Found Sci (2013) 18:449466DOI 10.1007/s10699-011-9279-yNewtonian
Emanation, Spinozism, Measurementand the Baconian Origins of the
Laws of NatureEric SchliesserPublished online: 4 April 2012
Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012Abstract The rst two
sections of this paper investigate what Newton could have meant ina
now famous passage from De Graviatione (hereafter DeGrav) that
space is as it werean emanative effect of God. First it offers a
careful examination of the four key passageswithin DeGrav that bear
on this. The paper shows that the internal logic of Newtons
argumentpermits several interpretations. In doing so, the paper
calls attention to a Spinozistic strain inNewtons thought. Second
it sketches four interpretive options: (i) one approach is
genericneo-Platonic; (ii) another approach is associated with the
Cambridge Platonist, Henry More;a variant on this (ii*) emphasizes
that Newton mixes Platonist and Epicurean themes; (iii)a
necessitarian approach; (iv) an approach connected with Bacons
efforts to reformulate auseful notion of form and laws of nature.
Hitherto only the second and third options havereceived scholarly
attention in scholarship on DeGrav. The paper offers new arguments
totreat Newtonian emanation as a species of Baconian formal
causation as articulated, espe-cially, in the rst few aphorisms of
part two of Bacons New Organon. If we treat Newtonianemanation as a
species of formal causation then the necessitarian reading can be
combinedwith most of the Platonist elements that others have
discerned in DeGrav, especially New-tons commitment to doctrines of
different degrees of reality as well as the manner in whichthe rst
existing being transfers its qualities to space (as a kind of
causa-sui). This canclarify the conceptual relationship between
space and its formal cause in Newton as well asNewtons commitment
to the spatial extended-ness of all existing beings. While the rst
twosections of this paper engage with existing scholarly
controversies, in the nal section thepaper argues that the recent
focus on emanation has obscured the importance of Newtonsvery
interesting claims about existence and measurement in DeGrav. The
paper argues thataccording to Newton God and other entities have
the same kind of quantities of existence;Newton is concerned with
how measurement claries the way of being of entities. Newton isnot
claiming that measurement reveals all aspects of an entity. But if
we measure somethingthen it exists as a magnitude in space and as a
magnitude in time. This is why in DeGravNewtons conception of
existence really helps to lay truer foundations of the
mechanicalsciences.E. Schliesser (B)Philosophy and Moral Sciences,
Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgiume-mail:
[email protected] 3450 E. SchliesserKeywords Newton Emanation
Measurement Existence Bacon Spinozism1
IntroductionThemainaimofthispaperistogetclearontherelationshipsamong,God,space,exis-tence
and the science of motion in Newtons famous manuscript De
Gravitatione (hereafterDeGrav). In the rst two sections, I re-cast
the ongoing scholarly debate over the statusof Newtons emanation
doctrine in DeGrav. In the third section I focus on Newtons
claimsabout existence.A major theme of this paper is that DeGrav
offers us two ways of thinking about Godsrelationshiptonature.
FollowingWhitehead(1933)andOackley(1961), Icall theseanimmanent and
an imposed conception.1The rst, immanent, conception is the God
ofthe philosophers, while, the second, more anthropomorphic and
Voluntarist God is familiarfrom the Judeo-Christian tradition. I
argue below that the composition of DeGrav largelysegregates these
two conceptions, but that the immanent one accounts for more of the
meta-physically significant features of Newtons account. I argue
that the immanent conceptionbrings Newton rather close to
Spinozismin DeGrav.2In Newtons published works the Volun-tarist
strain is more prominent,3but the immanent strain in Newtons
thought was perceivedby Leibniz who (while unfamiliar with DeGrav,
of course) raised the specter of Spinozismin his second letter to
Clarke, paragraph 7.4Before I summarize my paper, I offer three
caveats, two of which regard my stance towardDeGrav and one on
methodology. First, the DeGrav manuscript was (a) probably put
togetherfrom earlier reections in order (b) to start a large,
ambitious work. The case for b is fairlystraightforward. The Halls
report that the notebook that contains it was left blank after
theabrupt ending of DeGrav (Newton 2004, p. 89). This suggests that
Newton intended to addmore to it. Below I call attention to other
various ways in which Newtons plans for the workbetray considerable
ambition. The case for a is more speculative, but there are two
furtherarguments on its behalf: (i) unlike many other manuscripts
in Newtons hand DeGrav doesnot contain numerous (obsessive) false
starts and new beginnings. This suggests, as GeorgeSmith pointed
out to me, that Newton was copying frompre-selected pieces.5The
correctionsin the manuscript of DeGrav are all corrections to an
already fairly polished draft. (ii) if bis true then it would help
explain the difculty in dating the manuscript that has
bedevileddiscussion of it. The piece reects Newtons thought at
different stages of his intellectualdevelopment.
(Onecanbecommittedtothiswithout thinkingNewtonsdevelopment isalways
linear.) I assume that DeGrav was brought together in the rst half
the 1680s whenNewton decided to write an ambitious anti-Cartesian
tract in the science of motion.6For my argument the dating is
irrelevant. But second, I resist a close identication betweenDeGrav
and Principia, especially the scholium on space and time and the
General Scholium.In recent years, there has been a tendency in
Newton scholarship to resolve interpretive
dif-1Oackleyisself-consciouslydevelopingWhitehead(1933).
BotharewritingbeforethepublicationofDeGrav in the twentieth
century. I thank Zvi Biener for calling my attention to these.2This
is not to claim identity between the two. On my reading of Spinoza,
he is uninterested in, even hostileto, developing a conceptual
framework for the mechanical sciences. See Schliesser (Forthcoming,
a).3Cf. Harrison (2004) with Henry (2009).4Leibniz and Clarke
(2000, p. 9).5Feingold (2004, pp. 2526). But see Henry (2011) for a
reafrmation of an early dating.6Karin Verelst has been an advocate
for this view.1 3Newtonian Emanation, Spinozism, Measurement
451culties in one of these texts in light of each other (this is as
true of Stein 2002, as it is ofMcGuire 1978). But this does no
justice to the fact that the metaphysical commitments of
thePrincipia changed signicantly with the second edition. It also
tends to ignore the evidencewe have ofthe original draft of Newtons
system of the world (dating from the mid 1680s andpresumably
composed after DeGrav was put aside) and posthumously published
Treatise ofthe System of the World.7My third caveat is
methodological. Below I draw on writings of Bacon to illuminate
someof Newtons concepts. My contribution should not be understood
in terms of the history ofideas; I am using Bacon to offer an
alternative interpretation of the meaning of emanation.I am not
claiming that Bacons writings inuenced Newton (although the claim
would notbe far-fetched). In general, my argument resists the
temptation to assimilate Newton withany particular school of
thoughtI view him as an eclectic, conceptual alchemist, who
isconstantly trying out subtle (and sometimes dramatic) innovations
on a wide-range of viewsavailable to him.The rst two sections of
this paper investigate what Newton could have meant in a nowfamous
passage from DeGrav that space is as it were an emanative effect of
God (21).8First I offer a careful examination of the four key
passages within DeGrav that bear on this.In my rst section I argue
that the internal logic of Newtons argument permits several
inter-pretations. I call attention to what I call a Spinozistic
strain in Newtons thought. Second Isketch four options: (i) one
approach is also neo-Platonic, and builds on work by ChristiaMercer
on Leibnizs views of emanation; (ii) an approach associated with
the CambridgePlatonist, Henry More, which was recently investigated
by Ed Slowik; a variant on this (ii*)articulated by McGuire and
more recently by Dana Jalobeanu emphasizes that Newton
mixesPlatonist and Epicurean themes; (iii) a necessitarian approach
associated with Howard Steinsinuential interpretation, recently
reafrmed by Andrew Janiak; (iv) an approach connectedwith Bacons
efforts to reformulate a useful notion of form and laws of
nature.Hitherto only the second and third options have received
scholarly attention in scholarshipon DeGrav. I offer new arguments
to treat Newtonian emanation as a species of
Baconianformalcausationasarticulated,especially,intherstfewaphorismsofparttwoofNewOrganon.
If we treat Newtonian emanation as a species of formal causation
then we canreconcile Steins necessitarian reading with most of the
Platonist elements that others havediscerned in DeGrav, especially
Newtons commitment to doctrines of different degrees ofreality as
well as the manner in which the rst existing being transfers its
qualities to space(as a kind of causa-sui). This can clarify the
conceptual relationship between space and itsformal cause in Newton
as well as Newtons commitment to the spatial extended-ness of
allexisting beings.My interest is not exclusively driven by
exegetical concerns. In particular, we can appre-ciate that one of
Newtons most important decisions in recasting the material for
Principiawas to drop the language of formal causation that was
still present in DeGrav and replaceit
withthelanguageoflawironically,
thiswasaconcessiontoCartesianterminology.I argue that in DeGrav
(and also the queries of the Opticks) there is, thus, overlooked
evi-dence for Thomas Kuhns old speculative claim that formal causes
are replaced by laws ofnature during the scientic revolution.While
the rst two sections of this paper engage with existing scholarly
controversies, inthe nal section I suggest that the recent focus on
emanation has obscured the importance of7I explore some of these
differences in Schliesser (2010a,b, Forthcoming, b).8All quotations
and translation of Isaac Newton are, unless otherwise noted, cited
from Newton 2004 bypage-number.1 3452 E. SchliesserNewtons very
interesting claims about existence and measurement in the same
passage(s).Newton writes:space is an emanative effect of the rst
existing being, for if any being whatsoever isposited, space is
posited. And the same may be asserted of duration: for certainly
bothare affections or attributes of a being according to which the
quantity of any thingsexistence is individuated to the degree that
the size of its presence and persistence isspecied. So that the
quantity of the existence of God is eternal in relation to
duration,andinniteinrelationtothespaceinwhichheispresent;andthequantityoftheexistence
of a created thing is as great in relation to duration as the
duration since thebeginning of its existence, and in relation to
the size of its presence, it is as great as thespace in which it is
present (2526).Ted McGuire and Ed Slowik are the only commentators
that I am familiar with to haveremarked on Newtons focus on the
quantity of existence. Recently, Slowik writes it isa fairly
mysterious and undened notion in the De Gravitatione, so it is
difcult to draw aspecic conclusion based on this use of
terminology.9McGuire (1978), by contrast, makessense of it in light
of Newtons Epicurean turn of the 1690s. I am greatly indebted to
McGu-ires brilliant study, but in the nal section of this paper I
deviate from his reading and arguethat in DeGrav God and other
entities have the same kind of quantities of existence.My
overarching argument is that in DeGrav Newton is concerned with how
measurementclaries the way of being of entities. Newton is not
claiming that measurement reveals allaspects of an entity. But if
we measure something then it exists as a magnitude in space and asa
magnitude in time. This is why in DeGrav Newtons conception of
existence really helps tolay truer foundations of the mechanical
sciences (21), which is one of Newtons ambitionsfor DeGrav that I
wish to recover here.2 Four passages from DeGrav on emanation and
Causa SuiIn this section, I introduce and analyze four passages
from DeGrav.The rst passage, [A], reads:[N]ow it may be expected
that I should dene extension [spaceES] as substance,accident, or
else nothing at all. But by no means, for it has its own manner of
existingwhich is proper to it and ts neither substances nor
accidents. It is not substance: onthe one hand, because it is not
absolute in itself, but it is as it were an emanative effectof God
and an affection of every kind of being; on the other hand, because
it is notamong the proper affections that denote substance, namely
actions, such as thoughtsin the mind and motions in body (21;
emphasis added).The second, [B], reads: space is eternal in
duration and immutable in nature because itis emanative effect of
an eternal and immutable being (26).In these two passages Newton
claims that space is eternal in duration and immutable. Thismuch
appears clear, although my use of is might not do full justice to
the claimthat it has itsown manner of existence. (I return to this
below.) Space is an emanative effect of an eternaland immutable
being. It is tempting to identify the eternal and immutable being
with God,9Slowik (2009) originally appeared as Slowik (2008); if I
mention page-numbers it will be to Slowik (2009).See also Slowik
(2012).1 3Newtonian Emanation, Spinozism, Measurement 453but
Newtons use of as it were in passage A should give us pause.10What
is the eternaland immutable emanative cause of space? In this
section I offer some preliminary answers.We shall also come to
understand what it might mean to say that space is an affection
ofeverything.The plot thickens when we consider two further
passages.The third passage, [C], reads: Space is an affection of a
being just as a being. No beingexists or can exist which is not
related to space in some way. God is everywhere,
createdmindsaresomewhere,andbodyisinthespacethatitoccupies;andwhateverisneithereverywhere
nor anywhere does not exist. And hence it follows that space is an
emanativeeffect of the rst existing being, for if any being
whatsoever is posited, space is posited (25).Thefourthpassage, [D],
reads:[l]estanyoneshouldimagineGodtobelikebody,extended and made of
divisible parts, it should be known that spaces themselves are not
actu-ally divisible and furthermore, that any being has a manner
proper to itself of being presentin spaces (26).That space is an
affection of everything is claried by these two passages: it means
that allexisting entities are located in some spatial structure
(Stein 2002). A more Kantian way ofsaying this is that space is
(part of) the condition of possibility for any entity. (Or one
mightsay that: spatiality is a quality that belongs to
everything.)11Moreover, because of passage [C] we can specify
something more explicit about the eter-nal emanative cause of
space; it is the rst existing being. Most readers would be
inclinedto call the rst existing, eternal, and immutable being,
God. But this is too easy because itleaves unexplained Newtons use
of as it were. Of course, we are also still left clarifyingwhat it
means that space is an emanative effect of the rst existing eternal
and immutablebeing.One way to approach Newtons use of as it were is
to interpret it as his attempt to indicatethat he is discussing a
philosophical God, one that has no anthropomorphic qualities.
For,emanation as a form of divine causation is traditionally
distinguished from conceptions thatrefer to Gods will.12Newton is
clearly signaling that his God does not stand outside nature;even
God exists spatially. In DeGrav, Newton plainly rejects a soul of
the world with Godstanding outside nature (30; Slowik 2009, 443;
see also Newton 2004, 124125). This tsnicely with what he wrote
later in life in his Account of the Commercium Epistolicum, inwhich
he rejects Leibnizs view of God as an intelligence above the bounds
of the world;whence it seems to follow that he cannot do anything
within the bounds of the world, unlessby an incredible miracle
(Newton 2004, 125). In context Newton has just afrmed that,
whileGod is not the soul of the world, he is omnipresent, so this
accords with the viewexpressed inDeGrav (recall: no being exists or
can exist which is not related to space in some way [25]).If
Leibnizs God is above the bounds of the world, this means he is
outside of space and timealtogether. God would literally be acting
from nowhere, that is, an incredible miracle. Thus,in his response
to Leibniz, Newton is echoing the infamous doctrine of the sixth
chapter ofSpinozas Theological Political Treatise; in a discussion
of miracles, Spinoza rejects the veryintelligibility of placing God
above the bounds of the world.Nevertheless, before we start
exploring how Newtons contemporaries use emanation(Sect. 3), we
have not exhausted all the reasonable options in trying to
establish the identity10In correspondence, Ed Slowik suggested, I
think you place much too importance on the as it werepassage in the
DeGravits difcult to infer much from this throw-away quip, as it
were... (12/5/2008); Cf.McGuire (1978, p. 481).11For more elaborate
treatment that locates this reading in intellectual context, see
McGuire (1978, p. 465ff).12See Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy;
http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/emanatio.htm, accessed on October24,
2008.1 3454 E. Schliesserof the emanative cause of space based on
Newtons text alone. It is probably safe to assumethat for Newton
ordinary material entities and (maybe less likely) ordinary minds
(which,however, are more noble than bodies, see DeGrav, 20; Slowik
2009, 438 n. 10) are noteternal and immutable, and can, thus, be
ruled out as the rst existing beings.But despite the recent
philosophic interest in DeGrav, it has not yet been noted that
New-tons wording in these four passages is compatible with the
position that space is the rstexisting being. The emanative cause
of space could be space itself! Or to be more
preciseGodandspacewouldberelatedbywayofself-causation.13Newtonsspacewouldthenbe
a Godlike causa sui. This is not as crazy as it sounds: Newton is
certain that space iseternal, immutable, immobile, indivisible, and
innite (viz. space is extended innitely
inalldirections23);itistheconditionofpossibilityofallbeings.So,giventheseclaimswhy
not call space a philosophic conception of God? This could then
explain Newtons asit were, especially if we see the phrase as
modifying emanation (and not God). The rela-tionship between the
rst eternal (etc) cause and its eternal (etc) effects (space, time,
etc)is then emanative-like, and that would be a way to capture
causa sui. Newtonian space andNewtonian time are then, in a certain
sense (and more precisely), attribute-like aspects of aself-causing
God.14Before one rejects this, shall we say, Spinozistic reading
out of hand, one should recog-nize that Newton seems aware of this
option when he writes, I see what Descartes feared,namely if he
should consider space innite, it would perhaps become God (25; see
alsothetreatmentofDescartesandtheatheistsat3132).15Incontext,NewtonisdiscussingDescartes
Principles, but we know from his early notebooks that he was also
familiar withthe Meditations. In fact, Newton interpreted the
ontological argument of the fth meditationin terms of
self-causation: A Necessary being is ye cause of it selfe or its
existence afterye same manner yt a mountaine is ye cause of a
valley(wch [sic] is not from power orexcellency, but ye peculiarity
of theire natures.16So, even if Spinoza was never on Newtonsmind in
such passages, Cartesian ideas on causa sui were available to
Newton.17It might appear unlikely that in DeGrav, Newton would
endorse this reading, because heinsists that it is repugnant to
reason that God created his own ubiquity (26). One might betempted
to claim that this rules out any causa sui.18Unfortunately, this
conclusion cannot be13These funny sounding phrases are meant to
echo Descartes responses to Caterus and Arnauld. For
excellentdiscussion, see Lee Jr (2006).14In order to avoid
confusion, with most recent commentators I recognize that DeGrav
drops the traditionalsubstance-property/attribute structure (see,
especially, McGuire (1978, p. 474); even without access to
DeGravthe point was discerned by Cassirer (1951, pp. 6164);
Cassirers argument relies on the reception of Newtonby Dutch
Newtonians.) For Newton entities can exist without inhering in a
substance. However, I have arguedelsewhere that Newton probably was
a substance monist, with God being the only entity with full
substantialreality. See Schliesser (2011). Gorham (2011) wishes to
argue against the recent consensus in order to explainthat space is
a principle, generic attribute of God; Gorham draws on a rich
Cartesian framework to argue this.Without claiming to have done
justice to all of Gorhams subtle position I claim to have captured
the sameinsight by stressing that the emanative relationship
between God space is a form of causa sui (somethingGorham also
notes) but that Newton can say so without accepting the traditional
substance-attribute structurein DeGrav.15Concern over Descartes irt
with atheism seems to have been something of a trope; it also shows
up inMacLaurin (1748, p. 77).16Quaestiones, folio 83r, quoted in
McGuire (1978, p. 485).17Henry More published his Confutatio of
Spinoza in 1678. So Spinoza was being discussed in
Newtonscircles.18Newtons striking appeal to reason here offers
independent evidence for my claim that we are here dealingwith the
God of the philosophers. It also should also make us cautious about
reading Newtons later strictempiricism back into DeGrav.1
3Newtonian Emanation, Spinozism, Measurement 455established because
emanation is a doctrine that avoids creation in time. And as others
havenoted, there is no trace that Newton is using emanation to
indicate activity.19All we can sayis that is that the rst emanative
cause and its effect are both eternal, and this is compatiblewith
causa sui.20(See also my discussion of emanation below.)In the next
section, I advance the debate by canvassing four usages of
emanation thatwere available in the seventeenth century. My
argument will proceed independently frommyremarks about
self-causation in DeGrav. But they can be fruitfully presupposed
when I treatmore fully of Newtons immanent or philosophic
conception of God below.3 Four kinds of emanationThere can be no
doubt that in DeGrav according to Newton space is something like an
emana-tive effect of something (eternal, immutable, etc). I am
familiar with four possible meaningsof the word emanation in the
seventeenth century. Let me survey these and comment onthe
plausibility that Newton might have had any one of them in
mind.First, there is what I call a traditional neo-Platonic version
of emanation, which relates apure or perfect cause with an impure
or imperfect imitation of it. The perfect cause emanatesa property
to the imperfect effect so that the effect participates in or has
an inferior versionof the property or accident.21Something like
this concept is clearly presupposed in passage[B]. For in it
immutability and eternality are transferred from the cause to the
effect. This ischaracteristic of neo-Platonic emanation. It is a
bit unfortunate that Newton does not explainthe causal transference
of immobility, indivisibility, and innitude from God to space in
asimilar matter. Newtons silence frustrates our search. If Newton
had fully intended this useof emanation it is a bit surprising that
in passage [D] he does not mention God as the sourceof spaces
immobility, indivisibility, and innitude; this would have been a
natural place forhim to do so in clarifying the relationship
between the emanative cause and effect.Nevertheless, we should not
entirely forego this option because it ts with another aspectof
Newtons view: while space is uncreated (33), it is somehow not
quite absolute (recallpassage A). In fact, Newton is committed to
things having different degrees of reality (seealso Spinozas Ethics
1p11; because of the shared commitment to different degrees of
reality,this is one further reason why I connect Newtonian
emanation with Spinozistic causa suispace/extension is dependent on
God, while being, in some sense, self-same with it).22Thisis partly
indicated by Newtons claim that things have their own manner of
existing whichis proper to them (21). Later in the piece Newton
also claims: whatever has more reality inone space than in another
space belongs to body rather to space (27). Perhaps, only
Godhasfull(absolute)realityandspacehaslessofit;asNewtonwrites,spacehassomesubstantial
reality (33), but not complete reality. This is a doctrine familiar
from Descartes,who employs an emanative cast in the third
Meditation; different degrees of reality arecrucial in the fourth
and fth Meditations (Grene 1999, 102).19See Stein (2002) and Gorham
(2011).20Gorham (2011) has argued for what he calls an
assimiliationist interpretation in which space is an attributeof
God in Newton. Gorhamsharply distinguishes Newton fromSpinoza,
because according to GorhamNewtonhas a Voluntarist conception of
God. As I argue more fully below in DeGrav Newtons Voluntarism is
veryattenuated.21For an informative account, see Mercer (2001, pp.
189190).22I thank Maarten Van Dyck and Ted McGuire for discusson,
although I fear my discussion does not satisfyeither.1 3456 E.
SchliesserSecond, there is the definition of emanation by the
Cambridge Platonist, Henry More,who was well known to Newton. Even
by contemporaries Newton was taken to be followingMore in various
ways. For example, in his Account of the Commercium Epistolicum,
New-ton notes that the editors of Acta Eruditorum point to Mores
potential inuence on Newton(Newton2004,
124125).ForMore,anemanativecauseisanimmediatecausewhichisco-present
with its effect. As More writes, a Cause as merely by being, no
other activityor causality interposed, produces an Effect (quoted
in Jalobeanu 2007).23No doubt someof Newtons comments point to this
definition. Indeed this notion of causation must havebeen very
inuential, because as late as the 1730s it is still Humes target in
his eight
ruleofreasoning(withoutmentionofMore):anobject,whichexistsforanytimeinitsfullperfection
without any effect, is not the sole cause of that effect, but
requires to be assistedby some other principle, which may forward
its inuences and operation. For as like effectsnecessarily follow
from like causes, and in a contiguous time and place, their
separation fora moment shews, that these causes are not complete
ones (Hume 1739, 1.3.15.10).24Nevertheless, while there are ways in
which Newtons approach harmonizes with Cam-bridge Platonism (see
Slowik 2009, 2012; cf. Stein 2002, 269), Mores particular
definitionofemanationisuninformativeasanaidtounderstandingthedetailsofNewtonsclaims(in
passages [A] through [D], above). It is at best consistent with
these passages, but evenSlowiks splendid papers do not help account
for all the rich details in them. Ted McGuireand Dana Jalobeanu, in
particular, have argued that these passages mix Platonist
imagerywith Epicurean themes that Newton would have derived from
Charleton.25Their approachin which Newton is an eclectic in its
original sense (i.e., choosing what is best) has much torecommend
to it.26It is, thus, a bit surprising that so much scholarly
attention is focused onmining the More-Newton connection.27A third
conception, diametrically opposed to Platonizing readings, has been
defended byHoward Stein. No one has done more to rehabilitate the
reputation of Newtons analysis ofspace among the community of
space-time theorists and historians of philosophy than Stein.28Part
of his argument turns on a revisionary analysis of emanation in
Newton (Stein 2002). Byrelying on passages [A] and [C], in
particular, and on linguistic contextual evidence drawnfrom the
OED, Stein argues against a non-causal reading of emanation.
Instead Stein readsNewton as employing emanation in the sense of a
necessary consequence (2002, p. 269).Now, above I have relied on
aspects of Steins argument. Moreover, elsewhere, I have agreedwith
Steins focus on the empirical basis of Newtons doctrines, including
those pertaining toGod, and Steins emphasis on Newtons probabilism,
even fallibilism; Stein clinches his casethat Newtons doctrines do
not crucially rely on Newtons theology. Steins arguments
haverecently been afrmed by AndrewJaniak (ms) in a careful study of
passages [A] through
[D].23Slowik(2009)quotestherelevantpassagefromMoresTheImmortalityoftheSoulasfollows:anEmanative
Effect is coexistent with the very Substance of that which is said
to be the Cause thereof , andexplains that this Cause is the
adequate and immediate Cause, and that the Effect exists so long as
thatSubstance does exist (438).24For more on Humes Rules of
Reasoning and their relationships to Newton, see Sect. 4.5 in
Schliesser(2008).25McGuire (1978), 471ff. and Jalobeanu
(2007).26Moreover, it also ts with some Epicurean themes that are
very prominent in the rst edition of the Principia(Schliesser
Forthcoming, b).27But see also Slowik (2012) for an attempt to
integrate the Morean inuence with strands coming fromGassendi and
Charleton.28Starting with the classic Stein (1967).1 3Newtonian
Emanation, Spinozism, Measurement 457Nevertheless, Stein and Janiak
are silent on some crucial details of these passages. In
par-ticular, they seem to miss the fact that passage [B] purports
to explain how qualities of spaceare caused by the emanative cause
(see also Slowik 2009, pp. 445446). We could put theargument
against Stein as follows: he ignores the fact that even if we posit
any being, we neednot posit space as eternal in duration and
immutable in nature. So, Steins argument seemsto attribute to
Newton conceptual question-begging. To be clear: Newton does offer
a separateargument fromour ability to imagine a rotating triangle
to the conclusion that space is innite(23). So, it does seem that
if we posit any (geometric) object we (can) posit innite
space.29But I cannot see how Steins resolutely anti-causal approach
can account for these crucialdetails in passage [B]. This is not to
say that Steins focus on emanation as necessary conse-quence is
entirely misguided. In section I, I agreed with his claim that
Newton is committedto the view that all beings presuppose space as
a condition of possibility. It is Steins focuson the logical
structure of Newtons position that exhibits this fact most clearly.
Thus, weshould not ignore the possibility that emanative causation
may in many respects be moreakin to a conceptually necessary
consequence than efcient causation, but this cannot be thewhole
story. We can illustrate and make more precise what I mean if we
focus on an unlikelysource: Bacon.Fourth, Bacon has been hitherto
ignored as a possible source in this discussion. There wasa time,
fromthe middle of the eighteenth century onward, and especially
since the writings ofThomas Reid, that Bacon and Newton were viewed
as the twin sources advocating a sharedand proper method of
philosophizing (a viewespecially popular among early nineteenth
cen-tury thinkers like Whewell and Mill). Particularly highlighted
were Bacons and Newtonsempiricism in the service of the discovery
of the true causes of nature, especially if accom-panied with an
experimentum crucis. In recent years commentators have been more
eagerto differentiate between Bacons natural history and Newtons
mathematical-experimentalapproaches (Feingold 2001). While I
endorse the recent trend, we should not be blind toBacons
signicance. Bacon sometimes uses emanation in what we may label an
inno-cent sense, as when he writes that the rays of light emanate
from the sun (New Organon,2.XII).30But at other times emanation has
a more technical meaning in Bacon. Considerthe following two
paragraphs:On a given body, to generate and superinduce a new
nature or new natures is the workandaimofhumanpower.
Ofagivennaturetodiscovertheform, ortruespecicdifference,
ornature-engenderingnature, orsourceofemanation(forthesearetheterms
which come nearest to a description of the thing), is the work and
aim of humanknowledge. Subordinate to these primary works are two
others that are secondary andof inferior mark: to the former, the
transformation of concrete bodies, so far as thisis possible; to
the latter, the discovery, in every case of generation and motion,
of thelatent process carried on from the manifest efcient and the
manifest material to theform which is engendered; and in like
manner the discovery of the latent congurationof bodies at rest and
not in motion.In what an ill condition human knowledge is at the
present time is apparent even fromthe commonly received maxims. It
is a correct position that true knowledge is
knowl-edgebycauses.Andcausesagainarenotimproperlydistributedintofourkinds:the
material, the formal, the efcient, and the nal. But of these the
nal cause rather29This is not to deny that the point of the example
is to give us a handle for grasping [spaces] actual, notpotential,
innity (McGuire, Private Communication, May 16, 2011).30I quote
Bacons New Organon by book and aphorism number.1 3458 E.
Schliessercorrupts than advances the sciences, except such as have
to do with human action. Thediscovery of the formal is despaired
of. The efcient and the material (as they are inves-tigated and
received, that is, as remote causes, without reference to the
latent processleading to the form) are but slight and supercial,
and contribute little, if anything, totrue and active science. Nor
have I forgotten that in a former passage I noted and cor-rected as
an error of the human mind the opinion that forms give existence.
For thoughin nature nothing really exists besides individual
bodies, performing pure individualacts according to a xed law, yet
in philosophy this very law, and the investigation,discovery, and
explanation of it, is the foundation as well of knowledge as of
operation.And it is this law with its clauses that I mean when I
speak of forms, a name whichI the rather adopt because it has grown
into use and become familiar (New Organon,2.III; emphasis in
original).Bacon is no Scholastic, as can be clearly seen by his
claims that (a) nal cause rathercorrupts than advances the
sciences, except such as have to do with human action, and (b)that
forms give existence is an error. Yet Bacon embraces the three
other
Aristoteliancauses(material,formal,andefcient)asentirelyappropriatetohisproposedscienceofnature.
In particular, here I want to focus on Bacons willingness to
embrace a reformulatedversion of formal causation; he writes that
the aim of human knowledge is to discoverthe nature-engendering
nature of bodies in order to create new natures. Bacons formsare
materialistic. In labeling his causes in this fashion, Bacon is
even willing to risk con-fusion with the Scholastics. To be clear:
a Baconian formal cause has nothing to do withhylomorphism.31Now,
two aspects are relevant for my treatment of DeGrav. First Bacon
glosses a nature-engendering nature as a source of emanation.
Second the cause or source of emanation isassociated with the form.
As I understand Bacon here, he is relying on the traditional
mean-ings of words in the rst paragraph, and then begins to offer
innovative uses in the second. Ifthis is so, then those
commentators that have tried to treat emanative causation as a
species ofefcient causation (see for discussion Slowik 2009,
437438, 2012) are mistaken. We neednot saddle the Platonizing
reading with this mistake; one may question the modern
identi-cation of, for example, Mores claim about God as the
adequate and immediate Cause ofspace with an efcient cause. Why not
treat More as explicating a formal cause?I can allow that Bacon is
innovating linguistically in both paragraphs; here the main pointis
that we have evidence for a subtly different reading of Newton.
While I do not claim thatBacon is the source of Newtons doctrines
about space, it is worth noting that for Bacon,too, space is innite
(2.XXVI). Moreover, according to Bacon forms [] are (in the eyeof
reason at least, and in their essential law) eternal and immutable
(2.IX). So, if Newtonsrst existing being were in Bacons sense the
formal cause of space it would have to beeternal and immutable.
Thus, Newtons rst existing being could t the characteristics of
aBaconian form as a source of emanation.Now, while Bacon is clearly
an admirer of Galileos discoveries and willing to speculateabout
interplanetary travel on the basis of them (2.XXIX), his views on
space and motionare too undeveloped for them to count as a source
of the details of Newtonian doctrine onspace. Here, I insist only
that Bacon offers helpful clues for understanding Newtons use
ofemanation.The crucial point is that we should consider treating
Newtons emanative causation alongthe lines of nature-engendering
nature, that is, as a species of formal causation in Bacons31See
Mancosu (1999) for discussion of non-hylomorphic formal causation
in mathematics.1 3Newtonian Emanation, Spinozism, Measurement
459sense.32Interestingly, in DeGrav formal causation shows up twice
explicitly: rst that prod-uct of the divine will is the form or
formal reason of the body denoting every dimension ofspace in which
the body is to be produced (29); second we should distinguish
between theformal reason of bodies and the act of the divine will
(31; for the sake of argument, allowthat for Newton a reason is a
cause). Now the context is Newtons thought experimentabout how God
could have created bodies. So, despite the fact that it appears
that the thrustof Newtons treatment of body is to emphasize a
Voluntarist conception of God, who couldhave created bodies
differently (see also the late query 31 in Opticks), Newton is
warninghisreadersnottoconfuseGodswillfortheformalreasonofbodies.Thatistosay,thenature-engendering
nature of bodies is not Gods will, but (presumably) the essential
(wewould say, intrinsic) qualities of body, e.g, (i) mobility; (ii)
impenetrability, which Newtonarticulates in terms of law-like
behavior in collision; and (iii) that they can excite
variousperceptions of the senses and the imagination in created
minds, and conversely be moved bythem (DeGrav, 2829). This list
helps us appreciate that Newtons formal reason(s) shouldnot be
conated with an efcient cause. It is regularly underestimated that
even in the mostVoluntarist part of DeGrav, much of the
metaphysical work is being done by a more immanentconception.One
might object that given that Newton did not shy away from the
language of formalcausation/reason, why would he not use that
language in describing the relationship betweenthe rst existing
(eternal, immutable, etc) thing and space? The response to this is
straight-forward: if Newton is following Bacons usage then
emanation picks out a particular speciesof formal causation.33What
else can be said in favor of this option? First, if we treat the
emanative cause asa species of formal causation then we can make
sense of Steins qualms about treating itas a species of efcient
causation; we can capture Steins insight that there is a
necessaryinference between the rst existing being and the qualities
of space. That is to say, it is notmerely that space is a necessary
consequence of any entity, but various particular
qualities(immutability, eternal duration, and perhaps also innitude
and indivisibility) of space arealso necessary in this way. One
might capture this with the claim these are essential or intrin-sic
qualities of space for Newton. Spaces would not be space without
them. Second, we canaccommodate the evidence in favor of the
neo-Platonizing reading of passages [A] to [D];we can allow that
emanation signals Newtons commitment to a version of the
doctrine32McGuire (1978, 480), uses the language of ontic
dependence in order to avoid the language of causation.Given our
post Humean condition this may be said to attempt to capture the
insight that as it were emanationunderstood as Baconian formal
causation is not quite our notion of causation.33Marc Lange has
called my attention to a very interesting passage in Hooker:
Whereas therefore thingsnatural which are not in the number of
voluntary agents do so necessarily observe their certain laws,
thatas long as they keep those forms which give them their being,
they cannot possibly be apt or inclinable to dootherwise than they
do; seeing the kinds of their operations are both constantly and
exactly framed accordingto the several ends for which they serve,
they themselves in the meanwhile, though doing that which is t,
yetknowing neither what they do, nor why: it followeth that all
which they do in this sort proceedeth originallyfromsome such
agent, as knoweth, appointeth, holdeth up, and even actually
frameth the same. (Hooker 1888,Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical
Politie, Book I.iii.4.) As Lange remarks: Shades of Hempel and
Oppenheimfrom 350years later! Lange (2009) discusses the Hooker
passage briey in chapter 1.Hooker is claiming that natural things
are law-like in virtue of Gods unknowable general providence.
(Cf.Descartes in Meditations!) The form is an imposed manifestation
(if I may use that term) of Gods providence.Whats
especiallyinterestingis that Hookers nature is very much knowable
because it is part of makersknowledge; yet Hooker transforms that
traditional (medieval) doctrine because he does not seem to be
inter-ested in discovering local nal causes. So, not unlike Spinoza
(who probably was familiar with the Baconpassage quoted in the body
of the text) Hooker has an account of what one might call blind
forms (blindbecause divorced from nal causes) that are responsible
for the law-following order we nd in nature.1 3460 E. Schliesserof
different degrees of reality, as well as the claim (in passage [B])
that the rst existingbeing transfers (somehow) its qualities to
space. We can do this if we reject the claim thatemanation is a
species of efcient causation.So, Bacon shows us the way to
reconciling the rst three options.34Fair enough. NowI extend my
reading by offering a speculation inspired by Thomas Kuhn, who once
arguedthat during the scientic revolution formal causes morphed
into laws of nature (Kuhn 1977,pp. 2130). His argument, while
ingenuous, is largely speculative. But here we have evidencethat
one of Bacons innovations appears to reinterpret the formal cause,
or nature-engenderingnature, in terms of a law of nature (recall
2.II).35My proposal is that we should treat DeGrav as offering
evidence of Newtons willingnessto try out a radical newidea: the
emanative source of space could be better conceived as a for-mal
cause of a decidedly modern kind: a law of nature. To be clear: I
have very little positiveevidence for the view that I am defending.
I am certainly not claiming that while writingDeGrav Newton
conceived of the emanative cause as a law of nature. But reection
on thethrust of DeGrav could have pushed him to recognizing this.
Let me offer some arguments,some new and some reiterating earlier
points.First, laws of nature can play the logical role that Stein
assigns to the emanative cause.They provide the necessity that is
required for his arguments to be persuasive. Second, whenwe
conceive of emanative causation as a species of formal causation,
then laws of nature tthe function that as it were emanation has in
the discussion of space in DeGrav; Baconianlaws of nature are
eternal and immutable (etc).36Third, the laws of motion in Newtons
Principia have been treated as constitutive princi-ples (by
neo-Kantians) or deeply entrenched empirical working assumptions
(by Empiricists),but we can also read them as formal causes in
Bacons sense. They are the natures that helpdene the nature of
motion.37FourththeBaconianaspectofNewtonsconceptionofalawofnatureshowsupinadecidedly
surprising place. In one of the most Voluntarist passages in
Newtons oeuvre, hewrites: it may be also allowed that God is able
to create particles of matter of several sizesand gures, and in
several proportions to space, and perhaps of different densities
and forces,and thereby to vary the laws of nature, and made worlds
of several sorts in several parts of theuniverse (Query 31, Opticks
403404; emphasis added). It is the relationships among thedensities
and forces of matter to space that accounts for the varying laws
and worlds. That isto say, in the Opticks for Newton the
nature-engendering nature of our world is simply theway in which
bodies are organized. This picks out a Baconian form. In Newtons
conceptionthe laws of nature vary if the way bodies are organized
varies. With different laws of nature34Slowiks very ne papers do
one disservice to the dialectic surrounding the meaning of
Newtonian ema-nation. Steins treatment of Newtons use of emanation
is not itself an argument for a third way betweenthe debate over
substantivalist and relationist interpretation of absolute space,
although it can certainly beslotted into such a one (as it is in
Slowiks reconstruction of Steins argument). Steins treatment of
emanationis really designed to put claims about the importance of
Newtons theology for his physics on the defensive(see Stein 2002,
268, quoted in Slowik 2009, 436).35Karin Verelst has called my
attention to an important passage in Burtt (1927, p. 64), where
Burtt argues thatKepler transformed Aristotelian formal causes into
an approach that sees underlying mathematical harmonyas a species
of causation. A fuller analysis of these matters should certainly
incorporate this aspect into theargument.36As Katherine Brading has
pointed out to me, this argument works best for force laws (such as
law
ofuniversalgravitation)becausetheymakematterclumptogetherintothekindsofbodiesthatthereare(personal
communication, 17 June 2011).37See McGuire (2007) for an argument
that shows the importance for Newton of identifying natures. I
haveextended this in Schliesser (2010a).1 3Newtonian Emanation,
Spinozism, Measurement 461or Baconian emanative causes we have
different worlds. The whole point of Query 31 is todeny that the
laws of nature have a separate causal standing apart from the way
matter isorganized.38This is the Baconian form. Of course, Newton
is no Baconian because he is alsowilling to consider densities and
forces as basic components.There is an objection to this Baconian
reading: I have treated the emanative cause of spaceas a kind of
philosophic, un-anthropomorphic God. This God is immanent in the
world. Butit looks as if DeGrav has a very anthropomorphic
conception of God; Newton repeatedlyappeals to the divine will; the
power of God; Gods action of thinking and willing(27); divine
constitution (30); the work of God and creation (33). In the
Principia thiskind of anthropomorphism is more strictly conned to
the General Scholium added to thesecond edition; in Opticks it
shows up in Queries 28 and 31, especially. Yet it appears to be
acentral conception of DeGrav. If correct, it is hard to accept a
reading of Newton that treatsemanation as a Baconian form or
nature-engendering nature.Yet, matters are not so simple. To see
this we must investigate a little-noticed peculiarityof the
structure of DeGrav. It contains two explicit appeals to the
utility of his arguments inDeGrav: one is methodological in
character, the other theological. It turns out that
Newtonspresentation of God shifts between the two. First, at the
start of DeGrav Newton introduceshis twofold method (12), which
combines mathematical demonstration that abstracts fromphysical
consideration with experimental conrmation. The twofold method is
said to bemirrored in Newtons text: the mathematical demonstration
is supposed to be conned tolemmas, propositions, andcorollaries,
whilethefreermethodofdiscussionassociatedwith the experimental
conrmations are disposed in scholia (12). Newton explicitly
jus-ties his introduction of experimental conrmations to make clear
the usefulness of hismathematical demonstrations (12).Second, later
in DeGrav Newton sums up his treatment of the idea of body by
callingattention to its usefulness because it clearly involves the
principal truths of metaphysicsand thoroughly conrms and explains
then (31). In the very next sentence Newton makesexplicit the
advantages: we cannot posit bodies of this kind without at the same
time posit-ing that God exists, and has created bodies in empty
space out of nothing, and that they arebeings distinct from created
minds, but able to be united with minds (31). Newtons targetis
Descartes and the atheists (32).Now there need be no conict between
the methodological and theological utility. Nordo I mean to suggest
that the whole of DeGrav is organized around a distinction between
amethodological and theological section. In fact, most of what we
have of DeGrav is explicitlya digression (36) meant to dispose of
Cartesians ctions (14; in Janiaks 2004 edition thedigression is
most of the document). But the rst half of the digressionon the aws
of Carte-sian conception of motion (1421) and Newtons positive
conception of space (2127)isnot theologically useful in the way the
more speculative treatment of body (2735) is.Newtons employment of
emanativecausation(as indicatedinthefour passages,[A][D] above),
which offers us an un-anthropomorphic God, is conned to the
treatmentof space, that is, in the part that is designed to lay
truer foundations of the mechanical sci-ences (21). Presumably
these foundations are the way in which his methodology is
useful(cf. the use of foundations in 12 and 21). But when Newton
turns to his theologically usefultreatment of body, emanative
causation is absent (except, perhaps, hypothetically at 31).
Thetreatment of thecreation ofbody, whichis useful to metaphysics,
relieson an anthropo-morphic God. So, my response to the objection
is: do not conate the rst half of DeGravs38In Schliesser (2010a) I
argue that this is the view that guided Newtons treatment of
gravity in the rstedition of Principia. For further discussion on
the status of second causes in Newton, see Schliesser (2011).1 3462
E. Schliesserdigression (2127) with the second half (2735; cf.
Slowik 2009, 438ff). It is only the rsthalf of the digression that
ts more clearly the general methodological aims of DeGrav;
thereemanative causation gures in the way that resemble Bacons
notion of a formal cause. Strik-ingly, Newton is more condent of
the status of the exceptionally clear idea of extension(22) than he
is of the more uncertain part about the limits of the divine power
(27).Finally, Geoff Gorham uses these remarks as a source of an
objection. Gorham acceptsmy claim that in DeGrav Newton separates
Gods will from the formal reason of bodies.But he is more skeptical
about my claim that one can use Baconian emanation as a way
tointerpret the relationship between God and space. As Gorham
writes: Space and bodies arevery different sorts of effects
according to De Gravitatione: the former is necessary,
eternal,uncreated, imperceptible, innite, indivisible, immobile and
causally inert while the latterare, as Newton says, opposite in
every respect. (DG: 33) Indeed, laws are only mentionedin DeGrav
after the account of space has been completed and the more
uncertain accountof body is introduced. I agree with Gorham that
one should not conate Newtons treat-ments of space and body in
DeGrav. In fact, my argument relies on the assumption that
theseneed to be kept separate not only because they have a
different epistemic status (as Gorhamnotes) but also because they
presuppose largely different conceptions of God (although Ihave
also argued that even the treatment of the essential features of
body is less Voluntaristthan ordinarily supposed in the scholarly
literature).So,toclarifymypositionandsumup:IusetheevidencefromBacontoargue,rst,thatwhenNewtonspeaksofemanationhecouldbethinkingofcausa-sui-like,formalcausation.
IfwetreatemanationasaspeciesofformalcausationthenwecanreconcileSteins
necessitarian reading with most of the Platonist elements that
others have discerned inDeGrav, especially Newtons commitment to
doctrines of different degrees of reality as wellas the manner in
which the rst existing being transfers its qualities to space. This
is themain point of my argument. Second, I use the evidence from
Bacon to claim that Newtonshares with Bacon a privileging of
material composition as (part of) the ontic source of law-like
regularity in the world, and this is another, more speculative, way
to understand the roleof emanation in DeGrav.We can also appreciate
that one of Newtons most important decisions in recasting
thematerial for Principia was, rst, to drop the language of formal
causation that was still pres-ent in DeGrav and replace it with the
language of lawironically, this was a concession toCartesian
terminologyand, second, to separate the theologically useful
material from themain argument.39While it is clear that I advocate
the fourth option, my main aim has been to suggest theshortcomings
of all the current readings. In particular, with possible exception
of McGuire(1978), no reading I am familiar with has attempted to do
full justice to the intricacy of all ofthe details of Newtons
treatment of emanation. My appeal to Bacon is meant to advance
theargument by showing the fruitfulness of treating Newtons use of
emanation as a species offormal causation. But I do not claimthat I
have accounted for all the peculiarities of Newtonsposition. I turn
to one of these in next section of this paper.4 Newton on existence
and
measurementRecallpassage[C]:Spaceisanaffectionofabeingjustasabeing.Nobeingexistsorcan
exists which is not related to space in some way. God is
everywhere, created minds are39Again, note, that I am not offering
a historical account. For useful recent study, see Henry (2004).1
3Newtonian Emanation, Spinozism, Measurement 463somewhere, and body
is in the space that it occupies; and whatever is neither
everywhere noranywhere does not exist. And hence it follows that
space is an emanative effect of the rstexisting being, for if any
being whatsoever is posited, space is posited.It continues with
[C*]: And the same may be asserted of duration: for certainly both
areaffections or attributes of a being according to which the
quantity of any things existence isindividuated to the degree that
the size of its presence and persistence is specied. So thatthe
quantity of the existence of God is eternal in relation to
duration, and innite in relationto the space in which he is
present; and the quantity of the existence of a created thing isas
great in relation to duration as the duration since the beginning
of its existence, and inrelation to the size of its presence, it is
as great as the space in which it is present (2526).It is to Ed
Slowiks credit that he has tried to t [C*] in his Platonizing
interpretationof DeGrav. Nevertheless, even he has to admit that
the, quantity of existence is a fairlymysterious and undened notion
in the De Gravitatione, so it is difcult to draw a specicconclusion
based on this use of terminology. (this volume) But this does not
mean we cannotsay anything at all. McGuire, by contrast, relies on
Newtons 1692-3 manuscript (which hehas dubbed Tempus et Locus) to
argue that Newton is committed to the claimthat what isnever and
nowhere, it is not in the nature of things [rerum natura].40In one
sense McGu-ires interpretation of Newton is correct. As we have
already seen above, all things must existin space and time. To put
this in Steenbergens apt phrase: an entity exists only insofar
asits quantity of existence is speciable.41But as McGuires argument
develops he associates this doctrine with a further claim
thatNewton must deny that God exists in space in the manner of an
extended being (505).McGuires argument rests on the claim that any
being has a manner proper to itself of
beinginspaces(506;recallpassage[D]above).
TheupshotforMcGuireisthatquantityofexistence means something
different for God and bodies. For the former is a permanentthing
and the latter a successive thing (496ff; McGuire is relying on the
opening lines ofTempus et Locus and the General Scholium for his
argument). Crucially this is the case forMcGuires reading of Newton
because the successive things rely upon Divine will (497).But in
context (that is, of the claim that any being has a manner proper
to itself of beingin spaces) Newton wishes to deny that God is like
a body, extended and made of divisibleparts.42Newton is not
claiming that there are two ways of having a quantity of existence
inspace or two ways of having a quantity of existence in time. As
Steenbergen notes, Newtonis distinguishing between the fact of a
thing as existing in space and the manner in which itdoes so. So,
what is Newtons position in DeGrav?First, Newton indicates that he
is treating space and time symmetrically, something whichcarries
over in Principia (Gorham2011). This means that time is also a
condition of possibil-ity of all existing entities. Time is
presumably also indivisible, innite, etc. Whatever we sayabout the
emanative relation between God and space also holds between God and
time.Second, the geometric richness of space (and by analogy of
time) is sufcient for allthings to have determinate quantities of
extension and duration.43The significance of thisis that Newtons
two-fold method is not exhausted by mathematical propositions and
exper-imental conrmations; measurement is the method to establish a
way of being of entities.40McGuire (1978, 465), quoting Tempus et
Locus, CUL Ms. Add. 3965, Sect. 13, folio 545r.41See Steenbergen
unpublished ms. Here I cannot do justice to Steenbergens very
interesting reconstructionof the relationship among this point,
Newtons claims about affection, and emanation.42This is stressed in
Gorham (2011).43See, especially, DeGrav, 2223. It would have been
nice if Newton had also mentioned these geometricqualities in
passage [B] above; now their source is left unexplained. I thank
Katherine Brading for discussion.1 3464 E. SchliesserBefore I
explicate this (and what Newton means by quantity of existence) I
need to makean important point to prevent misunderstanding (and
distinguish my view from McGuires):being in space and in time is a
necessary condition for existence of an entity, but these (forlack
of a better word) dimensions of being do not exhaust the way of
being for Newton inDeGrav. Recall that Newton also allows that
entities can have different degrees of reality.As he writes, bodies
have a degree of reality that is of an intermediate nature
betweenGod and accident (Newton 2004 32). Now Newton asserts the
doctrine of different degreesof reality to help explain (as a kind
of error-theory) the Scholastic prejudice in applyingthe same word,
substance univocally to God and his creatures.44Bodies have
somesubstantial reality but are not themselves substances. This
makes sense in light of Newtonsclaim that a substance is absolute
in itself, while extension is not among the proper affec-tions that
denote substance, namely actions, such as thoughts in the mind and
motions inbodies (Newton 2004, 21). To have full reality is to be
the source of activity. This is not theplace to try to articulate
further what Newton could mean by this and the substance
monismtoward which it tends in DeGrav.Yet, third, when in the
mechanical sciences we individuate quantities, which exist in
somespace-timestructure,theycanthenhavesubstantialrealitywithoutinheringinasub-ject
(3233; see also Stein (2002), which also defends the use of the
slightly anachronisticspace-time language).45Newton insists against
Descartes that bodies must also have thecapacities to stimulate
perceptions in the mind by means of various bodies (35). For abody
to be a body in the mechanical sciences it must be susceptible to
measurement. (Thecriticism of Descartes treatment of motion boils
down to the claim that Descartes conceptscannot yield a determinate
motion, DeGrav, 20!) What is true of body is true of all entitiesas
a subject of mechanical science: they must have the ability to be
perceived by minds bymeans of other bodies. We can now appreciate
the relevance of [C*].In [C*], Newton is concerned with the way of
being of entities as appropriate to mechan-ical science. This is
why Newton focuses on quantities and sizes in [C*]; quantities
matterbecausetheyarewhatismeasured.Newtonisnot
claimingthatmeasurementrevealsallaspects of an entity. But if we
measure an entity then it exists as a magnitude in space and asa
magnitude in time.46This is why in DeGrav Newtons conception of
existence really helpsto lay truer foundations of the mechanical
sciences (21).IfGodexists, hehas(spatial andtemporal)magnitude.
IfwereadDeGravcarefullywe see it has a very radical message: if God
is going to be susceptible to analysis withinnatural philosophy
(see the General Scholium or Query 31 in Opticks), then it, too,
must besusceptible to measurement. No wonder Newton suppressed its
publication.4744This is one of the few places in DeGrav, where
Newton is in agreement with Descartes (Principles ofPhilosophy,
1.51). For more on such agreement, see Gorham (2011).45In earlier
draft I had claimed that for Newton we individuate entities. But as
Steenbergen notes, Newtondoes not say we can individuate an entity.
Rather he says we can individuate a quantity.46In private
correspondence (May 16, 2011), McGuire puts it as follows, that
being in a space-time nexusconfers actuality on things; but it also
indicates the magnitude of a things existence. Thus, having
magnitudeis a crucial part of what it is to have actuality, even
for God.47Goldish (1999) Newtons Of the Chuch: Its Kluwer, 148 and
162ff, points out that later in life Newtonrejected emanation
theories which he associated with Leibniz (see, for example,
Monadology; see also Dis-course on Metaphysics, 14). Moreover, on
Goldishs account emanation conicts with Newtons embrace ofa
voluntarist conception of God. On my account the Voluntarism only
becomes predominant with the
GeneralScholiumintroducedinthesecondeditionofthePrincipia.IthankJohnHenryforremindingmeofthesignificance
of Goldish piece.1 3Newtonian Emanation, Spinozism, Measurement
465Acknowledgments
TheauthorthanksZviBiener,SarahBrouillette,GeoffGorham,JohnHenry,GeoffMcDonough
Mogens Laerke, MaartenVan Dyck, and KarinVerelst for very helpful
comments on earlierdrafts. Moreover, I have beneted from Gordon
Steenbergen (ms) The Role of Measurement in NewtonsDe Gravitatione,
which has caught numerous ambiguities in my formulation of my
position, as well as Kath-erine Brading and Ted McGuire who
provided extremely insightful comments on the nal draft of this
paper.In fact, in the unpublished McGuire (2011), McGuire revisited
many of his earlier views that are criticallydiscussed here. Our
remaining differences on these matters are, I believe, now more a
matter of emphasisthan deep disagreement except for his ongoing
misgivings over my attempt to link Newtonian emanation
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ideas. NewYork: Simon&Schuster.Author BiographyEricSchliesser
(Ph.D.TheUniversityofChicago,2002)isBOFResearchProfessorinPhilosophyandMoral
Sciences at Ghent University. He writes about early modern
philosophy and science (especially Newton,Spinoza, Huygens,
Berkeley, Adam Smith, Hume, Sophie de Grouchy), the history of
sympathy research, andthe history and philosophy of recent
economics, especially Chicago Economics. He has co-edited volumeson
Adam Smith and Isaac Newton, and has agreed to edit various volumes
on sympathy, methodology inhistorical scholarship, and on neglected
philosophers.1 3
