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ANALYSIS OF CRUISE MISSILE VULNERABILITY WITHIN THE CONTEXT
OF THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS
By
Thomas M. Wilk
Project Report submitted to the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science
in
Systems Engineering
APPROVED:
a. O Brn tO Benjamin S. Blanchard Jr., Chairman
NL ee tL
Donald R. Drew Géorge A. Williams
April, 1996
Blacksburg, Virginia
Key Words: Systems Engineering, Vulnerability, Lethality, Cruise Missiles
C,
ANALYSIS OF CRUISE MISSILE VULNERABILITY WITHIN THE CONTEXT
OF THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS
By
Thomas M. Wilk
Committee Chairman: Benjamin S. Blanchard Jr. Systems Engineering
(ABSTRACT)
Anti-shipping cruise missiles are likely to pose a serious threat to U.S. Naval forces in
any future conflict. In order to adequately defend their assets, the U.S. Navy needs to
develop the means to defeat these systems. To do this, it needs to define and exploit
any vulnerabilities associated with them.
The Systems Engineering Process is used to define the vulnerability of a generic
cruise missile system. Initially, the requirement for a vulnerability analysis is
established. The functions associated with cruise missile systems are presented, to a
level in which components are identified. Existing systems are then compared,
providing a means in which a "typical" system can be identified. The failure modes
for this system are then defined.
Finally, a computer model of the missile is constructed and analyzed, leading to
numeric values for the measures of vulnerability to fragmenting warheads.
Page ADStraCt ooo ceccceececececceccececssveccocecsseacsevacseceesecenssavsecacsesesecsessseresssaerseeseesereneee: ii
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List Of Tables ooo... ooo ccccccccccccsccccescceceesceccecsecccececsecsacenccscescsasencececesecasesaceecenseceseeneceees vi
Introduction ooo. cecceececeeccsceecencececcceaceccecceaceseesceccacesceecsaresscsseccuscesssarcuseascenesceaeeee: 1
1.0 Statement of Need ooo ccccccccceccccescceccecececseesccececeseceeeceseesecsecsceseeeeneeeen 6
1.10 Definition of Threat... ooo ecccccccccccccccescecesccceseccecsscceesacesssseeenes 7
1.1.1 Characteristics of Cruise Missiles... cecceeeseceeecseeeeeeee 7
PVD Structure. ccc cccccceccceccecceccececeseceseseecesececeesereeeee 7
1.1.1.2 Propulsion ooo... ceccceccccecceecceceseceeceeececsnseessseeeseees 8
1.1.1.3 Guidance and Control ooo. ccceccccccecceescececsceeseeeeeees 10
1.1.1.4 Flight Paths occ ccccccccccccccsseecesseesesseeecseteessseeeeese 13 DeV.1.5 Munitions ooo. cccecccecccceecceceecccecsecceccecesececeescecssceeeaes 14
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1.2 «Current Status oooooiiccicccccccccccccccccccccessesececececcceesseceeessecsnsssasersceseeeses 15
1.30 Fatture Trends ooo ccccccceccceccceceecececccececeeceeceecceercesecsseeseeasensseeeeeees 15
V4 COmchasion ooo ceccccceccesceccecceseescecceccesccesesscsaveccesceseeatesceaeeaeess 16
2.0 Functional Analysis ooo ooo ccccccccccccccccceccccceccceccecceseceseessesseesesaseseeesecesceeeeses 16
2.1 Development of Functional Flow Diagrams. ooo. eeeeeeeeeeeeeee 17
2.2 Allocation of Requirements...o0 o.oo cccceccccccccccecesccecceseeseescesensecseeee 31
2.2.1 Missile Characterization ooo... ooo cccccccccccccecscecsecencceseceseeeees 31
Q.2.1.1 Range ooo ecccecccecceccceccescecesceceseesecseeseeseseescasesesereseees 31
2.2.1.2 Flight Profile ooo. ccccccecceccccsecccsceccescesceeceeceseeeeeee 31
2.2.1.3 Speed oii ccccccccccccecccesceeceessececersecesscessessestaccrsecseeeeee 32
2.2.1.4 Guidance Characteristics 2200... occccccceseceseessecseseceseees 32
2.2.1.5 Control Characteristics 2000000000 ooooecccecccccecececeseceseecseeseee 32
2.2.1.6 Munitions Characteristics ooo. ccccecccecccecceecceeseeseeee 32
2.2.2 Warhead Characterization .ooooooo.oo..ccccccccccesccceeceseceeccesceeseeeeee 33
2.3. Trade Off and Optimization 00000000 ooo ccecccccccecececscceccececeseceeceseceee 33
2.4 Conclusion 36 De Oe ee ROR ROO ERO OP ROH Re eRe OREO ORE OO EE DOH ew Ede sont Meee BEE ROH e ewes eees
ili
3.0 Failure Amalysis ooo... o..oecccccccccccccecccecececceccceccceccencececeescececeecceeeceeseeeseesseeceesees 37
3.1‘ Failure Modes and Effectiveness Analysis (FMEA) ....................00... 37
3.2 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) ooooooooooo.cccceccccccccceeccecceccceccecceseeseeeeceeececee 46
3.3 COMCHUSION ooo ceeeccecceccececceccceccecececececcceceecersesecssceeceuceseeseeseess 52
4.0 Vulnerability Analysis ooo... ccc cccccccccccscccsccescceeccceccececceeecceeccececeeesceesceeses 52
AL Untroduction ooo cece ccccccccccecccesccesscececeeseceecceessceeceecececesecesereneees 52
4.2 | Computer Programs For Vulnerability Analysis 00... eee: 54
4.3 COVART Assessment of a Cruise Missile Target 00.0... 59
4A Comet ooo ceccccsescceccccccscceseesceseceeccrsecscesccaseescessesseensesses 62
CONCIUSIONS ooo ooo ccc cccccccccescceseccccesccececsccsccesscesscessessecsecesecssecscsssesssesasesseseressasesseceee: 88
Bibliography .oooooo..ooococccccccccccecccesccescceeceecevecesseeessesecesessessssessesssesesecsessereceseseeeteeseeseces 89
iv
Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3
Figure 4
Figure 5
Figure 6
Figure 7
Figure 8
Figure 9
Figure 10
Figure 11
Figure 12
Figure 13
Figure 14
Figure 15
Figure 16
Figure 17
Figure 18
Figure 19
Figure 20
Figure 21
Figure 22
Figure 23
List of Figures
Page System Level Definition For Cruise Missile Vulnerability ... 2
Process For Analyzing Cruise Missile Vulnerability _............ 5
Top Level Functional Flow For A Cruise Missile System ..... 18
Second Level Functional Flow - Missile Launch To Cruise.... 20
Second Level Functional Flow - Missile Midcourse Flight... 21
Second Level Functional Flow -
Midcourse To Target Acquisition. ooo... ..cccccceccceceseceeceeeeeee, 22
Second Level Functional Flow -
Target Acquistion To Intercept 0000.0. ccccceececceeccecccceeeeneeeees 23
Second Level Functional Flow - Damage To Target ............ 25
Third Level Functional Flow - Propulsion |...oo..........0...0.... 27
Third Level Functional Flow - Midcourse Guidance ............ 28
Third Level Functional Flow - Terminal Guidance ............. 29
Third Level Functional Flow - Target Tracking ...000000...00..... 30
First Level Fault Tree For A Cruise Missile System.............. 47
Fault Tree Analysis For A Cruise Missile Guidance
SYStOM occ ccccecceceeceececssseescsesesecseeenseseeeeecesenesseeseeeececesen 48
Fault Tree Analysis For A Cruise Missile Control System.... 50
Fault Tree Analysis For A Cruise Missile Propulsion
SYSTEM ooo ceccceccccesecseececesecsecceceeesevesecsestasessveceeasenseeserseven 51
Fault Tree Analysis For A Cruise Missile Warhead
SYSCOM ooo cccccccceccsccececessceececececesseceaecesseesscssasecesecsasenseeecseceee 51
Viper Cruise Missile ooo. ccccecccccccccecccescceeeceeseeseceessceees 55
Wire Frame Of Viper Geometric Computer Model .............. 56
Viper Propulsion System ooo... ..ccccccecccececececccessceescecsseeesseess 56
Viper Control System ooo... ccccceccceccceeceeeececeseceecesseeeee 57
Viper Guidance System ooo. eeccccecseeeceseeseeseeseveececeeees 37
Typical Pdh Curves ooo... ccccccceccccccccsecccesecececeesseeececeeeesseees. 67
Table 1
Table 2
Table 3
Table 4
Table 5
Table 6
Table 7
Table 8
Table 9
Table 10
Table 11
Table 12
ist of Tabl
Page Cruise Missile Systems Currently In Use o.oo... 34
Characteristics Of A Generic Cruise Missile System ........... 35
Failure Modes And Effects Analysis For A Cruise Missile
SYStOM cee cccccccscseseceecesssseseseseseceesenseecseseeesesenseseseeseneseee: 38
Components Included In Viper FASTGEN Model .............. 58
BASIC File For Viper Assessment ooo... ......cccccccceccceceeeseee, 65
THREAT File For Viper Assessment 200.0000. ooceccecceeeeeceee, 65
MV File For Viper Assessment _..oooo..o.....cccccceceeccessecececceeees 66
PDH File For Viper Assessment .ooooo..o.....cccccsccesccececeseceseees. 68
JTYPE File For Viper Assessment .2oooo...oo.oo.eccecccecceeeseeeeeee 70
Results Of COVART Assessment Of Viper:
0° Azimuth, 0° Elevation oo occ ccccccccccceceseceecceeeeeeee: 72
Results Of COVART Assessment Of Viper:
45° Azimuth, 45° Elevation. ooo... coc ccccceccccccescesceeceeseceeeneee 75
Results Of COVART Assessment Of Viper:
90° Azimuth, 0° Elevation ooo... cccececccccsccceesecescecseeseeeseeee 81
Introduction
The success of Operation Desert Storm created a false sense of security in the West. Iraqi
forces were unable to mount a serious offensive threat to coalition Naval forces. This
situation is not likely to translate into the future. Due to technical advances, limited
defense budgets, and active arms markets, U.S. naval forces may encounter serious
threats in the form of anti-shipping cruise missiles. These weapons are lethal and
increasingly prolific. To make matters worse, existing defenses may be embarrassingly
inadequate.
This report is concerned with the measures of anti-shipping cruise missile vulnerability. It
is divided into two sections. The first section provides background information on both
parts of the report title; vulnerability and cruise missiles. The second section involves
exercising an analysis of a generic, yet practical, cruise missile design.
The system in this case can be looked at in terms of a military conflict. There are two
opposing forces, and the system, as shown in Figure 1, can be defined on many levels.
Total Conflict, between a foreign nation and the United States, comprises the top level. A
Theater \evel system includes the armed forces of both sides and is limited by geography
(although the theater may cover an entire hemisphere). Naval Actions, which comprise
the third level, may play a dominant role in theater operations. The Operations, or Task
Force, level involves the interactions of groups of surface combatants, submarines,
amphibious forces and aircraft. The Unit level is concerned with the interaction of task
force elements. In this case, the interaction is between incoming foreign cruise missiles
and a U.S. Navy surface ship. Finally, this interaction is limited to one attacking cruise
missile and the warhead of a defending surface-to-air missile launched from a ship.
Both elements of this system must be designed, produced, maintained and operated. This
report looks at the interaction between these elements, which occurs during their
operational phases. In these phases, the cruise missile is being fired at a ship and the
warhead is detonating to damage the missile as a means of preventing it from hitting its
target.
TOTAL CONFLICT
FOREIGN ADVERSARY VS. UNITED STATES
THEATER
FOREIGN MLITARY FORCES VS. U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN STRATEGIC REGION
Y NAVAL ACTIONS
FOREIGN NAVY VS. U.S. NAVY IN STRATEGIC REGION
Y OPERATIONS/
TASK FORCE
GROUP OF FOREIGN NAVAL ASSETS VS. GROUP OF U.S, NAVAL ASSETS
1 UNIT
FOREIGN NAVY ASSET(S) VS. U.S. NAVY ASSET(S)
\
FOREIGN ANTI-SHIPPING CRUISE MISSILE VS.
U.S. SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE WARHEAD
Figure 1: System Level Definition For Cruise Missile Vulnerability
The measure of effectiveness of the cruise missile is the primary concern of the
vulnerability analysis. This is defined as the number of missiles hitting the
target/number of missiles fired or, if single missiles are considered, the probability of a
missile hitting a target. This could be expressed as follows:
measure of effectiveness = (1-susceptability* vulnerability)* prob(hit/sur vival)
Susceptability (designated Pp) refers to the probability of the missile being hit by a
damage causing mechanism. Vulnerability (designated Pk/n) refers to the missile's
inability to withstand damage. These two measures are dependent on the capabilities and
characteristics of the missile and the means intended to damage it. The probability of
hit/survival refers to the probability of the missile to hit the target in the absence of
damage mechanisms.
Ideally, the Navy would like to keep the measure of effectiveness as low as possible.
Realistically, a value of zero would not be practical. A factor of 0.05, however, would
be considered a reasonable objective.
The "problem" from the perspective of the surface ship could be identified as finding a
means of preventing an incoming missile from completing its mission. Preventing a
missile from sinking a ship involves identifying and exploiting any vulnerabilities in the
missile and its subsystems. This can be accomplished through either countermeasures or
kill mechanisms. Countermeasures are more likely to affect the sensor and guidance
systems, while kill mechanisms affect every subsystem. In most cases, only a few
components need to be damaged to disable an entire system. Often, rendering one
subsystem inoperable would be sufficient to prevent the missile from completing its
mission.
There is an old saying that recommends "knowing your enemy” if you hope to be
successful in defeating them. Cruise missiles are flexible weapons that can be launched
from surface ships, submarines, aircraft or land-based positions. A wide, and growing,
variety of these systems are currently in service. By most indications, these systems are
quite effective. Compared to ships and attack aircraft, in terms of money and human
safety, they are a bargain. They are deadly as well, to which experience in the Falklands
and the Persian Gulf can attest.
Cruise missiles, despite their capabilities (and reputation), have weaknesses. To
determine these weaknesses, the physical and functional characteristics of the specific
target must be carefully analyzed. In doing so, it can be seen that cruise missiles can be
looked at as systems that are composed of several subsystems. These subsystems
include: a) propulsion systems, b) sensor systems, c) guidance systems, d) control
systems, e) warheads and f) airframe. The missile operates as the result of these various
subsystems working together.
There are a number of design paths which are followed in the cruise missile design
process. As aresult, there is a wide spectrum of viable threats to be considered; for
example, missile cruise speeds vary greatly (from subsonic to mach 5+). Of course,
architectural details, such as propulsion systems (solid rocket, liquid rocket, turbojet,
turbofan and ramjet), sensors, guidance packages and warhead characterization differ
considerably, as well.
Although the above characteristics contribute to the effectiveness of a missile system,
there are no definitive guidelines into which details make for better missiles. It all boils
down to the limits of mission objectives, technology and defense budgets. In short, the
design and production of a type of missile is the result of a systems process.
The procedure followed during this study to analyze cruise missile vulnerability is shown
in Figure 2.
The first section of this report looks at the vulnerability analysis process from a Systems
perspective. The threat to Navy ships by cruise missiles is defined and an overview of
missile architecture is presented. The need for proper analysis of missile systems, both
current and future, is then presented. A functional analysis is then conducted to
determine the arrangement and operational characteristics that are typical for cruise
missile systems. Next, a specific target is defined by comparing the characteristics of
existing systems. Finally, the failure modes of this target are analyzed by developing a
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and by performing a Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA).
The second part of this report involves the results of applying the principles of
vulnerability to a generic missile target. This target is based on existing systems and
represents a viable threat. The damage mechanism applied here, HE fragmenting
warheads, is the most probable, but not exclusive, defense against missiles. The analysis
consists of modeling the target, determining which subsystems and/or components are
vulnerable, determining the degree of this vulnerability, and finally, quantifying the
vulnerability of the missile to fragmenting warheads.
STATEMENT OF NEED DEFINED
*THREAT DEFINITION “CURRENT STATUS “FUTURE TRENDS
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS CONDUCTED
“FUNCTIONAL FLOW “ALLOCATION OF REQUIREMENTS “TRADE OFF ANDO OPTIMIZATION
1 FAILURE ANALYSIS
CONDUCTED
“FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) “FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA)
! VULNERABILITY
ANALYSIS CONDUCTED
“SYSTEM MODEL CONSTRUCT “DETERMINATION OF VULNEAABLE AREAS
Figure 2: Process For Analyzing Cruise Missile Vulnerability
This analysis took only hard kill mechanisms into account. Countermeasure techniques
are a viable means of defeating missiles, but follow a completely different methodology,
and a thorough explanation of them was beyond the scope of this report.
1.0 Statement of Need
The first step in conducting a systems engineering approach to evaluating cruise missile
vulnerability is identifying the system need. In this case, the need of the system is
exactly the opposite of the need of one of its elements. The need statement of this
element, the missile, could be stated as follows: the missile must be able to find, track
and reach a target, and inflict as much damage as possible upon reaching it. The system
need statement could be written as follows: We must prevent the missile from finding,
tracking and reaching its target, or prevent it from inflicting an amount of damage that is
sufficient to disable its target. To satisfy this basic need at least 95% of the time, the
Navy can concentrate on defending against missiles before, during or after launch.
Defending against missiles by preventing them from being launched in the first place, by
attacking the launch platform, requires the adoption of a "shoot-first", or "defense
through good offense” policy. This policy makes sense in the frame of a total war
scenario, provided the launch platforms could be located in time. Unfortunately, this is
not always the case. Furthermore, destroying all platforms is a difficult task. Invariably,
a certain number of missiles are likely to be launched.
Realizing that the HMS Sheffield was virtually destroyed by an Exocet missile that did
not detonate , expecting to minimize damage after being hit by a missile is difficult.
Hardening ships by installing armor is expensive, and the additional weight on topdeck
structures has adverse effects on stability. Installing defensive compartments and
designing for survivability is a worthwhile pursuit, but only partially successful against
missiles that may carry warheads that weigh in excess of 500 lbs (225 kg).
Consequently, the Navy needs to look at the threats that it may encounter. Once these
threats have been identified, ways to engage them en route to their targets must be
determined. To do this, the Navy needs to analyze the operational characteristics of
these threats, determine their vulnerabilities, and exploit these vulnerabilities by
deception techniques and/or hard kill mechanisms. The results of this analysis should
remain valid for the life cycle of the missile (10-15 years), and the process should remain
flexible enough to account for modifications in missile physical and functional
characteristics.
Most of the vulnerability analysis being conducted on new missile systems is based on
knowledge of existing systems. In many cases, this approach is valid. Unfortunately,
reliance on these methods should not be taken for granted. Systems, and the means to
defeat them, change as the result of technological and economic factors. For this reason,
a process that analyzes cruise missile systems, beginning from the basic level and
proceeding in depth and detail, needs to be implemented.
1.1 Definition of Threat
It is estimated that anti-shipping cruise missiles pose the greatest threat to the surface
forces of the U.S. Navy. The reasoning behind this is two-fold. First, missiles are potent
weapons. They are hard to detect, hard to intercept, and are capable of inflicting serious
damage to ships. Secondly, as the result of economic factors, they are proliferating into
an ever-growing number of second- and third- world arsenals.
During the Gulf War, The USS Princeton was essentially crippled by one mine. Public
reaction to a $1.0 Billion+ ship being disabled by a product of 19th century technology
was less than enthusiastic. Cruise missiles are more modern, and even more lethal than
mines. The Navy would have much to answer for if it did not have a means of defense
for its assets.
1.1.1 Characteristics of Cruise Missiles
Cruise missiles come in all shapes and sizes. This section is included to present an
overview of the architecture and operational characteristics of cruise missiles.
1.1.1.1 Structure
The structure of the missile is designed to support the internals, such as warhead,
guidance and propulsion subsystems. It must be strong enough to withstand forces of
motion (weight, lift, thrust and drag), yet light enough to not contribute significantly to
those forces. The weapon must be shaped for optimum efficiency, yet must take into
account the constraints imposed by storage facilities, launch mechanisms and platforms.
In their most complicated forms, cruise missiles are constructed like aircraft, with a
weight bearing frame and an external skin. This method is seldom used by modern
missiles, however. Instead, most viable threats are small (15' - 25' (4.5-7.6 meters) long)
and monocoque in shape, with the outer skin (usually steel, aluminum or titanium) held in
shape by bulkheads and occasional stiffeners.
Missiles are fitted with sets of lifting and control surfaces that provide the means to alter
the angle of attack. The location and configuration of these foils can significantly alter the
performance characteristics of the missile. Smaller, "skid-to-turn" missiles feature a
forward set (usually 4) of fixed wing surfaces and an aft set of variable control surfaces.
Some missiles, such as Tomahawk and Styx, fly much like aircraft, using a pair of
horizontal wings for "bank-to-turn” control.
1.1.1.2 Propulsion
The objective of the propulsion system in cruise missiles is to obtain thrust by generating
rearward momentum in the form of exhaust gases. Rockets create this flow in a manner
that uses working fluid that is carried onboard the vehicle, while air breathing engines
rely on external sources for propellant gas.
There are two types of rockets being utilized in cruise missiles: liquid propellant and
solid, or hypergolic, propellant. Liquid propellant systems have the fuel and oxidizer
components carried in low pressure tanks. They are capable of being throttled. They do
however, require “plumbing” in the form of pumps, and fuel lines, and the components
tend to be corrosive and volatile. Solid rockets are simple in design. Essentially, the
entire rocket motor serves as the combustion chamber. Solid rockets , however, are self-
sustaining and burning rate is not controllable.
Turbojets, turbofans and ramjets fall into the category of air breathing engines. All
engines of this type operate on the following principles: i) air must be injected, 1i)
propellant must be supplied, 111) combustion must occur and iv) products must be
ejected. The high temperature and pressure of the exhaust gases provide kinetic energy to
the air flow trailing the missile. Gas turbines are best suited for operation at transonic
and supersonic speeds while ramjets are best when operating at high supersonic speeds.
Ramjets are simple in design (no moving parts) and efficient at high speed. A basic
ramjet consists of a cylindrical tube, open at both ends, with an interior fuel-injection
system. The ramjet operates by taking high speed, low pressure air in through a diffuser
section. The diffuser converts this air to high pressure, low speed air flow. This flow
mixes with fuel, which is continuously sprayed into the engine by injectors. Spark plug-
like devices called initiators commence burning, with subsequent burning being
uninterrupted and self-supporting. Ramjets are unable to develop thrust while at rest, so
a booster system must be used to accelerate the missile to near its operating speed.
Turbojets utilize high-pressure compressors that are turbine driven (with a fraction of the
exhaust gases running the turbine). The major components of a turbojet engine are the
inlet, compressor, combustor, turbine and nozzle. Inlets capture air from the freestream
and may decelerate it to provide uniform, subsonic flow to the compressor. The
compressor is used to increase the pressure of this air. Combustors operate by having
fuel sprayed into a centralized region where the fuel evaporates and the fuel ignites.
Exhaust nozzles focus the high pressure exhaust gas and thus control the kinetic energy
and reaction force on the missile.
Turbofans are extensions of the turbojet concept. Turbofans are generally more efficient
than turbojets, as they utilize a second stage of turbine blades to extract additional energy
from the gases aft of the compressor turbine.
In addition to propulsion related components, turbojets and turbofans require lubrication,
cooling, and accessory drive subsystems. The lubrication subsystem is usually a self-
contained pressurized oil system (composed of tanks, pumps, lines and coolers that
lubricates bearings and accessory drives. The engine cooling subsystem may utilize a
closed, pressurized liquid system, fuel, or freestream air to prevent engine components
from being damaged by thermal stress. The accessory drives provide power to the other
various subsystems.
Currently, all of the above systems are used; however, the majority of missile systems use
either solid rockets or turbojets. Ramjets have been come into greater use recently.
Future systems can be expected to make further use of these systems.
1.1.1.3. Guidance and Control
Guidance and Control is the means in which a missile tracks, and ultimately intercepts, its
target. The specifics of how this is accomplished vary, not only from missile to missile,
but also where the missile is located in its flight path. Every missile guidance and control
system consists of an attitude control system and a flight path control system. The
attitude control system is responsible for maintaining the missile in the desired attitude by
controlling pitch, roll and yaw. The flight path control system determines the flight path
necessary to intercept the target and issues commands to the attitude control system to
maintain that path.
The line of sight (LOS), which refers to the line between the sensor and the target, is the
crucial measurement of any terminal guidance package. The parameters associated with
this measurement are target azimuth, elevation, range, and relative velocity. The
difference between this line and the tracking line (the "line" in which the missile is
traveling) is considered the error. The guidance and control system is heavily reliant on
feedback, with corrective adjustments being made when a guidance error, or missile
instability, is present. Guidance and stabilization corrections are combined and the result
is applied as an error signal to the control system. The control system is "driven" to
respond to this error until the tracking line becomes incident with the LOS.
The primary components associated with the attitude control system are the devices for
measuring attitude and motion, the autopilot, and the control surfaces. The flight path
control system is a computer, which may or may not be located on board the missile. The
control surfaces are wings or fins that work to regulate airflow over the air frame. Their
controlling mechanisms are usually hydraulic or electrical.
There are usually three missile guidance phases: boost, midcourse and terminal. The
boost phase usually refers to the early stages of flight, at or near launch. Essentially,
“guidance” during this phase involves having the missile clear the launch platform and
being placed in a position in which it can either see the target or receive external guidance
signals. The likelihood of intercepting the missile during this phase is remote, however.
10
The midcourse phase of guidance is the longest in both time and distance. Corrections
may be necessary to bring the missile onto and maintain the desired course. Several
means may be used to provide information to the guidance system. The midcourse phase
usually ends when the missile is near the target, and the terminal phase begins.
Midcourse guidance can either rely on control guidance systems (using a combination of
internal and external components), or self contained systems (using exclusively on-board
components).
With self contained systems, all guidance and control equipment is located on board the
missile. In cruise missiles, these systems usually utilize an inertial navigation package.
These systems are responsible for placing the missile in a predetermined location, with
the missile's flight path constantly being corrected by means of gyro-stabilized
accelerometers. Most missiles utilize three types: to measure vertical, lateral and
longitudinal accelerations (to measure altitude, azimuth and range respectively). Desired
values are compared with measured values, and if necessary, correction signals are sent to
the control system.
The terminal guidance phase requires a highly accurate, fast-response, system of sensors
and controls. The sensors usually home in on a signature of the target. Active radar is the
most common type of sensor, although infrared, passive radar and optical systems are
used as well. The missile is guided on the basis of electromagnetic radiation contact with
the target. Azimuth and elevation of the target are required for homing to be successful.
Guidance can be either active, semi-active or passive with reference to a line of sight
sensor. Active systems contain both the transmitter and receiver. An on-board computer
calculates a course to intercept the target and sends steering commands to the autopilot.
Semiactive homing relies on a tracking radar that is located at the launching sight. The
missile is equipped with a receiver only, and uses reflections from the target to formulate
an intercept path. Passive homing relies on energy that emanates from the target (such as
heat or radio transmissions) for guidance.
11
Radar uses electromagnetic waves to remote-sense the position, velocity and identifying
characteristics of targets. Most missile guidance radars are essentially specialized
tracking radars. The basic parameter measured by the tracking radar is the line of sight
between the antenna and the target. There are usually two types of radar used in anti-
shipping cruise missiles: pulse and pulse-doppler.
Pulse radars illuminate targets by transmitting short bursts of energy and listen for echoes
while the transmitter is silent. In the case of directional antennas, the line of sight to the
target can be accurately determined. Target range is determined by measuring the time it
takes for the pulse to return and multiplying that number by the speed of light (the
velocity of the wave) and dividing by 2 (to account for round-trip travel).
All radars operate in accordance with the same principles. Performance, on the other
hand, varies considerably. Essentially, all pulse radar systems have the following
components in common: antenna, antenna servo, synchronizer, modulator, duplexer,
transmitter, receiver, receiver protection device, and power supply.
The antenna concentrates the signal into a narrow beam that is radiated in a single
direction. The antenna is steerable, by means of the antenna servo. The synchronizer
times the transmission of the radar pulses. The modulator provides input power to the
transmitter. The duplexer is an electronic device which switches single antennas between
the transmit and receive modes. The transmitter generates the radar signal. The receiver
intercepts and amplifies the echo signals.
Pulse doppler radars are specialized versions of pulse systems. Pulse doppler systems
utilize most of the same components as pulse systems. They do, however, feature the
following innovations: highly versatile transmitters that are capable of measuring
doppler frequencies (and thus, velocities), the use of digital signal processors for high
speed signal processing, the use of radar data processors to control and monitor all
elements of the system, and the integration of the radar into the inertial navigation
system.
12
The components associated with pulse doppler systems differ from pulse systems in the
following: the modulator is eliminated, with its functions being performed by the
transmitter, a component, called the exciter, is used to establish the radio frequency of
the transmitter, the synchronizer is eliminated, with its functions being performed by the
radar data processor.
Since no one system is ideal for all phases of guidance, composite systems are often used.
For example, inertial guidance may be utilized during the midcourse phase, with homing
guidance used during the terminal phase.
1.1.1.4 Flight Paths
Flight paths are determined by the guidance system. They can be either preset or
variable. Preset flight paths can be either constant or programmed. Variable flight paths
rely on target position and velocity. The four basic types of variable flight paths are
pursuit, constant-bearing, proportional navigation and line of sight. The pursuit type of
flight path strives to keep the missile pointed at the target at all times. Constant-bearing
flight paths aim at the point in which the missile expects to intercept the target. Changes
in target heading and velocity are accounted for by continuously recalculating the
aimpoint. Proportional navigation takes into account changes in the line of sight. These
changes are passed on to the computer, which generates steering commands for the
autopilot. Line of sight flight paths follow along the LOS between the launching
platform and the target.
The actual profile of flight varies from missile to missile. Most slower (high subsonic)
missiles travel at low altitude to avoid detection. At the terminal phase, they may
maintain this profile or they may execute a series of maneuvers to evade defenses or to
intercept a specific area of a ship. High speed missiles may cruise in at a high altitude,
and dive in, using speed as a defense, to intercept their target.
13
1.1.1.5 Munitions
The munitions, or ordnance, system refers to the means which the missile uses to
complete its mission (damaging a shipping target). This involves 1) a container to hold
the damage mechanisms, ii) the damage mechanisms themselves, which could be
fragments, or blast or incendiary devices and iii) a means of deciding when to release the
mechanisms. Cruise missile munitions usually fall into the category of warhead/fuse
systems, although some systems consist of kinetic energy penetrators or explosive
submunitions.
Warheads usually consist of a hard outer casing (usually made of steel or some other high
hardness metal) filled with high explosive, a central core initiator, and fusing devices.
Depending on the warhead shape and orientation, the ordnance system can be designed to
detonate after penetrating the target, at impact, or at close proximity to the target (usually
just above). Fuses can be located in the nose area to detonate on impact or a set time
afterwards or they can be timed in accordance with the guidance system. The
characteristics of the case and explosive are instrumental to the lethality of the warhead.
Fragment size and velocity can be dictated by geometry and scoring on the surface of the
case as well as the amount and type of explosive charge.
Cruise missiles fitted with submunitions utilize a release mechanism to eject penetrators
or bomblets over a wide area. Although the area in question is usually associated with
ground forces or airfields, the concept may be applied in the anti-shipping role.
1.1.2 Overview
The threats to U.S. Navy ships are diverse. Incoming missiles may be traveling at high
subsonic speeds to speeds in excess of Mach 5.0. They may be traveling just above the
surface of the waves, executing evasive maneuvers, or they may be executing a steep
terminal dive. They may be using rockets, turbojets or ramjets, guided by active radar,
to reach the end of their mission. To properly defend its assets, the U.S. Navy needs to
look at all of these possibilities.
14
1.2 Current Status
Currently, both deceptive techniques and hard kill mechanisms are in use by the U.S.
Navy. Deceptive measures involve using physical or electronic means to disorient or
mislead the guidance system of an incoming missile. These techniques can be relatively
effective, but a thorough presentation of them is beyond the scope of this report.
Hard kill mechanisms, on the other hand, involve intercepting the missile with high
energy projectiles so as to inflict enough damage to prevent the missile from reaching its
target. The problem amounts to knowing how much energy is required, and at what
location to apply it.
A number of systems, such as Phalanx and Standard missile, are currently envisioned in
the hard kill role. New projectile and warhead designs are constantly being proposed. In
each case, the energy distribution of projectiles or fragments is known or estimated with
reasonable certainty. Knowing where to deliver these particles (as penetrators) requires a
knowledge of the arrangement and operational characteristics of the incoming missiles.
Finding accurate and detailed information about potential threats is difficult, and reliance
on previous knowledge is not always valid; thus, a process needs to be followed to
determine the vulnerability of various cruise missile systems to existing or postulated
defenses. This requires identifying, in order, the missile functions, missile components,
possible failure modes, component vulnerability, and ultimately, the system vulnerability.
1.3 Future Trends
It is expected that cruise missiles will continue to pose a serious threat well into the next
millennium. Future systems could be expected to be faster, more maneuverable and
harder to detect. Hard kill mechanisms will remain a viable means to counter this threat.
For this reason, vulnerability analysis will remain a vital tool.
15
1.4 nclusi
Despite the various approaches to cruise missile design, all systems have the same
intention. They must find, track and fly to a target before they can damage it. Defeating
these systems, through deception, or hard kill, requires knowledge of the system's
vulnerabilities. By defining the need statement, we have shown that we have a definite
requirement to determine the vulnerability of cruise missiles. A detailed analysis of how
the system functions is required to determine these vulnerabilities.
2.0 Functional Analysis
Quite often, the Systems Engineering Process involves identifying a need, proposing a
means to satisfy that need, and designing a system to accomplish these means. In the
case of analyzing cruise missile vulnerability, the need, (preventing cruise missiles from
reaching and damaging U.S. Navy ships) and the means (hard kill mechanisms exploiting
vulnerabilities) seem to fit this process. The "designed system," however, is not involved
in accomplishing the means. Instead, this system is the recipient of the means.
Furthermore, this system is usually designed, produced , and operated, under different
conditions, by an adversary.
In the case of a Systems Engineering approach to cruise missile vulnerability, the system
under analysis may already be in existence. Even so, there is not great deal of
information available about how the system is arranged or operates. To determine these
characteristics, a functional analysis is performed.
Functional analysis involves identifying system operational and support requirements
and translating them into specific design requirements. This translation is accomplished
through the development of functional flow diagrams. The functional approach is used as
a basis for identifying design requirements for each level of the system.
16
Functions usually fall into the operational or maintenance categories. When analyzing
cruise missile systems, maintenance is not an overwhelming factor, as a missile is only
required to be used once. Maintenance functions are limited to keeping the missile ready
to be launched on demand. This usually involves keeping the missile stored, usually in
storage canisters, at facilities or on ships that protect the missile from the effects of its
environment. These facilities must be located to insure rapid availability and maintain
security.
The most important functional concerns, from a vulnerability standpoint, are operational
functions. Operational functions are those functions that are associated with fulfilling
mission requirements.
2.1 Development of Functional Flow Diagrams
Functional flow diagrams present system requirements in functional terms. Constructing
them begins with a definition of what the system must accomplish. Subsequent layers
provide more detail into what is being done within the system. Ultimately, the diagram is
detailed enough so that individual components can be identified.
The top level of a functional flow diagram shows all of the gross operational functions
that must be performed in order for a system to accomplish its mission. The warhead
functions are limited to fusing, detonation and fragment dispersion. A typical cruise
missile, from the perspective defined here, is more complicated. The top level functional
flow diagram for this element is presented in Figure 3.
These functions are arranged in series. Thus disrupting any of these functions will result
in the missile being unable to complete its mission, which from the vulnerability
standpoint, is a successful mission.
At this point, no components, or subsystems, are clearly defined. In the second level, the
system functions that are required for the gross functions to be accomplished are
identified. At this level, the various systems become apparent.
17
; T
1
1.0 PLATFORM ENTERS RANGE
2.0 TARGET
INDENTIFIED YY AM
_d \-
t
4.0 MISSILE FAILS
PRE-FLIGHT
32.0 MISSILE PASSES
PRE-FLIGHT
G Y 7.0
MISSILE LAUNCHED
6.0 ALTERNATE
MISSILE CHOSEN
30 ! REDAIRED 8.0
A MISSILE BOOSTED | TO CRUISE
9.0 MISSILE REACHES SENSOR RANGE
DAMAGES TARGET
vel Functional Flow For A ise Mi
18
At the operational level, the first function in Figure 3 is identified as "launching platform
reaches the proper launch range". The launch platform is either an aircraft, a surface
ship, a submarine, or a land based platform (which can be mobile or fixed). To
accomplish the gross function, these platforms must remain capable of launching
offensive weapons. Preferably, they remain undetected, although damage is the true
intention here. From the vulnerability standpoint, the objective is to prevent the platform
from reaching a point where they can launch missiles.
The second function in Figure 3 is “target is identified by launch platform”. Usually,
some type of sensor is used by the launching platform. These are usually search radars,
although acoustic (sonar), and visual (reconnaissance) means are also employed. The
vulnerability intention is to prevent detection, either by deception, jamming or physical
elimination of search systems. |
The third through sixth functions in Figure 3 involve preflight preparations for the
missile. This requires the missile to be taken from the stored state, passing preflight
inspection, and then being placed into the launch system. The mechanisms are missile
and platform specific. In the event of aircraft launch, missiles must be loaded onto
launch rails (tactical attack aircraft) or into bomb bays (for strategic or intermediate range
bombers). Surface ships require the missile to be mounted on rails, box launchers or
vertical launch systems. Submarines require missiles to be loaded into torpedo tubes or
vertical launching tubes. Land based systems require missiles to be loaded onto rails or
box launchers. Vulnerability concerns include damaging the launching systems to
prevent missiles from being loaded.
The seventh function in Figure 3 is "missile launched" by platform. The launch system
must function properly and the missile’s propulsion system must be initiated. From a
vulnerability standpoint, the launch system must be rendered inoperable, or the missile's
propulsion system must be damaged. The flow diagram for a turbojet propulsion system
is shown in Figure 4. At this level we are able to identify the principal components of the
propulsion system are identified.
19
REF. 7.0 MISSILE
LAUNCHED
Y 7.1
INITIAL POWER
SUPPLIED
Y 7.2
. COMPONENTS LUBRICATED/ COOLED
Y 7.3
AIR ENTERS INFAKE
4 7.4
-——___—__ p> AIR OMPRESSED
Y 7.5
FUEL PUMPED FROM TANKS
Y 46
FUEL INJECTED
INTO CHAMBER
Y 7.7
FUEL/AIR
MIXTURE IGNITED
N 78
TURBINE
GENERATES POWER
Y 7.9
EXHAUST GASES
EXPANDED
4 7.10
THRUST DEVELOPED
Y Put
Figure 4: Second Level Functional Flow - Missile Launch to Cruise
20
The eighth function in Figure 3 is "missile boosted to cruise.” Many missiles must be
accelerated to a cruise velocity. This is usually accompanied by the missile reaching a
desired altitude. The function flow diagram is shown in Figure 5. This function is
dependent on both the propulsion and control systems. The vulnerability consideration
here is to damage either of these systems.
8.4 TERMINAL GUIDANCE [#2 TURNED ON
REF. 8.0 8.1 82 83 MISSILE PROPULSION CONTROL LOCATION (or)
BOOSTED lan systeM || sysTEM lan OFMIssLE = TO CRUISE OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL DETERMINED B5
i GUIDANCE SOLUTION GENERATED
Y 8.6
ADJUSTMENTS MADE TO
PROPULSION
Y 8.7
ADJUSTMENT MADE TO CONTROLS
Figure 5: Second Level Functional Flow - Missile Midcourse Flight
21
The ninth function in Figure 3 is "missile reaches sensor range." Missiles are usually
launched outside of the range of on-board sensors. When the missile has reached a
certain point, on-board systems replace the launch platform's systems for guidance and
tracking. The propulsion, guidance and control systems must function properly up to this
point. Depending on the missile system, the midpoint may be determined prior to launch,
and the missile must identify when it reaches this point (fire and forget systems) or the
launch platform guides the missile to this point and signals for the missile to turn on its
terminal systems. The functional flow is shown in Figure 6. From a vulnerability
perspective, damaging or disorienting these systems will disrupt this process.
9.4 TARGET bo
REF. 9.0 LOCATED MISSILE PROPULSION CONTROL 30 SENSOR(S) | py PEACHES | system [OP] system + SEARCH FOR (or) Nee OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL TARGET O56
TARGET NOT
LOCATED
The tenth function in Figure 3, “Target acquired/tracked" is shown in Figure 7. The on-
board sensors system acquires the signature, and establishes and maintains a track of the
target. The track is vital for directing the missile in reaching the target. As with the
earlier function involving the launch platform, the vulnerability concerns involve
deceiving or damaging the sensor systems. The difference here is that the systems are
located on the missile itself, which is a smaller, faster and closer to the target.
22
REF. 10.0 TARGET
ACQUIRED TRACKED
10.1
PROPULSION
| SYSTEM OPERATIONAL
10.2 CONTROL SYSTEM
OPERATIONAL
10.3 TARGET TRACK
MAINTAINED
105 - LOS TRAJECTORY COMPARISON
10.4
TARGET TRACK LOST
F igure 7: Second Level Functional Flow - Target Acquisition To Interce
23
0.8 ADJUSTMENT:
MADE TO CONTROLS
_4
10.8 ADJUSTMENTS
MADE TO PROPULSION
I
10.7 NEW
TRAJECTORY SOLUTION
10.6 PATH
MAINTAINED
Y 10.10
CHECK RANGE
t
The missile flies to target, avoiding defenses, during the terminal phase. The control
system follows instructions based on target tracking data. These instructions dictate the
flight path that the missile must follow to reach the target. The vulnerability side must
concern itself with making the control system ineffective or disrupting communication
between the sensor, guidance, and control systems.
The final gross operational function, "Missile damages target," is shown in Figure 8.
This function involves detonating a warhead, with the intent of disabling or sinking a
ship. The warhead system must function properly, detonating at the right time and
location. The vulnerability side must be concerned with limiting damage to their
resources. This is difficult, as even if the warhead does not detonate, significant damage
could be expected. However, large ships are capable of withstanding numerous hits at
non-critical locations. Thus, the intention of the vulnerability team is to get the warhead
to a) not detonate at all, b) detonate ineffectively ("fizz") or c) detonate at a location that
does not cause critical damage. This may involve damaging the control system or
warhead components.
At this point, the various subsystems can be identified for a cruise missile. They include
propulsion, sensors/guidance, controls, and munitions. The structural system, which
encloses all of the other systems could also be considered a system. Furthermore, we can
determine which components are included in the propulsion and munitions systems. A
third level functional analysis will help in identifying guidance and control components.
24
REF. 11.0 MISSILE REACHES TARGET
(=)
14.2 11.1 FUSE SENDS
PUse DETONATION SIGNAL
11.3 WARHEAD DOES NOT
DETONATE
11.4
INITIATOR
~ BEGINS
DETONATION
oy, 1 11.5
BOOST
CHARGE
, DETONATES
11.6 INEFFECTIVE (on)
DETONATION
' 11.7
~ MAIN
CHARGE
DETONATES
11.8
CASE
FRAGMENTS
Y
Figure 8: Second Level Functional Flow - Damage To Target
25
Figure 9 is similar to the second level diagram for initiating propulsion for a turbojet
system. In this case, propulsion is merely being sustained. Although only Function 8.1 is
referenced, the diagram could be referenced to Functions 9.1 or 10.1.
Figure 10 presents the functional flow for midcourse guidance. This involves
determining where the missile is, and comparing that location to a predetermined value.
Longitudinal, lateral and vertical accelerometers measure x -,y -, and z- direction
accelerations, which are integrated to determine range, azimuth and altitude. The
missile's location is continuously being monitored, with feedback being used to adjust the
control system.
Figure 11 is similar to Figure 10, although this diagram represents the terminal guidance
phase. Here, the missile's location is compared to the location of the target. The
difference between the flight path and the line of sight to the target is identified as an
error, which is sought to be corrected by the control system.
Figure 12 shows the functional flow of the tracking radar. In this case, the diagram
represents a pulse doppler system. Although this diagram represents a third level of
functions, it could be referenced to Function 8.4.4 as well.
At this point, the primary systems and components of a cruise missile have been shown.
26
REF 8.1.0 PROPULSION SYSTEM
OPERATIONAL
y 8.1.1
COMPONENTS LUBRICATED/ COOLED
Y 8.1.2
AIR ENTERS INTAKE
t 8.1.3
RR oo AIR COMPRESSED
! 8.1.4
FUEL PUMPED FROM TANKS
Y 6.1.5 FUEL
INJECTED INTC CHAMBER
8.1.6 — FUEL/AIR MIXTURE IGNITED
8.1.7 TURBINE
GENERATES POWER
Y 8.1.8
EXHAUST GASES
EXPANDED
y 8.1.9
THRUST DEVELOPED
!
Figure 9: Third Level Functional Flow - Propulsion
27
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Figure 12: Thir
9.3.2 DUPLEXER
> SWITCHES
REF 9.3.0 SENSOR IS) SEARCH FOR
TARGET
Y 9.3.1
POWER SUPPLIED TO RADAR
Y
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y 9.3.7
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2.2 I] ion of iremen
The allocation of requirements step of the functional analysis is the point in which actual
requirements of the system are defined. In the case of a vulnerability analysis of cruise
missiles, this step involves identifying the operational characteristics of both the cruise
missile systems and the defensive systems that we are employing to defeat them.
2.2.1 Missile Characterization
The following missile parameters need to be considered: range, flight profile, speed,
guidance characteristics, control characteristics, and munitions characteristics. If existing
systems are an indication, there are wide ranges in most of these characteristics.
2.2.1.1 Range
Cruise missiles must be launched from ranges that protect the launching platform.
However, once the missile is launched, most systems are "on their own." Longer ranges
require larger powerplants, and/or increased fuel capacities. Guidance and control
systems on missiles are generally less capable than those of the launch platform, and
longer ranges tend to allow more things to go wrong with them. In general, missile range
varies significantly, from less than 10 to over 1500 nautical miles.
2.2.1.2 Flight Profile
The intention here is for the missile to follow a flight path that is efficient, yet makes
interception as difficult as possible. Depending on the launching platform, the missiles
may be launched from zero altitude or high altitude. Following launch, they may climb
to higher altitudes, dive to intermediate or low altitudes (sea skimming) or maintain the
altitude of launch. Terminal flight profiles may consist of diving into the target, popping
up and then diving into the top of the target, flying horizontally into the side of the target
or flying over top of the target. In most cases, flight profiles are determined prior to
launch and are system specific.
31
2.2.1.3 Speed
The objective is to have a missile reach a target as safely and quickly as possible. High
speed targets give defenses less time to react, but at the price of maneuverability and
detection. Slower missiles are able to creep up on a target and are relatively
maneuverable, which makes them difficult to hit as well. As a result, both schools of
thought figure into missile design, with speeds varying significantly, from high subsonic
to mach 5.0 or above.
2.2.1.4 Guidance Characteristics
There are a number of ways in which a missile is guided to a target. There are three
phases. Boost phase involves the guidance from launch to cruise, and is usually dictated
by the launch platform. Midcourse guidance is responsible for getting the missile from
the launch area to a range in which the terminal sensors are effective. The terminal
guidance system must operate at a range that allows for an accurate identification of a
target and gives the missile the opportunity to reach the target. On board sensors are
limited by size and power constraints as dictated by the missile. Powerful sensors are
larger, use more energy and add additional weight and size to a missile. These factors
tend to degrade the dynamic performance of the missile.
2.2.1.5 Control Characteristics
Missiles can be highly maneuverable and slow, very fast and not very maneuverable, or a
combination of these characteristics. Increasing speeds and maneuverability require
stronger airframes, which lead to increased complexity and cost.
2.2.1.6 Munitions Characteristics
All missiles seek to damage a ship target, usually by penetration and warhead detonation
to render that target inoperable. Most munitions systems feature some sort of explosive
surrounded with a casing. Projectiles, blast, perforation and fire are common damage
mechanisms. In extreme cases, nuclear and chemical means are used.
32
2.2.2 Warhead Characterization
As a means of defeating cruise missile systems, fragmenting warheads delivered by
surface-to-air missiles are considered. Important parameters considered include fragment
weight, shape and velocity distributions.
Actual characteristics of surface-to-air warheads are classified. In general, however, they
operate by the same principles, albeit in a smaller way, as the systems addressed in
Section 1.1.1.5. In anti-air systems, fragment sizes range from less than 1 grain
(1/7000Ib) to greater than 1000 grains (0.141b). Fragments could be preformed in the
shape of rods or cubes, or randomly shaped. Preformed fragments are usually all
constant in size, while size distributions of random fragments vary. Fragment velocities
vary, and in some cases, velocities greater than 15,000 ft/sec are possible.
2.3 ff_an imization
The trade off and optimization phase of functional analysis presents the means in which
the requirements are met. At this point, the actual systems and their components are
identified. Existing, or postulated, systems are being analyzed, and the design
characteristics are set by outside considerations. To analyze a generic missile system,
the characteristics should be based on existing systems.
Table 1 presents a listing of the most prevalent systems currently in service. System and
performance characteristics are listed, based on information found in Jane’s Naval
Weapons Systems , Jane's Air Launched Weapons, and The Naval Institute Guides to
World Naval Weapons Systems and The Soviet Navy. Flight profiles and control
characteristics are not presented here, due to the fact that they are not usually available in
open literature.
This table does not give any indication of the probability of encountering a given system.
Thus, some systems that are produced by, and/or exported to, potentially hostile nations
(SS-N-22, SS-N-2, Exocet, Otomat) would carry more weight. Likewise, some systems
(SS-N-7, AS-7) have not been produced or exported in large numbers, or are nearing
obsolescence, and will carry less weight. A U.S. missile, Harpoon, is included as a
potential threat as it has been extensively exported.
33
ANTI-SHIP CRUISE MISSILES
Maximum Cruise
Name Launch Length Range Speed __ (origin) Piatiorm(s) mit) Guidance ton (nm) Propulsion mach Warhead
Harpoon (USA) ship, air,sub |3.8 ( 12.5)| inertial,active radar | 240 (130) turbojet 0.9 SAP
Exocet (France) ship,air,sub | 5.8 (19.0)| inertial, activeradar | 50 (27) solid rocket 0.9 SAP
Silkworm (PRC) ship,land [7.4 (24.1) active radar 100 (54) turbojet 0.9 HE
801/802 (PRC) ship 5.8 (19.0)| inertial, active radar | 40(22) | solid rocket/turbojet| 0.9 SAP
C-101 (PRC) ship, land, air| 6.5 (21.3)| inertial, activeradar | 45 (24) ramjet 2.0 SAP
C-201 (PRC) ship,land | 7.4 (24.1) active radar 150 (80) turbojet 0.9 SAP
ANS (France) ship,air,sub | 5.7 (18.7)|} inertial, active radar | 180 (97) rocket-ramjet 2.5 SAP
Otomat (Italy) ship,land |4.6(15.1)| inertial, active radar | 160 (86) turbojet 0.9 HE
SS-N-2 Styx (Russia) ship,land | 5.8 (19,0) active radar 85 (46) [liquid rocket/jurbojeq 0.9 HE
SS-N-9 Siren (Russia) ship,sub | 8.8 (29.0)/ inertial, active radar | 111 (60) solid rocket 0.9 nuclear,HE
SS-N-12 Sandbox (Russia) ship,sub {11.7 (38.4) inertial, active radar | 550 (296) turbojet 1.7 nuclear, HE
SS-N-7 Starbright (Russia) ship,sub | 6.5 (21.3) active radar 64 (35) solid rocket 0.9 nuclear, HE
SS-N-19 Shipwreck (Russia){ ship,sub [10.0 (32.8) inertial, active radar | 550 (296) turbojet 1.6 nuclear, HE
SS-N-22 Sunburn (Russia) ship 9.4 (30.7)] inertial, active radar |] 90 (48) solid rocket 2.0 nuclear, HE
SS-N-25 (Russia) ship 3.8 (12.4) inertial, active radar | 130 (70) turbojet 0.9 SAP
Kormoran (Germany) air 4.4 (14.4)| inertial, active radar | 30 (16) solid rocket 0.9 HE/projectiles
AS-4 Kitchen (Russia) air 114.3 (37.1) inertial, active radar | 400 (215) liquid rocket 2.5-3.5 nuclear, HE
AS-5 Kelt (Russia) air 8.5(27.8)| inertial, active radar | 326 (175) liquid rocket 0.9-1.2 HE
AS-6 Kingfish (Russia) air 10.5 (34.5] inertial, active radar | 300 (162) turbojet? 2.5-3.5 nuclear, HE
AS-9 Kyle (Russia) air 6.0 (19.7)| _ passive radar 90 (49) __ liquid rocket 3.0 HE
AS-11 Kilter (Russia) air 4.8 (15.7)| inertial, passive radar| 70 (38) solid rocket 4.0 | HE blast/fragment
AS-12 Kegler (Russia) air 4,2 (13.8)| inertial, passive radar| 25 (13.5) solid rocket 1.0 | HE blast/fragment
AS-13 Kingbolt (Russia) air 5.1 (16.7) TV-command 90 (48.5) solid rocket 0.8 HE
AS-15 Kent (Russia) air, Jand = |7.1(23.3)] inertial, TERCOM [3000 (1617) turbofan 0.8 nuclear, HE
AS-16 Kickback (Russia) air 4.8 (15.7)| inertial, active radar | 150 (80) solid rocket 5.0 nuclear, HE
AS-17 Krypton (Russia) air 4.7 (15.4)| inertial, active radar | 50(27) | solid rocket/ramjet {| 3.0 [HE blast/fragment
Based on this table, certain trends are seen in characteristics. These trends are used to
establish the characteristics for a generic cruise missile system to be analyzed in this
study. The characteristics for this missile, designated Viper, are presented in Table 2.
34
Table 2. Characteristi f A Generic Cruise Missil stem
Name SS-N-27/AS-20 Viper
Country of Origin |Russia
10c 1997
Postulated Users |expected to be exported
Launch Platforms |SS-N-27: box launched: Kuznetsov (8 rounds)
Slava (8), Neustrashimyy (4)
tube launched: Akula (8), Sierra (8)
AS-20: Tu-22M Backfire (8), Tu-160 Blackjack (12)
Su-24 Fencer (2)
Length 4.06 m (160") Diameter body: 0.39 m (15.5")
span: 0.96 m (37.6")
Guidance muidcourse : inertial
terminal: active Pulse Doppler radar
Controls cruciform fins, electric driven
Speed max: Mach 0.8 at sea level
Range 100 km (60 nm)
Propulsion turbojet
Flight Profile sea-skimmer, possible pop-up maneuever
Warhead semi-armor piercing, HE/fragmentation
explosive weight 200 kg (440 Ib) Origin: Russia 1s chosen as the producer, due to the fact that Russian industry has the
most substantial history in designing and producing cruise missiles. In recent years, this
experience has been accompanied by an increasingly aggressive attempt to export these
systems.
Launch Platform: Most common systems are capable of being launched from a variety of
platforms. In the case of the Viper, it is capable of being carried in box launchers, by
medium to large surface ships, on underwing pylons of ground attack aircraft, in the
internal weapons bays of medium bombers, and the torpedo tubes of attack submarines.
Dimensions: The missile should be capable of fitting onto the pylons of an attack
aircraft. The diameter is dictated by the fact that the missile may be launched from
canisters or torpedo tubes. Standard Russian torpedo tubes are 53 cm (20.9") in diameter.
Propulsion: Turbojets allow for longer ranges, and are more flexible. Solid rockets may
be used by more systems in Table 1, but turbojets allow for a better presentation of
vulnerability principles.
35
Speed: Most turbojets travel in the high subsonic range. This speed is high enough to
make detection and interception difficult. Subsonic speed also allows for the airframe
and intake to be relatively simple in design.
Guidance system: Most systems in Table 1 use a form of inertial guidance and terminal
active radar. Pulse-Doppler radars are generally more effective than pulsed systems.
Control System: Unclassified sources do not identify the internal structure of most
missiles. Usually, hydraulic systems or electric motors are used to adjust the attitude of
the control fins. Hydraulic systems require a set of pumps, reservoirs and fluid-filled
lines. Electric systems are less complicated, with motors and sets of gears being used to
rotate shafts that are attached to the fins. Both types of systems are equally effective.
Thus, the decision to include an electric system in the Viper was arbitrary. The fin
configuration is similar to the arrangement on Harpoon, SS-N-25, or Exocet. This allows
for high maneuverability at high subsonic speed.
Munitions: The Viper is fitted with a semi-armor piercing warhead because the more
common systems use them. As shown in Table 1, many Russian systems have nuclear
options. It is extremely likely that export versions will not have this option.
To defeat the Viper, a naturally fragmenting warhead was chosen. Fragments were
chosen as being cube-shaped, with sizes varying from 15 grains to 1000 grains.
Velocities vary from 3000 ft/sec to 15,000 ft/sec. This selection represents existing
warheads and allows for a more general representation of the Viper's vulnerability.
2.4 Conclusion
Functional Analysis has been used to determine which systems and components need to
be addressed from a vulnerability standpoint. To demonstrate this point, the
characteristics of a generic cruise missile, and a means to defeat it, have been defined.
These are based on systems that are currently in use. However, it is expected that these
systems will remain viable for the foreseeable future.
36
3.0 Failure Analysis
Examining the ways in which a missile system can fail is crucial to determining its
vulnerability . There are two ways that system failure can be viewed. In the first case,
the failure of individual components can be traced up to the ultimate effect on the system
as a whole. Alternately, the overall effect (usually "mission failure") could serve as the
starting point. Subsequent steps involve identifying the cause and effect relations that
lead up to that point. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA) are used, respectively, for each of these approaches.
3.1 ilure M nd Effectiven n is (FMEA
The FMEA identifies the relationship between each possible type of individual
component or subsystem failure mode and performance of essential functions. The
FMEA takes a bottom-up approach by identifying all possible failure modes of a
component or subsystem (as identified by functional analysis) and determines the effects
of each failure mode upon the capability to perform its functions. Typical failure modes
include premature operation, failure to operate, failure to cease operation, failure during
operation and degraded operation.
In the case of a cruise missile, the FMEA specifies the various ways in which the target
can fail to maintain controlled flight or fail to perform its mission. Loss of, or at least
serious degradation of, structural integrity, lift, power, control, or mission essential
equipment constitute the failure modes.
The FMEA for the Viper, for a mission kill is presented in Table 3. The FMEA takes
into account the fact the missile is being intercepted in the later stages of its flight profile.
The warhead is armed and the on-board radar is being used for guidance. These
conditions reflect the fact that the threats used against the missile, fragments from a
surface-to-air missile, are being launched from the missile's intended target.
Kill levels denote the level of performance degradation for the system. For cruise
missiles, two attrition kill levels, mission and recognizable, are usually considered.
Mission kill, the less severe level, is concerned with preventing the missile from
completing its mission. Recognizable kill involves identifying missile destruction within
a very short (1-2 second) time frame.
37
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The probability of each damage mode effect occurring is equal to the product of the
probability of a fragment hitting the component and the probability of that fragment
damaging the component. The probability of the fragment hitting the component is
dependent on fragment cloud density, fragment trajectory, and component size and
location. Component damage probabilities (Pgh) give a measure of the amount of
damage that a given component can withstand before being considered disabled. These
probabilities are relative to fragment size and velocity. The vulnerability analysis
(Section 4) accounts for these factors in determining the likelihood of component failure
(expressed in terms of vulnerable areas).
Each critical component has a reliability (expressed as a probability) associated with it,
and failure can be completely independent of damage mechanisms. Reliability values
may vary significantly, and proper determination would require detailed knowledge of
component design. A recommendation for future research involves taking into account
the effects of component reliability in failure analysis with regards to vulnerability.
A potential drawback of the FMEA involves the fact that it only presents the effects of
damaging individual components. In reality, many components are likely to be damaged
to some degree. For this reason, the FMEA should not be considered as a complete
measurement of a target's overall vulnerability.
In regards to failure modes for the propulsion system, cutting off the fuel flow or
damaging the internal engine components defeats the system. Defeating the system is
most likely to decrease the missile's range. However, if the missile is near its target when
the propulsion system is defeated, it may be able to complete its mission.
As listed in the FMEA, failure modes for the structural system are limited to removal of
the forward wings. Removal of one wing will affect the flight characteristics, yet the
control system should be able to compensate. Removal of multiple wings, on the other
hand, is likely to have significant effects on the missile’s lift and stability characteristics.
Damage to skin and structural members will adversely affect the missile’s performance.
Their exclusion from the FMEA, however, is due to the fact that damaging these
components is likely to be a secondary effect to damaging less ragged components.
45
The control system failure modes involve removing fins, damaging components, or
severing wires. As with the wings, disabling, or removing, one control surface merely
degrades performance. Disabling multiple surfaces is likely to result in serious effects on
the missile's flight worthiness. It is worth noting that severing only one wire (component
#3530) can defeat the whole system.
Defeating the guidance system involves damaging components, cutting off the power
supply, or cutting off the flow of tracking signals. In this case, all components are non-
redundant; each component is responsible for specific contributions to system
performance. Disabling one component is likely to bring the whole system down. This
system must be defeated at least 2 nm from its target. Otherwise, the missile will
continue its course and "glide” into its target.
The electrical system provides power to all of the other systems on board the missile.
Thus, disabling the components in this system disables the other systems as well.
In order for the munitions system to be defeated, the warhead must be detonated at some
distance from the target. For this to happen, the explosive charges must be provided
with sufficient energy (from the penetrating fragments) to detonate, or the circuit that
controls fusing must be closed prematurely. The circuit can be closed by accounting for
the fact that the crush fuses are designed to operate by being destroyed (by hitting a hard
surface on the target). Thus, hitting the fuses with a hard fragment should have similar
effects.
3.2 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Another way of evaluating the failure modes for the Viper is through fault tree analysis
(FTA). Although this method is not as descriptive (on a component level) as the FMEA,
redundancy and relations between components are more Clearly defined. Fault tree
analysis is a top down approach that starts by assuming an undesired event has occurred
and then proceeds with a determination of which combination of preceding events could
have caused it.
46
The fault tree analysis of the cruise missile begins with the objective of the vulnerability
analyst: keep the missile from seriously damaging its target. The first level is shown in
Figure 13. As can be seen, this fault/objective can be accomplished by defeating any of
the major systems. In fact, with the exception of the warhead system, disabling the
system will result in defeating the missile. In the case of the warhead, merely disabling
the system may not be sufficient to prevent serious damage from occurring. Figures 14-
16 expand the fault tree. In these cases, failures associated with the guidance, propulsion,
control and warhead systems were evaluated. “Structural Breakup" refers to the fact that
the missile is damaged to such a degree that it disintegrates.
As with the FMEA, the fault tree analysis accounts for damage events only, with
probabilities of occurrence being determined in the vulnerability analysis (Section 4).
MISSION KILL -
MISSILE DOES NOT
DAMAGE TARGET
OR
] Cc 7 _ | WARHEAD PROPULSION CONTROL STRUCTURAL GUIDANCE
DETONATES EARLY SYSTEM FAILS SYSTEM FAILS BREAKUP SYSTEM FAILS
| ow ~~ ot ~
Figure 13: First Level Fault Tree For A Cruise Missile System
Figure 14 expands the first level fault tree by detailing the faults associated with the
guidance system. This system is dependent on the transmission of signals between
components. Disrupting communication between components will be sufficient to defeat
this system. This can be done by damaging the components or severing the connections
between components. Wiring is not generally redundant in missiles. All components
related to this system require electrical power. Thus, disabling the power source,
distributor or power lines will defeat the system (and most other systems as well).
47
GUIDANCE SYSTEM FAILS
|
LOSS NO GUIDANCE GUIDANCE SIGNAL POWER LOST OF TRACK SIGNAL SIGNAL GENERATED NOT TRANSMITTED TO SYSTEM
OR
SENSOR WIRE FLIGHT WIRE WIRE DISTRIBUTION POWER SYSTEM|| FROM SENSOR COMPUTER BETWEEN AUTOPILOT} | FROM AUTOPILOT BATTERY || LNE(S
I COMPUTER AND AUTOPILOT
SEVERED
OR
jL
POWER ANTENNA SERVO TRANSMITTER] | EXCITER DUPLEXE DATA LINE DAMAGED DAMAGED DAMAGED DAMAGED DAMAGED] | PROCESSOR
SEVERED DAMAGED
Figure 14, Fault Tree Analysis For A Cruise Missile Guidance System
48
The control system is closely linked to the guidance system. This association is shown by
the inclusion of "guidance system fails" as an event in Figure 15. Again, electrical power
is necessary for this system to operate. Depending on the missile, an electrical system
failure will result in the control fins either becoming free-floating or Jocking in place. In
the case here, locking is the response. Either way, the missile becomes unable to correct
its attitude and departure from controlled flight results. Loss of one control surface
degrades the performance of the missile, but this can usually be compensated for, and the
missile is still able to maintain flight for a period of time. Loss of more than one fin,
however cannot be compensated for. Fin loss can be defined as physical removal or
disablement of the control mechanism. Physical removal comes about when a large
fragment, or group of fragments, perforates the skin to a point in which the effective
surface area becomes insignificant (usually about 25% removal). Also, if the shaft
connecting the fin to the actuator is sheared, the fin may simply fall off. The control
mechanism (consisting of motor and gears) is housed inside the actuator. Disabling this
component, or cutting off the signal to it, has the same effect as an electrical failure.
The fault tree analysis of the propulsion system is shown in Figure 16. In this case,
damaging components or disrupting the flow of fuel will result in a system failure. Fuel
ingestion occurs when fuel is injected into the forward end of the engine. This is more
likely to occur in the early stages of flight (when the tanks are more full). Even small
holes in the fuel system are likely to result in a loss of pressure, and subsequently,
flameout. Damaging the lubrication components is likely to result in the engine
overheating and seizing up. The effects of this occurrence are not instantaneous, but loss
of thrust could be expected in less than a minute in most cases.
Figure 17 details the faults associated with the warhead system. In this case, the warhead
can be detonated prematurely by penetrating the case with a sufficient amount of residual
energy to detonate the explosive charges inside, or by closing the fusing circuit by
activating the contact/crush fuses.
49
~~
GUIDANCE SIGNAL NOT RECEIVED
CONTROL SYSTEM FAILS
OR
[POWER LOST TO SYSTEM
AND
PATH OF SIGNAL DISTRIBUTION POWER GUIDANCE BATTERY FROM AUTOPILOT BOX LINE(S SYSTEM Sis SEVERED pamaceo || OAMAGED]| sevede'n
FIRST FIN SECOND FIN REMOVED/DISABLED REMOVED/DISABLED
FIN WIRE TO FIN WIRE TO FINSHAFT| | ACTUATOR FINSHAFTL | ACTUATOR PERFORATED ACTUATOR] | PERFORATED ACTUATOR (>25% REMOVED)| [SHEARED | | DAMAGED } I severen | [025% REMOVED)| | SHEARED] | DAMAGED | [ cevency
Fi 15, Fault Tree Analysis For A ise Missil ntrol m
50
~
|
PROPULSION
SYSTEM FAILS
OR
| | INTERNAT ENGINE FUEL FLAMEOUT DAMAGE INGESTION
[ | _t _LL i DAMAGE TO LOSS OF PERFORATION LOSS OF | Iocaroration| | PUNCTURE [ | PUNCTURE [1 PUNCTURE | | DAMAGE COMPRESSOR | TLUBRICATION/] | OF COMBUSTOR SHAFT T OF FUEL OF FUEL OF FUEL TO FUEL
BLADES COOLING CASE STABILITY TANK(S) LINE(S) CHAMBER | | CONTROLS
c —~)_ T_ ] DAMAGE DAMAGE DAMAGE DAMAGE DAMAGE TO OIL TO FRONT TO REAR TO ENGINE
SEAL RING | [70 OIL PUMP BEARING BEARING MOUNT
Figure 16. Fault Tree Analysis For A Cruise Missile Propulsion System
WARHEAD DETONATES EARLY
CRUSH FUSES] | MAIN CHARGE | | BOOSTER CHARG INITIATOR ACTIVATED DETONATED DETONATED DETONATED
Figure 17. Fault Tree Analysis For A Cruise Missile Warhead System
51
3.3 Conclusion
By using Failure Analysis, the ways in which a cruise missile system can be defeated
have been identified. The likelihood of these failures occurring has not been quantified;
thus, the true measure of the vulnerability of the system has not been determined. To do
this, a Vulnerability Analysis of the missile system can be conducted.
4.0 Vulnerability Analysis
4.1 In ion
The functions associated with a cruise missile system have been determined. This has
lead to an identification of the components included in the system. Fault Analysis has
identified which components are critical to particular missile system operations. As a
final step, the vulnerability assessment involves applying the physical, functional, and
fault characteristics to determine the overall vulnerability of the system to hard kill
mechanisms for a particular kill definition.
"Target Vulnerability” is defined as the inability of a system to withstand damage. Every
system, and each component within that system, is vulnerable to a certain degree.
Furthermore, the vulnerability of each component contributes to the vulnerability of the
system.
Vulnerability assessments provide numerical values for quantifying the measures of
vulnerability. These measures include the conditional probability that the cruise missile
is killed given a random hit (Pkh). Another measure determines the vulnerable area (Av)
of the missile. These measures apply to both individual components and the missile as a
whole. The vulnerable area is defined as the product of the presented area in the plane
normal to the approach direction (shotline), and the Pkh. On a component level, Pkh is
essentially aspect independent, while Av is not. This method takes into account only
whether a component is functioning or not; degraded performance is usually not
considered.
52
All assessments take into account characteristics of the threat (the means of damaging
the cruise missile) selected. These threats fall into the following categories: penetrating
projectiles or fragments, internally detonating HE projectiles and external
blast/fragmentation warheads.
Small-to-medium caliber gun launched projectiles may have internally detonating
warheads. In this case, evaluation using parallel shotlines is not valid. Taking this into
account, the actual presented area could be expanded and the results being applied to non-
explosive methods. Another method is assuming that detonations occur at selected
burstpoints. Each burstpoint is treated like a fragment, with the effects on nearby
components being evaluated. This evaluation determines whether the component and,
ultimately, the entire target is killed.
Externally detonating warheads feature blast fronts followed by fragments. Fragments
usually cause the most damage, although incendiary particles and blast can contribute
significantly as well. Thus, the vulnerability is analyzed in two steps. Vulnerability to
blast is usually expressed as an envelope about the target where the detonation of a
specific amount of explosive will result in a specified level of damage or kill to the target.
Although the dimensions of this envelope are determined from blast considerations, there
are fragment effects as well. Damage from blast is usually limited to airframe structural
and control surfaces. Fragments from externally detonating warheads are usually
uniformly ejected with divergent trajectories. Consequently, analysis using parallel
shotlines, at least near the target, is not valid. At sufficient distance, however, assuming
parallel shotlines gives results that are reasonably accurate.
A complete assessment takes into account the possibility of engaging the target at
various azimuth and elevation angles. Also, any assessment should take into account
vulnerability reduction concepts, such as redundancy, location, and shielding.
53
4.2 Computer Programs For Vulnerability Analysis
A number of computer programs have been developed for assessing vulnerability. They
fall into three categories: shotline generators, vulnerable area routines, and internal burst
programs. The first two methods are used to evaluate fragments and penetrators. The
third method is used for internally detonating warheads. Lethality analysis, which
involves endgame routines, utilizes the output from these programs.
Shotline generators are used to provide the data for determining vulnerable areas.
Shotlines are obtained by superimposing a square grid over the surface area exposed at
specific azimuth and elevation values. Parallel shotlines are then traced perpendicularly
through each section of the grid. The program traces the path through the target, resulting
in a list of components, voids and fluids encountered. FASTGEN is the currently
accepted method of generating shotlines, with the results being stored in a line-of-sight
(LOS) file. As a prerequisite to running FASTGEN, a geometric model of the target is
developed. This model takes into account all components, describing them in plate or
volume mode. The actual construction is as a series of panels (described as
interconnected triangles), boxes, spheres, or cylinders.
A FASTGEN geometric model of the Viper (from an aspect of 45 degrees azimuth, 45
degrees elevation) is shown in Figures 18 and 19. Views of the propulsion, guidance and
control systems are shown in Figures 20-22. A listing of all the components that are
included in the model is shown in Table 4. Critical components are listed in italics.
54
Figure 18: Viper Cruise Missi
55
y)
ex OO
KV
YON
] rM m : Wire Frame Of 1 I Fi
Figure 20: Viper Propulsion System
56
Figure 21: Vi ntrol m
Figure 22: Viper Guidance System
57
Table 4. mponents Incl In Viper FASTGEN Model
0010 RADOME 4110 FUEL SECTION] 0015 RADAR SECTION SKIN 4120 FUEL SECTION 2 0020 WARHEAD SECTION SKIN 4130 FUEL SECTION 3 0030 GUIDANCE/ELECTRONICS SKIN 4140 +FUEL SECTION 4 0040 PROPULSION SECTION SKIN 4150 FUEL SECTION 5 0050 CONTROL SECTION SKIN 4166 FUEL SECTION 6 0110 CONDUIT 4176 FUEL SECTION7 0130 AFT COVER PLATE 4180 FUEL SECTION 8 O410 UPPER PORT WING 4190 FUEL SECTION 9 0420 UPPER STARBOARD WING 4200 FUEL SECTION 10 0430 LOWER PORT WING 4210 FUEL SECTION II 0440 LOWER STARBOARD WING 4220 FUEL SECTION 12 1010 NOSE PIECE 4230 FUEL SECTION 13 1020 NOSEPIECE MOUNTING STUD 4240 FUEL SECTION i4 1030 AIR INLET HOUSING 4250 FUEL SECTION 15 1040 FRONT BEARING HOUSING 5110 WARHEAD CASE 1050 FRONT BEARING AND SHAFT SUPPORT 5120 WARHEAD MAIN CHARGE 1060 FRONT MOUNT 5130 WARHEAD BOOSTER CHARGE 1070 AXIAL COMPRESSOR ROTOR HOUSING 5140 WARHEAD INITIATOR CHARGE 1080 AXIAL COMPRESSOR ROTOR BLADES 5150 SAFE AND ARM DEVICE 1090 AXIAL COMPRESSOR HUB 5160 WIRE - AUTOPILOT TO SVA DEVICE 1100 AXIAL COMPRESSOR ROTOR DRIVE CONE 5170 WIRE - DISTRIBUTION BOX TO WARHEAD 1110 AIR INLET VANES $230 FORWARD PORT CRUSH FUSE 1120 STATOR REGION 5215 WIRE - FROM FWD PORT CRUSH FUSE 1130 COMPRESSOR HOUSING REAR SECTION 5220 FORWARD STARBOARD CRUSH FUSE
1140 FRONT SECTION OF SHAFT 5225 WIRE - FROMFWD STBD CRUSH FUSE 1150 OIL PUMP HOUSING ASSEMBLY 5230 UPPER PORT CRUSH FUSE 1160 FRONT BEARING ASSEMBLY 5235 WIRE - FROM UPPER PORT CRUSH FUSE 11760 OIL SEAL RING 5240 UPPER STARBOARD CRUSH F 1180 RADIAL COMPRESSOR HUB 5245 WIRE - FROM UPPER STBD HUSH FUSE 1190 RADIAL COMPRESSOR BLADES 6100 GYRO BLOCK 1200 RADIAL DIFFUSER 6110 LONGITUDINAL ACCELEROMETER 1210 AXIAL DIFFUSER 6120 LATERAL ACCELEROMETER 1220 COMBUSTOR HOUSING 6130 VERTICAL ACCELEROMETER 1230 PRIMARY AIR SWIRL VANE 6150 WIRE - ACCELEROMETERS TO COMPUTER 1240 COMBUSTOR SHELL 6500 FLIGHT COMPUTERIJINS 4250 REAR SHAFT SECTION 6510 WIRE - DIST. BLOCK TO COMPUTER 1260 AIR FLOW MIXER 6550 AUTOPILOT 1270 TURBINE INLET NOZZLE 6560 WIRE - DIST. BLOCK TO AUTOPILOT 1280 TURBINE COMBUSTOR VANES 6610 RADAR ANTENNA/WAVEGUIDE 1290 TURBINE AXIAL SHAFT 6620 RADAR ANTENNA SERVO 4300 TURBINE AXIAL BLADES 6630 RADAR TRANSMITTER 4310 EXHAUST DUCT 6640 RADAR EXCITER 1320 EXHAUST DUCT VANES 6656 RADAR DUPLEXER 1330 EXHAUST DUCT NOZZLE 6660 RADAR DATA PROCESSOR
1340 FUEL LINE 6670 WIRE - DISTRIBUTION BOX TO RADAR 1350 FUEL CHAMBER 6680 WIRE - RADAR TO FLIGHT COMPUTER 1360 STARTER CARTRIDGE PROPELLANT 7010 BULKHEAD - SENSOR WARHEAD 1370 STARTER CARTRIDGES (2) 7020 BULKHEAD- WARHEAD/GUIDANCE 1380 JUNCTION BOX 7030 BULKHEAD - GUIDANCE /PROPULSION 1390 FUELLINE, SECTION I 7040 BULKHEAD - PROPULSION/CONTROL 1400 FUELLINE, SECTION II 7100 | RADAR MOUNTING BULKHEAD 1410 ELECTRONIC FUEL CONTROL 7210 FORWARD WARHEAD BRACKET 1420. FUEL CONTROL VALVE 7220 AFT WARHEAD MOUNTING BRACKET 1430 BLEED AIR VALVE 7310 FORWARD FRAME - GUIDANCE SECTION 1440 FUEL LINE, START VALVE TO MAIN TANK 7320 AFT FRAME - GUIDANCE SECTION 1450 FUEL LINE, MAIN TANK TO FUEL VALVE 7410 FORWARD FRAME - PROPULSION 1460 FUEL LINE, FUEL VALVE TO 1160 E.F.L. (SECTION 1) 7420 FRAME It- PROPULSION SECTION 1470 REAR BEARINGS 7430 FRAME IIl- PROPULSION SECTION 1550 AIR INLET DUCT 7440 FRAME IV- PROPULSION SECTION 3010 UPPER PORT FIN 7450 AFT FRAME - PROPULSION SECTION 3020 UPPER STARBOARD FIN 7500 FRAME - CONTROL SECTION 3030 LOWER PORT FIN 7510 UPPER PORT ACTUATOR BRACKET 3040 LOWER STARBOARD FIN 7520 UPPER STBD ACTUATOR BRACKET 3310 UPPER PORT SHAFT 7530 LOWER PORT ACTUATOR BRACKET 3120 UPPER STARBOARD SHAFT 7540 LOWER STBD ACTUATOR BRACKET 3130 LOWER PORT SHAFT 8100 BATTERY 3146 LOWER STARBOARD SHAFT 8i50 DISTRIBUTION BOX 3210 UPPER PORT ACTUATOR
3220 UPPER STARBOARD ACTUATOR
3230 LOWER PORT ACTUATOR 3240 LOWER STARBOARD ACTUATOR 3310 WIRE - CONTROL, TO UPPER PORT ACTUATOR 3320 WIRE - CONTROL,TO UPPER STARBOARD ACTUATOR 3330 WIRE - CONTROL,TO LOWER PORT ACTUATOR 3340 WIRE - CONTROL,TO LOWER STARBOARD ACTUATOR 3530 WIRE - FROM AUTOPILOT AFT
58
Vulnerable area routines, such as COVART (Computation Of Vulnerable Area and
Repair Times) generate tables for single fragments or penetrators. Inputs to these
routines come from shotline generators, Pdh tables, penetration data and weapon
characteristic data. COVART takes into account mass and velocity decay as the fragment
proceeds along the shotline and utilizes penetration equations to simulate actual
conditions. The resulting product gives values for vulnerable areas for each grid cell. The
total vulnerable areas for components, systems or complete targets is the sum of all the
grid points that define the presented area in question.
Internal burst programs take into account burstpoints, with kill probability depending on
the relation of critical components to burstpoints.
Endgame programs require a vulnerability model to account for the terminal events in an
encounter between a HE warhead and the target. Evaluation usually includes warhead
detonation, blast propagation, fragment flyout, impact and penetration. The numerical
values for probability of kill (Pk) are determined based on encounter conditions, as well
as warhead and target characteristics. Usually, numerous orientations are considered,
with Px given as a function of distance.
4.3 ARTA ment of ise Missile T
As a final step in the analysis of the Viper cruise missile, a COVART assessment was
run. The final answer in the assessment is the vulnerable area (Av) of the components,
and the missile as a whole.
COVART is a FORTRAN program that determines vulnerable areas of targets that are
associated with specific levels of damage caused by kinetic energy penetrators, such as
warhead fragments. COVART has been used in the evaluation of manned aircraft and
land-based targets, as well as missiles. Determination of repair time is useful in aircraft
assessments, but is not applicable, and is usually omitted when missiles are being
analyzed.
59
The shotlines generated from the FASTGEN model, and found in the LOS file, are
essential for COVART assessments. Vulnerable areas are determined based on a
preselected fragment impact speed and weight matrix. Each penetrator is evaluated along
each shotline, and contributions made to target and component vulnerable areas are
determined. Weight and velocity reductions are taken into account as well. Kill
probabilities are determined as functions of threat impact (weight and velocity). The
component probabilities are then combined, to produce defeat probabilities for a given
threat against the entire target.
COVART results are useful from both lethality and survivability standpoints. From the
lethality side, COVART assessments are used to determine fusing schemes and warhead
designs. By evaluating a series of feasible targets, the most effective combination of
fusing aimpoints and warhead case and explosive characteristics, at given standoff
distances, can be determined. COVART assessments are also be used to determine the
survivability of friendly systems. By estimating the threats that may be encountered,
COVART analysis can be used as a tool in the design process for new aircraft and missile
systems.
Information required for a COVART evaluation includes: desired attack aspects,
definition of threats, kill levels and mission essential components, required outputs
(vulnerable areas, repair times in the case of aircraft), and forms of output. This
information is contained in a set of computer files. These include the BASIC file,
THREAT file, LOS file, JTYPE file, MV file, PDH file, and HEADER file.
The BASIC file contains guidelines for running COVART, such as dimensions, program
options, kill categories and aspects to be run. The BASIC file for the Viper assessment is
shown in Table 5. In this case, three common aspects (0° azimuth 0° elevation, 90°
azimuth 0° degree elevation, and 45° azimuth 45° elevation ) were run. Usually , aspects
are chosen in 30° or 45° increments in azimuth and elevation around the entire target.
The THREAT file contains input data for either fragments or projectiles, such as number
of fragment weights, shapes , basic dimensions and material types. The THREAT file
for the Viper assessment, entitled VIPER.FRAG, is shown in Table 6. In this case, seven
fragment sizes (15, 30, 60, 120, 240, 500, 1000 grains) and ten velocities (3000, 5000,
7000, 8000, 9000, 10000, 12000, 13000, 15000 feet/sec) were considered.
The LOS file includes the shotline information, and is output from FASTGEN.
The MV file provides information on multiply vulnerable component groups. The MV
file used in the Viper assessment is shown in Table 7. In this case, the control surfaces
(including fins, shafts, actuators and wires) and wings are multiply vulnerable. In the
case of the control surfaces, two surfaces must be disabled in order for the system to be
defeated. Disabling a surface, however, requires the defeat of only one component (fin,
actuator, shaft or wire). |
The PDH file is a numerical representation of on the Pdh curves for the vulnerable
components. The Pgh is expressed in terms of a function of impact weight and velocity.
Data is provided for each critical component at each kill level and velocity for a given
fragment weight. The Pgh curves represent the vulnerability of unshielded components.
Shielding by other components tends to reduce the energy of incoming fragments.
Typical Pgh curves for four component types; engine components, soft electronics,
battery and autopilot, are shown in Figure 23. The PDH file, which numerically
expresses the curves used in this assessment, is shown in Table 8.
The JTYPE file contains component information, such as identifying number, material
type, density ratio and pointers to Pdh tables. The JTYPE file used in this assessment is
shown in Table 9. Each line of this file gives information about a specific component.
The first column lists the component numbers (actually, vulnerable area names) of the
critical components, or is left blank (for non-critical components). The subsequent
columns list component number, component density (0-100 percent), vulnerable area
number, material type code, and applicable Pdh curve.
61
Information from the HEADER file is used to identify the output data specific for a given
target. This information usually consists of titles and headings.
44 Conclusion
The overall vulnerable area for the missile, and the vulnerable areas for the components
against single fragment impact are presented in Tables 10-12. Vulnerable areas for
individual components are listed for fragment sizes of 30, 120, 500 and 1000 grains.
Results for other sizes could be determined by interpolating these values. It should be
noted that, in reality, multiple fragments are likely to be encountered. Thus, the missile is
more vulnerable than these tables indicate.
The vulnerable areas for the 0° azimuth, 0° elevation aspect , which corresponds with the
missile coming in head-on, are shown in Table 10. At this aspect, presented areas are
small and shielding tends to protect most components. In fact, most critical components
would not be considered vulnerable. The radar components, however, are located in the
nose of the missile, where shielding has less of an effect. Since these components are
considered "soft" electronics, they would be relatively easy to defeat. Consequently,
disabling the guidance system is the only apparent means of defeating the missile from
this aspect.
The vulnerable areas for the 45° azimuth, 45° elevation aspect are shown in Table 11.
Compared to the results in Table 10, it can be seen that the missile and most components
have larger presented and vulnerable areas. Engine and fuel components appear to be the
most vulnerable at this aspect. As would be expected, larger fragments and higher
velocities are likely to cause more damage. Thus, defeating the propulsion system is the
most likely means of defeating the missile from this aspect.
It is apparent from this table that the multiply-vulnerable controls are not very vulnerable.
This is due, in part, to the fact that the components with the largest presented areas, the
control surfaces, are not considered vulnerable to single fragment impact. Smaller
components are vulnerable, but their overall contributions are small, due to small
presented areas and redundancy.
62
The vulnerable areas for the 90° azimuth, 0° elevation aspect are shown in Table 12.
This aspect provides the largest presented area of the three views analyzed. Similarly,
the values for vulnerable areas are slightly higher than those in Tables 10 and 11. As was
the case for the 45° azimuth 45° elevation aspect, the fuel/propulsion and guidance
electronics are the most vulnerable components. The electrical components are also
vulnerable at this aspect. Since the electrical components are located near the autopilot
and flight computer, and just forward of the fuel and propulsion sections, the aft part of
the center section of the missile would be the best targeting location on this missile.
Again, the multiply-vulnerable controls are difficult to defeat. Defeating one control
surface is possible, but it is unlikely that a single fragment impact will disable two
surfaces.
In all views it is apparent that electronic or engine components are the most vulnerable
parts of a missile. Wires and cables are crucial for proper operation of the missile, yet
they are too small to be targeted. Warhead explosives are not very vulnerable, due to
the fact that penetrating the hard outer casing requires a great deal of energy.
According to the COVART results, redundancy makes the control system difficult to
defeat. How well a missile operates after one control surface has been defeated depends
on the feedback capabilities of the system. The FMEA should give consideration to this
fact. Also, location of control components would tend to make the control system seem
less vulnerable than it really is. This is due to the fact that COVART only accounts for
single fragment impacts and it is unlikely that components from two control surfaces will
be located along one shotline. |
The results presented in these tables should be viewed as a small part of a larger picture.
In a real encounter, a large number of fragments, and shotlines, would be involved. Asa
result, the vulnerable areas of a large number of components need to be taken into
account.
63
Generally speaking, the COVART assessment puts the results of the failure analysis in
perspective. Looking at the FMEA and FTA, it seemed relatively simple to disable a
missile by knocking out one component or severing one wire. While this conclusion is
accurate, the results of failure analysis account for vulnerability at the system level. By
taking into account component characteristics, sizes and locations, the COVART
assessment provides a quantification of vulnerability at a component level.
Existing methods of vulnerability analysis have limitations. In the future, analysis
methods need to take into account such real-world concerns as multiple fragment impact,
degraded mode operations, and secondary effects. Many of these limitations may be
overcome as computational capabilities increase.
Table 5: BASIC File For Viper Assessment
5 1 6 6 7 0 9 1 8 0 50
0 1 0 i 1 0 003
1 0 1 6 2 -12 99599.
1
TARGET Viper 0 0 90 6 45 45
20 FRAG SY¥S2:[WILK.SYSENG])VIPER.FRAG
21 JTYPE SYS2:[WILK.SYSENG]VIPER.JITYPE
22 MV SYS2:[WILK.SYSENG]VIPER.MV
23 PDH S$Y¥S2:[WILK.SYSENG]VIPER.PDH
ad TITLES SYS2:[WILK.SYSENG]VIPER.HEAD
Table 6: THREAT File For Viper Assessment
FRAG
-2 10 7 $9.0 200.0
3000 5000 7000 8000 90001000011000120001300015000
15 15 GRAIN FRAG
30 30 GRAIN FRAG
60 60 GRAIN FRAG
120 120 GRAIN FRAG
240 240 GRAIN FRAG
500 500 GRAIN FRAG
1000 1000 GRAIN FRAG
4140341403414034140341403414034140
1 5 .196 .196 1. 2 5 25 -25 1.
3 5 -3i -31 1.
4 5 -33 ~39 1.
5 6 -568 0.90 -66021
6 6 -82 0.0 -45732
7 6 1.16 0.0 ~32328
65
Table 7: MV File For Viper Assessment
MV
2 KILL CATEGORY 1 *GCONTROL=UPPORT.AND.UPSTAR.AND.LOPORT.AND.LOSTAR /2/4 *SUPPORT=FIN1I.OR.SHFT1.OR.ACT1.OR.WIREI *SUPSTAR=FIN2.OR.SHFT2.OR.ACT2.OR.WIRE2 *SLOPORT=FIN3.OR.SHFT3.OR.ACT3.OR.WIRE3
*SLOSTAR=FING.OR.SHFT4.OR.ACT4.OR.WIRE4 CFIN1I=3010 CFIN2=3020 CFIN3=3030
CFIN4=3040 CSHFT1=3110
CSHFT2=3120 CSHFT3=3130
CSHFT4=3140 CACT1I=3210 CACT2=3220
CACT2=3230 CACT4=3240
CWIRE1=3310 CWIRE2=3320
CWIRE3=3330 CWIRE4=3340
END END OF GROUP]
®GWING=0410.AND.0420.AND.0430.AND.0440 /2/4/ END END OF GROUP2
66
= °o
—*~
° @
g &
12
2 co
Sgr
9 mB ° ty
o >
thertirtit
rte tirtitpdi
|
6 gr
. oT 9
j "6d ee "shoo
FRAGMENT VELOCITY (FT/SEC)
a. Engine Parts
1.0 >
0.8—
06—
Pdh — 04
02 4
~] 15 gr
Oe ee ney
FRAGMENT VELOCITY (FT/SEC)
c. Battery
1.0—— } = @
~—
7 1S 0.e—-
— Ser
. Oe
Pdh 4 0.4—
0.2mm
—
i
0 5000 10000 15000
FRAGMENT VELOCITY (FT/SEC)
b. Soft Electronics
9 °
° z
a @
@ 3°
& o
on
fris
lili
lita
liti
ls
purr erty
FRAGMENT VELOCITY (FT/SEC)
d. Autopilot
Figure 23: Typical Pdh Curves
67
Table 8: PDH File For Viper Assessment
PD
0.50000 2 2 0 28
i. 6. 12. 18. 24. 60.
1 9
1 LEENERG
0 ONONE
1 5.0 6 0
7 15 36 60 12601000 2 2 2 2 2 2
7200 O. 8100 1. 4950 0. 5525 1. 3450 0. 3900 1. 2520 0. 2780 1.
1750 0. 1950 1. 620 0. 700 1.
2 5.0 1 0 0
0 6
-900 01.500.082.500.225.000.586.500.798.00 1.0
3 0.1 7 1
1 2 5 15 30 661000 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1100 0. 1225 1. 495 0. 550 1. 215 0. 245 1. 125 0. 144 1.
20 0. $0 1. 65 0. 72°41. id 0. 17, 1.
4 0.1 1 0 1
0 2
0.06 00.07 1.0
5 0.05 6 i
1 5 15 30 60 120 5 4 2 2 2 2
305 .51 610 .70 900 .851200 .941510 1.
305 .71 610 .94 900 .981200 1. 305 .85 610 1. 305 .88 610 1.
305 .91 610 1. 0.0. 305 1.
6 0.05 1 0 0
0 6
-001 00.100.740.600.921.400.963.000.985.00 1.0
7 15.0 7 0
15 30 60 120 240 5001000 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
5310 05350 .279999 .793370 03410 .786400 .70
2375 62400 .274110 .7015790 01610 .282500 .790
1125 01150 .271600 .70 8090 0 835 .281010 .70
600 0 630 .27 755 .70
8 1.0 1 0 0
0 6
-350 02.000.103.000.185.000.2412.00.4232.0 1.9
9 0.05 5 0
15 30 60 1201000 3 3 3 3 2
390 0. 444 .777010 1.6 380 0. 423 .785013 1.0
376 0. 419 .813015 1.0 390 0. 412 .821010 1.0 360 0. 400 1.0
10 0.05 1 0 1
0 6
-001 00.020.410.040.500.080.600.160.681.66 1.0
11 3.0 6 1
5 15 30 60 1201000 3 3 3 3 3 3
213 0.0 242 .101510 1.0 173 0.0 193 .361210 1.0
111 0.0 124 .10 865 1.0 83 0.0 94 .45 616 1.0
65 0.0 72 .55 433 1.0 37 0.0 42 .67 155 1.0
12 3.0 1 ) 1
0 5
~06 00.070.250.150.500.600.77 5.0 1.0
13 06.05 6 1
1 5 15 30 60 120 5 4 2 2 2 2
300 .55 610 .73 915 ,851220 .921525 1.
300 .74 610 .92 915 .981220 1. 300 .82 610 1. 300 .86 610 1.
300 .90 610 1. 0 0. 300 1.
14 0.05 1 0 0
0 6
001 00.100.740.600.921.400.963.000.985.00 1.90
15 0.05 6 1
1 5 15 30 60 120 5 4 3 2 2 2
360 .40 600 .61 900 .771212 .981515 1.
engine comps
prim frag zone
engine ENERG
fuel line prim
frag zone
fuel line NRG
soft electron
primary frag
sft elect NRG
actuators
actuat. Eng.
wire primary
frag zone
wire Energ
crush Fuzes
crush Fuzes
Energy
electrical
primary frag zone
elect NRG
autopilot
68
Table 8: PIDH File For Viper Assessment (Continued)
300 .58 600 .85 900 .961200 1. 300 .73 690
300 .80 600 1. 300 .88 600 1. 0 0. 290
16 0.05 1 0 0
0 6
-002 01.000.763.000.843.000.896.000.967.00
17 10.0 6 1
15 30 60 120 2401000 4 4 4 4 4
2100 O. 310 .08 513 .131510 1. 100 .03 319
100 .08 3190 .15 513 .221300 1. 100 .13 310
100 .16 310 .41 513 .631090 1. 100 .37 310
18 10.0 1 0 0
0 4
0.50 01.400.108.000.6025.0 1.0
19 1.0 4 0
15 60 2401000 2 2 2 2
0 09999 0 0 09999 0 0 09999
20 15.0 7 0
15 30 60 120 240 5001000 2 2 2 2
3870 03955 1.02775 02850 1.01915 01984
955 01010 1.0 655 0 711 1.0 455 0 486
21 10.90 7 0
15 30 60 120 240 5001000 2 2 2 2
1965 02160 .2512525 01690 .251200 01340
775 6 870 .25 635 0 705 .25 545 0 600
22 300.9 2 0
5001000 2 2
5875 0.06480 .255000 0.05513 .29
23 10.0 2 0
151000 2 2
50 0 1111.00 50 0 1111.00
24 10.0 7 0
15 30 60 120 250 5001000 2 3 4 4
8950 09999 .057760 09100 .159999 .31
6815 08120 .209200 .459999 .705950 07120
5050 07120 .658200 .869200 .899999 .90
5025 06210 .757120 .889999 .913775 05130
25 10.0 7 0
15 30 60 120 240 §00106000 2 2 2 2 3888 05550 1.02400 03900 1.01965 02788
980 01400 1.0 675 0975 1.0 485 0 680
26 0.0 1 0 0
1. 4
1.25 0.02.53 .555.37 .8915.8 1.0
27 15.0 7 0
15 30 60 120 250 5001000 2 2 2 2
4175 04220 1.02775 02850 1.01875 01920
955 01025 1.0 628 0 655 1.0 485 0 513
28 15.0 7 0
15 30 60 120 250 §$001000 2 2 2 2
675 0 700 .85 555 0 590 .84 455 0 495
350 0 388 .83 331 0 355 .83 3190 0 330
-96 890
1.
1.0
4
-13 513
-25 $13
-75 513
0 0
2 2
1.01370
1.0
2 2
-25 945
-25
5 4
- 209200
- 706110
2 2
1.01390
1.0
2 2
1.01360
1.0
2 2
~-83 400
- 83
-161400
-4 1200
~-85 905
09999
01450
01040
4
-809999
-899999
2 01960
2 01415
6 435
25
-89
-94
1.0
- 83
primary
zone
frag
autoplt NRG
battery
primary
zone frag
battery NRG
wings/fins
blades
intake
act. Shafts
fuel
explosive
gyros
antenna
servo
dist.box
69
Table 9: JTYPE File For Viper Assessment
JTYPE
1 8 NON-CRIT 0010 100 227
0015 100 27 0020 100 27 0030 100 27 0040 100 27 0050 100 27 0110 100 27
0410 0410 100 37 19 0420 0420 100 47 #19 0430 0430 100 57 19 0440 0440 100 67 19
1010 07 28 1020 100 21 1030 100 28
1040 1040 100 712 1 1050 1050 100 812 1 1060 1060 100 912 1
1070 100 21 1080 1080 32101 20
1090 100 21 1100 100 21 1110 20 28 1120 25 28 1130 100 28 1140 100 2 6
1150 1150 100118 1 1160 1160 100126 1 1170 1170 100 1313 1
1180 100 24 1190 1190 25 1416 20
1200 25 28 1210 25 28
1220 1220 10015 3. 3 1230 100 24 1240 100 21 1250 100 25 1260 100 21 1270 100 23 1280 100 23 1290 100 25 1300 25 25 1310 100 21 1320 04 21 1330 100 21
1340 1340 100 16 1 3 1350 1350 100173 3
1360 79 27 1370 06 23 1380 60 21
1390 1390 2818 &@~ 3 1400 1400 2819 8 3 1410 1410 30208 5 1420 1420 100 21 8 ~ 3
1430 50 28 1440 1440 18 228 3 1450 2450 15 23 8 3 1460 1460 15 248 3 1470 1470 100 256 1 1550 1550 17 26 8 212 3010 3010 100 27 7 #19 3020 3020 100 28 7 19 3030 3030 100 29 7 19 3040 3040 10039 7 19 3110 3110 100 31 6 22 3120 3120 100 32 6 22 3130 3130 100 33 6 22 3140 3140 100 34 6 22 3220 3220 40 36 8 7 3230 3230 40378 7 3240 3240 4038 8 7 3310 3310 75 3918
70
Table 9: JTYPE File For Viper Asscssment_ (Continucd)
3320 3320 75° #4018 9 3330 3330 75° 4118 9 3340 3340 75 #4218 9 4100 4100 100 6954 23 4110 4110 100 7054 23 4120 4120 100 7154 23 4130 4130 100 7254 23 4140 4140 100 7354 23 4150 4150 100 7454 23 4160 4160 100 7554 23 4170 4170 10 7654 23 4180 4180 10 7754 23 4190 4190 10 7854 23 4200 4200 05 #7954 23 4210 4210 05 8054 23 4220 4220 O01 8154 23 4230 4230 O01 8254 23 4240 4240 01 8354 23 4250 4250 01 8454 23
5110 100 21 5120 5120 100 4315 24 5130 5130 90 4415 24 5140 5140 80 4515 24
5150 60 2 8 5160 75 218 5170 75 218
5210 5210 25 46 1 #11 5215 75 218
5220 5220 25°47 1 #11 5225 75 218
5230 5230 25 48 1 #11 5235 75 218
5240 5240 25 49 1 #11 5245 75 218
6100 6100 45 50 8 25 6110 6110 35 51 8 13 6120 6120 35 52 8 13 6130 6130 35 53 8 13 6150 6150 75 5418 3 6500 6500 40 55 8 13 6510 6510 75 5618 9 6550 6550 30 57 8 15 6560 6560 7S $818 9 6610 6610 100 5925 26 6620 6620 40 60 8 27 6630 6630 50 61 8 13 6640 6640 50 62 8 13 6650 6650 50 63 & 13 6660 6660 50 64 8 13 6670 6670 75 6518 ) 6680 6680 75 6618 9
7010 #100 22 7020 100 2 2 7030 100 2 2 7040 #100 2 2 7100 42100 2 2 7210 #100 2 2 7220 100 2 2 7310 #100 2 2 7320 100 2 2 7410 #100 2 2 7420 100 2 2 7430 100 2 2 7440 200 2 2
7450 100 2 2 7500 100 2 2 7510 100 2 2 7820 100 2 2 7530 100 2 2 7540 100 2 2
8100 8100 100 67 8 17 8150 8150 35 68 8 28
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Conclusions
The vulnerability of cruise missiles has been examined using the Systems Engineering
Process and Vulnerability Analysis programs. The Definition of Need for vulnerability
analysis was presented. Functional Analysis gave insight into how cruise missiles are
arranged and operate. Failure Analysis addressed how these systems could be defeated.
Finally, the Vulnerability Analysis took into account the physical characteristics and the
results of the Systems Engineering Process to provide an estimate of overall system
vulnerability.
Although the target evaluated in this report is generic, the process followed would work
equally well for other cruise missile systems. In fact, the principles of identifying needs,
defining functions and evaluating failure modes could be applied to the analysis of most
any type of system.
In the future, analysts need to remain aware of trends in the design of cruise missiles, and
the methods needed to defeat them. Fragmenting warheads continue to evolve, yet the
analyst should not limit their efforts to this method. Advances are being made in fields
such as ballistics, flight dynamics, and explosive physics. Application of these advances,
made possible by greater computational capabilities, would allow for more detailed and,
presumably, more accurate vulnerability models.
88
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