Nietzsche K

Jack Wilson Nietzsche K

1NCThe fact that there is a value to life gives the affirmative’s impacts meaning. Their framework is predicated on the assumption that life has intrinsic meaning making it worthy of moral protection, implying that your ballot is a mechanism to endorse the ideals that allow you to do give life meaning. The aff values morality and justice without telling you why these notions of truth are important to begin with; the only function of truth is to give life grounding and meaning. Nietzsche,

Let's proclaim this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, and we must first question the very value of these values. For that we need a knowledge of the conditions and circumstance out of which these values grew, under which they have developed and changed (morality as consequence, as symptom, as mask, as hypocrisy, as illness, as misunderstanding—but also morality as cause, as means of healing, as stimulant,

as scruples, as poison), a knowledge of the sort which has not been there until now, something which has not even been wished for. People have taken the worth of these "values" as something given, as self-evident, as beyond all

dispute. Up until now people have also not had the least doubts about or wavered in setting up "the good man" as more valuable than "the evil man," of higher worth in the sense of the improvement, usefulness, and prosperity of mankind

in general (along with the future of humanity). Now what about this? What if the truth were the other way around? What if in the "good" there lay a symptom of regression, something like a danger, a seduction, a poison, a narcotic, something which makes the present live at the cost of the

future? Perhaps something more comfortable, less dangerous, but also on a smaller scale, something more demeaning? . . . So that this very morality would be guilty if the highest possible power and magnificence of the human type were never attained? So that this very morality might be the danger of all dangers? [Frederich Nietzsche. “On the Genealogy of Morals.” Print.

The affirmative framework attempts to create a conception of absolute truth. This will to truth merely a farce for even if it were possible to have objective truth, we ought to reject it. Their attempt at truth is a dangerous phantasm appeals to ascetic values external to the subject. Nietzsche 2,

Has a European or a Christian free-thinker [Freigeist] ever strayed into this proposition and the labyrinth of its consequences? Does he know the Minotaur of this cave from

experience? I doubt it, indeed, I know otherwise: – nothing is stranger to these people who are absolute in one thing, these so-called ‘free spirits’, than freedom and release in that sense, in no respect are they more firmly bound; precisely in their faith in truth they are more rigid and more absolute than anyone else. Perhaps I am too familiar with all this: that

venerable philosopher’s abstinence prescribed by such a faith like that commits one, that stoicism of the intellect which, in the last resort,

denies itself the ‘no’ just as strictly as the ‘yes’, that will to stand still before the factual, the factum brutum, that fatalism of ‘petits faits’ (ce petit faitalisme, as I call it) in which French scholarship now seeks a kind of moral superiority over the German, that renunciation of any interpretation (of forcing, adjusting, shortening, omitting, filling-out, inventing, falsifying and everything else essential to interpretation) – on the whole, this expresses the asceticism of virtue just as well as any denial of sensuality (it is basically just a modus of this denial). However, the compulsion towards it, that

--1--


unconditional will to truth, is faith in the ascetic ideal itself, even if, as an unconscious imperative, make no mistake about it, – it is the faith in a metaphysical value, a value as such of absolute truth, sanctioned and guaranteed by this ideal alone. [Frederich Nietzsche. “On the Genealogy of Morals.” Print.

--2--


By appealing to the ascetic ideal the affirmative makes meaningless valuable by breeding resentment and the denial of life, thereby destroying meaning to life. What is the value of the value? The Socratic method of truth assumes higher values beyond life and does not accept life as it is, rendering it meaningless. Deleuze,

From the speculative position to the moral opposition, from the moral opposition to the ascetic contradiction. ..But the ascetic contradiction is, in turn, a symptom, which must

be interpreted. What does the man of the ascetic ideal want? The one who repudiates life is also the one who wants a diminished life, the conservation of his type and moreover its power and triumph, the triumph and contagion of reactive forces. At this point reactive forces discover the disturbing ally that leads them to victory:

nihilism, the will to nothingness (GM III 13). The will to nothingness, which can only bear life in its reactive form. The will to nothingness is the

one that used reactive forces as a way of ensuring that life must contradict, deny and annihilate itself. The will to nothingness from the beginning, inspires all the values that are called "superior" to life. This is Schopenhauer's greatest error: he

believed that the will is denied in all values superior to life. In fact, it is not the will which is denied in superior values, it is the superior values that are related to a will to deny, to annihilate life. This will to deny defines "the value" of superior values. Its weapon is to hand life over to the domination of reactive forces in such a way that the whole of life slips further and further away, separated from what it can do, getting smaller

and smaller, towards nothingness, towards the poignant feeling of his nothingness" (GM III 25). The will to nothingness and reactive forces, these are the two constituent elements of the ascetic ideal. [Gilles Deleuze.

“Nietzsche and Philosophy.” 1983. Print.

This turns the affirmative case since their attempt to order the world and reduce suffering denies humans the ability to discover value and meaning in existence. We must engage in suffering and dynamic thought in order to allow it to unveil the value to life. Nietzsche 3,

Whether hedonism, or pessimism, or utilitarianism, or eudaimonianism (6)—all these ways of thinking, which measure the value of things according to pleasure and pain, that is, according to contingent circumstances and secondary issues, are ways of thinking in the foreground and naïveté, which everyone who knows about creative forces and an

artistic conscience will look down on, not without ridicule and not without compassion. Compassion for yourself[,]—that is, of course, not compassion the way you mean the term: it's not pity for social "needs," for "society" and its sick and unlucky people, with those depraved and broken down from the start, and with the way they lie on the ground all around us—

even less is it compassion for the grumbling oppressed, the rebellious slave classes, who strive for mastery—they call it "Freedom." Our compassion is a higher compassion which sees further—we see how man is making himself smaller, how

you make him smaller—and there are moments when we look at your compassion with an indescribable anxiety, where we defend ourselves against this compassion—where we find your seriousness more dangerous than any carelessness. You want, if possible—and there is no

wilder "if possible"—to do away with suffering. What about us? It does seem that we would prefer it to be higher and worse than it ever was! Well being, the way you understand it, that's no goal. To us that looks like an end, a condition which immediately makes human beings laughable and contemptible, something which

--3--


makes their destruction desirable! The culture of suffering, of great suffering, don't you realize that up to this point

it is only this suffering which has created all the things which raise man up?

The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s attempt to act as the master of the world and the priest of truth by embracing the uncertainty of existence with a simple roll of the dice. Vote not only against their ascetic ideal, but also for a type of thought that allows us to all positively engage. Deleuze 2,

Whereas the thrown dice affirm chance once and for all, the dice: which fall back necessarily affirm the number or the destiny

which brings the dice back. It is in this sense that the second moment of the game is also the two moments together or the player who equals the whole. The eternal return is

the second moment, the result of the dicethrow, the affirmation of necessity, the number which brings together all the parts of chance. But it is also the return of the first moment, the repetition of the dicethrow, the reproduction

and reaffirmation of chance itself. Destiny in the eternal return is also the "welcoming" of chance, "I cook

every chance in my pot. And only when it is quite cooked do I welcome it as my food. And truly, many a chance came imperiously to me; but my will spoke [0 it even more imperiously, then it went down imploringly on its knees - imploring shelter and love with me, urging in wheedling tones; 'Just see, 0 Zarathustra, how a friend comes to a

friend!' "(Z III "Of the Virtue (hat makes small" 3 p. 191). This means that there are fragments of chance which claim to be valid in themselves, they appeal to their probability, each solicits several throws of the dice from the player; divided among several throws, having become simple probabilities, the fragments of chance are slaves who want to speak as masters. 24 But Zarathustra knows that one must not play or let oneself be played, on the contrary, it is necessary to affirm the whole of chance at once (therefore boil and cook it like the player who wants the dice in his hands), in order to reunite all its fragments and to affirm the number which is not probable but fatal and necessary. Only then is

chance a friend who visits his friend, a friend who will be asked back, a friend of destiny whose destiny itself assures the eternal return as such. [Gilles Deleuze. “Nietzsche and Philosophy.” 1983. Print.

The permutation fails since it attempts to manipulate the dice-roll in order to producing a better outcome, creating resentment and destroying the meaning to life. The alternative is your chance to promote the type of thought necessary for us to determine how we define the value in our lives. Deleuze 3,

When knowledge becomes a legislator, the most important thing to be subjected is thought. Knowledge is thought itself, but thought subject to reason and to all that is expressed in reason. The instinct for knowledge is therefore thought, but thought in its relation to the reactive forces which seize and conquer it. For rational knowledge sets

the same limits to life as reasonable life sets to thought; life is subject to knowledge and at the same time thought is subject to life. Reason sometimes

dissuades and sometimes forbids us to cross certain limits: because it is useless (knowledge is there to

predict) because it would be evil (life is there to be virtuous), because it is impossible (there is nothing to see or think behind the truth). 2' — But does

not critique, understood as critique of knowledge itself, express[es] new forces capable of giving thought another sense, a thought that would go to the limit of what life can do, a thought that would lead life to the limit of what it can do, a thought that would affirm life instead of a knowledge that is opposed to life. Life would be the active force of thought, but thought would be the

--4--


affirmative power of life. Both would go in the same direction, carrying each other along, smashing restrictions, matching each other step for step, in

a burst of unparalleled creativity. Thinking would then mean discovering, inventing new possibilities of life. "There are lives with prodigious difficulties; these are the lives of the thinkers. And we must lend an ear to what we are told about them, for here we discover

possibilities of life the mere story of which gives us joy and strength and sheds light on the lives of their successors. There is as much invention, reflection, boldness, despair and hope here as in the voyages of the great navigators; and to tell the truth, these are also voyages of exploration in the most distant and perilous domains of life. What is surprising in these lives is that two opposed instincts, which pull in opposite directions, seem to be forced to walk under the same yoke: the instinct that leads to knowledge is constantly constrained to abandon the ground where man habitually lives and to throw itself into the uncertain, and the instinct that wills life is forced to grope ceaselessly in

the dark for a new place to establish itself' (PTG). In other words, life goes beyond the limits that knowledge fixes for it, but thought goes beyond the limits that life fixes for it. Thought ceases to be a ratio y26* life ceases to be a reaction.

The thinker thus expresses the noble affinity of thought and life: life making thought active, thought making life affirmative.

--5--


Saurette LinkTheir attempt at absolute truth is an attempt to somehow correct existence. Their expression of a will to truth appeals to an impossible and ideal real world – which creates resentment towards life. The link is clear as the affirmative defines we have an ethical obligation to do X; however, what constitutes that obligation is the desire to escape the suffering of existence. Saurette,

The Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealised Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both order and disorder, however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possible by creating a 'Real World' of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an 'Apparent World' of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the Apparent World , disparaged, devalued, and ignored in relation to the ideal order of the Real World . Essential to the Socratic Will to

Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealised order of the Real World. According to

Nietzsche, this dichotomised model led to the emergence of a[n] uniquely 'modern' understanding of life which could only view suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World. This outlook created a modern notion of

responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something, is to blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition ressentiment, and argues that it signalled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution. This contradiction, however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche, ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God, the Truth, and the Real World. As Nietzsche wrote,`I suffer: someone must be to blame for it' thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: 'Quite so my sheep! someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself,- you alone are to blame for yourself—This is brazen and false enough: but one thing is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered." Faced with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, once again, 'one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational....' The genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdium the Socratic division through the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through this redirection, the Real World was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action.This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomised worlds creates the Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the

modern Will to Truth. Unable to accept the Dionysian suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately searches for 'the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest sleep, in short absence of suffering'.` According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possible only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World. The Will to Order, then, is the aggressive need increasingly to order

the Apparent World in line with the precepts of the moral Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two interrelated reactions. First, ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal, Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve this, however, the

ascetic ideal also asserts that a 'truer', more complete knowledge of the Real World must be established, creating an ever-increasing Will to Truth. This self-perpetuating

movement creates an interpretative structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche

suggests,[t]he ascetic ideal has a goal—this goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it, petty and narrow; it interprets

epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goal; it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation : The very

structure of the Will to Truth ensures that theoretical investigation must be increasingly ordered, comprehensive, more True, and closer to the perfection of the ideal. At the same time, this understanding of intellectual theory ensures that it creates

practices which attempt to impose increasing order in the Apparent World. With this critical transformation, the Will to Order becomes the fundamental philosophical principle of modernity. [Pual Saurette. “I mistrust all systemizers and Avoid Them: Nietzsche Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory.”]

--6--


--7--


Kain LinkLife is amoral - anyone who denies this and attempts to reduce and eliminate suffering is a coward too fearful to engage life. The aff’s fixation with righting the world is a delusion that

masks the true nature and meaning of suffering. Kain,

The third vision takes the cosmos to be alien. It was not designed for human beings at all; nor were they designed for it. We just do not fit. We do not belong. And we never will. The cosmos is horrible, terrifying, and we will never surmount this fact. It is a place where human beings suffer for no reason at all. It is best never to have been born. Let us call this the horrific cosmos. This is Nietzsche's view. Nietzsche simply dismisses

the designed cosmos, which few believe in anymore anyway (WP 12a). On the other hand, Nietzsche takes the perfectible cosmos very seriously. He resists it with every fiber of

his being.5 For Nietzsche, we must stop wasting time and energy hoping to change things, improve them, make progress (see, e.g., WP 40, 90, 684)—the outlook of liberals, socialists, and even Christians, all of whom Nietzsche tends to

lump together and excoriate. For [End Page 50] Nietzsche, we cannot reduce suffering, and to keep hoping that we can will simply weaken us. Instead, we must conceal an alien and terrifying cosmos if we hope to live in it. And we must develop the strength to do so. We must toughen ourselves. We need more suffering, not less. It has "created all enhancements of man so far . . ." (BGE 225, 44; WP 957; GM II:7).

If we look deeply into the essence of things, into the horror of existence, Nietzsche thinks we will be overwhelmed—paralyzed.

Like Hamlet we will not be able to act, because we will see that action cannot change the eternal nature of things (BT 7). We must see, Nietzsche says, that "a profound illusion . . . first saw the light of the world in the

person of Socrates: the unshakeable faith that thought . . . can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it. This sublime metaphysical

illusion accompanies science as an instinct . . ." (BT 15). In Nietzsche's view, we cannot change things. Instead, with Hamlet we should "feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that [we] should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint" (BT 7; cf. TI "Anti-Nature," 6). Knowledge of the horror of existence kills action—which requires distance and

illusion. The horror and meaninglessness of existence must be veiled if we are to live and act. What we must do, Nietzsche thinks, is construct a meaning for suffering. Suffering we can handle. Meaningless suffering, suffering for no reason at all, we cannot handle. So we give suffering a meaning. We invent a meaning. We create an illusion. [Phillip Kain. “Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence.” Online.]

--8--

http://208.34.222.250/bin/rdas.dll/RDAS_SVR=muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v033/33.1kain.html%20%5C%20FOOT5


Der Derian LinkThe aff creates a false view of rationality in which our fear of suffering justifies the acceptance of securities nihilism – this is an independent link into the critique. Der Derian,

[Nietzsche’s] method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. 33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment

and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death

which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterpretation of security will receive a more extensive

treatment here. One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil, he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal

instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength--life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results." 34

The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce[s] a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are

produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for ". . . life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own

forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35 Elsewhere

Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism[.] in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." 36 But [T]he denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of

difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of

difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?"

37 The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything

reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols. The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most

habitual explanations. 38 A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche

puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." [James Der Derian.

“The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard.” Print.]

--9--


--10--


Baudrillard LinkThe imminent threat of nuclear annihilation has literally become a non-event, for the explosive energy of the nuclear has been programmatically integrated into the strategies of social and political implosion. The technologies of the nuclear, of a deterrence without any boundaries or objectives, are a fixture of a global power that levels out the possibility of any true conflict or event in order to incorporate the political into the totalizing logic of security. Baudrillard,

The apotheosis of simulation: the nuclear. However, the balance of terror is never anything but the spectacular slope of a system of deterrence that has insinuated itself from

the inside into all the cracks of daily life. Nuclear suspension only serves to seal the trivialized system of deterrence that is at the heart of the media, of the violence without consequences that reigns throughout the world, of the aleatory apparatus of all the choices that are made for us. The most insignificant of our behaviors is regulated

by neutralized, indifferent, equivalent signs, by zero-sum signs like those that regulate the "strategy of games" (but the true equation is elsewhere, and the unknown is precisely that variable of simulation which makes of the atomic arsenal itself a hyperreal form, a simulacrum that dominates everything and reduces all "ground-level" events to being nothing but ephemeral scenarios, transforming the life left us into survival, into a stake without stakes - not even into a life insurance policy: into a policy that already has no

value). It is not the direct threat of atomic destruction that paralyzes our lives, it is deterrence that gives them leukemia. And this deterrence comes from that fact that even the real atomic clash is precluded - precluded

like the eventuality of the real in a system of signs. The whole world pretends to believe in the reality of this threat (this is understandable on the part of the military, the gravity of their exercise and the discourse of their "strategy" are at stake), but it is precisely at this level that there are no strategic stakes. The whole originality of the situation lies in the improbability

of destruction. Deterrence precludes war - the archaic violence of expanding systems. Deterrence itself is the neutral, implosive violence of metastable systems or systems in involution. There is no longer a subject of deterrence, nor an adversary nor a strategy - it is a planetary structure of the annihilation of stakes. Atomic war, like the Trojan War,

will not take place. The risk of nuclear annihilation only serves as a pretext, through the sophistication of weapons (a sophistication that surpasses any possible objective to such an extent that it is itself a symptom of nullity), for installing

a universal security system, a universal lockup and control system whose deterrent effect is not at all aimed at an atomic clash (which was never in question, except without a doubt in the very initial stages of the cold war, when one still confused the nuclear apparatus with conventional war) but, rather, at the much greater probability of any real

event, of anything that would be an event in the general system and upset its balance. The balance of terror is the terror of balance. Deterrence is not a strategy, it circulates and is exchanged between nuclear protagonists exactly as is international capital

in the orbital zone of monetary speculation whose fluctuations suffice to control all global exchanges. Thus the money of destruction (without any reference to real destruction, any more than floating capital has a real referent of production) that circulates in nuclear orbit suffices to control all the violence and potential conflicts around the world. What is hatched in the shadow of this mechanism with the pretext of a maximal, "objective," threat, and thanks to Damocles' nuclear sword, is the perfection of the best system of control that has ever existed. And the progressive satellization of the whole planet through this hypermodel of security. The same goes for peaceful nuclear power stations. Pacification does not distinguish between the civil and the military: everywhere where irreversible apparatuses of control are elaborated, everywhere where the notion of security becomes omnipotent, everywhere where the norm replaces the old arsenal of laws and violence (including war), it is the system of deterrence that grows, and around it grows the historical, social, and political desert. A gigantic involution that makes every conflict, every finality, every confrontation contract in proportion to this blackmail that

interrupts, neutralizes, freezes them all. No longer can any revolt, any story be deployed according to its own logic because it risks annihilation. No strategy is possible any longer, and escalation is only a puerile game given over to the military. [Jean Baudrillard. Simulacra and Stimulation. Print].

--11--


Nietzsche LinkAbsolute knowledge is a farce and even if it was possible we should forgo the possibility of absolute conceptions of an idea in favor of multiple perspective that better understanding of a concept. Nietzsche,

Assuming that such a personified will to contradiction and counter nature can be made to philosophize: on what will it vent its inner arbitrariness? On that which is

experienced most certainly to be true and real: it will look for error precisely where the actual instinct of life most unconditionally judges there [is] to be truth. For example, it will demote physicality to the status of illusion, like the ascetics of

the Vedânta philosophy did, similarly pain, plurality, the whole conceptual antithesis ‘subject’ and ‘object’ – errors, nothing but errors! To renounce faith in one’s own ego, to deny one’s own ‘reality’ to oneself – what a triumph! – and not just over the senses, over appearance, a much higher kind of triumph, an act of violation and cruelty inflicted on

reason: a voluptuousness which reaches its peak when ascetic self-contempt decrees the self-ridicule of reason: ‘there is a realm of truth and being, but reason is firmly excluded from it!’ . . . (By the way: even in the Kantian concept of ‘the intelligible character of things’, something of this lewd ascetic conflict [Zwiespältigkeit] still lingers, which likes to set reason against reason:

‘intelligible character’ means, in Kant, a sort of quality of things about which all that the intellect can comprehend is that it is,

for the intellect – completely incomprehensible.) – Finally, as knowers, let us not be ungrateful towards such resolute reversals of familiar perspectives and valuations with which the mind has raged against itself for far

too long, apparently to wicked and useless effect: to see differently, and to want to see differently to that degree, is no small discipline and preparation of the intellect for its future ‘objectivity’ – the latter understood not as ‘contemplation [Anschauung] without interest’ (which

is, as such, a non-concept and an absurdity), but as having in our power the ability to engage and disengage our ‘pros’ and ‘cons’: we can use the difference in perspectives and affective interpretations for knowledge. From now on, my philosophical

colleagues, let us be more wary of the dangerous old conceptual fairy-tale which has set up a ‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless, subject of knowledge’, let us be wary of the tentacles of such contradictory concepts as ‘pure reason’, ‘absolute

spirituality’, ‘knowledge as such’: – here we are asked to think an eye which cannot be thought at all, an eye turned in no direction at all, an eye where the active and

interpretative powers are to be suppressed, absent, but through which seeing still becomes a seeing-something, so it is an absurdity and non-concept of eye that is demanded.

There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival ‘knowing’; the more affects we are able to put into

words about a thing, the more eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our ‘concept’ of the thing, our ‘objectivity’. But to eliminate the will completely and turn off all the emotions without exception, assuming we could: well? would that not mean to castrate the intellect? [Frederich Nietzsche. “On the Genealogy of Morality.” Print.]

--12--


Hegemony LinkHegemony is a militaristic strategy that aims to create a stable, perfect, and safe world. This type of power is a farce as it merely creates more violence in the name of security. Hegemony is a lie – it destroys value in it’s quest for a perfect world. Der Derian,

Ultimately, however, real-world transformations exceed the grasp of the NSS. The war in Iraq put on full display just how effective the military could be in attaining its planned goals. But what falls outside the engineering and imaginary of the plan, what Edmund Burke called the "empire of circumstance," is in the driver's seat and beyond the

cybernetic machinations of the NSS, as we see in the "peace" that followed. Many scholars saw the end of the Cold War as an occasion to debate the merits of a unipolar future as well as to wax nostalgic over the stability of a bipolar past. These

debates continued to be state-centric as well as materialist in their interpretation of how power works. By such criteria, there was little doubt that the United States would emerge as the dominant military, economic, and, indeed, civilizational power. Even in Paul Wolfowitz's worst-case nightmares, it was difficult to identify a potential "peer

competitor" on the horizon. But then came 9/11, and blueprints for a steady-state hegemony were shredded. Asymmetrical power and fundamentalist resentment, force-multiplied by the mass media, prompted a permanent state of emergency. After the first responders came a semiotic fix with a kick, The

National Security Strategy of the United States of America. But from the tragedy of 9/11 to the farce of war in Iraq, after the multilateral hopes for a "safer and better world" were subverted by the unilateral nihilism of preventive war, the syntax of order and the code of the simulacrum began to break down. We caught a glimpse of a heteropolar matrix, in which actors radically different in identity and interests (states versus super-empowered individuals), using technologies in revolutionary ways (civilian airliners to create kamikaze weapons of mass destruction, the Internet to mobilize the largest antiwar demonstrations ever),

were suddenly comparable in their capability to produce improbable global effects. It might be small solace, but out of this deeply nihilistic moment might yet come a real balance of power and truth, in which the Straussian reach of The National Security Strategy is foreshortened by a Nietzschean grasp of reality.

--13--


Terror LinkRethinking the epistemological and ideological foundations of how we understand terrorism is necessary to understand the roots of violence. The affirmative’s call for a hard approach merely obscures the conditions that cause retaliatory violence to begin with. Der Derian,

It is more difficult - and certainly less popular - to assess the intellectual and structural obstacles blocking an inquiry into terrorism [are]. The first obstacle is epistemological: even the most conscientious and independent student of terrorism faces a narrowly bounded discipline of thought . During the

1980s, terrorist studies became a fortress-haven at the edge of the social sciences, a positivist's armory of definitions, typologies, and databases to be wielded as much against the methodological critic as the actual terrorist who might call into question the sovereign reason and borders of the nation-state. The

second obstacle is ideological: to gain official entry into the terrorist debate one must check critical weapons at the door, and join in the chorus of condemnation- or risk suspicion of having sympathy for the terrorist devil. What this means is that following a rash of terrorist incidents - at the moments of highest tension when

sober thinking is most needed - responses other than instant excoriation and threats of retaliation are seen as "soft," or worse, collaborationist. As others have noted, this is very reminiscent of the regimentation of critical thinking by threat-mongering that marked

Cold War I in the 1940s and 1950s and the most morbid moments of Cold War II in the early 1980s. Let Oliver North remind us once again: "It is very important for the American people to understand that this is a dangerous world that we live at risk and this nation is at risk in a dangerous world’s However, as Gorbachev worked hard to improve relations with the United States, and as the Soviet bloc began to disintegrate, it proved increasingly difficult to find, let alone maintain the credibility of an alien, uniform, foe. In the future, there will indeed be external dangers, but it is US national identity, not the United States as a nation, that it is truly at risk. Here lies the third,

ontological, reason for the intractability of terrorism: it has been subsumed by the traditional gambit of defining and unifying a national identity through the alienation of others. In spite of the odds that

we are more likely to die from a lightning strike, an automobile accident, or even a bee sting, many have come to accept the ubiquity of the terrorist threat as well as tale on the identity of the victim. The terrorist discourse Yet, even in polls taken

immediately after a terrorist strike, the majority of Americans are reluctant to endorse military retaliation. Common sense probably plays a conservative role: if polled, most Americans would probably not (for similar reasons) endorse surgical air-strikes on automobile plants or bee colonies to lessen the chances of an unlikely death. But I suspect something beyond common sense is at work. Reflecting the diverse and highly individualistic forces behind terrorism, we are not - nor can we be - of one mind, of one identity, or of one course of action when it comes time to think and act collectively against the terrorist threat. What the polls probably reflected is that after Vietnam (and before another Lebanon debacle), many preferred the non-identity of a silent but safe majority when it comes to taking on an enemy that is fearsome but faceless, anywhere and

nowhere. This is not to claim that one must sympathize with terrorism in order to understand it, although this

chapter does attempt a better understanding of the terrorist in situ. Nor is it to pretend that a total comprehension of terrorism is possible , remedial, or even preferable, although this chapter does try to reconstruct our knowledge and to critique current practices of terrorism and anti-terrorism. Rather, it is to argue at the outset that any productive reading of terrorism requires difficult, even contorted feat, of stepping outside of the one –

dimensional identities that terrorism and the national [of] security culture have implanted in both sides the conflict. [Ibid].

--14--


Kant LinkThe affirmative’s Kantian framing of reason links because they turn ethics into an eternal, empty question for truth by enslaving us into an internal order. Deleuze,

But in what way did Kant understand his idea of philosophy- legislation? Why does Nietzsche, at the very moment when he seems to revive and develop the Kantian idea, rank Kant among the "philosophical labourers", those who are content to make inventories of current values, the opposite of the philosophers of the future? (BGE 211 p. 123). For

Kant, what legislates (in a domain) is always one of our faculties: understanding, reason. We are legislators ourselves only insofar as we make proper use of this faculty and allot our other faculties tasks which conform to it. We are legislators only insofar as we submit to one of our faculties, as it were the whole of

ourselves. But to what do we submit in such a faculty, to what forces? Understanding and reason have a long history: they are instances which still make us obey when we no longer want to obey anyone. When we stop obeying God, the

State, our parents, reason appears and persuades us to continue being docile because it says to us: it is you who are giving the orders. Reason represents

our slavery and our subjection as some thing superior which make us reasonable beings. Under the name of practical reason, "Kant invented a reason expressly for those cases in which one has no need to bother about reason: namely, when the needs

of the heart, when morality, when 'duty' speaks". 2 ' And, finally, what is concealed in the famous Kantian unity of legislator and subject? Nothing but a renovated theology,

theology with a protestant flavour: we are burdened with the double task of priest and believer, legislator and subject. Kant's dream was not to abolish the distinction between two worlds (sensible and super-sensible) but to secure the unity of the personal in the two worlds. The

same person as legislator and subject, as subject and object, as noumenon and phenomenon, as priest and believer. This arrangement succeeds as theology: "Kant's success is only a theologian's success" (AC 10). Can we really believe that by installing the priest and the legislator in us we stop being primarily believers and subjects? The legislators

and the priest practise the ministry, the legislation and the representation of established values; all they do is internalise current values. Kant's "proper usage of the faculties" mysteriously coincides with these established values: true knowledge, true morality, true religion. [Gilles Deleuze. “Nietzsche and Philosophy.” 1983. Print.

--15--


Nozick/Autonomy LinkThe aff’s desire to maximize autonomy and freedom creates resentment towards life, which turns ethics into an empty appeal to truth. Nietzsche,

38 My conception of freedom. - The value of a thing sometimes lies not in what one attains with it, but in what one pays for it - what it costs us. I give an example.

Liberal institutions immediately cease to be liberal as soon as they are attained: subsequently there is nothing more thoroughly harmful to freedom than liberal institutions. One knows,

indeed, what they bring about: they undermine the will to power, they are the leveling of mountain and valley exalted to a moral principle , they make small, cowardly and smug - it is the herd animal which triumphs with them every time. Liberalism: in plain words, reduction to the herd animal. . . . As long as they are still being fought for, these

same institutions produce quite different effects; they then in fact promote freedom mightily. Viewed more closely, it is war which produces these effects, war for liberal

institutions which as war permits the illiberal instincts to endure. And war is a training in freedom. For what is freedom? That one has the will to self-responsibility. That one preserves the distance which divides us . That one has

become more indifferent to hardship, toil, privation, even to life. That one is ready to sacrifice men to one's cause, oneself not excepted. Freedom means that the manly instincts that delight in war and victory have gained mastery over the other instincts - for example, over the instinct for 'happiness'. The man who has become free - and how much more the mind that has become free - spurns the

contemptible sort of well-being dreamed of by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen and other democrats. The free man is a warrior . - How is freedom measured , in individuals as in nations? By the resistance which has to be overcome, by the effort it costs to stay aloft . One would have to seek the highest type of free man where the greatest resistance is

constantly being overcome: five steps from tyranny, near the threshold of the danger of servitude. This is trye psychologically when one undersands by 'tyrants' pitiless and dreadful instincts, to combat which demands the maximum of authoirty and discipline towards oneself - finest type Julius Ceasar - ; it is also true politically: one has only to look at history. The nations which were worth something, which became worth something, never became so under liberal institutions: it was great danger which made of them something deserving reverence, danger which first teaches us to know our resources, our virtues, our shield and spear, our spirit - which compels us to be strong. . . . First principle: one must need strength, otherwise one will never have it. - Those great forcing-houses for strong human beings, for the strongest kind there has eve

been, the aristocratic communities of the pattern of Rome and Venice, understood freedom in precisely the sense in which I understand the word 'freedom': as something one has and does not have, something one wants , something one conquers . . . [Frederich Nietzsche. Twilight of the Idols. Print.]

--16--


Ethics LinkNeither political values nor metaphysics can give life a higher, actual meaning; in the end, we are all merely bits of cosmic dust, convinced we have importance because of “our thought.” Nietzsche,

Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of "world history," but

nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die. One might invent such a fable, and yet he still would not have adequately illustrated how miserable, how shadowy and transient, how aimless and arbitrary the human intellect looks within nature. There were eternities during which it did not exist. And when it is all over with the human intellect, nothing will have happened. For this intellect has no additional mission which would lead it beyond human life.

Rather, it is human, and only its possessor and begetter takes it so solemnly-as though the world's axis turned within it. But if we could

communicate with the gnat, we would learn that he likewise flies through the air with the same solemnity, that he feels the flying center of the universe within himself.

There is nothing so reprehensible and unimportant in nature that it would not immediately swell up like a

balloon at the slightest puff of this power of knowing. And just as every porter wants to have an admirer, so even the proudest of

men, the philosopher, supposes that he sees on all sides the eyes of the universe telescopically focused upon his action and thought. It is remarkable that this was brought about by the intellect, which was certainly allotted to these most

unfortunate, delicate, and ephemeral beings merely as a device for detaining them a minute within existence. For without this addition they would have every reason to flee this

existence as quickly as Lessing's son. The pride connected with knowing and sensing lies like a blinding fog over the eyes and senses of men, thus deceiving them concerning the value of existence. For this pride contains within itself the most flattering estimation of the value of knowing. Deception is the most general effect of such pride, but even its most particular effects contain within themselves something of the same deceitful character. [Frederich Nietzsche. “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense.” Print.]

--17--


Equality/Alterity LinkThe aff rejection of inequality and suffering is the desire for a collective strength to overcome the suffering that is inherent to our world. Ure,

However, if Nietzsche thus conflates a number of very different discourses, his conceptualization of the social phenomenon he objects to remains much more sharply focused.

In theorizing the cult of philanthropy, he accentuates what [Nietzsche] sees as the tight connection between the

modern form of communal integration and a lamentable process of deindividuation: Today it seems to do everyone good when they hear that

society is on the way to adapting the individual to general requirements, and that the happiness and at the same time the sacrifice of the individual lies in feeling himself to be a useful member and instrument of the whole. . . . [T]here is . . . a wonderful and fair-sounding unanimity in the demand that the ego has to deny itself until, in the form of the

adaptation to the whole, it again acquires its firmly set circle of rights and duties— until it has become something quite novel and different. What is wanted . . .

is nothing less than the fundamental remoulding, indeed weakening and abolition of the individual: one never tires of enumerating and indicting all that is evil and inimical, prodigal, costly, extravagant in the

form individual existence has assumed hitherto, one hopes to manage more cheaply, more safely, more equitably, more uniformly if there exists only large bodies and their members. (D 132) Nietzsche’s analysis of this post-Enlightenment transformation and valorization of Mitleid is significant for our purposes because it reveals the notion of subjectivity and intersubjectivity that underpins his lament over a communitarianism that, as he sees it, entirely enfolds the individual into the collective.47 Nietzsche suggests that the concepts of pity, sympathy, and vivre pour autrui have become little more than the ideological stalking horses for the “moral fashion of a commercial society” (D 173,

emphasis added)—a moral fashion, that is to say, that transforms individuals into industrious, calculable instruments of social labor. He argues that what unites the

modern mantras of “pity,” “impersonal action,” “self-sacrifice,” “adaptation,” and the “blessing of work” is the

fact that they share one covert idea: the fear of individuality. “In the glorification of ‘work,’” as he writes, “I see the

same covert idea as in the praise of useful impersonal actions: that of fear of everything individual” (D 173). (The scare quotes around “work” are Nietzsche’s; he evidently means to imply that the worship of instrumental, material labor, or “hard industriousness,” should not be confused with what he considers the more valuable work, the work on the self [D 173].) In this context, then, his critique of pity highlights his resistance to philosophical and sociological perspectives whose conception of human beings is exhausted by the image of homo faber and homo economicus.48 Nietzsche challenges the legitimacy of social relations that construct individuals as nothing more than disciplined instruments of labor and uniform members of an integrated collectivity. Such perspectives, he implies, are symptomatic of an anxious desire to cordon ourselves off from the intrapsychic domain. The “blessing of work,” he jokes, “is the best policeman. . . . [I]t keeps everyone in bounds and can mightily hinder the development of reason,

covetousness, desire for independence” (D 173). Instrumental labor, we might say, is our psychological cordon sanitaire. Of course, Nietzsche concedes, this policing of the self through the discipline of work also has its benefits insofar as the regular satisfaction of small, instrumental problems gives one a sense of “security.” However, this is not merely material security

but, indeed, a security from the temptations of “reflection, brooding and dreaming,” and such security, as Nietzsche puts it, “is now worshipped as the supreme divinity” (D 173). In Daybreak he defines the post- Enlightenment age as one in which the metaphysical and theological dream of salvation has been displaced by the worship of a divinity

that protects one from the risks (and possible gains) of confronting and working on one’s own psychical reality. According to Nietzsche, the idol of security that modern commercial society worships is a divinity it has erected in order to save us the trouble of working on and cultivating ourselves. [Michael Ure. “The Irony of Pity: Nietzsche contra Schopenhauer and Rousseau.” Online.]

--18--


Fairness LinkNew link: their impact of fairness becomes a catalyst for resentment by negating the positive value of suffering and hardship to life. Nietzsche,

Thus do I speak unto you in parable, ye who make the soul giddy, ye preachers of EQUALITY! Tarantulas are ye unto me, and secretly revengeful ones! But I will soon bring your hiding-places to the light: therefore do I laugh in your face my laughter of the

height. Therefore do I tear at your web, that your rage may lure you out of your den of lies, and that your revenge may leap forth from behind your word "justice." Because, FOR MAN TO BE REDEEMED

FROM REVENGE--that is for me the bridge to the highest hope, and a rainbow after long storms. Otherwise, however, would the tarantulas have it. "Let it be very justice for the world to become full of the storms of our vengeance"--thus do they talk to one another. "Vengeance will we use, and insult, against all who are not like us"—thus do the

tarantula-hearts pledge themselves. "And 'Will to Equality'--that itself shall henceforth be the name of virtue; and against all that hath power will we raise an outcry!" Ye preachers of equality, the tyrant-frenzy of impotence crieth thus in you for "equality": your most secret tyrant-longings disguise themselves thus in virtue-words! Fretted conceit and suppressed envy--perhaps your fathers' conceit and envy: in you break they

forth as flame and frenzy of vengeance. What the father hath hid cometh out in the son; and oft have I found in the son the father's revealed secret. Inspired ones they resemble: but it is not the heart that inspireth them-- but vengeance. And when they become subtle and cold, it is not spirit, but envy, that maketh them so. Their jealousy leadeth

them also into thinkers' paths; and this is the sign of their jealousy--they always go too far: so that their fatigue hath at last to go to sleep on the snow. In all their lamentations soundeth vengeance, in all their eulogies is maleficence; and being judge seemeth to them bliss. But thus do I counsel you, my friends: distrust all in whom the impulse to

punish is powerful! They are people of bad race and lineage; out of their countenances peer the hangman and the sleuth-hound. Distrust all those who talk much of their justice! Verily, in their souls not only honey is lacking. And when they call themselves "the good and just," forget not, that for them to be Pharisees, nothing is lacking but--power! My friends, I will not be mixed up and confounded with others. There are those who preach my doctrine of life, and are at the same time preachers of equality,

and tarantulas. That they speak in favour of life, though they sit in their den, these poison-spiders, and withdrawn from life--is because they would thereby do injury. To those would they thereby do injury who have power at present: for with those the preaching of death is still most at home. Were it otherwise, then would the tarantulas teach

otherwise: and they themselves were formerly the best world-maligners and heretic-burners. With these preachers of equality will I not be mixed up and confounded. For thus speaketh justice UNTO ME: "Men are not equal." And neither shall they become so! What would be my love to the Superman, if I spake otherwise? [Frederich Nietzsche.

“Thus Spoke Zarathustra.” Print.]

The new Nietzsche links critiques the concept of fairness and equality in the debate space. The desire for life to be fair and debate to be fair is only an appeal to a notion of security, which means that their theory actually bites into the impacts of the critique. This is damning to theory since theory attempts to create truth regarding how we ought to debate.

--19--


Der Derian ImpactThe affirmative’s quest for security and dependence on the logic of security transforms the ambiguity of life into a quest for truth, causing violence against the unknown – turns case. Der Derian,

The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power which produces an

aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science Nietzsche asks of the reader: Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, [is] the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable,

something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the

restoration of a sense of security?" The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against

contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces and is sustained by the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it.

Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols: A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the

alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility - recycling the desire for security. The 'influence of timidity,' as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative

values to the 'necessities' of security: 'they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences'." The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show the perilous conditions which created the security imperative - and the western metaphysics which perpetuate it - have diminished if not disappeared; yet the fear of life persists: 'Our century denies this perilousness, and does so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security,

Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation." Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even

worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox - all that makes life worthwhile. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is

captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions. [James Der Derian. “The value of security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard.” Online.]

--20--


Kain TurnSuffering is inevitable – the affirmative merely attempts to create obligations in an attempt to bypass suffering that is implicit to our existence. In order to give our existence meaning, we must embrace suffering and better ourselves by overcoming, not avoiding, it’s challenges – turns case because only the alternative can solve the aff case. Kain,

Even if we could show that it will be possible to continuously reduce suffering, it is very

unlikely that we will ever eliminate it. If that is so, then it remains a real question whether it is not better to face suffering, use it as a discipline, perhaps even increase it, so as to toughen ourselves, rather than let it weaken us, allow it to dominate us, by continually hoping to overcome it. But whatever we think about the possibility of reducing suffering, the question may well become moot.

Nietzsche tells a story: "Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of 'world history,' but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a

few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die" (TL 1, 79). Whatever progress we might think we are making in reducing suffering, whatever change we think we are bringing about, it may all amount to nothing more than a brief and accidental moment in biological time, whose imminent disappearance will finally confirm the horror and meaninglessness of existence. The disagreement here is not so much about the quantity of suffering that we can expect to find in the world but, rather, its nature. For

proponents of the designed cosmos, suffering is basically accidental. It is not fundamental or central to life. It is not a necessary part of the nature of things. It does not make up the essence of existence. We must develop virtue, and then we can basically expect to fit and be at home in the cosmos. For the proponents of a perfectible cosmos, suffering

is neither essential nor unessential. The cosmos is neutral. We must work on it to reduce suffering. We must bring about our own fit. For Nietzsche, even if we

can change this or that, even if we can reduce suffering here and there, what cannot be changed for human beings is that suffering is fundamental and central to life. The very nature of things, the very essence of existence, means suffering. Moreover, it means meaningless suffering—suffering for no reason at all. That cannot be changed—it can only be concealed. [Ibid].

--21--


Deleuze Violent ImpactOnly the alternative solves the aff’s impacts since the aff authorizes limitless violence as an attempt to correct the imperfections of our existence. Deleuze,

The imputation of wrongs, the distribution of responsibilities, perpetual accusation. All

this replaces aggression. "The aggressive pathos belongs just as necessarily to strength as vengefulness and rancour

belong to weakness" (EH I 7 p. 232). Considering gain as a right, considering it a right to profit from actions that he does not perform, the man of ressentiment breaks out in bitter reproaches as soon as his expectations are disappointed. And how could they not be disappointed, since frustration and revenge are the a prioris of ressentiment? "It is your fault if no one loves me, it is your fault if I've failed in life and also your fault if you fail in yours,

your misfortunes and mine are equally your fault." Here we rediscover the dreadful feminine power of ressentiment: it is not content to denounce crimes and criminals, it wants

sinners, people who are responsible. We can guess what the creature of ressentiment wants: he wants others to be evil, he needs others to be evil in order to be able to consider himself good . You are evil, therefore I am good; this is the slave's fundamental formula, it expresses the main point of ressentiment from the typological point of view, it

summarises and brings together all the preceding characteristics. This formula must be compared with that of the master: I am good, therefore you are evil. The difference between the two measures the revolt of the slave and his triumph: "This inversion of the value-positing eye . . . is of the essence of ressentiment: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile world" (GM 1 10 pp. 36-37). The slave needs, to set the other up as evil from the outset.

--22--


Nietzsche AlternativeThe affirmative mirrors a system of thought that seeks to justify resentment by structuring events of existence; you must refuse to endorse the affirmatives paranoia about our insecure world and instead affirming chance as necessarily to find value in life. Nietzsche,

The means toward genuine peace. —No government will nowadays admit that it maintains an army in order to satisfy occasionally its passion for conquest. The army is said to serve only defensive purposes. This morality, which justifies self-defense, is called in as the government's advocate. This means, however, reserving morality for ourselves and

immorality for our neighbor, because he must be thought eager for attack and conquest if our state is forced to consider means of self-defense. —At the same

time, by our explanation of our need of an army (because he denies the lust of attack just as our state does, and ostensibly also

maintains his army for defensive reasons), we proclaim him [is called] a hypocrite and cunning criminal,

who would [337] fain seize by surprise, without any fighting, a harmless and unwary victim. In this attitude all states face each other to-day. They presuppose evil intentions on their neighbour's part and good intentions on their own. This hypothesis, however, is an inhuman notion, as bad as and worse than war. Nay, at bottom it is a challenge and motive to war, foisting as it

does upon the neighbouring state the charge of immorality, and thus provoking hostile intentions and acts. The doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense must be abjured

as completely as the lust of conquest. Perhaps a memorable day will come when a nation renowned in wars and victories, distinguished by the highest development of military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifice to these

objects, will voluntarily exclaim, “We will break our swords,” and will destroy its whole military system, lock, stock, and barrel. Making ourselves defenseless (after having been the most strongly defended) from a loftiness of sentiment—that is the means towards genuine peace, which must always rest upon a pacific disposition. The so-called armed peace that prevails at present in all countries is a sign of a bellicose disposition, of a disposition that trusts neither itself nor its neighbour, and, partly from hate, partly from fear, refuses to lay down its weapons. Better to perish than to hate and fear, and twice as far better to perish than to make oneself hated and feared—this must some day become the supreme maxim of every political community!—Our liberal representatives of the people, as is well known, have not the time for reflection on the

nature of humanity, or else they would know that they are working in vain when they work for “a gradual diminution of the military burdens.” On the contrary, when the distress of these burdens is greatest, the sort of God who alone can help here will be nearest. [Frederich Nietzsche. “Human, All Too Human. A Book for Free Spirits.” Print.]

--23--


Kain AlternativeEmbrace our fate and affirm the eternal recurrence of our life. Live according to the knowledge that suffering and death are inevitable and do what you would will yourself to spend eternity doing over and over again. Only by doing so can we create value for life. Kain,

We have seen that in Nietzsche's opinion we cannot bear meaningless suffering and so we give it a meaning. Christianity, for example, explains it as punishment for sin.

Eternal recurrence, however, would certainly seem to plunge us back into meaningless suffering (WP 55). It implies that suffering just happens, it repeats eternally, it is fated. There is no plan, no purpose, no reason for it. Eternal recurrence would seem to rub our noses in meaningless suffering. In one sense this is perfectly correct. And Nietzsche does want to accept as much meaninglessness

and suffering as he can bear (BGE 39, 225; WP 585a). Nevertheless, we must see that there is meaning here— it is just that it lies precisely in the meaninglessness. Embracing eternal recurrence means imposing suffering on oneself, meaningless suffering, suffering that just happens, suffering for no reason at all . But [A]t the very same time, this creates the innocence of existence. The meaninglessness of suffering means the innocence of suffering. That is the new meaning that suffering is given. Suffering no longer has its old

meaning. Suffering no longer has the meaning Christianity gave to it. Suffering can no longer be seen as punishment. There is no longer any guilt. There is no longer any sin. One is no longer accountable (TI "Errors" 8; HH 99). If suffering just returns eternally, if

even the slightest change is impossible, how can one be to blame for it? How can one be responsible? It can be none of our doing. We are innocent. This itself could explain why one would be able to embrace eternal recurrence, love every detail of one's life, not wish to change a single moment of suffering. One would be embracing one's own innocence. One would be loving one's own redemption from guilt. Eternal recurrence brings the

Übermensch as close as possible to the truth, meaninglessness, the void, but it does not go all the way or it would crush even the Übermensch. Eternal recurrence gives the Übermensch meaning. It eliminates emptiness. It fills the void . With what? It fills it with something totally familiar and

completely known; with something that is in no way new, different, or strange; with something that is not at all frightening. It fills the void with one's own life—repeated eternally. It is true that this life is a life of suffering, but (given the horror of existence)

suffering cannot be avoided anyway, and at least suffering has been stripped of any surplus suffering brought about by concepts of sin, punishment, or guilt.

--24--


Morality is Subjective(_) Knowledge is perspectival in nature – the aff framework attempts to create a universal morality that applies to agents without considering their unique perspectives. Nietzsche,

The falsity of human judgment derives firstly from the condition of the material to be judged, namely very incomplete, secondly from the

way in which the sum is arrived at on the basis of this material, and thirdly from the fact that every individual piece of this material is in turn the outcome of false knowledge, and is so with absolute necessity. Our experience of another person , for example, no matter how close he stand to us, can never be complete , so that

we would have a logical right to a total evaluation of him; all evaluations are premature and are bound to be. Finally, the standard by which we measure, our own being, is not

an unalterable magnitude, we are subject to moods and fluctuations, and yet we would have to know ourselves as a fixed standard to be able justly to assess the relation between ourself and anything else whatever. (Aphorism #32) [Frederich Nietzsche. “Human, All too Human.” Print.]

(_) Even if we had the ability to experience the perspective of others, it is impossible to formulate objective truths as no moral idea is equal to another. Nietzsche 2,

Every word immediately becomes a concept, inasmuch as it is not intended to serve as a reminder of the unique and wholly individualized original experience to which it owes its birth , but must at the same time fit innumerable, more or less similar cases—which means, strictly speaking, never equal—in other words, a lot of unequal cases.

Every concept originates through our equating what is unequal. No leaf ever wholly equals another, and the concept "leaf" is formed through an arbitrary abstraction from these individual differences, through forgetting the distinctions; and now it gives rise to the idea that in nature there might be something besides the leaves which would be "leaf "— some kind of original form after which all leaves have been woven,

marked, copied, colored, curled, and painted, but by unskilled hands, so that no copy turned out to be a correct, reliable, and faithful image of the original form.

(_) Objective morality is a phantasm – morality must be subjective in nature because only those in power have the ability to define the good. Nietzsche 3,

On the contrary, it was the “good people” themselves, that is, the noble, powerful, higher-ranking, and higher-thinking people who felt and set themselves and their actions up as good, that is to say , of the first rank, in opposition to everything low,

low-minded, common, and vulgar. From this pathos of distance they first arrogated to themselves the right to create values , to stamp out the names for values. What did they care about usefulness! Particularly in relation to such a hot pouring out of the highest rank-ordering, rank-

setting judgments of value, the point of view which considers utility is as foreign and inappropriate as possible . Here the feeling has reached the very opposite of that low level of warmth which is a condition for that calculating shrewdness, that reckoning by utility—and not just for a moment, not for an exceptional hour, but permanently. The pathos of nobility and distance, as mentioned, the lasting and domineering feeling, something total and fundamental, of a higher ruling nature in relation to a lower type, to a

“beneath”—that is the origin of the opposition between “good” and “bad .” (The right of the master to give names

extends so far that we could permit ourselves to grasp the origin of language itself as an expression of the power of the rulers: they say “that is such

--25--


and such”; they seal every object and event with a sound, and in the process , as it were, take possession of it.) [Fredrich Nietzsche. “The Will to Power.” Print.]

(_) Even if there were an objective morality, any attempt to determine its content is undermined by each person’s subjective experience. Sartre,

If an angel appears to me, what is the proof that it is an angel; or, if I hear voices, who can prove that they proceed from heaven and not from hell, or from my own subconscious or some pathological condition? Who can

prove that they are really addressed to me? Who, then, can prove that I am the proper person to impose, by my own choice, my conception of man upon mankind? I shall never find any proof whatever; there will be no sign to

convince me of it. If a voice speaks to me, it is still I myself who must decide whether the voice is or is not that of an angel. If I regard a certain course of action as good, it is only I who choose to say that it is good and not bad.” [Jean Paul Sartre. “1946 Lecture.” Marxist.org].

(_) Objectivist moral systems treat people as objects, undermining their own foundation of truth. Sartre 2 explains that existentialism,

In the second place, this theory alone is compatible with the dignity of man, it is the only one which does not make man into an object. All kinds of materialism lead one to treat every man including oneself as an object – that is, as a set of pre-determined reactions, in no way different from the patterns of qualities and phenomena which constitute a table,or a chair or a stone. Our aim is precisely to establish the human kingdom as a pattern of values in distinction from the material world.

(_) Justice is violence – this is inherent to the concept of ethics itself. Any attempt at inclusion necessarily results in exclusion, which means that justice can never escape the machinery of violence. Hagglund,

Derrida argues that spectrality is at work in everything that happens. An identity or community can never escape the machinery of exclusion; can never fail to engender ghosts, since it must demarcate itself against a past that cannot be encompassed and a future that cannot be anticipated. Inversely, it will always be threatened by what it cannot integrate in itself—haunted by the negated, the neglected, and the

unforeseeable. Thus, a rigorous deconstructive thinking maintains that we are always already

inscribed in an “economy of violence” where we are both excluding and being excluded. No position can be autonomous or absolute but is necessarily bound to other positions that it violates and by which it is violated. The struggle

--26--


for justice can thus not be a struggle for peace, but only for what I will call “lesser violence.” Derrida himself only uses this term briefly in his essay “Violence and Metaphysics,” but I will seek to develop its significance. The starting point for my

argument is that all decisions made in the name of justice are made in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. If there is always an economy of violence, decisions of justice cannot be a matter of choosing what is nonviolent. To justify something is rather to contend that it is less violent than something else. This does not mean that decisions made in view of lesser violence are actually less violent than the violence they oppose . On the contrary, even the most horrendous acts are justified in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence.

For example, justifications of genocide clearly appeal to an argument for lesser violence, since the extinction of the group in question is claimed to be less violent than the

dangers it poses to another group. The disquieting point, however, is that all decisions of justice are implicated in the logic of violence. [Martin Hagglund. “The Necessity of Discrimination.” Online.]

(_) Objective morality is a farce –truths shift from domination to domination, where there can be no absolute truth – this is a link to the critique. Foucault,

In a sense, only a single drama is ever staged in this "non place," the endlessly repeated play of dominations. The dom ination of

certain men over others leads to the differentiation of values;32 class domination generates the idea of liberty;33 and the forceful appropriation of things necessary to survival and the imposition of a duration not intrinsic to them account for the origin of logic .34 This relationship of domination is no more a "relationship" than the place where it occurs is a

place; and, precisely for this reason, it is fixed, throughout its history, in rituals, in meticulous procedures that impose rights and obli gations . It establishes marks of its power and engraves mem ories on things and even within bodies . It makes itself accountable for debts and gives rise to the universe of rules, which is by no means designed to temper violence, but rather to satisfy it. Fol lowing traditional beliefs, it would be false to think that total war exhausts itself in its own contradictions and ends by re nouncing violence and submitting to civil laws . On the contrary, the law is a calculated and relentless pleasure, delight in the promised blood, which permits the perpetual instigation of new dominations and the staging of meticulously repeated scenes of violence . The desire for peace, the serenity of compromise, and the tacit acceptance of the law, far from representing a major moral conversion or a utilitarian calculation that gave rise to the law, are but its result and, in point of fact, its perversion: "guilt, conscience, and duty had their threshold of emergence in the right to secure obligations; and their inception, like that of any major event on earth, was saturated in blood." 35 Humanity does not

gradually progress from combat to combat until it ar rives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally re places warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination. The nature of these rules allows violence to be inflicted on violence and the resurgence of new forces that are sufficiently strong to dominate those in

power. Rules are empty in themselves, violent and unfinalized; they are impersonal and can be bent to any purpose. The successes of history belong to those who are capable of seizing these rules, to replace those who had used them, to disguise themselves so as to pervert them [and] invert their meaning[;] and redirect them against those who had initially imposed them; controlling this complex mechanism, they will make it function so as to overcome the rulers through their own rules. The isolation of different points of emergence does not conform to the successive configurations of an identical meaning; rather, they result from substitutions, displacements, disguised conquests, and systematic reversals. If interpretation were the slow exposure of the meaning hidden in an

origin, then only metaphysics could interpret the development of humanity. But if interpretation is the violent or surreptitious

appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has no essential meaning, in order to impose a

direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game, and to subject it to secondary rules, then the development of humanity is a series of interpretations. The role of genealogy is to record its history: the history of morals, ideals, and metaphysical concepts, the history of the concept of liberty or of the ascetic life; as they stand for the emergence of different interpretations, they must be made to appear as events on the stage of historical process. [Michele Foucault. “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” Online.]

--27--


--28--


A2: Permutation1. Perm fails: the alternative is the status quo. Any perm that actually solved would have to sever their change in the status quo. We must affirm every moment of life in the status quo – the perm as an attempt to sever the status quo merely links into the critique.

2. The perm fails since it attempts to manipulate the dice roll in order to produce a better outcome, which only creates resentment towards life – the perm is definitionally not possible.

3. The affirmative’s initial framing precludes change – forgetting the AC is necessary. Bleiker,

The power to tell stories is the power to define common sense. Prevalent IR stories have been told for so long that they no longer

appear as stories. They are accepted as fact for their metaphorical dimensions have vanished from our collective memories. We have become

accustomed to our distorting IR metaphors until we come to lie, as Nietzsche would say “herd-like in a style obligatory for all. As a result dominant ir stories have successfully

transformed one specific interpretation of world political realities, the realist one, into reality per se. Realist perceptions of the international have gradually become accepted as common sense, to the point that any critique against them has to be evaluated in terms of an already

existing and objectified world view. There are powerful mechanisms of control precisely in this ability to determine meaning and rationality. 'Defining common sense', Steve Smith argues, 'is the ultimate act of political power.’8 It separates the possible from the impossible and directs the theory and practice of international relations on a particular

path. The prime objective of this essay is to challenge prevalent IR stories. The most effective way of doing so, the chapter argues, is not to critique but to forget them, to tell new stories that are not constrained by the boundaries of established and objectified IR narratives. Such an approach diverges from many critical engagements with world politics. Most challenges against dominant IR stories have been

advanced in the form of critiques. While critiquing orthodox IR stories remains an important task, it is not sufficient. Exploring the origins of problems, in this case discourse of

power politics and their positivist framing of the political practice, cannot overcome all the existing theoretical and practical dilemmas. By articulating critique in relation to arguments advanced by orthodox IR theory, the impact of critical voices remains confined within the larger discursive boundaries that have been established through the initial framing of

debates. A successful challenge to orthodox IR stories must do more than merely critique their narrow and problematic nature. To be effective, critique must be supplemented with a process of forgetting the object of critique, of theorizing world politics beyond the agendas,

issues and terminologies that are prest by orthodox debates. Indeed the most powerful potential of critical scholarship may well lie in the attempt to tell different stories about

IR, for once theres stories have become validated , they may well open up spaces for a more inclusive and less violence prone practice of real world politics. [Roland Bleiker. “The Zen of International Relations.” Pdf.]

4. The perm ensnares us into a trap of securitization by treating the AC as an ordering principle of the political order. Dillon,

We are not simply the people who employ discourses of security , we are the people who are

ensnared in and used by them . Just as there therefore could be no hisotry of security without a history of the (inter)national politics that seeks to

define, pursue, and prosecute order under the various names of security, so also any individual political transformation would manifest its own particular order of fear. Don’t ask what a people is, the genealogist of security might sat, ask how an order of fear forms people. And, in particular, bearing the imprint of the wat determinations of what is

political have originated in fear, s/he would emphasize that security is a principal device for constituting political

--29--


order and for confing political imagination within the laws of necessity of the specific rationalities thrown-up by their equally manifold discourses of danger. [Michael

Dillon. “The Politics of Security.” Print.]

--30--


A2: Cede the Political1. I don’t cede the political – the affirmation of life creates a transformative politics. Daigle,

Could it be that in political matters as well as in moral matters we need a reevaluation of values? In morality, one of the tasks that Nietzsche takes on is to criticize and reject existing values. He also criticizes and rejects morality. All morality? No, as we saw earlier, only a certain kind of morality is rejected, that is, morality that is detrimental to the

human. So Nietzsche reevaluates morality in order to present it in a new form . The idea of a morality, then,

is not thrown overboard, but only a certain particular conception is done away with. Could it be the same with

democracy? What if Nietzsche really is criticizing and rejecting a certain particular form o f [End

Page 14] democracy? What if he wants to get to a political regime that would favor the flourishing of all (who would choose to flourish, i.e., an equality of opportunities)? His best choice is a democratic form of government. But democracy as he saw it in his days leads to mediocrity. Democracy breeds the mediocre individual and favors the cultivation of Christian virtues, virtues for the weak. But does it need to be that way? Nietzsche thinks that there is an adequation between the two, democracy and Christianity. But we can conceive of a

transfigured democracy at least as much as we can conceive of a transvaluation of values in the realm of morality. A democracy that would adhere to the new morality that Nietzsche advocates would not end up breeding a weaker kind of individual. Instead, it would be the kind of regime that embodies the virtue politics we need in order to cohere with Nietzschean virtue ethics. To my opinion, this is the only way we can equate the political Nietzsche and the ethical Nietzsche.

2. The critique is the only effective political strategy – the political had already been ceded to the right, the K is key to broadening the scope of politics. Grondin,

A poststructuralist approach to international relations reassesses the nature of the political. Indeed, it calls for the repoliticization of practices of world

politics that have been treated as if they were not political. For instance, limiting the ontological elements in one’s inquiry to states or great powers is a political choice.

As Jenny Edkins puts it, we need to “bring the political back in” (Edkins, 1998: xii). For most analysts of International Relations, the conception of the “political” is

narrowly restricted to politics as practiced by politicians. However, from a poststructuralist viewpoint, the “political” acquires a

broader meaning, especially since practice is not what most theorists are describing as practice. Poststructuralism sees theoretical discourse not only as

discourse, but also as political practice. Theory therefore becomes practice. The political space of poststructuralism is not that of exclusion; it is the political space of

postmodernity, a dichotomous one, where one thing always signifies at least one thing and another (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 14). Poststructuralism thus

gives primacy to the political, since it acts on us, while we act in its name, and leads us to identify and differentiate ourselves from others. This

political act is never complete and celebrates undecidability, whereas decisions, when taken, express the political moment. It is a critical attitude which encourages dissidence from traditional approaches (Ashley and Walker, 1990a and 1990b). It does not represent one single philosophical approach or perspective, nor is it an alternative paradigm (Tvathail, 1996: 172). It is a nonplace, a border line falling between international and domestic politics (Ashley, 1989). The poststructuralist analyst questions the borderlines and dichotomies of modernist discourses, such as inside/outside, the constitution of the Self/Other, and so on. In the act of definition, difference – thereby the discourse of otherness – is highlighted, since one always defines an object with regard to what it is not (Knafo, 2004). As Simon Dalby asserts, “It involves the social construction of some other person, group, culture, race, nationality or political system as different from ‘our’ person, group, etc. Specifying difference is a linguistic, epistemological and, most importantly, a political act; it constructs a space for the other distanced and inferior from the vantage point of the person specifying the difference” (Dalby, cited in Tvathail, 1996: 179). Indeed, poststructuralism offers no definitive answers, but leads to new questions and new unexplored grounds. This makes the commitment to the incomplete nature of the political and of political analysis so central to poststructuralism (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 15). As Jim George writes, “It is postmodern resistance in the sense that while it is directly (and sometimes violently) engaged with modernity, it seeks to go beyond the repressive, closed aspects of modernist global existence. It is, therefore, not a resistance of traditional grand-scale emancipation or conventional radicalism imbued with authority of one or another sovereign presence. Rather, in opposing the large-scale brutality and inequity in human society, it is a resistance active also at the everyday, community, neighbourhood, and interpersonal levels, where it confronts

those processes that systematically exclude people from making decisions about who they are and what they can be ” (George, 1994: 215, emphasis in original). In this light, poststructural practices are used critically to investigate how the subject of international

relations is constituted in and through the discourses and texts of global politics. Treating theory as discourse opens up the possibility of historicizing it. It is a myth that theory can be abstracted from its socio-historical context, from reality, so to speak, as neorealists and neoclassical realists believe. It is a political practice which needs to be

--31--


contextualized and stripped of its purportedly neutral status. It must be understood with respect to its role in preserving and reproducing the structures and power relations present in all language forms. Dominant theories are, in this view, dominant discourses that

shape our view of the world (the “subject”) and our ways of understanding it.

A2: Security Good1. Realism creates a death drive – it is a philosophy that must be rejected – turns case. Der Derian,

In epistemic realism, the search for security through sovereignty is not a political choice but the necessary reaction to an anarchical condition: Order is man-made and good; chaos is natural and evil. Out of self-interest, men must pursue this good and constrain the evil of excessive will through an alienation of individual powers to a superior, indeed supreme, collective power. In short, the security of epistemic realism is ontological, theological and teleological:

that is, metaphysical. We shall see, from Marx's and Nietzsche's critiques, the extent to which Hobbesian security and epistemic realism rely on social constructions posing as

apodictic truths for their power effects. There is not and never was a "state of nature" or a purely "self-interested man"; there is, however, clearly an abiding fear of violent and premature death that compels men to seek the security found in solidarity. [James Der Derian. “On Security.”

Ciaonet.]

2. Realism allows the state to exert biopolitical control over it’s citizens – the state tells us that we are violent and we become violent in turn. Bleiker,

Human agency is not something that exists in an a priori manner and can be measured scientifically in

reference to external realities. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as human agency, for its nature and its function are, at least in part, determined by how we think about

human action and its potential to shape political and social practices. The mutually constituted and constantly shilling relationship between agents and discourses thus undermines the possibility of observing social dynamics in a value-free way. To embark on such an endeavour nevertheless is to superimpose a static image upon a series of events that can only be understood in their fluidity. It is to objectivise a very particular and necessarily subjective understanding of agency and its corresponding political practices. The dangers of such an approach have been debated extensively. Authors such as Richard Ashley, Jim George and Steve Smith have shown how positivist

epistemologies have transformed one specific interpretation of world political realities, the dominant realist one, into reality per se ." Realist perceptions of the international have'. gradually become accepted as common sense. to the point that any critique against them has to be evaluated in terms of an already existing and obiectivised world-view. There are powerful mechanisms of control precisely in this ability to determine meaning and rationality . 'Defining common sense', Smith thus argues, is 'the ultimate act of political power'." It separates the possible from the impossible and directs the theory and practice of international relations on a particular path. [Roland Bleiker. “Human Agency and Global Politics.” Online.]

--32--


3. Realism is not inevitable – only the aff’s framing allows the mindset of realism and security to be inevitable, which means they just link even more into the critique.

--33--


A2: Extinction First

1. Extend Nietzsche 3 from the critique - this obsession with avoiding suffering makes death, suffering, and extinction desirable by forcing humanity to remain stuck in its state of imperfection, avoidance, and reactivity. We must engage suffering and allow it to unveil the value to life.

2. Everything ends – nobody is immoral – the affirmative’s resentment of insecurity drives them to attempt to order a safer world. Der Derian,

In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over

the restoration of a sense of security?" 37 The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self , the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and

is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished

the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. 38 A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined , the unknown becomes identified as evil , and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses

a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." 39 The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good," and other common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses;

he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god." 40 For Nietzsche, of course,

only a false sense of security can come from false gods: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of

error : in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes." 41

--34--


Ks Good TheoryA. Interpretation: debaters ought to be able to run critiques of the affirmative’s ethical endorsements, such as their desire for Security.

B. Violation: the links of my critique specifically attack my opponent’s ethical endorsement, not their in round behavior, which means, I meet.

C. Standards:

First is Education:

(_) Critical Education: critiques encourage in depth discussion about thought that debaters do not normally encounter, such as Nietzsche. While normal rounds hear stock arguments coupled with stock enlightenment philosophies, critiques allow us to engage in a different side of the philosophical literature, one which critiques the generic debate philosophies, such as util or deontology. My Nietzsche critique is especially key and outweighs all aff education turns because it challenges the way we normally view the world, i.e., a world that is plagued by security.

Critical education outweighs topical education because there are many debates per tournament where we can learn about the topic. This debate about our framing of the real world is unique and is therefore more valuable to education. Moreover, the critical education precludes topic education because it frames how we understand the implications of the topic on the real world. Also, there are explicit reasons as to why normal, stock, topical rounds, are not as education as the critique in the extended standard itself.

Critical education holds the internal link to real world education because criticism determines how debaters frame the real world. The critique itself attacks the real world itself by explaining how the mindset of security that exists in the real world is nihilistic. Moreover, critical education outweighs real world education because such education, unlike real world education, is possible in other rounds. While util is run in most LD rounds, this K is not, which makes it uniquely important.

(_) Advocacy Engagement: critiques allow us to engage in our advocacies in a manner which is unique when compared to other debate rounds. In academics, one must not only be prepared for normal, “stock” responses and criticisms to their positions, but also critical responses, namely, one’s that attack the framing of the argument itself. The Nietzsche K specifically

--35--


outweighs turns because it forces debaters to completely re-think how their own advocacy engages in the real world as well as their own lives.

(_) Real World Education: when a Kritik is won, it generates a lot of hype and attention and spreads the critical thought beyond the mere confines of the round. Critiques help frame the way in which we view the world and can restructure the thought processes of those around us. This is more important that the imaginary arguments that we construct about how the world ought to be because critiques actively change the way the real world functions by changing the beliefs systems of those who live in it.

I outweigh on real world education because (a) I am changing the way people think about the real world; while the aff puts together some policy action or normative ideal, I am proactively changing the way we think in the round, and in the real world. This is especially true with Nietzsche because the critiques is an attempt to change normativity and our drive for security in the world; and (b) since the aff arguments are never actually going to happen, but my impacts will happen. The critique isn’t some imaginary fiat, it is a discussion of ethics and the meaning to life. Also, extend from the framework of the critique that they appeal to a meaning to life, which must exist in the real world, and I am providing a way to achieve that meaning.

Second is Fairness:

(_) Philosophy Ground: without allowing me to run a critique the aff is completely destroying my philosophy ground as I am restricted to plain normative thought – the same types of philosophical arguments that are run in most LD rounds. This is unfair as it arbitrarily limits the amount of ground I have. The Nietzsche ground is specifically key to fairness since Nietzsche revolutionized the way we think about life, and how we formulate ethical theories. Philosophy ground is the most important type of ground since it determines which other types of impacts, i.e., ground actually matters in the round. Moreover, its more important than other standards because philosophy is something that is unique to LD. Only in LD can we interact normative ethics with Nietzsche on a framework level – nothing is the same, which means that I outweigh on fairness as well as philosophical education because it increases our breadth of philosophical knowledge.

Philosophy ground outweighs time skew in terms of fairness because the amount of time we have to speak does not matter if we can’t use it effectively. They will say that we need equal

--36--


time to be fair, but that time won’t matter if the neg functionally moots key philosophical ground, like Nietzsche. Philosophy ground outweighs predictability because there is no real abuse with predictability, my critique is on the wiki and Nietzsche can be run on any topic.

(_) Clash: critiques proliferate normative clash because they question the very values behind the ethics of the aff case, while also challenging the merits and implications of the aff framework itself. Clash is key to fairness because it makes arguments easier to judge. Judge intervention kills fairness because the debate might as well be a flip of the coin if there is intervention.

D. Extend their voters for fairness and education. A2: Ks Bad Theory

A2: Time Skew

A2: Reciprocal Burdens

A2: Predictable

A2: Research Burden

A2: Topic Education

A2: Fiat Abuse

--37--


A2: Nelson1. Nelson explains that truth testing gives debaters infinite ground, which is unfair. This does not link into my advocacy because...

2. My advocacy outweighs on education because I am inspiring the critical thought necessary to determine true value and knowledge in life.

3. Nelson’s paradigm is infinitely regressive.

4. Nelson’s impact comparison is comprehensible under their offense-defense paradigm.

--38--

Documents

Nietzsche K