NGOs' role in limiting national sovereignty over environmental resources of global significance: the 1990 campaign against the Southern Okavango Integrated Water Development Project

Journal of International Development

J. Int. Dev. 15, 215–229 (2003)

Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/jid.987

NGOs’ ROLE IN LIMITING NATIONALSOVEREIGNTY OVER ENVIRONMENTALRESOURCES OF GLOBAL SIGNIFICANCE:

THE 1990 CAMPAIGN AGAINST THESOUTHERN OKAVANGO INTEGRATED

WATER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

ALAN THOMAS*

Centre for Development Studies, University of Wales Swansea, Swansea, UK

Abstract: This paper analyses the NGO campaign against the proposed development of the

Okavango Delta in 1990, and the subsequent policy change by the Botswana government.

Four explanatory factors are explored: the democratic attributes of the domestic political

context; the internationalisation of the issue; the complementary role of different NGOs; and

the relative lack of impact on major economic stakeholders. The limitations of the campaign

are noted in relation to more recent developments.

We conclude that confrontation and collaboration can complement each other. Framing

environmental issues as international, mobilising communities and facilitating participation,

and providing independent technical expertise, are all important NGO activities. However,

whereas in 1990 these were carried out in opposition to government, nowadays they are likely to

be undertaken in a co-operative framework of international agreements. NGOs may thereby gain

more political space, but be in danger of co-option. Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

1 INTRODUCTION

This paper analyses a campaign in Botswana in 1990 against a large proposed water

engineering project in an ecologically unique wetland. Unusually, the campaign involved

confrontation between local and international NGOs and the Botswana government which

was apparently successful, at least from the NGOs’ point of view. The project was halted

despite having been part of national development policy.

Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

*Correspondence to: A. Thomas, Centre for Development Studies, School of Social Sciences and InternationalDevelopment, University of Wales Swansea, Singleton Park, Swansea SA2 8PP, UK.E-mail: [email protected]

The Southern Okavango Integrated Water Development Project (SOIWDP) would have

involved the dredging of one of the main waterways of the Okavango Delta in north-

western Botswana. The delta is fed by the water of the Okavango River, which rises in

Angola and also runs through Namibia before spreading out over some 16,000 km2 in the

otherwise arid Kalahari. Its swamp, water channels and hundreds of islands form habitats

for a variety of birds and animals, so that the Okavango Delta is world famous for its

wildlife. It also provides livelihoods for over 100,000 people of a variety of ethnic groups.

The Okavango Delta is typical of many environmental resources of global significance

in that three competing types of proprietorial claim can be identified (Humphreys, 1996).

Different stakeholders may assert that it is a local common belonging to local peoples, a

national resource to be used for national development, or part of the global heritage of

mankind, i.e. a global common. The water of the Okavango is also an international

environmental resource which could be claimed as a local common or a national resource,

but here the third claim would be in terms of a shared resource between the three countries

of the river basin, the water itself being of regional rather than global importance. Until

recently at least, internationally accepted systems of governance have prioritized the

principle of sovereignty of states over resources within their boundaries, so that the second

claim has tended to take precedence over the first and third. The case is used to analyse the

circumstances where sovereignty may be limited by actions of local and international

NGOs promoting the first and third claims.

The Australian Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation (SMEC) began a feasibility

study for the SOIWDP in 1985. Dredging would increase water flow to a system of

reservoirs, dams, control structures and pipelines, providing water for commercial

irrigation, village-based flood recession agriculture, livestock, domestic use for the

town of Maun and surrounding areas, and the diamond mine at Orapa, with emphasis

on agricultural production (SMEC, 1987a, p. ix). SMEC then reviewed the options, giving

priority to supplying water for Orapa and Maun (SMEC, 1988). The project gained cabinet

approval in late 1988, but local people only realised it was agreed when earth-moving

equipment arrived in Maun towards the end of 1990.

Local environmentalists and others campaigned against the project, mobilizing local

communities and forming an action group which later became the Tshomorelo Okavango

Conservation Trust (TOCT). International NGOs also became involved in different ways,

notably Greenpeace and IUCN. The Botswana government eventually halted work on the

project in 1991. At the time it reserved the right to develop the water resources of the

Okavango in the future as part of the modernization of the country, although since then it

has modified its stance in response to the threat by Namibia to divert water from the

Okavango upstream of the Delta.

2 UNCERTAINTYAND DIFFERING EXPERT OPINIONS

Disputes about large-scale water engineering projects in arid regions relate to environ-

mental issues in two main ways. First, water is a basic natural resource in short supply, so

that there are always competing demands and alternative proposals for water utilisation.

Second, land degradation could be hastened or reversed depending on how water resources

are managed. In some cases, such as the Narmada projects in India and the Ilisu dam in

Turkey, a third issue relates to the displacement of people and their need for resettlement.

However, this was not of major importance with the SOIWDP.

216 A. Thomas

Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Int. Dev. 15, 215–229 (2003)

In respect of the first issue, in this case, the potential use of water resources for national

economic development conflicted with its use locally to support indigenous livelihood

strategies and community-based forms of development that may have been easier to

reconcile with protecting endangered species and biodiversity. Although this particular

conflict was avoided when the SOIWDP was dropped, competition for limited water

resources remains an ever-intensifying problem for the arid regions of south west Africa,

and in the case of the exploitation of the water of the Okavango has more recently become

the source of a potential international dispute between Namibia and Botswana.

Both proponents and opponents of the SOIWDP cited the avoidance of land degradation

as one of their objectives. Proponents argued that careful water management, including

deep reservoirs, could reduce the very high evapo-transpiration rates in the Okavango,

enabling water to be used for irrigation, domestic purposes and mining without disturbing

the delta ecosystem (Porter, 1989, p. 6). Opponents argued that water would be removed

more quickly from the delta so that part of the floodplain would dry out and become

degraded, that previous large-scale irrigated development projects had failed, and that the

SOIWDP could have a negative impact on areas to the south of the delta proper if it

encouraged over-intensive cattle or agricultural production. They favoured a combination

of smaller, less intrusive measures.

An environmental impact assessment (EIA) was prepared by SMEC at the same time as

their feasibility study (SMEC, 1987b). The EIA estimated that about 70 km2 of floodplain

would be dried out and probably become virtually sterile, with negative consequences on

animal and bird wildlife including the endangered wattled crane, much reducing the

wilderness value of one of the main tourist boat routes into the delta, and damaging

fisheries important for local communities. However the direct and indirect impacts would

be limited to less than 1 per cent of the delta. The anticipated economic gains were

regarded as outweighing the relatively small environmental costs.

However, in a government-sponsored review of the environmental impact studies

Skinner (1989) suggested that up to 3.5 per cent of the delta could be affected altogether.

Furthermore, demand for water might not be satisfied by the project, creating pressure to

continue the river ‘improvements’ into the heart of the delta.

Cost–benefit analysis relies on accurate estimation of all the impacts of a proposed

project. However, critics of the SOIWDP claimed that both the benefits and costs were

marked by extreme uncertainty. They argued that the entire Northern Wildlife Area, of

which the delta is only part, should be considered holistically (Williamson, 1994, p. 12),

and that the damage to the integrity of what is a unique ecosystem was essentially

unknowable in advance. It was also uncertain that the project would actually deliver extra

water. Dredging could break up the hard river bed, causing siltation and loss of water by

seepage into the Kalahari sands. In addition, the hydrology of the whole delta is poorly

understood. Its overall gradient is very low at only 1:3300, and the hundreds of

interconnecting channels form ‘an extremely complex system of flow that is subject to

changes in route and even direction’ (Greenpeace, 1991, p. 1). Clift-Hill (1991) challenged

the assumptions in the consultants’ model and the calculations of water availability with

and without the scheme. Peter Smith (1989), an ecologist with the Department of Water

Affairs, argued in a critical internal memorandum that it was within the model’s

boundaries of error of that there would be no increased flow at all.

This case illustrates opposing views of the appropriate response to uncertainty, epitomised

by an exchange between Smith and SMEC’s hydrological consultant, J. W. Porter. Porter

argued for a scientific approach, to reach the most accurate conclusion with available data:

NGOs’ Role in Limiting National Sovereignty 217


It is usual practice in science and technology, if we are either unable to understand or

unable to define the complexity of a system, to make assumptions, postulate the-

ories, and simplify the system. One could almost say this is the basis of science, pro-

vided it makes use of the data available. For indeed, some degree of simplification is

always necessary.

(Porter, 1990, p. 6)

Smith, on the other hand, argued that nothing should be done before an independent

reassessment of the project. This is in line with the precautionary principle under which

‘potentially harmful activities [should] be undertaken only if it can be demonstrated that

there will be no environmental damage’ (Kamminga, 1995, p. 127), and, one might add,

only if it can be demonstrated that the potential benefits will be realized.

3 THE STORY OF THE CAMPAIGN AND THE ROLE OF NGOS

A blow-by-blow account of the campaign and a more detailed summary are given

elsewhere (Thomas and Selolwane, 1998, 2001). Here we outline the story of how

NGOs related to the SOIWDP in three phases.

3.1 Consultations

First, there were low-key local and national consultations, conducted in parallel with the

technical processes of design, costing and tendering which brought the SOIWDP from

cabinet approval in late 1988 to the point of implementation in late 1990. The main

national NGO consulted was the Kalahari Conservation Society (KCS), the longest-

established environmental NGO in Botswana and the only large national conservation

organization.

Radical conservationists questioned the ‘independence and impartiality’ of KCS,

suggesting that it was both too close both to De Beers [the South African diamonds

giant] and effectively controlled by the Botswana government (Williamson, 1994, p. 24).

Indeed, KCS’ chair since its inception in the 1970s had been the head of Debswana, the

joint venture between the Botswana government and De Beers which runs the Orapa

diamond mine. On the other hand, KCS had been criticised in government circles for its

white expatriate leadership and conservationist interests that may conflict with Botswana’s

development objectives.

KCS certainly promoted conservationist ideals. Earlier it had successfully lobbied for

anti-poaching legislation. Throughout the late 1980s KCS expressed concern over the

proposed dredging in letters and meetings with government. Its Chief Executive Officer

was on the government’s Water Development Committee, providing another route for

KCS to state its views. Like Smith and Clift-Hill, KCS had doubts about the hydrological

viability of the SOIWDP. It suggested possible alternatives such as a pipeline or canal

from the delta. However, ‘KCS has decided not to adopt the more radical stance of external

pressure groups such as Greenpeace since it would quickly lose credibility with Govern-

ment and be much less effective.’ (KCS, 1991, p. 4). KCS had been reassured by the EIA

and received further assurances at a meeting with the Department of Water Affairs in May

1990 that there would be no additional incursions into the delta (KCS, 1991, p. 6).

218 A. Thomas


Meanwhile, the Department of Water Affairs undertook local consultations through a

series of small kgotla meetings in communities likely to be affected such as Maun. The

kgotla is traditionally the local chief’s court and the chief may call a meeting to discuss

matters of importance. However most kgotla meetings are now used for officials to explain

government policies, and dissenting voices are rarely heard. Nonetheless, in the series of

kgotla meetings on the SOIWDP some general, though muted, dissatisfaction was

expressed. The term ‘river improvement’ was used, giving the impression of limited

works such as weed clearing. ‘Dredging’ was not mentioned, so that local people did not

expect a large-scale project.

3.2 Local Action and the Suspension of the Project

When the earth-moving equipment arrived in Maun, white residents reacted quickly,

including members of the Maun branch of KCS. However, KCS nationally was reported as

having stopped lobbying, possibly as a result of government pressure to ‘keep its nose out

of the issue’ (Johannesburg Sunday Times, December 2, 1990). Within a few months most

of the Maun members split from KCS.

Two public meetings were held in Maun in November and December 1990, where

concerns were expressed equally by the local Batawana and the white conservationists.

There was a fear that the whole delta could be destroyed. At the second meeting it was

noted that De Beers was no longer involved, hence water was not required for ‘national

development’ but would only be for Maun, Hence, as ‘the meeting here is totally against

dredging’ the government should delay the project pending an independent investigation.

Here is one contribution from the floor:

‘I speak as a tribesman. You know we had a dredging scheme that failed. . . . I saw

the terrible effects. . . .Dredging is destructive to the environment, and there is still

no guarantee that you can drink the water. . . . It is like saying you killed a snake by

hitting it on the tail. Government can get water in some other way. . . .Dredging is

the last thing. Dredging is something we don’t want’

(Questions asked at a Public Meeting held at the Duck Inn

on Wednesday 12th December 1990, mimeo)

Twin campaign strategies were adopted of international networking and local mobiliza-

tion. Maun residents alerted environmental NGOs in South Africa, USA, UK and

elsewhere. Greenpeace wrote expressing concern both to De Beers and to the Botswana

Government. The latter invited Greenpeace to ‘come and find out’.

The South African press played a considerable role, suggesting that Maun residents

planned to sabotage construction and that Greenpeace International was ‘considering

launching an international campaign called ‘Diamonds are for Death’ to save the swamps’,

and quoting the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) of London as fully supporting

the protest (Johannesburg Sunday Times, December 2, 1990; Saturday Star, December 8,

1990; Sun, December 11, 1990).

It was recognized that the local campaign had to demonstrate clearly that opposition

was widespread and not confined to a minority with interests in conservation and tourism.

An informal Batawana steering committee was formed to contact the authorities on behalf

of the Maun community. They were granted a kgotla meeting in January 1991. Local



businessmen lent trucks to transport people, and over 100 attended. Most were traditional

leaders and representatives of communities in and around the delta. The Minister of

Mineral Resources and Water Affairs was questioned for six hours by at least 20 speakers

all opposing the project, including the local MP from the ruling party. At least one

appealed to the idea of democracy:

The huge turnout of locals gave the lie to suggestions by proponents of the scheme

that opposition to it was being organised purely by a band of expatriate whites for

their own ends. . . .Accusing the government of arrogance, . . . ex-game ranger John

Ben said Botswana was a democratic country and Minister Mogwe must understand

that ‘the Kgotla rules—he must come and speak to us here, and answer us here’.

(Johannesburg Saturday Star, January 12, 1991)

Immediately after the meeting the Minister announced that the SOIWDP was suspended

‘pending further consultation’, while restating that ‘Government remains satisfied that this

project offers the best long-term solution to the [local] water shortage’.

3.3 International NGOs and the Termination of the Project

In response to the government invitation, Greenpeace sent a three-person study team from

29 January to 12 February 1991. After two days with ministries in Gaborone they flew to

Maun to meet what by now was the Tshomorelo Okavango Conservation Trust (TOCT)

with a membership of white Maun conservationists and local Batawana leaders. TOCT

had arranged meetings with local tribespeople and visits to sites in and around the delta.

On the last day of the visit a joint press communique was issued by the Botswana

government and Greenpeace International. It stated that Greenpeace had ‘appealed to the

government of Botswana to establish the Okavango Delta Ecosystem as a World Heritage

Site’ and to sign the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance and that

the Botswana government was considering this. The communique stated that the SOIWDP

was suspended and that:

The Botswana government . . . does have to keep the dredging option open, if in the

end it is the only option through which Government can meet its obligation to pro-

vide water.

(Joint Communique issued by Botswana Government and Greenpeace

International on the SOIWDP, February 12, 1991).

Greenpeace’s report on the visit (Greenpeace, 1991) was circulated widely to interna-

tional NGOs and the press. The Botswana government, meanwhile, had commissioned an

independent review by the World Conservation Union (IUCN). An international team of

hydrologists, biologists, engineers and social scientists led by Ted Scudder, an anthro-

pologist from CalTech, began work in October 1991 and presented its report in May 1992

(IUCN, 1992). They unanimously recommended termination, putting forward a ‘preferred

alternative’ which would use groundwater, surface water and a water treatment plant to

meet the objectives of the SOIWDP more sustainably and at lower cost. There were

recommendations for using water-related natural resources to improve the household

220 A. Thomas


economy of the riverine communities, and integrating the village sector into the devel-

opment of Maun and the tourism industry.

On the same day the IUCN released their report (21 May 1992), the government

announced that the SOIWDP was ‘terminated’. Scudder has criticised the Botswana

government for failing to respond to the IUCN report and not even appraising his team’s

‘preferred alternative’ (Scudder, 1994).

Thus there were two clear and apparently forced policy changes on the part of the

Botswana government and its Department of Water Affairs: first, to halt work while an

independent study was commissioned; second, to ‘terminate’ the project.

4 ANALYSING THE POLICY CHANGE

How can we explain these policy changes? One factor peculiar to Botswana is not

considered here, namely the special role of the expatriate community. Instead we

concentrate on four more general explanations, relating to the democratic attributes of

the domestic political context, the internationalisation of the issue, the complementary

role of different NGOs, and the relative lack of impact on major economic stakeholders.

4.1 The Domestic Political Context

Botswana clearly espouses multi-party democratic ideals. However, it is too simple to

argue that Botswana is, unusually for Africa, a successful democracy, and this was why

NGOs were able to force policy change. Following Potter (1996) we consider four

dimensions of democracy: accountability through multi-party elections, diversity of power

centres, civil and political rights, and political participation. In these terms, Botswana is

not a model democracy, though it does ‘score’ well particularly on the first two

dimensions.

Elections have generally been ‘free and fair’, although the Botswana Democratic Party

(BDP) has won every election since independence and in practice Botswana is a ‘de facto

one party state through the ballot box’ (Tsie, 1993, p. 36). The electoral process had some

relevance to the campaign. Batawana leaders opposed to the SOIWDP included an ex-

Independent MP as well as the local BDP MP and other BDP members. There were reports

of a possible electoral alliance between opposition parties that might include environ-

mental issues in its platform (Johannesburg Weekly Mail, January 11–17, 1991). The

government is generally sensitive to any issue that could become a focus of opposition

during an election campaign. However, the campaigners played down any question of

electoral opposition and emphasised instead the unity of the local community against the

project.

Botswana also exhibits some decentralization of democratic institutions. Local coun-

cils, an independent judiciary and traditional structures all contribute to an internal

plurality of power. Local institutions were very important to the success of the campaign,

particularly the Maun Council and traditional authorities such as the Chief of the

Batawana. The kgotla, usually a vehicle for one-way communication from government

to communities, was used to generate and demonstrate local opposition.

With respect to civil and political rights, Botswana is in principle open and politically

‘free’. However, up to 1989 at least it was claimed that ‘formal and informal censorship



pressures remain strong’ (Zaffiro, 1989, p. 67). This particular campaign was not openly

suppressed, though there was little press coverage in Botswana compared to South Africa,

and there were hints of government pressure on KCS and veiled threats against expatriate

campaigners.

Finally, there is little political participation at national level, partly because the peaceful

transition to independence meant democratic institutions were all ‘handed down’ from the

colonial administration. Traditional local institutions such as the kgotla are of decreasing

importance. The high degree of popular participation during this campaign was unusual.

The policy change occurred not because of any participative political culture, but rather

despite the closed nature of the policy process.

Apart from its reputation for democracy, Botswana is also unusual in Africa in the

strength and autonomy of the state. Its government is run by a politico-administrative elite

under a policy-making system described as ‘paternalistic developmentalism’ (Charlton,

1991, p. 276). Unlike many African states which lack capacity and reach, Botswana

exhibits features which Leftwich (1994) argues are characteristic of strong, developmen-

talist states, whether democratic or authoritarian: inter-penetration of political and

administrative elites; relative autonomy of these elites from special interests and hence

their ability to act in the ‘national interest’; a weak civil society dominated by the state;

and a successfully managed economy.

The Botswana economy is strong enough for the government to deal with international

agencies and the donor community on its own terms, so that they do not represent such an

important alternative source of power in Botswana compared to other African countries.

However, foreign investors and companies, particularly those from South Africa, are

powerful actors within their own industrial sectors.

The strength and legitimacy of the Botswana state also allows it to dominate areas such

as rural development and education whereas in other African countries there is space for

NGO activity. There is a tendency for the government to co-opt independent initiatives.

Doubts over the independence of KCS are typical of the position of many NGOs.

The government often claimed that the climb-down over the Okavango was proof of its

democratic credentials. Certain attributes of democracy did indeed contribute to the

success of the campaign, notably the presence of alternative power centres, particularly at

the local level. This is how the President responded to a question about water shortage in

Maun in 1994:

‘I suppose this is where democracy conflicts with development. We could have built

a dam here a couple of years ago and there would be water galore but mainly because

those who have interests in the tourism industry, they thought it was going to spoil

the environment or bring in lots of people here to whet the appetite of government to

build even more dams. So there was Green Peace, there was the local people, they

incited the local tourist operators, they incited the people in the Kgotla and they all

refused. So in a democratic set up, people must make their beds and lie on it.’

(His Excellency Dr. Quett Masire, President of Botswana, interviewed in

the Okavango Observer, 12–18 July 1994).

Conversely, the strength of the developmentalist state allowed the government to make a

tactical withdrawal in order to keep control over the policy agenda and keep open the

future option of developing the waters of the Okavango, while not ceding too much power

to the local or international interests represented by NGOs.

222 A. Thomas


One opponent of the SOIWDP gave the government credit for backing down. Peter

Smith commented: ‘You wouldn’t find any other African government doing this.’1

4.2 Internationalization of the Issue

Another interpretation is that the internationalisation of the issue forced the government to

change policy. Eccleston suggests that collaboration with Northern NGOs can ‘widen the

political space within which [Southern NGOs] campaign’, although a concomitant danger

is that government may perceive international collaboration as a threat, thus curtailing

domestic political space even further (Eccleston, 1996, p. 67).

Northern-based international NGOs have assumed increasing importance in Africa.

However, Botswana’s record of economic growth has protected the government from

pressure to allow them open access. International NGOs have tended to work through

government agencies rather than independently or in partnership with indigenous NGOs.

Nonetheless, local branches of international NGOs do operate in Botswana, including

PACT, ACORD, SNV Netherlands and Conservation International.

The involvement of international NGOs appears to have aided this campaign. Interna-

tional NGOs claimed legitimate interest by framing the Okavango as an international,

rather than just local or national, issue. The role of South African environmentalists in

placing stories in the South African press cannot be discounted. Greenpeace and IUCN

brought scientific and organizational resources to bear which were beyond the capacity of

TOCT. The involvement of South African activists and Greenpeace presented the

government with an external threat, real or perceived. To some extent the Botswana

government also helped promote the broader view of the SOIWDP as an international

issue by commissioning the IUCN to undertake the independent assessment.

The involvement of other international actors may also have been important, not only

De Beers, whose decision to withdraw support from the SOIWDP may have been made

with its international reputation and interests in mind, but also others such as SMEC and

potential financial backers. These might have been targets for lobbying if a full-scale

international campaign had materialised.

4.3 The Complementary Role of Different NGOs

The campaign involved local, national and international NGOs. It was relatively unusual

in Botswana where conservation concerns are still sometimes dismissed as a ‘white man’s

problem’. Although NGOs may be formally consulted on environmental policy, they do

not have a strong input. However, in a few cases NGOs have been able to prevent the

implementation of certain policies. For example, in the case of the ‘Ghansi farms’, in

1991, ministers proposed to develop a group of commercial farms but an NGO campaign

forced them to back down in favour of a project for utilization of local ‘veld products’ and

local management by Basarwa people.

In the SOIWDP campaign NGOs of different types undertook different kinds of

activities. The individuals who formed TOCT worked by mobilizing the local population

and were not afraid of confrontation. KCS, by contrast, aimed at maintaining a long-term

1Interview with author, 16 December 1994.



collaborative relationship with government and avoiding public confrontation. It was able

to lobby behind the scenes and to obtain technical information. Its links with industry may

have had some bearing on Debswana’s withdrawal of support from the SOIWDP.

The roles of international NGOs involved in the campaign were different again. The

most openly confrontational were South African activists including members of the

Okavango Wild Life Society. Greenpeace brought a reputation more than anything.

Mentioning its name provided a credible threat even though Greenpeace did not campaign

beyond reporting on its visit. IUCN derived legitimacy from the scientific research

capacity and independence of its study team.

The NGOs therefore performed different roles which together complemented each other

effectively. They were not, however, deliberately co-ordinated, although TOCT did assist

Greenpeace during its visit. TOCT was formed through disagreement with KCS, and they

did not work together. IUCN’s involvement was quite separate. NGO relationships were

ad hoc, what Eccleston would call a coalition on a ‘single event joint campaign . . . among

fairly diverse NGOs [with] division of labour [and] limited life’ rather than a permanent

network (Eccleston, 1996, p. 74).

4.4 The Lack of Impact on Major Economic Stakeholders

The campaigners, particularly those outside the country, tried to emphasize links between

the SOIWDP and economic sectors of central importance to Botswana and its ruling elite,

notably the diamonds and beef industries. Both these sectors involved international actors

on whom leverage could be exerted.

However, it is arguable that it was the relative lack of importance of the SOIWDP to the

major economic stakeholders within Botswana that allowed the government to drop the

project. South African environmentalists and others had depicted Botswana’s ‘beef

barons’ as determined to take over the country for cattle ranching, including an area

immediately to the north-east of the Okavango Delta. However, there was apparently no

immediate plan to bring cattle into the delta itself, so no need for the beef lobby to back the

SOIWDP.

Equally, it was not that De Beers was put off by threats, but rather that the Orapa mine

had no immediate need for additional water, especially with the downturn in the diamonds

industry. There was no point in De Beers risking its reputation with international

environmentalists by backing the scheme.

5 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE NGO CAMPAIGN: LOOSE ENDSAND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS

The NGOs were successful in their immediate objective of stopping the dredging.

However, there were several limitations to their campaign which left loose ends and

uncertainties for the future. For example, they could not persuade the government to adopt

the IUCN team’s alternative proposals for local development, or, at the time, to join the

Ramsar Convention. It looked as though their success in defining the issue as an

international one might be only temporary.

More recently, however, the future of the Okavango Delta has become an international

issue in other ways. In 1994 Botswana, Namibia and Angola set up the Permanent

224 A. Thomas


Okavango River Basin Commission (OKACOM) with a declared political agreement to

work towards joint management of the whole river basin. Namibia, which is even more

arid than Botswana, already had long-term plans to divert water from the Okavango

upstream of the delta, to connect to its Eastern National Water Carrier and supply its

Central Area, where the great majority of the country’s economic activity is located. After

a series of years of below average rainfall a disastrous water shortage crisis was foreseen

and in 1996 Namibia announced its intention to extract water from the Okavango as

quickly as possible, an emergency measure. In 1997, Botswana became a contracting party

of the Ramsar Convention after all, and the Okavango Delta became the core of the world’s

largest protected Wetland of International Importance, in a move interpreted as an attempt

to counteract Namibia’s plans (Ramberg, 1997, p. 129). Thus the claim that the Okavango

should be regarded as a global common has shifted from being an NGO strategy in

opposition to the Botswana government’s claim of sovereignty over natural resources

within its state boundaries to being part of the government’s own strategy for protecting

the same resources from sovereignty claims by another state. Given the crucial economic

importance of water to the economy of the Central Area of Namibia, there are likely to be

continuing threats to the Okavango which will be difficult to counter even with appeals to

international obligations.

The NGOs also lacked continuing capacity. In different ways, they all responded to

what they saw as a crisis by a big short-term effort. Of the international NGOs involved,

Greenpeace had never prioritized Southern Africa, hence its capacity for long-term

campaigning was extremely limited. IUCN was contracted to undertake a study and its

international team of scientists could not be expected to pursue the issue once their report

was completed, although Ted Scudder did so personally to some extent (see e.g. Scudder,

1994). Locally, the individuals who formed TOCT invested a lot of time over a short

period to mobilize the communities and to communicate to the media and international

NGOs. This voluntary effort could not be maintained over a protracted period, and TOCT

had little organizational capacity. After the SOIWDP was shelved, TOCT switched to

public education in conservation issues, but by 1994 the safari operators and local people

in TOCT had split over the government’s land use plan. The only NGO involved which had

long term capacity was KCS, which continues to take up similar issues. For example, it led

a successful lobbying campaign in 2000 to alter the government’s tsetse control strategy,

reducing the likely danger to wildlife in areas like the Okavango (Panafrican News

Agency, 2000).

Another weakness was that the NGOs did not represent clearly united interests. One

contention is that the anti-SOIWDP campaign was led by expatriates in Maun with interest

specifically in wildlife conservation and connections to safari companies. In this view the

local NGOs such as TOCT were not truly representative of local opinion and Greenpeace

took up the issue without fully understanding the local situation. This possible lack of

‘representativeness’ and of full political accountability might have meant that in the longer

term the Botswana government would feel free to ignore these NGOs. While there may

have been a temporary coincidence of objectives between the white conservationists and

the members of the local communities in TOCT, there was no underlying unity of interests.

Hence a concerted long term campaign could not be expected.

However, although TOCT was not itself sustainable as an organization, it has proved

possible to mobilize again, under different banners, in response to similar issues. The

Okavango Conservation Trust is now one of almost 50 local community based organiza-

tions registered as trusts, or in the process of doing so, in order to take on legal



responsibility for managing wildlife and other natural resources, in partnership with

government agencies such as the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (Rozemeijer

and van der Jagt, 2000).

At a regional level, the Okavango Liaison Group (OLG) was formed in 1996 as an NGO

coalition to work for the sustainable development of the Okavango River and Delta. Its

membership comprises a number of conservation, tourism and research organizations from

both Botswana and Namibia, including KCS (OLG, 1998). It was used in 1997 and 1998 to

mobilize local community opposition in the Delta to the Namibian pipeline proposal and to

publicise this local opposition internationally (Ramsar Forum, 1997; The Namibian,

October 4, 1999), while two of its member organizations undertook a technical study on

alternative ways of sourcing water for Namibia (Rothert, 1999a; 1999b). OLG has also been

working with OKACOM to facilitate public participation in the process of developing and

implementing a basinwide management plan for the Okavango (OLG, 1998).

6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Elsewhere we argued that this case demonstrates that NGOs can make confrontational

tactics can work, at least in the short term or in response to occasional crises, in a multi-

party democracy like Botswana where there is an internal plurality of power centres.

Multi-partyism is meaningful as a source of accountability in Botswana, and the

government is sensitive to the need to maintain its democratic credentials. The rul-

ing party is also careful to avoid allowing issues to develop for opponents to use to

political advantage. Both local councils and the kgotla system provide alternative

power centres. If there is clear local dissent from a government position then it

may give way in order to maintain control over the long-term political agenda.

(Thomas and Selolwane, 2001)

However, the SOIWDP case also lends support to NGOs collaborating with government

in certain ways, even where the participative political culture is relatively weak, as in

Botswana. Success was not just because of confrontational tactics, but resulted from

different NGOs undertaking complementary roles. Although the ‘insider’ methods of KCS

seemed to have very little effect in the SOIWDP case, there is clearly potential for behind-

the-scenes influence. KCS continues to figure in more recent controversies, like that on

tsetse control.

There is also potential for NGO influence through complementing government

expertise. There are two particular ways in which NGOs can assist, namely through

facilitating participation and capacity building in communities, and by undertaking

independent analysis of policy options and alternatives.

Defining the issue as international was key to NGO success in the SOIWDP case, but

this is a two-edged sword both for NGOs and for governments (Turton, 1999). For NGOs,

there seems to be some danger of a backlash if they pursue international links with

disregard to the sensitivity of government over sovereignty issues. For example, Green-

peace was clearly unwelcome in Botswana for some time after the campaign. Framing the

issue as international may help to avoid such a backlash. The Okavango issue is now

clearly defined as international, with both the Delta and the river basin subject to

international agreements. Both OKACOM and membership of the Ramsar Convention

226 A. Thomas


allow Botswana to defend its resources from unilateral exploitation of the Okavango water

by Namibia, but it has become impossible for the Botswana government to continue to

maintain that the Delta comprises national resources under its control and its exploitation

is essentially an internal issue.

There is also some evidence of a more positive long-term effect that may override the

danger of a backlash. This is a sort of demonstration effect. The SOIWDP showed that it is

possible to oppose government and win, adding to the occasional cases where NGOs in

Botswana had been able to prevent certain projects or policies from going ahead. It also

demonstrated other NGO strengths, in mobilizing communities and in providing inde-

pendent technical expertise. The more they succeed in such ways, the more the credibility

of NGOs grows. It is interesting to note that similar strengths were evidenced in the

later campaign against the Namibian pipeline and on CBNRM, although in these cases

NGOs were working to complement the Botswana government’s position. Perhaps we

should already revise Molutsi and Holm’s (1990) verdict that civil society is weak in

Botswana.

An enhanced role for NGOs within Botswana, occasionally confronting government

despite the danger of reaction against them, would be part of a worldwide trend. Other

trends are the increasing importance of community participation and of international

commitments for governments, sometimes in combination, partly due to international

lobbying by NGOs. For example, the Ramsar Convention includes a commitment to local

participation and the involvement of NGOs at all levels, as well as to integrated

management planning in the name of sustainability. Even in the case of a strongly

autonomous state like Botswana, these trends combine to constrain sovereignty over

environmental resources where there are competing claims based on local and global

interests.

As noted, NGOs today may provide similar complementary strengths and undertake

similar activities to those which allowed them to succeed in the SOIWDP campaign

(mobilising communities, facilitating participation and capacity building, independent

technical expertise). However, they are doing it in a context of co-operation and partner-

ship within the framework of various international agreements, rather than in opposition to

government policy. While the possibility of referring to such international commitments

may open up more political space for NGOs, another possible implication is that NGOs

(and community organizations such as local environmental trusts) are co-opted into the

system and hence lose their capacity to provide critical opposition if the need arises.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This paper is based on research carried out in 1994 and 1995 by myself and Onalenna

Selolwane of the University of Botswana, which is reported in detail in a Working Paper

(Thomas and Selolwane, 1998). A separate, longer version has appeared as a book chapter

(Thomas and Selolwane, 2001). This paper contains more analysis and relates the case to

changes which have occurred since 1994. Thanks to those involved in the case who

allowed us to interview them and to analyse their archives, to the Economic and Social

Research Council and The Open University for financial support, to Onalenna Selolwane,

Susan Carr and David Humphreys for fruitful collaboration, and to P. B. Anand and an

anonymous reviewer for useful critical suggestions. The interpretation and errors in this

paper are however mine alone.



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NGOs' role in limiting national sovereignty over environmental resources of global significance: the 1990 campaign against the Southern Okavango Integrated Water Development Project