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SCHEDULED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ON MARCH 14, 2016
No. 15-7062
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
RONALD EUGENE DUBERRY, et al.,
APPELLANTS,
V.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
APPELLEES.
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
KARL A. RACINE
Attorney General for the District of Columbia TODD S. KIM
Solicitor General LOREN L. ALIKHAN
Deputy Solicitor General MARY L. WILSON
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Solicitor General Office of the Attorney General
441 4th Street, NW, Suite 600S
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 724-5693
USCA Case #15-7062 Document #1592907 Filed: 01/11/2016 Page 1 of 34
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CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES
A. Parties and amici.—Plaintiffs below and appellants here are Ronald
Eugene Duberry, Harold Bennette, Maurice Curtis, and Robert Smith. A defendant
below and the appellee here is the District of Columbia. The named defendants
below also included Mayor Muriel Bowser in her official capacity (as successor to
Vincent Gray) and Thomas Faust in his official capacity as Director of the District
of Columbia Department of Corrections. The district court dismissed the case as to
the Mayor and Director because the claims against them in their official capacities
were essentially suits against the District itself. A63. Plaintiffs do not challenge
that ruling on appeal. There are no amici.
B. Rulings under review.—Plaintiffs appeal from Judge Rudolph
Contreras’s May 28, 2015, order dismissing the case. Record Document 28;
Duberry v. District of Columbia, 106 F. Supp. 3d 245 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
C. Related cases.—This case has not been before this Court or any other
court, except the district court below. Government counsel is not aware of any
pending related cases.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT .......................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES............................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 2
1. LEOSA. ................................................................................................. 2
2. Plaintiffs’ Factual Allegations. .............................................................. 5
3. District Court Proceedings. ................................................................... 6
STANDARD OF REVIEW ....................................................................................... 9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................................................. 9
ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................12
I. Plaintiffs Have No Rights Enforceable Through 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 To Require The District To Certify That They Are
Qualified Former Law Enforcement Officers Under LEOSA. ...........12
A. Plaintiffs can invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only upon
meeting their burden to show that the right they attempt
to enforce is “unambiguously conferred” by federal law. ........12
B. Plaintiffs do not carry their burden to show that LEOSA
unambiguously confers a right to require states to certify
whether former employees are qualified retired law
enforcement officers. ................................................................15
II. In The Alternative, Correctional Officers In The District Do
Not Have The Statutory Powers Of Arrest Necessary To
Qualify As Law Enforcement Officers For Purposes of LEOSA. ......21
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................26
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iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES*
Cases
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) .......................................................... 14
Atherton v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ...................... 9
Blackman v. District of Columbia, 456 F.3d 167 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ........................... 9
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) ........................................... 8, 12, 13, 18
Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ............24
City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005) ...............................13
District of Columbia v. Sierra Club, 670 A.2d 354 (D.C. 1996) ............................20
Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2012)....................................................... 9
El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. United States, 750 F.3d 863 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ..................14
Friedman v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 2014 WL 5472604 (D. Nev. Oct. 24,
2014).....................................................................................................................19
*Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) ................................ 8, 13, 14, 16
In re A.T., 10 A.3d 127 (D.C. 2010) ........................................................................21
In re Carry Permit of Andros, 958 A.2d 78 (N.J. Super. 2008) ..............................19
In re M.E.B., 638 A.2d 1123 (D.C. 1993) ...............................................................23
*Johnson v. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 709 F. Supp. 2d 178
(N.D.N.Y. 2010) ...................................................................... 2, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19
Lomont v. O’Neill, 285 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ......................................................16
* Authorities upon which we chiefly rely are marked with asterisks.
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Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) ....................................................................13
Maranatha Faith Cent., Inc. v. Colonial Trust Co., 904 So. 2d 1004 (Miss. 2004)
..............................................................................................................................25
Moore v. Trent, 2010 WL 5232727 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2010) ................................19
Morello v. District of Columbia, 621 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) ....19
*Mpras v. District of Columbia, 74 F. Supp. 3d 265 (D.D.C. 2014) ............... 16, 19
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) ...........................................................16
Ramirez v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2015 WL 9463185
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2015) .....................................................................................18
State v. Linthwaite, 665 P.2d 863 (Ore. 1983) .........................................................25
Torraco v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 615 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2010) ........................14
Zarrelli v. Rabner, 2007 WL 1284947, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) ....... 17, 19
Statutes
10 U.S.C. § 807(b) ...............................................................................................3, 24
18 U.S.C. § 926A .....................................................................................................20
18 U.S.C. § 926B ...................................................................................................1, 3
18 U.S.C. § 926C ............................................................................................ 1, 2, 18
18 U.S.C. § 926C(a) .............................................................................................3, 15
18 U.S.C. § 926C(c)(1) .............................................................................................. 3
18 U.S.C. § 926C(c)(2) ........................................................................... 3, 21, 23, 24
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18 U.S.C. § 926C(d).............................................................................................4, 15
18 U.S.C. § 926C(d)(1)-(2) ......................................................................................15
18 U.S.C. § 926C(d)(2)(A) ..................................................................................5, 17
18 U.S.C. § 926C(d)(2)(B) ..................................................................................5, 17
28 U.S.C. § 1291 ......................................................................................................... 1
28 U.S.C. § 1331 ......................................................................................................... 1
28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) ................................................................................................ 1
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ............................................................................ 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12
Act of July 15, 1932, ch. 492, § 5, 47 Stat. 696, 698 ...............................................24
Act of June 6, 1940, ch. 254, § 4, 54 Stat. 242, 243 ................................................24
D.C. Code § 22-2106 ................................................................................................. 8
D.C. Code § 22-4505 ...........................................................................................8, 22
D.C. Code §§ 23-501(2) .......................................................................................7, 21
D.C. Code § 23-562 ............................................................................................. 7, 21
D.C. Code § 24-405 ................................................................................ 8, 22, 23, 24
Constitutional Provisions
Tenth Amendment .................................................................................................... 16
Legislative History
S. Rep. No. 108-29, at 4 (2003), available at 2003 WL 1609540 ...........................23
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GLOSSARY
A Appendix
LEOSA Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004
RD Record Document
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The district court had jurisdiction of plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. The June 25, 2015 notice of appeal was timely as to the district court’s final
order of May 28, 2015.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. §§ 926B-
926C (“LEOSA”), allows a qualified retired law enforcement officer to carry
firearms if the officer meets certain criteria and carries the necessary identification.
Four former correctional officers with the District of Columbia Department of
Corrections asked the District to certify that they were former law enforcement
officers for purposes of LEOSA. The District would not because District
correctional officers lack the “statutory powers of arrest” necessary to qualify
under LEOSA. The issues on appeal are:
1. Whether the district court properly dismissed this action for failure to
state a claim considering that LEOSA does not unambiguously confer any right to
a certification from a former employing agency, and so no such right is enforceable
in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2. In the alternative, on the underlying merits, whether the District properly
denied the certification requests since corrections officials do not have “statutory
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powers of arrest,” but rather only the limited authority to execute parole violator
warrants.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Four former correctional officers with the District of Columbia Department
of Corrections filed this action for injunctive and declaratory relief against the
District of Columbia, claiming that the District had illegally refused to certify them
as former law enforcement officers, thereby preventing them from qualifying under
LEOSA to carry concealed firearms. The district court granted the District’s
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6),
concluding that plaintiffs had no enforceable rights under LEOSA and therefore no
actionable claim. Appendix (“A”) 43. Plaintiffs appeal from that judgment.
1. LEOSA.
LEOSA authorizes “a qualified retired law enforcement officer” with an
identification credential issued by his former law enforcement employer to carry
firearms transported in interstate commerce (subject to certain limits), regardless of
state criminal laws to the contrary. 18 U.S.C. § 926C; see Johnson v. N.Y. Dep’t of
Corr. Servs., 709 F. Supp. 2d 178, 184 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). LEOSA, which is
codified in the United States criminal code, provides in pertinent part:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of the law of any State or
any political subdivision thereof, an individual who is a qualified
retired law enforcement officer and who is carrying the identification
required by subsection (d) may carry a concealed firearm that has
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been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, subject
to subsection (b).
18 U.S.C. § 926C(a).1
LEOSA defines a “qualified retired law enforcement officer” who may
receive the benefits of the law if he or she carries the necessary identification as an
individual who, among other things:
(1) separated from service in good standing from service with a
public agency as a law enforcement officer; [and]
(2) before such separation, was authorized by law to engage in or
supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of, or
the incarceration of any person for, any violation of law, and had
statutory powers of arrest or apprehension under section 807(b) of
title 10, United States Code (article 7(b) of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice) . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 926C(c)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).2
The requisite identification referenced in § 926C(a), meanwhile, is defined
in subsection (d):
(d) The identification required by this subsection is—
1 LEOSA similarly allows a qualified active law enforcement officer with the
requisite identification to carry a concealed firearm (again subject to certain
limits). 18 U.S.C. § 926B. 2 The referenced provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice reads:
“Any person authorized under regulations governing the armed forces to
apprehend persons subject to this chapter or to trial thereunder may do so upon
reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the person
apprehended committed it.” 10 U.S.C. § 807(b).
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(1) a photographic identification issued by the agency from which the
individual separated from service as a law enforcement officer that
identifies the person as having been employed as a police officer or
law enforcement officer and indicates that the individual has, not less
recently than one year before the date the individual is carrying the
concealed firearm, been tested or otherwise found by the agency to
meet the active duty standards for qualification in firearms training as
established by the agency to carry a firearm of the same type as the
concealed firearm; or
(2)(A) a photographic identification issued by the agency from which
the individual separated from service as a law enforcement officer that
identifies the person as having been employed as a police officer or
law enforcement officer; and
(B) a certification issued by the State in which the individual resides
or by a certified firearms instructor that is qualified to conduct a
firearms qualification test for active duty officers within that State that
indicates that the individual has, not less than 1 year before the date
the individual is carrying the concealed firearm, been tested or
otherwise found by the State or a certified firearms instructor that is
qualified to conduct a firearms qualification test for active duty
officers within that State to have met—
(I) the active duty standards for qualification in firearms
training, as established by the State, to carry a firearm of the
same type as the concealed firearm; or
(II) if the State has not established such standards, standards set
by any law enforcement agency within that State to carry a
firearm of the same type as the concealed firearm.
18 U.S.C. § 926C(d).
LEOSA by its terms does not entitle any individual to such an identification
or require any agency to issue one. Nor does LEOSA by its terms require a former
employing agency to certify on outside inquiry whether an individual is a qualified
retired law enforcement officer.
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2. Plaintiffs’ Factual Allegations.
According to the complaint and its exhibits, plaintiffs Ronald Duberry,
Harold Bennette, Maurice Curtis, and Robert Smith are all former correctional
officers who retired in good standing from the D.C. Department of Corrections and
who wish to take advantage of LEOSA. A17-20. Each already claims to possess
the necessary identification from the Department under 18 U.S.C.
§ 926C(d)(2)(A). A17, 33. To obtain the separate certification that he met
firearms-training standards under § 926C(d)(2)(B), however, each asked the
Department to certify that he was a retired law enforcement officer for purposes of
LEOSA. A15-17.3
The Department of Corrections denied each of those requests, explaining
that it did not deem correctional officers to be law enforcement officers within the
meaning of LEOSA because correctional officers do not have general arrest
3 The application form that Duberry submitted to the Department of
Corrections was issued by the Prince George’s Community College, Prince
George’s Municipal Police Academy. A26. Duberry resides in Prince George’s
County, Maryland, and was apparently applying for a LEOSA credential there.
A26, 46-47. That application form had a section that was to be completed by the
applicant’s former employer. The actual forms submitted to the Department of
Corrections by the other plaintiffs, one of whom lives in the District, A7, are not in
the record. Plaintiffs asserted that the LEOSA application process for Prince
George’s County and the District of Columbia both require the employing agency
to certify that the applicant is a retired law enforcement officer. A47-48 n.4. The
district court accepted the truth of this assertion for purposes of adjudicating the
motion to dismiss. A47 n.4.
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powers under District law. A15-17. On Duberry’s application form, which was
attached to the second amended complaint, a Department official answered “no” to
the following two questions:
Was the applicant authorized to engage in or supervise the prevention,
detection, investigation or prosecution of, or the incarceration of any
person for, [sic] any violation of law, and did he/she have the statutory
powers of arrest?
Before separation, was the applicant regularly employed as a law
enforcement officer with your agency for the months of service
provided above . . . ?
A26.
3. District Court Proceedings.
Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint against the District under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.4 They alleged that the District had wrongfully failed to certify
them as retired law enforcement officers under LEOSA, thus denying them their
“right to carry a concealed firearm under the federal statute.” A17. They sought a
declaration that they qualify as retired law enforcement officers under LEOSA and
an injunction directing the District to certify them as retired law enforcement
officers for purposes of that statute. A22-23.
4 Plaintiffs also named as defendants the Mayor of the District and the
Director of the Department of Corrections in their official capacities. The district
court dismissed the case as to them because the claims duplicated the claims
against the District. A63-64. Plaintiffs do not challenge that ruling on appeal.
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The District of Columbia moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) because,
inter alia, LEOSA does not create a private cause of action or any rights that
plaintiffs could enforce through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Record Document (“RD”) 19 at
1, 4-5; RD 24 at 2.5 The District explained that LEOSA does not require a state
agency to classify any particular retired employee as having been a “law
enforcement officer,” but rather leaves that determination to the discretion of the
state agency, and therefore plaintiffs had no actionable federal claim. RD 19 at 11;
RD 24 at 6. The District suggested that plaintiffs could litigate whether they
qualified as law enforcement officers within the meaning of local District law in an
appropriate local court or administrative agency. RD 19 at 11; RD 24 at 7.
The District explained in the alternative that District of Columbia
correctional officers are not considered law enforcement officers because they do
not have “statutory powers of arrest” under District law. RD 19 at 25-26 (citing
D.C. Code §§ 23-501(2), 23-562 (authorizing law enforcement officers to make
arrests, and defining “law enforcement officer” as a member of the Metropolitan
Police Department or other police force operating in the District, District animal
control officers, certain members of the Fire Department of the District of
Columbia, and agents of the United States). The District distinguished other
5 Page numbers for record documents are to the numbers at the top of the page
inserted by the Court’s PACER system.
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District statutory provisions cited by plaintiffs as not conferring powers of arrest
on correctional officers. RD 19 at 26-27 (discussing D.C. Code § 22-4505, which
excludes prison or jail wardens and their deputies from the prohibition against
carrying a pistol without a license; § 24-405, which authorizes an officer of a penal
institution to execute parole violator warrants issued by the parole authority; and
§ 22-2106, which defines the crime of murder of a law enforcement officer to
include murder of a correctional officer).
The district court granted the District’s motion to dismiss. It concluded that
Congress did not intend to confer upon plaintiffs the right they seek to enforce in
this action. A73. The court analyzed the issue under Blessing v. Freestone, 520
U.S. 329, 340 (1997), which establishes that a § 1983 “plaintiff must assert the
violation of a federal right, not merely a federal law,” and Gonzaga University v.
Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002), which “requires an ‘unambiguously conferred
right’ borne out in the ‘text and structure’ of the statute.” A64-68. The court
concluded that LEOSA did not create any right to have the District of Columbia
classify any particular persons as retired “law enforcement officers” so as to enable
them to qualify to carry concealed weapons under the law, and therefore plaintiffs
had no federal right to enforce under § 1983. A71-72, 75-77. Even if the
Department of Corrections misclassified plaintiffs for purposes of LEOSA,
“Congress did not intend through LEOSA to confer a ‘right’ to have this mistake
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9
corrected, at least by way of § 1983.” A77. The court concluded that ‘the text and
structure of LEOSA do not manifest an unambiguously conferred right.” A75
n.27. The court noted that it was not deciding the issue of whether plaintiffs
qualified as law enforcement officers, and noted that plaintiffs might be able to
pursue their claim in that regard in the District’s local courts. A77.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court reviews de novo a district court order dismissing a complaint for
failure to state a claim. Atherton v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681
(D.C. Cir. 2009). The Court assumes the truth of all well-pleaded factual
allegations in the complaint and makes reasonable inferences from those
allegations in the plaintiff’s favor, but is not required to accept the plaintiff’s legal
conclusions as correct. Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 391 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The
Court reviews issues of statutory construction de novo. Blackman v. District of
Columbia, 456 F.3d 167, 174 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The district court correctly held as a matter of law that LEOSA does not
create the right that plaintiffs seek to enforce under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The essence
of plaintiffs’ claim is that, as retired District of Columbia correctional officers,
they have a federal right to force the District to certify that they qualify as law
enforcement officers under LEOSA. There is no merit to this claim. Congress did
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not require any state to certify that any former employee is a qualified retired law
enforcement officer under LEOSA.
Under Supreme Court case law, to obtain redress through § 1983, a plaintiff
must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law. It
is only unambiguous rights, not broader or vaguer benefits or interests, that may be
enforced under § 1983. It is plaintiffs’ burden to show that Congress intended for
the statute at issue to create an enforceable right.
Plaintiffs fail to show any right enforceable under § 1983 here. LEOSA
provides a federal right for qualified retired law enforcement officers who possess
the requisite identification to lawfully carry concealed firearms across state lines.
But the statute leaves it to the states and the District to decide what actions to take
to facilitate individuals’ applications to satisfy those prerequisites for LEOSA
protection.
To qualify to carry a firearm under LEOSA, an individual must both satisfy
the definition of “qualified retired law enforcement officer” under subsection (c)
and be in possession of an identification required under subsection (d). Nothing in
the text or structure of LEOSA suggests that Congress explicitly or impliedly
intended to create a federal right to have a local jurisdiction issue the identification,
and plaintiffs admit as much. Congress left that authority in the hands of the
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relevant state agency. Any conclusion to the contrary has Tenth Amendment anti-
commandeering implications.
Nor does LEOSA create the right plaintiffs seek to enforce here to have the
District certify that they are qualified former law enforcement officers within
LEOSA’s meaning so as to facilitate the completion of their firearms qualification
training and their credentialing under LEOSA. LEOSA does not mandate that
states have a process for such certification. Indeed, LEOSA lacks any indication
that Congress intended to mandate that states must issue any identification or
certification under the law. The law lacks any language imposing a binding
obligation on the states in this regard, much less unambiguously doing so.
Every court to consider whether LEOSA creates any enforceable right has
answered the question in the negative, in addition to the district court here.
Plaintiffs cite to no law in support of their position. Plaintiffs should pursue their
asserted rights against the District in the local courts.
2. In the alternative, on the merits, the Court should affirm because the
District was correct to deny plaintiffs’ requests to be certified as law enforcement
officers under LEOSA because corrections officers in the District do not have the
requisite “statutory powers of arrest” under the law.
Correctional officers are not included in the statute conferring general arrest
authority on police officers in the District. Plaintiffs’ asserted experience
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12
supervising prisoners in and out of the penal facilities, pursuing escapees, and the
like is beside the point because LEOSA requires “statutory powers of arrest.”
Correctional officers do have statutory authority to execute parole violator
warrants issued by the parole authority, but that statute does not even use the word
“arrest” but speaks only of “retaking” a prisoner who is a parole violator to return
him to prison. That does not amount to powers of arrests under LEOSA.
Correctional officers in the District have not been trained to determine
whether probable cause exists to make a warrantless arrest for any crime in the
community. LEOSA did not intend to arm individuals to “respond immediately to
crime” across state lines, when those individuals have not spent their career
assessing whether a crime has been committed and whether probable cause exists
to arrest.
ARGUMENT
I. Plaintiffs Have No Rights Enforceable Through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 To
Require The District To Certify That They Are Qualified Former Law
Enforcement Officers Under LEOSA.
A. Plaintiffs can invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only upon meeting their
burden to show that the right they attempt to enforce is
“unambiguously conferred” by federal law.
Under § 1983, the District may be liable if it deprives an individual of “any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the
United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This provision authorizes lawsuits to enforce
certain rights conferred by federal statutes. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340 (citing Maine
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13
v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980)). But it “does not provide an avenue for relief
every time a state actor violates a federal law.” City of Rancho Palos Verdes v.
Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 119 (2005). To obtain redress through § 1983, “a plaintiff
must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.”
Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court clarified in Gonzaga University, nothing
“short of an unambiguously conferred right” will “support a cause of action
brought under § 1983.” 536 U.S. at 283. It is only “rights, not the broader or
vaguer ‘benefits’ or ‘interests’ that may be enforced under the authority of”
§ 1983. Id. A court must find that Congress spoke “with a clear voice” to confer
individual rights. Id. at 280. Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that Congress
intended for the statute at issue to create an enforceable right. Id. at 284.
The Supreme Court in Blessing identified three relevant factors to help
determine whether a federal statute creates and confers a federal right: (1)
“Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff”;
(2) the asserted right must not be “so ‘vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement
would strain judicial competence”; and (3) “the statute must unambiguously
impose a binding obligation on the States” by being “couched in mandatory, rather
than precatory, terms.” 520 U.S. at 340-41. But a court need not apply the
Blessing factors in a “rigid and superficial” manner before concluding that
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Congress did not create a federal right for plaintiffs under a particular statute.
Torraco v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 615 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2010). Further,
even if all three Blessing factors are satisfied to show the creation of a federal
right, a defendant may still show that Congress either expressly or impliedly
foreclosed the § 1983 remedy for that right. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341.
This inquiry as to whether a statute creates a right enforceable under § 1983
overlaps with the inquiry as to whether a statute creates an independent implied
right of action. Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 283-84. Both inquiries look to
whether “Congress intended to confer individual rights upon a class of
beneficiaries.” Id. at 285. A “court’s role in discerning whether personal rights
exist in the § 1983 context should therefore not differ from its role in discerning
whether personal rights exist in the implied right of action context.” Id. “[W]here
the text and structure of a statute provide no indication that Congress intends to
create individual rights, there is no basis for a private suit, whether under § 1983 or
under an implied right of action.” Id. at 286; see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (recognizing that whether a private right of action exists
depends on Congress’s intent); El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. United States, 750 F.3d
863, 889 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (similar).
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B. Plaintiffs do not carry their burden to show that LEOSA
unambiguously confers a right to require states to certify whether
former employees are qualified retired law enforcement officers.
With these principles in mind, it is clear that while LEOSA does provide a
right, it does not provide the one plaintiffs seek to enforce. “LEOSA provides a
federal right for qualified retired law enforcement officers who possess the
requisite identification to lawfully carry concealed firearms across state lines.”
Johnson, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 184; 18 U.S.C. § 926C(a) (emphasis omitted). While
it thus protects individuals meeting certain prerequisites from prosecution under
state law, LEOSA leaves it to the states and the District to decide what actions to
take to facilitate individuals’ attempts to satisfy those prerequisites for LEOSA
protection.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 926C(d), a person has no rights under LEOSA unless and
until the individual’s employing agency issues the credential identifying the
individual “as having been employed as a police officer or law enforcement
officer” and until that agency or the individual’s home state indicates that the
individual met the requisite firearms training. 18 U.S.C. § 926C(d)(1)-(2).
“Congress therefore established two distinct limitations to the class of persons for
whom LEOSA was enacted to benefit.” Johnson, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 185. To
qualify to carry a firearm under LEOSA, an individual must both satisfy the
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definition of “qualified retired law enforcement officer” under subsection (c) and
be in possession of an identification required under subsection (d). Id.
Plaintiffs repeatedly admit that they have no right to a LEOSA
identification. E.g., Br. 2 (“[S]tate agencies may choose or not to issue the
identification cards necessary to exercise the LEOSA ‘right to carry.’”); Br. 16-17
(similar). That admission is appropriate, as nothing in the text or structure of
LEOSA suggests—let alone unambiguously suggests, as Gonzaga University
requires—that Congress explicitly or impliedly intended to create a federal right to
have a local jurisdiction issue the identification. “Congress expressly left the
authority to issue the identification described in subsection (d) in the hands of the
relevant state agency.” Johnson, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 185; see Mpras v. District of
Columbia, 74 F. Supp. 3d 265, 270 (D.D.C. 2014) (“In enacting LEOSA, Congress
clearly recognized the states’ authority to establish their own firearm permit
standards and make their own decisions whether to issue the photographic
identification required by subsection (d).”). Indeed, it would have been surprising
if Congress had compelled states officers to implement this federal regulatory
program given the Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering implications. See
Johnson, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 184 (concluding that Congress could not compel states
to issue documents to implement LEOSA, relying on Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 117 (1997)); see also Lomont v. O’Neill, 285 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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Even more clearly, LEOSA does not provide the right that plaintiffs seek to
enforce. While they claim already to have the necessary identification from the
Department of Corrections under 18 U.S.C. § 926C(d)(2)(A), they lack the
certification that they have met firearms-training standards under § 926C(d)(2)(B).
A15-17. The latter provision does not on its face have anything to do with whether
they are qualified former law enforcement officers within LEOSA’s meaning, but
the LEOSA application paperwork requires the Department’s certification that they
are so qualified. A16-17, 26. They thus claim a right to force the Department to
certify as much. But LEOSA does not even make such certification a prerequisite
for protection, let alone mandate that states have a process for certification.
Indeed, LEOSA lacks any indication that Congress intended to mandate that states
must issue the certifications that are actually mentioned in 18 U.S.C.
§ 926C(d)(2)(B)—certifications regarding satisfaction of firearms-training
standards. Johnson, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 184; Zarrelli v. Rabner, 2007 WL
1284947, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (per curiam) (“The statute may bar
one State from preventing an individual who meets the criteria of the statute and
has received a certification from his or her home state from carrying a weapon into
that State. It does not, however, require a State to issue a certification in order to
permit an individual to qualify under the statute.”).
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LEOSA thus does not confer, let alone unambiguously confer, the right
plaintiffs seek to enforce. Under the first Blessing factor, Congress did not intend
“that the provision in question benefit” plaintiffs here. 520 U.S. at 340. As
already explained, the intended beneficiaries of 18 U.S.C. § 926C were not all
retired law enforcement officers in general, but those who have been issued the
requisite identification and certification described in subsection (d). Johnson, 709
F. Supp. 2d at 184-85. Under the second Blessing factor, the right plaintiffs
identify—evidently, to require the District to answer all inquiries related to their
LEOSA prerequisites in the manner they prefer—is “vague and amorphous”
enough to cast doubt that Congress intended the judiciary to enforce it. 520 U.S. at
340-41. And under the third Blessing factor, there is no provision “unambiguously
impos[ing] a binding obligation on the States” that is “couched in mandatory,
rather than precatory, terms.” 520 U.S. at 341. Indeed, plaintiffs’ claimed right is
not supported by any statutory language at all.
It is thus not surprising that plaintiffs can cite no authority supporting their
position. Every court to consider whether LEOSA creates any enforceable right
has answered the question in the negative, in addition to the district court here. See
Ramirez v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2015 WL 9463185
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2015) (“Congress did not intend to make [LEOSA’s] violation
actionable under § 1983.”); Friedman v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 2014 WL
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5472604, at *5 (D. Nev. Oct. 24, 2014) (“Rather than affirmatively requiring states
to issue concealed carry licenses to retired police officers, LEOSA merely permits
retired officers who already possess a concealed-carry permit to bring a concealed
firearm across state lines.”); Mpras, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 270 (“[N]othing in LEOSA
bestows a federal right to the identification required by subsection (d).”); Moore v.
Trent, 2010 WL 5232727, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2010) (“The text of [LEOSA]
reveals Congress’ decision to preserve the States’ authority in establishing
eligibility requirements for qualified retired law enforcement officers.”); Johnson,
709 F. Supp. 2d at 187-88 (holding that LEOSA does not create federal mandate
for state officials to issue LEOSA identifications); Zarrelli, 2007 WL 1284947, at
*2 (“[LEOSA] is bereft of any indication that Congress, on passing the Act,
intended to mandate that the various States implement a procedure for issuing
certifications in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 926C(d).”); see also In re Carry
Permit of Andros, 958 A.2d 78, 84-85 (N.J. Super. 2008) (holding that LEOSA
does not preclude a state from revoking a permit to carry a handgun); cf. Morello v.
District of Columbia, 621 F. App’x 1, 2-3 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (rejecting
claim that the District violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights by denying his
application for LEOSA credential).
Although plaintiffs do not seek damages here, the Court should be cognizant
that any conclusion that plaintiffs have an enforceable right under LEOSA would
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20
potentially enable other similarly situated plaintiffs to seek damages against
District officials for the denial of that right. There is simply no evidence in the text
or legislative history of LEOSA that local officials responsible for reviewing
applications for LEOSA credentials would be liable for damages for failing to
correctly apply the law. Support for this conclusion comes from Torraco, in which
the Second Circuit considered a suit under § 1983 to enforce 18 U.S.C. § 926A,
which allows individuals to transport firearms from one state where they are legal,
through another state where they are illegal, to a third state where they are legal,
provided certain conditions are met, without incurring criminal liability under any
local gun laws. The Second Circuit held that there was “no evidence either in the
text or structure of Section 926A that would indicate that Congress intended that
police officers tasked with enforcing state gun laws should be liable for damages
when they fail to correctly apply” that law. 615 F.3d at 137. The same holds true
here. There is no evidence that, in enacting LEOSA, Congress intended that police
and correctional officers assigned to review applications for LEOSA certifications
should be liable for damages when they fail to correctly apply the law.
As the district court determined here, plaintiffs should pursue their remedy
against the District in the local courts. A77; see Morello, 621 F. App’x at 2 (citing
District of Columbia v. Sierra Club, 670 A.2d 354, 358 (D.C. 1996) (articulating
the presumption that agency action is reviewable in the Superior Court of the
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District of Columbia)); see also In re A.T., 10 A.3d 127, 134-35 (D.C. 2010)
(explaining how the Superior Court has direct authority to review in “non-
contested cases”). They have no entitlement to relief in federal court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
II. In The Alternative, Correctional Officers In The District Do Not Have
The Statutory Powers Of Arrest Necessary To Qualify As Law
Enforcement Officers For Purposes of LEOSA.
In the alternative, if the Court concludes that plaintiffs have an actionable
claim under § 1983, the Court should nevertheless affirm because the District was
correct to deny plaintiffs’ requests to be certified as law enforcement officers under
LEOSA. Although the government employees potentially eligible for LEOSA
identifications include those “authorized by law to engage in . . . the incarceration
of any person for . . . any violation of law,” LEOSA specifies that the putative
“qualified law enforcement officer” also must have “statutory powers of arrest or
apprehension under section 807(b) of title 10, United States Code (article 7(b) of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice).” 18 U.S.C. § 926C(c)(2). District
correctional officers do not have such powers.
To be sure, correctional officers in the District serve a vitally important
function by overseeing the incarceration of detainees and convicts. But
correctional officers are not included in the statute conferring general arrest
authority in the District. D.C. Code §§ 23-501(2), 23-562 (authorizing law
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22
enforcement officers to make arrests, and defining “law enforcement officer” as a
member of the Metropolitan Police Department or other police force operating in
the District, District animal control officers, certain members of the Fire
Department of the District of Columbia, and agents of the United States).
Plaintiffs claim that their “actual experience” on the job shows that they
functioned as law enforcement officers because they engaged in activities like
helping United States Marshals track down escapees and supervising inmates
transferring between facilities and on authorized visits to funerals and hospitals.
Br. 10-11, 15, 31 (citing D.C. Code § 22-4505 and § 24-405). Similarly, they
repeatedly assert that their identification cards recited that they had arrest powers.
E.g., Br. 11. These assertions are beside the point, however, because they need to
demonstrate that they had “statutory powers of arrest.” 18 U.S.C. § 926C(c)(2)
(emphasis added).
The closest plaintiffs come to this is to cite D.C. Code § 24-405, but that
statute does not give them “powers of arrest” within LEOSA’s meaning. Under
§ 24-405, when the parole authority has reliable information that “a prisoner has
violated his parole,” it may issue a warrant “for the retaking of such prisoner.”
“Any officer of the District of Columbia penal institutions . . . to whom such
warrant shall be delivered is authorized and required to execute such warrant by
taking such prisoner and returning or removing him” to a penal institution. D.C.
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23
Code § 24-405. But having the authority to execute a limited type of warrant does
not amount to having “statutory powers of arrest.” The statute speaks only of
executing warrants and “retaking” a prisoner who is a parole violator to return him
to prison.
That is not properly considered “arrest” under LEOSA. One of its purposes,
after all, was to enable off-duty or retired law enforcement officers to carry
concealed firearms “in situations where they can respond immediately to a crime
across state and other jurisdictional lines.” S. Rep. No. 108-29, at 4 (2003),
available at 2003 WL 1609540. It is focused on officers “trained to uphold the
law and keep the peace.” Id. at 3. That is why LEOSA defines a law enforcement
officer as, inter alia, someone with “statutory powers of arrest.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 926C(c)(2). “Generally, an arrest is effected when the police have made a
determination to charge the suspect with a criminal offense and custody is
maintained to permit the arrestee to be formally charged and brought before the
court.” In re M.E.B., 638 A.2d 1123, 1126 (D.C. 1993). Correctional officers do
not make any determination to charge parole violators with any particular crime,
but rather merely execute a warrant issued by the parole board. Indeed, they
cannot detain even a known parole violator without such a warrant.
Moreover, the immediate context for the phrase “statutory powers of arrest”
shows that Congress did not mean to extend LEOSA’s benefits to those with any
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24
type of detention authority whatsoever. LEOSA requires either “statutory powers
of arrest or apprehension under section 807(b) of title 10, United States Code
(article 7(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice).” 18 U.S.C. § 926C(c)(2).
In citing the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Congress referred specifically to a
statutory provision that permits apprehension only “upon reasonable belief that an
offense has been committed and that the person apprehended committed it.” 10
U.S.C. § 807(b). That is the same understanding that should apply to the partner
phrase “statutory powers of arrest.” See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC,
372 F.3d 395, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“The canon of statutory construction noscitur
a sociis, i.e., a word is known by the company it keeps[,] is often wisely applied
where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid giving unintended
breadth to the Acts of Congress.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Furthermore, the body of § 24-405 does not even use the word “arrest.”
When the statute was originally enacted by Congress in 1932, the heading used in
the margin of the United States Statutes at Large was “Apprehension of prisoner”
for violation of parole. Act of July 15, 1932, ch. 492, § 5, 47 Stat. 696, 698. In
1940, the law was amended and the margin heading was “Retaking of prisoner” for
violation of parole. Act of June 6, 1940, ch. 254, § 4, 54 Stat. 242, 243. The word
“arrest” appears to have been added to the heading of the statute (“Arrest for
violation of parole.”) by the publisher of the modern codified code for the District
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25
of Columbia; Congress itself did not use the word when it authorized correctional
officers to retake parole violators. As such, the word “arrest” is not properly
considered part of the statute. See Maranatha Faith Cent., Inc. v. Colonial Trust
Co., 904 So. 2d 1004, 1008 (Miss. 2004) (“[I]n the instant case, the headings at
issue are the product of the publisher and have never been considered by the
Legislature.”); State v. Linthwaite, 665 P.2d 863, 867 (Ore. 1983) (“Of course, the
bold face heading is only the opinion of the code compiler as to the meaning of the
statute; it is not part of the statute.”).
Section 24-405 thus does not give correctional officers powers of arrest.
Correctional officers in the District have not been trained to determine whether
probable cause exists to make a warrantless arrest for any crime in the community.
LEOSA did not intend to arm individuals to “respond immediately to crime”
across state lines, S. Rep. No. 108-29, at 4, when those individuals have not spent
their career assessing whether a crime has been committed and whether probable
cause exists to arrest, even if they may have supervised prisoners, worked with
federal marshals to track escapees, and served parole violator warrants. Br. 19.
Thus, even if plaintiffs here did have a cause of action, their claim fails on the
merits.
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CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the judgment below.
Respectfully submitted,
KARL A. RACINE
Attorney General for the District of Columbia
TODD S. KIM
Solicitor General
LOREN L. ALIKHAN
Deputy Solicitor General
/s/ Mary L. Wilson
MARY L. WILSON
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Bar Number 359050
Office of the Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General
441 4th Street, NW, Suite 600S
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 724-5693
(202) 741-0429 (fax)
January 2016 [email protected]
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on January 11, 2016, electronic copies of this brief were served
through the Court’s ECF system, to:
Aaron Marr Page
F. Peter Silva
/s/ Mary L. Wilson
MARY L. WILSON
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I further certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation in
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B) because the brief contains 6,110
words, excluding exempted parts. This brief complies with the typeface and type
style requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) and (6) because
it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word
2007 in Times New Roman 14 point.
/s/ Mary L. Wilson
MARY L. WILSON
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