NLRB Production 9 Affidavits

7/30/2019 NLRB Production 9 Affidavits

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Solicitation of the information on this form is authorized by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq.

The principal use of the information is to assist the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in processing representationand/or unfair labor practice proceedings and related proceedings or litigation. The routine uses for the information are fullyset forth in the Federal Register, 71 Fed. Reg. 74942-43 (Dec. 13, 2006). The NLRB will further explain these uses uponrequest. Disclosure of this information to the NLRB is voluntary. However, failure to supply the information may cause theNLRB to refuse to process any further representation or unfair labor practice case, or may cause the NLRB to issue you asubpoena and seek enforcement of the subpoena in federal court.

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) Case 19-CA-32431) SS)

CONFIDENTIAL WITNESS AFFIDAVIT

I hereby state as follows:

I have been given assurances by an agent of the National Labor Relations Board that thisConfidential Witness Affidavit will be considered a confidential law enforcement record by theBoard and will not be disclosed unless it becomes necessary to produce the Confidential WitnessAffidavit in connection with a formal proceeding.

I reside at Home: Work:

My telephone number (including Area Code) is Cell:

I am employed by

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3.4

The Dreamliner5

787 was already in the developmental stage for our bargaining unit. I think at the time,6

Boeing was already assembling the prototypes. (At that point in time, the Dreamliner7

project was behind schedule due to supplier issues. has much more8

information regarding the details of the early stages of the Dreamliner.) There were9

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11

12

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14

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16

17

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4. I became involved in the negotiations for the placement of the second line of the19

Dreamliner in For purposes of providing some background regarding20

what the circumstances were like at the time I became involved in the negotiations in21

I am providing the following information22

After the 200823

strike mediations, there were a lot of stories in the press about different states that24

Boeing was considering placing the second Dreamliner line, including South Carolina.25

A few years ago, Boeing had outsourced the making of some parts of the Dreamliner to26

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a producer in South Carolina - Vought. (Boeing currently focuses on design, marketing1

and final assembly. They have sold off lots of its factories that made parts for2

airplanes. This outsourcing has been part of the ongoing dialogue with Boeing for3

many years4

Vought also created a joint venture with5

another manufacturer, Alenia. The joint venture was called Global Aeronautica. My6

understanding was that they were having a lot of trouble with fabrication of the7

Dreamliner parts which was putting Boeing far behind schedule. Then Vought at some8

point, entered into discussions with Boeing and at some point in 2008, Boeing bought9

Vought. The same day that this occurred, the bargaining unit in at the Vought plant10

filed a decertification petition. All of the stories in the news media stated that if IAM was11

decertified at the South Carolina plant, that Boeing would place the second Dreamliner12

line in that plant. The union was then decertified.13

5. The media reports since the 2008 strike said that Boeing didnt want to put the second14

line in the Puget Sound area because of labor strife. Then the media reports started15

saying that Boeing would put the second line in the Puget Sound area if the union16

agreed to a 20-year agreement. At some point, there was a quote in the paper or a17

press release from our union18

that if Boeing wanted to do that, it should come talk to us. I do not have those articles19

currently, but I will provide copies to the Board Agent.20

6. said wanted me to join21

in Chicago to talk to Boeing about a long-term agreement. The agreement would22

be between Boeing and the Union and entered into in order to eliminate the possibility23

of strike activity for a long period of time at Boeings airplane factories represented by24

IAM. the negotiations with Boeing about keeping the25

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Dreamliner in the Puget Sound area and about coming up with some sort of long-term1

agreement.2

7. not aware of any3

effort that Boeing officials made to talk directly to the Union about addressing the4

Companys concerns. My understanding from was that if Boeing wanted a long-5

term agreement, that it needed to be a long-term collective bargaining agreement that6

covered the entire multi-state bargaining unit. It was the Unions position that we didnt7

just want a strike agreement stating that if there was some sort of dispute, that we8

would just go to an arbitrator instead of striking; we wanted an overall contract9

protecting all of our unit members. (At this point in time, we were in the first year of a10

four year agreement; the current collective bargaining agreement expires in 2012).11

8. It was agreed that we would meet with Boeing in early October 2009. This was kept12

quiet - there were no press releases or anything else that I am aware of regarding our13

meetings. I was not aware that the Union had any meetings with Boeing prior to the14

15

16

9. Over the course of about three weeks in October 2009 I participated in17

meetings at which officials from the IAM and The Boeing Company met for purposes of18

negotiating Boeings request for a long-term collective bargaining agreement. I19

understood from that the purpose of these meetings was to discuss what Boeing20

wanted in order to build a second Dreamliner 787 line in Puget Sound rather than South21

Carolina.22

10. The first of these meetings took place on October 1, 2009, at a hotel in Chicago.23

Boeing headquarters is in Chicago and we also felt that having the meetings there was24

a way to keep the meetings out of the media.25

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11. Vice President of Human Resources for Boeing Commercial Airplanes Doug Kight, Vice1

President for Operations Ray Conner, Vice President of Labor Relations Gene2

Woloshyn, and General Counsel Joan Clarke attended on behalf of Boeing. For the3

Union,4

5

6

12. The first meeting on October 1, 2009, was very short and lasted only one or two hours.7

It was very informal. are attached as Exhibit A. Ray8

Conner was the lead spokesperson for Boeing9

although everyone spoke at some point during the meeting. We all10

introduced ourselves and then Ray said that getting the work for the Dreamliner second11

line in the Puget Sound depended on a long-term agreement so there wouldnt be any12

work stoppages. He said the customers were buying things well in advance and didnt13

want disruptions which could prevent Boeing from delivering the planes on schedule to14

the customers. He also said that historically they had15

16

That was the Rays main thrust. responded17

by saying that we were interested in exploring a long-term collective bargaining18

agreement but we had concerns about how to handle disputes under the agreement,19

that we needed to handle economic issues for the long term and we needed to create a20

new relationship with Boeing. said that we needed a process to reconfirm the21

contract every three years to deal with contract bar issues. My understanding was that22

we were both (Boeing and the Union) talking about a new collective bargaining23

agreement that would cover all employees (not just those working on the Dreamliner).24

25

26

Arguably Ex. 4

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bargaining unit.) Ray informed the Union that Boeing wanted to negotiate about the1

787 work, but was not open to discussing any of the 787 derivative work. (Derivative2

work is future plane models based on the Dreamliner technology and processes.) Ray3

expressed that he was concerned that we would have another strike when the contract4

expired in 2012. expressed the Unions concern that a long-term agreement5

would waive the members right to strike for many years, so we needed to have the6

contract terms clearly worked out; that we wouldnt just do a no-strike pledge with7

binding arbitration every three years. Ray also discussed other economic issues,8

specifically productivity (bonuses) and profit sharing (an incentive program). Boeing9

wanted productivity and profit sharing to get flexibility and have compensation tied to10

how the company was performing. I dont believe that the current agreement contains11

productivity and profit sharing. The primary reason to add this in to a new agreement12

was to give the company some flexibility as to what it labor costs would be. (As13

discussed in later meetings, the thought was that the company could, for example,14

lower yearly wage increases but at the same time allow employees to get bonuses15

based on production and profitability.) We didnt get into details about this, it was just a16

basic discussion about including such a program into a new agreement. Ray also17

raised the issue that if we were going to have a long-term economic package, Boeing18

would need a trigger that if something terrible happened to the economy (like 9/11),19

they could have an escape clause to get out of their economic commitment.20

21

22

Doug Kight (Doug was very involved in the 2008 strike negotiations; he was the main23

spokesperson for Boeing in the strike negotiations).24

13. The point of this whole meeting was just to figure out if we should even be talking to25

each other. The end result was yes - the Union and Boeing should talk more to see if26

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we could resolve the issue as to where to place the second line and at the same time1

negotiate ecomonic terms for our whole unit. Ray to make proposals that2

would result in a long-term collective bargaining agreement containing a no-strike3

clause. One of the Boeing representatives at the meeting stated that Boeing was4

seeking a minimum of an 8 to 10-year long contract tacked onto the end of our current5

agreement which didnt end until 2012 (so the new contract would end in 2020 or6

2022). I dont recall that we responded to this. I dont recall if we agreed to a new7

meeting date, but we did agree to meet again. This is all I currently recall from this8

October 1 meeting. I came out of the meeting with the thought that we would be able to9

reach an agreement.10

14. At some point after the meeting, that the next meeting would be on11

October 7.12

15.13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

(Under the last contract, we were getting betwee general wage increases24

(GWI) plus COLA (usually about of inflation percentage),25

))26

Arguably E...

Arguabl... Arguably Ex. 4

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1

2

3

4

5

attached as Exhibit B.6

16. On October 7, 2009, we had our second session in Chicago,7

are attached as8

Exhibit C. We engaged in pleasantries, then Ray spoke. Again, although I dont recall9

the specific words, I recall Ray emphasizing the need for a long-term CBA to avoid10

strike activity. I also recall Gene Woloshyn describing what Boeing wanted in an11

economic package for the new, long-term agreement. I believe Gene, it may have12

been someone else, drew a figure on a flip chart (We will13

provide the Region with a copy of the actual flip chart used in the meeting.) At the14

bottom of the chart was COLA (we werent talking specific numbers at this time). Then15

on top of that was a general wage increase (GWI). Then on top of that was the16

incentive (bonuses) linked to the productivity plan; depending on how much you were17

above or below the target would determine the amount of the bonus. He showed this18

on the chart with a box for performance and one for over-target. The incentive would19

be based on some sort of matrix including productivity, quality, and cost. The plan20

would possibly be the same for management. Also the criteria might also include21

22

I dont recall if23

there was a response. Someone brought up24

Im not exactly sure what this means but it is something about efficiency. I think Boeing25

brought it up, but I dont recall exactly what this was but I guess it was tied to the26

Arguably Ex. 4

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productivity. In any event, I dont think the was ever brought up again. Someone1

from our side, I dont recall whom, didnt want included in the productivity issue2

because it might be an incentive for employees3

I dont recall Boeing responding to this comment. (But was4

never brought up again, so it seems Boeing understood our concerns on this issue.)5

There was some general discussion for the need to communicate the incentive6

programs clearly to employees. We also talked about man-hours per plane. The7

company uses something called notice of escape.8

but it deals with when a plane part has to be replaced -9

10

Then we discussed Portland which is a machine11

shop - the issue was how would their productivity be measured? Portland does12

machining work for parts put on planes in Puget Sound. The Boeing reps said they13

would have to think through on how they would have to deal with Portland on this issue.14

So the questions was what exactly was the productivity concept - do you have the15

same productivity measurement for different places that do different work, e.g. making16

machinery versus putting parts together. At some point, said that there needed to17

be a joint committee that would be reviewing all the different measurements and would18

oversee the productivity plan and the long-term agreement during the term of the19

contract. At some point, we also discussed triggers again (we also referred to it as a20

circuit breaker). Someone from the company said that some possible circuit breakers21

22

Using these types of criteria, we wold come up with a trigger resulting in the company23

having an out regarding specific economic terms such as GWI (when they could delay24

or cancel the GWI). We just talked about this in general terms; we did not determine25

what the exact numbers would be where the company could opt out. There was also26

Arguably...

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some discussion about how often the payouts would occur under the profit sharing1

plans. (These negotiations were not super-structured so we bounced around a lot2

regarding the different subjects.) talked about being able to reaffirm the3

CBA due to contract bar issues. Someone said whether we should write a letter to the4

Obama administration to get a longer contract bar time frame created specifically for5

Boeing talked about that there needed to be a process where the Union6

would have a trigger - that if the company broke all the agreements, that we could opt7

out too - that we wouldnt be tied into the contract under extreme circumstances. I think8

at this meeting we came up with the example that if we went to an arbitrator and the9

company did not comply with the arbitrators decision, that could possibly be a trigger to10

get out of the contract. mentioned job security and mentioned it in a way tha11

meant job security for all bargaining unit employees, not just those on the Dreamliner12

project. talked about that if we had this long-term agreement, we needed to13

have a better relationship with the company. We couldnt be holding hands in Puget14

Sound and then fighting about our unionizing drives elsewhere. There was some more15

discussion of a joint committee - who would be on it, how often they would meet, what16

type of information they would get, what information could be shared with the general17

membership, that it wouldnt be about solving grievances, and this would be the same18

joint committee that would be overseeing the profit sharing and productivity program.19

20

21

22

This meeting lasted for a few hours and was very cordial. This is all I23

recall from this meeting.24

17. The next day, October 8,25

26

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1

2

3

4

18.5

are attached as Exhibit D talked about the safety valve for the6

Union - the Unions trigger. Whether we would have some sort of mechanism as to7

what we could do if the company broke the agreement. Ray then said they would8

agree that there should be some sort of joint committee to try to resolve disputes. Then9

said that we should have a GWI of 3% a year plus the current COLA, plus a10

payout of under the incentive productivity plan. Ray said that the GWI could not11

be at a 3% level plus everything else said that in order to get the membership to12

ratify the agreement, we should give them a reason as to why they should vote in favor13

of it suggested that in the future the pension should increase by14

15

currently the new hires are in Boeings16

defined benefit plan. (Our current and past agreements, in general, determined17

pension in the following way -18

19

Also, in prior negotiations, Boeing had said they didnt want new hires in its20

defined benefits pension plan that is a Taft-Hartley plan, so we knew this was an issue21

for them.)22

At this point, was laying out all these ideas, so there wasnt much23

discussion - I dont recall responses. talked about how we needed strong24

neutrality language for organizing elsewhere said we cant be loving here while you25

fight us in other locations and that we must have this if we move in a new dimension. In26

Arguably ...

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1

2

But in order to settle the strike we agreed that the3

4

So in these negotiations stated that since a new CBA5

would be long-term, the employees should get the plan improvements that Boeing had6

taken off the table during the strike negotiations (the non-union employees had7

received the improvements.) (Our mindset, again, was that the company wanted the8

long-term CBA so they needed to give the employees a reason to accept a long-term9

agreement.) Page 2 of Exhibit D lists the benefits that may have been on the table10

during the strike discussions (it was unclear exactly which ones were included so we11

discussed the items listed in Exhibit D). Gene said that employees would have to start12

sharing the cost of health care increases and it would be better to do it incrementally13

than as a big hit. talked about the need for job security for the work done by14

the bargaining unit. said that we were willing to work with Boeing for15

improvements, reduction of costs, and new technologies for all the airplane lines, not16

just the Dreamliner finally said that there needed to be some sort of ratification17

bonus if the employees agreed to the new long-term agreement such as I dont18

recall a response. Again, we were just throwing out these ideas with more specifics19

than our last meeting and without too much discussion. I do not recall details of the20

companys response to our oral proposal. This is all recall from this meeting.21

19. On October 9, 2009 an email to Doug22

Kight requesting information that the Union needed in order to consider the Companys23

ideas. information requests is attached24

as Exhibit E. The reference to St. Louis is because we have a separate machinists25

bargaining unit in St. Louis26

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20. Doug Kight emailed The attachments to the email are1

attached here as Exhibit F.2

3

Doug provided the attachment in response to Exhibit E, page4

3, the first three items under the heading of St. Louis. The document provided was the5

6

21. On October 14, 2009, Doug Kight emailed a partial response7

to provide more information as it came available. Dougs email8

attachments included a cover letter which listed the information he provided9

10

attachments also included documents that I have not included in this affidavit due to11

some potential confidentiality issues. Those documents are:12

13

14

15

Dougs October 14 email with his October 13 letter is attached16

as Exhibit G.17

22. On October 15, 2009, we held another negotiation session in Chicago.18

19

20

21

attended this meeting. The same four individuals for Boeing attended.22

23

24

25

26

Arguably Ex. 4

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6

7

8

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Ex. 6, 7(C), 7(D) and arguably 4

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23.5

attached as Exhibit H. Ray Conner talked about how he was going to have a meeting6

with the Board of Directors on October 26 and he wanted to give a progress report on7

our negotiations at that meeting. He said that it would be great if we had this worked8

out by them response was that there was not much time before the 26th

; we9

could negotiate a structure, but we would have to go through a process where we10

involved the local people and had them vote on the agreement said that we11

needed enhanced job security if we were giving up the right to strike. When I refer to12

job security, I mean in the broad sense issues involving outsourcing work, transferring13

work to other Boeing, non-unit facilities, and addressing changes in demands for14

products and new technologies. Then Ray gave a 15 or 20 minute explanation as to15

how Boeing sees the future developments in the market, where they see competition,16

and where they see Boeings growth. He explained why our members should view it17

important to see the Dreamliner operation in Puget Sound - that the Dreamliner is the18

future. He said the processes that support the Dreamliner will follow where the second19

line goes. (Portland does machine work to support Puget Sound, but if the Dreamliner20

leaves the Northwest, then so would the supporting machine work.) He talked about21

how we had the skills to do the work in Puget Sound and it wasnt in the Machinists22

interest to have the Dreamliner leave Puget Sound. In essence, Ray was giving us a23

sales pitch as to why we should enter into the long-term agreement responded24

tha understood what Ray was talking about but we needed to address peoples25

perceptions and the media reports about a 20-year agreement - we had been left26

Ex. 6, 7(C), 7(D) and arguably 4

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wondering why the company didnt come talk to us about i said that it was good1

that we were keeping our current talks private in that it was helping us make progress.2

said it would be a tremendous feat to get a long-term contract ratified. Ray3

responded that the two major issues from their perspective were a no-strike provision4

and reopeners (this was to deal with the contract bar issues and address unexpected5

issues that may come up that need to be fixed), and that they wanted a 20-year6

duratio responded that the 20 year contract was impossible. But said we7

could do a long-term agreement if the compensation and incentive pay was there and8

that we could keep adding extensions to the contract explained that we could,9

during a reopener occurring way before the end of a contract, add years onto the end of10

the agreement. That way, the contract could be extended long before there would be11

any need for a strike said that we would have to change the ways we did things -12

that, again, we needed a different relationship with Boeing and reemphasized a need13

for a joint committee. Gene piped in and said Boeing was willing to consult with us but14

they werent going to co-manage with us. said that on some issues, we would15

need more than just consulting. Ray then said they needed to know our duration - how16

many years of a contract we would agree to said that it would depend on how17

much money Boeing would put in the contract for wages, bonuses, and benefits. So at18

this point, we are doing a dance since Boeing had not given us a written proposal or19

spelled out the economics. It was hard for us to commit to anything without knowing20

the numbers. At that point, Ray said that Boeing needed to move towards market21

wages and benefits - they didnt want our members getting paid so much more than22

everyone else that it would make them uncompetitive. Ray said he was okay with23

talking about COLA, GWI and productivity pay, but the IAM proposal that we made in24

our last meeting would not work. So he was saying, in essence, that the concept about25

COLA, GWI, and productivity pay was good but we were asking for too much.26

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Specifically, Ray said that he didnt agree with our proposal; he said GWI plus COLA1

needed to be 3.5 percent or lower, but that productivity could help raise this number.2

He also said that on health care there needed to be cost-sharing but they could make3

some improvements to wellness and other items (that were on the table during strike4

negotiations). Ray also said for the health cost-sharing, after 2012 the company would5

6

In countering7

ension proposal, Ray said they could not8

9

10

11

Ray then said they only wanted new employees in a defined contribution plan rather12

than a defined pension plan. (Right now all bargaining unit members are in Boeings13

defined pension plan had been suggesting that instead of putting them in14

Boeings defined pension plan, put Gene said that15

Boeing didnt like16

Ray said that was a non-starter.17

Gene responded that any advantages were not enough to18

outweigh their opposition Gene said the UAW19

in Philadelphia agreed to and he would get us a copy of that20

agreement. I am not aware that he ever provided this to us. how much they21

would contribute for the new hires and Doug responded that he thought said22

that if you put too many things like this in the package, it is going to make it harder to23

get it ratified. We then took a break for lunch.24

24. The October 15 talks resumed at 2:00 p.m. went back to the earlier discussion25

and said that we were willing to work on a incentive/productivity pay26

Arguably Ex. 4

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and contribute towards health care costs,1

but we needed to get a wage increase somewhere around 3% GWI plus COLA and we2

wouldnt accept new hires not being in a defined pension pla proposed doing a3

new agreement that would go through 2018 talked about how to re-open the4

contract and add extensions onto the end of the contract to resolve issues or problems.5

said that there should also be a signing bonus to entice people to sign the6

ratification.7

then talked about how to make a new contract appealing to members so8

that they would ratify it. said we needed to plus up - give a reason why members9

should vote on a new contract.10

25. Doug then mentioned integrity and 3-year re-openers.11

Ray said that six years wouldnt get us to a deal12

(meaning having the contract end in 2018). responded again with neutrality and13

trust issues. asked about maybe doing some sort of14

Doug said the retirement average15

hen Gene threw out that they wanted newer, lower wage structures for16

new hires - this was the first time this was brought up. said we wouldnt do that.17

18

19

them). Then Ray stated that after 2012, wages and COLA couldnt be more than 3.5%.20

issue as to what if inflation was high like at 4 or 5%? Then Gene said, well21

then youd get more no, you just said we couldnt get more than 3.5%. So22

we had this whole confusing discussion as to whether 3.5% was a max or not. At this23

point, I think we took a break.24

26. When we came back, Doug started the discussion by giving us a handout that is25

attached as Exhibit I. but it is not numbered26

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sequentially so Im not sure if pages are missing.) It was entitled Health Care Plans 1

Medical Cost Development, Plan Offerings and Plan Design October 2009. Our2

current contract plan is that our members3

4

5

cost. Doug gave examples showing what the companys proposal was.6

Previously they7

said they were proposing Now they were8

saying the company would pay9

We10

asked them to show us how this proposal would fit with the current contract language.11

We wanted to know how this proposal would work with the current language up until12

2012 when their proposal would kick in. They said they understood it was confusing,13

and would get back to us with more answers and clarification. (It seemed to us that for14

the current contract, this was a worse deal than we currently had.) We never received15

answers to our questions about the health care proposal. I believe the meeting ended16

at that point. We left planning to meet again. Im not sure when the next bargaining17

session was scheduled, but our next meeting was on October 20.18

27. I flew into Chicago the morning19

20

21

In this response, Doug added to his October 14 letter -22

it contained new and previously provided information. Exhibit J attached. Attached to23

this letter, Doug gave us 2 items: Airplane Programs which shows historical24

proprietary productivity data back to 2004 - it reflects manufacturing unit hours and25

customer introduction hours (hours added because of customers special requirements)26

Arguably Ex. 4

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"of October 20 for another round of negotiations"

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per airplane. document that is entitled Performance-Based1

Incentive Plan. This was a proposal that he gave us for the specific purpose of our2

negotiations for the long-term contract and laid out the concept for a profit sharing plan.3

4

5

meeting. This 32-page document explained in much greater detail Boeings ideas6

about a productivity pay system.7

8

9

28.10

11

12

are attached as Exhibit L.13

Ray Conner again talked about Boeing being close to making its decision on the site for14

the 787 second line. He said it would be a topic of discussion at the Board meeting on15

October 26. He talked about the Dreamliner being the future of airplane production;16

how the Company expected Airbus to catch up with Boeing; and how Boeing wanted to17

use the Dreamliner technology to make other large planes. He said that we should18

want to keep all the production in Puget Sound and if the second line moved elsewhere,19

the fabrication work would follow wherever the planes were made. (Some of the20

fabrication work was produced by non-Boeing plants here in Seattle, so the implication21

was that not only would we lose Boeing unit work, we would also lose non-Boeing22

machinist work in Puget Sound.) asked if the company would commit to a23

single source (the Dreamliner being built only in Puget Sound) but received no24

response. Someone from Boeing said that they wanted a 13 year contract.25

said that 13 years for the length of the contract was a huge ask (the current 3 plus 1026

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Page 22 of 28

have? said if they really wanted a long term deal then they would have a lot of1

hard questions from the unit. restated that the company needed to show2

commitment and brought up Ray then said dont discount3

if the second line goes. Again, his whole argument was that we should want the4

second line in Puget Sound because if they moved it elsewhere, there would be a5

competing center using the same technology. So he was saying dont discount the6

threat of the ramifications of moving the second line said that we understood the7

second line was important. Ray said that he needed to know what we were thinking8

about the triggers. I dont recall us responding to this said that well know if a9

deal is sellable, 9 years is a big deal, we need we need to be involved in10

work decisions, and there either has to be a profit sharing plan or some guaranteed11

money. Ray said that they would12

this was to ease our concerns that there would not be a payout. We then took a break.13

29. When we came back from break, Ray said that he felt that the Union and the Company14

were far too apart and nowhere close to a deal said that there was nothing15

looming and that Ray was the one setting the deadlines and that we believed that we16

could come to a deal. Ray said they wanted to start building the production facility for17

the second line. basically said that Ray was threatening us. Ray said that was18

the reality said, we view this as a threat. said that we didnt agree that we19

couldnt do it - referring to reaching an agreement. said there was a place we20

could get to, but not at21

said that we22

needed to move forward and asked that Boeing give us a proposal. At that point we23

took another break.24

30. After the break came to the table and proposed an additional year to the contract25

length that we previously proposed, which would mean that the contract would end in26

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2019. went through our prior list again regarding GWI, COlA, that we would1

consider medical cost sharing in year2

and restated that we would like the improvements to the3

medical packages. said that until we agreed to the profit sharing program,4

employees should get payout yearly (this was because we would be ratifying5

the new long term agreement without the details of the profit sharing plan in place - we6

knew it would be too complicated to finalize before ratification of a new contract)7

reiterated the need for signing bonuses, mentioned that we needed to take care of8

9

restated needing10

and neutrality agreements for organizing elsewhere also brought up a11

12

Again, the company did not13

respond to this proposal. At that point, we broke for the day and agreed to meet the14

next day. Unlike all the other meeting days, there was frustration in the room - we set15

out our proposal and moved forward but the Company had not presented any proposal16

other than the changes to health care.17

18

19

20

31. We met the next day on October 21.21

attached as Exhibit M. The mood in the room was much better that morning. At that22

meeting, presented the Company with a draft concept proposal for a long-term23

agreement and the joint partnership committee. The proposal is attached as Exhibit N.24

We handed out copies to everyone in the room - they took time to read it. Someone25

asked how the proposal fit in with our current CBA Article 21.7 which is outsourcing26

Arguably Ex. 4

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Page 24 of 28

language - they wanted to know if they could still outsource work. We responded that1

we needed to talk about this more. Ray said that he didnt know if our proposal was a2

workable solution said he heard the reluctance but we need a long-term3

agreement that shows Boeings commitment to our bargaining unit. We wanted to4

make sure that job security affected all our unit members, not just Dreamliner5

employees. So, if we were going to agree to a long term commitment, Boeing needed6

to do the same for the whole unit. At this point we took a break.7

32. When we got back, Ray responded to our proposal by saying that the job security8

discussions were only for the second line and that they were not willing to talk about9

any other plans for the 787 technology. They didnt want to make commitments10

regarding other bargaining unit work. Ray also said that a 3% GWI for perpetuity was a11

problem taking us in a wrong direction. He then stated that he still wanted a longer12

contract than we had proposed then asked them to give us a proposal, and Ray13

said, we told you (implying that they had explained their proposal) said14

job security was paramount. We then took a break for lunch.15

33. After the break we resumed our talks at 3:20 p.m. When we came back added an16

8th year to the contract extension length, bringing the new contract to 2020. He then17

went over the same issues: bonuses at ratifications and at reopeners,18

ratification bonus for each employee, 3% GWI plus COLA. said for the19

profit-sharing plan, the target would be for20

21

raised the issue as to how soon we could start the22

incentive program - that we wanted a firm date. Ray agreed that that we should start23

the joint committee as soon as possible to create the incentive program (as said above,24

we all knew that it would be too complicated for us to get something together for the25

members to vote on - that it would later be created by the joint committee). So Ray26

Arguably Ex. 4

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Page 25 of 28

agreed that we should get the plan in place as soon as we could, and then Doug said1

that he thought 2011 was the earliest the incentive program could take place.2

3

4

said that we were willing to do the cost sharing, but5

modified the pension proposal6

7

Then Doug raised the circuit breaker/trigger issue again. We said we8

were fine with that concept but that it couldnt be too complicated. restated9

some of our other points such as neutrality, and job10

security. That was the end of the day. The mood at the end of the day was much11

better than the day before - we had made movements from our side and the Company12

seemed happier that we added another year and we had agreed that the profit sharing13

would take place as quickly as possible. We then left the meeting; I dont recall exactly14

how he worded it, but I understood that Ray was going to meet with the Board and then15

16

34.17

18

is the email correspondence at Exhibit O. His response isnt clear, but it seemd that he19

was not giving us information the Company had considered.20

21

22

35. October 26 was the day that we were expecting Ray to meet with the Boeing Board.23

36.24

25

26

Arguably Ex. 4

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Page 26 of 28

1

2

These emails are attached as Exhibit P.3

37. Sometime later that day on October 27, someone sent me a newspaper article that4

Boeing had decided to move the 787 work to South Carolina.5

38. After the announcement,6

7

39. I was surprised when I learned of Boeings decision because I did not think we were at8

impasse. I understood we had not reached an agreement, but we were waiting for9

Boeings response to the proposal had made on October 21. I had the impression10

that when we added the eighth year that we were close to what Boeing needed. I11

thought we were still in negotiations when we left the meeting on October 21.12

40 there are several items that the13

Company failed to provide. In looking at Exhibit 19, page 3, the third bullet down, the14

Company listed examples of productivity measurements used in fabrication but did not15

provide data.16

at the time Boeing announcement the placement of the second line to17

South Carolina. On page 5 under St. Louis at the fourth bullet, we wanted to know how18

19

However, the Company did not provide information for the fourth20

bullet.21

22

23

24

25

On the last page, the second bullet, we asked for quarterly data26

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Page 27 of 28

1

2

3

41. - this related to the triggers they wanted in case of an economic crisis. The Company4

said that they the triggers may be based on financial issues involving profit/loss and5

operating margin - so we needed to know what this information was. For example, the6

7

8

We just wanted to have a look at the history of9

Boeings finances so we could make a determination as to how we would determine a10

trigger point. These items, in addition to those discussed earlier, are the requests that11

have not been fulfilled by the Company.12

13

14

15

16

I am being provided a copy of this Confidential Witness Affidavit for my review. If,after reviewing this affidavit again I remember anything else that is relevant, or desireto make any changes, I will immediately notify the Board agent. I understand thatthis affidavit is a confidential law enforcement record and should not be shown toany person other than my attorney or other person representing me in thisproceeding.

I have read this statement consisting of 27 PAGE(S), including this page, I fully

Arguably Ex. 4

Arguably Ex. 4

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Page 28 of 28

understand its contents, and I state under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is trueand correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

X__________________________________

Dated: _______________________

Subscribed and Sworn To Before Me At

__________

National Labor Relations Board

NLRB-FOIA-000


29/484

ase 9-C A -3243

)SS

CO NFIDE NT IAL W IT N E ss A FFID A V IT

I , hereby state as follow s:

I

have been given assuran ces

by

an agent of the N ational Labor R elations B oard that this

onfidential W itness A ffidavit will be considered a confidential law enforcem ent record

by

the

B oard and w ill

not be disclosed unless it becom es necessary

to produce the onfidential W itness

A ffidavit in connection w ith a form al proceeding.

Ireside at

M y telephon e num ber

including rea C ode)is

am em ployed by

L ocated

at:

.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

0

P ffivA cy AcT

ST A T E M E N T

Solicitation

of the information

on this form is authorized

bythe National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),

29 U.S.C. 5 et seq.

The principal

use of the inform ation

is to assist the National Labor Relations Board

(NLRB) in rocessing representation

and/or unfair

labor practice proceedings and related proceedings

or litigation. The routine

uses for the information are fully

set forth in he Federal Register,

7

Fed. Reg. 74942-43

(Dec. 3, 2006). The NLRB will further explain these

uses upon

request. Disclosure

of this information to the NLRB is voluntary. How ever,

failure to supply the

inform ation m ay cause the

NLRB to refuseto process any further

representation

or unfair laborpractice case,

or m ay cause the

NLRB to issue you a

subpoena

and seek enforcem ent of

the subpoena in ederal court.

Page of

32

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30/484

2. w ill

be discussing

various m eetings in

this affidavit.

2

3

3.

In 2008, the IAM

w as negotiating

w ith B oeing

over

a successor

collective

4

bargaining agreem ent

for a

unit Including those

em ployees

in the

Puget Sound

5 area.

A

strike

began after

negotiations broke

dow n.

6

7

Ido not

recall that there

had

8

been any m ention prior

to o r

d urin g th is

tim e ab o u t a "first"

787

line,

it w as just

9 "th e 787 prog ram ."

It

w as m y und erstanding

from

0

and

th e m edia th at

th e S tatelh ad

succ essfu lly

n eg o tiated th at

the

com plete

787 program w ould be placed

in W ashing ton ;

I

to ok th is

to m ean th at

12

all

787 assem bly w ould

be in

W ashing ton .

T he o nly th in g

th at

w e had heard

from

3 anyone

a s o f th e tim e of

the 2008

n eg o tiatio n s, including

14

an d m edia rep o rts,

w as

th at

th e

787

w as secured

and aw arded to

5 W ashing ton ,

so there w as no exp ectation

that w e w ould have

less th an

th e entire

6 787

prog ram . A s part of th e effort to aw ard th e

787

to W ashing ton , th e U nion

7

lobbied

th e S tate to m ake

leg islative

changes

ben eficial

to B oeing, including

tax

8

in cen tiv es v alued

at

$3.2

billion,

in o rde r for

th e

787 to be sited

in W ashing ton

9 S tate.

20

21

-

at

this

22

po int,

w e

h ad no t heard

th at

th e B oeing

w as contem plating

a second

line.

W e

23

believ ed it

w as

already in th e

b ag ,

th at

all of th e

787

final

assem bly

w as

go ing to

24

be located

in P u g et

S oun dl

if exp ansion

of th e

787 w as

ever

n eed ed , th ere

w as

25

already plenty

of room

in E verett

to h an d le

any needed

ad ditional

cap ac ity .

The

26 w ay th e

E verett

plant is

configured

is th at

B oeing

rearranges

its

Page

2

of

32

"in 2003"

"due to the Project Olympus agreement"

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production/assem bly

areas w hen they need

m ore room in any given area. It

is

2 not

unusual to do this. So, if they needed

to expand production of the

787

3 beyond w hat w as being done at that tim e, w e just figured that they w ould m ake

4 room as they had

in the past for other projects. That

is w hy the om pany is

5 placing the so

called "surge line" there

-I'll

talk

about this at a later

point.

6

4. A s m ention ed,

the IA M m em bers w ent on strike on S eptem ber

6, 2008,

after their

7

co n tract

ex pired w ithout th e p arties reac h in g an

ag reem en t. T he strik e lasted

57

8

d ay s. A fter th e co n tract ex pired ,

9

0

The

p arties failed to reach an y

agreem ent. T he L ocal

U nion L ead ers w ere gettin g a lot of

flack from U nion

12 m em bers w ho w anted to

strike w hile th e U nion

lea d ersh ip w as still

trying to w ork

3

th in g s ou t. In th e en d , a con tract w as reach ed

an d th e strik e en d ed in O cto be r

14

2008.

5

.

atten d ed th e B oeing-IA M sum m it m eeting held A pril

5- 6, 2009, in h icag o.

6

P rior to this m eeting,

I

had no t heard an y rep o rts a b o u t an ex pan sion to th e

787

7 produ ction. T he sum m it m eeting

w as a forum

for th e h ea d s of v ario u s B oeing

8

dep artm ents

to hav e face-to-face

discussions

w ith th e IA M an d to talk op en ly and

9 co nfiden tially.

20

B oeing

C E O

Jim M cN erney

w as the chief spo kesm an

21

for B oeing

an d talke d ab o u t th e

com pany's

b u sin ess p lan s an d th e com p etitio n

it

22 w as facing.

H e w as cordial, as w ere th e U nion

rep rese n tativ es.

T here w as no

23 m ention of th e om pan y's

d esire for a long-term

agreem ent w ith

a n o-strike

24 clau se

-

at

th is point in tim e,

I

had n ot h eard an yth ing ab o u t a lon g-term

n o -str ike

25 agreem ent. W e

w ere at th e m eeting

to talk ab o u t ho w to do th in g s

b etter

26 to g eth er. T he on ly thing

I

recall b eing

said about

strik es w as th at bo th sid es

Page

3

of

32

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briefly expressed

that

it w as unfortunate that

a strike had

occurred. (H ow ever,

2 prior to this m eeting,

M cN erney

had repeatedly said

in the m edia

that the 787 w as

3

delayed b eca u se of o ur

strik e

-

he had

alw ays blam ed u s for

th e delay . T his

is

4

totally u n true - 57

d ay s o f strik e d o es n o t eq u ate

to a d elay of 2 y ears.

H e w as

5

m aking th ese statem en ts

to th e p ress

startin g in D ecem ber

2008

an d all th e

w ay

6

up throu gh

th e sp rin g

of 20 09 .

believ e th at

Jim A lbaugh

also m ad e sim ilar

7

statem en ts

du ring the sam e

tim e

p eriod.)

8

6.

D uring the sum m it

m eeting,

th ere w ere

p resen tatio n s ab o u t ev eryth in g

th e

9

B o ein g o m p an y

w as inv olved in from m ilitary c o n trac ts

to co m m ercial rep o rts.

0

D uring th e com m ercial

aiE ftad s by M cN ern ey

and

h is ex ecu tiv es,

th ey talked

abo ut

th e co m p etitio n for th e v ario u s p ro g ram s,

sa les, etc.

In th is g en eral

12 co n tex t,

th ey ju st said th at

there w ere go od

sales for th e

787

bu t th ey had m ajor

3

p rob lem s w ith sup p liers so th ere

w ere d elay s.

B y

th is tim e, th e p lan e w as

14

prob ably ov er

tw o y ears delaye d.

W e ju st talked gen erally a b o u t th e

state of

5

B oeing. T he talks w ere

gen eral as th e p o in t

of th e m eeting w as really to try

to

, 6

nurture a better relatio n ship an d learn h ow to spe ak cand idly w ith each o th er.

I

7

do n o t recall an y fu rth er

d etails from th is

m eeting.

I

d o n 't believ e th at at this

8

m eeting th ere w as a d iscu ssio n a b o u t B o ein g 's rep u tatio n , B o ein g 's

cu sto m ers,

9

or if the cu sto m ers w ere dem and ing

an y ch an g es. A t no po in t in th is

m eeting do

20

rem e m b er

th at

a second

787 line m en tion ed .

(H ow ever,

ju st a

few

m on ths ago,

21 w e fou nd o u t th at a t th e tim e of th e A pril 200 9 m eeting , bu t u n b ek n o w n st to u s,

22 th e o m p any h ad alread y hired a S o u th arolina lob by ist to n eg o tiate w ith S o u th

23 arolina leg islato rs

for a relocation initiative. S o

by

th e tim e of th e sum m it

24

m eeting , lo b b y ists h ad alread y

reg istered th em selv es

on behalf of B oeing in

25

S o uth aro lin a.

W e fo u n d th is o u t in repo rting req u irem en ts

by

th e S tate of

26

S o uth aro lin a. W e w ill be providing

th is inform ation

to th e B oard

A gen t.)

Page 4 of

32

"reports"

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7.

A fter the A pril

m eeting,

m aybe som etim e

in M ay or

June 2009,

m edia reports

2

started

c om in g

ou t ab o u t

B oeing w anting

to ex pan d

th e p ro d u ctio n

of th e

787.

3

T his is th e

first tim e I

had

heard ab o ut

any

exp an sion to

the 787

production

line.

4

S hortly

afterw ards,

there w ere com m ents

throug h

the n ew s m edia

an d politician s

5

th at

B oeing

w as look ing

for a 20-year

co n tract

w ith th e

IAM . T his w as

th e first

6

tim e I had heard

an y th in g

abo ut

a long-term co n tract.

A t the sam e

tim e, w e h eard

7

th ro ug h

m ed ia repo rts th at

B oeing w as

say in g th at th is

w asn 't ju st

an exp ansion

a

of th e

original

787

project;

B oeing

w as ch aracterizin g

th is as a

"new "

787

line (a

9

second

line) to b e p laced

so m e

place

else

-

they

m ad e it

so u n d as if it

w as a

0

com pletely

different

p ro ject th an

th e original 787

project

in ex isten ce .

W e w ere

b o m b a rd e d

in a v ery sh o rt

period

of tim e w ith th ese

rep o rts

from th e

m edia. A s

12

far

as

I

know ,

the U nion had

not

b een con tacted

at th at

tim e

by

B oeing

abo ut

3

th ese issu es -

w e

ju st h eard th e

inform ation

throug h

the m edia

rep o rts.

14

5

6

7

O n July 8,2009,

The

S ea ftle T im es

reported

U .S.

R ep resen tativ es

N orm D icks and

8

Jay

Inslee saying th at

Jim M cN erney

h ad m ad e

it clear

to th em th at the

9

M achinists'

strik es h ad driven

the om pany

to consider

locating

a second

line

20 for

th e

787

o u tsid e

of

W ashing ton state and

th at th e

m ain com petitor

w as S outh

21

arolina.

T he m edia rep ort

stated

th at R ep resen tative

D icks

said M cN erney

told

22

him th at

u n less B oeing g o t

a lon g-term

agreem ent

w ith a n o-strike

clause

from

23

th e M ach inists,

the om pany

w ou ld b uild

th e

787

o u tsid e o f W ashing ton .

T his

is

24

th e first

I

recall

abo ut B oeing

statin g th at

they w ould

place th e

2

d

line here in

25

W ashington

S tate only if w e

agreed to a

long-term no -strike

co n tract.

M y

first

26

reaction

w h en

I

heard

th is rep o rt w as th at th is

w as a ruse b ecause

the re w as no

Page

5

of

32

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34/484

such thing

as a second line. The w hole notion of a second line forthe

787

w as

2 an invention o n

the p art of the om pany. W ashington state had already w on the

3

787 - as explained above,

our understanding from the m edia and

4 w as that

all 787 production w as going to occur in W ashington. The idea of a

5

seco n d line w as ju st dribbled o u t

by

the com pany in

th e p ress ov er tim e. T he

6 om pany had no t talked

to u s ab o ut their d em an d s.

7 9.

T here w as nev er a d iscu ssio n

betw een m yself and the B oeing com pany abou t

8 w hat their sp ecific in ten t w as reg ardin g

th e

787. B y th is

I

m ean tha t

I

never

9 d iscussed w ith them

w hether they intend ed to assem b le

all

787

p lan es in

th e

0

S tate

of W ashington

indefinitely.

(I

am no t aw are th at other

U nion officials

d iscussed

th is issu e w ith B oeing .) H ow ever,

as

I

stated ab ov e,

it w as th e U nion 's

12

im p ressio n ,

3

th at th e S tate h ad n eg o tiated to estab lish th e

787

assem b ly lines

-

all of them

-

in

14 th e S tate of W ashin gton .

If

the com pany

had told th e S tate in

2003

th at th ey

w ere

5

ju st talking

ab o u t placing

ju st o n e line o f all th e 7 8 7 's fu tu re lin es

in W ashin gton ,

6

th ink th e d iscu ssio n s w ith th e S tate w ould h ave turned o u t differen tly

-

the S tate

7 w ould not hav e

ag reed to all th e eco n o m ic

in cen tiv es th at it g av e to B oein

8

0.

A fter th e n ew s rep o rts,

9

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Page

6

of

32

Redacted by affiant upon review

NLRB-FOIA-000


35/484

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

0

A s

far as

I heard, B o ein g 's

th reat

to place th e

12

second line

outside

of

W ashington

w as

solely dependent

on w hether

the

union

3

agreed

to the long-term

no-strike

contract.

14

5

. believe

th e o m p an y

w as

aw are

of

("'

q

ssl",I do

/,,

w

6

W ashing tor R A M and reinyufneeded political cover in light of th e

$3.2

Incentives

7

they have

received

back

in late

2003. believe

it w as

B o ein g 's

strateg y

to blam e

8 th e

U n ion 's

u nw illin gn ess

to ag ree

to a

long -term

no-strike

agreem ent

for

9

B o ein g 's d ecisio n

to site th e

second

line in S o u th

arolina

because

th ey

didn't

20

w ant

to lo se

the support

of th ese

p oliticians.

B y

th is

I m ean that

I

think

th at

21

B oeing

th ou gh t

w e

w ould

never

agree

to

a long-term

no-strike

agreem ent

and

22

th ey co uld

use

th at refusal

as

an excu se

to

place

the secon d

line

elsew h ere.

23

w e m ad e

it

very

clear to th e

p oliticians,

and

later to B oeing

a s detailed

24

below ,

th at

w e w o u ld

n eg o tiate

for a

lon g-term

agreem ent.

25 12. B oeing

announced

th rou gh

th e

m edia

in

July 20 09

th at

it w as b uy ing

the V ought

26

787

plan t

in S o u th

arolina.

In A ug ust

2009, th e

m edia repo rted

th at

B oeing

w as

Page

7 of

32

Upon review, r

"Congressional Delegation hold in Congress"

"the important leadership positions members of"

"Boeing"

Below, redacted by affiant upon review.

NLRB-FOIA-000


36/484

applying for building perm its

to construct a

building and clear

82 acres of land

2

for

parking and taxiw ays

adjacent

to the V ought

plant at the

harleston airport.

3

B oeing's continued

acquisitions

of facilities in South

arolina

heightened

anxiety

4

am ong the

business, governm ent

and labor com m unities

in W ashington State

5

that

the

787

second

line m ight

go elsew here.

A t this tim e,

w e knew

w e had a

6 problem

- it w as

clear B oeing w as

thinking

about m oving to S.

arolina.

B ut, at

7

the tim e,

I

still did not have

any d irect

contacts w ith

B oeing regarding the

above

8

issues.

9 13.A t

the request

of Scott arson,

B oeing's CEO

of om m ercial

A irplanes

at the

0

tim e,

a Portland

m eeting w as held

on A ugust

27, 2009.

elieve he arranged

this

m eeting

M y understanding

of the m eeting w as

that Scott

12

w anted

to continue

the dialogue

about how to w ork w ith

each other.

B esides

3

m yself, attending

for

the U nion

14

Scott

arson, D oug

5

K ight, R ay

onner

and G ene W oloshyn

w ere the

B oeing officials

present at

the

6

m eeting.

7

This A ugust

8 m eeting

w asn't

hostile and w e talked

openly.

arson

said "the future

of the

9

Puget Sound

is at stake." H e seem ed

genuinely concerned.

arson then said

20

that the only

w ay the com pany

w ould

place the second 787 line

in W ashington

21

w as if

w e agreed to a 20-year

agreem ent w ith

a no-strike clause. This

w as the

22

first tim e that

Ihad heard anything

directly from B oeing about their need

for a

23 second

line or a long-term agreem ent (previously

it had just

been m edia reports

24

and

A gain, B oeing m ay

have had conversations

w ith

25

or others about these issues,

26

It w as

clear

from w hat

he w as saying that

the long-term

agreem ent

Page

8

of

32

NLRB-FOIA-000


37/484

w as a com prehensive agreem ent that w ould cover all com m ercial airplane

2 em ployees. In this m eeting,

w e w ere looking

back at our history and looking

3 forw ard

to se e ho w th e c o n d u ct b etw een th e p arties co uld c han g e. if

4 B oeing w anted a long term

ag reem en t, w e need ed to do b u sin ess differently.

5

6

described a nu m ber of ac tio n s B oeing officials had

tak en to

7

m align our officers an d rep resen tativ es

in th e p ast. w e had had

8 problem s w ith

w ho , du ring th e 2008 n eg o tiatio n s, had d on e thing s

9 w here

it seem ed like w as deliberately

trying to cause a strike w ould leave

0

th e n ego tiation table an d th en go directly to the e m p lo ye es and ask them w hat

they w an ted in the co n tract (w e had filed a U L P ab o u t th is at th e tim e).

12 did no t defen d at th is point, ju st sat tjiere s ilen tly

- th is w as su rp risin g

3 because it w as expected that if w e a Isible o fficer like som eone

14

/w ould com e to defense, but they didn't.

W e also talked how another B oeing

5 official, had circulated

a m em o during the 2008 bargaining

about how to

6 have m em bers resign their m em bership.

w e didn't w ant these type of

7 people to

poison the w ell. W e explained that w e w anted m utual respect in our

8 relationship with Boeing. W e needed to do things in a respectful m anner.

9

said that

the U nion

20

didn't want to be in a position of negotiating with a com pany w hile that com pany

21 w as trying to get

rid of us. arson said that w as a reasonable

request

22

they couldn't act like they w anted to negotiate

a contract with us for Vought

and

23

then support a decert at that plant. W hen sensed that

24

m ight go

along with that shouted out, "I'm

not giving that up!"

By

this

25

understood to m ean that they w ouldn't agree to stop these tactics. Idon't

26

recall exactly how we said it, but we left Boeing with the clear im pression that we

Page 9 of32

E...

Ex. 6

Ex. 6

Ex. 6

Ex. 6

Ex. 6

"criticized"

Ex. 6"from Boeing's side of the table"

Ex. 6

Ex. 6

Ex. 6

Ex. 6

Ex. 6

NLRB-FOIA-000


38/484

w ere w illing to w ork som ething out, but

that it w asn't going to be a 20-year

no-

2 strike contract. This is all I

recall from that m eeting

-

it w as fairly

straight

3

forw ard.

4

5 14. The B oard A gent has asked m e

if, during the A ugust m eeting, or at som e other

6

tim e, w e

discussed w ith B oeing w hy it thought

it could p lace the second

787

line

7 outside of the State of W ashington or if the 2

d

line w as un it w ork. W e did n ot

8 have

th ese d iscu ssio n s. A s I stated , w e already rep resen ted th e em plo y ees

at

9 V ought - altho ugh I'm no t saying th at w e th o u g h t it w ou ld be ok ay to place the

0

seco n d line th ere. I'm ju st saying w e ha d th e V ou gh t plan t.

I

w ant to em ph asize

that the A ug ust m eeting w as very fo cu sed

on us explaining w hy w e needed a

12 new relation ship w ith th e com pan y. W e w ere also very fo cu sed on saying th at

3 an y n ew lon g-term co n tract w ou ld co ver all com m ercial p lan es, no t ju st th e 787.

14

L oo k, th e co n tract for th e

787 assem bly w ork in W ashington w as

w ith th e S tate of

5 W ashington , no t w ith u s.

6

7

8 N either in th is m eeting n or in any o ther m eeting

th at I had w ith B oeing

9 officials ov er th e

placem en t of th e 2

d

787 line did w e

d iscu ss th e issu e a s to

20

w hether B oeing had th e righ t to place th e 2

d

line out side of W ashington or

21 w hether th e w ork w as un it w ork. T he U nion ag reed to en g ag e in neg otiation s

22 ov er th e lon g term ag reem en t b ecau se B oeing had linked th e

need for a long-

23 term agreem ent to

th e p lacem ent of

the secon d 787 line. O ur go al w as to

co m e

24 to a reso lution w ith B oeing in order

to c on vince them to place the secon d

line in

25

W ashing ton .

P a g e 0 of 32

Ex. 6

Ex. 6

NLRB-FOIA-000


39/484

5.Som etim e around late O ctober 2009, just days after B oeing announced the

2 p lacem en t of th e 787 in S o u th arolina,

3

4

5

M m m m

6

7

8

9

0 0.

6.

F ollow ing the A ug ust

2009

m eeting, th e U nion received a letter d ated S ep tem b er

12 21,

2009,

from Jim M cN erney

3

14

5 0.

T his is

attach ed as E xh ibit

A . I

u n d erstan d th at

M cN erney sen t th e letter

6

after ag reein g to d o so

7

8

9

20

21 7.

w e agreed on

22

hicag o a s th e location

for sub seq u en t

m eeting s as that w ould be aw ay from

the

23 public

eye.

24

W e thou ght w e could m ake

p ro g ress w ith ou t

publicity; th e big

25

concern

w as the m edia and ex p ectatio n s of

th e pu blic and B oeing

em ploy ees.

26 T his w ou ld helpfully

allev iate th e p ressu re

of th e

ex p ectatio n s as to w hat w as

Page

of

32



NLRB-FOIA-000


40/484

going to happen w ith the negotiations. (W e norm ally tried to keep contract

2

negotiations outside of the m edia's reach.)

3

4

agreed to a

5 less form al stru ctu re for th e m eeting s; w e w anted everyon e to sit do w n an d hav e

6 op en and h o n est d iscu ssio n s.

7

8.

8

9

0

9.W e m et several tim es in O ctob er 2009. F or th e

first m eeting, O ctober , w e had

12

ad eq uate n o tice,

but all th e rest of th e m eetings w ere b ased

on very sh o rt no tice.

3

14

5

6

7

8

9

20

21

22

23

24

25 20.

IA M rep resen tativ es

to travel to hicag o on sh o rt

notice from

26

various p arts of

th e co un try to m eet on O ctob er 7-9

and 5- 6 only to

have

Page 12

of

32

NLRB-FOIA-000


41/484

B oeing

out the m eetings short.

2

3

4

I'll

talk about this m ore below . It w as

like they w anted

to m ake it appear

as if they

5

w ere neg otiating

but it w as clear they

w eren't serio u s

ab o u t it.

6 21.

did not

hav e any d iscussio n s ab ou t the pu rpo se

of th e O ctob er

7 m eeting s

other than w e w anted

to co n tin ue th e co n v ersatio n s

from th e A ug ust

8

m eeting

9 22. Prior to our first m eeting,

proposed to the om pany that

w e

0

hav e a fed eral m ed iator in th e roo m an d co n tacted a poten tial m ed iator.

B u t, G ene W oloshyn said they w eren 't interested in involving a

12

third p arty. S o n o m ediator

participated in th e m eetin g s.

3 23.

14

5

6 w e w ere

go ing to b e talking w ith B oeing ab o u t

a long -term no -

7 strike ag reem en t th at w ou ld secu re w ork for th e IA M th ro u g h o u t th e en tire m ulti-

8 state b argaining un it. O ur position w as very clear - if w e entered into a long-term

9 ag reem en t, w e d id n 't w ant to be

threatened w ith the m ov em ent of prog ram

w ork

20 o ut of th e bargaining unit a year after w e en tered into a long-term no -strike

21 ag reem en t (alm o st all of th e p lan es are up for red esig n, not ju st th e 787, and w e

22 d id n 't w ant B oeing to th reaten to m ov e th e up da ted p ro gram s o u t of P u get

23 S ou nd ). W e w ere loo king for job secu rity regarding th e assem b ly of ou r

24 airp lan es. W e w an ted to m aintain th e integrity of th e p ro gram s into th e fu ture.

25 F or exam ple, if B oeing w as going to create a new m od el

of th e 737, say the 737-

26 A , w e w anted assu ran ces that the new

737-A w ould be assem b led in o ur un it.

I'm

Page

3

of

32

NLRB-FOIA-000


42/484

not talking about w ork other than

assem bly.

2

3

4

5

6 24.T he first of the hicago m eetings w as held on O ctober ,2009.

7 R ay onner w as B oeing's lead negotiator. W e

8 arranged all the

chairs in a big circle and w e w ere all m ixed up together. Ican't

9 recall w ho opened. told

0

them that right now w e w ere proposing a six year agreem ent but that w asn't

chiseled in stone.

12 said th at w e d id n 't need to

3 get into

th e g eneral w age in creases and sig ning b o n u ses th at day , bu t th at if they

14 w anted th is new agreem ent, w e nee ded to think ab ou t new ideas. W e talked

5 briefly ab o u t th e need for incentive

prog ram s and som e type of a b on us

pay ou t

6 link ed to quality, productivity an d sa les so th at th ere w ould be a tran sp aren cy

7

com pon ent.

8

9

20

21 told th e om pan y th at th e

U nion w as w illing

22 to reach an agreem ent w ith them if there

is a deal to be m ad e w e w ill

23

m ake th e d eal.

24 25. R ay beg an w ith w riting th e n um bers "737" ou t on a bo ard. H e then talked ab out

25 th e 737 co m petition w ith

A irbu s and th en co ntinu ed w ith other

p rod u ct lines and

26 ho w the hine se and other co m petitors w ere ou t there. T hen h e talked ab out the

Page 14 of32

NLRB-FOIA-000


43/484

cargo

planes, the 737

again and w hat w as com peting w ith

the 737. H e then

2 m oved

to the 747 and w here they w ere

looking at grow ing in that area and that

3

the com petition

w as targeting these m arkets

including the R ussians. H e then

4

talked generally about the 787 and that they w ere having problem s

w ith the

5 suppliers. H e just gave a lengthy broad-brushed statem ent about the existing

6 program s and future program s. R ay onner said a six-year agreem ent

(to 20 8)

7

w ouldn't

w ork. That w as fine

R ay said they w ere only interested

8

in do ing an ag reem en t for th e

787

said th at w asn 't acce p tab le. W hat this

9

m eant w as th at he w anted a lon g-term co n tract cov ering

all of th e em p lo y ees in

0

th e ex istin g unit b ut w ou ld only talk a b o u t gu aran teeing assem b ly w ork for the

787

assem b ly em p lo y ees. w e have u n d er th e co n tract

-

12 th at w e are cu ffing th is long co n trac t bu t w ill only provide

3

secu rity

for a fraction of th em ? H e gen erally

talked about the

787

being the

14 future.

I

d o n 't recall if he said an y thing specifically ab o u t the p lace m en t of the

5 787

oth er

th an sayin g th at if th ey p laced th e s eco n d

line elsew h ere, th ey w ou ld

6 hav e to d u p licate sup p liers (no t u se th e

sam e su p p liers th ey

cu rren tly u se for the

7 787

line in E verett).

8 26.

th e

U nion w as in terested in exp loring

a long-term co llective

9

bargaining agreem ent bu t w e had co n cerns ab ou t how

to h and le d ispu tes un der

20

the ag reem en t.

w e w ere

co n cern ed th at a lon g-term

21

agreem ent

w ould w aive

th e

m em bers' righ t to

strik e for

m any y ears, so

w e

22 n eed ed to h av e th e co n tract term s clearly w orked ou t; w e w eren 't

g o in g to ju st

23 do a n o-strik e p led g e

w ith binding arbitration

every th ree y ears. W e talked

about

24

som e econo m ic issues:

ab o u t th e

nA ion b eing a defined

b en efit rath er

than

25

defined

ab o u t productivity

bonuses and an

incen tive pro gram

If

26

w ere

open to negotiate

all th ese su b jects.

R ay said B oeing w anted

Page

5

of

32

"contribution"

"benefit as Boeing wanted"

Arguably Ex. 4

NLRB-FOIA-000


44/484

em ployees to share in the costs of health c are

insurance

2 w anted to talk about things

that they had

3 offered in the p ast but had taken off the table. T hese

w ere all discussed in

4 general term s. w as

proposing a different kind of

5 relationship

6 how w e h ad to d o things

7 differently in th e future an d h aving the parties create an a tm o sph ere of m utual

8 resp ect. w e tak e do w n th e trad itio nal b arriers w e had b etw een u s an d

9

have a tran sparen t

relation ship. G ene W oloshyn

resp o n d ed , "E ven if no thing

0

h ap p en s, th is is a go od start." T his w as a clear indication to m e that he w as not

w ith u s in th at roo m . H e is th e n um ber tw o gu y in th e roo m . T his is how the

12 m eeting en d ed , he m ade th e com m ent

and then they w alked o ut. W e

did no t g et

3

into future w ork based on th e

787

tech n o lo g y . T his m eeting lasted all day.

14 for the m eeting w as to set o u t broad, co m p reh en siv e policies an d th en

5 ad d ress d etails at later m eeting s. B oeing said th at w e h ad given them a lot to

6 co n sid er and the y w ou ld g et back to u s.

7 27.

T he next set of m eeting s w ith B oeing

w as held o n O ctob er 7 and 8.

8 p re se ntin g o u r p ro p o sa ls. o p en e d by talking ab o u t in th e 2008

9 neg otiation s and con du ct. T his w as stated to begin talk abo ut

m utual resp ect

20 about bringing forth neutrality. to give an exam ple of past

21

problem s an d th en talk ab o u t ho w to fix th e p rob lem . If there w as

organizing

22

cam paign o r decertification, w e

needed basic rules that neither party

w ould

23

violate. th at w e d id n 't expect th e com p an y to lay dow n if w e

24 w ere organ izing/

w an ted a certain qu ality of co n d u ct betw een

th e p arties.

25

th is statem en t

throug ho ut

neg o tiatio n s.

26

w e

w eren't

hung

up

over

a

tim e

period

for

the

length

of

th e

co n tract,

rather

m o re

Page

6

of

32

"[ ] proposed a problem solving procedure" "outside of the normal grievance"

"procedures to address some issues like" "the incentive pay system Boeing wanted

Ex. 6

"but we had concerns about raids or decerts" "after the 3 yr bar expired, as it would

"in a long term a

NLRB-FOIA-000


45/484

on the content

of w hat

w e w ere doing.

that

if w e agreed

to

the

2 co n cep ts,

w e

cou ld extend

th e len gth

of th e co n tract.

I d o n 't recall

th at w e set

3 out

a spec ific

length of

th e c o n tract

in that

m eeting.

th is

w as like

4

any other negotiation

process

an d reiterated

w ere w illing

to

5 n eg o tiate.

W e

talk ed

m o re

ab o u t p roductiv ity

prob lem s.

needed

6

a trigg er

w hich w ould

allow it

to o pt o u t if th e

o m p an y

broke

all th e ag reem en ts;

7 w e

d id n 't

w ant to

be tied to th e

co n tract

un der extrem e

circu m stan ces.

T his

w as

8 to g et

them to

be

tran sp aren t

in

th eir

n eg o tiatio n s

-

if

their nu m be rs

they

9

n eg o tiated for th e b o n u ses and p rod uctiv ity m ea sures

w ere tran sp aren t, g reat,

0

B ut, w e needed a trig g er so th at w e could opt out if B oeing

did n o t

fulfill

its

p ro m ises.

I d o n ot recall

B oeing

talking a b o u t

need ing

th eir ow n trig g er.

12

if

w e w ere

to a g ree

to a long-term

deal, w e w ou ld

need

job

sec u rity

for

3 all

bargaining

unit

em ploy ees,

not

ju st th o se

w orking

on

th e

787, an d w e

w ould

14

need to

have

a b etter relatio n sh ip

w ith the om pan y.

T here

w as n o

resp o n se,

5

bu t th is

w asn 't

un usual

since

O n

6

m edical

7

8

9

20

talked

abo u t

hav ing

lab or

p eace .

th at th is

w as

not

ab o u t the

21

co m p an y

surrendering

an y th ing ,

it w as

abo ut

creating

a peaceful

environ m ent.

22

th e

U nion

soug ht

a code

of co n d u ct

aim ed

at creatin g

a

civil

23

relatio n ship

w h ere w e

cou ld

w ork

co n stru ctiv ely

w ith ho nesty

and m utual

24

resp ec t.

O u r

g ene ral to n e

w as

that w e w anted

to

w ork to g eth er.

25

28. R egarding

an incen tive

(productivity)

plan

ag ree to

a bo nu s

plan

26

tied to

quality,

productivity

and

sales.

Page

7

of

32

"we could a

Arguably Ex. 4

Arguably Ex. 4

"to tha

NLRB-FOIA-000


46/484

to d iscu ss how to

2

craft a produ ctivity program th at w ou ld be an o ffset to w ag es. W e w anted

3 tran sp aren cy so w e w ould kn ow all th e facto rs affecting quality and productivity.

4 th ey sho u ld tell u s so w e could g et th e righ t

5 peo ple in w ho cou ld w ork ou t th e n um bers. B oeing agreed.

6 29. T he E m ploy er d id n 't p ut forth any p ro p o sals th em selv es. T hey ju st m ade so m e

7 general statem en ts regarding w hat I recall th at they stated on health

8 co sts th at th ey w anted em ploy ees to sha re th e c o sts an d w anted to ren eg o tiate

9 th e ben efits ev ery th ree y ears and u se an arbitrator to m ake th e final d ecisio n .

0

w asn't go ing to w ork and

by

th e n ext day th ey ag reed th at w e co uld lock

in a plan up fron t for th e d uration of th e co n tract. Ifthere w ould be any ch an g es,

12 then the p arties w ou ld n eg o tiate and ag ree to ch an g

Documents

NLRB Production 9 Affidavits