Nikki Keddie on Islamism

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Society for Comparative Studies in Society and History

The Revolt of Islam, 1700 to 1993: Comparative Considerations and Relations to ImperialismAuthor(s): Nikki R. KeddieSource: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Jul., 1994), pp. 463-487Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/179293 .

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The Revolt of Islam, 1700 to 1993:Comparative Considerations andRelations to ImperialismNIKKI R. KEDDIEUniversityof California,Los AngelesWithin the Muslimworld,revolts with a religiousaspector ideologyhave hada long history.My currentcomparativeresearchon this topic indicates thatthese revolts, common in the early centuries of Islam, became less frequentthereafter.These revoltsmay generallybe characterized s either "left"sec-tarianor "orthodox" evivalist. The latterrevived aftercirca 1700. It is partofmy thesis to see threephasesto these modem revivalistrevolts and to say thatall three phases were, in differentways, tied to interactionwith the West,although his was far frombeingtheironly cause. These threephaseswere thepre-colonial phase, early resistance to colonialism, and the recent Islamicrevival. The scope here covers the whole Muslimworld, andthe approach scomparative.Beforediscussingthese movementsI will give some backgroundabout therelationsbetween Islam and politics, which influenced the movements. It iswidely believed that Islam andpoliticsareunusuallyclosely intertwinedn allspheresandperiods, with the partialexceptionof the pastcentury.This viewunderstates he close church-state relationsof the EasternOrthodoxchurchesand of religion and politics in the pre-modernWest, with the differencebetween Islamic andChristian andsbeingpartlywhen and how theyreachedmodernity.In practice,despitethe often-citedspecialrole of Romanlaw andthe existence of a clear relationshipbetween church and state in the West,Christianityand Islamhad rathersimilar levels of relationsbetweenreligionand politics in pre-modern imes.The supposed near-identity f religionandpolitics in Islam is more a piousmyththanrealityformostof Islamichistory.After the first fourpiouscaliphs,there aroseessentially politicalcaliphal dynastiesthatworkedthroughpoliti-cal appointees and broke religious rules when they wished. The body of'ulamahelpedto create the schools of law partlyto create a sphereindepen-dent of suchessentially temporalrulers,but the 'ulama'srulingsgenerallyhadless force than those of rulers. The independenceof rulers from religiouscontrolgrewas tribalandmilitaryconvertstook increasingpower.Authorsof0010-4175/94/3308-9326 $5.00 ? 1994 Society for ComparativeStudyof Society andHistory

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464 NIKKI R. KEDDIEadvice to rulersoftenstressed he importance f backingreligion,but this waspragmaticadvice, not really advice to be good Muslims.'Views similar to mine on the essential separationof religion and politicshave been voiced by IraLapidus,SamiZubaida,MuhammadArkoun,NazihAyubi, andEmmanuelSivan;but the older view remainsdominant.2 t wouldbe useful to do a carefulcomparisonof the actualrelations of religion andpolitics and of church and state in pre-moder Europeandthe Middle East.The differencesare not all in the directionof greaterpoliticalpowerfor Islamthan forthe ChristianChurch.I suspectthatde facto themedievalrelationshipbetween religion and state was a standoffbetweenthe Muslim Middle Eastandthe ChristianWest,with Christiannstitutions tronger n some ways andmore limited in others than Islamic ones.Whatdoes seem clear andmaymakepeoplemistake hepremodemsituationis that n modem timesreligiousinstitutions,movements,andbeliefs have hadmorepolitical importancen the Muslimworld than in theWest. This is oftenattributedo specialfeaturesof Islam,whichareof some importance,but thereappear o be othercauses, suchas, first,thegreatchangesin the Westfromthelate Middle Ages on, includingthose in trade, production,exploration,theEnlightenment,andrepresentative overnment,whichoccurred nthe MuslimWorld only recently and in differentways. In this period there was lessstructural hangein the MuslimWorld han theWest;hence, Muslimsenteredmodem times with structures, deas, andreligiousbeliefs quitesimilarto pastones, while the West did not. Second, the long historyof conflict betweenChristiansand Muslims tendedto make Muslimsdefensive aboutIslam and todefine (as did some Westerners)he situation n religiousterms.I do not deny special features o Islamicthought.Beforediscussingthese Inote that t has becomefashionable,amongmembersof a groupdifferent romthose who pointto long-term ies of religionandpolitics in the Muslimworld,to attack he attribution f significantunityor continuity o variousphenome-na over time or place as essentialistandipso factobenighted.In my field it isalmostas bad to be an essentialistas to be an orientalist.In fact, no one callsherselfor himself an essentialist. Much as it is called biological essentialismis used to say there are significantnon-culturaldifferences between womenandmen, so it is ideologicalessentialism to say that Islam has important n-

' See, for example, Nizam al-Mulk, The Book of Governmentor Rulesfor Kings (London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul, 2nded., 1978), 190-238, stressinghereticalmovementsand revolts.2 Ira M. Lapidus,"TheSeparation f State andReligionin the Developmentof EarlyIslamicSociety,"International ournalof MiddleEasternStudies,6:4 (1975), 364; SamiZubaida, slam,the People and the State (London:Routledge, 1989), 41-42; Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam:Religionand Politics in the Arab World London:Routledge, 1991); EmmanuelSivan, RadicalIslam: MedievalTheologyandModernPolitics (New Haven:YaleUniversityPress, 1985), 175,with citations to two articlesby M. Arkoun. I quote and discuss this point and its literatureatgreater length in "Islam, Politics, and Revolt: Some UnorthodoxConsiderations,"n Nikki R.Keddie,Iran and the MuslimWorld:Resistance and Revolution London:Macmillan, 1994).



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THE REVOLT OF ISLAM, 1700 TO 1993 465duringfeatures.AlthoughI sympathizewith muchof this, if carried o its log-ical end, anti-essentialismmeansthatnothinghas any special featuresexceptthose displayedat a particularmoment.3My view is thatreligionsdo have ashapeand influencecoming from the past, althoughparticular daptionsvarywith time and circumstance.

Hence, it is important o note that Muslims themselves have often consid-ered Islam a total world view comprisingreligionandpolitics, howeverlittlethis unityhas been realized.This totalizingaspectof Islamappearsespeciallyin periodsof Islamic revolts and revivals, rather handuringstableempires.Althoughthe often radical Islamic revivalof recent decades is in many waysnovel, it has some importantresemblancesto religious revolts of the past.Amongthese resemblances s a return o theearlycombinationof religionandpolitics with enforcementof Quranicandlegal provisions.Lookingat severalunconnectedIslamic militantmovementssuggestsideologicalsimilarities hatowe somethingto a widespreadbelief in whatrelationsbetweenreligion andpolitics in Islam should be.Not counting the very early civil wars in Islam, its earliest religious re-volts were carriedout by the firstsectarians, he Shi'is and the Kharijis,bothof whom had a total alternate view of Islam. The Sevener branchof theShi'is continuedto be frequentlyrebelliousthroughthe age of the so-calledAssassins. The variabilityof Islam andpolitics is suggestedby the fact thatthe line of Assassin leaders ended with the Aga Khans,the wealthy pillarsoforder.An opposite evolution was tracedby the Twelver Shi'is. Although manyscholars say that Shi'is as such justified revolt, this is false. The Fifth andSixth Twelver mams laid down linesdividing religionandpoliticsandenjoin-ing obedienceto rulers. The doctrine that the Twelfth imamhaddisappearedwas probably adoptedto remove from the world an alternatesource of alle-giance, which might encouragerevolution.4Forsome centuriesbothShi'is andSunnisin the centralMuslim landshad a

3 Any kind of continuitynot causedby immediate actors could be characterized s essential-ist, even thoughfew people carrytheirthoughtsto this logical extreme. The views thatdo carryanti-essentialism o its logical conclusionareprimarily hose called "occasionalism" n the earlymodem West, which were put forthearlierby a school of conservativeAsh'aritetheologiansinIslam who said that there are no secondarycauses and that God recreates the world everymoment. The late Ash'arites said that apparentworldly causation and orderwere due only toGod's mercy to humanityand thatGod couldequallycreatea completelynew world, or none atall, at each moment. This is a theory designedto combat all naturalaw and, some say, to mirrorarbitrary ule; and it is in some ways ironic that the strongestanti-essentialistsof our day aremostly on the left, although they have either not thoughtof the implicationsof a totally anti-essentialistposition or would renounce such totality.4 W. MontgomeryWatt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought(Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversity Press, 1973); Idem, "The Significance of the Early Stages of Imami Shi'ism," inReligionand Politics in Iran, Nikki R. Keddie, ed., 21-32; and Nikki R. Keddie and JuanR.Cole, "Introduction"o Shi'ism and Social Protest, Cole and Keddie, eds. (New Haven:YaleUniversityPress, 1986).



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466 NIKKI R. KEDDIEdoctrineof obedience to existingrulers. It was only afterIranbecameShi'i in1501 thata morecentralized, ndependent lergy aroseand was given doctri-nal power that Shi'i clerical resistancebegan.Anotherwidely held myth is that the denial of legitimateresistance andrevolt by normative Islam left people without any but sectarian means tojustify revolt. Here again, comparisonwith pre-modem Europe would beuseful. Did main-lineEuropeanChristianity rovideanymore ustificationforrevolt than did Islam? Although leading Muslim thinkersspoke and wroteagainstrevolt,considering t worse than an evil ruler,there wereways aroundthis in the Islamic tradition. It was almost unknown to speak of one's ownmovementas a revolt, and the words we translateas "revolt"were pejorative(again as in Europe?).But there were other importantways to conceive arevolt.Onewas millenarian:A rebelcould claim to be the renewerof Islamorthe precursorof the messianic Shi'i or Sunni mahdi or the mahdi himself.Another was to declareone's ruler an unbelieverand the war againsthim aholy war. The possibility of declaringIslamic rulers unbelievers s found inthe great theologians,IbnTaimiyyaandthe North Africanal-Maghili,whoseideas were cited by West Africanrebels. Bothjihad and mahdismwere fre-quentlyused, often both at once.

Beforegoing into theeighteenth-andnineteenth-centuryevolts,I note thatthe idea thatMuslims were so hostile to revoltis partlybased on a simplistictranslation f ideas of revoltfrom the modemWest. The wordsin fact used forrevolt do not translateas revolt and have a positive meaning.It should againbe stressed that Sunnis used these ideas as much as Shi'is. The notion thatShi'ism as such is especially prone to revolt comes not only from the earlycenturiesbut also from a false belief that Shi'is generally ustified revoltsbyappealing to the model of Imam Husain's martyrdom n battle. A recentinvestigation ndicatesthisparadigmwas not usedfor revolt untilveryrecent-ly and thatearlier Shi'i revoltsusually had a Mahdistparadigm,much likemany Sunnirevolts.5My remarks ontainingsome reservations boutanti-essentialism hould benoted here. From one end of the Muslim world to the other-Senegal toSumatran my travels-Muslim revoltsusedmanyof thesame themes:mahd-ism, jihad, and a return o stricterQuranicand Islamic laws and practices,includingthose affectinggender.Hence, thereis almost surelysomethinginIslamic contentthathelps determine he form andideology of movementsindifferentpartsof the Muslimworld, even lackingdirect contact.MILITANT ISLAMIC REVIVALISM IN THE EIGHTEENTH ANDNINETEENTH CENTURIESThe rise of militantpoliticizedIslamicmovements n the 1970s and 1980s inIranand elsewherehas increased nterest n the pastof militantIslam. There

5 Interview with Mansour Ehsan, based on his University of Oregon Ph.D dissertation.



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THE REVOLT OF ISLAM, 1700 TO 1993 467has, however,been little new seriousmonographic tudyand also little seriouscomparative tudyof militantmovements,thoughthereareexceptions.6I willhere attempta comparativestudyof some militantMuslim movementsthat,like most recentones, claimed to be revivingpureIslamandits holy law. Themovements studiedcomparativelyhere are related o differentphasesof inter-action with the West, although they have indigenousroots. The past move-ments are sometimes called puritanicalmovements or reform movements.The latterphrase, reformmovements, seems unsatisfactory, ince the termIslamic reform is equally used for a liberal modem school with tenets andpracticesvery differentfrom those of the revivalists.Anythingthatchangesideas andpractices n a way that ts proponents onsidera major mprovementmaybe calledreform,but the termmaybe confusingif othersuse it to refertovery differentmovements.Similarly,the wordpuritanmay be objectedto asreferringto a particularWesterngroup;and so both will be used sparinglyhere.Anothername for these movements s jihadmovements,meaningthattheycalled for holy war againstexternal non-Muslimenemies or that they prac-ticed jihad againstlocal rulers andenemies whom they considered not trulyMuslim. These movements wished to replacethese rulersandpracticeswithtrulyIslamic ones. Among such movements were those of the WahhabisofSaudi Arabia, movements in West Africa in the eighteenthand early nine-teenthcentury,anda major ihad in Sumatra n the earlynineteenthcentury.These occurredwithout Westernconquest,while in the periodof earlyWest-ernconquestthere were similarmovementsdirectedwholly or in partagainstthe Westerners.These included the Wahhabisand Fara'izisof South Asia,Shamyl in the Caucasus,Abdel Qadirin Algeria, and the Senussis in Libya;while the Mahdists n the Sudanshow similarities.The causationof the lattermovements include Western,infidel conquest;while the causes of the pre-conquest movements are more complex and less obvious. There are somefeatures and causes found in both groups.Most of these movementshave only recentlybecome the topic of seriousstudy, and this-plus the fact that they occurredin such widely dispersedplaces and cultures-has meant that there has been very little comparativestudy of them. Yet it remains a dramaticand puzzling fact that, aftermanycenturies n which suchlarge-scalerevolutionaryihadmovementswerequiteinfrequent,there was a suddenconcentrationof them in a periodof abouta

6 Some of thesemovementsarediscussedcomparativelyn thefollowing works, whichI haveused with profit:JohnObertVoll, Islam:Continuityand Changein the Modern World Boulder,CO:WestviewPress, 1982);NehemiaLevtzion and JohnVoll, EighteenthCenturyRenewalandReformin Islam (Syracuse:SyracuseUniversityPress, 1987), especiallyrelevant articlesin thebook by Levtizan Voll and Louis Brenner. See also William Roff's arguments n the book heedited, The Political Economyof Meaning (Berkeley: Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1987). Ihavealso benefitedfromtravel o, anddiscussionsin, Senegal, Nigeria,NorthAfrica,the MiddleEast, Pakistan,Indonesia,Malaysia, England,and France.



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468 NIKKI R. KEDDIEcentury.It seems unlikelythat this is a coincidence,and it should be instruc-tive to ask what common factorsmay have operated n some or all of thesediverse regionsto producesimilar results.In the past, one common factor adducedregardingsome of these move-mentswas thepurportednfluence of the ArabianWahhabimovement,whichstood for a puritanical slam and for holy waragainstthose not consideredtobe trueMuslims. Recent researchershavegenerallyconcluded that the influ-ence of theWahhabishasbeen overstated.This influenceis no longerconsid-ered key in the main West Africanmovement,the Nigerianjihad of Usmandan Fodio; and it could not have entered into the Senegambianeighteenth-centurymovements, which came too early. South Asia's jihad movementsalso seem to have been less Wahhabi-influencedhan was once thought. InSumatra he fact that three movementleaders made the hajj at the time theWahhabis ontrolled heHijazis of some importance,but it was probablyonlya minor factor in a movement that can be shown to have had strong localroots. Wahhabism etainsa place amongthe causes of the simultaneous ihadmovements in the Muslim world, but it no longer appearsto be the majorexplanatorycause.One reasonwhy there havebeen few comparative tudiesof Islamicreviv-alist movements is that scholars of Islam tendto be divided by geographicspecialty,with Middle Eastspecialistsconfident hatthey represent hecentralMuslim world and are happy to ignore the great majorityof the world'sMuslims who live outside the Middle East. There has begunto be a recogni-tion of therole of South Asia in eighteenth-centuryeligiousreformandin theoriginsandspreadof eighteenth-century eo-Sufism,but this has not yet ledto a comprehensiveinterest in what was happeningin the Muslim worldoutside the Middle East. If one is studyingmilitantrevivalistmovementsofthe eighteenthand nineteenthcenturies, however, one finds the first majorexamples in what may be called the peripheryand the semi-periphery,andeven laterexamplesare concentratedn tribalareasnotnear mperialorpowercenters. (Herethe wordsperipheryand semi-periphery re used purelygeo-graphicallyfor areasnearthe edges of the Muslimworld or far from urbanimperialcenters.)Thus, in the latereighteenthandearlynineteenthcenturies,the largestmilitantpuritanicalmovementsoccurred n present-daySaudiAra-bia; in WestAfrica;and in Sumatra,Indonesia.Latermovements,largely inresponse to Westernconquests, occurredin South Asia, North Africa andadjacentAfricanlands, and the Caucasus.

There were a numberof conditions hathelpexplainthe rise and locationofthese movements, althoughavailablesources and scholarshipdo not allowconvincingcomparisonon all points. I wouldsuggestthe following factorsasprobably mportantn most of the movements.First, in West Africa and Sumatra,the impact of the significantrise ofEuropean radeweakened some classes, strengthened thers,andhelpedcre-



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THE REVOLT OF ISLAM, 1700 TO 1993 469ate preconditions or a unitedstate with a unitedlaw and ideology and wereimportant o internalsocioeconomicchange. A similarchange in class struc-tures and demandsmay also be found in the areasof some of the MuslimrevivalistmovementsoccurringafterEuropean onquest,andit is conceivablethe growing Westerntradein PersianGulf portshad an influence in inlandNajd.Second, European-inducedhangesinteractedwith internalsocioeconomicchanges. These may include a growth of population,which some scholarshave seen as characterizinghe eighteenth centuryworld-wide.7Along withapparentpopulationgrowth,therewas moreclearlynew tradeandurbanism,as well as new social tensions, problems, and possibilities. It is significantthatNajd,WestAfrica,andWestSumatrawere all areaseitherwithouta state,as was the case in NajdandSumatra,or with weak states, as in WestAfrica,so that a rise of trade,population,andeconomicquarrelsprovidedan impetusfor strongerstates, in which originalIslam could provideeffective law andideology.Third,in religionandideology,theeighteenthand nineteenthcenturiessawa spreadof Islamic learningand the rise of so-called neo-Sufism, includingstrongSufi orderswith types of scholarshipandpracticescloser to normativeIslam and classical scholarship hanwere most of the earlier Sufi orders. Inthe peripheryandsemi-periphery f the Muslimworld, neo-Sufiorders wereespecially important,often providingthe main force for spreadingIslam andits teachings.8Notably,although he Islamof the ArabianWahhabiss associ-ated withhostilityto Sufism, mostof the non-Arabian urist eadersbeganas,and often continued to be, leaders of the Sufi orders. This includes suchcharismaticgiants as Usman Dan Fodio in Nigeria, Abdel Qadirin Algeria,andShamylin the Caucasus.Sometimes,as with Shamyl, stress on the strictshari'a was combined with the Sufi idea that the Sufi pathwas only for theselect few, while the literal shari'a was for the majority.In additionto neo-Sufism, there was a general spreadof Islamiclearningandan increasein thenumber of Islamic scholars that was especially important n lightly Islam-icized areas.

Fourth, n thepolitical sphere,theeighteenthcenturysaw thedeclineof thegreat Islamic empires-Ottoman, Safavid, and Moghul-and their breakupinto smaller states or regions. This providedthe Wahhabis he opportunityoexpandinto territories hat had beenloyal to theOttomans,until the Ottomanswere able to enlist MuhammadAli of Egyptto send troops againstthe Wah-7 See JackGoldstone, "East and West on the SeventeenthCentury:PoliticalCrises in StuartEngland, OttomanTurkeyand Ming China"(unpublishedpaper);JosephFletcher,"IntegrativeHistory:Parallelsand Interconnectionsn the Early Moder Period, 1500-1800," Journal ofTurkishStudies, 9 (1985), 37-57.8 There is some controversyamongscholarsaboutneo-Sufism. See R. S. O'Fahey,EnigmaticSaint: AhmadIbnIdris and the Idrisi Tradition Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress, 1990),ch. 1.



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470 NIKKI R. KEDDIEhabis in the early nineteenthcentury. Eighteenth-century olitical fluidity,along with economicchanges, made it a propitiousperiodto build new states.Nineteenth-centurymovements in Algeria, Libya, and Sudan were clearlyinfluencedby Ottoman decline. And South Asian state-buildingpuritanicalmovements were reacting, amongotherthings, to the decline of the Mogulsand the Muslimpower vacuum it left.Fifth, also importantn the sphereof religiousintellectualswas the devel-opment of learning, of travel over large distances to learning, and of thepilgrimage to Mecca-factors important n the personal history of severalleaders of revivalist movements. JohnVoll has traced the eighteenth-centuryspreadof learningnetworkswhich tied many 'ulama to the same scholarsinthe Hejaz or Yemen, and Juhanyhas noted the growthof learned 'ulamaineighteenth-centuryNajd, some with ties to the network discussed by Voll.9Several eadersof revivalistmovements,such as thosein Sumatraand some inWest Africa, had histories of pilgrimagesto, or education in, Mecca andMedina. There was a growing understanding f early Islamic tenets arisingfromgreatereducation n Hejaz,Egypt, andSyria.Cumulativemprovementsin transportand communication,which mostly originated n the West, wereimportant o the rise in pilgrimageto and educationin Arab territories.Thesixth and final point is that, unsurprisingly,nearlyall these movementshadcharismaticreligio-politicalleaders.Several of the eighteenth-and nineteenth-centuryihad movements echopartsof the originalIslamicexperience.1 LikeearlyIslam, these movementsarose in a period of the decline of empires, often near the borders or justbeyond those empires. Islam in most of these regions was especially thereligion of traders,and in all the so-called Fulanijihads of WestAfrica, thejihadists were composed, like the early Muslims, of traders, scholars, andfighting nomads. Similar alliances were found in Arabia and South Asia,althoughthe trade element may have been less importanthere. Tradersandscholars were very important n the Sumatranmovement,where the tropicalterrainprecludedpastoralnomadism.I have not consideredhere deliberate mitationsof Muhammad,notablythehijra emigrationsof believers undertaken y UsmandanFodio andother WestAfrican ihad leadersbeforetheylaunched heir ihads;the list above includesonly structural similarities that presumably were not deliberate but,

9 John ObertVoll, "LinkingGroups n the Networksof Eighteenth-Century evivalistSchol-ars," in Levtzion and Voll, eds., EighteenthCenturyRenewal; and Uwaidah MetaireekAl-Juhany,"TheHistoryof NajdPriorto the Wahhabis;A Studyof Social, PoliticalandReligiousConditions n NajdduringThree CenturiesPreceding he WahhabiReformMovement" Seattle:Ph.D dissertation,History Department,Universityof Washington,1983).10 W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammadat Mecca (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1953), andMuhammadat Medina (Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1956); and Maxime Rodinson, Mohammed,Anne Carter, rans.(New York:VanguardBooks, 1974).This interpretationas been opposedbyvarious recentscholars, includingPatriciaCroneand Michael Cook.



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THE REVOLT OF ISLAM, 1700 TO 1993 47Irather,may express a similarityof movementsoccurring n partiallysimilarsocioeconomic and intellectual environments.The revivalist movements of the eighteenthand nineteenthcenturies,all ofwhich engaged in jihad (holy war)eitheragainstlocal rulers or againstwest-erners,were in part responding o a combinationof economic, political, andculturalchangeswhich hadsome similarities o the changesfelt at the time ofthe rise of Islam. Naturally,herewere also differences; hese, in particularhegrowing role of capitalism and of Western trade and conquest, made theeighteenth-andnineteenth-centurymovements nto new phenomena.ModemWestern rade,even beforecolonial conquest,had a moredramatic tructuraleffect on societies than did the more restricted radeof ancienttimes.THE ARABIAN WAHHABISDespitetheirrecognized mportance, heearlyWahhabis f SaudiArabiahavebeen the subjectof very little scholarly publication, althoughthereare somedissertations about them.1 The most importantdiscussion of the socio-economic and culturalbackground f theeighteenth-centurymovementof Ibn'Abd al-Wahhaband his followers in Najdis found in the recent dissertationby UwaidahAl-Juhany.By means of painstakingworkin the sources,Juhanytries to demonstratehegrowthof populationand of settlements n eighteenth-century Najd.12Others have spoken of a world-wide trend in populationgrowthin the eighteenthcentury,possibly the result of favorableclimatic andagriculturalconditions. Juhany'swork also suggests a rise in trade and agrowingneed foreconomic rules and laws in anincreasinglystratified ocietywith a growing number of tribal conflicts between nomadic and settledpeople.Also, the rise in Najdof Islamic scholarshipand the growthof its 'ulamacreated a group competentto carryout Islamiclegal rules in the face of dom-inant tribalcustomarylaw. There was no state structure n Najd, and therewere increasing problems and divisions that could best be met by a uni-fied state and legal system. The decline of Ottomanpower in Arabiaopenedthe way for the rise of an independentand powerful state, at least until

" In addition to the Juhanydissertation n note 3, above, see especially George W. Rentz,"Muhammad bn 'Abd al-Wahhab 1703/4-1792) and the Beginning of UnitarianEmpire inArabia"(Berkeley, Ph.D dissertation, History Department, University of California, 1948);Muhammad S. M. El-Shaafy, "The First Saudi State in Arabia"(Leeds, Ph.D. dissertation,University of Leeds, 1967). A vivid and instructivecontemporaryaccount is in John LewisBurckhardt,Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys,2 vols. (London:HenryColburnandRichardBentley, 1831). On Wahhabidoctrine, see Henri Laoust, Essai sur les doctrines sociales etpolitiques de Taki-d-DinAhmad b. Taimiya(Cairo:InstitutFrancaisd'archaeologieorientale,1939), Book III, ch. 2. Forcontemporarynformation,see JohnLewis Burkhardt,Notes on theBedouins and Wahabys London:ColburnandBentley, 1831), and M. Niebuhr,TravelsthroughArabia and Other Countriesof the East, RobertHeron, trans. (Edinburgh,1792).12 Juhany,"Historyof Najd, " first chapters.Goldstone, "East and West";JosephFletcher,"IntegrativeHistory."



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472 NIKKI R. KEDDIE

the Ottomanscould suppressit via MuhammadAli in the early nineteenthcentury.MichaelCook, while recognizingthe importanceof Juhany'swork, thinkshe has overstrained imited evidence of indigenoussocioeconomic change.Cook says thatJuhany akesimmigrationas a sign of populationgrowthandemigrationas a sign of overcrowding,so that both are seen as evidence ofpopulationgrowth. While some evidence points to internal socioeconomicchange or exogenous influences from foreign trade,Cook believes that thisevidence is not strong enough to make it certainthat either indigenous orexogenous socioeconomicchangeswere greatenoughto be majorfactorsinthe Wahhabimovement.13AlthoughCook's arguments effective, it appearsto me thatit does notdestroyall of Juhany'scase. As majornew sourcesmaynot be found,thenon-specialist houldkeepin mindCook'spointsand realizethat the economic evidenceconcerningNajdis weaker than it is for Sumatraand WestAfrica. Sumatraand West Africa in the eighteenthand nineteenthcenturieswere heavilyinvolvedin foreigntrade,which left records;butNajdwas not. It seems fair to say that the case for importantsocioeconomicinfluenceson the early Wahhabis s weaker thanit is for most other militantrevivalmovements,butsuch a case maystill havesome validitybased on theevidence. Alternatively,one may accept that not all majorrevivalist move-ments have socioeconomic causes. Since the original Wahhabi movementseems barelyrelatedto the Westor its trade,I will omit discussion of it here.THE PADRI MOVEMENT IN SUMATRAFor the Islamic Revivalmovement n West and CentralSumatra,we have theconvincing and documentedstudy by ChristineDobbin, which takes intoaccountsocioeconomicand ideological factors.14 Dobbin's book and articlesprovidea uniquetotalstudyof a jihadmovement,for which thereare, unfor-tunately,no equivalentsfor the other movementsunderconsideration. Herworksdeserveconsiderationby all studentsof similarmovements.Her stresson the socioeconomic impact of early modernWesterntrade is especiallyimportant.There areno otherworkson the subject hat make extensiveuse ofprimarysourcesin severallanguages.West Sumatra,usually called Minangkabau,comprises an ethnically re-lated,matrilineally rganizedsociety speakinga dialect of Malay.The society

13 Michael Cook, "The Expansionof the First Saudi State: The Case of Washm,"C. E.Bosworth et al., eds., TheIslamic Worldrom Classical to Modern Times:Essays in Honor ofBernardLewis (Princeton:DarwinPress, 1989), 661-700.14 ChristineDobbin, IslamicRevivalism n a ChangingPeasantEconomy:CentralSumatra,1784-1847 (London, 1983). Dobbin has also publishedrelated articles. The padris are alsodiscussedin a numberof Dutchsourcesandwritings,as well as in a smaller numberof Englishworks that have been largely supersededby Dobbin'sbook. O'Fahey,EnigmaticSaint, 188, n.48, says: "ProfessorAnthonyJohns of the AustralianNationalUniversity points out (personalcommunication) hat no studyof the religiouswritings generatedby the movement has yet beenmade;this he hopes to undertake."



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THE REVOLT OF ISLAM, 1700 TO 1993 473is based on agriculture,particularlywet-rice cultivation. Its basic organiza-tional unit was long the negari, or cluster of villages. We know little aboutchange within Minangkabau ociety before Hindu rulers came from Java tocreate a statein the fourteenthcentury,butit seems probable hat the popula-tion grew and that most of the good inland territorywas occupied in thisperiod. Also, gold was mined and tradedbefore the fourteenthcentury.Dob-bin cites convincingevidence that the Hindu rulers who came from Java andset upthe firstMinangkabau ingdomwereseeking gold and remaineddepen-denton the gold trade,which at first flourishedbut laterdeclined. Theynevercontrolledenoughwealthto have effective armedforces, and the local negariremainedvirtuallyautonomous.UnderthesekingsMuslim tradersapparentlyenteredMinangkabauand made many conversions, and by the seventeenthcenturywe finda triumvirate f rulers n theoriginallyHinduroyalfamily,allwith titles whose second words were Arabic and Islamic in origin. At the topwas the Raja Alam (King of the World),and below him were the Raja Adat(custom)and the RajaIbadat(Islamicworship).It is significantthat we findno mentionof the non-ibadatpartof Islam-mu'amalat (this-worldly ransac-tions), which cover the great majorityof this-worldlyquestionsdealt with inIslamic law. From the first, Minangkabau slam centered on worship andritual,primarily he so-calledFive Pillarsof Islam,while this-worldlymatterscame mostly underadat, or customary aw, as they still do in most Minang-kabauvillages.15Islam was apparentlybrought o Minangkabau y tradersandspread argelythroughteachersfrom three internationalSufi orders.All three were amongthe more orthodoxorders,but they still stressed the individual'srelations toGod, ratherthan Islamic law or the this-worldlyside of Islam. Once, how-ever, Minangkabau ocioeconomic conditionsdeveloped sufficientlyto makethe this-worldlyside of Islam relevantto Minangkabau ociety, a movementof Islamic Revival grew up in the late eighteenthandearlynineteenthcentu-ries that addressedmany new needs.With the decline in the monarchyafter the depletionof known sources ofgold, which formed the monarchy'smainsupport, herewere increasingwarsbetween negaris. At the same time, new forms of trade developed from

's See Nikki R. Keddie,"IslamandSociety inMinangkabau nd in the MiddleEast:Compara-tive Reflections,"Sojourn(Singapore),2:1 (1987);TaufikAbdullah,"AdatandIslam:An Exam-ination of Conflict in Minangkabau,"ndonesia, II (October) CornellUniversity,1966);HarsjaW. Bachtiar,"Negari Taram:A MinangkabauVillage Community," n Koentjariningrat,d.,Villages in Indonesia (Ithaca:Corell University Press, 1967); ElizabethGraves, The Min-angkabauResponse to Dutch ColonialRule in the NineteenthCentury(Ithaca:Cornell ModerIndonesiaProject, 1981);F. Benda-Beckman,Propertyand Social Continuityand Changein theMaintenanceof PropertyRelationsthroughTime inMinangkabauTheHague:MartinusNijhoff,1979); FrederickK. Errington,Manners and Meaning in WestSumatra:The Social ContextofConsciousness(New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1984); Joel S. Kahn,MinangkabauSocialFormations:Indonesian Peasant and the WorldEconomy (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1980).



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increasingtradecontacts withinSumatra; ndia, Indonesia, China,Malaysia;and, importantly,uch Western tates as Portugal,Holland,GreatBritain,andthe newly independentUnited States. These foreigners, in addition to theirinterestin what gold remained,developed an even greaterinterestin whatbecame very lucrative Sumatran xport crops-chiefly pepper,gambir,cas-sia, and especially coffee after Arabica coffee was introduced rom Yemen.These crops were mainly grown in hillside areas not suitable to Sumatra'solder staples, andthe growthandtransport f the new exportcrops attractedpersons in searchof new means of makingprofits. Transporting rops thatwere muchbulkierthangold was difficult andcostly, given the area's moun-tainousterrainand lack of roads;andtraderswere subjectto robberyand tovillage tolls. Nonetheless, internationalradegrew rapidly,so thatby the lateeighteenthcentury herewas a socioeconomic situationwithsignificantparal-lels to the Hijaz in Muhammad's ime. The old local adat did not cover theneedsof traders,who requireda supra-villageaw, morality,and enforcementmechanism,and indeed a new state thatcould enforce law and order betterthanthe old monarchyever had. The applicationof Islamiclaw, includingitsthis-worldly protectionof trade and traders,could providean ideal, alreadyavailable, solution to many of the problemsof a society with a growingtradinginterestbut withoutcentralized aw or government.In this situationan outstanding ate-eighteenth-centuryslamicreformer,who had many im-portantpupils, began to advocate the more thoroughapplicationof Islamand its laws. His stresson tradewas such thathe was called the "patronoftraders."

Minangkabau'snew wealth and increased nterest n Islam led to a rise inthe numberof its pilgrimsto Mecca. In 1803, threeimportant uch pilgrimswitnessedthe ruleof the militantpuritanicalWahhabisappliedin Mecca andreturned o Minangkabau etermined o applyuniformIslamiclaws, forciblyif necessary.The reformist"Patron f Traders"who had been their teacheratfirst backedthem, but lateropposedtheir use of force. These militant Mus-lims became known as Padris, apparentlyafter the name of the port fromwhichtheywentto Mecca(althoughsome derive it from the Portuguesewordfor priest).For almost threedecades, they spreadtheir influencethroughoutMinangkabau y bothpeacefulandviolent means.Theywereonly defeated nthe 1830s by the Dutch, who had received appealsfrom thatsection of adatleaderswho opposedthe Padris.The last Padrileader to resist the Dutch, amancalled ImamJombol,afterthe town on the equator romwhich he cameandin which he fought,hasbecomea Sumatran nd Indonesiannationalhero.He represents odaynot so muchpuritanical slam as one of the first to offersustainedresistanceto Dutch conquestand rule.'6 The Dutch were glad to

16 In ImamJombol'shome townof Jombol,on the equator n Sumatra, saw a fightingstatueof him, in which he was characterizedn a typical Malaylingua-francamixtureof words fromArabic, Persian,and Dutch, as the "MartyredNationalHero."



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THE REVOLT OF ISLAM, 1700 TO 1993 475have a pretextto conquer Minangkabau.The adat leaders who appealedtothem had no morelegitimacythan the adat and Islamicleaderswho sidedwiththe Padriswho were probablygreater n numberandcertainlyin power.Thedoctrinesof the Padrishad the samepuritanical ndstrictIslamicflavorasthose of theWahhabis,although heywere not carriedas far.Also, thePadrisbecame milder and more compromisingover time, as they had to win overpeople tied to a matrilineal,village-centeredcustomary aw radicallydifferentfrom strict Islamic law. Originally, in addition to protectingtradersfromrobberyandextortion,the Padriscalled forthe abolitionof opiumandalcohol,along with the cockfightingandthe gamblingthataccompanied t. The latterwas a more important hange than it might seem, as villages featuredpublicspace devotedlargelyto this highly popularpractice.The Padriscalled uponmen to wear beards andon women to use the veil, which they had not donebefore (andhave done rarelysince) andmadeotherdemandsconsonantwithpuritanicalslam. Overtime, asnoted,theycompromisedwithadat,whichwaswidely practicedand had powerfulrepresentativeswho could not be totallyconverted. Hadthe Dutch notconqueredMinangkabau,he Padrismighthaveset upa state in whichIslamic lawplayeda greater ole than t dideitherbeforeor since but in which adat andits officials also continued o havesome power.Internaldivisions in the movementsmeantthat this was only a possibilityandnot a certainoutcome, however.The Sumatrancase is one in which the spreadof OrthodoxSufi orders,often togetherwith Muslimtradersand scholars,andespecially the need forstate formationfelt with the growth of international rade, helped create asituation in which a handful of Wahhabi-influencedeaders could rapidlyinfluence a society for which largepartsof theirmessagewerethenappropri-ate. Likeothercontemporaryihadmovements,the Padrimovementevinces asocioeconomicchangeanddislocationbroughton partlyby a growthin West-ern trade,a felt need for state formationandunifiedlaw in a developingbutdecentralizedsociety, charismatic eadership,and an influence of the spreadof Islamic learning.In bothSumatraandWestAfrica the processof Islamizationhadfor centu-ries before the jihad movements been a peaceful one carried out not byconqueringstates and rulers but largely by traders who either came fromabroad or were influenced by travel in Muslim lands. In Sumatra, thesetraderswere often at firstidenticalwiththe membersof tarigas,usuallycalledSufi orders in English. This formof peacefulIslamization, argely by meansof traders,contributedo specialfeatures n IndonesianandmostWestAfricanIslam. Lackingcoercive powers, the convincedMuslimswere in no positionto make either rulers or believers follow Muslim law; and even relativelyorthodox Sufis were generally more concernedwith making converts thanwith assuringpracticeof the shari'a.Rulersandvillage heads in Sumatraandmost of Islamized West Africa, even when they were nominally Muslim,



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476 NIKKI R. KEDDIEgenerallyenforced little Islamic law andpractice.They found it more conve-nient both forpopularityand tojustify theirown ruleon traditional rounds omix older local religious practiceswith Islamicones, oftengiving the latterasecondaryplace. This situation,bothin Sumatraand WestAfrica, providedafertile ground, given otherpreconditions,for supportersof jihad to say thatexisting authoritieswere unbelieversagainstwhom holy war was incumbent.InWestAfrica the spreadsince theeighteenthcenturyespeciallyof first theQadiriand thenthe nineteenth-century ijaniordersmayhave been importantin generalizinga devotionto Islam thatprovidedfertilegroundfor the jihadmovements.A similarhypothesismaybe madeabout the spreadof tariqas nSumatra,althoughthis phenomenonhas been less studied.WEST AFRICAN MOVEMENTSAmong the many difficulties in comparingWest African eighteenth- andnineteenth-centuryihadswithSumatra's, s that thenatureof documentation,and scholarlyorientationof research,is quitedifferent.For Sumatra here isgood documentationfor international rade and its impact on Islamic re-formers, and little known documentationand, to now, little study of whatthese reformersactually said and wrote. For West Africa, althoughcertainkinds of tradeare documented,the whole questionof trade,particularly hesize and impactof the slave trade, is highly controversialand difficult for anon-Africanisto assess. Onthe otherhand,in recentyearsa massof originaltractswrittenby jihad leaders has become available, especially in Nigeria.These tractsprovidean invaluablesourcefor the studyof these movements,but some scholarshave been inclined to limit themselves to analyzingthesedocumentsand to takingthe motives andforces behindthejihad to be thoseexpressedin the ideology of its leaderswithoutlookingfor others, includingsocioeconomiccausation.To some degreethereis a divisionbetweenAfrica-nists who study social or economic historyandthose who study jihads, andthe socio-economic interpretations f jihads that have been put forth, forexample, by the SenegaleseB. Barry,havebeen controversial.What is saidbelow is thus provisional.The influenceof tradein WestAfrica, primarilybut far from exclusivelythe slavetrade,on WestAfrican ihadmovements s suggestedby the fact, notnoted in any work I have read, thatthese jihads followed the chronologicalpathof this trade.They began in Senegambia,which was involvedearly intradewith the West, andcame only in the nineteenthcenturyto Nigeria andMali, where Western rade,centeredon the slave trade, also came later. (A1985paperby HumphreyFisherdemonstrates onsiderablymorepresenceofthe slave tradein Nigeriabefore its earlynineteenth-centuryihad thanmostpreviouswritershad granted,andthis supports he hypothesisthatthis tradeinfluencedthe rise of thejihadmovements.)Fromthe earlynineteenthcentu-ry, the end of the slave trade and the rise of what was sometimes called"legitimate" radewith the Westbroughtfurther ransformations.



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THE REVOLT OF ISLAM, 1700 TO 1993 477The ways in which European radeappears o have influenced the rise ofjihad movements were not identical in Sumatraand West Africa, but therewere some similarities;and each situationmay suggest importantresearchquestionsfor the others. The size and effects on Africa of the Africanslavetrade has been a subjectof intensecontroversyamongAfricanistsfor severalyears. AlthoughI am not competentto enter into this controversy, t seemslikely that the slave trade had a very importantdisruptiveeffect in Africa.Devastationalone, whichis stressedby some historians,wouldnot, however,give rise to militantjihad movements. It is not the most devastated anddepopulated areas that have revolutions, but usually those where socio-economic andideologicalchangeshave been rapid,bringingabout the rise ofnew classes and theweakeningof the oldrulingclasses. TheFrench,Russian,Chinese, and Iranianrevolutionsare all examplesof this. The majorAfricanjihad movementsmay be consideredrevolutionary, nd one might expect thesocioeconomic changes thatprecededthem not to be limited to devastationanddepopulation,whateverweightthesefactorsmayhave, butalso to includea rise of new groupsand classes and a weakeningof old rulingclasses. Theavailable evidence indicates that this is indeed the case.Although many,perhapsmost, Africansremaining n Africamayhave been

hurtby the slavetrade,there were also groupsandclasses who profited romitand entered new lines of economic activity.ManyAfricans andpart-Africansengagedin the slave trade n variouscapacities,and thepresenceof Europeantradegave rise also to increasedtrade,both in Africa andoverseas, in otherproducts, including kola, gold, ivory, gum Arabic (important o Europeantextile industries),and others. There was a rapid developmentof groupsandclasses involved in this growingtrade, includingwealthy long-distancetrad-ers, local traderswho dealt with them, and various kinds of middlemen,despitetheprevalenceof elite and state controlof trade.Thegrowthof tradingclasses increased after the end of the slave trade.In addition,the eighteenthand nineteenthcenturies saw a developmentoflarge-scale village andplantation laveryin West Africa itself, whereslaveryhad formerlybeen predominantly mall-scale and family-centered.(Slaves,who sometimes carriedout independentrevolts, do not seem to have beenimportantparticipants n the jihad movement.) African slaveholders wereoften tradersor men involvedin trade n slaves or in the commoditiesgrownon plantations,so that the growthof large-scale slaverysuggestsanothersignof the importanceof the growth of trade and trading classes. Althoughwealthy Africansmight be involved in slave trade, it was often not in theirinterest to permit this tradeto be unregulatedor to catch and enslave localpersons who might be engaged in production.This was perhapsone reasonwhy jihad movements were generallystrict in enforcingIslamic law againstthe enslavementof Muslims, who were often taken from among the localpopulation.Jihad leadersthemselves accumulatednon-Muslimor "heretical"slaves, mainly by warfaredesignedto expandtheirstates, andto take power



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from those who were, or were consideredto be, non-Muslims.The acquisi-tion of firearmsand horses from the Westhelped make strongerstates pos-sible.17The few scholarswho have looked into the socioeconomicbasis of Africanjihad movements note the dislocations formed in the coastal societies ofMauritania ndof SenegambianFutaJalonbeginning n the sixteenthcentury.In Futa Jalonthe IslamicizedFulbe(Fulani)becamethe richest and strongestsocial groupandthe bearersof militantIslam. The Muslim Fulbespearheadeda revivalist revolt that set up a more Islamicizedstate than had previouslyexisted. The slave trade contributed o social conflict andreorganization.Asin many previouscases, nomadicwarriorsunitedby a militantIslamic ideolo-gy won out. A combinationof traders,religious leaders, and nomadic war-riorsprovedpotent, as they did in laterWestAfricanjihads.Similarly,Peter Clarketies the Mauritanian-Senegalese ihad of Nasir al-Din in the late seventeenthcentury o tensionsarisingfrom the slavetrade,theimportof firearms,andthe competition romEuropeanpowersfor controloftrade.He says European radecontributed ignificantly o socioeconomicandpoliticalchange. The growthin firearmsallowed fightingover wider territo-ries andencouragedgreaterwarriorpower.Peoplebeganto look to the Mus-lim Fulbe for political leadershipand ideology.18Thejihad movements n Senegambia n the eighteenthand nineteenthcen-turies, even though theydid not set up strongandlong-livedstates, increasedthe influenceof Muslim scholarsand orthodoxyand the identityof Muslimcommunities.Suchidentitywas importantn a situation n which"societywas

17 Amongthosewho mostconvincinglytiejihadmovements o socioeconomicconditionsandtrade,includingslave trade, is Peter B. Clarke,WestAfricaand Islam(London:EdwardArnold,1982). Also suggestiveof such ties is the dissertation unfinishedwhen I saw it in 1985) of B.Barryof Senegal, which was, however, when I saw it, in part problematic.Otheruseful worksincludeAllen Christelow,"ReligiousProtestandDissent in NorthernNigeria:fromMahdismtoQuranicIntegralism,"Journalof the Instituteof MuslimMinorityAffairs, 6:2 (1985), 375-93;Philip C. Curtin,EconomicChange in PrecolonialAfrica:Senegambia n the Era of the SlaveTrade Madison:Universityof WisconsinPress, 1975);Idem,"Jihadn WestAfrica:EarlyPhasesand Interrelationsn Mauritania nd Senegal, Journalof AfricanHistory,XII: 1 (1971), 11-24;MichaelCrowder,WestAfricaunderColonialRule(London:Hutchinson,1968);M. Hiskett,TheSwordof Truth:TheLifeand Timesof ShehuUsumandanFodio (New York, 1973);D. M. Last,TheSokotoCaliphate(London, 1967);N. Levtzion,Muslimsand Chiefs in WestAfrica (Oxford,1968);Paul E. Lovejoy,Transformationsn Slavery:A History of Slaveryin Africa(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1983); DavidRobinson,TheHoly Warof UmarTal:The WesternSudan in the Mid-NineteenthCentury(Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1985); J. S. Trimingham,AHistory of Islam in WestAfrica(London, 1962);J. R. Willis, ed., Studies n WestAfricanIslamicHistory (London, 1979); and a significantbody of jihad literaturen translation,such as 'Ab-dullah ibn Muhammad,Tazyinal-Waraqat,M. Hiskett, trans.and ed. (IbadanUniversityPress,1963). There arenumerous ranslations ndscholarlydissertationshatare, unfortunately, vail-able only in the universitiesof northernNigeria. Thereis also a considerable ocal andWesternarticleliterature,of which the articlesby MarilynWaldmanmay be singled out.18 Clarke,WestAfrica, 80. Some similar hemesare voiced in Barry's hesisandin P. Curtin,"Jihad n West Africa: EarlyPhases and Interrelationsn Mauritaniaand Senegal,"JournalofAfricanHistory,XII (1971), 11-24.



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THE REVOLT OF ISLAM, 1700 TO 1993 479being turnedupside down by the slave trade, the importationof arms andammunition, the pillaging and devastationswrought by the tyeddo, andpeople werecryingforprotection,stabilityandlaw andorder."'9Butthejihadleaders in Senegambia,as was the case later in Nigeria, tendedto abandontheirearly egalitarian endencies to favora few powerfulfamilies anddiscour-age popular-classparticipationn politics. Nearlyall thechallengersof the oldpolitical and religious authoritiescame from Muslim scholars who had re-ceived training n mysticismand were members of a Sufi tariqa.Some scholars also give a partly socioeconomic interpretation f the fa-mous early-nineteenth-centuryNigerian jihad of Usman dan Fodio. Whenrulersfoughteach other,tradersprofitedfromthe growingtrade;butthepoorexperienced erribleeffectsfromfamine,slaveraiding,andextortionateaxes.There was also tension between pastoralists(mainly Fulani) and peasants(mainlyHausa).Nineteenth-centuryihadistsreferred o the fifteenth-centuryMaghrebiwriter,al-Maghili,who spenttimein WestAfrica.He wrotestrong-ly against the still-prevalent practice of rulers of mixing local un-Islamiccustoms, often glorifying rulers, with Islam. He also said that a ruler whoimposed unjustandillegal taxes was an unbelieverandreiterateda prevalentIslamicbelief thatevery centurywouldsee a renewer mujaddid)of Islam. Headded that "thereis no doubt that Holy Waragainst [the above-mentioned"unbelieving"rulers]is better and more meritorious han Holy Waragainstunbelievers."20Usman dan Fodio of Nigeria, probablythe most scholarly of the jihadleaders,learnednotonly fromal-Maghilibut also fromQadiriSufis, althoughthe importanceof his ties to the Qadiriyyais in dispute. In his dream orvision, the founder of the Qadiriyyaordergave him the "Sword of Truth"ofightGod's enemies. In the late-eighteenth-century, smanbuiltup his ortho-dox community within the state of Gobir. Usman's jihad began when hiscommunitywas attackedfrom Gobirin 1804, which led some to see it as adefensive war. Many rebellious holy wars and revolts begin defensively,however, when the religious leader or reformer,unsurprisingly,ails to con-vert the powers that be to his reforms. It means little to say that if onlythe rulingelite had agreedto these changes, there would have been no war.The same can be said for Muhammadand the Meccans and possibly evenfor the Estates General and theirmonarch,not to mentionnumerousothers.In his key manifestoof 1804, the Wathiqat hl al-Sudan, Usmansays thatqualifiedjurists all agree thatjihad is incumbentagainstnon-Muslimsandagainstrulerswho abandon slamor combineun-Islamicobservanceswith it,which Usman said was commonin Hausaland.He says it is illegal to enslavefreeMuslims or attacknon-Muslimswho acceptMuslimpeaceterms.Jihad sa duty againstoppressors.He says the currentrulersimposeda non-Islamic

19 Clarke, West Africa, 87.20 Hiskett, Sword, 66.



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480 NIKKI R. KEDDIEcattle tax (particularly islikedby Fulanipastorlists,who alongwithprimarilyFulani scholarsplayed leading roles in the jihad), took bribes, and did notobserve Islamic laws of inheritanceand succession.

Although Usman and the brotherand son who succeeded him were mil-itarilysuccessfulandcreated n the Sokotocaliphatea long-livedstateunpar-alleled by any other West Africanjihad movement, it is unclear how muchlastingreformthey introducedbeyonda greaterenforcementof certainIslam-ic rules. Most scholars feel that the strongstate structure hat followed owesmuch to pre-existingstatesin theareaandthatold pre-jihadgovernmentalandeconomic elites were often left in place. AbdullahiMahadi, in his brilliantdissertationon Kano, notes that Usman andhis followers did not have a reallyrevolutionarytate model in mind, involvingreference o theera of the Proph-et andfirstfour electedcaliphs.Instead,theirwritingsreferredo late Abbasidmodels of the caliphate,which includedthe kindof dynasticand hierarchicalstructures hat Usman and his followers soon reinstalledin the areas theyconquered,with some change in personnelto benefit the largelyFulani con-queringclass.21 The introductionof a strongerand more centralized statestructure hanbefore, along with the spreadof a moreorthodoxIslam, wereimportant hanges, but they were not egalitarianandprimarilybenefitted thetradingandrulingclasses.In West Africanjihads we find the common features of importantanddisruptiveeconomic changeinfluencedby the West,a spreadof learningandneo-Sufism, a key role of tribes,and a need for stronger tates. Westernrule,Islamic ideology, and continuingsocioeconomicdisruptionsand discontentsform a line tying eighteenth-andnineteenth-centurymilitantrevivalist move-ments to those of recentyears. On the otherhand, there are today a host ofnew factors. This is suggestedby the fact that Islamismhas now moved fromthe tribalperipheryo the urbancenters,requiringdetailed ndependentanaly-sis of these recentmovements.It is not at all suggested here that the same socioeconomic and culturalcauses lead to militantpuritanicalrevival in all cases. Sumatraand WestAfrica seem to show similarsituations.Ineach, Europeanand othertradehada disruptive mpact;anda smallbutgrowingorthodoxeducatedcadrerejectedthe rulers,people, andpolicies thatthey consideredonly nominallyIslamic.Najdappears o have hadthe latterfeature,but the socioeconomiccausationwas differentand perhapsunprovable.Europeanconquestcreateda clearercause for holy war thanin the above cases. Othercausativefactorsandtheirdifferentoperation n differentareashave been discussed above.

21 AbdullahiMahadi, "The State and the Economy:The SaarautaSystem and its Role inShaping the Economy of Kano with ParticularReference to the Eighteenthand NineteenthCenturies" Ph.D. dissertation,AhmaduBello University,Zaria, Nigeria, 1983). I read this inZaria and do not know if it is availablein the West, thougha shortenedpublishedversion mayappear.



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THE REVOLT OF ISLAM, 1700 TO 1993 48IWhatseems clearis thatIslamic belief and doctrinesprovidethe idiomsfortwo major types of revolt, namely, the messianic and Wahhabitype. Themessianicrevoltusuallycenteredon the Mahdifigureandrangeddoctrinallyfrom occasional mainstreamconservatismto various kinds of heterodoxy.(Thesemovementshave beenespeciallyprevalentamongthe Shi'a but arenotexclusive to them.) The other,Wahhabi ype, is puritanicaland literalistandpredominates n the movements discussed above. These two categories arepermeable.Militantmessianistscanbe puritanical,and militantpuristscanbemessianic. The Sudanese Mahdi seems an example of the former,and theKhomeinimovementof the latter. The militance andrelativeclarityin basic

legal provisions that characterizedearly Islam have provideda continuingmodel for internaland externalmilitance. It is strikinghow much uncon-nected militantmovements used some of the same early Islamic models-leaders'hijras, deputiescalled khalifas, the institutionof Islamic taxes, theveiling of women, and so forth. When a charismatic eaderhas been able touse these traditions n favorablesocioeconomic and political circumstances,majorand significantmilitantrevivalmovementshave occurred.THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The second group of Islamic movements occurredchiefly in the nineteenthcenturyandwere, as a whole or in part,directresponsesto European mperialconquests. In these movements, the desire to keep out the conquerorand toform a united state were often strongerthan the goal of Islamic orthodoxy,althoughmostof the movementsalso hadstrongrevivalistfeatures.Clearly,aunified Islamic ideology was an effective one for a war againstinfidels andalso for state building. The similaritiesof ideas and practicesamong thesemovements and between them and earlier ones suggests some "essential"featurescoming downthrough he Islamicpoliticaltradition n very different,distantand unconnected ands. At the sametime, theirappearance nly undercertaindefined kindsof conditionssuggeststhat these essential featurescouldbe dormantor unimportantor long periodsbefore they burstforth, owinglargely to new social circumstances.Like the earliergroupof movements,the nineteenth-centuryihads againstinfidel conquests occurredin ratherperipheralareas and have seldom beencompared to one another. They do, however, show a number of similarfeaturesto one anotherand to earliermovements. Their eadership till tendedto come frompowerfulfiguresin majorSufi orders(Shamylin the Caucasus,'Abd al-Qadirand others in Algeria) or from disciples of leaders of newIslamic movements (Sayyid Ahmad Brelwi of the South Asian jihad move-ment). These movements again stressed orthodoxyand state building; theIndianmovementswere calledWahhabi,especiallyby outsiders,becausetheyresembled and presumablywere inspiredby, the ArabianWahhabis.Some movements moved from the pre-colonialto the colonial situation



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without real changes in ideology: The Padris ended up fighting the Dutch;some West African leaders ended up fighting the French;the South Asianjihadistsbased in the NorthwestFrontierstartedout fightingthe Sikhs, thenonly later clashed with the British. These similarities to early movementsand to one anothershouldguardus againstseeing these movements simplyas a supposedlynaturalMuslim resistanceto imperialism.In most Muslimareas therewas little or no initial armedresistance,so althoughthese move-ments clearly had a strongaspectof "Muslimresistanceto the infidel," thisis not enoughto explainthem. In general, settledpeoples underurban ead-ers and accustomedto strong imperial rule on the whole did not supportIslamically based resistance to Westernimperialistconquest. The 'Urabimovementin Egyptin the early 1880s is a partialexceptionto this but was asomewhat different kind of resistance from the Islamic revolts namedabove.22 As was the case in pre-imperialrevolts, the immediately post-imperial armed struggles against conquest were mostly based on tribalfightersandleaders with importantpositionsin a preexistingreligious order.The leaderstended to have an overall vision of a new, united and militantIslamicsociety; they tendedto come from, or (in the case of the SouthAsianWahhabis) ettle in, peripheralareasnot closely tied to an existing or recentempire. Although they were not quite as peripheralgeographicallyas theeighteenth-centuryihad leaders, they were not near the center of majorIs-lamic states.Tosome degree, theappearance f the SouthAsianmovements,despitetheabove-notedsimilar features, was based on where Europeanpowers madetheirfirstmodernconquests.Hence, SouthAsia, an areaof some of the firstWestern conquests of Muslims, saw two important and long-lastingnineteenth-centurymovements, the Wahhabisand the Fara'izis. The firstFrenchconquestof Algerialed to the first ihadmovement n theMiddle East.Similarly,Russia's conquestefforts in the Caucasus,beginningin the earlynineteenthcentury, ed to the firstandmostimportantihadmovementagainstthem. Like that of the Indian Wahhabisand of 'Abd al-Qadir, Shamyl'sresistancewas very longlasting. Some of these movements'peripheral oca-tion was thus due to the fact that the first Europeanconquests in MuslimterritoriesavoidedmajorOttomanand Iraniancenters. Even when Ottomanurbancenters were taken, however, this rarely gave rise to majorrevivalistresistance,which indicatesthatperipheraleatures,suchas the predominanceof nomadictribesand of non-urban eligious forms, were also important nencouraging ihad-oriented esistance o Western onquest.The Indianmove-mentsthattookplace in a contextof settledagriculturehad an explicit socio-

22 For a workstressingthe revolutionary atureof the 'Urabimovement,see JuanR. I. Cole,Colonialismand Revolution n the MiddleEast: Social and CulturalOriginsof Egypt's 'UrabiMovement(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1992).



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THE REVOLT OF ISLAM, 1700 TO 1993 483economicdimension,the Bengalimovementbeing especiallya partisanof thepoor.23Two later movementsalso belongin thisgeneralcontext.First,the Mahdistmovementin Sudanemployedthe messianic more thanthejihadargument orrevolt but had importantelements of fundamentalismandjihadism. P. Holtsees the Mahdiststruggleas largelya resultof the forcedendingof the slavetrade,whichcaused economicdisruption; nd R. Petersties this movementtovarious disruptivefeaturesof Egyptianand British colonialism.24Second,therewas the revoltagainstItalianrule in Libyaled by the Senussiorder n theearly twentiethcentury,later thanthe othermovementsbecause the Italianstook over Libya later. This movementhas manysimilar featuresto the otherjihads, however, including the importanceof a Sufi order. Mahdism andrevivalistjihad are two alternativeways of justifying revolt in Islamic con-texts, with mahdism more frequentlybeing unorthodox,sometimes "hereti-cal"(notably,the IranianBabis), whilejihadmovementstend toward"funda-mentalism"or a return o literal observanceof the scriptures.The Sudanesemahdistmovementand some othersamongthe movementsdiscussedin thisessay had some combinationof mahdistandjihadistelements, but the latterusually predominated.There were also a number of other significant anti-imperialistrevivalistrevoltsin Africa and SoutheastAsia.Although it is often said that religion and politics in Islam are alwaysintertwined,Islamicprinciplesare oftenonly loosely enforcedduringperiodsof normalgovernment.These principlesare, however, far more enforced inIslamic militantmovements, such as those discussed above, which wish toremakesociety in an Islamic image. The militance andinjunctionsregardingmoralityand gender relations that are believed to characterizeearly Islam

23 Among the useful works on nineteenth-centuryevival movementsrespondingto Westernconquest are(1) on Shamyl:JohnF. Baddeley,The RussianConquestof the Caucasus(London:Longmans,Green and Co., 1908); BaronAugust von Haxthausen,The Tribesof the Caucasus (London:Chapmanand Hall, 1855); Louis Moser, TheCaucasus and Its People: Witha Brief History ofTheir Wars;and Moshe Gammer,Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest ofChechniaand Daghestan (London:Cass, 1994).(2) South Asia: QeyamuddinAhmad, The WahabiMovement n India (Calcutta, 1966); K. K.Datta,Historyof the FreedomMovement n Bihar, I (Patna:Governmentof Bihar, 1957); PeterHardy,TheMuslimsof BritishIndia(London:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1972);W. W. Hunter,The Indian Musalmans:Are TheyBound in Conscience to Rebel against the Queen? (London:Trubner ndCo., 1871);Hafeez Malik,MoslemNationalism n IndiaandPakistan(Washington,D.C.: Public AffairsPress, 1963);3. Abd al-Qadir:Col. Paul Azan, L'EmirAbd el Kader 1808-1883 (Paris:LibrairieHachette,1925);RaphaelDanziger,Abdal-Qadirand theAlgerians(New York:Holmes andMeier, 1977).There is a need of furtherstudy of these movements and the Senussis by historians with aknowledge of the requisitelanguagesand of Islamistmovements elsewhere.24 PeterHolt, The MahdistState in the Sudan, 1881-1898: A Study of its Origins, Develop-mentand OverthrowNew York:OxfordUniversityPress, 2nded., 1977);RudolphPeters,Islamand Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in ModernHistory (The Hague:Mouton, 1979).



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484 NIKKI R. KEDDIE

providea model for these movements. It is strikinghow muchmovementsindisparategeographicalregions and without obvious ties to one anotherusedthe sameearlyIslamicmodels;most of them, forexample, insist on women'sveiling and segregation.Such gender separationwas not only the result ofcopyingearlyIslam but also arose from thedesireof these movementsto formstates. This was generally accompaniedby a stratificationof classes andgendersandby an ideologythat ncludedthe observationof normsconsideredIslamic. Often, from the eighteenthcenturydownthrough he Iranianrevolu-tion, Islamic movements became more lax and more centeredon the leader'sdesires afterthey took power.ISLAMIC REFORMISMFromthe late nineteenthcenturyuntil afterWorldWar I, the main intellectualtrend n the Muslim world was Islamicreformism,not militancy.Reformismcenteredin differentareas andclasses, especially the urban ntellectuals andnewmiddleclass. Although hisis anessay chieflyaboutmilitancy, t shouldbenotedthat most people whose works have been studiedin modem times havetaken a reformistrather than militantapproach, especially as the militantseverywherewere defeatedmilitarilyby Western rmsor were otherwiseunsuc-cessful untilveryrecenttimes. The reformistsbelieved thattheycould achievestrengthandindependence nlyby imitatingandnaturalizingWesternhought.FromsuchYoungOttomansas NamikKemalonward,earlyIslamic njunctionswere reinterpretedo make them more in accord with Western iberalismonmattersranging from parliamentsto women's rights. Periodic backlashesagainstwesternizedmodernism endedto come inresponse o Westernaggres-siveness, as in the dismembermentbetween 1878 and 1882 of the OttomanEmpireand the occupationof Egypt and Tunisiaby Britain and France.25The recent large-scale repudiationof modernismcame in part becauseMuslims weremoreinclined thanothersto rejectthe Westand its ways, due tothe centuries-oldhostility between Christiansand Muslims, to the new ob-stacle of Israel, and to the failures of ruleby Westernized eformersor thosewho called themselvesreformers.One person tied to reformismwho has, nonetheless, remainedpopular,largelybecauseof his anti-imperialistmilitancy, s SayyidJamalal-Din "Al-Afghani." He grew up in an Iranian Shi'i tradition that simultaneouslystressed rationalistphilosophyand Islamictheorizing.He had knowledgeofShi'i strugglesand of the militanthereticalBabimovement n mid-nineteenthcenturyIranand sensed the potentialof militant Islamic identificationas awellspring of political action in the moder world. Afghani respondedtoshiftingmoods. Until the early 1880s his writingswere nearlyall in a liberaland local nationalistvein, with a strongdose of Islamic modernismand of

25 See Albert Hourani,Arabic Thoughtin the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (London:OxfordUniversityPress, 1962), 103.



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THE REVOLT OF ISLAM, 1700 TO 1993 485hostilityto British colonialism. The latterfeaturestayedwith him throughouthis career. After the majorlosses of 1878 to 1882 of Muslim lands to theWest, Afghani joined those who promotedpan-Islamicunity againstWesternimperialconquerors.Afghani, whose words were diffused in Arabic by his disciples, was aparticularlynfluentialpan-Islamistbecause he tied pan-Islamism o a strongstand against British encroachmentsin Muslim lands. Indeed, his anti-imperialist,proto-third-worldistpproachmaybe the most influentialelementin Afghani's thought. This approachhad increasing importanceafter hisdeath. It is significant that Afghani is the only major writer and speakerpopularwith liberal and nationalistthinkerswho retainshis popularitywithtoday's Islamists.26CONTEMPORARY ISLAMISMAbove we havediscussed threephasesof Muslimthoughtandactionsince theeighteenthcentury,all of which had a relationship o Western mperialism.The early internal ihad movements of SumatraandWestAfrica were in partreactionsto a growthof tradewitha strongerWest,including heveryunequalslave trade. This tradehelped change the internalclass structureof the af-fectedcountries,makingcertainareasripeforstatebuildingalongthe lines ofthe originalstatebuildingof earlyIslam, while the end of the tradeproducedfurther ocioeconomicneeds. NormativeIslamprovidedanappropriatedeol-ogy for state formation.The next stageof jihadmovementswas a more directresponseto French,British, Russian and Italiancolonial conquest, which inseveralperipheralareaswas responded o by militant ihads. Inthe thirdphasediscussed, partly an outgrowthof Islamic modernism, such modernistsasNamikKemal and Jamal al-Din ("Al-Afghani")responded o a new wave ofWestern mperialistconquestby appealingto Muslim unity and revival as ashield against furtherWesternconquest. Muslim unity was in large part ameans to regainterritory.Thoughthe appealof this line of thoughtneverdiedcompletely amongintellectualsandmanyrulers,it lost out in thefirstdecadesof the twentiethcenturyto variousforms of secularnationalism,liberalism,socialism, and communism.Before WorldWarII, therebegan a new sort ofIslamic political revival and organizationaimed once again at affirmingavision of original Islam and lessening or getting rid of the political andideological influence of Westerncolonialistsandneocolonialists in the Mus-lim world.

Contrary o the views of those who tie the contemporary slamic revivalmostly to IranianShi'ism, the first importantmoder revivalistswere non-Iranian Sunnis: Maududi and his followers in Muslim India, and later26 See especially introduction,"FromAfghanito Khomeini,"to the 1983 edition of Nikki R.Keddie,AnIslamicResponsetoImperialism:Political andReligiousWritings f SayyidJamal al-Din "al-Afghani" Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress,-1983).



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486 NIKKI R. KEDDIEPakistan,and Hassanal-Bannaand the originalMuslim Brethren n interwarEgypt. The realexpansionof these movements s generallydated to the Arabdefeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeliwar, which discreditedthe hithertopopularsecularnationalistgovernmentof Gamal Abdel Nasserand also made manyMuslims think that the "Jewish" deology of Israelhelpedtheirvictory, so a"Muslim" deology would be similarlyhelpful. The increaseddiscreditingofWestern-typegovernmentsand the searchfor an untriedalternativeencour-aged many to turn to the promise of Islamic rule. Significantly, Islamistmovements are strongestnot in traditionalIslamic states like those of theArabianpeninsulabut in countriesthat have had and been disillusionedwithwesternizedgovernments:Iran, Algeria, Tunisia,and Egypt, in the MiddleEast, for example. Islamismis in parta reactionagainstthe failures of suchgovernments.Much of Islamism s also militantlyanti-imperialistnd anti-neocolonialist.Often this is presentedsimply as a question of Muslim "fanaticism"and"xenophobia."It is true that there is more vocal anti-Westerneeling in theMuslim world than in most other areas, partlybecause Islam brooks non-Muslim rule less than other traditionsaccept outsiders but also becauseMuslim-Western onflict and the Israeliand Palestinequestionshave a longhistory.On the otherhand, we must accept the probability hatmany youngeducatedMuslimsdo not so muchrejectthe Westbecausethey are Muslimsbut, rather,become Islamists largely because they are hostile to Westerndominance.Islamistsoften come from the same groupsand families and aresometimesthe sameindividuals,who once werenationalistsor even socialistsor communists.Disillusionmentwith secularsolutionshasas much to do withpracticalpoliticalexperienceas it does withreligiosity.Resistanceto Westernculturaldomination,for example, is seen in the ex-communistIranian ntel-lectual, Al-e Ahmad,whose famoustreatise,Westoxication, ecame a centraltext and led him to seek in Islam the solutionto Iran'sproblems.27Similarthings happenedelsewhere. So we can speak of radical anti-imperialism,includingculturalanti-imperialism,eadingto Islamismas much as or morethan the otherway around.Such radicalanti-imperialismwas one reasonfor the initial popularityofKhomeiniamongnon-Shi'iand even non-Muslimgroups n the thirdworld. Italso helps accountfor his initialIranian ollowing amonganti-shahand anti-imperialist ecularists,even of the left. HereI mayreaffirm omethingI notedin one of the first articles I wrote over thirty years ago. It is difficult tomaintain ntellectuallya totally anti-imperialist nd anti-Western osition atthe same time as one puts forth a Western-baseddeology, such as secular

27 Nikki R. Keddie, "WesternRule versus WesternValues:Suggestions for a ComparativeStudyof Asian IntellectualHistory,"Diogenes, 26 (1959), 71-96.



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THE REVOLT OF ISLAM, 1700 TO 1993 487nationalism, iberalism, socialism, orcommunism.28Tomany people it seemsa contradiction o rejectWesternways, especially as they are felt abroad,andto adoptWesternviews. This has led to periodicrevivals of neotraditionalistmovements, once it was a questionof getting an anti-imperialist ollowingamong the more traditionalmasses and not just the educated. In India themovementsof Tilak, Gandhi,andrecent Hindunationalism eflectthis;andinthe Muslim worldthe variouspan-Islamicand Islamicrevivalmovementsdothe same.The phases of modem Islamic militance have some common featuresbutare also diverse, changingfromthe periphery o the center,fromtraditional-ism to a kind of modernity,from indirectWestern nfluence to central anti-imperialismand from appealto tribalgroupsto appealto the young, urban,and educated. Islamic forms cover a greatvarietyof contents. We have cer-tainlynot seen the last of Islamicpermutations ndcombinations o meet theconditions of an ever-changingworld.

28 The literatureon what those in the field generallycall Islamism is extensive andgrowing.Among the most useful worksareNazihN. Ayubii, PoliticalIslam (London:Routledge, 1991);Said AmirArjomand,ed., FromNationalismtoRevolutionaryslam(Albany:StateUniversityofNew YorkPress, 1984);HamidDabashi,Theologyof Discontent:TheIdeologicalFoundationsofthe IslamicRevolution n Iran (New York:New YorkUniversityPress, 1993);JohnL. Esposito,ed., Voices of ResurgentIslam (New York:Oxford University Press, 1983); Michael M. J.Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press,1983);FredHallidayandHamzaAlavi, eds., State andIdeologyin theMiddleEast andPakistan(London:Macmillan,1988);the entireissue on "IslamandPolitics,"ThirdWorldQuarterly,10:2(April 1988), 473-1103; Gilles Kepel, Lepropheteetpharaon:Les mouvementsslamistes dansI'Egypte contemporain(Paris: Seuil, 1990), Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, HamidAlgar, trans. (Berkeley:MizanPress, 1981); MartinMartyand R. Scott Appleby,eds., Funda-mentalisms Observed, 4 vols. to date (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991-93); EdwardMortimer,Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam (New York:RandomHouse, 1982); MaximeRodinson,L'Islampolitiqueet croyance(Paris:Fayard,1993);EmmanuelSivan, RadicalIslam:Medieval Theologyand ModernPolitics (New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1985); SamiZubaida,Islam, the People, and the State (London:Routledge, 1989).

Documents

Nikki Keddie on Islamism