NO. 139 NOVEMBER/ DECEMBER 1999

NO. 139

NOVEMBER/DECEMBER1999

Australian Defence Force Journal

Board of ManagementBrigadier A.S. D’Hagé, AM, MC (Chairman)Captain J.V.P. Goldrick, RANLieutenant Colonel N.F. JamesGroup Captain J.M. KennedyMs K. Griffith

The fact that an advertisement is accepted forpublication in the Australian Defence ForceJournal does not imply that the product or servicehas the endorsement of the Australian DefenceForce Journal, the Australian Defence Force or theDepartment of Defence. Readers are advised toseek professional advice where appropriate as theJournal can accept no responsibility for the claimsof its advertisers.

Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articlesshould be typed double spaced, on one side of thepaper, or preferably submitted on disk in a wordprocessing format. Hardcopy should be supplied in duplicate.

All contributions and correspondence should beaddressed to:The Managing EditorAustralian Defence Force JournalR8-LG-002Russell OfficesCANBERRA ACT 2600(02) 6265 2682 or 6265 2999Fax (02) 6265 6972

CopyrightThe material contained in the Australian DefenceForce Journal is the copyright of the Department ofDefence. No part of the publication may bereproduced, stored in a retrieval system, ortransmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwisewithout the consent of the Managing Editor.

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Email: [email protected]

www.defence.gov.au/dpao/dfj/

© Commonwealth of Australia 1999ISSN 1320-2545Published by the Department of DefenceCanberra 1999

No. 139 November/December 1999

Managing EditorMichael P. Tracey

EditorIrene M. Coombes

Printed in Australia by National CapitalPrinting, Fyshwick, ACT 2609

Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of the informationcontained in their articles; the Board of Management accepts noresponsibility for errors of fact.Permission to reprint articles in the Journal will generally be readilygiven by the Managing Editor after consultation with the author. Anyreproduced articles should bear an acknowledgement of source.The views expressed in the articles are the author’s own and shouldnot be construed as official opinion or policy.

Contents3. Letters to the Editor

5. Army’s Fundamentals of Land Warfare: A Doctrine for“New Times”?Dr. Graeme Cheeseman, Australian Defence ForceAcademy

17. A Short Introduction to Alternative FuturesLieutenant Colonel Ian Wing, Aust Int

25. Increasing the Operational Effectiveness of Women inthe Australian Defence ForceLieutenant Sarah Chapman, RAN Reserve

34. From Exclusion to Submarines – The Integration ofAustralian Women Naval VolunteersKathryn Spurling, Australian Defence Force Academy

41. A Footnote in History December 1941: The Japanese Invasion of ThailandSquadron Leader Kevin Smythe, RAAF

53. Book Reviews

59. Annual Index

Front Cover

HMAS Tobruk alongside at Dili Port,East Timor.

Photograph by

Corporal Mark Dowling

Advertising EnquiriesPhone: +61 2 6265 1193Fax: +61 2 6265 6972E-mail: [email protected]: www.defence.gov/dpao/dfj/

REACHING THETOP WITH YOUR

MESSAGE?The advantages of advertising in the

Australian Defence Force Journal are far reaching.

Back to the FutureDear Editor,

The article “Back to the Future” AustralianDefence Force JournalNo.138 Sept/Oct 1999suggests the best idea I have heard to address theproblem of surveillance of our northern coastline.

A cost-effective platform such as an airshipcapable of sustained patrols over a large areawith its surveillance range enhanced by UAV’scomplementing existing ADF and Coastwatchmeasures is exactly what is needed to combat theincreasing assault on our shores by foreign anddomestic criminal activity.

I hope somebody in the right place gets hold ofthe idea and seriously explores the possibilities.

J.D. GarlandCPL Reporter, Army Newspaper

Military WritersDear Editor,

I share Hugh Wellesley’s remarks (Letters to theEditor, ADFJNo.138), about the writing standards ofsome military authors. In the early 1990s when I hada responsibility for teaching Service Writing, I putselected Defence policy documents through theFlesch Readability checker in Microsoft Word. Whatwas intended for all ranks, often scored below 35.(For those unfamiliar with Felsch, The Reader’sDigest scores 65, Time Magazine around 52, and theHarvard Law Review,32.) One letter dealing with achange to the Group Rental Scheme, addressed to allcommanders with the usual request for (the widestpossible circulation), produced an incredible 26. Thiswas not written by some academic jurist for a learnedcirculation but by senior staff officers who were noteven degreed. Good military writing is a matter of

professional importance and deserves a personal andcorporate commitment no less than any other militaryundertaking. The United States Armed Forces dealtwith poor written communication at the highest level.For example, in the US Army, the office of its Chiefof Staff managed the programme to teach soldiers towrite while the department responsible for leadershipeducation at the Fort Leavenworth Command andStaff College also taught communications, that beingno accident or convenience. We should remembertwo points: writing and organised warfare share acommon origin; and as art and science, warfare owesas much to writing as do other cultural endeavours.Conversely, some of the most profound works ofWestern civilisation describe armed conflict or impartmilitary understanding, and were written by soldiers.

John SteinbachWing Commander

Dear Editor,I should also like to take this opportunity of

congratulating you on producing a journal whichprovides source material on the theoretical as well asthe operational aspects of combat which is invaluableand also quite incomparable, at least in these parts.

Different readers will of course have differentinterests; but I was most impressed by two articles inyour July/August 1999 issue in particular: “DeepStrike Capability’ by Wing Commander PremchandKainikara, and “Deterring Terrorism” by SeniorConstable Joe Ilardi. The first has special relevancenow that we are faced with a genuine prospect ofneeding deep strike capability as an essential ofnational defence; and the second brought out thefundamentals of the terrorism/freedom fighter issue.

Glen St.J. Barclay

Letters to the Editor

Seasons Greetings from the Board of Management

and Staff of the Australian Defence Force Journal

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 139 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 19994

The Australian Service Nurses National MemorialPhotographer: C. Proudfoot

By Dr Graeme Cheeseman, Australian DefenceForce Academy

Issued in March 1999 the Australian Army's manualof Land War Doctrine 1 The Fundamentals of Land

Warfare (LWD 1) sets out how the Army and itsleaders think about, and plan to prepare for, conflictand war in the new millennium. In his preface to thedocument, the Chief of Army, Lieutenant GeneralFrank Hickling, states that LWD1 is merely “a step inthe Army's intellectual journey into the informationage and should be treated very much as a ‘work inprogress’: a dynamic document aimed at encouragingvigorous analysis and debate”. This article takes upthe Chief of Army's challenge by examining whetherLWD1 meets its doctrinal role and whether the storythat is told represents a reasonable or even relevantappraisal of war and peace in the twenty-first century.It ends with some general thoughts about whereArmy (and the ADF) might profitably head in thefuture.

According to LWD1, doctrine serves two basicpurposes. It provides, first, a conceptual frameworkfor helping understand the nature of armed conflictand the potential use of military force(s) in nationaland international affairs. Second, doctrine enunciatesa set of principles for guiding military planners anddecision makers in developing the strategies, policies,force capabilities and actions needed to achieve orsupport specific tasks or objectives. Thus doctrine hasboth an educative and an informative role. Itencourages practitioners to think about theirprofessional discipline and its underlying historical,experiential and theoretical assumptions, and it assiststhem to apply these insights to specific circumstancesor operational settings.1

While LWD1 claims to meet the educative andinformative roles it sets for doctrine, in practice itachieves neither of these goals fully or satisfactorily.This is in part because it insists on restricting itsconsiderations of Army's future operational milieu towar and its future role to fighting or preparing to fight

wars. As such, LWD1 provides a highly selectiveand, as described shortly, inadequate conceptualframework for considering the roles of land forcesand the land component of military power in thetwenty-first century. Its focus on war also means itprovides inadequate guidance for those Armyplanners and commanders who will be required todeal with non-conflictual situations or contribute toso-called “operations other than war”.

As a “keystone” document and one that is meantto provide an intellectual bridge between theory andexperience on the one hand and practice on the other,we might also expect LWD1 either to contain, orprovide references to, “state-of-the-art” or “state-of-the-discipline” summaries or overviews, as well asdiscussions of, or pointers to, the key issues andquestions concerning contemporary historians, policymakers and theorists. Yet there is little in thedocument to indicate that its drafters have studied orare aware of these issues. More importantly, there isnothing to help those military planners who wish toread into or research a particular issue or topic inorder to better understand or inform their policy orstrategic advice.

Given the emphasis placed on combined and jointforce operations, we might also expect LWD1 to atleast mention Australia's existing air power andmaritime doctrines and associated “keystone” texts.Yet, again, this is not done. Is this because they arenot seen as relevant or are not needed to formulate orcomment on how the land battle should proceed or beplanned for? Indeed, is Army's “hierarchy ofdoctrine” seen to be the last word on the subject ofland warfare and all that is necessary for planningappropriate force structures or designing interestingand informative curricula for military education andtraining? Read from this perspective, LWD1 seemscloser to dogma (or discourse) than doctrine. Itprescribes how the Army and its officers are to viewthe world around us, declares that the doctrinalagenda should be limited to the issues of war-fightingand war-winning, and uses the authority of the Chiefof Army to justify its contents and arguments.2 Whilebetter than some other military documents, LWD1also relies more than it needs on jargon and clicheswhich serves merely to reinforces its sense ofdogmatic insistence.

Doctrine or Dogma?

Army’s Fundamentals of Land Warfare: A Doctrine for“New Times”?


LWD1 places heavy emphasis on war, war-fighting and war-winning. According to thedocument, the Army “exists to fight and win battles”.It needs to be “structured for war and adapted forpeace”. Winning the battle at the tactical level is theland forces” “primary role”. In peacetime, the Army“trains to win” in times of war. Its doctrine isinformed by “principles of war”. In order to win itneeds to be able to “fight smart”. And so on. The warsand armed conflicts it has in mind, moreover, are of aparticular kind. They involve “nations” or “nation-states” and their respective armed forces. They arefought against readily identifiable “enemies” and“adversaries” which threaten our own or our friend’snational “objectives”, “interests” or “identities”. Theyare “violent, dangerous and unpredictable”, involve afundamental “clash of wills” between opponents, andare all about “prevailing” or “winning”. These notionsreflect traditional, realist thinking. We may bemoving from the industrial to a post-industrial orinformation age but warfare and armed conflictcontinue to be viewed from essentially Hobbsian andClausewitzian perspectives, perspectives which arelocated firmly in the (early) modern or industrial era.

The emphasis given to war and traditional meansof war-fighting can be criticised on a number of othergrounds. First, it doesn’t reflect Australia’scontemporary experience. Army’s doctrine continuesto be underpinned by principles of war even thoughAustralia’s military forces have not been involved in amajor war or armed conflict since 1975. During thistime the ADF has been heavily engaged in a range ofwhat are now being called “operations other thanwar”: peacekeeping, peace building and peaceenforcement, disaster and humanitarian reliefoperations, counter-terrorism, and so on. By theDefence Department’s own admission, the ADF ismore likely to be called on to conduct or participate inthese kinds of operations in the future, eitherunilaterally or as part of UN or other multinationalforces, than fight a traditional war.

Second, the emphasis given to war-fightinginvolves a very narrow, and selective, reading of whatshould constitute Army’s doctrinal domain.According to LWD1, military doctrine is defined asthe “fundamental principles by which militaryforces…guide their actions in support of nationalobjectives”, or more simply as “the preferred methodfor employment of land forces”. This definition

makes no mention of war. It is a secularrepresentation of the role of doctrine which can coverboth peace and wartime conditions. Yet Army haschosen to focus its analysis on war and makes onlypassing references to peace. The document does talkabout, in a chapter on “Conflict and War”, a future“spectrum of conflicts” (and associated militaryoperations) which range from “emergency relief”,“peacekeeping” and “defence aid to the civilcommunity” at the more peaceful end of the spectrumto tactical and strategic nuclear war at the “total war”end. It also classifies the land force operationscontained within this spectrum into distinctive“warfighting” and “military support” operationswhere each category is said to have a differentpurpose or “focus of effort”:

In warfighting, the focus is defeating an adversaryby the use or threat of force. In military supportoperations, the focus is overcoming a problematicenvironment, be it physical, social or political; theuse of force may be required, but it is secondaryto the objectives of the operation. But this categorisation of possible future military

roles is not followed through. Any distinctionsbetween the two kinds of operations are summarilydismissed on the grounds that “from its warfightingcapabilities the Army generally has been able to meetthe requirements for military support operations”.There is no need, then, for the document to speculateon whether and how military support operations maydiffer doctrinally from warfighting ones, and LWD1proceeds accordingly. Nor has the documentattempted to discuss which of the identified conflictsor conflict types may be more prevalent in the futureor to identify those factors that might inform such ajudgement.

Yet, as described below, there is a growing bodyof academic and broader opinion, and some supportingevidence, that suggests, first, that the prospect of warsof the kind envisaged by LWD1 may be declining aswe move from the industrial to the post-industrial age.Second, the kinds of military conflicts in which theADF is likely to be involved may be different insignificant respects to those that inform LWD1’sprimary considerations. Third, the principles,approaches and values associated with warfighting andwar-winning may not be relevant to, and may evenserve to compound, the complex emergencies andother conflicts that increasingly characterise the post-industrial and post-Cold War world.

LWD1: A Doctrine for War or Peace?

There is a growing consensus among nationalelites of at least developed states that war may be nolonger a rational or effective means of pursuingpolitical goals. The decline in the prospects ofinterstate war is said to be heightened by certaindevelopments which distinguish the present era fromearlier ones. These include the appearance ofweapons of mass destruction, the end of the ColdWar, increasing economic interdependence, the“triumph” of liberal capitalism, and the continuingspread of a modern, democratised and globalisedculture.3 These developments hold out the prospect ofslowly expanding “zones of peace” (or democraticeconomic communities) within which there would beno expectation of major war and no need for eitherstate-based sovereignty defence forces or themaintenance of internal military balances of power.4

Military forces will still be required for a degree ofinternal reassurance, to protect those in the “zones ofpeace” against threats emerging from the surrounding“zones of turmoil”, and, occasionally, to intervene inthese latter areas to safeguard peoples and resources,or to help protect or resurrect failed or failing states(this issue is discussed in more detail below).5

The decline in the prospect of war betweenindustrialised nations does not mean that armedconflict will disappear. Future crises and armedconflicts will certainly continue around the globe. Butthese conflicts, or “uncivil wars” as Donald Snow hascalled them, will differ from their predecessors in anumber of important ways.6 They will occur inrelatively remote regions on the periphery of thedeveloped world. They will take place largely withinsociety rather than between bordered states and willusually have little relevance much beyond theimmediate vicinity of the site of the violence – unlessthey are taken up by the international media. Theywill often arise in the wake of the disintegration ofexisting states or the destruction or marginalisation oflocal economies. They will be more about the politicsof identity than traditional concerns with realpolitikand so will make little sense from either traditionalClausewitzian or Cold War (counter) revolutionaryperspectives. And they will be marked by a decline inearlier patron-client state relations and the emergenceof a range of new external connections and actorsincluding various diaspora communities, transnationalcommercial networks (both legally and illegally-based), foreign mercenaries, and NGOs.

These kinds of developments are raising questionsabout existing military structures and mindsets.Donald Snow suggests, for example, that the high-technology weapons and forces flowing from the“revolution in military affairs” may not be particularlyrelevant or appropriate for most of the conflicts likelyto be faced by the United States and its allies in thefuture.7 Carl Builder of the RAND Corporationsimilarly argues that, in light of the systemic changestaking place in the world, the size of active forcesrequired for war-fighting roles will almost certainlydecrease, whereas missions and associated forces“involving the rapid projection of infrastructure(transport, communications, surveillance, rescue,medical, humanitarian assistance, civil emergency, andsecurity) are likely to increase disproportionately”.8

Alvin and Heidi Toffler see an increasing need forspecial forces or special operations units to deal withthese kinds of low-intensity conflicts as well asconduct such missions as “feeding villagers after adisaster”, clandestine raids for intelligence gathering,sabotage, hostage rescue, assassination and “anti-terrorist or anti-narco operations”.9 Army’s“keystone” planning document ignores thesedevelopments and their potential implications.10

The answer to the perennial question securityfrom who or what?is also being expanded beyondother states and quasi-states to include a range of“new” actors and sources of insecurity. These includeterrorist organisations, drug-smuggling and otherinternational criminal activities, competition forscarce resources, uncontrolled population movements,pandemics, and continuing environmentaldegradation. First World militaries and their advisershave begun to respond to some of these new agendasand concerns. In recent years, academic and theprofessional journals of the United States’ and otherarmed forces have contained articles on new forms ofinsecurity and the role of military forces in resourcemanagement and protection.11 Conferences have beenrun on such topics as “disaster relief”, “environmentalsecurity”, “defence and the environment”, and “newera security”.12 Existing military strategies anddoctrines, including those in Australia, are beginningto be extended beyond traditional war-fightingconcepts and techniques to encompass such things aspeacekeeping, conflict resolution and “operationsother than war”.13 Military forces are becominginvolved more in monitoring the environment, eitherdirectly or in concert with other government orinternational agencies. And they are being encouragedto respond to humanitarian concerns or conflictsarising from environmental or other pressures. The Australian Army’s insistence on developing

The Changing Scope and Nature of War

ARMY’S FUNDAMENTALS OF LAND WARFARE: A DOCTRINE FOR “NEW TIMES”? 7


doctrine only for traditional wartime operations andwar-fighting roles contradicts, then, what is beingthought about and done in other places and fails toacknowledge recent developments in Australia’s ownrecent experiences including its continuinginvolvement in UN and related peace operations.

Humanitarian intervention and new forms ofpeacekeeping

In contrast to the period that preceded it, the post-Cold War era has witnessed a significant number ofUN-sponsored or sanctioned military interventionsthat have been motivated, in theory if not in practice,by humanitarian considerations. The number of statesand other actors participating in, sponsoring, ororganising such operations has increased.14 And themeaning of peacekeeping itself is being expandedbeyond earlier understandings to embrace so-called“second-generation” or “wider peacekeeping”activities which includes the option of peaceenforcement.15 This trend has not been without itsproblems, dilemmas and controversies which couldhave significantly implications for military doctrineand practice.

The complexities surrounding the issue ofhumanitarian intervention has tended to predisposedecision makers either to “do nothing” or theminimum necessary to avoid embarrassing failuresand any potential political costs that might arise fromtheir actions. Yet national decision makers are alsounder intense pressure from their publics andincreasingly powerful social movements to “dosomething” to alleviate the misery and suffering thatis paraded before them on a daily basis by CNN andother international media outlets. As demonstrated bythe United States’ experience in Somalia, however,public support for a particular intervention can alsoquickly deteriorate in the face of mounting casualtiesor ongoing destruction and suffering. This growingpopular aversion to war and battle casualties has ledWestern governments to try and limit the nature andscope of their military involvement – to rely more onthe use of air power, for example, or to withdrawforces once certain limited objectives have beenachieved – and to subject the interventions that dotake place to increasingly restrictive operationalguidelines and rules of engagement.

The view that military force(s) should bedeployed only for short periods of time or to achieveonly limited operational objectives ignores thecomplex and interconnected nature of the post-ColdWar security environment. If it is to be involved at allin humanitarian operations, the military will in manycases need to be engaged for extended periods of

time. Rather than stabilising the military situation andthen withdrawing, military forces will need to becomethe “security guarantors” for the whole process ofcivil reconciliation and reconstruction in the affectedareas, helping provide the time and space for a returnto normalcy and “encouraging and maintaining anenvironment in which each phase of post-conflictrestoration can continue”.16 This requires, in turn, amore holistic and longer-term planning perspectivethan is presently allowed by political and militaryleaders alike, one which recognises that militaryaction is part of a much broader process, and acceptsthat other non-state actors and agencies have equallyimportant roles to play in the management of complexemergencies and their aftermath.17

This broader and more comprehensive roleinvolves an expanding repertoire of tasks, functions,capabilities and skills. Whereas in the past,intervening forces would be primarily involved insupervising and monitoring cease-fire agreements,they may now be required, among other things, toprovide humanitarian assistance of various kinds,manage the movement of refugees and displacedpersons, help conduct elections, provide safe havensand protection for humanitarian workers, establishcantonment areas or demilitarized zones betweenwarring parties, disarm military or paramilitaryforces, clear mines and other leftovers from war,provide civil administration, maintain law and order,negotiate local cease-fires or the safe passage of aid,provide for noncombatant evacuation, contribute tothe reconstruction and development of localeconomies, and assist in the re-establishment of civilsociety. As we have seen in the Balkans andelsewhere, many of these tasks will need to beconducted in the midst of ongoing armed conflicts,without the consent of some or all of the partiesinvolved, within the glare of international media, andin the face of ongoing hostility abroad andindifference at home. None of these issues and theirpotential implications for how military forces shouldbe prepared and used are addressed in any detail byLWD1.18

The document also ignores some of the moreimportant doctrinal differences, and associateddebates, between the practices of peacekeeping andpeace enforcement. Although conducted by morerobust forces than previously, post-Cold Warpeacekeeping needs, in the view of some, to continueto proceed around the processes of negotiation,conflict resolution and consensus-building, and theforces involved should have either no or only alimited capacity for conducting offensive operations.Others argue that there will inevitably be some

overlap between traditional peacekeeping and “moreambitious” or enforcement operations (producing so-called “grey area” operations). In their view theexperience in Bosnia and elsewhere shows that themilitary capacity of intervening forces needs to beextended beyond self-defence to include the ability,where needed, to compel compliance at least at thetactical and operational levels. Under this approach,the intervening forces would be relatively heavilyarmed and “actively impartial”. They would seek to“shape consent” not only by acting as traditionalpeacekeepers but also by

…pressuring the parties, intimidating them, ifnecessary, by subjecting them to exemplary pre-emptive self-defense or to a limited coercivecampaign against carefully-selected militarytargets. Thus, military credibility is to peaceenforcement what intrinsic military weakness is topeacekeeping. This means fielding a force readyfor war or at least capable enough to deter aparty that would resist by harming UN troops orother international personnel.19

Opponents of this view argue, in turn, that it willundermine the impartiality of the UN and furtherstretch its already limited resources, place militarypeacekeepers and civilian aid workers at risk, make itmore difficult to negotiate local cease-fires or politicalsettlements, inevitably force the UN or itsrepresentatives either to increase its offensiveoperations or, as the conflict worsens, to withdraw(thereby further reducing its credibility within theinternational community), dissuade member statesfrom participating in peace operations, and giveencouragement to the (flawed) notion that complexsocial and political problems can be solved quicklythrough military means.

Resolving these issues is no easy matter. Most ofthe arguments raised are sustainable in theory and canbe supported by examples drawn from the field.While it may be possible to distinguish betweenpeacekeeping and peace enforcement conceptually, itis much more difficult to do so in practice. Given thecomplex and changing nature of post-Cold Warconflicts and crises, there will always be situationswhen peacekeepers will be required to act asenforcers and vice versa.That said, the twoapproaches continue to be based on different andpotentially conflicting premises and values, theyfollow divergent operational strategies, have different(albeit overlapping) rules of engagement, and, morecontentiously perhaps, require different forcestructures and processes of command and control.The use of peacekeepers or peace enforcers for thewrong reasons or in the wrong circumstances might

have disastrous results not only for those directlyinvolved but for the prospects of peace and securitywithin the area of operations or even more generally.One possible outcome is that post-Cold Warpeacekeeping operations will continue to beconducted by traditional UN contingents of state-based forces provided under the UN’s StandbyArrangement System (SBAS).20 Peace enforcementoperations will be largely subcontracted by the UN tothose regional organisations, “coalitions of thewilling” and even individual states which have boththe capabilities and the political will to conduct whatare wars or quasi-wars.21

Another issue of contention is whether forcesdeveloped and maintained for the defence of the stateare the most appropriate for carrying out internationalpeace operations. There is a general belief amongnational political and military leaders, including thosein Australia, that state-based self-defence forces,equipped with battle-winning capabilities and trainedfor conventional war-fighting roles, can and should beused to conduct peacekeeping and humanitarian reliefoperations. Such forces can be dispatched overseas atrelatively short notice, are administratively self-sufficient, and are able to deal with the kinds ofthreats that characterise post-Cold War “complexemergencies”. Proponents of this view add that whileforces capable of defending the state against high-level military threats can be used in variouspeacekeeping roles, peacekeeping forces cannot beused to defend the state against any significant levelof threat. To structure a state’s military forces forinternational peace operations risks the security of thestate.

While there is some merit in these views, it needsto be kept in mind that they may be motivated asmuch by a desire on the part of national political andmilitary elites to retain favoured or desired weaponssystems as any rational assessment of what may bebest for the tasks at hand.22 The assertion thatconventional armies are the best for conducting non-conventional operations needs to recognise that forcesdeployed on peace operations still require a period ofspecialised training before they can be usedeffectively (and re-training when they are finished)and may need to be provided with additionalequipments and capabilities (such as air and groundtransport assets, medical facilities and civilian liaisonteams). As Colin McInnes has argued in the Britishcase, the policy encourages the maintenance of“balanced” forces – those capable of meeting everyforeseen contingency – which can be both very costlyand inefficient.23 The assertion that forces configuredfor peace operations cannot defend the state also


ignores the changing nature of in/security in anincreasingly globalised world. As described earlier,for many countries today, including Australia, theprincipal threats to national security are largely non-military in nature and need to be dealt with usingsecurity forces and strategies (broadly defined) ratherthan traditional defence forces.

There is evidence, too, that traditional militarystructures, capabilities, procedures and mindsets arenot always or entirely appropriate for contemporarypeace and security operations and so need to beadjusted or changed in some areas. Michael Dziedzicargues, for example, that internationally sanctionedpeace missions are usually required to establish astable and secure domestic environment where“particular attention must be given to coaxingindigenous institutions of law and order intofunctioning in rough accordance with internationallyacceptable standards”, and members of the missionwill be called upon to conduct a variety of policingroles such as training and mentoring local policecadres, mediating domestic disputes, and maintainingpublic order. While such activities would normally bethe responsibility of international civil police(CIVPOL) contingents, in at least the early stages ofan intervention they will have to be carried out bymilitary forces.24

A problem here, Dziedzic continues, is that“[m]iltary forces are reluctant to engage inconfrontations with civilians because, with theexception of constabulary units, they are generally nottrained in the measured use of force, control of riots,negotiating techniques, or de-escalation of conflict”.25

The answer, in his view, is to include moreconstabulary forces – such as the French gendarmerie,the Spanish Guardia and the Italian carabinerie – andcivil affairs police specialists in the initial militarycontingents, and provide for continuing liaison and“mutually reinforcing operations” between militarycivil affairs and CIVPOL elements (the latter wouldinclude common communications and logistics,shared command posts, intermingling of personnel inthe field, and so on).

A further problem is that many state-basedmilitary forces, in the West at least, are developed andmaintained to fight wars at the highest end of theconflict spectrum. Their commanders are trained tocommand their forces under wartime conditions andso will inevitably approach peace operations in thesame way. While success in peace and war candepend on similar processes and attributes – cohesivestrategic planning, clear lines of command, integratedapproaches to resource usage, and so on – the basicdifferences, described earlier, between the processes

and objectives of war-fighting and peace-restoration/building are too great to be ignored orsubsumed within a single force or operationaldoctrine. More fundamentally still, the basic valuestructures of state-based militaries often situncomfortably with those that should inspireinternational humanitarian operations. As StephenKinloch and others have argued, soldiers involved inhumanitarian interventions may need to be to be moreakin to members of volunteer and non-governmentalorganisations than to members of traditional militaryorganisations, and be motivated more byhumanitarian concerns and beliefs than by nationalmyths or interests.26

Warfighting, gender and discriminationLWD1’s continuing emphasis on warfighting and

war winning not only conflicts with how Australia’sarmed forces are likely to be employed in the future, itmay also reinforce an organisational culture whichtends to equate militarised violence with manhoodand statehood, and serves to foster or at least condonecontinuing, albeit declining, acts of discriminationagainst women service personnel.27 The openacknowledgement that the Army’s role in the nextcentury will be about much more than fighting andwinning wars will provide an opportunity to moveAustralia’s existing military culture away from itstraditional masculinist and combat-centred roots toone more in keeping with a progressive, enlightenedand post-industrial society.

Underpinning Army’s doctrine are ten “principlesof war”. While many of these remain applicable to the“new wars” that are likely to dominate the comingsecurity landscape, others, such as offensive action orconcentration of force, may no longer be applicable orwill need to be revised or replaced by other morerelevant principles or considerations. Just as doctrineis expected to evolve in response to political, strategicand other systemic changes, so too must the principleson which doctrine is based.

One such consideration is the growing popularaversion to war and battle casualties. This is having amajor impact on whether and under what conditionsdeveloped world military forces will be deployed inthe future, and on the kinds of operational concepts,strategies and tactics that are able to be used on theground. Fear of casualties has meant thatcontemporary war-fighting strategies are placing

The Principles of Which War?


much greater emphasis than previously on “stand-off”weapons systems and associated air and maritimecapabilities. As Edward Luttwak has argued, it mightalso force the United States (and its allies) to movetowards a “post-Napoleonic and post-Clausewitzianconcept of war” which borrows from eighteenthcentury experiences and norms. In addition tocasualty avoidance, these would invoke greater use ofvarious non-military instruments and policies – suchas trade embargoes and armed blockades – and placemuch less emphasis on the dictates of tempo,momentum and concentration of force. In the twenty-first century, Luttwak concludes, political andmilitary leaders require “not only a patientdisposition, but also a modest one, so as to admit thedesirability of partial results when to do more wouldbe too costly in US lives, and to do nothing, toodamaging to our self-respect and to world order”.28

In its chapter on “Modern Land Warfare”, thedocument states that the RMA and otherdevelopments will significantly influence bothwarfighting and military support operations, andproceeds to draw a number of conclusions about whatArmy will require to meet future challenges. The bulkof these conclusions relate to improving Army’sconventional warfighting role and its capacity tooperate within an increasingly dynamic andtechnology-dominated “battlespace”. While such anapproach may be reasonable in its own terms – theRMA is, after all, having a significant impact on theway modern warfare is able to be conducted – itassumes that nothing else will change. LWD1’s goalof being able to “fight and win the next war” can beachieved simply by making the most of continuingadvances in technology or, in LWD1’s words, by“continuous improvement through modernisation”.

The basic problem with this view is that the sameforces that are contributing to the so-called revolutionin military affairs are serving also to fundamentallyalter the broader political, social, strategic,environmental and other contexts in which militaryforce(s) will operate. We are, in short, on thethreshold of a new era in international politics. Oursense of changing times is reflected in the momentousevents that followed in the wake of the end of theCold War. It is being heightened by suggestions thatwe have reached the “end of history” or the “end ofgeography”,29 and by the variety of terms being usedto try and encapsulate the essence of the on-goingtransition: post-industrialism or post-Fordism, post-militarism, post-statism, post-capitalism, post-(Western) civilisation, post-internationalism, post-modernism, post-heroic warfare, and so on.30 Whilethere is considerable debate and contention over just

what this new era will end up looking like, there isbroad agreement (at least among academiccommentators) that we are entering truly “newtimes”. This sense of radical change and its potentialimplications for the future role of military force(s) isnot captured by LWD1.

The Fundamentals of Land Warfare is as much anexercise in politics as an expression of doctrine,seeking to balance what is needed with what ispossible, and to reconcile what is familiar andcomfortable with what is not. The struggle toaccommodate these different and often conflictingforces and perspectives is evident throughout thedocument. It begins with the Chief of Army’s ownmessage: the Army “exists to provide land forces thatare capable of fighting and winning battles”, yet thetransformation from the industrial to a post-industrialage will require the Army to “contribute to bothwarfighting and military support operations”. It isreflected in the way the story of land warfare in thetwenty-first century is presented and justified. And itunderpins the various tensions, contradictions anddisjuctures, described above, in the narrative itself.

These problems notwithstanding, LWD1 is a bolddocument. As an intellectual exercise, it is importantand well overdue. It recognises that changes arerequired and seeks to develop these both rationallyand openly. It contains much that is interesting,informative and challenging. Yet, the glowingtestimonials on its back cover notwithstanding,LWD1 does not fully come to terms with therevolutionary nature of our “new times” and itsimplications not only for the future role of militaryforce(s) in international affairs but the future contextsin which the Australian Army will be required tooperate. LWD1 is an important first step in thedevelopment of Army doctrine for the comingcentury but it needs further thought and work before itwill fully satisfy either its purported roles or anyreasonable test of applicability.

Part of the problem, which is outside the purviewof LWD1, is to decide what role(s) Army (and theADF generally) should play in the comingmillennium, and to reconcile what is expected of themwith the resources that are likely to be available tomeet these expectations. This problem of matching“ends” with “means” is being compounded at onelevel by: 1) continuing changes in Australia’sinternational circumstances which are requiring the

Conclusion: Some Thoughts on Army’sPlace in the Coming Century


Army and the other services to do much more thansimply defend our sovereign territory; 2) theunwillingness or inability of successive Australiangovernments to devote sufficient resources to thedefence establishment to enable it to carry out itsexpanding roles and responsibilities; and 3) theescalating cost of providing and maintaining modern,professional military forces and capabilities. But otherfactors are also at play. These range from the ADF’scontinuing preference for “state-of-the-art” weaponsand support systems, through the failure of asuccession of defence decision makers really to adjustAustralia’s defence policies and prescriptions to ourchanging times – we have tended to “portray” thechanges taking place around us in ways that ensurethe continuation of existing forces and investments –to an introverted and conservative strategic andbroader political culture which continues to favour,and exploit, traditional and militarised notions ofsecurity.

It seems reasonable to suggest that this basicdilemma is likely to continue to bedevil defenceplanners for some to come. It is unlikely that therewill (or should) be any increase in defenceexpenditure in the short to medium term. While theRMA may be increasing the reach and effectivenessof modern weapons systems, the absolute cost ofstaying at the forefront of technological change acrossthe board remains prohibitively high. It is likely, too,that Australia’s military forces will continue to becalled on, or be pressured by local or internationalopinion, to carry out an increasing number and rangeof “non-military” tasks and duties. Unless there aretruly substantive changes in policy and approach,therefore, we are likely to see the continuing“hollowing out” of Australia’s existing militaryforces, continuing high resignation rates, continuingpoor morale, continuing personnel shortages,continuing calls for yet more money to be spent ondefence, and so on.

The fundamental changes taking place in theworld around us provide an opportunity for Australiato revisit its existing defence and security policies andpriorities in ways that may solve or at least amelioratethe ongoing dilemma of trying to manage more and more with the same or less. As we have seen, the end of the Cold War, increasing economicinterdependence, the processes of globalisation andregionalisation, and the continuing move away fromthe Westphalian system of international order towardssome form of geogovernance, are making major warsbetween industrialised (and industrialising) countriesless likely especially within the slowly expanding“zones of peace” or democratic economic

communities we can see emerging in WesternEurope, the Americas and South-East Asia. Militaryand other conflicts will continue to occur, of course,but will be increasingly restricted to the periphery ofthe developed world, will take place largely withinrather than between states, and will be motivated byconcerns over injustice and various “politics ofparticularism”.

Within the developed world at least, the place ofboth the state and military power in internationalaffairs will become much less relevant although theywill continue to have a role. As we have already seenin the Persian Gulf and the Balkans, developed worldmilitary operations in the future are likely to beorganised along multinational rather than nationallines, and be conducted by, or on behalf of, theinternational community. The growing aversion,within democratic polities in particular, to war andbattle casualties is likely to ensure that the warfightingdimensions of these multinational operations will beconducted largely by air and maritime forces usingstand-off weapons systems (a change being facilitatedby the RMA). Land forces will continue to be needed,but their warfighting roles will be much morecircumscribed than in the past.

Again as we are seeing in Kosovo, this division ofresponsibilities will be reversed in the post-conflictphases of the “complex emergencies” and “uncivilwars” of the post-Cold War era. Once the fighting hasstopped, land force elements of the international forcewill be required to be the “security guarantors” for thewhole process of civil reconciliation andreconstruction in the affected areas, helping providethe time and space for a return to normalcy andencouraging and maintaining an environment inwhich each phase of post-conflict restoration cancontinue. This role will involve an expandingrepertoire of tasks, functions, capabilities and skills.military operations will need to be conducted in themidst of ongoing armed conflicts, within the glare ofinternational media, and in the face of ongoinghostility abroad and indifference at home. They willrequire rather different forces to those organised andmotivated for warfighting roles and the defence of thestate against external military aggression. Land andother forces involved in peacekeeping andpeacemaking will need to operate within muchbroader structures and processes in which a range ofother non-military and non-state actors, agencies andinterests have equally important roles to play.Although conducted by more robust forces thanpreviously, post-Cold War peace operations will needto continue to proceed around the processes of


negotiation, conflict resolution and consensus-building. The forces involved will continue to haveonly a limited capacity for conducting offensiveoperations. And the soldiers will need to be motivatedmore by cosmopolitan than communitarian concernsand values, to be more akin to members of volunteerand non-governmental organisations than members oftraditional military organisations.

At the broadest policy level these developmentsprovide an opportunity for Australia to shift awayfrom its current emphasis on self-defence towards aposture which emphasises much more national,regional and, especially, international security. Undersuch an approach, self-defence would remainimportant but can be directed more towards dealingwith existing and likely threats to our security – illegalimmigration, drug running, poaching of fish stock,and so on – than to defeating major military attacksagainst Australia’s territory or interests. Both regionaland international security planning would continue tofocus on supporting future UN or other multinationaloperations. In view of the costs involved inmaintaining a “balanced” high-technology force,however, it would make sense if Australia’s supportof prospective multinational warfighting and peaceenforcement operations was restricted to the provisionof air and maritime forces and capabilities. Its landforces would be better utilised being prepared andmaintained primarily for post-Cold War peacekeepingoperations.

Such an approach would not only better suit the“new times” into which Australia is heading, it wouldbe potentially easier to sustain within existing or evenreduced resource levels, enable Australia’s defenceestablishment to remain at the forefront oftechnological change in areas that counted most,continue to contribute to Australia’s internationalstanding, provide better guidance on how Australia’sdefence forces are to be used in the future, and(hopefully) facilitate more rational and informedpolicy making. While it would help ameliorateArmy’s current problem of having to prepare for adiverse range of conflict types and settings, such anapproach would also see drastic changes toAustralia’s existing land force structures andcapabilities. The regular Army’s involvement in thedefence of Australia would, for example, be severelyconstrained as would its capacity to fight alongside itsallies in a major ground war. Apart from specialforces and, perhaps, a battalion or brigade groupconfigured for joint force combat operations, theArmy would be largely structured and prepared formultinational peace operations which would becontrolled directly by the UN or on its behalf byappropriately constituted regional organisations.

While these forces would still need to be able toprotect themselves they would not require the types ornumbers of heavy weapons needed for conventionalwarfighting roles, nor would they need to rely ontapping into either the RMA or traditional militaryalliance networks.

Such changes would be strongly resisted by manyin the Army and its supporters who, like the authorsof LWD1, are more comfortable with traditional waysof thinking about peace and security. In the face ofsuch opposition, it will be tempting for decisionmakers to forego substantive changes to Australia’sexisting policies and prescriptions and continue eitherto try to “manage with less” or press the government,through Parliamentary and other inquiries, to devotestill more of the taxpayers’ money to the defenceportfolio. This is a pity. The solution to the dilemmasfacing Australia’s contemporary defence planners is,at least to this commentator, relatively clear. The realproblem is how to convince those at the top of thedefence establishment that it is time to implement it.

NOTES* A more detailed version of this article was submitted to the

inquiry by the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,Defence and Trade into “The suitability of the Australian Armyfor Peacetime, Peacekeeping and War”, and will be publishedas an ADSC Working Paper (Canberra: Australian DefenceStudies Centre, 1999).

1. These two purposes distinguish doctrine from policy andstrategy. Doctrinal guidelines may inform the policy makingprocess or the choice of a particular strategic option, but thedoctrine itself is developed and exists independently of nationalsecurity policies and defence strategies. Because of thisdoctrine, at the philosophical and strategic level in particular, issaid to be “authoritative” but not “prescriptive”. It is not a set ofrules to be followed without question, but guidelines whichrequire judgement, open-mindedness and flexibility in theirapplication. Furthermore, because it is based on history andexperience, doctrine is more enduring and broadly couchedthan either policy or strategy. While doctrine may be enduring,however, it is not immutable. As LWD1 states, “doctrineevolves in response to changes in political, strategic, economic,environmental, societal and technological circumstances”.

2. In a speech to the National Press Club in April 1999, the Chiefof Army noted that there were “plenty of commentators aroundthe edges of defence who are calling for a variety of reforms,ranging from the use of the ADF as a social engineeringlaboratory, through to reorganising us as peacekeepers”. Thereshould be “no doubt”, he continued, that “our focus is – andmust remain – the delivery of warfighting capabilities… To aimfor anything less would be an insult to our people in uniform;and a betrayal of the nation”.

3. Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution:Statecraft and the Prospects of Nuclear Armageddon(Ithica:Cornell University Press, 1989); Carl Kaysen, “Is warObsolete? A Review Essay”, in International Security, 14,1990, pp.42-69; Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and theLast Man (New York: Free Press, 1992) and Bruce Russett,Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-ColdWar World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).


4. Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order:Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil (New Jersey: ChathamHouse, 1993).

5. Steven Metz, “Which Army After Next? The StrategicImplications of Alternative Futures”, Parameters, XXVII(3),1997, pp.15-26 at pp.18-19.

6. Donald Snow, Uncivil Wars; International Security and theNew Internal Conflicts (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996). Seealso Mary Kaldor, New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in aGlobal Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).

7. Snow, Uncivil Wars,p.7. While high-technology forces mightbe needed for defence against an attack by a major second tierpower, such an eventuality is thought to be unlikely given, first,that most advanced second tier states are seeking to becomepart of the core, and second, the clear and growingtechnological ascendancy of first tier forces and economies.

8. Carl H. Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air PowerTheory in the Evolution and Fate of the US Air Force,(NewBrunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1994) p.255.

9. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, Wars and Anti-Wars: Survival at theDawn of the 21st Century (Boston: Little, Brown andCompany, 1993) pp.91-2. They further argue that Westernmilitaries need to become smarter and more attuned to both theproblems and possibilities of “Third Wave” civilisation andwarfare: to mobilise the almost limitless potential of the siliconchip and interactive software to not only enhance existingweapons systems but to develop a new and perhaps moreappropriate (and effective) range of non-lethal and othertechnologies; to extend their own protection against computerviruses, “info-terrorists”, “have-gun-will-travel fanatics” andother postmodern threats; and to develop a “brain” rather than“brawn” based structure and corporate ethos within the armedforces themselves.

10. By focusing on the strategic aspects of Australia’s changingenvironment, LWD1 was able to ignore such key indicators ofregional security as growing economic interdependence, thetrend towards greater multilateralism, and the move towardspluralist political systems. See Gerald Segal, “How insecure isPacific Asia?”, International Affairs 73(2): pp.235-49, 1997 andJames L. Richardson, “Asia-Pacific: The Case for GeopoliticalOptimism”, The National Interest 38: pp.28-39, Winter 1994/95.

11. See, for example, Michael Pugh (ed), Maritime Security andPeacekeeping: A Framework for United Nations Operations(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994); and W. S. G.Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds), Calming the Waters:Initiatives for Asia Pacific Maritime Cooperation (Canberra:Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian NationalUniversity, 1996).

12. Some recent examples are Peter Crabb, Julie Kesby and LaurieOlive (eds), Environmentally responsible defence (Canberra:Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1996); Kent Hughes Butts(ed), NATO/CCMS Environmental Security Conference (USArmy War College Center for Strategic Leadership,Environmental Security Series No. 1, 1997); Catherine A. J.Phinney and Kent Hughes Butts (eds), Proceedings of theRegional Asia Pacific Defence Environmental Workshop (USArmy War College Center for Strategic Leadership,Environmental Security Series No. 5, 1998).

13. See John W. Jandoora, “Threat Parameters for OperationsOther Than War”, Parameters, vol. xxv, no. 1, Spring 1995,pp.55-67.

14. See Trevor Findlay, “The new peacekeepers and the newpeacekeeping”, in Trevor Findlay (ed), Challenges for the NewPeacekeepers: SIPRI Research Report No. 12 (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press/SIPRI, 1996), pp.1-31.

15. There is a huge literature on the emergence, characteristics andimplications of this “new” form of peacekeeping. Someexamples include Donald C. Daniel and Brad C. Hayes (eds),Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping (London, Macmillan, 1995);S. Neil MacFarlane and Hans-George Ehrhart (eds),Peacekeeping at a Crossroads (Clementsport: The CanadianPeacekeeping Press, 1997) and Steven Ratner, The New UNPeacekeeping (London: Macmillan, 1995).

16. John Mackinlay and Randolph Kent, “A New Approach toComplex Emergencies”, International Peacekeeping, vol. 4, no.4, Winter 1997, pp.31-49 at p.46.

17. Findlay, The new peacekeepers and the new peacekeeping”,p.13.

18. The document does state that land forces will have a prominentrole in “military support operations” and “military responsesshort of war”, because “these operations typically requirepresence, compassion and cooperation with localcommunities”.

19. Daniel, “Is There a Middle Option in Peace SupportOperations?, p.69. He adds the important point that peaceenforcement differs from fully fledged enforcement operationsin that military contingents involved in the former “cannotassume that theirs is a combat task intended to break allresistance once and for all. Rather the same personnel expectedto demonstrate resolve and augment consent are also expectedto do so with the lightest touch possible in the hope that theparties that will finally assent to the UN’s will. They have toavoid taking sides and still alleviate the sufferings of innocentsbeing subjected to unspeakable cruelties. They may have todeal with leaders whom in other circumstnces they might arrestas thugs or war criminals. Hence, it would not be surprising ifthe soldiers involved regarded the means as contradictory to theends”.

20. Established in 1994, the SBAS is a confidential database of themilitary and other resources individual states are prepared toprovide to the UN within specific timeframes for SecurityCouncil-authorized peace operations. As at March 1999, 81member states had pledged a total of some 104,000 personnelincluding both individuals and formed military units. The bulkof the proposed resources comprises infantry personnel orforces. According to the UN “there continues to be a need foradditional resources to complement manoeuvre units with thenecessary logistics support” (“Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Standby Arrangements for Peacekeeping”, 30March 1999, S/1999/361).

21. See Michelle Griffin, “Blue Helmet Blues: assessing the TrendTowards Subcontracting”, Security Dialogue, vol. 30, no. 1,1999, pp.43-60.

22. For a discussion of how this applies in the Australian case, seeGraeme Cheeseman, “Structuring the Australian Defence Forcefor United Nations Operations: Change and Resistance”, inTom Woodhouse, Robert Bruce and Malcolm Dando (eds),Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards EffectiveIntervention in Post-Cold War Conflicts (Houndmills:Macmillan, 1998), pp.231-52.

23. Colin McInnes, “Restructuring the British Army” in Sharp (ed),About Turn, Forward March with Europe, pp. 49-62, at p.55.

24. Michael J. Dziedzic, “Policing the New World Disorder:Addressing Gaps in Public Security during Peace Operations”,Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 9, no. 1, Spring 1998,pp.132-59, at p.136. Even when CIVPOL are present, they maywell require continuing military support to deal with seriouschallenges to law and order, posed by criminal organisations orheavily armed gangs for example, or to implement certainprovisions of any peace agreement (disarming factions, handlingmore violent forms of opposition to political reform, etc).


25. Dziedzic, “Policing the New World Disorder”, pp.145-6. For acontrary view, see Alice Hills, “International Peace SupportOperations and CIVPOL: Should there be a Permanent GlobalGendarmerie?”, International Peacekeeping,vol. 5, no. 3,Autumn 1998, pp.26-41.

26. Stephen P. Kinloch, “Utopian or Pragmatic? A UN PermanentVolunteer Force”, in Michael Pugh (ed), The UN, Peace, andForce(London and Portland Or.: Frank Cass, 1997) pp.167-90.See also Gustav Daniker, The Guardian Soldier: On the Natureand Use of Future Armed Forces (New York and Geneva: UNInstitute for Disarmament Research, Research Paper No. 36)and Mary Kaldor, New & Old Wars (which raises the issue of“cosmopolitan armies”).

27. See the author’s “Submission to an Inquiry into SexualHarassment at the Australian Defence Force Academy”,<http://www.pol.adfa.edu.au/harassment.html> and referencestherein.

28. Edward Luttwak, “The Crisis of Classic Military Power and thePossible Remedy of “Post-Heroic” Intelligence-BasedWarfare”, in Ryan Henry and Joseph S. Nye Jr (eds), The

Information Revolution and International Security (WashingtonDC: Center for Strategic and International Studies press, 1998)pp.70-104, at p.89. More contentiously, he adds that it may alsobe reinforcing a view within the military itself that whilemilitary forces need to be accumulated and modernised, theyshould only be used under very carefully defined and controlledcircumstances.

29. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man(London: Penguin, 1992) and R. O’Brien, Global FinancialIntegration: The End of Geography(London: Pinter, 1992).

30. See for example Anthony Giddens, The Consequences ofModernity(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990); Martin Shaw, Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization and War at theEnd of the Twentieth Century(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991);A. Amin, Post-Fordism: A Reader(Oxford and New York:Basil Blackwell, 1994); James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee,Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to anIncoherent World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); Edward N.Luttwak, “Towards Post-Heroic Warfare”, Foreign Affairs,May-June 1995, pp.109-122.

Dr Graeme Cheeseman lectures in politics and defence studies at the University College, Australian Defence Force Academy. Hehas served in the Australian Regular Army and the Department of Defence and writes widely on issues relating to Australian andregional defence and security. He is the author of Selling Mirages: The Politics of Arms Trading(1992) and The Search for Self-Reliance: Australian Defence Since Vietnam (1993) and co-editor of Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defenceand Security Thinking After the Cold War (1996)


Lieutenant Colonel Ian Wing, Aust Int

The Americans have need of the telephone, but wedo not. We have plenty of messenger boys.– Chief Engineer of the British Post Office, 1876

Sir William Preece’s argument against theintroduction of the telephone over one hundred

years ago seems absurd today, but in 1876 he was aworld leader in the field of communications. Hiswords sound somewhat ridiculous because telephonesare now omnipresent and he lacked the vision toforesee this change. The evidence is clear, or is it?Before we judge Preece too harshly we shouldremember that it is not possible to know everything orto predict the future with complete accuracy. It is alsostartling to consider that even in 1999 more than halfof the world’s population have never used atelephone!

This example demonstrates how the study of thefuture contends with unexpected developments andcounter-intuitive outcomes. Things are seldom as theyseem. In response to this dilemma, futurists havedeveloped a technique known as Alternative Futures(AF). This technique can lead to powerful insightsinto the mysteries of the future. These insights canleverage effective strategic planning – a keyrequirement for military success.

The publication of “Australasian Defense 2048 –An Alternative Future” in the September/October1998 edition of this journal resulted in a largeresponse from readers who wanted to know moreabout the subject. The article was aimed atstimulating interest in AF by demonstrating howhistory is not preordained and how it can be shaped tocreate desirable outcomes. The article achieved itsaim.

Despite the increasing acceptance of AF, manywithin the Australian Defence Organisation (ADO)are yet to fully understand what AF are and what they

offer. For this reason, and at the urging of severalenthusiastic supporters of the use of AF, this article isaimed at providing a short and easily readintroduction. Those readers who can spare a fewminutes to read this article will gain an understandingof the fundamental concepts that underlie AF andhow they can be employed. It is not possible toprovide a detailed explanation of all aspects of AF inthis short article and some terms which may beunfamiliar to some readers are used. The articlesynthesises the work of several of the major writerson AF and concludes with a literature guide for thosewho seek a more complete understanding of AF andits terminology.

The development of AF was made possible byHerman Kahn, a leading nuclear warfare strategist.His work in the field of scenario planningwhile ananalyst with the RAND Corporation in the 1950sused the approach of “thinking the unthinkable”. Thisprovided the means for the creation of the multiplehypothetical and multifaceted descriptions of thefuture which are now essential to the study of AF.

At the same time, the writers of science fictionprovided an impetus to the intellectual considerationof the future. This raised public interest in the notionthat the future could be very different from thepresent. The early science fiction writings of ArthurC. Clarke, who first proposed the use of geo-stationary satellites, led to new directions in space andcommunications technology. The idea that theopportunities and threats of the future could beanticipated became widely accepted.

AF rose to prominence when they were used byRoyal Dutch/Shell in the 1970s. Pierre Wackundertook strategic planning, facilitated by StanfordResearch Institute (now known as SRI International).They coined the term “intuitive logics” to illustratetheir unconventional futurist philosophy. The use ofAF enabled Royal Dutch/Shell to understand theimplications of a possible energy crisis. As a result ofthis work, they were the only multinational oilcompany which was prepared for the 1973 oil crisis.This success led to the adoption of AF by othermultinational corporations.

Thinking about the future was not new and it hasengaged philosophers since ancient times. What wasnew was that AF provided a systematic andintellectually rigorous method of structuring this

Introduction

Preamble

A Short Introduction to Alternative Futures

thinking. The demonstrated utility of AF within thecorporate sector led to their adoption by thegovernments of the advanced nations. Today, AF areincreasingly being incorporated into the strategicplanning processes of forward-thinking organisations.

At the time of the publication of “AustralasianDefense 2048”, the use of AF as a means ofimproving strategic planning was gaining acceptancewithin Australian government departments. TheOffice of Strategic Crime Assessments and theAustralian Federal Police are committed to AF. TheAustralian Defence Organisation has also adopted AFin its strategic planning processes and they areemployed within Australian Defence Headquartersand the single service headquarters.

Individuals, societies and the international systemare not set on a deterministic path to a single unitaryfuture. In theory, an infinite number of possiblefuturesexists, ranging from the continuation of thestatus quo (simply more of the same) to a universalcataclysmic change (such as an asteroid striking theEarth and ending life as we know it). In reality, theprobable future lies somewhere between these twoextremes. It will be created by the combined effect ofa myriad of individual, societal and national decisionsand their outcomes. From any given moment in time,a range offuture trajectoriesis possible and one ofthese trajectories will become the future actuality.

The best way to understand this concept is tobriefly review Chaos Theory, which I previouslydiscussed in “Chaos Theory and IntelligenceAnalysis” in the November/December 1995 edition ofthis journal. Chaos Theory deals with the unstablenature of all natural systems. It demonstrates howevery small change within a system acts, directly orindirectly, upon every actor and object associatedwith the system. The apparent randomness that resultsfrom this phenomenon can be shown to containrepeating patterns and the theory is valuable becauseit enables the search for “order within chaos”. Thusthe future is inherently unstable, and capable ofdeveloping into a myriad of manifestations, butsimultaneously inherently orderly, enablingforecasting and predictions to occur.

Bearing in mind these introductory paragraphs itis hardly surprising that some now believe that AF area method of predicting or forecasting the future. Thisis a mistake. While the use of AF should be informed

by a realistic analysis of trends, it should not be overlyconstrained by rational and traditional thinking.

Peter Schwartz, one of the principal architects ofthe study of AF, describes them as:

A tool for helping us to take a long view in aworld of great uncertainty (Schwartz, 1991, p.3). AF are not necessarily intended for use by

intelligence analysts, although their greater use withinthe intelligence community is recommended. AF canoffer insights to all involved in organisationalstrategic planning and these insights result from anintellectual process which is not bounded byconventional logic or expectations. The developmentof AF and the study of their implications is intendedto broaden our understanding of what may be ratherthan what will be. As we improve our understandingof the range of future potentialities we can makedecisions intended to shape the future and hedgeagainst adverse outcomes which may result.

Having introduced the philosophy of AF, I willnow briefly describe how they are developed andused.

AF are derived from intensive and rigorousprocesses. Some examples are John Tydeman’s fourstep method (Tydeman, 1987, pp.48-49) and PeterSchwartz’s eight step method (Schwartz, 1991,pp.226-233). This article will describe Ian Wilson’ssix step method (Wilson, 1998, pp.83-94), and thesteps are: 1. Identify and analyse the organisational issues that

will provide the decision focus. 2. Specify the key decision factors. 3. Identify and analyse the key external factors. 4. Establish the scenario logics. 5. Select and elaborate the scenarios. 6. Interpret the scenarios for their decision

implications. The first step requires research into the most

important issue faced by the organisation. This issueis known as the strategic decision focus and finding itmay involve organisational surveys, interviews andliterature reviews.

The second step is to identify future developmentswhich would be crucially important to the strategicdecision focus of the organisation. This process oftenrequires the use of unstructured focus groups, knownas brainstorming sessions, and structured consensusgroups, using methods such as the Delphi Technique.During this phase it is imperative that senior

A Method

The Underlying Philosophy


management be engaged in the process and assume“ownership” of its outcomes. It is also important thatthe analytical process is seasoned by input frominformed personnel holding a balance of optimisticand pessimistic outlooks.

The third step (identify and analyse the keyexternal factors), identifies those trends or currents,which will interact to form driving forces, and arelikely to influence the future. The writings of StevenMetz, of the United States Army War College,provide a useful example of this process (Metz, 1997,pp.1–17). He has identified three overarching currentsof change: the interconnectiveness of individuals andorganisations; the compression of time; anddemassification (using Alvin Toffler’s term for thefragmentation of enterprise in the information age).Metz describes eight trend categories which operatewithin these currents: technological, economic,political, social, demographic, ethical, psychologicaland military. Other useful trend categories areenvironmental and organisational.

The trends within each category are extrapolatedin order to ascertain their level of relative uncertaintyand the level of their impact. This enables risk

assessment to be conducted and it informs theselection of the most important driving forces.

There are many methods of creating scenarios inthe fourth step (establish the scenario logics). Onemethod uses models and matrices enabling complexrelationships to be more easily understood. Cross-impact analysis is conducted to explore the combinedeffects of driving forces. When the results are appliedto the model or matrix, the plotting process can createan infinite number of possible futures. From these,three or four are selected for further examination.Experience generally indicates that three scenarios isthe minimum number for a meaningful study andmore than four will be difficult to manage andunderstand. Subjective judgement and intuition arerequired to make this step work and it is importantthat organisational preferences for desired outcomesdo not derail the process at this point. The mostimportant criteria for the selection of the scenarios istheir relevance to the strategic decision focus of theorganisation.

The development of scenarios is made possible bya relatively simple exercise. A focus group identifiestwo systemic driving forces which are considered

A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO ALTERNATIVE FUTURES 19

Figure 1. Two Dimensional Scenario Development

Scenario A

Scenario D

Scenario B

Scenario C

y

x

x axis = Driving Force # Oney axis = Driving Force # Two

likely to result in critical uncertainties for thestrategic decision focus of the organisation. These areused to create the intersecting x and y axes of a fourquadrant matrix, which is called thescenario space.The varying effect of the driving forces is plotted onthe matrix, providing four basic scenarios. Thescenarios do not need to be located at the midpointbetween the two axes and can be plotted to emphasisea key juxtaposition of the two driving forces. Thisprocess is illustrated on page 19.

The development of more sophisticated AF can beachieved with the addition of further axes and by thecreation of a three-dimensional scenario space. Thisenables coordinates to be plotted with reference tothree or more driving forces, resulting in an unlimitedand complicated choice of potential scenarios.

The fifth step (select and elaborate the scenarios)requires the choice of a few of the most excitingscenarios for greater development. Remember,scenarios are not intended to provide accuratepredictions of the future. Instead, they shouldstimulate original and considered thinking within thestrategic planning process. The scenarios are selectedaccording to their relevance to the decision focus ofthe organisation and the value of the lessons whichcan be drawn from them. Once selected, the scenariosare given life with compelling narratives that draw onthe driving forces which created them and alsoresonate with ideas drawn from other appropriatedriving forces. Scenario writers need imagination andlateral thinking to create these future histories. Thenarratives are then given an evocative title, in theform of a newspaper headline or movie title, tocapture the spirit of the scenario and provide allparticipants with a shorthand term of reference. The futures that are selected should be:• Plausible and credible. The scenario must contain

an internal plot or “logic” which should beinternally consistent. Despite this requirement itmay be necessary for planners to “suspend theirdisbelief” if they are to get the best results.

• Challenging and stimulating. There is little pointconducting an AF study if it serves to reinforcethe predispositions of the planners involved.

• Useful and relevant. The scenarios must concerninformation which is related, directly or indirectly,to the activity of the organisation.

• Understandable and interesting. It is important that the scenarios not constitute

simply the “best case”, “worst case” and “likelycase”. Those familiar with the military appreciationprocess should also avoid selection of scenariosaccording to “three courses” based on “threeapproaches”, or two scenarios which can be rapidly

discounted leaving the scenario which was desired inthe first place!

Good scenarios contain imaginative qualitativeinformation (descriptive assessment) tempered byintellectually coherent quantitative information(empirical data). Too much of either will render thescenario either too “woolly” and “pie in the sky” ortoo “dry and boring”.

Once the scenarios are fully developed, the sixthstep can commence (interpret the scenarios for theirdecision implications). All of the effort put into theprevious five steps comes to fruition at this point. Thescenarios are reviewed; interpreted; used to testorganisational assumptions; provoke discussion;encourage new insights; and enable planners toexamine policy responses and strategies. Importantissues which can be raised by AF are:• Whether the organisation is optimised for its

future operating environment. • How the organisation can avoid being a victim of

“strategic surprise”. • How the current strategies of the organisation will

cope with the threats and opportunities of eachscenario.

• Where and when the organisation can detect“branching points”, where the future actualitychanges course, and “signposts”, which indicatethat basic assumptions may require review. Thesesignposts are similar to the “indicators” in theIndicators and Warnings process that will befamiliar to many military readers.

• How this information may then be used toinfluence the future actuality. This can include“shaping actions” which are intended to create afavourable future, “hedging actions” whichprotect against less favourable futures andcontingency plans for responses to unfavourablefutures. Those readers who are familiar withAssumption-Based Planning, RAND’s formalisedstrategic planning system, will recognise thisterminology. The evocative titles of the scenarios often remain

in the minds of people who have worked with themand they provide a shorthand method of discussingthe future. When used in this manner, scenariosprovide the catalyst for ongoing “strategicconversations”.

The creation of scenarios through the analysis andextrapolation of current driving forces is referred to as“future forward”. Another method which can providefurther stimulating results and provide a useful cross-check of future forward results is referred to as“future backward”. In this method a possible future isenvisioned and selected, with far less emphasis on


current driving forces. The course of events whichmay lead to it is analysed by working backwards fromthe envisioned future to the present.

The future forward method emphasises deductivethinking and the use of logic, although intuitionshould not be discounted. Future backward scenario-development, on the other hand, emphasises inductivethinking, hunches, “wildcards” and “left fieldthinking”. The combination of the two methods canprovide powerful strategic insights.

I have already pointed out that AF do not offerpredictions or intelligence estimates. This is not aproblem as long as all those involved in the use of AFunderstand their intended use. Several other problemsmay be encountered.

First, the scenarios may be ambiguous and thiscan confuse rather than inform. Those tasked with theelaboration of the scenarios must strive for clarity andbe alert for the need for ongoing improvements.

Second, the development of scenarios mayencourage self-altering or self-fulfilling prophecieswhich distort normal future trajectories. Thistendency should be counteracted by sceptical analysisduring steps one to five of the development ofscenarios. This is because AF are intended to enablethe study of the future not to alter it.

A third problem is posed by the underlyingphilosophy of AF that emphasises causal linkages andtrend extrapolation. This philosophy could beundermined by a completely unexpected developmentsuch as a discovery or invention which has a majorimpact on all possible future trajectories. It isimportant that all involved in the use of AFunderstand this weakness and strive for the earlyidentification of such discontinuities in the real world.“Environmental scanning”, which uses multiplesources of information to observe and report on theentire strategic environment, offers the best means ofdetecting future unexpected developments.

A fourth problem is that the extrapolation oftrends and the identification of driving forces, whichare crucial to scenario-development, are themselvessubject to several potential pitfalls:• Over-reliance on historical examples – which may

lead analysts to discount “wildcards” which donot fit the historical mould.

• Poor research which is likely to result inuninformed speculation.

• Over-reliance on statistics and modelling – whichmay distort analysis and limit the potential forintuitive perception.

• The failure to appreciate the influence of ethnic,cultural and institutional thought processes on theanticipated actions of others – who may in fact actin accordance with quite different thoughtprocesses.

• Undue influence over the process by dominantpersonalities or those in positions of authority. All of these problems can be overcome,

particularly if the AF are created using “lateralthinking”, made famous by Edward de Bono.

In order to realise the full potential of AF it isimperative that we use lateral thinking to “think out ofthe box”. We must escape hidebound thinking andexplore possible, and often unpalatable alternatives.By way of example, here are the fundamentals ofsome scenarios which could be thought-provokingwithin Australian strategic planning: • Chinese Anschluss. China and Taiwan form a

strategic alliance that causes Japan to accelerate itsrearmament and encourages increased UnitedStates military deployments to North Asia.

• Batik Breakdown. Indonesia fragments intoseveral smaller nations which each seek militarysupport from the other ASEAN nations andAustralia.

• Strange Bedfellows.Malaysia guarantees thesecurity of Papua-New Guinea and Malaysiantroops are deployed to Port Moresby.

• Serious Fishing. Foreign warships accompanyforeign fishing fleets into the Southern Oceanwith the capability to operate within theAustralian Fishing Zone. And here are the fundamentals of some scenarios

which are more immediately relevant to theAustralian Defence Force: • Australia’s Coastguard. The Navy is directed to

assume full responsibility for all Australianmaritime border management, includingsurveillance, maritime law enforcement,immigration and fisheries patrols.

• Proliferating Warriors. The Army is tasked withdoubling the size of its available combat forceswithin a 12 month period.

• Aircrew Adieu.The Air Force is directed tomaintain its fleets of F-111 and F/A-18 until

Think Out of the Box

Some Problems


Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles and cruisemissiles are purchased to replace them. Some readers will be busy thinking of good

reasons why these scenarios are unlikely – rather thantrying to investigate their implications. It is relativelyeasy to assert that everything will follow the normalcomfortable predictions that we have become used to.It is harder but more useful to think about othertrajectories.

Those who remain unconvinced might ponderthis: If I had written this article ten years ago anddescribed AF which included the collapse and partialfragmentation of the Soviet Union or a multi-nationalUnited Nations military operation against Iraq, manyreaders would have been highly sceptical. Morerecent examples of unexpected scenarios are thesuccessful air campaign by NATO againstYugoslavia and the United Nations ballot onindependence in East Timor. We must escape thenotion that things don’t change very much. In reality,things do change and they frequently change veryfast. Winners are those who can free themselves ofobsolete paradigms and anticipate change.

Futurists are committed to the use of innovativemethods such as AF to assist in understanding andinfluencing the future. Futurism is an intellectualpractice grounded in the analysis of data but requiringthe use of imagination and intuition. Successfulfuturists can escape the constrictive norms of theexpected and enhance the strategic planning processthrough the consideration of the unexpected.

The decision-maker who is sensitised to the rangeof possible futures will be better prepared to shapeevents. He or she will gain the opportunity toreconstruct their “mental map” – the set of beliefs andexpectations which underlie and inform all decisions.

AF are not intended to predict or forecast thefuture but if they are employed correctly they willimprove strategic planning and the likelihood ofmilitary success. The ADO is ideally suited to AFbecause it strives to be a “learning organisation” andit deals with strategic uncertainty with measures suchas strategic intelligence and strategic contingencyplanning. The stakes are very high because the failureto anticipate the future could fundamentally affect thefuture historyof Australia.

There is a substantial body of literature onfuturism and AF. The following list provides a sampleof the early influential works, some contemporaryworks and several useful internet sources. Robert Ayres, Uncertain Futures: Challenges for

Decision-Makers, John Wiley & Sons, New York,1979.

Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, Anticipating theFuture, Simon & Schuster, London, 1998.

Arthur C. Clark, The Challenge of the Space Ship:Previews of Tomorrow’s World,Frederick Muller,London, 1960.

Edward de Bono, Lateral Thinking: Creativity Step byStep,Harper & Row, New York, 1970.

– Six Thinking Hats, Viking, New York, 1985.– Why I Want to be King of Australia: Lateral

Suggestions for a New Millenium, Penguin Books,Ringwood, Victoria, 1999.

James Dewar, Carl Builder, William Mix and MorlieLevin, Assumption-Based Planning: A PlanningTool for Very Uncertain Times, RAND, SantaMonica, California, 1993.

Liam Fahey and Robert Randall (Eds), LearningFrom the Future: Competitive Foresight Scenarios,John Wiley & Sons Inc., New York, 1998.

Victor Ferkiss,Futurology: Promise, Performance,Prospects,The Washington Papers No.50,Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 1977.

Jib Fowles (Ed.), Handbook of Futures Research,Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1978.

Herman Kahn, William Brown and Leon Martel, TheNext 200 Years: A Scenario for America and theWorld, William Morrow and Co Inc., New York,1976.

Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener, The Year 2000:A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years,Macmillan, New York, 1967.

Harold Linstone and W.H. Clive Simmonds (Eds),Futures Research: New Directions,Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1977.

Steven Metz, Strategic Horizons: The MilitaryImplications of Alternative Futures,StrategicStudies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle,Pennsylvania, 1997.

Risk Management Handbook(Unclassified),Australian Security Intelligence Organisation,Canberra, September 1996.

Thomas Saaty and Luis Vargas, Prediction,Projection and Forecasting: Applications of theAnalytic Hierarchy Process in Economics,Finance, Politics, Games and Sports, KluwerAcademic Publishers, Boston, 1991.

Want To Know More?

Great Utility


Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art andPractice of the Learning Organisation,RandomHouse, Milsons Point, NSW, 1993.

Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View,DoubledayCurrency, New York, 1991.

Alvin Toffler, Future Shock, The Bodley Head,London, 1970.

– The Third Wave,William Morrow and CompanyInc, New York, 1980.

– Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence atthe Edge of the 21st Century,Bantam Books, NewYork, 1990.

Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: MakingSense of Today’s Global Chaos,Warner Books,London, 1995.

John Tydeman, Futures Methodologies Handbook:An overview of futures research methodologiesand techniques,Commission for the Future,Canberra, 1987.

Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War: TheMost Radical Reinterpretation of Armed ConflictSince Clausewitz, The Free Press, New York, 1991.

Kees van der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of StrategicConversation,John Wiley & Sons, London, 1996.

Ian Wilson, “Mental Maps of the Future: An IntuitiveLogics Approach to Scenarios”, in Liam Faheyand Robert Randall (Eds), Learning From theFuture: Competitive Foresight Scenarios,JohnWiley & Sons Inc., New York, 1998, pp.81-108.

Ian Wing, “Chaos Theory and Intelligence Analysis”,Australian Defence Force Journal,No.115,November/December 1995, pp.21–26.

– “Australasian Defense 2048 – An AlternativeFuture”, Australian Defence Force Journal,No.132, September/October 1998, pp.3-11 (alsoavailable at www.dod.gov.dpao/dfj/index.html).

Australian Institute of Professional IntelligenceOfficers,www.aipio.asn.au

Australian Public Service Futures Forum,www.psmpc.gov.au/future/

Club of Rome, www.clubofrome.orgGlobal Business Network,www.gbn.orgGlobal Futures Foundation,www.globalff.orgInstitute for Alternative Futures,www.altfutures.comIntelligent Futures,www.ifutures.com.auOpen Source Solutions,www.oss.netStrategic Studies Institute,http://carlisle-

www.army.mil/usassiWorld Futures Society(“The Futurist”), www.wfs.orgWired,www.hotwired.com/wired/scenarios

The draft version of this article received criticalinput from officers of the Australian Defence StudiesCentre, the Australian Institute of ProfessionalIntelligence Officers and the Strategic Policy Branchof the Australian Defence Organisation.


Lieutenant Colonel Ian Wing was the 1998 Chief of the Defence Force Scholarship Fellow at the AustralianDefence Studies Centre. His tenure has been extended to enable him to complete his doctoral research into“Reconceptualising Australia’s Defence”. He is a graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, and Commandand Staff College, Queenscliff. He holds a Bachelor of Arts with Honours in Political Science and a Master ofDefence Studies, both awarded by the University of New South Wales. His current research areas are the future ofconflict, the roles of post-modern armed forces, open source intelligence and futurism.

The Churchill Trust invites applications from Australians, of 18 years and overfrom all walks of life who wish to be considered for a Churchill Fellowship toundertake, during 2001, an overseas study project that will enhance theirusefulness to the Australian community.No prescribed qualifications are required,merit being the primary test, whetherbased on past achievements or demonstrated ability for future achievement.Fellowships are awarded annuallyto those who have already establishedthemselves in their calling. They are not awarded for the purpose of obtaininghigher academic or formal qualifications.

Details may be obtainedby sending a selfaddressed stamped envelope (12x24cms) to:The Winston Churchill Memorial Trust 218Northbourne Avenue, Braddon, ACT 2612or from: http://sunsite.anu.edu.au/churchill_fellowshipsCompleted application forms and reports from three referees must be submitted byTuesday 29 February, 2000.

In Australia the military is seeking to attract and retain a talented and motivated workforce


By Lieutenant Sarah Chapman, RAN Reserve

This article discusses issues pertinent to anexamination of the way in which the Australian

Defence Force (ADF) can increase the operationaleffectiveness and length of service of its femalemembers. Whilst these will be discussed in sequentialfashion, it is not intended that this prohibit an holisticappreciation of the issues. It is suggested thatincreasing the operational effectiveness and length ofservice of female members of the ADF may beachieved by dispensing with the current exclusion ofwomen from combat and the implementation ofpolicy initiatives that will enable more flexibleemployment practices.

To a nation already absorbing the culture shockof uniformed women being ordered into apotential war zone while able-bodied young menstayed home, the sight of military mothersvoluntarily leaving babies as young as six weeksold unveiled a new and disquieting reality in themodern military.

Francke on the deployment of female US troopsto the Gulf War, 1997: 130.

The issue of female members of the ADF servingin combat roles is a contentious and as yet unresolvedissue. Some argue that lifting the ban on theemployment of women in combat is aggressivelypursued by precious few for reasons of self-aggrandisement and more rapid promotion (cf.Ripley, 1992). Others assert that such employmentcontravenes social mores (Dembert, 1995; Lind,1992), sociobiological urges to protect women(Owens, 1992) and religious doctrine (Kirk, 1988).

Whilst the ADF is yet to make firm decisions onexisting combat-exclusion policies, Becraft (1990)notes that Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, Norwayand Portugal all allow women to serve in combatroles.1 Arguably the lessons which may be learnedfrom these nations are limited, given that they are aculturally diverse group and each nation is very

different from our own. The contemporary culture ofthe Australian military is a mix of both the finest andthe most dubious imperialist traditions from theUnited Kingdom and the superficially moreprogressive, yet equally restrictive, influences of theUnited States. We are yet to carve out a position forourselves on the world stage in clearly defining ourown stance on the inclusion of women in combat.

This section will address the most commonlycited reasons why the exclusion of women fromcombat duties should remain. Further sections of thisarticle will examine other more piecemeal argumentsrelated to this issue, which in themselves areimpediments to increasing the operationaleffectiveness of female members of the military.

Perhaps the most rudimentary argument for thecontinued exclusion of women from combat duties isthe patriarchal assumption that it is the role ofgovernment to preserve femininity and protectwomen from the horror of the battlefield. Ripley(1992), a retired United States Marine, commentsthat: “The issue of whether women belong in combatpositions should not be argued from the standpoint ofgender differences. It should not be argued from thestandpoint of female rights and desires. Important asthese issues are, they pale in the light of the need toprotect femininity, motherhood, and what we havecome to appreciate in Western culture as the gracefulconduct of women.” (Ripley, 1992: 36). Given thereticence of our own politicians to endorse femaleparticipation in combat (see Mackay, 1999), it mayreasonably be argued that this seemingly all-American view still holds considerable sway here inAustralia.

One of the most frequently cited reasons forexcluding women from combat is the presumablydetrimental effect that this will have upon esprit decorps.Curiously, it is yet to be established that malesoldiers, sailors and airmen have a monopoly on whatcountless historical anecdotes suggest to be afundamental characteristic of group membershipwhen such groups have a common goal or haveformed under adverse circumstances. Despite this, asubstantial number of authors have espoused the viewthat the employment of women in infantry, armour,combat engineering or submarines has a markedlyadverse impact on unit performance (cf. Dembert,

Women in Combat

Increasing the Operational Effectiveness of Women in theAustralian Defence Force

1995; Manzi, 1998; Messer in Deegan, 1992; vanCreveld, 1993).

Maubert (1993) asserts that mixed-gender combatunits will suffer impaired cohesion, morale anddiscipline because male commanders are likely to beunduly influenced in their strategic and operationaldecision-making by their emotional attachment tofemale subordinates.2 In doing so, he chooses toignore the reality of homosexual relationshipsbetween serving members and the intenselyemotional “male bonding” which has been found tooccur between men when under training or embarkedupon a stressful deployment. Indeed, Maubert’sargument is ultimately self-defeating: The potentialindecision arising from a commanding officer’s over-identification with his troops is precisely the reasonwhy the captain of a modern day warship, irrespectiveof the gender breakdown of his or her crew, is not amember of the Officers’ Wardroom. Thisphenomenon is as likely to occur in all male militaryunits as it is in those of both sexes.

Despite their popularity, neither the politicalresponsibility nor esprit de corpsargument fullyacknowledges the desire of women to serve theircountry in combat, nor their potential ability to do so.These issues will be addressed later in this article.

Arguably the most emotive reason for prohibitingwomen from participating in combat is the fear thatthey will be subject to rape, humiliation, torture,mutilation and death. Voge (1996), in interviewingmale and female US Air Force and Army aircrew,reported the most frequently cited concern for havingwomen fly combat missions was a recurrent fear ofwomen being captured by the enemy. Damousi(1992) asserts that within wider society it iscommonly held that those who create life should notbe called upon to destroy it. Further, van Creveld(personal communication, 1998) notes that willinglyexposing women to the lethal consequences of enemyaction and equipping them to inflict casualties, carrieswith it an emotional burden of responsibility that formany is too great to bear.

In concluding this section it is worth noting thatthe rapid technological advancement of militaryhardware may soon render the prevailing distinctionbetween combat and combat support moot. Hay andMiddlestead (1990: 23) note, “The myth that soldiersin combat roles face more danger than those … farremoved from the theatre of operations must bedispelled because new advances in militarytechnology … have made all areas of duty equallydangerous. In low-intensity conflict there is no ‘front’in the conventional sense, or rather the front iseverywhere and all soldiers are equally at risk.”

Greater sophistication in weapons developmentand the concomitant evolution of modern warfareheightens the relevance of a discussion addressing thefeasibility of women undertaking combat training.This may also raise questions about the relevance andsuitability of existing training methods, however onlya consideration of the feasibility of womenundertaking combat training falls within the purviewof this article.

Serving in the military is a privilege, and duringtimes of national emergency, an obligation –never a right.

Brennan, 1994: 53One of the more outspoken contemporary critics

of the employment of women in combat is ProfessorMartin van Creveld. Whilst few would argue with hisdescription of combat as, “the toughest, mostdemanding, most terrible activity on earth” (vanCreveld, 1993: 5), the tactics and weaponrycharacterising modern warfare somewhat qualify hisassertion that, “(t)he demands that it makes in termsof physical strength, endurance, and sheer wear andtear are horrendous” (van Creveld, 1993: 5). Withoutwishing to detract from the brutality of a militarycampaign designed to enslave those pursuing adifferent philosophical or economic outcome, manycontemporary researchers and commentators havenoted the greater emphasis in modern warfare ontechnical skill than physical strength (cf. Watts,1999).

Despite this, many still cite concerns over theinability of women to perform the physicallydemanding work traditionally associated withcombat-related employment. Hay and Middlestead(1990) note that despite the existence of a CanadianForces project designed to examine and facilitate theCombat Related Employment of Women (CREW),they are yet to witness a female member of theCanadian Forces successfully complete infantrytraining. In contrast, the Norwegian Navy hassuccessfully employed its first female submarinecommander. The comparison to be made whenexamining the success or otherwise of these nations infacilitating the employment of women in combat liesin the nature of the employment in which thesewomen have been engaged. Whilst commanding asubmarine requires a significant degree of physicalstamina in resisting fatigue, it requires considerablyless power and strength in lifting and carrying heavy

Combat Training Standards


loads, a task still synonymous with infantryoperations.

Gebicke (1993) has noted an innovative solutionto the commonly occurring discrepancy between thephysical strength of male and female members of themilitary. He found that troops deployed to the PersianGulf during Operations Desert Shieldand DesertStorm averted any such potential difficulties bycapitalising on teamwork to move heavy objects andload and carry equipment. Obviously, the success ofthis approach is heavily dependent upon the contextin which the work is undertaken; it seems moreappropriate for a headquarters or base campenvironment than during field operations ormovement in enemy territory.

A second approach to facilitating the employmentof women in combat and combat-related fields is theapplication of differential physical trainingrequirements for men and women. Unfortunately,these are most often a source of frustration anddisharmony, particularly when women are training foremployment in male-dominated or previouslyexclusive male occupations. Brennan (1994: 52)writes, “What we lieutenants viewed at TBS (TheBasic School)… was the fact that equal opportunityhad taken precedence over the good of the Service.Politically inspired euphemisms attempted to justifythe difference in standards to no avail. Separatestandards for women were clearly viewed as doublestandards”.

Hay and Middlestead (1990) suggest that thefailure of female trainees to negotiate the rigors ofinfantry training may be attributable to unsatisfactoryrecruiting and training standards. Specifically, theycite the use of separate fitness standards in basictraining leading to stamina limitations amongstfemale trainees during subsequent infantry trainingand inaccurate and misleading information beingconveyed to female applicants at recruitment centres.The combined effect of these discrepancies in thetreatment of male and female applicantsdisadvantages the latter and hinders their ability toserve in combat positions.

Steel (1998), in reviewing the potentialemployment of women in the clearance divingbranch, notes that members undertaking maritimetactical operations are working behind enemy linesand are susceptible to enemy attack. Employment ofwomen in this capacity would therefore contravenethe current ADF policy on women in combat.However, exceptional physical fitnessnotwithstanding, women could currently be employedin underwater battle damage repair and minecountermeasures roles. Given the widely promulgated

views such as that contained in the previousparagraph, the differential employment of women inthe clearance diving branch, that is their exclusionfrom maritime tactical operations, would likelyengender resentment and hostility and compromisethe operational flexibility of the branch. It seems theemployment of female clearance divers must awaitthe implementation of policy allowing women to beengaged in combat.

One of the significant difficulties in developingpolicy and guidelines for the employment of womenin combat is in the application and embodiment of theequity principle. Whilst equity, the enabling ofdifferential access to resources, training andassistance to facilitate the successful progression ofminority or disadvantaged members, is enshrined inthe civil and wider Defence community, theapplication of the equity principle to the employmentof women in combat proves more difficult.

Brennan (1994: 53), in questioning whether theMarine Corps should “become a test bed for socialexperimentation at the expense of morale andtraining”, represents a more extreme expression ofthis conflict. He further comments that, “seniorofficers are military leaders, not managers of socialprograms. Our challenge should not be how far wecan lower standards to acquiesce to misguided socialpressure and still win a battle through technology andfirepower” (Brennan, 1994: 53). Whilst negativisticand potentially misogynist, Brennan’s fundamentalconcern is very real. The military cannot afford tolower the selection and employment standards forcombat operations in order to allow the employmentof those who are not physically able to perform thetask.

A more considered and harmonious suggestion tothis dilemma is offered by Watts (1999), who notesthat increasingly sophisticated military hardwarerequires operators with specialist educationalqualifications and technical aptitude, which maycreate an alternate avenue for employment in combat.Division of labour in this regard would provide forthe employment of those who are technically skilledand those with a greater ability to withstand thetraditionally heavy labour of combat operations.

An efficient fighting force must ensure theadequate strength, stamina and psychological fitnessof those members engaged in direct combat. Based onthe preceding literature review, it seems the ADF maybe best served by ensuring a more sophisticatedsystem of selection and employment of memberswishing to serve in combat. Those who do not meetthe physical requirements necessary to be engaged inthe first line of defence, but whose psychological

INCREASING THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF WOMEN IN THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE 27

profile suggests they are suitable for employment in acombat role, may be gainfully employed in a capacitythat draws upon their technical expertise. This willenable competency-based employment of all thoseseeking to work in combat operations, irrespective ofgender.

Quinn (1998) comments that a group comprisingan 85 per cent majority and a 15 per cent minorityresults in the definition and subsequent control ofgroup culture by members of the dominant subgroupand the enforced regulation of the behaviour of all itsmembers. In this context, the token member suffersfrom heightened attention from others, both withinand outside the group and the differences betweenthemselves and the dominant members are oftenexaggerated, leading to further exclusion. In addition,she notes that token group members are oftenstereotyped and rewarded for conforming to thestereotype, rather than for their contribution to groupfunctioning and success.

Evidently tokenism, or perceived tokenism, isdetrimental to the operational effectiveness andsuccessful integration of women in the military. Inaccordance with Quinn’s description of groupdynamics, Smart (1998) has noted that female fast-jetpilots may be subject to the jealousy and envy of theirmale colleagues for capturing the imagination of themedia and in detracting from the achievements oftheir classmates. Further, she adds that maleinstructors may experience increased pressure fromsenior management to pass these “trail blazing”women, who may not otherwise be suitable foremployment in this profession (see also Smith, 1999).Similarly, Harrell and Miller (1997) found thatmembers of the United States Defense Forceexpressed discontent with the distorted media focuson the achievements and deaths of military women, tothe seeming exclusion of the achievements and morefrequent deaths of their male counterparts. In addition,these men and women expressed dissatisfaction andfrustration with the subsequent lack of attention to theabilities and contribution of all military personnel andthe preferred focus on scandals than on “a job welldone”.

The ADF can learn a sobering lesson from its UScounterpart. Senior management must moreeffectively control the media fascination with femalemembers of the military, or risk disenfranchisingmore than half its population. The most immediate

opportunity to achieve this aim is in deflectingattention away from the initial deployment of womenaboard HMA Ships Collins and Farncomb and re-directing the attention of the nation on the ability ofmembers of our submarine squadron to perform theirduties aboard fully-functioning, Australian-madesubmarines.

Many women in the United States Defense Forcereport experiencing job dissatisfaction andconsiderable frustration as a result of the prevailingcombat restrictions (Voge, 1996; Harrell & Miller,1997). It is commonly held that the direstconsequence of these restrictions is the debilitatingeffect this may have upon career progression. Asnoted by Brower (1996:13), “Without the propercredentials and experience, military women can neverbe full partners with their male counterparts. In truth,only a small percentage of those in combat positionsare ever exposed to direct enemy fire, but it is nearlyindispensable to have risked personal safety for thoseaiming at the top of the military positions”.

Voge (1996), in conducting focus groups withmale and female aircrew of the United States Armyand Air Force, found that most participants asserted apreference for competency-based employment andmerit-based progression, not the allocation of femalequotas. “Frequent comments were made that sinceeveryone in the military takes the same oath ofservice, everyone should be available for combatduty, especially since the military is now an all-volunteer force” (Voge, 1996: 17).

In recent years, both the United States andAustralian defence forces have circumvented thisdifficulty by allowing women to train in a selectnumber of combat roles. Subsequent to demonstratingproficiency and whilst awaiting a review of thelegislation pertaining to their employment in combat,some of these women have been engaged in aninstructional capacity. Whilst providing temporaryrelief for policy-makers, this approach ultimatelyproves unsatisfactory, as male trainees fail to identifywith, or develop respect for, instructors who have nocombat experience (cf. van Creveld, 1993).

Turning to the consideration of militaryemployment and career management in more generalterms, Voge (1996) found that a significant number ofmen and women also reported dissatisfaction with thedisruption to their personal lives that was necessarilyassociated with their vocation. Air Force women in

Career ManagementTokenism


particular asserted a preference for normal workinghours and a more regular lifestyle.

Given the competing desires of women seekingemployment in combat and those seeking a morestable lifestyle, balancing the needs and concerns ofmilitary members is a significant challenge. Whencoupled with lifting the restriction on women incombat, policy initiatives such as the FIMOTESProposal and Harlequin Option (see Gilks, 1998), oradaptations thereof, may indeed be able to reconcilethese differences. The FIMOTES Proposal aims tomatch training and education to occupational streams,whilst the Harlequin Option aims to provide tri-service respite postings to meet individuals’ lifecircumstances. The development and subsequentadministration of a questionnaire to a random,stratified sample of ADF personnel later this year willascertain the feasibility and acceptability of these andother such initiatives for addressing these concerns.

As mentioned previously, rapid developments inmilitary technology have facilitated the employmentof women in roles that previously required a level ofphysical strength most often associated with men. TheADF can little afford to hamper the career aspirationsof those women whose abilities would, were it not forpolicy restrictions, otherwise enable them to fulfiltheir desire to serve Australia in a capacity that iseither unpalatable or unattainable for the vast majorityof Australians. This issue will be dealt with in moredetail later in this article.

The preceding sections have broadly canvassedthe issue of women in combat and the implicationsthe existing restrictions have on career progression.This article will now address more specific concernsraised by those opposed to the more effectiveintegration of women in the armed forces.

Whilst it is widely acknowledged and largelyundisputed that pregnancy limits the operationaleffectiveness of a female member of the military,prevailing attitudes about the degree to whichpregnancy is correlated with absenteeism, lostproductivity and lack of work-related commitment donot concur with many statistical findings. Withrespect to the latter, Voge (1996) found that 80 percentof United States Army and Air Force enlistedaircrew reported having postponed motherhood whilston operational duty.3 This finding is contrary to theoft-cited concern that the organisational, career or job

commitment of female members is negativelyinfluenced by their desire to bear children.

Recent data obtained from the United States Navyindicated that men had recorded a combined total of386000 days’ leave for drug and alcohol rehabilitationduring a single financial year. This figure was twicethat of the number of days Navy women reportedhaving taken leave for reasons relating to pregnancy(Francke, 1997). Further, a recent examination ofpersonnel statistics held by the Marine Corpsillustrated that whilst pregnancy-related attrition wasless than three per cent, attrition for reasons ofphysical disability commonly fluctuates between 27and 30 per cent(Schoby, 1994). Unfortunately, itseems figures such as these have done little to curbthe hostility and resentment directed toward thosewomen seeking maternity leave or leave relating topregnancy.

The corrosive effect that such attitudes can haveon morale has been extensively documented in theliterature. For example, Schoby (1994: 54), notes that“Along with the perception that other Marines mustwork longer and harder in order to compensate forpregnant peers, many Marines also express a negativeopinion towards a pregnant woman’s change inphysical appearance and, in cases of unwed mothers,her possible promiscuity. Whether valid or not, whenthese speculations are left unchecked, they candestroy a unit rapidly”.

Current personnel management policies andpractices do little to engender more positive attitudestowards the entitlements of pregnant members. Amember accessing maternity leave most often createsa vacant position in her work section that results in anincreased workload for her remaining colleagues.Anecdotal evidence and research findings alikesuggest that this engenders considerable animositywithin the workplace between those who remain.Francke (1997) notes that in the United StatesDefense Force pregnancy is considered a “temporarydisability”, which does not then attract supplementarypersonnel. The net effect of these administrativeprocedures is detrimental to the integration andacceptance of women in many units: “While theArmy’s team spirit rallied around male soldiers withtemporary injuries like broken legs, there was nogenerosity of spirit extended to pregnant women.Morale problems are reported when the pregnantfemale soldier is not replaced, and male membersmust assume the redistributed workload” (Franke,1997: 111). Unfortunately, the same administrativepolicy currently applies to maternity leave in theADF.

Pregnancy


A male senior sailor participating in a focus groupheld by the author questioned the fairness of a policyenabling women access to paid maternity leave earlyin their career whilst their male counterparts wererequired to work for ten years before being granted anequivalent period of paid leave. This exemplifies theview expressed by Miller (1997), who has argued thatpregnancy is yet another impediment to greateracceptance that both male and female members of themilitary receive equal pay and promotion inaccordance with their exposure to risk and/or level ofresponsibility.

The ADF has recently examined the impact ofpregnancy on operational effectiveness and thepotential hazards to a foetus that may occur werefemales to be employed as clearance divers andsubmariners. Steel (1998: 12) comments, “To employfemale RAN personnel in the clearance diving branch

may expose the Commonwealth to possible liabilityactions if abnormalities in a female diver’s pregnancycan be linked to diving. Legal advice indicates thatthe signing of some form of indemnity oracknowledgement of risk, similar to the USNprocedure, would have little effect upon the issue ofliability – although it may assist in mitigatingdamages. Additionally, an indemnity form would notnegate a claim made by the child against theCommonwealth in the future”. To date, there havebeen no definitive decisions made by senior ADFofficials in relation to this issue.

Ultimately, personnel policies should be designedto facilitate the more gainful and efficientemployment of women both during and following apregnancy. These policies must perform the dual roleof accommodating the small number of women whoare pregnant at any one time and allowing more


A Member of the INTERFET Force stands guard in Dili, East TimorPhotographer: Corporal Mark Dowling

flexible employment practices to facilitate theincreasingly equal childcare contribution made bymen.

There are three stages in the revelation of anytruth: in the first, it is ridiculed; in the second,resisted; in the third, it is considered self-evident.

SchopenhauerThe Government has long been subject to

pressure from community groups who view anincrease in employment opportunities for women inthe military as a moral and social imperative. “Themilitary, as a servant of society, must ‘reflect societalcore values and culture or be labelled ananachronism’ … (and) divorce itself from society”(Watts, 1999: 14).

Research conducted in the United States hasdemonstrated that American citizens overwhelminglysupport the participation of women in the military, butare opposed to their involvement in direct, hand-to-hand, ground combat (see Francke, 1997; Owens,1992). Whilst there has been no large-scale opinionpoll conducted in Australia which has examined thisissue, it is feasible to suggest that results obtained herein Australia would concur with those obtained in theUnited States (see Smith, 1990).

Whilst debate on the morality and merit ofemploying women in combat roles continues, womenhave been joining the military in ever-increasingnumbers. One of the more successful arguments forincreased involvement of women has been both theobservable decline in the number of young menseeking employment in the military and the increasingquality of the female candidates. Previous researchconducted by the United States Defense Departmenthas found that whilst the average female applicantmay be physiologically less able than her malecounterpart, she is likely to be better educated, receivehigher scores on the requisite aptitude battery and lesslikely to become a disciplinary problem (Francke,1997). Similar findings have been reported inAustralia with respect to disciplinary action (cf.Academy Performance Indicators, 1998), however nosuch evidence exists to demonstrate the more ableacademic or test aptitude performance of femalecandidates for military service (Psychology ResearchGroup, 1999).

In Australia, the military is seeking to attract andretain a talented and motivated workforce in anincreasingly competitive marketplace. Thisnecessitates the development and successful

implementation of policies designed to foster aharmonious and efficient working environment,which harnesses the skills and fosters the personal andprofessional development of its members. Alterationof current ADF personnel policies relating to theemployment of women may create more favourableperceptions of a fair and equitable managementphilosophy and a more desirable future workplaceamongst high calibre men and women in Australiansociety.4 The Australian military must balance theneeds and concerns of its members with those of thewider community if it is to remain vital, alive andrelevant to the society it serves.

This article has addressed a number of factorsdiscussed in the literature which pertain to theemployment of women in a military context. Thereview has not been exhaustive, its parameters havingbeen defined by a previous discussion paper outliningthe views of current serving members of the ADF(Chapman, 1999).

It is intended that this article further inform thedevelopment of a quantitative attitudinal andsociodemographic questionnaire to be administered toa random, stratified sample of ADF personnel later thisyear. The questionnaire will canvass the feasibility ofpolicy initiatives designed to increase the operationaleffectiveness and length of service of female membersof the ADF. In so doing, it is important to note that anumber of these initiatives are gender neutral in thatthey may prove equally beneficial to both men andwomen. The questionnaire will ask close-endedquestions (providing a multi-choice response format)in addition to presenting a number of hypotheticalscenarios describing conditions of service and flexibleemployment practices.

Whilst it may be argued that disproportionatecoverage has been given to the employment ofwomen in combat, this issue is considered the mostfundamental of all reforms designed to enhance theintegration and operational effectiveness of women inthe ADF. To date, this issue has been debated in thesafe confines of a parliament residing over a nationproviding small-scale involvement in peacetimeoperations. During the Israeli War of Independencethis nation state witnessed the sight of mutilatedfemale corpses and suffered the knowledge that theyhad little influence over the ethics of their combatants.The Israeli experience represents a sobering lesson –

Conclusion

Market Forces and Social Expectation


and one we here in Australia are yet, hopefully never,to learn.

NOTES1. See also Stanley, S.C. (1988). “Military women in NATO: An

update”, Armed Forces and Society,14(4): pp.559-585.2. It is unclear whether Maubert feels that women too are folly to

such weakness, but given his declaration that women are notpsychologically, physically or emotionally equipped forcombat, it seems unlikely he would advocate their exclusiveemployment in command positions.

3. Admittedly, it was not made explicit whether these womenwere externally or internally motivated (that is, were awaitingthe completion of a return of service obligation or hadpostponed motherhood in order to more firmly establishthemselves in their military career). It is assumed that had thedecision been externally motivated Voge would not havepresented this finding in the context of a discussion pertainingto career commitment.

4. It is yet to be established whether a reversal of the policycurrently excluding women from combat would have this effect.

BIBLIOGRAPHYAcademy Performance Indicators (1998). The Australian Defence

Force Academy, University of New South Wales.Becraft, C. (1990). Women in the military, 1980-1990. World

Wide Web Page, http:/eng.hss.cmu.edu/feminism/women-in-the-military.txt

Bell, D.G., Gill, J.W., Swan, R. & Myles, W.S. (1975). Effects ofthe physical conditioning program administered to the femalerecruits at CBF Cornwallis, Defence and Civil Institute ofEnvironmental Medicine,Technical Report No. 75-X5.

Brennan, T.P. (1994). “Putting politics before military readiness”,Marine Corps Gazette.78(12): pp.52-53.

Brower, M.J. (1996). “Undermining old taboos: US, UK studiessay women can meet physical demands of combat”, ArmedForces Journal International,May, 13.

Chapman, S.E. (1999). Increasing the Operational Effectiveness ofWomen in the Australian Defence Force,DSPPR ResearchNote 3/99.

Damousi, J. (1992). “Marching to different drums: Women’smobilisations 1914-1939”, In K Saunders, and R. Evans (eds.).Gender Relations in Australia. Domination and negotiation,Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, Sydney.

Deegan, G.A. (1992). “Women in combat: A view from the top”,Marine Corps Gazette,76(9): pp.42-44.

Dembert, M.L. (1995). Nobody asked me, but… women shouldn’tserve on submarines. United States Naval Institute Proceedings.121(8): p.72.

Downing, T.M. (1992). “Just say no!” Naval Institute, February,pp.45-46.

Francke, L.B. (1997). Ground zero: The gender wars in themilitary, Simon & Schuster, New York.

Gebicke, M.E. (1993). Women in the military: Deployment in thePersian Gulf War,United States General Accounting Office,National Security and International Affairs Division.Washington, DC.

Gilks, D.J. (1998).Fully Integrated Military and OccupationalTraining, Education and Service within the Australian DefenceForce,DPSR Research Note. 1/98

Gilks, D.J. (1998). Impact on Capability of Personnel Policies:Workforce Management and Gender Equity,DPSR ResearchNote 5/98.

Harrell, M.C. & Miller, L.L. (1997). New opportunities for militarywomen: Effects upon readiness, cohesion, and morale, NationalDefense Research Institute, RAND.

Harris, M. (1997). “Recognising the role of women in NATO’smilitary forces”, NATO Review. 45(5): pp.25-26.

Hay, M.S. & Middlestead, C.G. (1990). Women in combat: Anoverview of the implications for recruiting,Research Report1568. US Army Research Institute for the Behavioural andSocial Sciences, Alexandria, VA.

Lind, W.S. (1992). “Tailhook: The larger issue”, Marine CorpsGazette.76(11): pp.36-37.

Mackay, H. (1999). “Women in combat and the enemy within”Sydney Morning Herald,1 Aug. p.20. John Fairfax Group Pty.Ltd.

Manzi, T. (1998). “Women in combat: The opposing view”,Washington Post Opinions.3 Jan, p.A19.

Miller, L.L. (1997). “Not just weapons of the weak: Genderharassment as a form of protest for Army men”, SocialPsychology Quarterly.60(1): pp.32-51.

News Weekly (1997). Women in combat? RAN follows flawed USexperience, 2515: p.10.

Nordstrom, C. (1993). “Australia Report: Sexual harassment in themilitary”, Pacific Research,6(4): pp.30-31.

Owens, M.T. (1992). “Women in combat – Equal opportunity ormilitary effectiveness?”, Marine Corps Gazette,76(11): 32-36.

Primoff Vistnes, J. (1997). Gender differences in days lost fromwork due to illness, Industrial and labor relations review.50(2): pp.304-323.

Quinn, K. (1998). Group Dynamics: An OrganisationalFramework for Understanding Mixed Gender Interaction andSexual Harassment in the Military,DPSYCH-N RR 2/98.

Ripley, J.W. (1992). “Women in combat? A marine veteran says,simply, no”, Marine Corps Gazette. 76(11): pp.36-37.

Schoby, T.E. (1994). “When the bough breaks: Pregnancy and theMarine Corps”, Marine Corps Gazette.78(12): pp.53-54.

Smart, T. (1998). “Fast Women: Dispelling the myths of women in afast-jet environment”, Australian Military Medicine. 7(1): pp.8-16.

Smith, H. (1990). “Women in the Australian Defence Force: In linefor the front line?” Australian Quarterly,62(2): pp.125-144.

Smith, H. (1998). Women in the military: developments, debatesand dilemmas. Unpublished paper.

Smith, H. (1999). “Over my dead body”: Debating women incombat. Conference Paper, Women in Uniform: Perceptionsand Pathways, Australian Defence Force Academy.

Steel, D. (1998). “Reviewing the employment of female RANmembers in the Clearance Diving Branch”,Journal of theAustralian Naval Institute. Oct-Dec, 10-12.

van Creveld, M. (1993). “Why Israel doesn’t send women intocombat”, Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College.23(1): pp.5-9.

Voge, V.M. (1996). Self-reported aviation concerns of male andfemale US Air Force and Army rated aircrew,ArmstrongLaboratory, Brooks Air Force Base, TX.

Watts, M. (1999).Enlisted personnel in the US Armed Forces: TheEvolving Pattern of Gender Segregation 1984-98,Paperpresented to Women in Uniform: Perceptions & PathwaysConference Australian Defence Force Academy, May 12-13,1999.


Sarah Chapman works as a Research Psychologist in a civilian capacity, within the Directorate of Strategic Personnel Planning andResearch. A reserve lieutenant (Psych) in the Royal Australian Navy, she examines issues affecting submarine personnel. Sarah iscurrently working on a project that pertains to ADF progress in integrating women into submarine service.

The Part-TimersA History of the RAAF Reserve From 1948 to 1998

The Part-Timers tells of the valuable contribution made by the Air Force reservists overthe years.

The Part-Timers covers the formation of the CAF fighter squadrons in 1948, through theflying days of the 50s, on through the post-flying eras to the changing times of the 80s andinto the 90s.

The Part-Timers was written by Group Captain Doug Hurst who, after 33 years of service withthe RAAF is a “part-timer” himself.

The Part-Timers is available from the office of the Australian Defence Force Journal at acost of $25.00.

Australian Defence Force Journal - Mail Order - The Part-TimersPlease send order to The Australian Defence Force Journal, R8-LG-003, Russell Offices, Canberra, ACT 2600

Name:........................................................................................................................................

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What a difference a century makes

By Kathryn Spurling, Australian Defence ForceAcademy

On 12 May 1999 the Chief of the Defence Force,Admiral Chris Barrie, RAN, opened the

“Women in Uniform: Perceptions and Pathways”Conference. The Conference, organised by the Schoolof History, University College, was held over twodays at the Australian Defence Force Academy. Itwas the first Conference held in Australia to includeInternational and Australian academic, civilian anduniform presentations on the past, present and futureof women in defence force, police and fire servicecareers. In his opening address Admiral Barriereferred to the integration of personnel as an issuewhich represented a major cultural challenge for theAustralian Defence Force and an important priority.The last 90 years has seen enormous change inDefence Force personnel policy and the alteration isno better exemplified than in the integration ofwomen naval volunteers.

During World War I both the United Kingdomand the United States recruited women into defenceforce auxiliaries. In the United Kingdom 8,000volunteers served in Army auxiliary positions, 24,000with the RAF and 7,000 with the Women’s RoyalNaval Service (WRNS).1 In the United States a similarutilisation of women volunteers occurred after thethen Secretary of the Navy Joseph Daniels asked “Isthere any law that says a yeoman must be a man?”2

By the end of the war 34,000 women served with theUnited States Navy, Marines, Coastguard and Armyand Naval Nursing Corps in non-combat positions. Inboth the United States and the United Kingdom theWomen’s Auxiliaries were disbanded followingWorld War I and reformed in the first part of WorldWar II. During 1917 the Soviet Union formed awomen’s frontline battalion known as the “Battalionof Death”. The acceptance of women in combatpositions in the Soviet forces expanded during WorldWar II.3

In Australia during World War I, women’sdefence auxiliaries were not formed. Of the Westernallies Australia, proportionate to population, sufferedthe highest casualty rate, save only that of NewZealand. Of an Australian population ofapproximately 4,000,000, some 417,000 volunteers

were mobilised to fight the enemies of Great Britainand 60,000 died. The sacrifice made by so many wascommitted to national legend, the legend was revered,the legend was sacred and the legend was masculine.

As yet another generation prepared to followGreat Britain into war large numbers of Australianwomen again mobilised themselves into self-funded,para-military organisations. Women members wereridiculed but they continued to drill and learn skillsthey believed would be in demand if and when theircountry chose to recognise their resolve andwillingness to serve. Two of these organisations inparticular, the Women’s Emergency Signal Corps(WESC) and the Women’s Emergency Naval Service(WNS), would provide an invaluable, trained nucleusfor what would become the Women’s RoyalAustralian Naval Service (WRANS).4

Australia declared war on Germany on 3September 1939, within hours of Great Britain. Asthousands of men were enlisted and convoyed toanother conflict in the Northern Hemisphere, theAustralian Government continued to demonstrate areluctance to admit women to the Defence Forces. By1941 the demand for manpower had outstrippedintake levels. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) wasincreasingly troubled by a shortage of wirelessoperators. WESC signallers were skilled morse codeinstructors and eagerly offered their expertise. TheMinister for the Navy in 1941 was the 78 year oldWilliam Morris Hughes. He would advise theAustralian Prime Minister, “in my opinion theemployment of females in the navy is undesirable”.5

As the Axis nations accelerated their conquest ofEurope and the Japanese shadow lengthened in Asia,the Australian War Cabinet had little choice but toconsent to the “final option”, the induction of womenvolunteers. The Australian Womens’ Auxiliaries wereformed in 1941. In April the first women arrived atthe Naval Wireless Transmitting Station, outsideCanberra, still dressed in the bottle green uniforms ofthe WESC. Naval authorities were awkward anduneasy with their new charges and women personnelwere accommodated in two self-contained houses onthe perimeter of the base. The Commanding Officerwas skeptical and insisted that the women be tested inhis presence. A signaller was chosen and placed onthe busiest channel. Warrant Officer Sid Willetts,

From Exclusion to Submarines – The Integration ofAustralian Women Naval Volunteers

RAN, observed “the operator on the other end musthave wondered what had hit him because the lassmade him sit up. The girl could certainly tickle amorse key”.6

The telegraphists took their places on the stationwatch bill. Telegraphist Jess Prain remembered, “I’llnever forget how frightened and tired we were,always so tired. Most of us were only eighteen ornineteen and yet we were sending and receiving vitalsignals from all over the world.”7 Jess Prain would bethe telegraphist who on 16 December 1941despatched to all Australian ships the message thatAustralia was at war with Japan. The war in thePacific would force the change in naval policy longawaited by women.

Australia had traditionally focused its loyalty forand trust in British protection. With the crumbling ofthe Singapore defence strategy, the destruction ofAustralian naval ships in the Battle of Savo Island, thefirst of many Japanese bombing missions on theAustralian mainland, and a submarine attack on thecity of Sydney, those who administered the RANwere faced with the inescapable fact that the navaldefence of the nation could no longer be met by an allmale volunteer force. Members of the WNS wererequested to assist the RAN as the survivors of Savoreturned to Sydney. One remembered “We were therehanding out razor blades, cap tallies etc… I recallwith great delight one battered hero’s first words onfirst sighting us were, ‘Gawd bloody women’”.8 Thesailor’s reaction was one being repeated in the highestechelons of the Royal Australian Navy, althoughperhaps not with such honest inflection.

When Pearl Harbor was bombed there were amere 26 women volunteers employed by theAustralian Navy. Not until 1 October 1942 were theyactually enlisted in the Women’s Royal AustralianNaval Service. It had taken the largest threat to faceAustralia before the male monopoly on naval servicewas broken. Official decree did not however ridcareer naval administrators of their innate resistanceto women in their ranks and recruiting proceeded atan excruciatingly slow pace. Many would-bevolunteers simply tired of waiting and enlisted in theArmy or Air Force. One volunteer observed“Administration was totally unprepared for us”.9 Forthe first women volunteers accepted there were nouniforms, accommodation or wages.

The direct attack on Australia had a profoundeffect on its people. Australians referred to Britain as“the motherland”. But the parent had been unable tohelp the child in its time of need. The ideologies ofAustralians were challenged. And then there wasanother onslaught, one million American GI’s. These

new protectors from the United States were popularlyreferred to as “over-paid, oversexed and over here”.Australian women had been disenfranchised from theAustralian military legend and notions of “mateship”but here they were too, demanding a role in thedefence of their country. Many women wishing toenlist faced family resistance. One volunteer recalledtaunts that she “would be ruined”.10 Another delayedtelling her parents until the day before she was tocatch her train. Her father’s advice was “don’t getpregnant, you won’t be welcomed home, and pleasedon’t marry an American”.11

The first WRANS Officer Training Course didnot commence until January 1943 and the basicWRANS structure not established until the beginningof 1944. No sooner had these breaks from traditionbeen conceded by a reluctant administration but theWRANS found restrictions placed on expansion anddiversification. By March 1944 there were anestimated 49,000 women serving with the AustralianDefence Forces but the WRANS complementconsisted of only 58 officers and 1,738 enlisted.

Despite the strong commitment of those whoserved, the Australian Naval Board stubbornlyresisted WRANS expansion. When General DouglasMacArthur requested further WRANS personnel forSupreme Allied Fleet Headquarters in Brisbane, hisrequest was rejected. To make up the shortage ofpersonnel, members of the British, United States andNew Zealand women naval auxiliaries were broughtto Australia. Furthermore when MacArthur’s staff leftfor the Philippines, WRANS personnel were notpermitted to leave Australia.

Senior RAN naval administrators treated womenvolunteers with great conservatism. Whereas womenAir Force volunteers could choose to serve in 53different occupations, women naval volunteers wererestricted to 27. Trade training was closed to WRANSpersonnel. The WRANS was the last women’sauxiliary formed, the last to officially enlist volunteersand the last service to appoint officers. Throughoutthe war the WRANS was permitted to retain thesmallest complement of the three women’s auxiliariesand serving members faced fewer opportunities fortraining, and transfer, than members of the otherservices. Unlike their Army and Air Force peers theywere not permitted to serve overseas and only inforward positions on the Australian mainland twomonths before peace was declared.

VJ day marked Victory against Japan. For womenin the Australian armed forces the victory was also adefeat. Even before many of the country’s servicemenhad returned to Australian shores the women’sservices were being demobilised. At the same time as


approval was given for the WAVES to be apermanent arm of the United States Navy and theWRNS assumed similar status with the Royal Navy,the last WRANS volunteer was discharged.

It would take Australia’s commitment to theKorean War before this short-sighted attitude wasreversed. Even then it would take enormous pressurefrom the Australian Government before the resistanceof senior naval administrators was overcome. Thereformation of the WRANS was announced on 18July 1950 but the announcement was premature andinadequate planning ensured that the WRANS wouldnot be an immediate reality. The very restrictiveprocesses imposed on the WW II operation of theservice were again implemented. Margaret Curtis-Otter was advisor on the re-establishment of theWRANS. Curtis-Otter had served with distinctionduring WW II. Although willing to resume hercommissioned rank to oversee the service, she was amarried woman and married women could not servein the Australian Defence Forces or any permanentGovernment position. Curtis-Otter was amazed by theanimosity of senior naval administrators towardswomen personnel. One opinion expressed was thatwomen officers should not under any circumstancesbe permitted to exercise control over enlisted men.”12

Curtis-Otter replied that “If the WRANS is to be partof the permanent service it seems reasonable thatmale ratings should be educated to acceptance”. Toomany members of the RAN viewed women asintruders who should never be allowed permanency intheir navy. This sentiment prevailed despite anoverwhelming willingness of women to serve. In thefirst two weeks of WRANS recruitment, 1,500applications were received for the 250 billetsavailable.13 The first enlisted WRANS were acceptedfor service in January 1951. The willing responsecontinued but a year later the WRANS numberedonly 304.

With the end of the Korean War Australiandefence faced budgetary constraints. Because defenceforces derived their sense of worth from combat-readiness, non-combat components were the first togo. The WRANS fared badly. To a degree acceptanceof the WRANS was dependent on the position ofwomen in Australian society. The 1950s and 1960s inAustralia comprised an era when women werecircumscribed publicly to the roles of wife andmother. It was also a period when the demarcationbetween male and female, real and imagined, hadnever been more emphasised. The dominantdefinition of “femininity” and the role of women wasin no way compatible with the attributes traditionallyseen as being necessary for a career, let alone one in

the defence forces. Whilst it was generally acceptedthat able bodied young men would wish to defendtheir country there remained an unwillingness topermit the same commitment from able-bodied youngwomen. Public disapproval of women in uniform, andthe accompanying accusations of immorality andmasculinity, were no longer tempered with thepatriotic incentive of war.

The WRANS remained on the periphery of theAustralian Navy. Members of the service were placedin unchallenging positions which best personified“feminine traits”. Rather than challenge the socialdefinition RAN administrators emphasised it.Whereas the women’s component of the Army andAir Force was maintained at around five per cent, by1956 the WRANS had been allowed to dwindle tofewer than 200 members. Official status for theWRANS came in 1959 but the Governmentlegislation made little difference to the tiny tokenforce. Male administrators declared the WRANS tobe excessively expensive because of the smallnumber of personnel involved, yet it was they whorestricted the number of women volunteers acceptedfor service. Why? The official justification evolvedaround ship/shore rosters but this could not justify thedepth of the neglect. Strategies and mechanismswhich had evolved over centuries had created a navalculture which consciously excluded women. TheWRANS barely survived the era.

As Australia entered the Vietnam War andpledged “All the way with LBJ” the opportunities ofwomen naval volunteers gradually improved. At theend of 1969 the Australian Government permittedwomen public service members who married toremain permanent staff. The removal from thepermanent public service of women on marriage hadceased in the United States and United Kingdomfollowing the end of WWII. For the AustralianDefence Forces this was a most significant alteration.Members of the Women’s Auxiliaries could nolonger be removed from the forces when theymarried. With the impetus generated by InternationalWomen’s Year, equal pay was implemented in 1978and the first women officer candidates joined theRoyal Australian Naval College, Jervis Bay. WomenMidshipmen and officers were permitted to carryswords on ceremonial occasions from 1981.

The following decade would see further landmarklegislation. In 1984 the Sex Discrimination Actbecame law and forced change on the defence forces,the most significant being that serving women couldno longer be discharged automatically for reason ofpregnancy. On 7 June 1985 the WRANS regulationswere repealed, the service disbanded in 1986 and the

FROM EXCLUSION TO SUBMARINES – THE INTEGRATION OF AUSTRALIAN WOMEN NAVAL VOLUNTEERS37

WRANS and the RAN integrated. Some members ofthe WRANS mourned the demise of their service andwere unable to accept the progression. They sawthemselves abandoned to an unsympatheticorganisation. The WRANS had been a safe harbour,the challenges minimal, the boundaries understood.Some had relished the separate sphere and had drawncomfort from it. These individuals did not wishchange, they clung to the traditions of old and couldnot embrace the new dimension.

There was some justification for concern. Theirony was that through the process of evolution, navalwomen had begun drifting into combat-related dutiesand the Act was a retrograde step because it includeda waiver on such assignments. Suddenly womenmembers found themselves faced with an evenplaying field. But the playing field was not even. Inthe RAN personnel were accorded deference andpromoted on their sea experience, yet womenvolunteers had none, nor were they permitted to go tosea. One young woman officer referred to hers as “thelost generation”. Women recruits were inducted asmembers of the WRANS but shortly into theirseparate training they were informed this wouldchange. It was a tumultuous era. The trauma wasnonetheless necessary because the very separatenessof the WRANS was detrimental to the status ofserving women. The very female nature of WRANSpersonnel nullified their existence in the scheme ofnaval service. Unfortunately the RAN had beencaught underprepared and personnel were notadequately forewarned and informed.

In 1986 the Australian Government opened theAustralian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) inCanberra. This combined the Naval, Army and AirForce Academies. The traditional colleges would beretained to train direct entry officers but ADFA wouldaccept officer candidates at University level, whowould be fully integrated. Never had such anopportunity been offered to women officercandidates. There have been problems, highlighted inthe 1998 ADFA Sexual Harassment Report.TheReview Team found “the level of unacceptable sexualbehaviour” was high as was the tolerance of suchunacceptable behaviour amongst cadets and militarystaff.14 As so often has happened the humandimension was lost in decisions made on economicand political grounds.

During this decade the pace of human rightslegislation has continued to force revision on theAustralian Defence Forces and their personnel. In1990 combat-related duties were opened to women.At this time 11.3 per cent of Australian DefenceForce personnel were women.15 As of June 1998 15.5

per cent of personnel were women.16 This places theADF as a leader in defence personnel integration. Atthe end of 1997 14.4 per cent of United States ArmedForces personnel were women compared to only 7.5per cent of those serving in the Defence Forces of theUnited Kingdom.17

The integration process has not been easy. TheRoyal Navy had HMS Brilliant, the United StatesNavy had Tailhook, the Australian Navy had HMASSwan. Faced with continued procrastinations fromsome senior naval officers to open more than tokensea billets to women personnel, the Chief of NavalStaff, Vice Admiral Mike Hudson, RAN, issued theinstruction that women would be sent to sea in thedestroyer escort Swan. In 1992 several womenmembers of Swan’s crew were subjected toconsiderable harassment and discrimination. TheNaval Board of Enquiry found the Swan affair “a veryuseful case study of the way in which femalepersonnel have been integrated onboard RANwarships”, but failed to fully appreciate the humancarnage. It did acknowledge that the “Navy climatecondoned uncouth behaviour, the liberal use ofalcohol and a degree of misogyny”. It was alsoadmitted that the ship itself had been “inadequate andinappropriately fitted” for mixed crews. The decisionto send more women to sea was correct but itsexecution was a hasty improvisation. Swan personnelwere not properly prepared and there should havebeen a closer scrutiny of those who would make upthe crew of this ship. A Senate Enquiry andconsiderable embarrassment for the Navy resulted.18

Of the Swan affair one newspaper editorialconcluded that the “real proof of the Navy havinglearned a lesson will be from a new attitude, and fromnew scope for men and women to develop in theservice.”19 The Navy did learn from the lesson ofSwan and successive Chiefs of Navy have committedtheir service to the implementation of positive policiesfor the full integration of naval personnel. Of theAustralian Defence Force the RAN now leads theway in its treatment of and opportunities offered toserving women. Some statistical evidence of this is asfollows. At the end of 1998, 15.1 per cent of navalpersonnel were women, 22 per cent of recruits undertraining were women and 36 per cent of allMidshipmen were women. In 1995, unlike the Armyand Air Force, the Navy dropped its quota on womenentries to the Defence Academy. Since then womenMidshipmen have made up around 40 per cent of thenaval student body. Women have held command onland and at sea. Currently Lieutenant CommanderJennifer Daetz is the Commanding Officer of thesurvey ship HMAS Shepparton, Commander Sue


FROM EXCLUSION TO SUBMARINES – THE INTEGRATION OF AUSTRALIAN WOMEN NAVAL VOLUNTEERS39

Jones is the Commanding Officer of theCommunication Station at North West Cape,Commander Vicki McConachie will shortly assumecommand of HMAS Kuttabul in Sydney. In 1998 tenwomen sailors and one officer commenced Collinsclass submarine training and are currently serving atsea. Women volunteers are restricted from only onebranch, “Clearance Divers”, the Australian equivalentto the United States SEALS. This is currently underreview. The navies of the United Kingdom and theUnited States watch the service of Australian womensubmariners with great interest because unlike theRAN they have yet to adopt such a progressivestance. How the wheel has turned.

Problems do remain. Human nature being what itis, means the complete eradication of unacceptablebehaviour is unlikely, indeed the naval lifestyle tendsto exaggerate human failings. But this has been toooften condoned under such anachronistic suggestionsas “male bonding”. Policies such as “ Good WorkingRelationships” (GWR) were implemented to educatepersonnel into greater acceptance and understanding.There will always be the need for the Navy tointerpret and resolve fairly and continue to closelyevaluate and educate its personnel. Perhaps thegreatest threat to equal opportunities is not now fromwithin but from without. Altered social values forced

the RAN to change. The RAN may now need to resistsocial tension. In the current climate of politicalconservatism encouraged by recession andunemployment there is pressure to return to timespast. Battles won appear now to have to be re-won.The obsession with the warrior ethic, muscles,civilian sensibilities, political proclivity and of course,sex, continue to undermine women’s equality in thedefence forces. Australian Government policycontinues to discriminate against servicewomen withthe bar on women serving in direct combat.

On 5 May 1998 Midshipman Megan Pelly losther life during a fire at sea onboard HMAS Westralia.A graduate of the Australian Defence Force AcademyMegan embodied the spirit of a young person whobelieved it was her innate right and responsibility tocommit herself to the defence of her country. She didnot wish to be seen as a woman officer but as aprofessional naval officer. The non-combat rule didnot protect Megan from the inherent dangers of anaval career, yet because she was not, and could notbe a “combatant”, sadly in the minds of some hersacrifice is somehow diminished.

It could be suggested that specific immigrationpatterns, the uniqueness of the continent’s ecology,the particular historical period in which Europeansettlement took place, combined to create an

Country Numbers Percentage of Total Force Total Force Numbers

Australia 7,418 15.5% 47,756Belgium 3,121 7.18% 44,450Canada 6,663 10.8% 61,600Czech Republic 1,646 10.8% 61,700Denmark 912 5.0% 32,900France 27,092 8.12% 380,820Germany 3,810 1.1% 347,100Greece 6,155 3.75% 162,300Hungary 2,198 4.0% 49,100Italy — — 325,150Luxembourg 47 .06% 800Netherlands 4,173 7.4% 57,180Norway 891 5.04% 33,600Poland 167 0.43% 241,750Portugal 2,298 6.52% 59,300Spain 2,398 2.3% 197,500Turkey 684 1.0% 639,000United Kingdom 15,700 7.5% 213,000United States 198,139 14.4% 1,447,600

Compiled from Garcia, Sarah., Major (USAF) “Military Women in the NATO Armed Forces", unpublished paper,presented at “Women in Uniform: Perceptions and Pathways Conference", 13 May 1999, and Australian DefenceDepartment Annual Report 1997-98.

Table 1: Military Women Personnel Strengths by Nation, 1998-99


Australian society which was male-dominated. Thiswas no better exemplified than in the nation’s defenceforces. But the demographics of the Australianpopulation and an individual’s right to bear arms indefence of their country necessitate, indeed demand,the complete acceptance of volunteers regardless oftheir gender or sexual orientation. As Admiral Barrie,the Chief of Defence Force suggested on 12 May1999, the integration of women represents a majorcultural challenge for the Australian Defence Forceand is an important priority.

NOTES1. Cynthia Fowler, Air Commodore, RAF. “Integration of

Women Into Armed Services of the United Kingdom”,unpublished paper, presented at “Women in Uniform:Perceptions and Pathways Conference”, School of History,University College, (UNSW) at Australian Defence ForceAcademy, Canberra, 13 May 1999.

2. Major General Jeanne Holm, USAF (Ret.) Women In TheMilitary: An Unfinished Revolution,Presidio, USA, 1993, p. 9.

3. Lieutenant Valeria Khomyakova is believed to be the firstwoman pilot to shoot down an enemy aircraft, a German JunkersJu-88, in 1942. Captain Katya Budanova flew in the Soviet 586air group and was credited with 11 confirmed kills before shewas shot down by a Messerschmitt in July 1943. SeniorLieutenant Lilya Litvyak had 12 confirmed kills before her Yak-1 aircraft was shot down in August 1943. Litvyak had flown 168missions and was 22 years of age when she died. The Soviet588th Night Bomber Regiment flew more than 24,000 sortiesand dropped 23,000 tons of bombs. Known by the Germans asthe “Night Witches” the regiment was made up entirely ofwomen air crews, mechanics and bomb loaders. Soviet womenalso served in tank corps and rifle battalions. The exemplaryservice of these women disputed some of the argument used inwestern societies against the service of women in front line corps.See also http://pratt.du/~rsilva/sovwomen.htm and H. Rogan, H.Mixed Company,Beacon Press, Boston, 1982, p. 88.

4. K. Spurling, “Willing volunteers, resisting society, reluctantNavy: The troubled first years of the Women’s RoyalAustralian Naval Service” in Stevens, D. (ed) The RoyalAustralian Navy in World War II,Allen & Unwin, St Leonards,1996.

5. Australian Archives, ACT, MP 151, Navy Office (IV),Correspondence Files, 1923-1950 series.

6. S. Willetts, Warrant Officer. Interview, 28 May 1985.7. J. Prain, Second Officer. Interview 21 August 1985.8. L. Mill, Been There, Done That,self-published, 1983, p. 15.9. M. Johnson, Submission, 12 August 1985.10. J. Griffin, Submission, 24 February 1985.11. M. Musgrave, Submission, 28 August 1985.12. DWRANS Files; “Re-introduction of the Peacetime Service”,

file no. 302/201/10.13. DWRANS Files; “Re-introduction of the Peacetime Service”,

file no. 302/201/10.14. Bronwen Grey, Australian Defence Force: report of the Review

into Policies and Practices to Deal with Sexual Harassmentand Sexual Offences at the Australian Defence Force Academy,Canberra,Director Publishing and Visual Communications,1998.

15. ADF personnel numbered around 70,000. Women personnelnumbered 1,879 in the RAN (12.1 per cent), 2,593 in the Army(8.5 per cent) and 3,194 in the RAAF (14.4 per cent).

16. ADF personnel number 47,756, as of 30 June 1998. Womenpersonnel number, Navy 2,164 (15.2 per cent), Army 2,704(10.8 per cent), Air Force 2,550 (16.0 per cent). The RAN hasmaintained a higher percentage of women officers than theRAAF.

17. Major Sarah Garcia, (USAF) “Military Women in the NATOArmed Forces”, unpublished paper, presented at “Women inUniform: Perceptions and Pathways Conference”, School ofHistory, University College, (UNSW) at Australian DefenceForce Academy, Canberra, 13 May 1999. See also Women’sResearch and Education Institute, Women in the Military,Washington, DC, 1997.

18. Papers relating to The incidence of sexual harassment or sexualassault in the Royal Australian Navy and the other armedforces: official Hansard report, Canberra, 1994.

19.The Canberra Times, 10 September, 1993.

Kathryn Spurling entered the Women's Royal Australian Naval Service (WRANS) in 1966 and left at the end of 1968. In 1984 shecompleted a BA (History-Hons) at the Australian National University, and in 1988 a Masters Degree (Hons) in History at UniversityCollege, University of New South Wales, with a thesis titled "The Women's Royal Australian Naval Service, 1939-1960: A Study inDiscrimination." Kathryn submitted her PhD dissertation titled "Life in the Lower Deck of the Royal Australian Navy, 1911–1952",through School of History, University College, University of New South Wales, in June 1999.Kathryn has worked as an historian, researcher and consultant on several projects, including seven years with the AustralianCustoms Service on the Department's official history project. She is currently employed as a part-time research assistant on theRoyal Australian Navy volume of the "Centennial History Project". During 1997,1998 and 1999 she has tutored First Year History atUniversity College.Kathryn has published articles and book chapters dealing with women in the Australian Navy; women in the Australian PublicService; women in sport, and those who have served in the Royal Australian Navy. Current projects include writing the Chapter 11:"From the Lessons of the Present to the Dilemma of the Future – 1990–2001" of the RAN Centenary History; writing a book onWomen in the Australian Navy, and on-going research comparing the experiences of women Australian Defence Force Academygraduates with those of women graduates of United States Armed Force Academies. On 12/13 May 1999 Kathryn convened, onbehalf of the School of History, University College, the "Women in Uniform: Perceptions and Pathways Conference" and presentedthe paper "From Chief of Defence Force to Xena – Media Response and Responsibility." In July 1999 she presented the paper "AStrategy for the Lower Deck of the Royal Australian Navy" at the King-Hall Naval History Conference, held in Canberra.

By Squadron Leader Kevin Smythe, RAAF

Japan’s entry into the Second World War (WWII) ismost often associated with its attack on United

States forces in Hawaii on 7 December 1941. Yetsome hours before that attack took place Australianforces had made contact with other elements ofJapan’s military, the advance guard of its invasionforce in the South-West Pacific theatre.

Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) andAustralian Army elements under BritishCommonwealth command played an active role in theearly days of the Pacific War. As part of theOperation Matador, RAAF 1 Squadron Hudson’stracked the Japanese invasion force bound forThailand and the Malay peninsula in the dayspreceding Japan’s simultaneous attacks on targetsacross the Pacific. In a vain effort to stem theJapanese thrust, 1 Squadron Hudsons and hastilygathered Army units engaged the Japanese in the firsthours of the conflict in the air and on the ground.

Japan declared war on Allied forces in earlyDecember 1941 following its simultaneous attacks onsouthern Thailand, northern Malaya, Hong Kong,Ocean Island, Nauru and US forces in Hawaii, thePhilippines, Midway, Guam and the Aleutians.Thailand itself was invaded at nine separate points.1

The advance into Thailand and northern Malaya wasstrategically planned and aimed at providing transitfor ground forces into Malaya, Singapore and to thedoorstep of Australia itself.

Thailand, an independent nation surrounded byFrench and British colonial possessions, played animportant role in the early and subsequent stages ofWorld War II in the South-West Pacific. Thailand’sresponse to the situation in which it found itself is anexample of Thai realpolitik at its most extreme. It is

the study of a nation struggling to maintain itshistorically independent role in world affairs, itsleaders’ fervent belief in the continuity of the Thaination and the pragmatism of those wartime leaderswho manipulated Japanese advances towardsThailand in an attempt to maximise individualpolitical advantage.

The Japanese stalking of Thailand gave rise to aunique moment in the nation’s history. Considerablediplomatic and military pressure had been placedupon Thailand in the days leading up to the 8th ofDecember 1941.2 Thailand at first resisted theJapanese invasion and in an effort to protect thenorthern Malayan flank, Commonwealth forces weredrawn into Thailand under the flawed OperationMatador.

The Japanese invasion fleet left Camranh Bay inVietnam around 5 December. RAAF aircraft hadtracked the Japanese fleet since it rounded CapeCambodia on 6 December. Although the RAAF hadsighted a large convoy of transports and their escortsof heavy cruisers and Air Force fighters, ordersforbade attack so as not to be seen as the provocateursof a formidable Japanese force.

Since November that year the British commanderof Commonwealth forces in the Far East, Air ChiefMarshal Brooke-Popham, had received intelligence ofan increasingly strong concentration of Japanese sea,land and air forces. To defend Malaya against theJapanese he had formed a plan known as OperationMatador. The plan relied on the Japanese firing thefirst shots after which Commonwealth forces couldrespond. Until the Japanese attacked, little could bedone except to wait and prepare for the expectedinvasion. The only questions were where, when andin what numbers?

While the Japanese and British-led forces played amilitary version of cat and mouse, Thailand’s rulingpowers were about to confront an unusualopportunity. A watershed moment in Thai history wasabout to break. Following the Japanese invasion ofThailand, lay not only the immediate fate of theEuropean powers’ South-East Asian colonies, but forthe Thais their greatest and most cherished possessionwas at risk, the survival of the Thai nation itself. Theimplications for Thailand were not only feltimmediately, but in the longer term the Thais had to

Background

Introduction

A Footnote in History December 1941: The JapaneseInvasion of Thailand


Japanese troops take up position in the streets during the invasion of the Malayan Peninsula

A FOOTNOTE IN HISTORY – DECEMBER 1941: THE JAPANESE INVASION OF THAILAND 43

consider just who might dominate their world at theconclusion of the war.

At 2240 hours, 7 December (US time) 1941, USState Department secretaries Hull, Stimpson andKnox had gathered in conference. According toStimpson’s notes, Hull was sure that the Japanesewere “planning some devilry” and all were wonderingwhere they would strike.3 At 0200 hours8 December (Thai time), a Japanese invasion forcecommenced an attack upon Kota Baru in Malaya andsoon after began landing troops in southern Thailand.4

The Japanese attacked Malaya and invadedThailand on 8 December 1941, several hours ahead ofthe attacks on US installations in Hawaii.5 Attackswere also launched against several other parts ofThailand ranging from Aranyaprathet on the easternborder with Cambodia to Pattani in the far south closeto the border with British Malaya. The RAAF foughtdecisive and courageous actions from their Kota Baruairfield in Malaya, while two reserve units supporteda British-led column that advanced into Thailand.Australian naval involvement was limited during thisperiod, with the notable exception of the role of theHMAS Vampirewhich had escorted the RN shipsRepulseand Prince of Walesas they sailed north insearch of the invasion fleet. Both capital ships were tofounder in one of the most shocking incidents of thewar when they came under sustained Japanese airattack.

On 9 December, Japanese aircraft armed withtorpedoes left Saigon to attack the flotilla as it passedKuantan on the Malayan east coast. RAAF Buffaloesfrom 453 Squadron, Sembawang, were sent to assist.On arriving, aircrew were only to see the Prince ofWalesgo under. In an astonishing act of chivalry thecrews of the Buffaloes witnessed the Vampire,unmolested by the Japanese airmen, rescuing thehundreds of men in the water.6

In retrospect, the story of Thailand’s role in theearly part of the South-East Asian theatre of WWIIwas a by-play to more strategic concerns. To theThais it was a time of high drama and high stakes.Their response to the Japanese invasion andsubsequent coercion into the war was aimed little atthe intentions of the main players, but moreover,based on a power struggle between elite Thairevolutionaries. Democratic forces had forced aconstitution upon the King just nine years beforewhen they staged a daring coup to oust Thailand’sChakri ruler, King Prajadipok, Rama the Seventh.The principal player was the venerable GeneralPhibul Songkram.

Phibul was a conservative soldier who had playedan important part in the 1932 coup against KingPrajadipok, the 7th Rama king. As the winds ofchange blew across Asia with Japanese authorityincreasingly in the ascendant, Phibul began to assertgreater dominance in Thailand’s internationalrelations. By 1938, he had become Prime Minister.One of Phibul’s first moves was to change the nameof the nation from Siam to Thailand, notably placingthe nation at the centre of the Thai peoples of theregion. This move was to have ramifications when theThais sought recovery of their Lao and Cambodianprovinces from the French, and in 1942, Thai forcesmoved into the Shan state in British Burma and laterthe four northern Malayan states.

At the same time Phibul moved against theChinese business class who had taken a strong holdon the economic structure of the nation. To some, hisactions mirrored the German leader of the times, as hesought to control the economic activities of apowerful non-indigenous economic class and at thesame time looked for territorial expansion to bring thewider group of Tai under his protection. Phibul wasan autocrat and he admired the Japanese way ofopposing the occidental powers resident in Asia.

To further strengthen his power-base Phibulencouraged Thai nationalism and invoked thememory of French and British encroachment uponand forceful possession of Thai territory to justify hispolicies. During the reign of Rama the 5th, colonialpowers had forced the Siamese into unpopularterritorial concessions. Neither Phibul nor patrioticThais had forgotten these acts of European power.

Phibul was a wily power-broker and knew whereto focus the nation’s attention. He had leaned on theChinese for political reasons. The Chinese inThailand were, at the outbreak of the war, a powerfuleconomic force. Thai-Chinese relations duringPhibul’s reign deteriorated with parallels being drawnbetween the Jews of Germany and the Chinese ofThailand. The Thai-Chinese had reacted unfavourablyto the Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s andover Thailand’s role in supplying rice andcommodities to Japan.7 Phibul put in place anti-Chinese laws to ensure greater indigenous Thaicontrol over the economy. Twelve cultural mandateswere instituted between 1939 and 1942 to reinforceThai culture and “national awareness”.8

Thailand Under Phibul

By 1940 the Axis pact between Germany, Italyand Japan had been signed. Under this agreementJapan would be allowed to pursue its need to developthe “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”,“extending from Burma to the Gilbert and EllisIslands in the east and Timor in the south.”9 Phibulwas a shrewd politician and by early 1941 he hadsteered Thailand firmly into the Japanese orbit.

Political changes in Europe had resulted in controlof France’s Indo-chinese colonies passing to theVichy Government. Phibul took advantage ofFrance’s wartime plight and in 1940 Thailand went towar with French-Indochina in pursuit of theCambodian and Laos territories, which it had lost tothe French in the late 19th century. The Thais boreanimosity toward the French from the 1893 loss ofLaos and Cambodia, and saw in France’s weakenedstate a chance to act to restore Thai pride. Inrecovering lost territories, Phibul was to display hisirredentist policies for the first, but not the last time.10

Japan was able to mediate a settlement in thisconflict between Thailand and France, with the resultthat Thailand regained its territories in Laos andCambodia. A deterioration in relations with the Westfollowed as Thailand moved seemingly closer toburgeoning Japanese hegemony. In response, the UScancelled orders of fighter planes and the Britishmoved troops to the Thai borders with Malaya andBurma.11

Phibul was now engaging in political and militarybrinkmanship. Despite Thailand’s apparent friendshipwith Japan, Phibul was clearly aware that Tokyoviewed the kingdom exclusively for Japanese use. On7 December, 1941, the Japanese ambassador toThailand sought the Thai Prime Minister to informhim that Japan had declared war on the US and nowrequested that Japanese troops have right of passagethrough Thailand. Phibul was, coincidentally, out oftown touring the new Cambodian provinces andunder Foreign Minister Direk Jayaynam, Thailandrefused the Japanese request.

Japan, under the Axis pact agreements, had beenable to move into military bases in Vietnam in the late1940s to position troops in preparation for its moveinto the war. Japanese Minister of War, GeneralHideki Tojo had ensured that Indochina would serveJapan well when he ordered troops into the Frenchcolonies leaving the hapless Vichy Government withno option, but to accept occupation of its Asian

colonies.13 From this action it drew an agreement withthe French to utilise its bases from which Thailand,Malaya and Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, Pacificcolonies and eventually Australia could be threatened.Western reaction resulted in trade embargoes and anultimatum to withdraw from Indochina and mainlandChina, where Japanese troops had waged war since1931. Japan defied the West’s terms, and opted forwar.14

Thailand was now enmeshed in developmentsmoving beyond its control. For Phibul and hissympathisers this was a unique opportunity to moveThailand to the world stage and at the same timeconsolidate their own political agenda. Long anindependent nation, the Thai Government’s first andforemost responsibility was to maintain its politicalindependence and territorial integrity. Thailand’sborders were already subject to colonial pressure withits western and southern flanks under British colonialcontrol and its eastern border now under Vichycontrol, though increasingly dominated militarily bythe Japanese. Within the region lay even moreEuropean controlled colonies: Ceylon, Singapore,Hong Kong and the Dutch East Indies amongst them.

To the Thais, the traditional European menacewas now compounded by the Japanese thrust. TheThais brooked favour with neither, the Japanese northe Europeans, and to them it was, as it had been forcenturies, a matter of survival against foreignaggressors. However, unlike the Europeans, theJapanese advance offered opportunities for gain. TheJapanese had courted the Thais and saw the militarybenefits of a quick transit through Thailand, as hadalready been achieved in Vietnam. Phibul foresaw thechance to regain territories, and at the same timeensure his place in history as a great leader who hadhumbled the Western powers. He acted in response tothe prevailing circumstances and set his plan inmotion.

As 8 December approached, frantic diplomaticand military planning was underway in Tokyo,Bangkok and in the British Headquarters ofSingapore and London. At this time Australia wasinvolved in the European theatre and was poorlyprepared for action in the Thai-Malay peninsula.Commonwealth troops, many of them reserves andirregulars, were thinly scattered in support rolesacross the Malayan peninsula. The majority of Britishand Allied combat troops were at this time committedto the European action.

By the beginning of 1941 Phibul firmly believedthat totalitarianism was the ideological wave of thefuture. This belief coincided with Phibul's burgeoningambitions of total power. Attempts to have himself

Political and Military Opportunism



crowned king and the renaming of the reclaimedCambodian provinces to Songkram Province revealedPhibul’s true egotistic and autocratic nature. Hismilitary background, authoritarian style and ruthlesselimination of competitors made him a natural ally oftotalitarianism.15

Phibul also harboured anti-European feelings,having seen his country’s borders and dominancewithin the region reduced by successive political andmilitary forays by the French and British. Thailandhad been dispossessed of its Shan state provinces inBurma, its southern provinces now belonged toBritish Malaya and its eastern borders were re-drawnwith France taking its Lao and Cambodian provinces.It had suffered continued territorial loses inmaintaining its independence and of this Phibul waskeenly aware.

On 11 March 1941, Japan signed an agreementwith Thailand over two enclaves in Laos and much ofnorth-western Cambodia.16 These areas had beenannexed earlier by the French under the 1909 treatyand to the Thais were a welcome gesture of friendshipin the face of European dominance. Thailand nowcontrolled the entire west bank of the Mekong andmuch of Battambang province. The agreementindebted Thailand to Japan and drew the countrydeeper into the Japanese military fold.

Phibul, employing the traditional Thai ploy ofplaying off all sides against each other, now soughtmilitary equipment from both the US and GreatBritain. By late 1941, neither country saw any benefitin assisting the seemingly Japanese-sympatheticPhibul Government. Whilst Phibul played politics, theNational Assembly viewed the encroaching Japanesesituation with far greater concern. In late 1941 a lawwas passed curtailing the number of Japanese“visitors” entering Thailand. This law effectivelyhalted the invasion of Japanese military scoutscollecting data on landing sites for Japanese troops.17

By December 1941 Bangkok was certain thatJapan would enter the war. The Thai Governmentpromptly decreed that it was the duty of all Thaicitizens to resist, to the death, any invasion of Thaisoil.18 This policy, to the outside world, seemedcontradictory given Thailand’s close and profitablerelations with Japan. To the Thais it was nothing ofthe sort. When prominent parliamentarian and laterPrime Minister M.R. Seni Pramoj sought clarificationof Thai policy from Phibul he was rebuked. Phibulpointed out that while some saw his policy as pro-Japanese and others saw it as pro-Western, it was infact nothing of the sort. It was, he said, simply pro-Thai.19

By 7 December 1941, matters had taken a seriousturn. At 2230hrs, the Japanese ambassador informedthe Thai Foreign Minister, Direk Jayaynam, thatJapan had declared war on the US and UK and theirallies. Japan requested the right of passage throughThailand into Malaya and Burma. This request wassummarily rejected by the Thai cabinet. Just three anda half hours later, on 8 December at 2 am, Japaneseforces began landing in Thailand. The 5th Division,25th Army,landed at Pattani, Songkla and on theisland of Koh Samui in the Gulf of Thailand. TheGuards’ Division, 25th Army,landed elements atSamut Prakarn at the mouth of the Chao Praya River,south of Bangkok. From Cambodia, Japanese troopscrossed the Thai border at Aranyaprathet.20

Strangely, Phibul was not in Bangkok at the timeof the Japanese invasion. He had gone to the provinceof Battambang, ostensibly to inspect military units. Inhis absence the Thai cabinet, lacked the authority toact against the Japanese. Deputy Prime Minister,General Adun Adundecharat presided over the Thaicabinet, but was not empowered to make decisions toadequately defend Thailand. While the Thaisprocrastinated, a second wave of troops landed in thesouth at Chumpon and Prachuap Kiri Khan along theKra Isthmus. Local Thai units resisted fiercely,notably in Songkla and Pattani, but by the next dayJapanese forces had secured footholds in Songkla,Pattani, Koh Samui and Haadyai and had effectivelysurrounded Bangkok.21

Phibul immediately returned to Bangkok to assessthe situation. News of Japanese attacks on PearlHarbor, the Philippines and Hong Kong had by nowreached Bangkok. Pleas to the US and Great Britainhad produced no support. It was clear that the US andGreat Britain would not assist and that Thailand wasisolated and on its own. Phibul assessed the onlyfeasible option as being to accede to Japanesedemands and on 8 December at noon Phibul orderedall Thai forces to cease fighting. His actionundoubtedly saved thousands of lives and averted anational catastrophe of proportions not experiencedby the kingdom since the fall of Ayuthaya to theBurmese in 1767.

This view of Phibul’s decision-making intentionsis not shared by all historians of the era. Phibul'sactions may cast him with some as a patriot, but indoing so, it should equally be argued that his actionsstrengthened his role as a virtual dictator, now withJapanese support. This view was given added strengthwhen Phibul declared war on the US, Great Britainand all their allies on 25 January 1942.22



Plans for the assault of Malaya had beenunderway since 1940. The Japanese 25th Army wasassigned to the task and planning became theresponsibility of Lieutenant Colonel Masanobu Tsuji.Operational command was assigned to LieutenantGeneral Tomoyuki Yamashita. Yamashita had longbeen in command, but had little combat experience.However, unlike his British counterpart, LieutenantGeneral A.E. Percival, he learned fast.

The Japanese initially planned that four Divisionscould conquer Malaya. But Yamashita, working onintelligence information, had lesser respect for theBritish forces, reckoning only three divisions wouldbe needed. He based his assessment on the fightingcapacity of the Commonwealth forces under Percivaland the knowledge that, whilst numerically superior,Percival’s forces were poorly trained, had littleexperience in jungle warfare and in many cases hadlittle familiarity with their commanders, many of theexperienced officers having been transferred toEuropean assignments.

Yamashita invaded with the 5th and 18thDivisions, plus theImperial Guardsand the 3rd TankGroup (180 tanks). His forces totalled 40,000 soldierssupported by 530 aircraft of the 3rd Armyair groupand the Imperial Japanese Navy. Their assault uponsouthern Thailand, the Malay Peninsula andeventually the British fortress of Singapore, was oneof the war’s most stunning victories.23

Japanese training and planning for the invasionhad been meticulous. Preparations were conducted insecret beginning around 11 February 1941 withamphibious assaults staged in Japan on Kyushu andHainan islands. Intelligence was well prepared andaccurate. The Japanese had left little to chance.

British intelligence was not to blame for militaryineptitude. British commanders were well aware ofthe Japanese plans and that extreme danger lay to thenorth. Ironically, staff college exercises across theregion often used Singapore as a model for strategicplanning purposes and any number of officers andstrategists knew that its vulnerability lay to the north.GOC Malaya 1936, Major General Dobie had, in fact,predicted a strategy of invasion via Kota Baru,Songkla and Pattani. To Britian’s ultimate loss, hisadvice went unheeded and it was via this route thatthe Japanese struck late in 1941.

The British Commander-in-Chief, Far East in1941 was Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-

Popham. Brooke-Popham was not idle in addressingthe problems that lay before him. He devised adefence strategy, known as Operation Matador toensure the protection of Malaya and Singapore. Theplan involved an advance into Thailand to counter thelikelihood of attacks on the Thai port towns ofSongkla and Pattani. Both ports were accessed bypaved roads running directly across the ruggedmountains to the west and provided the only suitabletransport links capable of supporting a large invasionforce moving towards Singapore. However, Brooke-Popham’s plan had a strategic flaw. Thailand’sneutrality would prevent British forces from enteringthat country to enforce the plan. While the plan wouldprove to be far-sighted and logical, its enforcementwas impractical due to a policy dilemma whichprevented the British entering neutral Thailand.Brooke-Popham was unable to convince London ofthe advantage of such an action, should it benecessary and the plan was never fully activated.25

Brooke-Popham needed at least 60 hours advancenotice should invasion forces leave their Indo-chinesebases, time during which his forces could enterThailand and establish defensive positions to counterthe Japanese at Songkla and Pattani. Ironically, in theend he was politically, rather than militarily, out-maneouvred. British adherence to political conventionand Thai neutrality, had forestalled vital defensiveinitiatives. It was a convention that the Japanese hadno intention of honouring.26

As the invasion hour approached a game of catand mouse broke out involving the British, the Thais,the Japanese and Americans. The Americans had forsome time, been able to break Japanese codesgenerated by the “Purple” machine and had clearknowledge of Japanese intentions. In partnership withBritish analysts, who had broken the German enigmacodes, the Allies now had access to Japanese plans.Brooke-Popham knew of the invasion plans and ofThai internal power struggles amongst pro-British andpro-Japanese elements in the Thai cabinet. Pro-Japanese elements under Phibul were looking for anexcuse to provoke a British invasion, which theywould interpret Operation Matadorto be, should it beactivated, establishing a case of just cause if militaryassistance from the Japanese was to be sought.27

In early December, Brooke-Popham got a break.The British Prime Minister, Churchill, agreed to hisplan. Churchill, however, expressed doubt over thequality of British, Indian, Australian and NewZealand troops on the ground in Malaya andSingapore, though together they comprised 30battalions. In addition, two battalions of Malay troopsand Indian state forces were available. The

The Japanese Assault on Thailand andthe Malay Peninsula


Australians made up several infantry battalions andsupport units. The force comprised 87,000 men, butwas made up of many volunteers and untrainedconscripts. The Japanese, on the other hand, werebattle hardened from their lengthy Chinesecampaigns.

Amazingly, the British Command did not operatea jungle warfare training school, nor had any intentionof building one. Consequently, the ground forces ofBrooke-Popham’s command were poorly equippedfor jungle warfare. Sensing the vulnerability’ ofBrooke-Popham’s troops, Churchill invoked a plan ofhis own. British hopes for a stout defence ofSingapore and the peninsula were put in place on 2December 1941 when Churchill’s Z Force elementsHMS Repulse, HMS Prince of Walesand fourdestroyers arrived in Singapore. In an act to proveultimately fateful the task force carrier, HMS

Indomitable, was stranded in the West Indies afterrunning aground. Its absence was to deny the TaskForce Air, vital air protection and in the end it was airpower that was to sink both Repulse and Prince ofWales. So great was the shock of the loss of two ofthe Royal navy’s finest ships Churchill was moved tocomment; “In all the war I never received a moredirect shock”.28

While the US forces’ fate in Hawaii was yet to berealised, the Japanese struck Thailand and northernMalaya at three points around 2 am on Monday,8 December 1941. Conditions were stormy, with seashigh. The RAF Station at Kota Baru near the Malay-

8 December, 1941: The JapaneseInvasion of Thailand and Malaya


Thai border was hit first in a devastating display of airpower backed by seaborne landings. Kota Baru wasdefended by the 3rd Indian Corps who met theJapanese in blinding monsoon rain. Despite fierceresistance and difficult landing conditions theJapanese quickly establish a beachhead. The RAAF,for its part, flew continuous sorties against theJapanese troopships, sinking one and damaging twoothers. Japanese casualties of 900 dead and woundedwere the heaviest single engagement casualties of theentire campaign.29

The first defensive actions of the Allied Pacifictheatre campaign came from the RAAF who put upHudsons from 1 Squadron, Kota Baru, which carriedout successive sorties against incoming Japaneseforces. With only 10 serviceable aircraft and afterinflicting heavy casualties on the troopships theHudsons were unable to contend with superiorJapanese air power and forced to withdraw.30 Forthree days the Indian ground forces tried to halt theJapanese advance, but once all three airfields in thenorth-east fell (Kota Baru, Gong Kedah andMachang), the Japanese turned their attention to largescale troop landings in southern Thailand at Pattaniand Songkla.

Japanese strategy had called for the airbases to beneutralised before the main body of troops could landin Thailand. With Kota Baru, Gong Kedah andMachang out of action the Japanese only had tocontend with Thai ground forces to commence theircampaign. The Thai landing points had strategicsignificance for the invasion plan. Kota Baru hadlimited transport links with the west coast. It wasstrategically important, therefore, to land forces attowns with road links to the Thai and Malayan westcoast from where penetration, deep into the Malaypeninsula, could commence. Under OperationMatador and in an attempt to pre-empt Japaneseadvances, the British commanders formed the KrohColumn (Krohcol) and the Layton Column (Laycol)to defend the Pattani and Songkla roads, respectively.

Krohcol was ordered to advance into Thailandand secure a point known as “The Ledge”, a piece ofhigh ground 50 km inside the Thai border. However,by the time the column formed and moved out theJapanese were well on their way down the Pattani-Kroh road. The column was a depleted forcecompared to that originally planned. It comprised the3/16 Punjabis and an Australian motor transport unit,

the 2/3 Reserve Motor Transport Company. It waslater reinforced by the 5/14 Punjabis and wassupported by the 2/3 Motor Ambulance Convoy.

Krohcol crossed into Thailand at 1330 hours,8 December 1941 with the Punjabis being transportedby the 2/3 Reserve Motor Transport Company to the“33.5 km peg to Betong” and immediately metresistance from, ironically, Thai border police whoviewed the column as an invading force. However,after negotiations, the Thais yielded and the columnentered Thailand. Matador was underway, but bynow the Japanese were well ashore and on their waydown the Kroh and Songkla roads.

The column never reached “The Ledge”. TheJapanese arrived first with their 42nd InfantryRegiment.Krohcol clashed with the Japanese onWednesday 10 December and after sustaining heavycasualties was forced to withdraw. Just three dayslater the dispirited and defeated column retreatedacross the Malayan border.

Australian forces had been involved in theJapanese invasion of Thailand in the air and on theground. RAAF aircraft from Kota Baru and acollection of transport corps soldiers and ambulancecompany personnel had found themselves at the frontline as the Japanese commenced their thrust uponThailand and down the Malay peninsula. Theiractions were to prove futile, though the RAAF didinflict heavy losses on the Japanese Navy as theylanded troops in southern Thailand. HMAS Vampirewas seemingly the recipient of an act of militarychivalry, when Japanese Navy aircraft torpedobombers which sunk the British ships, left theVampire unscathed to assist in the rescue of sailors.

Buffaloes of 453 Squadron RAAF fromSembawang, Singapore were at the scene only to seethe Prince of Walesgo down. Their records indicatethat they observed survivors rescued by the Vampire,unmolested by the enemy.31

The Japanese had attacked Thailand at ninelocations on 8 December 1941. Aside from thelandings in the south and the attack on northernMalayan airfields, the Japanese Imperial Guardsadvanced on Bangkok from Aranyaprathet. By noonon the 9th, they had encamped a few kilometres fromBangkok. The days after the 8th were a confused andhectic period for the Thais. On 8 December, PrimeMinister Phibul ordered Thai forces to ceaseresistance. Fighting, however, continued and Japanesehopes of fostering a spirit of co-prosperity with theThais had taken a serious blow.32 Nevertheless,Thailand had reached agreement with Japan. It was amasterly piece of political compromise and, inhistorically consistent Thai style, a face-saving

Commonwealth and Australian Forcesin Thailand: The Kroh Column

outcome as the Thais confronted overwhelming oddsand emerged almost unscathed. The Thai-Japaneseagreement had four main clauses: Japanese combattroops could transit through Thailand; Japanese troopswould not disarm Thai troops; Japanese forces wouldnot remain in Bangkok; and through the agreement nopolitical or military alliance was implied.33

Despite the existence and form of the agreement,Thailand once again did a volte face. On 21 December,1941, Thailand signed a treaty of alliance with Japan.Finally, on 25 January 1942 Thailand declared war onthe US, the UK and their allies.34 The agreement withJapan was by no means a popular decision. Phibul hadexpelled anti-Japanese members of his cabinet, but inWashington his ambassador to the US, Seni Pramoj,refused to present the US Government with the Thaideclaration of war. This declaration effectivelyspawned the Free Thai (Seri Thai) movement adisparate group of overseas based Thai citizens whofought vigorously to protect their homeland.Prominent liberal Pridi Panomyung led this movementfrom inside Thailand. After the war, Pridi was tobecome prime minister while Phibul went into hidingbefore returning to power in 1948.

The Japanese invasion of southern Thailandensured that Australian military forces would be thefirst to not only record military actions against theJapanese in WWII, but also that their first actionsinside the long independent Thai Kingdom would berecorded in Australian military history. WhilstAustralian forces’ engagements with the invadingJapanese were, at this stage of the war, fleeting andfutile, this footnote in history is linked to a moreunusual aspect of the war in the Pacific theatre.

The circumstances prevailing at the time ofThailand’s entry into WWII presented Thailand’sleaders with choices that would determine the futureof the nation. Thailand did not seek participation inthe war but was compelled to react following theJapanese invasion of the kingdom on 8 December,1941. The invasion forced the political heavyweightsof the era to decide on the immediate good for thenation, which meant capitulation and cooperationwith Japanese forces.

Conclusion


In strategic terms Thailand’s role in acting as thestaging point for the Japanese invasion of BritishMalaya and Singapore cannot be overlooked. TheJapanese assault on Thailand provided thespringboard for successful attacks on Malaya,Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, Papua and NewGuinea, Pacific islands and eventually Australia.

Though the British were aware of the Japaneseinvasion plan for Thailand, Thai politicalintransigence and British political inaction ensuredthat Operation Matador could not be enforced. HadMatador been implemented the British may haveforestalled the invasion and avoided the loss of bothBritish Malaya and Singapore. Australia’s militaryrole in Thailand’s balancing act was small andoperationally minor. Like the Commonwealth forceswith whom it fought, the Australian forces inability toprovide serious defensive capabilities was an exampleof the misassessment by planning staff of thecapability required to halt rampaging Japanese forces.Nevertheless, Australia was able to be there at theoutset and its role in Thai military history marks theonly significant action in the two country’s mutualmilitary histories.

Australia’s role in Operation Matador andeventually in Thailand was as a part of a British-ledCommonwealth force and, disregarding the clash withThai border police at Kroh, Australia did not engagethe Thais as an enemy force. Australian forces inaction in Thailand during this phase of the SecondWorld War were engaged in defensive confrontations,though ones with implications for the years that layahead as Japanese forces came eventually to threatenAustralia itself.

While, to their own peril, the British ignored theJapanese build-up, the Thais used the situation toreclaim lost territory. Phibul gambled and used hisnation to judiciously seek greater personal power. Inthe end, he was unable to bring neither glory, norprosperity to his people.

Phibul himself had covered his bets. His cleverlyworded alliance with the Japanese ensured thatThailand did not clash with the Allies, although theforay into Burmese territory, in the Shan states,approached confrontation with the British. Similarlythe gains in Indochina, with the Vichy colonials wereshrewdly calculated. Phibul saw himself as a patriotand claimed that his actions were in fact directed toThailand's long-term survival.

The Japanese invasion of Thailand had drawn anunwilling Thailand into the war. Quite amazingly, atthe conclusion of the war and after reparations hadbeen sought from Axis allies the Thai nation was able

to emerged intact, free and able to resume its pre-1941 status as an independent nation. Ironically, thenation was able to resume its sovereign status underthe title bestowed upon it by the discredited Phibul:Thailand, the Land of the Free.

NOTES 1. D.K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History Silkworm: Bangkok

1984 p.256.2. S. Weintraub, Long Day’s Journey Into War, December 7 1941

Dutton: New York, 1991 p.201.3. L. Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust Australian War Memorial:

Canberra 1957 p.122.4. D.K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History Silkworm: Bangkok

1984 p.256.5. L. Wigmore, ibid., p.144.6. Chinese merchants in Siam were sensitive to Thailand’s trade

with the Japanese who had waged war in China during the1930s. Their conquest of Nanking and other atrocities hadcaused tension between the Thai Government and the Chinesecommunity.

7. ibid., pp. 253-255.8. P. Elphick, and M. Smith, Odd Man Out: the Story of the

Singapore Traitor Hodder and Straughton London:1988.9. D.K. Wyatt, op.cit. p.255.10. ibid., p.256.11. ibid.12. P. Elphick, op.cit. p.8.13. ibid., p.9.14. D.K. Wyatt, p.255.15. ibid., p.256.16. ibid. 17. ibid.18. J.B. Haseman, The Thai Resistance Movement During the

Second World War Chalermit Press: Bangkok. 19. ibid., p.10.20. ibid., p.11.21. ibid., p.18. 22. The declaration of war is a fascinating study of Thai realpolitik

and is worthy of a separate assessment. Whilst the declarationwas passed to and accepted by the British, the US neverreceived nor accepted the declaration as universally popular.This view was as much to do with the Seri Thai (Free Thaimovement) as it was with US post-WWII foreign policy andrespective colonial movements in the post-War period.

23. P. Elphick, op.cit., p.10.24. ibid.25. ibid., pp.11-12.26. ibid., p.12.27. ibid., pp.10-13.28. ibid., p.13.29. ibid., p.32.31. ibid., p.22.32. ibid., pp.137-138.33. Noted in Unit Intelligence Summary 8 Dec 41.33. L. Wigmore, op.cit. pp.144-145.34 J. Wright, The Balancing Act: A History of Modern Thailand.35. J. Haseman, op.cit. p.15.36. ibid., p.18.

BIBLIOGRAPHYElphick, P., and Smith, M., Odd Man Out: The Story of the

Singapore Traitor.Hodder and Straughton: London, 1993.Gillison, D., Royal Australian Air Force 1939-1942AWM:

Canberra 1962.



Haseman, J.B., The Thai Resistance Movement During the SecondWorld War.Chalermit Press: Bangkok.

Jayanam, D.,Siam and WW2.Social Science Association ofThailand 1966.

Walker, A.S., Medical Series: Middle East and Far East.AWM:Canberra 1953.

Wigmore, L., The Japanese Thrust.AWM: Canberra 1957.Weintraub, S., Long Day’s Journey Into War.Truman Talley: NY

1992.Wright, J., The Balancing Act: A History of Modern Thailand.Asia

Books 1991.Wyatt, D.K., Thailand: A Short History.Silkworm: Bangkok 1982.

Squadron Leader Kevin Smythe graduated from Officer Training School in 1981 and was posted for duty as anEducation Officer. Squadron Leader Smythe has experienced a succession of postings where he gained expertise inregional affairs, particularly Thailand and Indonesia. An attachment to Thailand in 1986 developed Squadron LeaderSmythe's interest in Thai language, culture and military history. After attending the RAAF School of Languages in 1987as a student and subsequently as a staff member, Squadron Leader Smythe was posted to the Indonesian Air ForceCommand and Staff College in 1990. A Thai, Indonesian and Pacific languages linguist, Squadron Leader Smythe

holds masters degrees in English and Arts (International Relations). He is currently studying for his MBA at Monash Mt Eliza Business School.

RAAF heritage awards

Written records, drawings, paintings and

photographs have formed an integral part

of Royal Australian Air Force and national

histories. To enhance the existing records of its

activities and to foster and encourage interest in

its heritage, the RAAF has established the

Annual Heritage Awards.

There are three Awards (Art, Literature and

Photography. The prizes for each category are as

follows:

• Art

1st $3,500 2nd $1,500

• Literature

1st $5,000 (no secondary prize)

• Photography

1st $1,500 2nd $500

Applications for entryApplications for entry in the Heritage Awards

must be made on the official Entry Form. Entry

form and brochure are available from the Air

Power Studies Centre on request.

Entries should be submitted in accordance with

the details on the Entry Form.

GET THE BLOODY JOB DONE: The RoyalAustralian Helicopter Flight – Vietnam 135thAssault Helicopter Company by Steve Eather,Allen & Unwin, 1998, 166 pages.

Reviewed by Bill Crompton

Steve Eather’s book is a fitting tribute to theRoyal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight Vietnamand 135th Assault Helicopter Company. The book isextremely easy to read thanks to the almostconversational style, and the mix of detailedinformation and many anecdotes from those actuallyinvolved in the various operations and incidents,makes the reader feel they are actually there with theparticipants.

Those interested in high level analysis of the waror the vexed questions of the wisdom of Australia’sinvolvement in Vietnam will be disappointed as thebackground to the war is only covered in sufficientdetail to set the scene. This is a book about men whovolunteered to serve their country and got on with thejob that the Government called upon them to do.

There are lessons in this book that appear to beenduring and should be remembered by decisionmakers in the current climate particularly whendownsizing and civilianisation are the order of theday. In particular, the critical role of non-aircrewmembers of the flight as combatants should beremembered. Without uniformed maintenancepersonnel, cooks and stewards etc. to act as doorgunners, operations could have been severelyconstrained by personnel shortages. Is this flexibilitybeing lost as a result of contracting out many of thesesupport functions? Another important lesson is thedifferent perspectives and imperatives that drive thoseat the front, as opposed to those supporting andcontrolling the war fighters from secure areasthousands of kilometres away. The dangers andproblems inherent in using the procedures anddoctrine of forces many times larger than our own,who are prepared to operate in massed formations andto absorb casualties in both men and equipment, arealso addressed in some detail. There are alsointeresting insights into the ability of any force ornation to surge or sustain high operational tempos.

Get The Bloody Job Doneis an enjoyable andinformative read and is recommended for anyonewith an interest in military aviation, the Vietnam Waror merely in search of a good book.

THE KREMLIN DEVICE by Chris Ryan, Arrow Books, Random House, 412 pages.

Reviewed by Alister Pope

I rarely read fiction as there are more than enoughreal-life issues, stories and incidents to fill in myavailable reading time. However, occasionally a booksuch as this, with a plausible fictional plot, but usingactual organisations and situations comes along whichis worth reading. This is such a book.

If Chris Ryan’s description of the British SAS’srecce’s, planning techniques, equipment, training andoutlook sound authentic, it is because they are. Chrisspent ten years in 22 SASR and made history in theGulf War of 1991 as the only member of the ill-fatedand poorly planned Bravo Two Zero patrol operatingbehind Iraqi lines to evade capture or death. Hisfactual book on that experience “The One That GotAway” became a best seller and was perhaps thecatalyst that fired his desire to become an adventurewriter.

The Kremlin Device is well written and thedescriptions and details of training and behaviour areobviously drawn from experience. This gives thebook a very authentic feel to it that makes it easy andenjoyable to read. Having read the biographicalversion I found it strange that the author gives hischaracters less heroic traits in fiction than in the reallife story. These SAS men have more weaknesses andare less derring-do than the real life troopers whotook part in the Bravo Two Zero patrol. The humanfoibles of the fictional soldiers detract slightly fromthe story line and slow the pace of what is after allescapist adventure. Some further padding involvingsmall descriptions of unrelated incidents can also bedistracting. For instance, there is a bemusing accountof an incident involving an incompetent mugger. Thislone, young Muscovite follows three obviously fit andalert strangers along a riverbank apparently seekingan opportunity to rob them at knifepoint. This isunlikely enough, but the poor fellow has chosen toprey on three SAS soldiers. He loses the contest, butis treated with minimum acceptable violence,according to the law and the rules of war. Well, it isfiction.

Despite these distractions, which appear to simplybe added as padding (you can just hear the publisherdemanding 200,000 words – and not one less!) the

Book Reviews

Kremlin Device is a relaxing read. The story isdeclared early and there is no mystery, hidden twistsor subterfuge in it. I must admit that I constantly triedto work out which of the Russians would turn out tobe the double-crosser. I was disappointed, as Chris isnot into complex Le Carre type plots. His skill is indescribing the plain mechanics of special forcesoperations at Team and Squadron level. That is whathe does well, and that is what makes this bookreadable for any soldier killing time waiting for apatrol to start, or the transport to turn up. And, whilebeing entertained something might be learned too, soit is worth some space in the backpack.

A YANK DOWN UNDER by Ray A Wyatt, softcover 226pp, published by Sunflower UniversityPress USA and priced $22.95 (US).

Reviewed by Flight Lieutenant H.S.Brennan RFD

This book could almost be called the personaldiary of Staff Sergeant Ray Wyatt as he hastranscribed, I would say, very accurately the life andtimes of his experiences from the period directlybefore the 1939-45 war to the cessation of hostilities.Ray Wyatt does not conceal his respect for theAustralian Army during the period he was assigned toduty in Australia and the islands. Each chapter carriesa map of Australia as background for chapter title anda much smaller map as breaks between sections ineach chapter.

The early part of the book takes us through thelatter part of the Great Depression on his family farmwhere conditions were anything but good to hisenlistment in the US Army where he trained as aSignaller and was given convoy duty in the Statesbefore shipping out to Australia in mid 1942 via NewZealand. After a period in Melbourne his Signals Unittravelled to Darwin via Brisbane and CentralQueensland which would have been an experience forthe US servicemen as at that time transport was verybasic. On arrival in Darwin the troops found adevastated city as a result of the Japanese air raids andour failure to provide sufficient troops and aircraft tocounter the Japanese onslaught, however the USservicemen stationed in the Darwin area seem to havebeen pretty lucky as they managed to travel round thearea and meet up with all sorts including Aborigineswho apparently amazed the troops with their lifestyle.One point which Ray Wyatt makes mention of is thepossible fate of Amelia Earhart and Fred Noonan whoboth perished supposedly at sea during theirprogrammed round the world flight in mid 1937, theunofficial Australian feeling was the same as the US,

the Japanese got them and spirited them awaybecause of what nowadays would be infringement ofair space. Ray also makes mention of the midgetJapanese submarine which was captured and ondisplay at Garden Island, Sydney, strangely enough Iwas on leave in Sydney after completing a DriverOperators wireless course at about the same time.

After completing R&R in Melbourne and Sydney,Ray was transferred to New Guinea, being stationedat Finschhafen in control of communications andwhere he found a very considerable alteration toclimate after Darwin, instead of dust and heat hereceived tropical weather where it rained and was alsovery hot.

From descriptions given by Ray the joint Servicesdid not receive the same volume of air raids as wasthe case in Darwin, also the time had come when theAllies were on the offensive and were giving insteadof receiving plus jungle warfare is totally different toopen or desert warfare. During his tour of duty Rayfound time to mix with the Native population wherepossible and learn some of their customs and beliefs.Because of his almost three years of overseas Servicehis health was suffering and he was posted fordischarge back in the USA. During his time as a radiocryptographer he broke the Japanese code, copies ofwhich are in the book as are 78 black and whitephotos, several maps plus an official publication onwhat to do as a POW, copies of which I have neverseen. To anyone buying the book I would advise“read the outer back cover first” as it summarises theService life and return to civilian life of Staff SergeantRoy A Wyatt very well. An account of wartimeexperiences extremely well put.

TO SANDAKAN: The Diaries of CharlieJohnstone, Prisoner of War 1942-45, byChristopher Dawson, Allen & Unwin RRP $19.95.

Reviewed by Garth Pratten, Consultant Historian,Army Doctrine Centre.

In his introduction to To Sandakan,ChristopherDawson writes, “Charlie Johnstone was a goodbloke”. Throughout the book, this is indeed what hecomes across as, an ordinary decent man thrown bythe fortunes, or perhaps more aptly, the misfortunes ofwar, into three years of harsh captivity as a prisoner ofthe Japanese.

The title is a misnomer; To Sandakan is not theoriginal diaries of Charlie Johnstone, an Australianserving with the RAF who was taken prisoner by theJapanese in 1942, but a retrospective narrative thathas been composed from these, much of which were


BOOK REVIEWS 55

kept ingeniously concealed from his captors insidespliced playing cards. In reality, Johnstone only spentfive months of his time as a POW in the camp atSandakan and moved on long before the horrificmarches of which we are all aware. Moved fromSandakan in August 1943, Charlie Johnstone spentmost of his time as a POW in equally wretchedconditions at Kuching. It appears that the title hasbeen chosen more as a marketing ploy than as anappropriate reflection of the contents of the work. ToSandakanwould have been more aptly titled ToKuching.

Johnstone’s story is one told withoutpretentiousness. His prose is uncomplicated and insome places a little repetitive, but this plain simplicityis part of To Sandakan’sattraction. Charlie tells of thedesperate and ultimately fruitless airborne defencemounted in the face of the unremitting Japaneseassault against Singapore and Java. He then goes onto detail the four-year struggle for survival in the faceof Japanese inhumanity. It is a story which is bothdisturbing and uplifting and even amidst thedescriptions of the misery of the Japanese camps,there is room for subtle humour.

The engaging simplicity of Charlie Johnstone’sstory is disturbed by the continual presence ofChristopher Dawson. From the introduction onwards,Dawson’s journalistic background is evident, hehighlights the sensational and he makes a habit ofstating, and repeating, the obvious. Adding as it doesto a steadily growing body of Australian POWliterature, including Peter Henning’s The DoomedBattalion,Patsy Adam-Smith’s Prisoners of War,theWeary Dunlop books, Russell Braddon’s classic TheNaked Islandand Betty Jeffrey’s White Coolies,andconsidering the latent suspicion of the Japanese, thatmuch of Australia still harbours as a result of theSecond World War, one of the main premises ofDawson’s prologue, that the POWs of the Japaneseare Australia’s forgotten heroes is a little hard tosustain.

After setting the scene for Charlie Johnstone’sstory with his introduction and prologue, Dawsonpersists in interrupting the narrative with shortparagraphs providing additional information. Theneed for these paragraphs is questionable; the originalnarrative is quite capable of standing on its ownmerits. Often Dawson is merely retelling Charlie’sstory, but without any of the original simpleunderstatement. Dawson’s superfluous interruptionsbecome downright annoying.

It should be acknowledged that Dawson’scontributions are at times interesting and aninformative complement to Charlie’s story, but if they

had to be included it would have been far better tohave placed them in footnotes, endnotes, or in aconsolidated introduction or conclusion to eachchapter. Any form that did not interrupt the narrativeflow of the book would have made for a better readall round.

Complemented by a large format, clear andcomprehensive maps, and a number of photographs,To Sandakan serves to remind us of the courage,resourcefulness and determination of ordinary blokeslike Charlie Johnstone who found themselves in veryextraordinary circumstances. Charlie’s last sentencesepitomise the style and content of his story: “Ofcourse, I will never forget this episode in my life andeven now, so many years after, I sometimes dream Iam still in a Jap prisoner of war camp and will neverget out. It is a terrifying experience.” It is just a shamethat Christopher Dawson did not see it fit to letCharlie have the last word and had to “rabbit” on foranother two pages.

PRISON CAMP SPIES by Howard Greville,$20.00 p&p from AMHP, 13 Veronica PlaceLoftus 2232, soft cover, 127pp, well illustrated

Reviewed by Flight Lieutenant H.S. Brennan RFD

This book is an account of POW life for theBritish Army and the ANZACS following the fall ofGreece to the German and Italian Armies early in the1939–45 war, which was a shambles according toHoward Greville’s account of the German assault onGreece, the combined forces of British and ANZACbeing severely outnumbered in the air war and groundassaults. From the commencement of the story theBritish or rather English style of understanding eventsleads one to believe that there was little fighting withdisastrous results to the Allies as Howard writes in avery laid back style however his description of theAllies surrender is done with respect to the forcesconcerned.

One detail which I picked up early in the storywas the fact that Germany was one nation who signedthe Geneva Convention which contained sections onthe treatment of POW’s but that Japan and Russiawere not signatories which would be one good reasonfor the extremely harsh treatment of our AustralianPOW’s of the Japanese. Howard’s description ofearly treatment of prisoners of the Germans andItalians was reasonable except for food supplieswhich were only very marginal except for thosePOW’s who were assigned heavy work in the areaswhere they were compelled to work on railway linereplacement or heavy farm work.


Throughout the story, AIF, New Zealand andAllied troops are mentioned in the sense of “mates”with the English however French POW’s were not onsimilar terms. The feeling one gets from the generalterms of the story is that provided one behavedoneself the German guards were not all that severe onthe prisoners, however, should one or more attempt toescape and be caught again it would mean periods ofsolitary confinement and removal to a largecompound. Howard Greville moved through severalsmall camps but as he tried to escape was confined toStalag XV111 A situated in Austria. During his timeas a POW he worked on the railways, logging campsand farms. In some ways it is a pity that he did notexpand on his account of prison life as one gets thefeeling that he has glossed over numerous adventuresand account of mixing with the civilian population ofthe areas in Austria where he was confined, howevermention is made of at least two accounts of closealliances with Austrian females as apparently thePOW’s were allowed to fraternise with civilians andalso people in camp although such doings werefrowned upon by guards and camp administrators.Another point which I thought should be given moreprominence in the story was his role in the collectingand passing on of any important information on troopmovements and matters of interest to the Allies. Onhis return to England the government department forthis type of material apparently did not give much inthe way of value for his efforts.

Throughout the book are numerous photographsand maps, all black and white, an Index of people, aGeneral Index, a Bibliography and Glossary andAcknowledgements.

Taken overall the book is an interesting story ofPOW life and provides the reader with an insight intowhat went on without being sensational. At the pricewell worth buying.

MENZIES AND THE “GREAT WORLDSTRUGGLE” : AUSTRALIA’S COLD WAR1948-1954, By David Lowe, University of NewSouth Wales Press, Sydney, 1999. 243pp.

Reviewed by Wing Commander John Steinbach

On the tenth anniversary of Pearl Harbor,Australia agreed to accept defence of the Middle Eastas its first military priority. To David Lowe, that wascounter-intuitive, subverting textbook orthodoxy andmotivated him to want to know “the bigger story.”This book is the result of that quest, a complex historyof Menzies defining Australia’s Cold War; how thePrime Minister’s seemingly simple anti-communism

created a complex of convoluted foreign and defencepolicies, often unmatched, from Coalition efforts tohave an international yet always token presence, andso to be seen shoulder to shoulder with our allies.Anti-communism was to be the means through whichAustralia’s international position would be givenexpression. Domestically, it came down to efforts ateliminating communists regarded as fifth columnists,while preparing the nation to accept the prospect ofWorld War III breaking out in the early 1950s. Thesewere linked by the imperative for nationaldevelopment: Menzies saw defence preparations asleading the post-war expansion of Australia’seconomy directed by a national security state. Thecentrepiece of that was a National Security ResourcesBoard (NSRB) set up to manage war preparationsthrough the optimal allocation of finance and materielto essential industries. However, the NSRB wasalmost moribund by June 1952. Despite muchhullabaloo at its inception, it failed so much so thatwhen Menzies went to Washington in February 1954he had to practically beg Eisenhower for equipmentfor the Australian Divisions that were supposed todefend Malaya. When asked at a 1957 SenateEstimates hearing about the effectiveness of Menzies’war preparations, Sir Frederick Shedden would shockhis listeners, admitting that it had all been ratherineffectual and wasteful.

Lowe, like Andrew Moore in The Right Road?sees Menzies’ anti-communism and his concernsabout a third world war as genuine and not some ployto win elections. Of course given the narrow marginsin electoral support between the ALP and theCoalition, where literally every vote counted, it isalways easy to assume otherwise. The threat thatMenzies saw was all-encompassing: there was notenet of Australian faith; no material basis toAustralian living which Communists could not get at.Yet as Lowe writes, “the threat which the Cold warpurportedly posed for Australians came home morestrongly with Menzies’ accession”, and that hisdominance in Cabinet grew in direct escalation ofinternational tension. The messenger and not themessage figured. Chifley firmly rejected the idea ofAustralia having three years to prepare for war andthe ALP never accepted Menzies’ sense of urgencyeven if it acknowledged international tension. Inhindsight, it was right.

The Australian version of the security state was tobe built on consensus yet at no time did more thanjust over half of the Australian electorate believe that.Efforts to mobilise public opinion even though thelargely conservative Australian press backedMenzies, would be limited by his inability tocompromise: by nature and training he was strongly

adversative and the organising principle of his partywas, after all, anti-socialist. If Labor eschewednational service, Menzies became its champion; whenLabor decided to recognise the PRC, his mind wasmade up; when the Federal Executive voted againstsending troops to Malaya, Menzies’ wavering on thatpoint ended and he dispatched a battalion in 1955, notas the vanguard of a force to combat an attack fromthe north as per the Harding Plan (the creation ofSEATO had made that redundant and the US nolonger supported the idea), but to fight the Terroristswhich by then were, even according to the OfficialHistorian, a spent force. However, the urge forinvolvement overseas was strong. Once the Coalitionhad adopted “forward” defence, an overseasdestination and an anti-communist cause had to befound, Labor having proposed that Australia shouldbe defended along her northern shores from whatMenzies contemptuously referred to as Martello-liketowers.

Menzies and the “Great World Struggle” offersgreat insights not only into Menzies’ pervasive anti-communism but also how his earlier experiencesshaped his decisions. The book is scholarly andmakes extensive use of the primary sources Loweused to write his Cambridge doctoral thesis. It isrichly and thoroughly documented. He shows us howMenzies successfully married the Communist threatto traditional and popular Australian fears: of Asians,of coloureds and of isolation which curiously alsoechoed the conservatives’ mobilisation of anxietiesbased on the threat of modernity to established valuessuch as the family, the Christian religion andindividuality. Lowe even hints that Menzies may havewanted to play the part of a wartime leader, an

opportunity denied him in 1940; this time around hewould be stymied by constitutional impediments. AsLowe noted, Menzies was so frustrated when theHigh Court in 1951 decided Australia was technicallynot at war even though Australian forces were activein Korea, that he tried to get the definition of warchanged to include its “cold” form by seekingstatements from overseas statesmen with similarviews. What does come out of this book is a sensethat much of what Menzies was up to was primarilyideologically inspired, that he identified the nationalinterest as his own and that if Menzies was not there,things may have worked out differently. Menziesfailed to see that ideology had no exclusive hold onpolicy making.

Staff Colleges and universities frequently usealmost mechanistic models with a rational path toshow how foreign policies are developed. Theserarely admit personality into that process because it isstill regarded as improper. How does thepsychological outlook of a leader caught up in hisown rhetoric or even “big-noting”, a term not then infashion, figure? Lowe has shown that the basis ofmuch of Australian foreign policy making in the early“fifties was driven by domestic circumstances asmuch as external factors, more precisely, by Menzies’own predilections. And that’s why Australians wereearmarked for the Middle East. It was fortunate forAustralia that the threats Menzies enunciated toinduce fear into the nation to get consensus, wereafter all, largely imaginary or irrelevant.

BOOK REVIEWS 57

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INDEX

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL

INDEX

1999No. 134 January/February 1999 – No. 139 November/December 1999


TITLE INDEX

TITLE ISSUE PAGE

ABRI Intelligence Apparatus, The: A “Corps” of Many Lanyards 134 Jan/Feb 25

Allocation and Retention in the Australian Regular Army 134 Jan/Feb 17

Army’s Fundamentals of Land Warfare: A Doctrine for “New Times”? 139 Nov/Dec 5

Australia’s Air Strike Capability: A Personal and Critical Perspective 138 Sep/Oct 48

Back to the Future: Airships in the Defence of Australian Sovereignty 138 Sep/Oct 43

Breaking the Spears: HMAS Tobruk’s Involvement in Truce Monitoring Operations in Bougainville 135 Mar/Apr 33

Cambodian Genocide, The: Causes and Aftermath 137 Jul/Aug 9

Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5

Civilian Support to Military Operations Under International Humanitarian Law 135 Mar/Apr 27

Comparing Australian and New Zealand Defence and Foreign Policy since 1985 136 May/Jun 35

Continuing Relevance of the ANZUS Treaty, The 138 Sep/Oct 5

Deep Strike Capability – The Cutting Edge of Deterrence 137 Jul/Aug 25

Deterring Terrorism: Reality or Wishful Thinking? 137 Jul/Aug 41

Does Present International Communication Fuel the Concept of a Global Village? 138 Sep/Oct 29

Education and Training for the Australian Defence Force 135 Mar/Apr 3

Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law 137 Jul/Aug 47

Footnote in History December 1941, A: The Japanese Invasion of Thailand 139 Nov/Dec 41

From Exclusion to Submarines – The Integration of Australian Women Naval Volunteers 139 Nov/Dec 34

Genocidal Events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the International Community’s Ability to Deter Future

“Ethnic Cleansing”, The 138 Sep/Oct 11

Helmuth von Moltke and the Rise of the War Planning System 135 Mar/Apr 45

Importance of Training Needs Analysis in Integrated Logistic Support, The 136 May/Jun 41

Increasing the Operational Effectiveness of Women in the Australian Defence Force 139 Nov/Dec 25

Indonesia’s Defence Policy 135 Mar/Apr 13

Joint Operations: An Essential Aspect of Today’s Armed Forces 138 Sep/Oct 19

Leadership Development: A Case of Teaching Individuals to Juggle Complexity 137 Jul/Aug 57

Linking Sensors and Shooters in the ADF 137 Jul/Aug 19

Mandatory Retirement and Age Discrimination in the Australian Defence Force 138 Sep/Oct 25

Mobility: What effect does it have on ADF Personnel? 138 Sep/Oct 31

Peace Development 136 May/Jun 23

Planning for Military Operations Other Than War: Lessons from US Army Efforts 134 Jan/Feb 57

Postmodernism and the Implications for the Development of Leadership Doctrine in the Australian Army 135 Mar/Apr 39

Regional Focus and Low Intensity Conflict Response Organisations 138 Sep/Oct 38

Relevance of the Knowledge Edge, The 134 Jan/Feb 37

Re-thinking the Psychological Contract Between Army and its People 137 Jul/Aug 5

Selective Conscientious Objection and the Australian Defence Force 137 Jul/Aug 31

Short Introduction to Alternative Futures, A 139 Nov/Dec 17

Simulation in a Tactical Environment: Requirements from the Field 134 Jan/Feb 49

Strategy and Crisis 136 May/Jun 13

Sub-Regional Security System for Southeast Asia, A 135 Mar/Apr 19

Unconventional Warfare – An Overview 136 May/Jun 43

Unique Qualities of Indonesian Islam, The 135 Mar/Apr 9

What Has Gone Wrong 136 May/Jun 5

INDEX 61

SUBJECT INDEXTITLE ISSUE PAGE

ADMINISTRATIONAllocation and Retention in the Australian Regular Army 134 Jan/Feb 17Army’s Fundamentals of Land Warfare: A Doctrine for “New Times”? 139 Nov/Dec 5Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5Civilian Support to Military Operations Under International Humanitarian Law 135 Mar/Apr 27Comparing Australian and New Zealand Defence and Foreign Policy since 1985 136 May/Jun 35Deep Strike Capability – The Cutting Edge of Deterrence 137 Jul/Aug 25Education and Training for the Australian Defence Force 135 Mar/Apr 3From Exclusion to Submarines – The Integration of Australian Women Naval Volunteers 139 Nov/Dec 34Importance of Training Needs Analysis in Integrated Logistic Support, The 136 May/Jun 41Increasing the Operational Effectiveness of Women in the Australian Defence Force 139 Nov/Dec 25Indonesia’s Defence Policy 135 Mar/Apr 13Leadership Development: A Case of Teaching Individuals to Juggle Complexity 137 Jul/Aug 57Mandatory Retirement and Age Discrimination in the Australian Defence Force 138 Sep/Oct 25Mobility: What effect does it have on ADF Personnel? 138 Sep/Oct 31Peace Development 136 May/Jun 23Planning for Military Operations Other Than War: Lessons from US Army Efforts 134 Jan/Feb 57Postmodernism and the Implications for the Development of Leadership Doctrine in the Australian Army 135 Mar/Apr 39Relevance of the Knowledge Edge, The 134 Jan/Feb 37Re-thinking the Psychological Contract Between Army and its People 137 Jul/Aug 5Sub-Regional Security System for Southeast Asia, A 135 Mar/Apr 19What Has Gone Wrong 136 May/Jun 5

AIR MATTERSABRI Intelligence Apparatus, The: A “Corps” of Many Lanyards 134 Jan/Feb 25Australia’s Air Strike Capability: A Personal and Critical Perspective 138 Sep/Oct 48Back to the Future: Airships in the Defence of Australian Sovereignty 138 Sep/Oct 43Breaking the Spears: HMAS Tobruk’s Involvement in Truce Monitoring Operations in Bougainville 135 Mar/Apr 33Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5Comparing Australian and New Zealand Defence and Foreign Policy since 1985 136 May/Jun 35Deep Strike Capability – The Cutting Edge of Deterrence 137 Jul/Aug 25Indonesia’s Defence Policy 135 Mar/Apr 13Planning for Military Operations Other Than War: Lessons from US Army Efforts 134 Jan/Feb 57Relevance of the Knowledge Edge, The 134 Jan/Feb 37Sub-Regional Security System for Southeast Asia, A 135 Mar/Apr 19

EDUCATIONAllocation and Retention in the Australian Regular Army 134 Jan/Feb 17Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5Education and Training for the Australian Defence Force 135 Mar/Apr 3From Exclusion to Submarines – The Integration of Australian Women Naval Volunteers 139 Nov/Dec 34Helmuth von Moltke and the Rise of the War Planning System 135 Mar/Apr 45Importance of Training Needs Analysis in Integrated Logistic Support, The 136 May/Jun 41Increasing the Operational Effectiveness of Women in the Australian Defence Force 139 Nov/Dec 25Joint Operations: An Essential Aspect of Today’s Armed Forces 138 Sep/Oct 19Leadership Development: A Case of Teaching Individuals to Juggle Complexity 137 Jul/Aug 57Mobility: What effect does it have on ADF Personnel? 138 Sep/Oct 31Postmodernism and the Implications for the Development of Leadership Doctrine in the Australian Army 135 Mar/Apr 39Re-thinking the Psychological Contract Between Army and its People 137 Jul/Aug 5Selective Conscientious Objection and the Australian Defence Force 137 Jul/Aug 31Short Introduction to Alternative Futures, A 139 Nov/Dec 17What Has Gone Wrong 136 May/Jun 5

HISTORYAllocation and Retention in the Australian Regular Army 134 Jan/Feb 17Australia’s Air Strike Capability: A Personal and Critical Perspective 138 Sep/Oct 48Back to the Future: Airships in the Defence of Australian Sovereignty 138 Sep/Oct 43Cambodian Genocide, The: Causes and Aftermath 137 Jul/Aug 9Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5Comparing Australian and New Zealand Defence and Foreign Policy since 1985 136 May/Jun 35Deterring Terrorism: Reality or Wishful Thinking? 137 Jul/Aug 41Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law 137 Jul/Aug 47Footnote in History December 1941, A: The Japanese Invasion of Thailand 139 Nov/Dec 41From Exclusion to Submarines – The Integration of Australian Women Naval Volunteers 139 Nov/Dec 34Helmuth von Moltke and the Rise of the War Planning System 135 Mar/Apr 45Indonesia’s Defence Policy 135 Mar/Apr 13Re-thinking the Psychological Contract Between Army and its People 137 Jul/Aug 5Selective Conscientious Objection and the Australian Defence Force 137 Jul/Aug 31Sub-Regional Security System for Southeast Asia, A 135 Mar/Apr 19Unconventional Warfare – An Overview 136 May/Jun 43Unique Qualities of Indonesian Islam, The 135 Mar/Apr 9What Has Gone Wrong 136 May/Jun 5


HUMAN BEHAVIOURABRI Intelligence Apparatus, The: A “Corps” of Many Lanyards 134 Jan/Feb 25Allocation and Retention in the Australian Regular Army 134 Jan/Feb 17Breaking the Spears: HMAS Tobruk’s Involvement in Truce Monitoring Operations in Bougainville 135 Mar/Apr 33Cambodian Genocide, The: Causes and Aftermath 137 Jul/Aug 9Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5Civilian Support to Military Operations Under International Humanitarian Law 135 Mar/Apr 27Deterring Terrorism: Reality or Wishful Thinking? 137 Jul/Aug 41Does Present International Communication Fuel the Concept of a Global Village? 138 Sep/Oct 29Education and Training for the Australian Defence Force 135 Mar/Apr 3Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law 137 Jul/Aug 47Footnote in History December 1941, A: The Japanese Invasion of Thailand 139 Nov/Dec 41Genocidal Events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the International Community’s Ability to Deter Future

“Ethnic Cleansing”, The 138 Sep/Oct 11Helmuth von Moltke and the Rise of the War Planning System 135 Mar/Apr 45Importance of Training Needs Analysis in Integrated Logistic Support, The 136 May/Jun 41Increasing the Operational Effectiveness of Women in the Australian Defence Force 139 Nov/Dec 25Indonesia’s Defence Policy 135 Mar/Apr 13Leadership Development: A Case of Teaching Individuals to Juggle Complexity 137 Jul/Aug 57Linking Sensors and Shooters in the ADF 137 Jul/Aug 19Mandatory Retirement and Age Discrimination in the Australian Defence Force 138 Sep/Oct 25Mobility: What effect does it have on ADF Personnel? 138 Sep/Oct 31Peace Development 136 May/Jun 23Planning for Military Operations Other Than War: Lessons from US Army Efforts 134 Jan/Feb 57Postmodernism and the Implications for the Development of Leadership Doctrine in the Australian Army 135 Mar/Apr 39Relevance of the Knowledge Edge, The 134 Jan/Feb 37Re-thinking the Psychological Contract Between Army and its People 137 Jul/Aug 5Selective Conscientious Objection and the Australian Defence Force 137 Jul/Aug 31Strategy and Crisis 136 May/Jun 13Sub-Regional Security System for Southeast Asia, A 135 Mar/Apr 19Unconventional Warfare – An Overview 136 May/Jun 43Unique Qualities of Indonesian Islam, The 135 Mar/Apr 9What Has Gone Wrong 136 May/Jun 5

INTELLIGENCEABRI Intelligence Apparatus, The: A “Corps” of Many Lanyards 134 Jan/Feb 25Australia’s Air Strike Capability: A Personal and Critical Perspective 138 Sep/Oct 48Civilian Support to Military Operations Under International Humanitarian Law 135 Mar/Apr 27Deep Strike Capability – The Cutting Edge of Deterrence 137 Jul/Aug 25Helmuth von Moltke and the Rise of the War Planning System 135 Mar/Apr 45Indonesia’s Defence Policy 135 Mar/Apr 13Planning for Military Operations Other Than War: Lessons from US Army Efforts 134 Jan/Feb 57Relevance of the Knowledge Edge, The 134 Jan/Feb 37Short Introduction to Alternative Futures, A 139 Nov/Dec 17Sub-Regional Security System for Southeast Asia, A 135 Mar/Apr 19Unconventional Warfare – An Overview 136 May/Jun 43

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSABRI Intelligence Apparatus, The: A “Corps” of Many Lanyards 134 Jan/Feb 25Back to the Future: Airships in the Defence of Australian Sovereignty 138 Sep/Oct 43Breaking the Spears: HMAS Tobruk’s Involvement in Truce Monitoring Operations in Bougainville 135 Mar/Apr 33Cambodian Genocide: Causes and Aftermath, The 137 Jul/Aug 9Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5Civilian Support to Military Operations Under International Humanitarian Law 135 Mar/Apr 27Comparing Australian and New Zealand Defence and Foreign Policy since 1985 136 May/Jun 35Continuing Relevance of the ANZUS Treaty, The 138 Sep/Oct 5Deterring Terrorism: Reality or Wishful Thinking? 137 Jul/Aug 41Does Present International Communication Fuel the Concept of a Global Village? 138 Sep/Oct 29Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law 137 Jul/Aug 47Footnote in History December 1941, A: The Japanese Invasion of Thailand 139 Nov/Dec 41Genocidal Events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the International Community’s Ability to Deter Future

“Ethnic Cleansing”, The 138 Sep/Oct 11Indonesia’s Defence Policy 135 Mar/Apr 13Peace Development 136 May/Jun 23Planning for Military Operations Other Than War: Lessons from US Army Efforts 134 Jan/Feb 57Regional Focus and Low Intensity Conflict Response Organisations 138 Sep/Oct 38Relevance of the Knowledge Edge, The 134 Jan/Feb 37Sub-Regional Security System for Southeast Asia, A 135 Mar/Apr 19Unconventional Warfare – An Overview 136 May/Jun 43Unique Qualities of Indonesian Islam, The 135 Mar/Apr 9

LAWABRI Intelligence Apparatus, The: A “Corps” of Many Lanyards 134 Jan/Feb 25Cambodian Genocide, The: Causes and Aftermath 137 Jul/Aug 9Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5

INDEX 63

Civilian Support to Military Operations Under International Humanitarian Law 135 Mar/Apr 27Comparing Australian and New Zealand Defence and Foreign Policy since 1985 136 May/Jun 35Deterring Terrorism: Reality or Wishful Thinking? 137 Jul/Aug 41Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law 137 Jul/Aug 47Importance of Training Needs Analysis in Integrated Logistic Support, The 136 May/Jun 41Peace Development 136 May/Jun 23Selective Conscientious Objection and the Australian Defence Force 137 Jul/Aug 31Unconventional Warfare – An Overview 136 May/Jun 43

LEADERSHIPAllocation and Retention in the Australian Regular Army 134 Jan/Feb 17Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5Helmuth von Moltke and the Rise of the War Planning System 135 Mar/Apr 45Leadership Development: A Case of Teaching Individuals to Juggle Complexity 137 Jul/Aug 57Postmodernism and the Implications for the Development of Leadership Doctrine in the Australian Army 135 Mar/Apr 39Re-thinking the Psychological Contract Between Army and its People 137 Jul/Aug 5Unconventional Warfare – An Overview 136 May/Jun 43What Has Gone Wrong 136 May/Jun 5

LOGISTICSAllocation and Retention in the Australian Regular Army 134 Jan/Feb 17Australia’s Air Strike Capability: A Personal and Critical Perspective 138 Sep/Oct 48Back to the Future: Airships in the Defence of Australian Sovereignty 138 Sep/Oct 43Breaking the Spears: HMAS Tobruk’s Involvement in Truce Monitoring Operations in Bougainville 135 Mar/Apr 33Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5Deep Strike Capability – The Cutting Edge of Deterrence 137 Jul/Aug 25Importance of Training Needs Analysis in Integrated Logistic Support, The 136 May/Jun 41Increasing the Operational Effectiveness of Women in the Australian Defence Force 139 Nov/Dec 25Peace Development 136 May/Jun 23Planning for Military Operations Other Than War: Lessons from US Army Efforts 134 Jan/Feb 57Relevance of the Knowledge Edge, The 134 Jan/Feb 37Simulation in a Tactical Environment: Requirements from the Field 134 Jan/Feb 49Strategy and Crisis 136 May/Jun 13

MANAGEMENTAllocation and Retention in the Australian Regular Army 134 Jan/Feb 17Army’s Fundamentals of Land Warfare: A Doctrine for “New Times”? 139 Nov/Dec 5Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5Education and Training for the Australian Defence Force 135 Mar/Apr 3From Exclusion to Submarines – The Integration of Australian Women Naval Volunteers 139 Nov/Dec 34Helmuth von Moltke and the Rise of the War Planning System 135 Mar/Apr 45Importance of Training Needs Analysis in Integrated Logistic Support, The 136 May/Jun 41Increasing the Operational Effectiveness of Women in the Australian Defence Force 139 Nov/Dec 25Joint Operations: An Essential Aspect of Today’s Armed Forces 138 Sep/Oct 19Leadership Development: A Case of Teaching Individuals to Juggle Complexity 137 Jul/Aug 57Mandatory Retirement and Age Discrimination in the Australian Defence Force 138 Sep/Oct 25Mobility: What effect does it have on ADF Personnel? 138 Sep/Oct 31Peace Development 136 May/Jun 23Postmodernism and the Implications for the Development of Leadership Doctrine in the Australian Army 135 Mar/Apr 39Relevance of the Knowledge Edge, The 134 Jan/Feb 37Re-thinking the Psychological Contract Between Army and its People 137 Jul/Aug 5Short Introduction to Alternative Futures, A 139 Nov/Dec 17Simulation in a Tactical Environment: Requirements from the Field 134 Jan/Feb 49Strategy and Crisis 136 May/Jun 13What Has Gone Wrong 136 May/Jun 5

MEDICALCivilian Support to Military Operations Under International Humanitarian Law 135 Mar/Apr 27Peace Development 136 May/Jun 23

MILITARY PROFESSIONALISMABRI Intelligence Apparatus, The: A “Corps” of Many Lanyards 134 Jan/Feb 25Allocation and Retention in the Australian Regular Army 134 Jan/Feb 17Army’s Fundamentals of Land Warfare: A Doctrine for “New Times”? 139 Nov/Dec 5Back to the Future: Airships in the Defence of Australian Sovereignty 138 Sep/Oct 43Breaking the Spears: HMAS Tobruk’s Involvement in Truce Monitoring Operations in Bougainville 135 Mar/Apr 33Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5Civilian Support to Military Operations Under International Humanitarian Law 135 Mar/Apr 27Comparing Australian and New Zealand Defence and Foreign Policy since 1985 136 May/Jun 35Deep Strike Capability – The Cutting Edge of Deterrence 137 Jul/Aug 25Deterring Terrorism: Reality or Wishful Thinking? 137 Jul/Aug 41Education and Training for the Australian Defence Force 135 Mar/Apr 3Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law 137 Jul/Aug 47Helmuth von Moltke and the Rise of the War Planning System 135 Mar/Apr 45


Increasing the Operational Effectiveness of Women in the Australian Defence Force 139 Nov/Dec 25Joint Operations: An Essential Aspect of Today’s Armed Forces 138 Sep/Oct 19Leadership Development: A Case of Teaching Individuals to Juggle Complexity 137 Jul/Aug 57Linking Sensors and Shooters in the ADF 137 Jul/Aug 19Mandatory Retirement and Age Discrimination in the Australian Defence Force 138 Sep/Oct 25Mobility: What effect does it have on ADF Personnel? 138 Sep/Oct 31Peace Development 136 May/Jun 23Planning for Military Operations Other Than War: Lessons from US Army Efforts 134 Jan/Feb 57Postmodernism and the Implications for the Development of Leadership Doctrine in the Australian Army 135 Mar/Apr 39Regional Focus and Low Intensity Conflict Response Organisations 138 Sep/Oct 38Relevance of the Knowledge Edge, The 134 Jan/Feb 37Re-thinking the Psychological Contract Between Army and its People 137 Jul/Aug 5Selective Conscientious Objection and the Australian Defence Force 137 Jul/Aug 31Short Introduction to Alternative Futures, A 139 Nov/Dec 17Simulation in a Tactical Environment: Requirements from the Field 134 Jan/Feb 49Strategy and Crisis 136 May/Jun 13Unconventional Warfare – An Overview 136 May/Jun 43What Has Gone Wrong 136 May/Jun 5

NAVAL MATTERSABRI Intelligence Apparatus, The: A “Corps” of Many Lanyards 134 Jan/Feb 25Breaking the Spears: HMAS Tobruk’s Involvement in Truce Monitoring Operations in Bougainville 135 Mar/Apr 33Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5Comparing Australian and New Zealand Defence and Foreign Policy since 1985 136 May/Jun 35From Exclusion to Submarines – The Integration of Australian Women Naval Volunteers 139 Nov/Dec 34Indonesia’s Defence Policy 135 Mar/Apr 13Planning for Military Operations Other Than War: Lessons from US Army Efforts 134 Jan/Feb 57Relevance of the Knowledge Edge, The 134 Jan/Feb 37Sub-Regional Security System for Southeast Asia, A 135 Mar/Apr 19

ORGANISATIONAllocation and Retention in the Australian Regular Army 134 Jan/Feb 17Army’s Fundamentals of Land Warfare: A Doctrine for “New Times”? 139 Nov/Dec 5Breaking the Spears: HMAS Tobruk’s Involvement in Truce Monitoring Operations in Bougainville 135 Mar/Apr 33Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5Civilian Support to Military Operations Under International Humanitarian Law 135 Mar/Apr 27Comparing Australian and New Zealand Defence and Foreign Policy since 1985 136 May/Jun 35Deep Strike Capability – The Cutting Edge of Deterrence 137 Jul/Aug 25Education and Training for the Australian Defence Force 135 Mar/Apr 3Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law 137 Jul/Aug 47Helmuth von Moltke and the Rise of the War Planning System 135 Mar/Apr 45Importance of Training Needs Analysis in Integrated Logistic Support, The 136 May/Jun 41Increasing the Operational Effectiveness of Women in the Australian Defence Force 139 Nov/Dec 25Leadership Development: A Case of Teaching Individuals to Juggle Complexity 137 Jul/Aug 57Linking Sensors and Shooters in the ADF 137 Jul/Aug 19Mandatory Retirement and Age Discrimination in the Australian Defence Force 138 Sep/Oct 25Mobility: What effect does it have on ADF Personnel? 138 Sep/Oct 31Peace Development 136 May/Jun 23Planning for Military Operations Other Than War: Lessons from US Army Efforts 134 Jan/Feb 57Postmodernism and the Implications for the Development of Leadership Doctrine in the Australian Army 135 Mar/Apr 39Regional Focus and Low Intensity Conflict Response Organisations 138 Sep/Oct 38Relevance of the Knowledge Edge, The 134 Jan/Feb 37Short Introduction to Alternative Futures, A 139 Nov/Dec 17Strategy and Crisis 136 May/Jun 13What Has Gone Wrong 136 May/Jun 5

PEACEKEEPINGArmy’s Fundamentals of Land Warfare: A Doctrine for “New Times”? 139 Nov/Dec 5Breaking the Spears: HMAS Tobruk’s Involvement in Truce Monitoring Operations in Bougainville 135 Mar/Apr 33Cambodian Genocide, The: Causes and Aftermath 137 Jul/Aug 9Civilian Support to Military Operations Under International Humanitarian Law 135 Mar/Apr 27Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law 137 Jul/Aug 47Peace Development 136 May/Jun 23Planning for Military Operations Other Than War: Lessons from US Army Efforts 134 Jan/Feb 57

PLANNINGAllocation and Retention in the Australian Regular Army 134 Jan/Feb 17Army’s Fundamentals of Land Warfare: A Doctrine for “New Times”? 139 Nov/Dec 5Australia’s Air Strike Capability: A Personal and Critical Perspective 138 Sep/Oct 48Breaking the Spears: HMAS Tobruk’s Involvement in Truce Monitoring Operations in Bougainville 135 Mar/Apr 33Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5Civilian Support to Military Operations Under International Humanitarian Law 135 Mar/Apr 27Comparing Australian and New Zealand Defence and Foreign Policy since 1985 136 May/Jun 35Deep Strike Capability – The Cutting Edge of Deterrence 137 Jul/Aug 25Education and Training for the Australian Defence Force 135 Mar/Apr 3Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law 137 Jul/Aug 47

INDEX 65

Helmuth von Moltke and the Rise of the War Planning System 135 Mar/Apr 45Importance of Training Needs Analysis in Integrated Logistic Support, The 136 May/Jun 41Increasing the Operational Effectiveness of Women in the Australian Defence Force 139 Nov/Dec 25Joint Operations: An Essential Aspect of Today’s Armed Forces 138 Sep/Oct 19Leadership Development: A Case of Teaching Individuals to Juggle Complexity 137 Jul/Aug 57Mobility: What effect does it have on ADF Personnel? 138 Sep/Oct 31Peace Development 136 May/Jun 23Planning for Military Operations Other Than War: Lessons from US Army Efforts 134 Jan/Feb 57Postmodernism and the Implications for the Development of Leadership Doctrine in the Australian Army 135 Mar/Apr 39Relevance of the Knowledge Edge, The 134 Jan/Feb 37Re-thinking the Psychological Contract Between Army and its People 137 Jul/Aug 5Short Introduction to Alternative Futures, A 139 Nov/Dec 17Strategy and Crisis 136 May/Jun 13What Has Gone Wrong 136 May/Jun 5

POLICYABRI Intelligence Apparatus, The: A “Corps” of Many Lanyards 134 Jan/Feb 25Allocation and Retention in the Australian Regular Army 134 Jan/Feb 17Army’s Fundamentals of Land Warfare: A Doctrine for “New Times”? 139 Nov/Dec 5Australia’s Air Strike Capability: A Personal and Critical Perspective 138 Sep/Oct 48Back to the Future: Airships in the Defence of Australian Sovereignty 138 Sep/Oct 43Breaking the Spears: HMAS Tobruk’s Involvement in Truce Monitoring Operations in Bougainville 135 Mar/Apr 33Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5Civilian Support to Military Operations Under International Humanitarian Law 135 Mar/Apr 27Comparing Australian and New Zealand Defence and Foreign Policy since 1985 136 May/Jun 35Continuing Relevance of the ANZUS Treaty, The 138 Sep/Oct 5Deep Strike Capability – The Cutting Edge of Deterrence 137 Jul/Aug 25Deterring Terrorism: Reality or Wishful Thinking? 137 Jul/Aug 41Education and Training for the Australian Defence Force 135 Mar/Apr 3Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law 137 Jul/Aug 47From Exclusion to Submarines – The Integration of Australian Women Naval Volunteers 139 Nov/Dec 34Helmuth von Moltke and the Rise of the War Planning System 135 Mar/Apr 45Importance of Training Needs Analysis in Integrated Logistic Support, The 136 May/Jun 41Increasing the Operational Effectiveness of Women in the Australian Defence Force 139 Nov/Dec 25Indonesia’s Defence Policy 135 Mar/Apr 13Joint Operations: An Essential Aspect of Today’s Armed Forces 138 Sep/Oct 19Leadership Development: A Case of Teaching Individuals to Juggle Complexity 137 Jul/Aug 57Linking Sensors and Shooters in the ADF 137 Jul/Aug 19Mandatory Retirement and Age Discrimination in the Australian Defence Force 138 Sep/Oct 25Mobility: What effect does it have on ADF Personnel? 138 Sep/Oct 31Peace Development 136 May/Jun 23Planning for Military Operations Other Than War: Lessons from US Army Efforts 134 Jan/Feb 57Postmodernism and the Implications for the Development of Leadership Doctrine in the Australian Army 135 Mar/Apr 39Relevance of the Knowledge Edge, The 134 Jan/Feb 37Re-thinking the Psychological Contract Between Army and its People 137 Jul/Aug 5Selective Conscientious Objection and the Australian Defence Force 137 Jul/Aug 31Strategy and Crisis 136 May/Jun 13Sub-Regional Security System for Southeast Asia, A 135 Mar/Apr 19What Has Gone Wrong 136 May/Jun 5

POLITICSABRI Intelligence Apparatus, The: A “Corps” of Many Lanyards 134 Jan/Feb 25Allocation and Retention in the Australian Regular Army 134 Jan/Feb 17Cambodian Genocide, The: Causes and Aftermath 137 Jul/Aug 9Civilian Support to Military Operations Under International Humanitarian Law 135 Mar/Apr 27Comparing Australian and New Zealand Defence and Foreign Policy since 1985 136 May/Jun 35Deterring Terrorism: Reality or Wishful Thinking? 137 Jul/Aug 41Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law 137 Jul/Aug 47From Exclusion to Submarines – The Integration of Australian Women Naval Volunteers 139 Nov/Dec 34Indonesia’s Defence Policy 135 Mar/Apr 13Peace Development 136 May/Jun 23Relevance of the Knowledge Edge, The 134 Jan/Feb 37Selective Conscientious Objection and the Australian Defence Force 137 Jul/Aug 31Sub-Regional Security System for Southeast Asia, A 135 Mar/Apr 19Unique Qualities of Indonesian Islam, The 135 Mar/Apr 9

RECRUITINGAllocation and Retention in the Australian Regular Army 134 Jan/Feb 17Increasing the Operational Effectiveness of Women in the Australian Defence Force 139 Nov/Dec 25Selective Conscientious Objection and the Australian Defence Force 137 Jul/Aug 31What Has Gone Wrong 136 May/Jun 5

SECURITYABRI Intelligence Apparatus, The: A “Corps” of Many Lanyards 134 Jan/Feb 25Australia’s Air Strike Capability: A Personal and Critical Perspective 138 Sep/Oct 48


Back to the Future: Airships in the Defence of Australian Sovereignty 138 Sep/Oct 43Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5Civilian Support to Military Operations Under International Humanitarian Law 135 Mar/Apr 27Comparing Australian and New Zealand Defence and Foreign Policy since 1985 136 May/Jun 35Continuing Relevance of the ANZUS Treaty, The 138 Sep/Oct 5Deterring Terrorism: Reality or Wishful Thinking? 137 Jul/Aug 41Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law 137 Jul/Aug 47Indonesia’s Defence Policy 135 Mar/Apr 13Peace Development 136 May/Jun 23Planning for Military Operations Other Than War: Lessons from US Army Efforts 134 Jan/Feb 57Relevance of the Knowledge Edge, The 134 Jan/Feb 37Short Introduction to Alternative Futures, A 139 Nov/Dec 17Strategy and Crisis 136 May/Jun 13Sub-Regional Security System for Southeast Asia, A 135 Mar/Apr 19Unique Qualities of Indonesian Islam, The 135 Mar/Apr 9

STRATEGYABRI Intelligence Apparatus, The: A “Corps” of Many Lanyards 134 Jan/Feb 25Australia’s Air Strike Capability: A Personal and Critical Perspective 138 Sep/Oct 48Breaking the Spears: HMAS Tobruk’s Involvement in Truce Monitoring Operations in Bougainville 135 Mar/Apr 33Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5Comparing Australian and New Zealand Defence and Foreign Policy since 1985 136 May/Jun 35Continuing Relevance of the ANZUS Treaty, The 138 Sep/Oct 5Deep Strike Capability – The Cutting Edge of Deterrence 137 Jul/Aug 25Deterring Terrorism: Reality or Wishful Thinking? 137 Jul/Aug 41Linking Sensors and Shooters in the ADF 137 Jul/Aug 19Planning for Military Operations Other Than War: Lessons from US Army Efforts 134 Jan/Feb 57Relevance of the Knowledge Edge, The 134 Jan/Feb 37Strategy and Crisis 136 May/Jun 13Short Introduction to Alternative Futures, A 139 Nov/Dec 17Unconventional Warfare – An Overview 136 May/Jun 43

TECHNOLOGYAustralia’s Air Strike Capability: A Personal and Critical Perspective 138 Sep/Oct 48Breaking the Spears: HMAS Tobruk’s Involvement in Truce Monitoring Operations in Bougainville 135 Mar/Apr 33Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5Deep Strike Capability – The Cutting Edge of Deterrence 137 Jul/Aug 25Helmuth von Moltke and the Rise of the War Planning System 135 Mar/Apr 45Importance of Training Needs Analysis in Integrated Logistic Support, The 136 May/Jun 41Increasing the Operational Effectiveness of Women in the Australian Defence Force 139 Nov/Dec 25Joint Operations: An Essential Aspect of Today’s Armed Forces 138 Sep/Oct 19Linking Sensors and Shooters in the ADF 137 Jul/Aug 19Planning for Military Operations Other Than War: Lessons from US Army Efforts 134 Jan/Feb 57Regional Focus and Low Intensity Conflict Response Organisations 138 Sep/Oct 38Relevance of the Knowledge Edge, The 134 Jan/Feb 37Short Introduction to Alternative Futures, A 139 Nov/Dec 17Simulation in a Tactical Environment: Requirements from the Field 134 Jan/Feb 49Strategy and Crisis 136 May/Jun 13

TRAININGAllocation and Retention in the Australian Regular Army 134 Jan/Feb 17Australia’s Air Strike Capability: A Personal and Critical Perspective 138 Sep/Oct 48Change, People and Australia’s Defence Capability for the New Century 134 Jan/Feb 5Comparing Australian and New Zealand Defence and Foreign Policy since 1985 136 May/Jun 35Deterring Terrorism: Reality or Wishful Thinking? 137 Jul/Aug 41Education and Training for the Australian Defence Force 135 Mar/Apr 3From Exclusion to Submarines – The Integration of Australian Women Naval Volunteers 139 Nov/Dec 34Importance of Training Needs Analysis in Integrated Logistic Support, The 136 May/Jun 41Increasing the Operational Effectiveness of Women in the Australian Defence Force 139 Nov/Dec 25Joint Operations: An Essential Aspect of Today’s Armed Forces 138 Sep/Oct 19Leadership Development: A Case of Teaching Individuals to Juggle Complexity 137 Jul/Aug 57Linking Sensors and Shooters in the ADF 137 Jul/Aug 19Mandatory Retirement and Age Discrimination in the Australian Defence Force 138 Sep/Oct 25Postmodernism and the Implications for the Development of Leadership Doctrine in the Australian Army 135 Mar/Apr 39Regional Focus and Low Intensity Conflict Response Organisations 138 Sep/Oct 38Relevance of the Knowledge Edge, The 134 Jan/Feb 37Re-thinking the Psychological Contract Between Army and its People 137 Jul/Aug 5Selective Conscientious Objection and the Australian Defence Force 137 Jul/Aug 31Short Introduction to Alternative Futures, A 139 Nov/Dec 17Simulation in a Tactical Environment: Requirements from the Field 134 Jan/Feb 49Strategy and Crisis 136 May/Jun 13What Has Gone Wrong 136 May/Jun 5

WWIIFootnote in History December 1941, A: The Japanese Invasion of Thailand 139 Nov/Dec 41

INDEX 67

BOOK REVIEWS

TITLE ISSUE PAGE

100 Years of Australians at War 138 Sep/Oct 57

Against the Sun: The AIF in Malaya 1941-42 137 Jul/Aug 65

Airlines of Asia Since 1920 137 Jul/Aug 65

All Men Back – All One Big Mistake 136 May/Jun 52

An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare 138 Sep/Oct 58

Australia’s Security in the 21st Century 134 Jan/Feb 68

Billion Dollar Business: Strategies and Lessons in Australian Arms Acquisition 136 May/Jun 55

Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War 138 Sep/Oct 63

Bombers Versus Battleships 134 Jan/Feb 71

Broken Eighth, The: A History of the 2/14th Australian Field Regiment 136 May/Jun 54

Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zufikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto 138 Sep/Oct 59

Dragonstrike – The Millennium War 138 Sep/Oct 60

Gallant Life, A: The Story of an Old Soldier 135 Mar/Apr 56

Get the Bloody Job Done 139 Nov/Dec 53

Hitler’s U-Boat War: The Hunted 1942-1945 138 Sep/Oct 62

In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army 137 Jul/Aug 67

Jungle Circus, A: Memories of Vietnam 138 Sep/Oct 61

Kippenberger, An Inspired New Zealand Commander 135 Mar/Apr 53

Knowing Your Friends – Intelligence Inside Alliances from 1914 to the Cold War 135 Mar/Apr 52

Kremlin Device, The 139 Nov/Dec 53

Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare 137 Jul/Aug 69

“Letter” Batteries, The: The History of the “Letter” Batteries in World War II 136 May/Jun 55

Little Bit of Hope, A – Australian Force – Somalia 134 Jan/Feb 67

Maritime Power in the 20th Century: The Australian Experience 135 Mar/Apr 52

Menzies and the “Great World Struggle”: Australia’s Cold War 1948-1954 139 Nov/Dec 56

Nothing is Forever 2/3 Commandos 134 Jan/Feb 67

Portland’s Historic Battery (1889): Including the Western Artillery Corps (1866-1884) and the

Portland Battery Garrison Artillery (1884-1904) 136 May/Jun 53

Prison Camp Spies 139 Nov/Dec 55

Rooting Democracy – Growing the Society We Want 136 May/Jun 51

Thunder of the Guns, The: A History of the 2/3 Australian Field Regiment 136 May/Jun 54

To Sandakan: The Diaries of Charlie Johnstone, Prisoner of War 1942-45 139 Nov/Dec 54

To the Last Ridge – The First World War Memoirs of W.H. Downing 135 Mar/Apr 54

Uncertain Fate: An Australian SAS Patrol in Vietnam 137 Jul/Aug 72

Up Top – “The Royal Australian Navy and Southeast Asian Conflicts 1955-1972” 134 Jan/Feb 69

Vietnam: A History 137 Jul/Aug 71

Warrior of Kokoda: A Biography of Brigadier Arnold Potts 137 Jul/Aug 68

We Were the First 135 Mar/Apr 54

Wirraway to Hornet: A History of the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation Pty Ltd 136 May/Jun 53

Yank Down Under, A 139 Nov/Dec 54


AUTHOR’S INDEXAUTHOR ISSUE PAGE

Barrie, Admiral C.A., AO, RAN, Chief of the Defence Force 134 Jan/Feb 5

Baschiera, D., Defence Community Organisation 136 May/Jun 23

Bruni, Dr J., Assistant Editor, RUSI 138 Sep/Oct 43

Bull, D., Social Researcher 138 Sep/Oct 31

Chapman, Lieutenant S., RAN 138 Sep/Oct 25

Chapman, Lieutenant S., RAN Reserve 139 Nov/Dec 25

Cheeseman, Graeme, Australian Defence Force Academy 139 Nov/Dec 5

Davies, Corporal M.N., Aust Int 134 Jan/Feb 25

Dibb, Professor P., Australian National University 134 Jan/Feb 37

Dugdale, Major M.J., RA Sigs 137 Jul/Aug 9

du Toit, Commander A.K., RAN 135 Mar/Apr 33

Fenwick, S., Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 135 Mar/Apr 27

Flynn, Lieutenant Commander P., RAN 135 Mar/Apr 9

Goyne, Major A.N., AA Psych 134 Jan/Feb 17

Graham, Captain D. 137 Jul/Aug 19

Heron, Lieutenant Commander M.W., RAN 135 Mar/Apr 19

Hutcheson, Major J., RA Inf 138 Sep/Oct 11

Ilardi, G.J., Victoria Police 137 Jul/Aug 41

Joiner, Squadron Leader K., RAAF 138 Sep/Oct 48

Kainikara, Wing Commander Premchand, Indian Air Force (Rtd.) 137 Jul/Aug 25

Kenny, Lieutenant Commander J., RAN 136 May/Jun 41

Leahy, Brigadier P., Australian Army 134 Jan/Feb 49

Lockhart, Lieutenant M., RAA 138 Sep/Oct 5

Lord, Rear Admiral J.R., RAN 135 Mar/Apr 3

Madsen, Flight Lieutenant S.A., RAAF 136 May/Jun 35

McKinnon, A., Department of Defence 138 Sep/Oct 29

McLaughlin, Lieutenant R., RAN 135 Mar/Apr 45

McNicholas, Major D.M., RAA 135 Mar/Apr 13

Moor, Major R.C., RA Inf. 136 May/Jun 43

Orme, Lieutenant Colonel C.W. 137 Jul/Aug 19

Phillips, Captain J.B.R., RA Inf 135 Mar/Apr 39

Reilly, M., DSTO 134 Jan/Feb 49

Schmidtchen, Major D., AA PSYCH 137 Jul/Aug 5

Smith, Major G., RA Inf 138 Sep/Oct 38

Smythe, Squadron Leader K., RAAF 139 Nov/Dec 41

Spurling, K., Australian Defence Force Academy 139 Nov/Dec 34

Stevenson, E.J., Department of Defence 137 Jul/Aug 57

Taw, Dr J. Morrison, RAND 134 Jan/Feb 57

Thomas, Major J. 137 Jul/Aug 19

Wallace, Brigadier J.J.A., AM 136 May/Jun 13

Watson, Captain M.A.J., RAA 136 May/Jun 5

Wing, Lieutenant Colonel I., Aust Int 137 Jul/Aug 31

Wing, Lieutenant Colonel I., Aust Int 139 Nov/Dec 17

Wood, Captain B.A., RAA 138 Sep/Oct 19

Worswick, Major B., AALC 137 Jul/Aug 47

Documents

NO. 139 NOVEMBER/ DECEMBER 1999