No. 35 - Testing North Korea: The Next Stage in U.S. and ROK Policy

8/9/2019 No. 35 - Testing North Korea: The Next Stage in U.S. and ROK Policy

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Testing NoKorea:

The Next Stage iand ROK Po

Report of an Independent Sponsored by the

Council on Foreign Re


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Founded in 1921, the Council on Foreign Relations is a no

zation, research center, and publisher. It is dedicated to incing of the world and contributing ideas to U.S. foreign pothis mainly by promoting constructive discussions and byleading journal on global issues. The Council is host to thebut an advocate of none, though its research fellows and Inpolicy stands.

THE COUNCIL TAKES NO INSTITUTIONAL POSAND HAS NO AFFILIATION WITH THE U.S. GOMENTS OF FACT AND EXPRESSIONS OF OPINIONPUBLICATIONS ARE THE SOLE RESPONSIBILIAUTHORS.

The Council will sponsor an Independent Task Force w

critical importance to U.S. foreign policy arises, and (2) ibackgrounds and perspectives may, nonetheless, be able toon a policy through private and nonpartisan deliberationsbetween two and five times over a brief period to ensure t

Upon reaching a conclusion, a Task Force issues a report, anand posts it on the Council website. Task Force Reports caand meaningful policy consensus, with Task Force membe

thrust and judgments reached by the group, though notrecommendation; (2) a report stating the various policy fairly as possible; or (3) a Chairmans Report, where Task the Chairmans Report may associate themselves with it,submit dissenting statements. Upon reaching a conclusiindividuals who were not members of the Task Force to assForce Report to enhance its impact.All Task Force Reports bcurrent administration policy in order to make explicit arement. The Task Force is solely responsible for its report. Thposition.

For further information about the Council or this Task For


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CONTENTS

ForewordStatement: Seoul Forum for International A

Executive Summary

Findings and Recommendations

Additional ViewsDissenting View

Members of the Task Force

Observers of the Task Force

Appendixes


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FOREWORD

More than a year has passed since South Ko

Dae Jungs unprecedented visit to North KoJune 2000 North-South summit meeting in Pytions and raised new hopes that a political breakone of the worlds most dangerous flashpoints awand onto a path toward peace and reconciliati

months that followed, North Koreas once-secreKim Jong Il, emerged as a public figure whowith world leaders.The hermit kingdom laudiplomatic offensive, normalizing relations wcountries in Europe and Asia, including t

European Union,the Philippines, and Australiilies separated across the 38th parallel for allowed to rediscover relatives.Cultural and athsomed. The two Koreas pledged to reconneway links across the demilitarized zone, the

border on earth. For the first time, Northdefense ministers met face to face.

Yet only months later, the momentum of Kbegan to wane. Kim Jong Ils pledge of a retu


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In this report, the Council on Foreign Relpendent Task Force on Korea acknowledgindeed been turned in the Korea story, but is one whose ending remains a dangerouslycircumstances on the peninsula have evolvdays of the 1994 nuclear crisis and the political1998 Taepo Dong missile test over Japan, thKoreas nuclear and missile programs, althousile test moratorium and the existing nuclunresolved. And the conventional arms staconfrontation continues unabated.

The Task Force concludes that the diplyears are not irreversible. It warns, for exatation of the Agreed Framework, whichnuclear weapons program in exchange fortors and other economic benefits, faces maj

easily unravel, leading to another nuclear realizing this existing agreement foreshadowthe Bush administration will face in tryingballistic missile program. And even more diing down of the conventional arms stando

allel.The Task Force argues that attaining and credible verification is key if any progrthese difficult security problems.

The Task Force spells out its preferred cou


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Foreword

will have enormous impact in shaping the futTask Force argues that the United States has mthe future of Korea unfolds, and thus it shoulist of foreign policy priorities.

The Task Force is co-chaired by James T. Lsador to the Republic of Korea, and Mortonmer assistant secretary of state for intelligDuring the course of the Task Force deliberatiowho had been director of the Task Force,departal Security Council staff, and Robert A. Maand director of Asian studies at the Council, s

place.This report is the fifth public interventio

Force since it was established in 1997, follreports and two letters to the president of thfifty-one participants in the Task Force includ

Northeast Asia with long experience insideernment.Discussions in Washington and Seoul for International Affairs,which has collaborainform the views of the Task Force, were an iTask Forces deliberations.

My thanks to Morton I. Abramowitz, JBob Manning for overseeing this effort, andmembers and observers for their contributiongo to the Korea Foundation for its generous


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STATEMENT: SEOUL FORUINTERNATIONAL AFFA

We are happy to have worked with the Indeon Korea sponsored by the Council on Foreign ration of the third report on the Korean pen

For several reasons, the report could ntimely. One year after the historic Nor

inter-Korean relations are in a state of a hiatuKorean relations,despite the recently stated wiadministration to begin talks with Pyongyaof great uncertainty.There is also the heated Korea about the course of its policy toward

is bound to affect the future of its relations witabove all, we are faced with the persistent oKorean regime. While detecting tantalizinwillingness to change, we cannot ignore asson the other hand. For all of these reasons, the

another comprehensive look at the policy isscontext of what has happened and what has last three years.This report, we believe, is pre

This is not the first time that the Seoul For


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recommendationsof the present report,ably, not everyone is in full agreement with ev

We hope and believe that the study canU.S. and the South Korean governments implement their policies toward North Koas North Korea, which is not exactly know

none of us will want to claim monopoly of iit of pooling our resources in order to gaininto many of the problems we face in NortForum for International Affairs collaborateForeign Relations. It is our belief that t

cerned can benefit from the report for the


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EXECUTIVE SUMMAR

A year after the historic June 2000 North-Sou

administration begins its diplomacy toward tples Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North lingering hope but also troubling uncertainof the Korean peninsula. The summit openin inter-Korean relations and offered the p

reconciliation by beginning to address the caeffectsweapons of mass destructionof thalso marked a transformation of the once-mIl, who surfaced as a serious political figure wa remarkable diplomatic offensive, normal

nearly two dozen nations in Asia and Europe,allies, as well as hosting an American secretary ofof diplomacy and the imagery of change havpaced the reality on the ground.

U.S. Policy ReconsideredNonetheless, the Korea problem in mid-200ent from that faced by both the first Bushthe Clinton administration.The bedrock of s


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We applaud the Bush administration for i

discussions to address pending security issBased on the lessons of policy past, we suggguidelines for U.S. policy:

U.S. policy must be consistent with the and Japan and proactively coordinatedROK and U.S.-Japan alliances are keis the basis of engagement with Nort

South Korea should be in the lead in othe North, in roughly parallel movement

though their respective agendas with This coordination is key to avoiding Nplay one nation against the other. Textends this parallel diplomacy to Jap

Serious, results-oriented diplomacy m

the DPRK leadership. Addressing iprobably inevitable, but the separate diif they are undertaken within a larger,work. In this process, patience is a vir

Focus on priorities.There is a long U

Koreafrom eliminating nuclear, mithreats to promoting human rights. Athe enemy of the good, view progress athat progress is likely to be slow


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Executive Summary

Defining a U.S. AgendaThe Bush administration policy review wasthe stage for a new approach, though we belcontinuity with regard to the basic (and insepU.S. policy: reduction of the threat of militarfacilitation of North-South reconciliation.T

a menu of security threats that needs to be addreballistic missiles, chemical weapons, biologithe core of the confrontation, conventional foadministration and Congress should approaconceptual terms similar to those of the

reduction program in Russia. Conventional prove to be the most difficult, but the issue hly raised by the United States or the ROK for the hints of change in North Korea, conventshould at least be explored in the U.S. dialogu

or in a trilateral setting among the United SSouth Korea. In general terms, the conclusioof former Secretary of Defense William Perry two pathsone of cooperation or, if it refumeasuresis still valid. It must be made clear t

the goalposts are for normalization of relationof economic benefits associated with reduciof the DPRK military threat.


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reactors (LWRs) being constructed will su

Korea before 200910.The AF was structured to defer the mos

agreement until its later stages, and anothhappen, as in 1994. Under the current schthe LWRs will reach the point at which Ninto full compliance sometime in the first is no stipulation in the agreement for wAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA) shouldprocess. Also, before licenses involving U.S. tea U.S.North Korean nuclear cooperation agtiated and accepted by Congress. Moreovercipitated the 1994 crisis,which were removed core with enough plutonium for four to fivtreated. Under the AF they are to becountry, but it is not clear to where they wis room for more creativity in implementinthe AF.

Given the chronic shortages of electriciprovision of energy has already become part tion. By requesting two million kilowatSeoulexactly the amount of power that providePyongyang has joined the issue.cy may open up new possibilities in regardh AF R dl i i f d


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Executive Summary

A fresh collective look at the LWR pro

framework (and in consultation with ththe United States and its allies need to eing challenges to full implementation ofwork as well as potential opportunitiKorea on a revision of the terms to meet

diate energy needs by nonnuclear mean

No ambiguous determination by the IAEnuclear history should be acceptable if thbetween what plutonium the North has dec

the IAEA judges it may actually havethe amount required for one or more n

Offer more for more.To address the inheAF, offer to provide near-term electpractical means, if North Korea goes

obligations.The AF does not specify whto discover North Koreas nuclear histocooperationmust begin. This leaves four-year gap between the construction of ery of its nuclear components. Nor d

removal of the canned fuel rods from NPyongyang permits removal of the fuel roto begin its unfettered inspections, and enhanced safeguardsprogram, the Unite


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North Korean Missile Program

It is clearly in the U.S. interest to negotiattion of North Koreas missile program beyogy Control Regime (MTCR) limits. It muthe missile issue, unlike the nuclear issue, d violations of international agreements (N

tion Treaty/IAEA). It is a question of secuthe proposals left on the table at the end oistration, the North would prohibit all exlong-range missiles and related technologkind assistance in categories such as food.

said it would ban further indigenous testinga certain range in exchange for in-kind cotance with launching commercial satellites.to freeze current missile deploymentsNo Dong missiles that can hit Japan and U

offer fell short of U.S. goals. Yet the scopeposal was unprecedented and should be pursthe proposal does not imply acceptance.Ana standard of verification whereby it is judare better served with it than without it.

We offer two suggestions that could facilitmentioned goals:

Disaggregate the missile issue. Proceewith the issue of missile exports then


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Executive Summary

goal is to offer significant assistance

upgrading the countrys energy infrastrdismantles its deployed No Dong missilcould also facilitate revision of the AFenergy. In any case, this move would reqJapan.

Support for ROK DiplomacyThe United States should give strong suppoefforts at reconciliation and tension reductiothe administration has indicated it will do. In itKorea, the United States should press Kim Jongto come to Seoul for a return summit.We beliegy of cooperation and reconciliation with Pythe political dynamic on the peninsula in a posions are lower than at any time in recent mthat the policy is a failure because the Northmilitary forces or improved human rightsSouths overtures. We firmly believe that withe North Korean military threat, economic and improvement in human rights in the NoPyongyang will only go so far. However, thebe the goals of policy and not preconditions fat tension reduction. Kim Dae Jungs focus ononciliation is the right way to move the pro


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possibility. This should be done, perh

mental organizations (NGOs), absen

Renew the offer to exchange interest se

Allow the ROK and Japan to facilitatemembership in the International M

Bank, and/or Asian Development BankNorth Korea is removed from the Stastate sponsors of terrorism,Washington cbership in international financial instUnited States should press the North

steps to allow its removal from the teon DPRK membership in an internattion would not necessarily block the United States did not actively discoKorean effort to begin the process of

Our final suggestion relates to the managand allied coordination:

Appoint a special coordinator for Kowhich is underscored by the experienc

Our preference is for a full-time personoutside the government. Alternativelycer could be given a second hat as cooed point person, reporting to the sec

d K l Th


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Executive Summary

engagement with North Korea and that of

suggests that what is possible vis--vis North Koin advance. A dialogue must start at the levelister or higher. North Koreas intentions muparticularly important in light of the remarkabJune 2000. No critics have offered a better id

course of sustained, hard-headed engagemeand allied interests. We should get on with

Americas forward presence and allianceprevented a second war on the peninsula anded North Korea that it has no better option

Pyongyang is indeed ready to take further steening peace on the peninsula, then Washinprepared to respond. In the meantime, we mstrong and support the patient efforts of our


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FINDINGS AND RECOMME

A year after the historic June 2000 North-S

administration begins its diplomacy towtime of lingering hope, but troubling uncerof the Korean peninsula. The summit opinter-Korean relations and offered the prospetion by beginning to address the causesra

of weapons of mass destruction on the Kothe high hopes and grand pledges of the sthe difficult task and tortoise-like pace of udistrust and confrontation. The Bush admited a situation of persisting military stando

lowered tensions, stable deterrence, a sturdand a rich thirteen-year history of expandtion with North Korea.Yet the promise of dipof change have so far outpaced the reality

The summit ushered in a revolutionary c

tactics of North Koreas dealings with the oumysterious and often derided recluse, Ksurfaced as a serious political figure who coan array of foreign leaders. North Korea em


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Findings and Recommendat

past three years; the trajectory of U.S. and So

respectively; and what may constitute the micy response to the current predicament.

Plus a Change?The Korean peninsula in mid-2001 is marked

conveyed in our previous reports. That an Astate actually met with Kim Jong Il in Pyongyident seriously considered a similar trip, and tly $1 billion in food and other aid since 1995 complex U.S.North Korean relations have b

question is whenand ifa second North-SouInside North Korea, economic decline, depappear only modestly abated. However, the pKorea beginning to modernize in a manner sVietnam seems at least imaginable rather than

tasy. In January 2001,Kim Jong Il went to ShanU.S. and Japanese factories and praised Chiafter issuing an intriguing New Years statemfor new thinking. This sparked much conKorean version of market-oriented reform m

tive stages. But to date, this remains largely The initial Task Force report, released in J

the implications of Kim Dae Jungs election as pand the need to develop a long-term peninsula


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York Times, disclosing a suspected underg

at Kumchang-ni. These two developmenta larger North Korean threat:ballistic missiles tand even the United Statesand the possiles could be ultimately be tipped with nusame time,Kim Dae Jungs overtures to Nor

spurned, they were greeted with military proinflammatory rhetoric.

It is worth recalling the political environopments fostered. The missile test sent Japan, dramatically affecting public opinio

The heightened sense of threat from the Nogressional reservations about a U.S. policy thFramework, consisted of incremental incraid and a series of meetings that had maddressing the new concerns. North Ko

Dae Jungs overtures for reconciliation heithe United States.The turn of events raiseunderlying assumptions of U.S.policy and thad been the policys centerpiecethe Amight come undone. Sustaining bipartis

policy was becoming very difficult.This predicament led the Task Force

Letter to President Clinton, reaffirming sFramework but expressing concern that it w


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Congress enacted legislation compelling t

take steps along the lines proposed in the Taident Clinton then appointed former SecretaryPerry as North Korea Policy Coordinator, aa nine-month-long review of U.S. policy. Was the Perry Process sought to address c

security threats and offer North Korea a newwith the United States. Perry went to Pyonthe highest-level contact the U.S. governmeKorean War. Perry essentially offered North Koron a new path of security cooperation that w

age of political and economic incentivesintion of relations with the United States andaidor to face a path of confrontation.

Perrys report to the president emphasizemissile and nuclear programs as overriding c

icy. Although it underscored the importanPyongyangs known nuclear facilities, Perrydeclared its serious concerns about possibleweapons-related work in the DPRK.1The reDPRKs continuing efforts to develop ballist

ing range, including those potentially capaterritory of the United States. The Clinton aed Perrys recommendation for a compreheapproach that would seek complete and verif


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designed to address the concerns that spar

renew congressional support. One enduriPerry exercise was a significant upgrade in pthe ROK and Japan.

Although some U.S. officials expected cate with a high-level visit to Washington

North failed to fully respond to the U.Smonths. Indeed, there was abrasive rhetornaval skirmish in the Yellow Sea. The firston missiles came in July 2000, floated by King with visiting Russian President Vladim

This was the backdrop for the remarkabof First Vice Chairman Jo Myong Rok, aenvoya return for the Perry visit to PyongyThe U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqu thChairman Jos visit was a vaguely worded

of which seemed to be a desire to move towation in bilateral relations. The communiqgovernment would have hostile intent toconfirmed the commitment of both govereffort in the future to build a new relationsh

ty. Despite such assurances, Vice Chairmworded dinner toast at an event hosted by tMadeleine Albright to press PyongyangsKim Jong Il would move toward a cooper


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centerpiece of a presidential trip to Pyon

response to the U.S. initiative left the Clinton out adequate time to negotiate firm details. Inlines of a prospective missile deal were leadministration.

Today, tensions on the peninsula are con

at any time since the 1994 crisis, and North Kket case. But it has come out of its shell, ameconomic modernization may follow. Nonconfrontation on the Korean peninsula remainsMajor problems of the standoffNorth Kor

program and missileshave been constrain

Where Are We Now?As the Bush administration initiates its Koimportant moment to take stock of its inher

inside North Korea and South Korea, the srelations, and lessons learned from the Clin

The Situation in North KoreaIn many respects, the determining factor in re

South reconciliation and U.S.North Korinternal situation in North Korea. Is it prepits militarized, state-controlled economy to oing, opening to outside actors, and reformin


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and at the top of all priorities. The Natio

sion was enlarged from five to ten membehave moved up in the political hierarchy abers in the Supreme Peoples Assembly in

The military first notion is particuspeculation about economic reform. In Chi

at the bottom of priorities for economic retor to be modernized (after industry, agrictechnology). Yet despite massive faminover the past two years the KPA has beenDPRKs scarce resources, rebuilding its ca

on South Korea and Japan with new dnear the demilitarized zone (DMZ), new foptics to improve command and control, andof ballistic missiles and larger military exe

Despite hints of change from the to

changes on the ground, there is too muchof transparency) surrounding the North Ksider affirmative answers to any of the largeNorth Koreas future. Although a lack of rea large component of guesstimate to econ

that the DPRKs economy suffered steep ing the 1990s. By the end of the decade,third that of 1990, and its gross nationaltwo-thirds that in 1990 and roughly thirty


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energy infrastructure with a highly inefficienergy grid. Similarly, although North Koreaa result of floods and droughts compoundamage in addition to other consequences o

Sources:International Monetary Fund, Direction of Tradeand Republic of Korea Ministry of Unification (http://wNote:All export and aid figures are based on estimates.


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reluctance to embark clearly on a course o

is evident in its refusal to take up the Intern(IMF) and World Bank offer to assess its ecoKorean economists, though Pyongyang hanomic bureaucrats abroad for training sincas North Korea continues to ban the term

ingly tolerated private farmers markets,now300 by some estimates; as the national distriken down, these markets account for a food and other basic necessities.

The Situation in South KoreaSouth Korea approaches its 2002 presidentof the wind taken out of its sails on the econoSouth Korea defied the projections of m199798 financial crisis with its rapid recover

cent in 1999 and 8.8 percent in 2000. Mandegree to which South Korea had moved teconomy. But Seoul has only partially acausal factors of the crisis, particularly withsystem.The government has not entirely ch

ture and dismantled the chaebolconglomedebt remains a significant problem.The Koresignificantly in 2001,due in part to slow growand in part to its own internal problems. Ni S h K l i


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Kims critics are not opposed to his engagem

to the pace, scope, and manner of its impleof concrete results and the reluctance of Kimpledge to come to Seoul have lowered enKoreas generosity toward the North and rations, not about active engagement with the N

to engagein particular, how to define theany relationship with the North.

North-South Relations: Half Full or Half EmThe June 2000 summit sparked a plethora o

interactions, including athletic and cultural social, economic, and military interaction.Th

Trans-Korean railway/road connectionHyundai Mt. Kumgang tourist deal, thement to reconnect the Seoul-Shinuiju

mutual confidence-building measure, as step toward rebuilding infrastructureKorean economic activity and, not leasfication.The project involves reconnectiof railway on both sides of the DMZ an

adjacent highway. Implementation invoset of joint understandings on how to mSouth has largely completed demining athe North has not yet either demined or


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reached, with Hyundai taking the lead,

industrial complex at Kaesong, someof the DMZ, and accessible to the Seouroad links. Institutionally, an inter-Keconomic cooperation was formed. Anificantly, four economic agreements

a legal framework for inter-Korean traagreement for settling trade in dollinvestment protection; an agreement tlement of commercial disputes; and andouble taxation.These accords are an i

for attracting the hundreds of investmambitious large-scale Kaesong industrnomic zone that Hyundai hopes will emduce up to $12 billion in export goods by trade zones.But Hyundais flagship Mt

ject has lost substantial amounts of mernment bailout on which the continuatio

Military issues. It is in the security realonciliation, that the least progress has oone meeting of North-South defense crete results, and the DPRK has showcussing confidence-building and tensiowith the ROK. There have also be

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round of ministerial-level talks in January 20

diately supply the North with 500,000 kilgratis, and 2 million kilowatts in the longamount of power that the two light-water reactowould produce. It is also true that with the tinitiated a host of processes in the economic, m

itarian spheres, the next phase of North-Souimplementationconnecting railways and romilitary confidence-building measures, econoize the Kaesong industrial parkthat may brisky by Pyongyang.

However, it was never clear that Kim Jongor the structure of reconciliation in Kim Dengagement. In his historic March 2000 BerJung offered a broad trade-off similar in charby the United States. The future Nobel P

said that he was making three important promto guarantee their national security, assist in thery [including large-scale aid to rebuild their and telecommunications], and actively supponational arena. In return, he asked the Nor

and for all armed provocation against the Sopledges not to develop nuclear weapons, and to develop long-range missiles.This approacobjectives of U.S. policy as well: threat red


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ed or rejected that proposition. In practice

known as the Basic Agreement,have guidedSouth relations.

The current North-South relationship full or half empty? The post-summit dabove appear modest in relation to the goals

opening and reform in the North, rehabilitan economy, reuniting millions of divided the threat of conflict on the worlds most Yet at the same time, these developmenpreviously, not even 300 families had the p

no economic/legal framework existed, defenmet, and neither had a North-South sum

The key question is whether an inter-Koing institutionalized or irreversible. At preto conclude that this is the case. The grud

Dae Jungs generous assistance and magnanimhas led to skepticism and a mood of sharpization in South Korea.There is a growing the lack of reciprocity from Pyongyang mayIls changes may be more tactical than subst

twice pledged a return visit to Seoulin thlaration and in September 2000, during emissary Kim Young Suns trip to Seoul. YetKim Dae Jungs courageous trip to Pyon

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The Clinton Legacy

In assessing the implications for future U.S.poan peninsula and its evolution over the course oit is important to bear in mind the significant cThe nuclear crisis that culminated in the Octobework grew out of the first Bush administ

pressing North Korea to reach agreements wiits past nuclear activities, and submit to IAEcrepancies in North Koreas declared nuclearby the IAEA sparked a mounting crisis inengagement with North Korea reached its

meeting by an undersecretary of state with a terpart that represented the highest-level conuntil 1999. U.S. policy over the past eight ye

Sustained credible deterrence.The U.S.-Rthe bedrock of security on the peninsula

irritants and problemsthe Status of ROK missile development, and the Nowere resolved before the change in U.S.lingering discomfort with the U.S. militthe Korean public is a problem.

Bound the nuclear proliferation problem wiworks freeze on Pyongyangs declared nAF is a mechanism for eventually en

T i N h K


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Expanded the scope of diplomacy. Th

was more than a nuclear nonproliferanew level of diplomacy, testing Northan interlocuteur valideand opening tof engagement, such as the now-dor(involving North and South Korea, the U

and missile talks.The regularization oJapan policy coordination was another ithat occurred during the Clinton adm

Bought time. By providing roughly $1aid, heavy fuel oil, and other support States, along with other major actoKorea and China, has, in effect, put Pport. The hope is that another crisis obe avoided and that time will benefit its allies in the form of either changedferent regime.

Gave North Korea something to loseKoreas diplomatic opening to the woburgeoning U.S., South Korean, and E

and assistancehas created a web of deto have a constraining effect on NoProvocative behavior such as another mjeopardize the wide array of assistance.

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U.S. Policy Reconsidered

The Korea problem that now confronts U.Ssignificantly from that faced by both the tration and the Clinton administration. Yequestions remain unanswered.There is a far interactions between the United States and Nort

North Korea and the rest of the world. Nordecade-long assumptions that it would collapDefense Secretary Perrys argument that Northwith as it is, not as we would like it to be, a pleadership in Pyongyang is a far more known

decision-making process remains opaque. Tof change in North Korea, but also a hint ofDiplomacy has the prospect of reducing keyNorth Korean threatnuclear weapons and

We welcome the Bush administrations ini

on a comprehensive basis to address pendingNorth Korea. Based on the lessons of polsome principles and guidelines for U.S. poli

U.S. policy must be consistent with the appand Japan and proactively coordinated w

ROK and U.S.-Japan alliances are key is the basis of engagement with North

South Korea should be in the lead in over

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Focus on priorities.This may seem obv

U.S. wish list for North Korea, from elsile, and conventional threats to market and democracy. U.S. policy must keepto avoid making the best the enemUnited States must accept that progr

Define reciprocity and where it appnot be tit-for-tat, nor applied to all isan aid), but it is highly unlikely that awith North Korea will be politically sued States, the ROK, or Japan absent by Pyongyang.The bargain offered in thnuclear freeze for specified benefitsapplied reciprocity. More broadly, diplreduction should be prepared to put thto North Korea on the table as quid punder no illusions.

Aid to North Korea should be in-kindson of the Hyundai deal is that providing productive. Pyongyang had agreed

the United States that in-kind aid understanding should be adopted colframework.

P bl f P l k



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A number of respected NGOs such as M

tires, CARE, Oxfam, and World Vision hain frustration as a result of restrictions imposby Pyongyang.In order to join the World Banfirst join the IMF.To do so requires openingbudgetary information, and the budget process

information that North Korea is reluctant thas thus far refused World Bank/IMF offermy and rejected an invitation to attend the 200meeting in Prague as an observer.

On security issues, the question of verific

a prospective impediment to agreements aimtion. For example, DPRK secretiveness conproblems for full implementation of the AImplementation calls for North Korea to allal Atomic Energy Agency the access it ne

records and suspected nuclear sites, and theto do so remains an open and dangerous questiohowever, that North Korea did grant the Una suspected nuclear site at Kumchang-ni. Sima missile deal requiring Pyongyang to halt e

technology, dismantle current deployments, amissiles beyond MTCR limits would requiparency far beyond what North Korea hasShould North Korea join the Chemical Wea

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North Koreas economic disaster is miti

much of it from longtime adversaries, tROK, and Japan, and significant amountsit, many believe, on life support. Yet at thehas continued to invest a growing portion oal treasure into its military forces by buying

oping missiles, and increasing its tempdependence on outside assistance creates ais difficult to envision as politically sustaincines are fungible in the sense of freeingmilitary.



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Indeed, there is a greatand underappreciat

ROK-Japan policy toward Pyongyang. Thefood, fertilizer, and other assistance to Nortmuch easier for the regime to muddle throat great cost to the citizens of North Korea. Yalso militate against a risk-averse Kim Jong

changes that U.S. and allied policies hope to ining up and reforming if you can get by with

For the moment, our Task Force recommof a particularly severe drought, provision oaid should continue, with increased pressure

to end-points of distribution and for easing to operate in North Korea.There are differeForce as to whether food aid should be cmonitoring the aid, which give us confidenceaid is reaching its targets, are not provided

there are inherent problems that may rendera perpetual structural food deficit politically

Another dilemma that has garnered less atharsh fate of North Korean refugees crossing Contrary to its U.N.commitments,Beijing ha

gees harshly, returning those it discovers to fatdence suggests include torture and death. Wother governments have been relatively silenright of first asylum is an issue that should be ra

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dealing with North Korea and skeptical abou

cies. Pyongyangs skillful tactic of freezintions, then strongly hinting that the Bdiplomatic freeze in U.S.North Korean rreinforced this view in South Korea (which iby domestic political rivalries). Nonetheless,

persisted, despite U.S. official public statemsince the Bush-Kim meeting stating that tports Kims engagement policy and remainsAgreed Framework, and a declared intentiPyongyang on a comprehensive basis.

The policy review by a new administratioessary exercise. It has set the stage for a neForce commends President Bushs adoptioapproach to North Korea and recommendtion initiate discussions on a broad agenda

Pyongyang at the highest possible level.Thenational interests at stake in the two Koreas ana top potential flashpoint that should bforeign policy priorities.

However, we believe there should be cothe basic (and inseparable) objectives of Uthe threat of military confrontation and facilreconciliation. During a May meeting with adelegation, Kim Jong Il extended his mora

b id i il ld



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the degree that the military confrontation an

reduced; progress on reducing the confrontaweapons of mass destruction is likely to be litoward ending the cause of the confrontatiothe conclusion of the Perry report offerinpaths, one of cooperation, or, if it refuses, o

is still valid.This suggests that particular issueof a framework making clear to North Kornormalization of relations and the economicbe associated with elimination of various elemilitary threat. We believe the administr

should approach security issues involving a bmilitary assets conceptually in transactional tof the Nunn-Lugar threat reduction programof North Korean military capabilities is an incan security. We also believe that U.S. and alli

likely to be achieved if North Korea makes thadopt a serious policy of economic opening

Weapons of Mass DestructionThe starting point for U.S. diplomacy towa

be the two elements of security that North Kitself to address: the Agreed Framework andhas been argued that conventional force reduc

t diffi lt t d ld i

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g

Regardless of how any comprehensive

Korea policy is structured, at the top of thmutual implementation of the Agreed Frameballistic missile program.

Agreed Framework

For the United States, the Agreed Framewof eliminating North Koreas nuclear weapmuch more. As the first major diplomatic tKorea, the AF is a benchmark of the abiliPyongyang and was viewed by both sides

addressing larger concerns of each side. Hthe AF has changed in several respects: itof diplomacy with North Korea than it wasNorth Koreas electrical power situation hadesperation.This is important since under th

it is unlikely that the nuclear reactors beingply energy to North Korea before 200910. Gages of electricity in North Korea, provisiobecome part of the diplomatic equatiomillion kilowatts of electricity from Seou

of power that the two reactors would providethe issue.This may open up new possibilitmentation of the AF. But regardless, any pl i i N h K h i li k



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g

KEDO Operating Costs

Year Operating Costs Heavy Fuel Oi(millions USD) (metric tons)1995 $26.31 150,0001996 $62.17 500,0001997 $66.60 500,0001998 $122.45 500,000

1999 $91.80 500,0002000 ( JanJul) $350.71 186,8692001 $120.00 N/ATOTAL $840.03 2,336,869

Source:KEDO Annual Reports FY 199599 (wwwNote:Operating costs include HFO, LWR, and a

The AF was structured to defer the mosthe agreement until its later stages (see chUnder its terms,North Korea must come into its safeguard agreement with the IAEA wh

tion of the LWR is completed, but before decomponents.This means completion of some pbuildings for the turbine generator and delivthough its precise definition is to be deternegotiated protocol. But it is estimated that i

two to four years to reconstruct North Koreadetermine Pyongyangs compliance. In SoutIAEA nearly three years with the full cooperia government. To date, Pyongyang has b

i i li i l

Testing North Korea


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Envisaged Sequence of Events

Step Verification IssuePartial completion of None, but the IAEA KEDO Reactor 1 in the wants to start the next ROK and partial step early (24 years preparation of Kemho needed).site in DPRK.

IAEA declaration that the Verification of accuracy DPRK is in compliance and completeness of with its agreements. DPRKs initial declaration

on all nuclear materials in the DPRK, at Yongbyon,and possibly elsewhere.

Delivery of KEDO Safeguards for KEDO

Reactor 1s key nuclear Reactor 1 are installed.components starts. Transfer of Yongbyon

Transfer of Yongbyon spent fuel (and other spent fuel (and other material?) to ultimate material?) to ultimate disposition verified.disposition starts.

Simultaneous completion Safeguards on KEDO of previous steps. disposition site monitored.

Dismantlement of Yong- Safeguards for KEDO byon facilities in parallel Reactor 2 are installed.

with delivery of KEDO Dismantlement verified.Reactor 2s key nuclear

components.

Simultaneous completion Safeguards on KEDO of previous steps. Reactor 2 operations.

g



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ed. In this situation, the United States shou

basic principles: The United States should stand by its c

allies, make no unilateral changes to work, and emphasize in its dialogue withdelay in the nonproliferation milestone

will not be fudged and will lead to corcompletion of the LWR project.

No ambiguous determination by the IAEnuclear history may be accepted if thebetween what plutonium the North declthe IAEA judges it may actually havethe amount required for one or more nu

There is room, however, for more creativand perhaps revising the AF:

Take a fresh collective look at the LWRlateral framework (and in consultation wied States and its allies need to examchallenges to full implementation of theas well as potential opportunities to eng

a revision of the terms to meet Pyongyangy needs by nonnuclear means.

Offer more for more.To address the inheAF ff d l

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whatever means is most technically an

ble. Some may argue this approach rebut it addresses gaps in the AF on a r

The United States shouldin the coommendationalso offer to help refurbian plants and its grid in lieu of some

heavy fuel oil provided to the DPRK. Hthis U.S. commitment expensive, andficulty absorbing all 500,000 tons of tapproach is consistent with the logic oprovide energy until the LWRs are co

Expand KEDO. Any bilateral or multil ventionally sourced electricity to Nmanaged and implemented through a precursor to expanding KEDOs r

rehabilitation of the DPRKs energy ienhancing external involvement ieconomy.

North Korean Missile Program

It is clearly in U.S. interests to negotiate aof North Koreas long-range missile programind that the missile issue, unlike the nucleaDPRK violations of international agre



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certain range in exchange for in-kind compen

with launching commercial satellites. Pyongfreeze current missile deploymentswhichhundred No Dong missiles that can hit JapJapanand remained vague about the definiMost important, the North balked at the m

verification.The United States should resume talks onest possible levels. U.S. objectives should be

Effective verification. No verification is 1and what is adequate is a matter of judgm

require a degree of transparency that Pyondifficulty accepting and will thus test tions.The criteria should be that U.S. intewith the agreement, despite less-than-perwithout it.

Elimination of long-range missiles alreing the threat from deployed No Dong mand Tokyo would be involved in elementTaepo Dong missiles can reach U.S. territoopment of long-range missiles (beyonalso an important part of any comprehe

Ban on export of missiles and missile teimportant element as DPRK exports ar

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don capabilities, and may be the least

danger to be avoided is keeping otherissue on the table.

Integrate missiles with electricity. If Nobilitate its economy, it must refurbishgrid. One possible means to achieve

cant assistance to refurbish and upgstructure if it verifiably dismantles its deplSuch an initiative could also facilitatoward nonnuclear energy. In any case, tparticipation by Japan.

No provision of hard currency, but rato the North that would not includtransfers.

Conventional ForcesThere should be no illusions about the difbest of circumstances, of realizing radical cutin Korea that would tend to make recoversible. North Koreas tough initial respo

raise the issuedemanding that U.S. troopwas not surprising and underscores the ditional forces issue. Although force redeploDMZ should also be pursued, these will si


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Testing North Korea


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Other First-Order Issues

Strong support for South Korean effand tension reduction with the North; preturn summit.We believe that Seouls sand reconciliation with Pyongyang hasdynamic on the peninsula in a positive d

the peninsula are lower than at any timSome argue that the policy is a failure bnot reduced its military forces or improresponse to the Souths overtures. Wewithout a reduction of the North Korea

improvement in human rights in the NPyongyang will only go so far. Howevergoals of policy and not preconditions fortension reduction. Kim Dae Jungs focureconciliation is the right way to begi

clearly in U.S. interests.

Continue to invest in the U.S.-ROK secU.S.-ROK alliance has been extraordinaripinning stability in Northeast Asia and est

strength for South Korea to test reconciliatioROK cooperation has also helped facilitateSeoul has clearly stated that the U.S. militto its security even after the North Korean t



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trilateral coordination. A close trilateral relati

of North Korean belligerence and defines thmunitys terms for improved economic relatiochange its stance.The Bush administrations eTrilateral Coordination and Oversight Grouis a positive step.The level of participation shou

key decision-makers in Seoul and Tokyo. Chtier actor in regard to Korea, and the conChinas interests in Korea with those of the Uscores why consultation with Beijing merits msia and the EU also have significant roles to play

U.S. consultation.Take steps to indicate a path to normalizatithat North Korea attaches to normalized relaed States suggests that this DPRK objective proage and should be woven into the fabric of U

the North. Some near-term initiatives migh Software of change initiative.The Unite

the ROK should agree in a trilateral North Korea a substantial program of tetraining business managers, legal experts, ahuman capital required to make economsibility.This should be done,perhaps ledernment facilitation, absent any recipro

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milestones and requirements delineat

tion and clearly communicated to No

International Diplomatic AgendaInternational diplomacy toward Korea is pa series of overlapping concentric circle

United States and ROK in the innermost ccircle, followed by China, and then Russia anin the outermost circle. Political consultatioa broad range of actors remains an importanU.S. policy. The role of each of these actor

JapanJapans unique history with Korea colors anpeninsula, as exhibited by the controvertextbooks in which the depictions of histo

protest from both Koreas. The presencegroups sympathetic to the North and the cates the relationship.Though it has very lnomic interests at stake in Korea,Tokyo hasin the diplomacy of the Korean peninsula.E

malization of relations with North Korea hawith the issues of missing Japanese believed tand North Koreas No Dong missiles on d d f l i d h b th D



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China

China is perhaps the outside actor best positionon the peninsula, where it has vital interests.with the South in 1992, Beijing has built upmilitary, and economic relationship (trade incr$34 billion in 2000) with Seoul. Since the late

repaired a frayed relationship with the North inical, and military spheres.And it has providedof food and fuel to North Korea on a bilateratle and low-key approach in regard to Northmation of its role difficult. But China has

facilitating role in North-South relations, hage economic reform in the North, and, at prelittle desire to see nuclear weapons or a robust bility in North Korea. Korea should be a regioeration in Sino-American relations might be acti

roughly parallel policies with the United Statesbut has sought to avoid the appearance of actifrom the now-dormant Four Party talks. ChU.S. alliances, however, suggests limits to proand a likely divergence of interests when Ko

Russia and the European UnionAlthough both are secondary actors in regarnot unimportant. As a permanent member

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Management of Korea Policy and Allied

We urge the administration to appoint a Korea, the importance of which is underscof the Perry process. Our preference is fostature chosen from outside the governmenly to the president and the secretary of stat

rent senior official could be given a second designated point person, reporting to ththe president on Korea policy. This step wthe interagency process and in making clear and North Korea who is the point person

also facilitate diplomatic protocol to raise ttion on the allied coordinating committROK and Japan, and provide greater access toofficials.

ConclusionThe essence of our approach is to trade econrity assurances for threat reduction and enhchange in North Korea.The experience ofU.S. engagement with North Korea and th

ly suggests that what is possible vis--vis Nknown in advance. North Koreas intentionis particularly important in light of the remsince June 2000. No critics have offered a



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toward threat reduction that has been made

and Democratic administrations over the paAmericas forward presence and allianceprevented a second war on the peninsula anded North Korea that it has no better optionPyongyang is indeed ready to take further ste

ening peace on the peninsula, then the Unifully prepared to respond. In the meantime,rence strong and support the patient effortsan ally.


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ADDITIONAL VIEW

On the U.S.-DPRK Agreed FrameworkThe 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framew

piece of diplomacy with North Korea. ClearlDPRK negotiations of importance have tato these ongoing interactions, the AF is stinstitution that exists today on gaining a witions. Moreover, if one peruses all the othdations in the report, they are all tied in onthe AF, whether the issue is conventional ethe AF implementation process or refurbisstructure in return for concessions on No DAF may not be what concerns us the mosis still central.

On the U.S. Support of the ROKs SunshiWhile the report rightly emphasizes su

id Ki D J

Additional Views


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On Conventional Weapons Issues

With regard to the United States raising coissues in the current U.S.North Korean talkunnecessary and may provoke objections in Slittle to do with the issues at hand.The publicissue as now coming under the purview of th

encourage the perception of a lack of confidencan allies. Although there is no need for a stricaddressing DPRK security threats, the pubthe South Koreans would lead on this has beof the allied stance. The intent of the Kim D

tion has clearly been to take up conventional isstunity, with the return visit of Kim Jong Il to SeoMaximum coordination with the United Stathe planning for that visit. The need to addrissue is far greater in Seoul than in Washingt

lic and political pressure. Finessing the two chelp maintain the trust and cohesion betweeand the ROK that was built up through coordthree years during the Status of Forces AgreemGun Ri investigation, and the Kumchang-n

Testing North Korea

O h R d i T k F h


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On the Recommendation to Take a Fresh

the LWR Project as It Applies to RevisingIn principle, I do not disagree with the rea fresh look at the LWR project, provided ed in coordination with the ROK and Japawith the EU) and provided neither the Uni

upon conclusion of the review, acts unilaterall(which is a party to the Agreed Framewoment, and other documents that govern th

It would be a mistake, however, for the LWR project to reopen it without fully co

ing constraints. First, Seoul has agreed the cost of the LWR project, conserv$5 billion to $6 billion,but likely to be muchvide financing for the bulk of the remaininJung was able to secure funding for the pro

al Assembly in 1999, but the process even rougher than expected. He may not be wilwise for him) to give up that funding only to ing from the National Assembly for a coacoal-fired plants were cheaper than the

light-water reactors, the National Assemblfunding for any massive project involving thThis is particularly true the closer we come to

Additional Views

l fi d j h ld b d i


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a coal-fired project should not be underesti

talks between KEDOs four primary membereactors lasted more than a year and were exThird, coal-fired plants need fuel to opera

need coal.The DPRK, which is unable to feeoperate its existing power plants, is unlikely to

coal. If the LWR project is revised in favorit will need to include a provision that fuel will bIt will also need a guarantee that the coal supoff in the future should the Norths relations wtake a turn for the worse. Pyongyang, which w

en its relations with Washington, is likelyrequirement should fall to the United States, wrent accord is responsible for providing 500,0oil per year to the North until the first of the is building is completed.

Fourth,South Korea needs more nuclear plantic energy purposes. It is running out of space fIt views the North as a good location to platwo Koreas unite, these reactors will be neeunified peninsula. If the two Koreas remain se

can sell the power generated by the light-wthe South in return for desperately needed h

In view of these constraints, it is possible tha

Testing North Korea

O U S E t i N ti ti ith


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On U.S. Engagement in Negotiation with

the Overall Context in the Task Force RepThe Task Force Report encompasses theare critical to reducing tensions and improvinan peninsula.The United States should engain a comprehensive framework but proc

rough reciprocal fashion to first address coof mass destruction. We should do so in cthe ROK and Japan as well as with Chinaacknowledging the ROKs central role and tpeace and the concomitant resolution of co

take place between South and North, aStates playing a key role. Although there arreport with which I agree, there are several or find incomplete. In large measure this of, but not free to discuss, critical elements o

took place during the Clinton administratioadministration is undertaking serious discuswithout prior conditions with North Koclosely trilaterally and bilaterally, and that,beand outside the administration, progress w


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DISSENTING VIEW

On the BushKim Dae Jung Summit and onNormalization of Relations with the DPRK

I endorse this report, which adequatelyexpressed during the deliberations. Howeveless euphemistic in describing the unfortunatadministrations ill-advised public commentsident Kim Dae Jungs visit to Washington.thoughtless, and very damaging. In addition,American tendency to move the goalposts for ntions with the DPRK.We were the originatorrecognition in the 1970s. I believe it would be into have diplomatic relations with the DPRbenefit from regular channels of communinothing to be gained from treating the issue To be sure, full normalization with North Kmutual trust and willingness to experiment wit

jects, etc.) must be held in reserve. Progress m

Willi


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MEMBERS OF THE TASK

MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ is Senior Fellowdation. He was Ambassador to ThailanPresident of the Carnegie Endowment f

RICHARD V. ALLEN is Senior Fellow at theWar, Revolution, and Peace at Stanfordas National Security Adviser to Presiden

EDWARD J. BAKER is Associate DirecYenching Institute, a foundation assUniversity that brings East Asian scholafor research and studies.

DANIEL E. BOB is Senior Adviser at Reed ly, he served as Special Assistant for AsianSenator William V. Roth Jr. (R-Del.), CFinance Committee. Before that, he waStudies and Policy Programs at the Japaand a Fulbright Scholar in Fiji.

KURT CAMPBELL is Senior Vice Presiden

Members of the Task For

international law firm of Paul Weiss R


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international law firm of Paul, Weiss, R

Garrison and teaches at New York UniverSTEPHEN COSTELLO* is Director of the Pr

Transition at the Atlantic Council of the U

JAMES E.DELANEYis a consultant to the Institu

ses. He served as an intelligence officer intwenty years.

WILLIAM M.DRENNANJR. is a Program OfficeInstitute of Peace. A former colonel in th

military assignments included a tour as CPolicy, J-5, U.S. Forces Korea.

ROBERT DUJARRIC* is Research Fellow at the Hhe chairs the Korea-Japan seminar series.

L. GORDON FLAKE is Executive Director at ter for Pacific Affairs. He was Associate Dion Conflict Resolution at the Atlantic Counc

ROBERT L. GALLUCCI is Dean of the Edmu

of Foreign Service at Georgetown UnivAssistant Secretary of State.

WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEENJR.,* a former Am

Testing North Korea

FRANK S JANNUZI is a Democratic Staff


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FRANK S. JANNUZI is a Democratic Staff

Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Has the East Asia regional political-militarof Intelligence and Research, U.S. Depa

ARNOLD KANTERis Senior Fellow at the Fal Policy and a Principal in the ScowcroUnder Secretary of State for Political ASpecial Assistant to the President for dcontrol (198991).

RICHARD KESSLERis a Staff Director of the S

national Security, Proliferation, and FedeSenate Committee on Governmental A

JAMEST.LANEYis President Emeritus of Emoas U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of

KENNETH G.LIEBERTHAL is Professor of PolitDavidson Professor of Business Adminisity of Michigan.

WINSTON LORD is Co-Chairman of the

Committee. He has previously served asState for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,and President of the Council on Foreign

Members of the Task For

DONALD OBERDORFER is Distinguished Jou


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DONALD OBERDORFERis Distinguished Jou

and Adjunct Professor at the Nitze Schoonational Studies of Johns Hopkins UnivTokyo correspondent and diplomatic coWashington Postand is the author ofTContemporary History.

KONGDAN OH is a Research Staff Member at thAnalyses and a Nonresident Senior Fellow atution.

DOUGLAS H. PAAL is President of the Asia P

Prior to forming the APPC, he was SPresident George H.W. Bush and PresidenNational Security Affairs and Senior Direcon the National Security Council.

MITCHELL B. REISS is Dean of Internationalege of William & Mary. He was Assistanand Senior Policy Adviser at the KoreaDevelopment Organization.

ROBERTW. RISCASSI is a retired U.S. Army

as Commander in Chief,United Nations Cmander in Chief, Republic of Korea/U.SCommand.

Testing North Kore

as a special adviser and consultant on m


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as a special adviser and consultant on m

policy. She was the Special Adviser Secretary of State, and North Korea Po

SCOTT SNYDERis Korea Representative of this involved in exchanges and education progans in the areas of law, agriculture, healwas a Program Officer at the U.S. Insacting director of the Contemporary AffAsia Society.

STEPHEN J. SOLARZ is Vice Chair of th

Group. He served for eighteen years Representatives and for twelve of those ySubcommittee on Asian and Pacific Afinternational business consultancy.

HELMUT SONNENFELDT is Guest Scholar fies at the Brookings Institution. He sthe State Department and as a SeniorNational Security Council.

NANCYBERNKOPFTUCKERis Professor of University and at its Edmund A. WaService. She served in the State DepartmAffairs and the U.S. Embassy, Beijing (


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OBSERVERS OF THE TASK

Harry Barnes Asia SocieRobert Carlin U.S. DepaDavid W. Davis Office of

HutchinsoEdward Dong U.S. DepaRobert Einhorn U.S. DepaMichael J. Green National SPaul C. Grove Subcomm

OperationCommitte

John Merrill U.S. DeparCharles L. Pritchard U.S. Depa

James J. Przystup National DGary Samore U.S. DepaAndrew K. Semmel Office of SRichard H. Solomon U.S. InstitMary Tighe National S


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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I


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AGREED FRAMEWORK BETW

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERIC

THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Geneva, October 21, 1994

Delegations of the governments of the Unitca (U.S.) and the Democratic Peoples Repubheld talks in Geneva from September 23 to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclea

an Peninsula.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attacontained in the August 12, 1994, Agreed StaU.S. and the DPRK and upholding the prin

1993, Joint Statement of the U.S. and the DPand security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsuDPRK decided to take the following actionsthe nuclear issue:

I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the

moderated reactors and related facilities wtor (LWR) power plants.

1) In accordance with the October 20, 199


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experimental reactor during the cons

Appendixes


72/84

project, and to dispose of the fuel in a snot involve reprocessing in the DPR

4) As soon as possible after the date of thiDPRK experts will hold two sets of ex

At one set of talks, experts will discalternative energy and the replacemmoderated reactor program with the

At the other set of talks, experts warrangements for spent fuel stodisposition.

II. The two sides will move toward full norcal and economic relations.

1) Within three months of the date of this Dwill reduce barriers to trade and inv

restrictions on telecommunications setransactions.

2) Each side will open a liaison office in thlowing resolution of consular and ot

through expert level discussions.3) As progress is made on issues of conc

U.S. and the DPRK will upgrade bila

Testing North Korea

IV. Both sides will work together to streng


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al nuclear nonproliferation regime.1) The DPRK will remain a party to th

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPmentation of its safeguards agreemen

2) Upon conclusion of the supply contrthe LWR project, ad hoc and routine under the DPRKs safeguards agreemerespect to the facilities not subject to thclusion of the supply contract, inspeIAEA for the continuity of safeguarfacilities not subject to the freeze.

3) When a significant portion of the LWbut before delivery of key nuclear cowill come into full compliance with it

with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), incthat may be deemed necessary by consultations with the Agency with accuracy and completeness of the DPall nuclear material in the DPRK.

Robert L. Gallucci Kang Sok JHead of Delegation of the Head of thU it d St t f A i D ti

APPENDIX II


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SOUTH-NORTH JOINT DECLAR

In accordance with the noble will of the entifor the peaceful reunification of the nation,Jung of the Republic of Korea and Nationa

sion Chairman Kim Jong Il of the Democralic of Korea held a historic meeting and summfrom June 1315, 2000.

The leaders of the South and North, recogning and the summit talks, the first since the d

try, were of great significance in promoting mdeveloping South-North relations and realizcation, declared as follows:

1. The South and North have agreed to r

of reunification on their own Initiativjoint efforts of the Korean people, who acountry.

2. Acknowledging that there are common eleproposal for a confederation and the North

eration of lower stage as the formulae for tion, the South and the North agreed to pin that direction.

Testing North Korea

5. The South and North have agreed to hol t th iti i th f t t


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relevant authorities in the near future toagreement expeditiously.

President Kim Dae Jung cordially invited Nmission Chairman Kim Jong Il to visit Kim Jong Il decided to visit Seoul at an ap

June 15, 2000

Kim Dae Jung Kim Jong IlPresident ChairmanThe Republic of Korea National De

The DemocRepublic of

APPENDIX III


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AGREEMENT ON RECONCILIATION, NON-EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION BETWE

NORTH KOREA (THE BASIC AGR

South and North Korea,

In keeping with the longing of the entire Koreful unification of our divided fatherland;

Reaffirming the three basic principles of unthe South-North Joint Communiqu of July

Determined to end the state of political andtion and achieve national reconciliation;

Also determined to avoid armed aggression aensure the lessening of tension and the estab

Expressing the desire to realize multi-faccooperation to promote interests and prospeKorean people;

Recognizing that their relationship,not being a rstates, is a special one constituted temporarily fication;

Pledging themselves to exert joint efforts ifi i

Testing North Korea

4. South and North Korea shall refrain tage or insurrection against each othe


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tage or insurrection against each othe

5. South and North Korea shall together the present state of armistice into a firmthe two sides and shall abide by the presAgreement until such a state of peace

6. South and North Korea shall cease tofront each other, and instead shall cooppromote the racial dignity and interestnational arena.

7. South and North Korea shall establishNorth Liaison Office at Panmunjom wthe entry into force of this Agreementand consultations between the two sid

8. South and North Korea shall establish

ical Committee within the framework of Level Negotiations within one monthof this Agreement to consider concrete implementation and observance of theNorth reconciliation.

CHAPTER2: AGREEMENT OF NON-AGGRESSOUTH AND NORTH KOREA

Appendixes

12. In order to implement and guarantee non-


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and the North shall establish a SMilitary Commission within three monforce of this Agreement. In the said Commshall discuss problems and carry out stetary confidence and realize arms reductimutual notification and control of largemilitary units and major military exercilization of the Demilitarized Zone, expersonnel and information, phased reduincluding the elimination of weapons of mattack capabilities, and verifications the

13. South and North Korea shall install andline between the military authorities of the outbreak and escalation of accidenta

14. South and North Korea shall establish itary Sub-Committee within the frameworHigh-Level Negotiations within one into force of this Agreement to discuss cthe implementation and observance onon-aggression and to remove the sta

frontation.

CHAPTER3: EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION

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17. South and North Korea shall implemKorean travel and contact among the


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Korean travel and contact among the an people.

18. South and North Korea shall permit freement between the two sides, meetings,persed family members and other re

voluntary reunion, and take measures toitarian issues.

19. South and North Korea shall reconnepreviously severed roads, and shall op

20. South and North Korea shall establishexchanges by post and telecommunicantee the confidentiality of intra-Kormunications.

21. South and North Korea shall coopera

arena in the economic,cultural,and otherabroad together.

22. In order to implement the agreemecooperation in the economic, cultural,

and North Korea shall establish joint sector, including a Joint South-Northand Cooperation Commission, within thinto force of this Agreement

CHAPTER4: AMENDMENTS AND EFFECTUATI

Appendixes


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25. This Agreement may be amended or supment between the two sides.

26. This Agreement shall enter into forceSouth and the North exchange the apprfollowing the completion of the respectiv

sary for its implementation.

Signed on December 13, 1991*

Chung Won-shik Yon Hyong-m

Chief Delegate of the Head of the NSouth delegation to the to the South-NSouth-North High-Level Talks, Premier o Talks, Prime Minister of Council of ththe Republic of Korea Peoples Repub


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OTHERREPORTS OFINDEPENDENTSPONSORED BY THE COUNCIL ON FORE

* The United States and Southeast Asia: A Policy AgendAdministration (2001)


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J. Robert Kerrey, Chair; Robert A. Manning, Project D* Strategic Energy Policy: Challenges for the 21st Centur

Edward L. Morse, Chair; Amy Myers Jaffe, Project Di

* State Department Reform (2001)Frank C. Carlucci, Chair; Ian J. Brzezinski, Project Coo

with the Center for Strategic and International Studies

* A Letter to the President and a Memorandum on U.S.Brazil(2000)Stephen Robert, Chair; Kenneth Maxwell, Project Dir

* U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 21st Century: A Follow-oBernard W. Aronson and William D. Rogers, Co-ChaRussell Mead, Project Directors

* Toward Greater Peace and Security in Colombia(2000

Bob Graham and Brent Scowcroft, Co-Chairs; MichaeCosponsored with the Inter-American Dialogue

* Future Directions for U.S. Economic Policy Toward JaLaura DAndrea Tyson, Chair; M. Diana Helweg New

* Promoting Sustainable Economies in the Balkans(20Steven Rattner, Chair;W. Montague Winfield, Proje

* Nonlethal Technologies: Progress and Prospects(1999)Richard L. Garwin, Chair; W. Montague Winfield, Pr

* U.S. Policy Toward North Korea: Next Steps(1999)Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Co-ChairsProject Director

* Safegarding Prosperity in a Global System: The FutureArchitecture(1999)Carla A. Hills and Peter G. Peterson, Co-Chairs; MorrDirector

* Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions(1999)Michael Rocard, Chair; Henry Siegman, Project Direc

* U S P li T d N h E ( )


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Documents

No. 35 - Testing North Korea: The Next Stage in U.S. and ROK Policy