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New tactics, sameobjectives: France'srelationship with NatoAdrian Treacher aa Department of Political Science andInternational Studies , University ofBirmingham , Edgbaston, Birmingham, B152TTPublished online: 28 Sep 2007.

To cite this article: Adrian Treacher (1998) New tactics, same objectives:France's relationship with Nato, Contemporary Security Policy, 19:2, 91-110,DOI: 10.1080/13523269808404192

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New Tactics, Same Objectives:France's Relationship with Nato

ADRIAN TREACHER

Introduction

An announcement by the then French Defence Minister Millon inDecember 1995 promised, based on certain provisos, to institutionalize asecret process begun at least a decade earlier: France's reintegration, afteralmost 30 years, into NATO's top military structures.1 For Joseph Fitchettthis meant that 'for all practical purposes, Paris has abandoned the doctrineof independence from NATO's military wing decreed by Charles deGaulle'.2 Although, admittedly, this new policy has stalled in the last year,it is still, nevertheless, moving forward. The change has been tactical and isindicative of a significant shift in French foreign policy, although the overallstrategic objectives remain unaltered.

At the systemic level, the end of the Cold War essentially meant thatFrance could no longer enjoy the great benefits it had learnt to extract fromthat bipolar, superpower stand-off. In any case, at the national leveleconomic realities, which had begun to have an impact well before thecollapse of the Berlin Wall, determined that France no longer had thefinancial resources to maintain such a position. Subsequently, the end of theMitterrand double septennat in 1995 removed what, at the personal level,had become a considerable obstacle to full Franco-NATO rapprochement.The latter provided the opportunity for the tactical changes necessitated bythe first two if France were to continue to pursue the twin long-term, almostsacrosanct, goals of grandeur and an elevated global rank.

These tactical changes have produced dramatic results. Historicallynoted for being a country apart, France has in the last few years beendeliberately modifying its distinctive character. Whereas traditionallyduring the Fifth Republic the strategic goals of global rank and grandeurhad been pursued by a policy of non-dependence on external powers and anemphasis on the French exception, the new tactics require France to relyincreasingly on the support, tacit or overt, of its Western partners. As a

Adrian Treacher is in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, Universityof Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT.

Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.19, No.2 (August 1998), pp.91-110PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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result, the notion of France's acting alone and unassisted within theinternational system is being downplayed in favour of co-operation and, tosome extent, harmonization with the rest of the former Western bloc. Withregard to NATO this has meant that France's strategic security goals are nolonger being served by remaining outside the Alliance's military decision-making organs.

This article thus looks at the evolving Franco-NATO relationship fromthe three analytical levels alluded to above. First, it focuses on the key roles,one more 'positive' than the other, played by the current President of theFifth Republic and his almost legendary immediate predecessor. Secondly,it elaborates upon the constraints placed on French security policy by theon-going imperative requirements of the domestic economy. Thirdly, itdescribes how virtually all the premises upon which France's traditionalpolicy towards NATO had been based disappeared with the end of the ColdWar and how French ambitions for Europe have had to be radically revised.The article then describes this revision process, characterized, almostinevitably, by an intense domestic political debate. Finally, the article placesthe new state of Franco-NATO relations in the wider, longer-term, contextof relative French global decline and the growing normalization of Franceas an international actor in the sense that the tactic of openly pushing theFrench exception has largely had to be dropped.

The Role of Personalities

At one level, the recent French moves towards NATO can be explained bythe actions and outlook of both the present incumbent at the Elysee, JacquesChirac, and his predecessor for 14 years, Francois Mitterrand. The latter,although appearing to be at times somewhat antagonistic, was willing tomake some formal gestures of rapprochement with the Alliance. However,he was vehemently opposed to any formal return of France to NATO'sintegrated military structures. In this way he was a considerable block toany 'progress' on this matter. He would have to relinquish his position ashead of the executive before the impasse could be overcome. The formermeanwhile, boosted in his first two years by a majority right-wing coalitiongovernment, would prove to be more flexible and open in this regard.Chirac would soon spearhead attempts to bring France fully back into theNATO fold. And despite some political rhetoric to the contrary, the presentleft-wing administration largely accepts this logic, although with somemisgivings about the modalities.

Mitterrand Would only Go so Far

It is conceivable that the recent transformation in Franco-NATO relations

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could have occurred earlier but for the opposition of Socialist PresidentFrancois Mitterrand. He effectively blocked any moves towards the formalreintegration of France. And yet, on taking over at the Elysee in 1981, hehad seemed intent on revitalizing and improving the Alliance from within.'Atlanticism' became increasingly favoured by the political elite. The newPresident's firm stand against the Soviet Union,3 for example, placed himfor a while among the Americans' staunchest allies. For Gregory Flynn,'under his presidency, the French government has undertaken several forceposture adjustments to further improve the interface between French andNATO forces, or to symbolize closer solidarity with France's allies'.4 At nopoint was this more apparent than in January 1983 when Mitterrand stoodbefore the German Bundestag and argued in favour of the proposeddeployment on German soil and elsewhere in western Europe of Americanintermediate nuclear forces.

The possibility of 'normalizing' relations with NATO was then broachedat the April 1990 summit between Presidents Bush and Mitterrand at KeyLargo. But for Mitterrand the overriding necessity had become the need tocontain future German power. He soon rejected the normalization option,reasoning that French strategic autonomy would be too severelycompromised within an Alliance subservient to an American-German axis.5

He did, however, go on to break Gaullist taboos during the second Gulf Warby putting French forces under US control6 and by allowing American B-52bombers to use French airfields. Then, in 1992, he accepted that theAlliance could play a role in peacekeeping and, in January 1993, that itcould have command of the Eurocorps for such operations, as well as inwartime.7 Moreover, the French were to become closely involved withNATO in the former Yugoslavia.

But there was a sense that Mitterrand would only go so far. As Cold Warcertainties collapsed, he tried to resist the disappearance of those elementswhich had strengthened France's international position: a divided Germanyand the bipolar system. To some extent he was retrospective and of thewrong generation. Consequently, as support grew on both the left and theright of the French political spectrum for a tightening of relations withNATO, successive Socialist administrations were willing to take only smalland inconspicuous steps in that direction. De Gaulle's supposed taboo onmilitary dependence on the Alliance was left largely intact and controversyavoided. Mitterrand resolutely believed that the arrangement functionedwell as it was, a view he felt was vindicated by the experiences of the GulfWar.8 Ultimately, he gave priority to the European approach. His attitudetowards the Alliance was cautious, constrained by a certain mistrust. Anypro-NATO gestures were thus afforded minimum visibility.9 Reflecting thisdominant Mitterrandist paradigm, Defence Minister Joxe also stressed a

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certain distrust of the US as the sole post-Cold War Superpower: 'there canbe a great temptation to rely on its protection. Some do. That is not ourchoice, so long as America itself is questioning the role and responsibilitiesthat it does or does not wish to accept.'10

The notion of Mitterrand's blocking the further deepening ofFranco-NATO relations was, however, somewhat softened by the 1993legislative victory of Edouard Balladur's centre-right RPR-UDF coalition.Traditional French caution towards the Alliance was dropped. ForeignMinister Juppe was able to declare in September 1993 that if the WEU11

could have some form of distinct existence within the NATO structure itshould be possible for France to rejoin some NATO structures such as theMilitary Committee.12 Mitterrand, for his part, increasingly consumed withterminal illness, steadily lost influence or was 'won over' by thegovernment's arguments. In his 'defence' it may be said that France'sreaction to the post-Cold War security environment was still underconsideration at the end of his tenure in 1995, only four years after the GulfWar and with the Yugoslav crisis still raging: the first defence White Papersince 1972 had appeared only the previous year and the StrategicCommittee13 had only just been launched.

A New Man at the Elysee

With Jacques Chirac's presidential success in 1995 following 14 years ofMitterrandism, it was only natural that the reflection on French securitypolicy begun by Balladur should be accentuated. One possible 'advantage'for Chirac and the centre-right government was that they came to powerwith the end of the Cold War as a fait accompli. In a sense, it was easier forthem to adjust French policy to allow for the fact that Europe was no longerdefined and divided by superpower rivalry and to accept that the world hadchanged and that therefore adjustments in France's posture had to be made.As Michel Tatu put it, Mitterrand 'had great difficulty in turning the corner.His successor inherited a situation that if not stable was at least clear."4 AndChirac's character was much more predisposed to a rapprochement with analliance dominated from Washington, having spent some time in the USAduring his college years. Besides, he has proved less sentimental than hispredecessor, with a smaller attachment to ideological principles and is farmore prone to taking risks.

Furthermore, his is a different vision of Europe. European constructionremains central, but there is far more emphasis on national sovereignty andthe nation state. As far as this concerns the French vision of a EuropeanSecurity and Defence Identity (ESDI), the approach has to beintergovernmental. This translates into a weaker enthusiasm for federaloptions such as the eventual absorption of the WEU into the EU's first pillar

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and a more sympathetic attitude towards NATO. The subsequent June 1997legislative victory of Lionel Jospin's Socialist-led coalition has, somedramatic posturing aside, not brought any dramatic change to this policy. Aswill be seen, the margin for manoeuvre is steadily diminishing.

Economic Imperatives

French governments have increasingly been faced with diminishingfinancial resources in pursuit of foreign policy goals which remained asambitious as ever. Economic constraints had, for example, forced de Gaullein the 1960s to choose between upgrading France's conventional forces orthe continuation of the nuclear programme. By the time of Mitterrand'spresidential term, France lacked the budgetary resources to meet all itssecurity obligations. Yet none of de Gaulle's successors chose to tamperwith the General's legacy, which had left France having to fund a world-wide military presence, an independent nuclear force and a distinctlynational armaments industry, while simultaneously contributing to theconventional defence of western Europe. The necessary hard choices werenot made and hence the country's unrealistic commitments weremaintained.

But the reality of France's position within the global market of the1990s, combined with the overwhelming priority of meeting the EU's entryrequirements for monetary union, led first to a further slowdown in theincreases to what was still a bloated defence budget (a trend already in placebefore the end of the Cold War), and then to actual defence cuts at a time ofexponentially mounting technical and equipment costs. In addition, thebenefits of a national defence industry, separate from other internationalventures, now seemed minimal. Therefore the scope for de Gaulle-stylepolitical manoeuvre had been dramatically cut. Where else could Franceturn if not to its European partners and to NATO? Otherwise France riskedfalling irreparably behind in crucial, new, military technologies. At the sametime, there was the prospect of boosting French arms sales (a major sourceof domestic employment) that had fallen dramatically since the end of theCold War. Expansion of the Alliance eastward, through Partnership forPeace or full membership, requires these countries ultimately to acquireNATO-compatible electronic, communications and general militaryequipment. France would be in a better position to exploit this market bybeing closer to the Alliance.15

In part at least then, the actions of France's two Presidents of the 1990scombined with the exigences of the domestic economy aid an understandingof the dramatic recent revision of France's NATO policy. But more isneeded. The inevitable return of France to the Alliance's military structures

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has also to be appreciated at the structural level. It is equally the product ofFrance's revised self-assessment, given the new security environmentemerging from the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of theSoviet Union.

Implications of the New Security Environment

Some of the fundamental assumptions upon which French foreign policyhad rested throughout the Fifth Republic no longer applied in the post-ColdWar security environment. This prompted the need for a wholesale tacticalreassessment and hence a belated, open, national security debate. France'sambitions for an operational and autonomous European - or at least westEuropean - security organ foundered on the responses of its key Europeanpartners, Britain and Germany. While the north Atlantic alternative, NATO,which might have been expected to whither slowly away with the Cold Warover, actually thrived, showing a remarkable capacity to reform itself andadapt to the changed circumstances.

The Loss of Key Points of Reference

The drawn-out processes collectively termed the 'end of the Cold War' sentShockwaves throughout the French foreign policy-making system as theycaused some basic underlying assumptions, based on the legacy of deGaulle, to become obsolete. The relatively comfortable position France hadenjoyed since the early 1960s as a result of favourable geostrategicconditions (for example, the self-defined role of 'balancer' in a bipolarEurope) received a series of major jolts. There followed the painfulrealization that in many ways French policy was out of step with the newworld.16 Its global rank and status, and to a large extent its national identity,had been defined with reference to an international framework that was nomore. To a large extent the end of the Cold War removed the basis ofFrance's international 'exceptionalism'. Serious questions regarding, forexample, France's largely nationalist defence policy were now being raised.Its nuclear weapons capacity, hitherto one of the fundamental instrumentsof national independence, was now largely devalued in the absence of aprincipal foreign adversary. Equally, traditional French objections to theAlliance as a tool of the international bloc system to which France had beenopposed were now negated.

The Yugoslav crisis then served to compound the sense, alreadyprevalent after the Gulf War, of the country's relative powerlessness on theinternational stage. The post-Cold War world was one in which the capacityto act counted far more than the ability just to 'talk a good game'. TheFrench were now reduced to promoting links with the US so as to encourage

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the latter to remain in what could otherwise become a German-dominatedEurope.17 The power balance within the Franco-German relationship hadshifted markedly in favour of Bonn: being closer to the Americans could beof some comfort to the worried French. In addition, according to MargaretBlunden, the Gulf War had 'raised the level of French consciousness ofdisturbing potential developments in the South, including the proliferationof nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; the spread of ballistic missiletechnology; and the widening demographic gap between the developed andthe developing world... Implicit in the emphasis on threats from the Southwas the need to move closer to the "North"."8 The experience of the crisesin the former Yugoslavia and Algeria also revived the danger of militaryconflict close to French borders and graphically illustrated the diminishingability of existing international institutions to instill order and a peacefulresolution. The world was experiencing rapid change, Europe wasbecoming a more dangerous place, and it no longer felt so comfortablebeing the maverick of the Western world. The need for firm commitmentswith one's partners became increasingly imperative.

Europe Fails to Meet French Expectations

It had already become abundantly clear by the time of Chirac's arrival at theEly see that most of France's European partners were not prepared, inFrench eyes, to contemplate the necessary defence expenditure to meet bythemselves all the new security threats.19 Instead, they were content to 'hide'behind American power. Simultaneously, German reunification had put anend to hopes in Paris that a Europe could be built largely to French designs.This would have been a Europe in which Paris pulled the strings in order topreserve French national grandeur and to achieve global rank in the guiseof Europe. It now seemed as though Germany rather than France was set todetermine Europe's future direction and character. The acceptance in Francethat its ambitions for Europe would remain unobtainable for the foreseeablefuture became more widespread with events in Yugoslavia. This wassupposed to mark 'Europe's hour', when the Europeans would be in aposition to balance American military power and finally take in hand thesecurity of their own arena, when the European Union's Common Foreignand Security Policy would become a dramatic reality and when, possibly,concrete progress could have been made towards an autonomous, operative,European identity as the best way for Paris to realize its internationalobjectives. At best however, the crisis was only contained. Moreover,relative peace on the ground was only finally achieved in 1995 via the^4/nencan-brokered Dayton Agreement. The unfurling of ever-worseningevents in Bosnia was the defining moment when it became unquestionablyclear in Paris that France's west European partners had failed her, that they

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were markedly lacking the political will to allow the French to realize theirgeopolitical ambitions,20 that they lacked confidence in Europe's ability toact alone in security matters and to have a common defence policy(Germany and the UK, in particular, were loath to be seen to bechampioning the WEU and thereby encouraging the isolationist lobbyinside the US). Indeed, the 1994 French Defence White Paperacknowledged as much, ruling out 'an integrated military organization in afederal-type European framework'.21 Paris was accepting that the Europeanswould still need the Americans to cajole them into action and to give ESDIany impetus.

The whole process of further European integration was now in doubtgiven the faltering progress of the Maastricht Treaty on European Uniontowards ratification: during 1992, Danish voters initially rejected the Treaty,the French barely voted in favour, the British government had enormousdifficulties in pushing the Treaty through Parliament and nervousspeculators came close to bringing down the Union's Exchange RateMechanism, the intended forerunner of the single currency. In addition,there was a certain reluctance among the smaller countries to forsake theirstrong sentimental links to the Alliance and to American leadership insecurity matters in favour of probable Franco-German dominance.22 AndFrance had undermined its own position somewhat by refusing to relinquishnational independence for deeper European integration. The clear messagewas that it would require much more time for any truly autonomousEuropean political identity, along French lines, to emerge. In the meantime,the credibility of the EU and the WEU as definitive security organizationswas taking a series of potentially fatal blows in Bosnia as their roles becameincreasingly peripheral. French plans for Europe were becoming unravelled.Some form of alternative, more realistic, approach had to be devised withFrance and its European partners working in concert. From 1993, with thereturn of the Right to government, focus began to shift towards the AtlanticAlliance as a conduit for French ambitions.

While NATO Prospers

There certainly seems to have been some surprise among the Frenchleadership, and perhaps others, that not only did NATO remain fully intactafter the end of the Cold War, having seemingly run its course, but also that,rather than becoming marginalized, it managed to evolve and adapt withrenewed vigour to the new security environment by broadening its role.23

Some French observers had argued that with NATO having realized itsprimary objective of deterring Soviet aggression, western Europe shouldprepare for an eventual American military withdrawal from the region bybuilding up its own defence capability.24 To this end the French could be

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observed employing certain spoiling tactics with regard to the Alliance.They launched a wholly European rapid reaction capability in response tosimilar NATO moves. For a while they argued against any major expansionof the Alliance's political role, in particular regarding central and easternEurope. Paris failed to give strong support to NATO's dialogue with theseregions via the North Atlantic Co-operation Council. In addition, it initiallyresisted moves to bestow a major role on NATO during the crisis in theformer Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, Paris was championing the WEU asEurope's primary security organization. But the fact that the USdemonstrated a willingness to maintain its European commitment, even ifreduced, lessened the likelihood of any autonomous European security bodywith a real capacity to act emerging, not least because countries would bewilling to continue their reliance on the US.

But French perceptions of the US have shifted. There was dismay at theAmericans' initial reaction to the Bosnian crisis. 'Rather than fearing acontinuing US hegemony in western Europe that the end of the Cold Warhad rendered unjustifiable', wrote Robert P. Grant, 'France started to worrymore about US disengagement, an outcome that would be all the morealarming in light of the limitations of Europe's intervention in Bosnia.'25

American attitudes have likewise undergone something of a turn around. Tothe extent that President Clinton began actively to encourage Europeaninitiatives; accepting, for example, that European troops could functionwithin or outside NATO without weakening the Alliance. Washingtonclearly sees France as a crucial player if the Alliance is to redistribute themilitary burden among its members successfully.

Meanwhile, in Europe itself the French appear to have been the subjectof a fair degree of lobbying on behalf of the Alliance, particularly by theBritish and the Germans. The latter, for example, encouraged French movestowards the Organization with the promise of support for attempts at itsreform. The December 1996 Nuremberg Declaration is a case in point. It isalso possible that the Germans used the Eurocorps as a means of easingFrench participation in NATO's military structures.26 While it seems equallyevident that increasing Franco-British military co-operation, from nuclearplanning to co-ordinated naval patrols, from the joint experiences in Bosniato the creation of a joint air command, similarly served to bring the Frenchcloser to the military branch of the Alliance.

On a more practical level, NATO's reform of its patterns of deployment,so that most national forces remained in their home countries except intimes of crisis, potentially provided greater scope for co-operation betweenFrench and American conventional troops, building on the experience of theGulf War. France also had to acknowledge the useful role an American-dominated NATO can play in those overseas interventions for which it

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lacked the capacity to act alone. Bosnia was another important experiencein this regard. Furthermore, the more closely France worked with NATO,the more it came to realize that some of its preconceptions had beenmisguided. Watching the British at close quarters in Bosnia, for instance,revealed that members of the Alliance's military structure can still retainreasonable scope for manoeuvre. Some level of national independence andreintegration with NATO's military commands were not necessarilyincompatible. At the same time with regard to Bosnia, the Alliance appearedto accommodate certain French demands: the Atlantic Council saw its rolein planning operations increase, while the role of SHAPE (the integratedsupreme command) was downplayed in favour of the military committee.27

And, if the French were accepting that NATO was going to perpetuate itspre-eminence in European security rather than be supplanted by some otherorganization, then France had to acknowledge this and acquaint its troopswith large-scale NATO-type battlefield command and control practices.

To a large extent, taking all these factors into account, France had to 'getcloser' to NATO; indeed, between 1993 and 1994 it had already createdmilitary missions at three NATO permanent commands. In Bosniathousands of French troops on the ground came under NATO's operationalcontrol. It was clearly imperative that France's Defence Minister and Chiefof Staff now sat on, and had an influential voice in, those committeesdetermining the fate of French forces, especially given the rising number ofFrench casualties and fatalities. The subsequent signing of the Dayton PeaceAccord, with provision for a NATO-led implementation force (IFOR), theassigning of a similar follow-up force (SFOR) and the correspondingsidelining of the United Nations' role in the crisis, only heightened theurgency in Paris for the French to avoid any further marginalization inNATO's military command structure.

Equally, NATO's embracing of the CJTF (Combined Joint Task Force)concept in 1995 appears to have been key in bringing France to the brink offully returning to the Alliance's military fold. Formal provision forEuropean-only military operations but with the use of NATO (American)assets has gone a long way in convincing many policy-makers in Paris thatFrench strategic interests can be served by a strengthening of military tieswith an Atlantic Alliance which is steadily, from their point of view, beingEuropeanized. By co-operating and by trying to influence the reformprocess from the inside, they can argue, France has been able to steer theAlliance in a direction which potentially could compliment the whole thrustof French security policy.

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Reassessment

France's options had thus become self-evident by 1995. After five or sixpost-Cold War years there was still no prospect of a distinct, autonomousand competent European defence and security institution emerging. Thisimplied that if France were still committed to developing ESDI as envisagedby the Maastricht Treaty, then the anomalous relationship with NATO, theorganization which provided the essential guarantee of the EU's territoryand freedom, had to be resolved. This involved, for example, convincingFrance's partners that it was not working to undermine NATO. But thatrather a concerted effort would have to be made to forge some form ofEuropean identity, or personality, within the Atlantic Alliance.28 Observerssuch as William Pfaff noted that the west Europeans had, in the first yearsof the post-Cold War era, missed their chance to take control of the newEuropean order.29 The reality was now that 'the "European defence identity"will be built within NATO or will not be built at all.'30 NATO was nowacknowledged by France as fundamental if ESDI were to be anything but avague, hazy concept, as having become more, not less, important forEuropean security. 'Europe' could not now be built by opposing the US.France had to end its relative isolation in the European security dialogue.The past policy of antagonism was now counterproductive. Essentially,France had to help to forge Europe's new security shapes, namely NATOreform, before its position of influence was fully eroded. For Daniel Vernet,'France, which had for a time entertained the notion of a European defenceentity that was allied to and complemented the United States, but which wasindependent, has just made a double acknowledgement: the Europeans haveneither the financial means nor the political will to be independent. With ourprincipal partners integrated in NATO, it is in NATO that the "Europeandefence identity" has to be asserted.'31

Moreover, it was now clear that the countries of central and easternEurope were looking to the Atlantic Alliance, rather than to theOrganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe or the EU/WEU forsecurity guarantees. Hence the significance of the Alliance's military andpolitical activities was set to increase as they were bestowed with new tasks.They were evolving into something much more than a defence organization.It became a growing priority that France participate fully in the negotiationsso as to direct the reform process in a direction most favourable to Frenchinterests and before the Alliance began the process of enlargement to theeast. This implied a loosening of the structure so as to conform to France'sown ideas of multinational co-operation. According to Defence Minister DeCharette, 'We admitted that the prospect of the Alliance's enlargement andreform made it necessary that France be on the inside rather than the outside

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so as to contribute to the work and debates. So long as nothing washappening within the Alliance, this question never arose.'32

The French leadership's reappraisal of the global security environmentthus appeared to conclude that a new strategic doctrine favouring efficientconventional modes of intervention, and hence much closer military co-operation with NATO, was now a necessity. There seemed to be littlecontinued justification for France's 'empty chair' policy towards NATO'smilitary arm. France's centre-right-led retour to the Alliance may hence beinterpreted as a logical, if belated, reaction to the new security environment;as an attempt to halt the country's self-perceived slide towards internationalmarginalization. Without the illusion tricks made possible by the Cold War,the country simply does not have the capacity, apart from the occasionaldramatic initiative, to be the consistently major player of a global orderrequired by its overall strategic objectives: rank and grandeur. In this sense,Chirac made a simple calculation: France has to sacrifice a measure of(often notional) national sovereignty for the reality of continued influence.He may be said to have, at least temporarily, abandoned the traditionalFrench goal of an autonomous European security identity for one within theconfines of NATO, but one which has more chance of becoming somethingtenable. In front of the American Congress Chirac emphasized: 'the spirit ofopenness and receptiveness with which France approaches NATO reform,including in the military sphere, so long as it fully maintains the Europeanidentity.'33

Ironically, it was the Socialists who decried these moves as a betrayal ofGaullism, as the voluntary sacrifice of national sovereignty with nothingguaranteed in return. France, it was argued, did have a choice. It could haveremained outside NATO's military structures. Former Defence MinisterQuiles, for example, believed that some non-NATO alternatives for ESDI,in particular the WEU, had not been fully explored.34 Equally, he pointed outthat two NATO summits had already recognized a European defenceidentity without the French having to sacrifice any of their sovereignty orindependent status.35 Hence for Quiles, the notions of this identity and of aEuropean defence already had significant credibility. While PierreDebezies, as part of the older generation of Gaullists within the RPR, fearedthat with CJTF Chirac has just offered the keys to French national securityto the Americans; effectively making the US the sixteenth member of theEU,36 with a double veto on both the objective and the means of any ESDIoperation.

Supporters of the President denied such a betrayal, pointing out that deGaulle had been above all else a pragmatist and that he too had attemptedto reform NATO from within. Hence the policy was aimed at a redesigning,rather than the abandoning, of defensive autonomy. Observers such as Jean

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Klein saw no contradiction between the policy of Chirac and that of deGaulle on this matter." Moreover, there were some rhetorical attempts tostress that it was the Alliance which had moved closer to France, rather thanthe other way around. As Chirac himself put it, this 'opens the way to fulland complete French participation in the structures of an alliance whoseprinciples and operating procedures will have been profoundlytransformed.'38 Or in the words of de Charette: 'so that no onemisunderstands the meaning of our rapprochement with NATO. We expectthe Organization to be transformed; that coherent command elements whichcan be utilized for European operations be identified within its militarystructures; that these elements allow a European identity to develop withinthe context of Atlantic solidarity.'39

Furthermore, Chirac was able to make such a move because of its lowstanding as a live political issue. This was no huge political gamble. By1996 much of French public opinion had already taken on board the majorloss of French national sovereignty to the EU, as well as the largelysymbolic, military co-operation with the old German enemy. And there hadbeen no mass outcry after disclosures that France's nuclear weaponsprogramme had benefited from secret American scientific assistance andthat French warships operated at sea using only standard NATO commandsand communicated with each other in English.40 This followed a similarambivalence concerning Franco-American co-operation during the GulfWar when France was quite clearly the junior partner.

Thus by the second half of 1995 the leadership's assessment of Franco-NATO relations had undergone something of a transformation. It wasdeemed that France had to revise its ambitions for a Europe 'directed' fromParis and instead had to strive for some form of active European identitywithin a reforming Atlantic Alliance. And this interpretation appears to beshared by Jospin's administration, installed at the Matignon since June1997. No open challenge to Chirac's policy has been issued, although Jospinis known to fear the subordination of French nuclear forces to decisionstaken within the Alliance.41 And no formal reintegration of France intoNATO occurred at the Alliance's July 1997 Madrid summit, with the Frenchseemingly holding out for further concessions. But this may have been moreto do with the new Socialist-led government's attempting to 'win' policy-making territory from the centre-right Elysee. For it is widelyacknowledged that a France determined to retain its fundamental foreignpolicy goals of rank and grandeur, a concept to which both the centre-rightand the left are fervently committed, has no alternative but to fully embraceNATO.

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The Loss of Exceptionalism?

In a wider context, the recent developments in Franco-NATO relations maybe said to have a deeper significance, as a symbol of a country finally andopenly accepting its slide from great to medium power. This has meantdiscarding much of the jealously guarded specialness as an internationalactor. The French, and particularly de Gaulle, had been masters atdisguising this decline during the Cold War, exploiting the rigidity of thesystem to maintain an elevated level of global influence well in excess oftheir actual means. They were thus able to act with a large amount ofindependence on the international stage, and their inherent flamboyanceonly accentuated the notion of France being a country apart, a country thatmattered more than most. The end of the Cold War removed most of theprops for this delusion. The subsequent years have seen the French adjust tothe new realities and acknowledge the need for tactical changes of policy.They can only play a world role beyond their means and promote Frenchgrandeur by obtaining the 'assistance' of Europe and asking it to achievewhat they can no longer achieve by themselves. National ambitions in termsof the French exception are having to be cut back. If this is the case, theFrench have been dealing with NATO from a position of weakness. Theyclearly appeared to have travelled furthest to reach the 'compromise'promoted at the June 1996 NATO summit in Berlin which spawned CJTF42

And did Chirac and his advisers overestimate the welcome, and theaccompanying concessions, that France would receive from its Alliancepartners? What could the French do if they deemed that sufficient progresshas not been made towards the establishment of ESDI within the Alliance?The answer appears to be not much. Although they refused to re-enterNATO's integrated military structure at the July 1997 Madrid summit,43

economic and geopolitical realities leave them no credible alternative tocontinuing to work for ESDI within the Alliance. Indeed, the Frenchstressed that they were keen to continue the dialogue. This could also be theconclusion drawn from the EU's June 1997 Amsterdam summit where littleprogress was made in building on the vague provisions of the MaastrichtTreaty for a fully developed CFSP and ESDI within the Union.

In many ways, the myth of French specificite is steadily being laid torest. By the time of Chirac's presidential inauguration, pretensions thatFrance was blazing a 'third way' between the industrialized countries andthe third world, between the 'Western' and 'Socialist/Communist' models,in the social and the economic sphere had all but disappeared; Mitterrand's1981-83 economic experiment being the final proof. Moreover, France, asone of Europe's eldest states, has been one of a handful of countries that hasrested on the traditional view that 'power' comes with military and

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diplomatic might.44 This view too is changing. Foreign affairs make up thelast element of de Gaulle's policy to succumb to the realities of the mid-1990s. There is less and less room to behave as did de Gaulle in foreignaffairs. Fewer attempts are being made to pursue a unique diplomatic path.Although familiar policy contradictions continue to re-emerge from time totime, opposing, for Michel Fortmann, 'attachment to the national ideal, thatis becoming less and less credible, to the pull of Europe, which is tolling thebell for French specificity.'4S

A further analysis could be that France has finally, after years of internaltorment following the national humiliation of 1940, reconciled itself to itsreal position and standing in the world, as well as to its past. The sense ofinsecurity, as demonstrated by an almost aggressive internationalassertiveness, has steadily diminished. As the national memory of 1940(and, indeed, of previous national humiliations) fades with each generationso the feeling of national accommodation with France's medium-powerstatus rises.46 At the same time, the rest of the world has become accustomedto the French behaving as they do on the world stage, so that theirexceptionalism is less evident. France is expected to behave sometimes in aunique manner, to demonstrate its 'quirkiness'; but this is perhapsincreasingly more a question of style rather than substance.

The fundamental goals of French foreign policy remain the quest forglobal rank and the pursuit of grandeur. French national political cultureforces the country to have an overtly external outlook, to have an inherentpreoccupation with its international standing. 'Her ambitions of grandeur',wrote Marie-Claude Smouts, 'still feed on the dreams of distant horizons.She cannot imagine herself without a presence beyond her borders and aninfluence overseas.'47 For France, international identity is an essential partof the national identity. This is unlikely to change. Inherently, France cannotbe silent on the international stage. Continued gestures of independence canbe interpreted as both vain efforts at self-denial of national decline or asfundamental elements of France's character. But essentially the tactics it isnow having to employ to achieve its fundamental foreign policy goals makeits international behaviour now increasingly similar to that of its partnersand allies: military and technological co-operation, emphasis on thecommon approach, the improved relationship with NATO. Some insecurityof national identity and of relative decline still linger and it is these whichpush France to, at times, go out on a limb, as seen recently with nucleartesting or separate diplomatic missions to the Middle East.

Conclusion

Several explanations have been presented above as accounts for recent

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French moves towards formally rejoining NATO's military structure. Thesehave either been presented at the individual, the national or the internationallevel, or they have come as part of a wider assessment of France's comingto terms with its loss of great power status in the classic sense of the term.But these do not proffer any clear indication as to just what the French nowwant the Organization to become. Certainly, great emphasis is placed onincreasing the decision-making powers of the NAC at the expense of themilitary commands. Emphasis is likewise placed on peacekeepingoperations being undertaken outside the integrated military commandstructure. But beyond those things become vague. Certainly, CJTF does notmark the Alliance's 'Europeanization'. Rather, it represents theacknowledgement of continued American supremacy, as the deal wouldseem to have been struck on American terms, in the face of the inadequaciesof all security alternatives to NATO. The Americans do not appear to havemade any real sacrifices or concessions. Equally, with the diplomatic rowover NATO's southern command Chirac came up against American resolveto maintain its hegemony.

In one sense it is almost as if the French used the Berlin and the MadridDeclarations as a convenient smokescreen hiding the fact that they have hadto end their distinct position with regard to NATO. Chirac had to be able toconvince that he had obtained something in return. Besides, just what kindof event, other than a humanitarian crisis, would lead to a 'Europe only'response? It seems unlikely, based on the experience of the last few years,that for the foreseeable future a purely European force could be broughttogether for any purpose of even one-twentieth of the size of the alliancethat freed Kuwait.48 This hardly matches traditional French aspirations forthe Europeans' taking full responsibility for their security.

Are the French now totally committed to NATO, with some form ofEuropean pillar, as the sole military organization for Europe, or are they stillworking towards the goal of an autonomous European entity completelyseparate from the Alliance? Certainly, the latter has not been officiallyrenounced. To have more Europe tomorrow, are they having NATO now?Whatever the longer-term outcome, a tactical decision is being made thatNATO is the only organ in which, at present, progress towards Frenchstrategic aims can be made. In the future, Paris may push for some form ofinformal NATO directory, as de Gaulle attempted to do in the early 1960sand his predecessors attempted to do a decade earlier, comprising France,America, Britain and Germany. But many of France's Western partners arenot yet ready to accept its 'European credentials' in the field of defence andsecurity after decades of devout French attachment to national sovereigntyand independence.49 Are the French truly prepared to forgo their cherishedmilitary independence in the name of some integrated European entity?

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These partners cannot help but be sceptical given the past vacillations ofParis over the European question. Moreover, as Yost observes, the historicantagonisms which emerge everytime one European state tries to get aheadof the others and recast the continental balance of power have to beovercome.50 The European states prefer to be 'equally unequal rather thanaccord to any one of their number the privileged status enjoyed by theUnited States within the Atlantic Alliance'.51 But if the French succeed inforging a working European arm of the Alliance what does this imply forthe future of the EU in defence and security matters? Would this not simplysupersede EU efforts?52 Have the French abandoned the CFSP concept andwhat future, particularly after the EU's Amsterdam summit, for thesupposed fusion of the WEU and the EU? Clearly, the future link betweenthe EU and NATO will be the crucial one.

Chirac, by sacrificing French sovereignty to NATO, becomes the firstPresident of the Fifth Republic to make an open and long-term break withGaullist foreign policy tactical orthodoxies. Gone is the sentiment thatFrance should distance itself from all international initiatives that it cannotcontrol. While an emphasis on independence of action appears to have beendowngraded. However, the basic goals of maximizing France's world rankand French grandeur remain firmly in place. These are fundamental to whatFrance is. Perhaps, Chirac's tenure in presidential office will mark France'stransition from living according to vague Gaullist legacies to a countrywilling to come to terms with the security environment of the twenty-firstcentury. The struggle of the French for specificite in a largely American-dominated global society will continue, but is set to be fought almostexclusively in the cultural domain. The French, for de Montbrial, continueto retain 'a lofty conception of their history, and of the wealth of theirliterary, philosophical, artistic or scientific culture'.53 And they will continueto boast of their having fostered the values of the eighteenth-centuryEnlightenment. La Francophonie will be the principal instrument of Parisfor this struggle. French language and culture will be vigorously promoted,principally in 'competition' with Anglo-Saxon alternatives.

This article has argued that the Cold War was used by successive FrenchPresidents to disguise the fact that France was no longer a great power, andthis was as much for domestic as for external consumption. The realities ofthe post-Cold War security environment, some of which emerged before1991, have forced the current leadership to change its approach tointernational relations, but without compromising strategic goals. Thetraditional tactics provided little gain for French rank and greatness giventhe new 'rules'. France thus has calculated that it has to begin to behave likeany other medium-size Western power. But for the French more than most,the process of acknowledging limitations and inadequacies is particularly

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traumatic. Their leaders have attempted to postpone the day of reckoningfor as long as possible.

NOTES

Much of the research for this article was conducted in Paris during the summers of 1996 and1997. Thanks are due to those who gave their time in discussion. Salient points by particularindividuals are referenced wherever possible; thanks are also due to those members of the Frenchgovernment and military who chose to remain off the record. The author expresses his gratitudeto Stuart Croft and Burkhard Schmidt whose feedback on earlier drafts was most useful.

1. In a series of formal moves, the French rejoined most of the Atlantic Alliance's militaryorgans and committees they had left in 1966; although they officially remain outside of theintegrated command structure.

2. Joseph Fitchett, 'France Drops Gaullist Boycott of NATO's Military', International HeraldTribune, 6 Dec. 1995.

3. Western fears concerning France's loyalties following Mitterrand's appointment of fourcommunist ministers in his first administration had to be allayed. Mitterrand therefore wentto great lengths to distance himself from the leadership in Moscow and to make suitably pro-Western noises and gestures.

4. Gregory Flynn, French NATO Policy: The Next Five Years (RAND, 1990), p.7.5. Margaret Blunden, 'France after the Cold War: Inching Closer to the Alliance', Defense

Analysis, Vol.9, No.3, 1993, pp.261-2.6. Although, in private, it had always been understood during the Cold War that French troops

would operate under American command in the event of an attack on western Europe by theSoviet Union.

7. As the Franco-German Brigade, Eurocorps had initially been devised to operate outsideNATO structures as a distinct European entity. It also partly served as a riposte to theformation of the Alliance's British-led Rapid Reaction Force. See for example, HeinzSchulte, 'France Could Play the Spoiler in NATO', Wall Street Journal Europe, 21 Oct. 1992.

8. A view supported during numerous research interviews by the author in Paris, June and July1996. See also Edward Mortimer, 'Europe's Teetering Pillar', Financial Times, 1 May 1991.

9. Robert P. Grant, 'France's New Relationship with NATO', Survival, Vol.38, No.1, Spring1996, p.64.

10. Pierre Joxe, in his opening address to the New Strategic Debate Conference, Paris, 29 Sept.1992.

11. Resurrected by France in the mid-1980s to be the principal 'vehicle' of ESDI (EuropeanSecurity and Defence Identity).

12. Alain Juppe, during a press conference at the opening of the 48th session of the UN GeneralAssembly, 27 Sept. 1993.

13. Established in the wake of the Gulf War to assess France's performance in the conflict andto present the lessons learnt concerning the requirements of the country's military capabilityin the new post-Cold War security environment.

14. Michel Tatu, 'Précis de politique étrangère à l'usage du nouveau Président', PolitiqueInternationale, No.67, Printemps 1995, p.206.

15. Mark Yost, 'Why France Wants back in NATO', Wall Street Journal Europe, 24 Jan. 1996.16. Francois Bujon de L'Estang, 'Time for a New French Foreign Policy', Wall Street Journal

International, 30 March 1993.17. 'France Is Getting Involved', International Herald Tribune, 4 March 1994.18. Margaret Blunden, 'France after the Cold War', p.262.19. Defence expenditures were actually declining elsewhere within the EU. 'Burying the

General', Economist, 20 April 1996, p.25.20. France sought an autonomous EU, with its own foreign and security policy, that was linked

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to its North American partners in a looser Atlantic Alliance that would eventually becomebipolar, with two fully-developed and equal components. See Alexis Seydoux and JeromePaolini, 'From Interblocking to Institutional Evolutionism', in Mark Curtis et al. (eds.),Challenges And Responses To Future European Security: British, French And GermanPerspectives (Brussels: European Strategic Group, 1993), p.187.

21. Quoted in Soell, 'Explanatory Memorandum' in A European Security Policy (WesternEuropean Union General Assembly, Doc.1439, 10 Nov. 1994), p.7.

22. Panel discussion on The Changing Franco-American Security Relationship, US-CREST,Arlington, 1993, p.44.

23. Author's interview with Dominique David, Chargé de Mission auprès du Directeur, InstitutFrançais des Relations Internationales, Paris, July 1996.

24. Alan Riding, 'Paris Moves to End Isolation in NATO', International Herald Tribune, 30Sept. 1992.

25. Robert P. Grant, 'France's New Relationship with NATO', p.64.26. William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, 'France's Evolving Policy towards NATO',

Strategic Review, Vol. 23, No.3 (Summer 1995), p.20.27. Burkhard Schmitt,, 'France's Alliance Policy in a Changing World', Aussenpolitik, Vol.47,

No.4 (Winter 1996) p.350.28. François Heisbourg, 'La réintégration de la France dans I'OTAN', Les Echos, 4 Jan. 1996.29. Cited in André Fontaine, 'Diplomatic Francaise: Jacques Chirac et l'ombre du Général',

Politique Internationale, No.70 (Winter 1995-96), p.84.30. Jean Quatremer, editorial in Libération, 17 Jan. 1996.31. Daniel Vernet, 'L'OTAN fait une place à l'Europe en son sein', Le Monde, 4 June 1996, p.2.32. Hervé De Charette, interview with Le Figaro, 20 Dec. 1995.33. Jacques Chirac, quoted in Jean-Marc Gonin, 'Otan: Chirac l'Atlantique', L'Express, 8 Feb.

1996, p.26.34. Cited in Les Echos, 17 Jan. 1996.35. Paul Quilès, 'Défense européenne et OTAN: la dérive', Le Monde, 11 June 1996, p.14.36. Idem.37. Jean Klein is Maître de recherche at l'Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris;

he was interviewed by the author in July 1996. See also Klein, 'La France, le réorganisationdu systéme de sécurité occidental et la sécurité européenne', paper presented at the Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Paris, Sept. 1995, p.1.

38. Jacques Chirac, quoted in Craig R. Whitney, 'France to Be Fully in NATO', InternationalHerald Tribune, 10 June 1996.

39. Hervé de Charette, speech to the Institute for Higher National Defence Studies, Paris, 2 April1996.

40. Joseph Fitchett, 'France in the '90s: Has the Time Arrived to Shatter the Gaullist Icon?',International Herald Tribune, 7 May 1990.

41. 'Jospin, l'Otan et la cohabitation', L'Express, 6 Feb. 1997, p. 30.42. Jay Branegan, 'A New Look for NATO', Time, 17 June 1996, p.42. The Berlin Summit made

formal provision for the formation of a European Security and Defence Identity within theAtlantic Alliance 'which will enable all European allies to make a more coherent andeffective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of ourshared responsibilities; to act themselves as required; and to reinforce the transatlanticpartnership'. Provision was made for the use of 'separable but not separate militarycapabilities in operations led by the WEU'. Furthermore, all European members should bein a position 'to play a larger role in NATO's military and command structure'.

43. Chirac declared that the Alliance had not done enough to reform itself into an organizationthat was 'lighter, cheaper, more flexible and more effective'. Quoted in Michael Evans,'Chirac Bows to Anglo-US Deal', The Times, 9 July 1997, p.13.

44. Interviews by the author with Pierre Jacquet, Directeur-Adjoint, Institut Français desRelations Internationales, Paris, and Dominique Moïsi, op cit, July 1996.

45. Michel Fortmann, 'Entre l'eurovolontarisme et le réalisme: la France et la sécuritéEuropeenne en mutation', Relations Internationales Et Stratégiques, No.12, Winter 1993,p.5.

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46. Didier Grange (pseud.), 'Pour une nouvelle politique étrangère', Esprit, No.186, Nov. 1992,p.20. Supported during several interviews conducted by the author in Paris during June andJuly 1996.

47. Marie-Claude Smouts, 'The Fifth Republic and the Third World', in Paul Godt (ed.), Policy-Making in France (London: Pinter, 1989), p.235.

48. 'The Defence of Europe: It Can't Be Done', Economist, 25 Feb. 1995, p.24.49. Nicole Gnesotto, 'La France et la défense Européenne', Sciences et Vie, March 1996.50. Mark Yost, 'Why France Wants back in NATO'.51. Edward A. Kolodziej, French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou: The

Politics of Grandeur (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp.74-5.52. France had consistently opposed augmenting the political competence of the Atlantic

Alliance so as to preserve the foreign policy role it had mapped out for the European Union.See for example, Joseph Fitchett, 'France Eases NATO's Problems', International HeraldTribune, 21 April 1990.

53. Thierry de Montbrial, 'French "Exception", Yes, and It Isn't Likely to Fade Away Soon',International Herald Tribune, 14 Sept. 1995.

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