAlianza Progresista benefited from Rodolfo Nin’s stand as Vasquez’s running mate:Nin’s election gave the party their first ever senator, and they won five seats in theChamber of Deputies, a gain of four on 1994. Five of the EP–FA lists failed to winany parliamentary representation.

The main loser in the parliamentary election was the traditional PN, which sawits representation fall to 22 deputies and seven senators, compared with 31 and 10respectively in 1994. The results showed the conservative Herrerista faction, led bypresidential candidate Luis Alberto Lacalle, to be dominant: it supplied five of thePN’s seven senators and 18 of its 22 deputies. The centre–right Alianza Nacionallist was left with a meagre representation of two senators and four deputies, despitehaving received almost a third of the PN’s votes.

The unity shown within the PC in support of its presidential candidate, JorgeBatlle, was not in evidence in the parliamentary polls. The Foro Batllista faction,led by former President Julio Marıa Sanguinetti, won in 11 departments, whilst Jorge


Batlle’s faction, Lista 15, won in eight (including Montevideo). Although Lista 15actually won slightly more votes than Foro, the territorial distribution of those voteswas such that, of the 32 PC seats in the lower house, 18 went to Foro and only 15to the new President’s Lista 15. Whilst there are no major ideological differencesbetween the PC’s main factions, there are notable policy differences. Foro defendsformer President Sanguinetti’s relatively moderate economic policies and his supportfor the regional trading bloc Mercosur, whilst Lista 15 backs Jorge Batlle’s neo-liberal policies, including the capping of public spending and the privatisation ofsome public services.

The parliamentary election results demonstrate that the 1996 electoral reformshave served to weaken the presidency. The DSV system, for all its faults, did atleast ensure that a President’s faction would have some degree of dominance withinits own party, and that the President’s party would have the largest number of seatsin parliament. Under the 1996 electoral reforms, the President’s party may not havea plurality in parliament, since a candidate with the most first-round votes (and henceobtaining a parliamentary plurality) may lose the presidency in the second round.The primaries, held six months ahead of the presidential and parliamentary election,also imply that the candidate nominated may not represent the faction that emergesas dominant at the parliamentary polls (Buquet, 2000).

That is clearly what happened at the 1999 elections. Jorge Batlle won the nomi-nation in April, but his faction accounts for a minority of the PC’s parliamentaryseats. President Batlle can only count on fifteen deputies and four senators, and willhave to negotiate for the other parliamentary votes that he needs. The PN supportshim at present, and is likely to remain within a governing coalition. But, as thenext elections approach, the PN will grow reluctant to remain the junior partner ingovernment, and will seek to reassert its freedom of action and its separate identity,in order to avoid a repetition of the 1999 results.

Furthermore, the PC–PN support for the government is unlikely to be monolithic.Centre–right factions such as the PC’s Foro Batllista or the PN’s Alianza Nacionalwill continue to oppose major privatisations, or any search for trading alliances out-side Mercosur. Alianza Nacional’s support for social justice and decentralisation mayeven lead them to vote with the opposition, bringing the latter close to a majorityin the Senate. Thus, expectations of stability in government may yet prove premature.

6. Conclusions

The results show that the tendency to bipolarity continues to characterise Urug-uayan politics, even when the principal actors swap roles. The centre–left has nowbecome one of the main poles, and the traditional parties of the right and centre–right have had to form a coalition that could continue to erode their individual ident-ities. This has already forced President Batlle into some concessions. Whilst he con-tinues to advocate the legal enforcement of limits on public spending, and the privat-isation of public services, he has moderated his proposal to seek a link with Naftaas a potential alternative to Mercosur.


Although at first sight it might appear that President Batlle could easily governwith the parliamentary support of his party and the PN, the factional nature of Urug-uay’s party politics means that he can only rely on the support of his own Lista 15faction in parliament. Other sources of support cannot be counted on, and, like somuch in Uruguayan politics, are subject to negotiations.

References

Blais, A., Massicote, L., 1996. Electoral systems. In: LeDuc, L., Niemi, R., Norris, P. (Eds.), ComparingDemocracies: Elections and Voting in Globl Perspective. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.

Buquet, D. 2000. Uruguay: la novedad de seguir igual. Nueva Sociedad 166.Cardarello, S., 2000. Efectos de las nuevas reglas sobre las estrategias electorales: Uruguay 1999–2000

una campana de cuatro estaciones. Paper presented at the 18th World Congress of IPSA, Quebec.La Republica, 1999. 2, 29 November, 2 December.

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No change in Uruguay: the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections