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NEW ENGLAND SECURE MILK SUPPLY PLAN
FOR MILK MOVEMENT DURING A FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE OUTBREAK
(September 1, 2015)
Contents
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................5
PURPOSE ..................................................................................................................................5
Balancing Response Goals: ....................................................................................................6
INITIAL ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................................................7
Types of FMD Outbreak ..........................................................................................................9
PERMITTING AUTHORITY ......................................................................................................10
Example of Incident Command Structure with Permits Group: ..............................................11
TRIGGER FOR IMPLEMENTATION ........................................................................................12
Phases of FMD Response .....................................................................................................12
Critical Activities in the First 72 Hours of a U.S. FMD Outbreak .............................................13
GET ORGANIZED ....................................................................................................................15
1. Establish a Permits Group within the Incident Management Team (IMT). .....................15
2. Request support in the Operations Section ..................................................................16
3. Select a decision-making schedule and time-keeper for each operational period. .......17
4. Request support from State Veterinarian(s). .................................................................17
5. Request support in the Documentation Unit .................................................................17
6. Request support from the Liaison Officer. ....................................................................17
7. Request support from the IMT’s lead Public Information Officer (PIO). .......................17
ESTABLISH AND IMPLEMENT A PROCEDURE FOR ISSUING PERMITS ............................19
8. Identify premises that require and are eligible for a Permit .............................................19
9. Assess and prepare a response to the reliability of data on farm Readiness ..................21
10. Identify premises that meet the Readiness requirement for a Permit. ..........................22
11. Establish conditions for expiration of Permits. .............................................................24
12. Issue Permits. .............................................................................................................24
13. Establish an investigation and service capacity ...........................................................25
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Appendix 1: Zones, Areas, and Premises Types in Animal Disease Response ................26
Summary of Zones and Areas ...............................................................................................26
Summary of Premises Types .................................................................................................27
Appendix 2: Snapshot of Readiness of New England Dairy Farms, August 2014 ............28
Frequency Distribution: Number of Surveyed Farms by Their Readiness Rating ..................28
Cumulative Frequency: Share of Farms and Production by Minimum Readiness Rating ......29
Appendix 3: Readiness Section of Farm Survey .................................................................30
Appendix 4: Weighted Criteria for Rating Producer Readiness .........................................33
Appenidix 5: Permit Form ......................................................................................................34
ATTACHMENTS (PDF format) linked below and in the full New England SMS Plan on-line
MOU on the New England SMS Plan (signed by the six states, June 3, 2014)
1. Notifications and Public Information
1.1 Notification for Producers
1.2 Notification for Processors
1.3 Notification for Haulers
1.4 Message Maps (from MSPSA)
2. Job Aids
2.01 How to Reduce Risks to Your Farm
2.02 How to Spot Clinical Signs of FMD
2.03 How to Conduct Active Observational Surveillance: A Guide for Herd Health Monitors
2.04 How to Increase Farm Biosecurity– On-line Support
2.05 How to Protect Farm Employees During a FMD Outbreak
2.06 How Drivers Can Reduce the Risk of Spreading Infection
2.07 How to Wash the Exterior of a Milk Tanker
2.08 How to Clean and Disinfect FMD Virus
2.09 How to Use Boot Baths
2.10 How to Communicate with Dairy Consumers about FMD
See also Just-in-Time Training (JIT) for Animal Health Emergency Responders (CFSPH)
3. Forms
3.1 Visitor Log
3.2 Vehicle Entry Log
3.3 Cleaning and Disinfection Checklist
3.4 Tanker Exterior Cleaning Certificate
3.5 Herd Monitoring Daily Log
3.6 Epidemiological Investigation Questionnaire
3.7 Message Map Template for Risk Communication
3.8 Initial Permit for Movement of Unpasteurized Milk from Farm to Processing Plant
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4. Signs for posting on Farms
4.01 Sign – Stop at Main Gate – Bilingual (English and Spanish)
4.02 Emergency Disease Prevention Measures in Effect – Bilingual (English and Spanish)
4.03 No Trespassing
4.04 Farm Visitor Policy – English or Spanish
4,05 Honk to Announce Arrival Before Exiting – English or Spanish
4.06 Check-in – English or Spanish
4.07 Authorized Personnel Only – English or Spanish
4.08 Do Not Enter – English or Spanish
4.09 Policies for Visitors Contacting Animals – English or Spanish
4.10 Protective Clothing Required – English or Spanish
5. Guides for Response to FMD on Farms
5.2 To Do List Go Guide
5.1 If you see . . . Poster – Bilingual (English and Spanish)
5.3 FMD Response Package – English or Spanish
5.4 Fast Facts about FMD
5.3 Fact Sheet for Livestock Specialists – English or Spanish
5.5 Inactivation of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus in Milk Products
5.6 Disease Images
5.7 Dairy Farm FMD Emergency Response Plan (ERP)
5.8 Legend and Sample Map for Dairy Farm ERP
6. The Secure Milk Supply (SMS) Plan
6.2 SMS Plan Components
6.1 Foot-and-Mouth Disease Information and Links
7. Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plans (FAD PReP) from APHIS AHEM
7.1 The Red Book – the USDA Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan (June 2012)
7.2 NAHEMS Guidelines
7.2.01 Continuity of Business
7.2.02 Biosecurity
7.2.03 Quarantine and Movement Control
7.2.04 Information Management
7.2.05 Cleaning and Disinfection
7.2.06 Disposal
7.2.07 Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing
7.2.08 Health and Safety
7.2.09 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
7.2.10 Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia
7.2.11 Vaccination for Contagious Diseases
Appendix A: Vaccination for Foot-and-Mouth Disease
7.3 FAD PReP Ready Reference Guides
7.3.01 Understanding FMD Response Strategies
7.3.02 Communications
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7.3.03 Zones, Areas, and Premises in an FAD Outbreak
7.3.04 Critical Activities and Tools during an FAD Response
7.3.05 Movement Control in an FAD Outbreak
7.3.06 Overview of the FMD Response Plan (The Red Book)
7.3.07 Overview of Emergency Vaccination
7.3.08 Overview of FMD Vaccination Issues
7.3.09 Overview of FMD Freedom and Vaccination
7.3.10 Quarantine, Movement Control, and Continuity of Business
7.3.11 FMD Surveillance
7.3.12 Overview of FMD Diagnostics
7.3.13 Etiology and Ecology of FMD
7.3.14 Common Operating Picture
7.3.15 Comparing US and UK FMD Response Planning
7.3.16 Additional FMD References
7.4 FMD Materials
8. International Standards from the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)
8.1 Dairy Processing Standards to Deactivate FMDV – Articles 8.5.38 and 8.5.39 of the
Terrestrial Animal Health Code
8,2 Foot and Mouth Disease – Chapter 8.5 of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code
8.3 Foot and Mouth Disease – Chapter 2.1.5 of the Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals
9. Resources for Assessing "Readiness" for Emergency Milk Movement from NESAASA
9.1 Producers
9.1.1 Producer Survey
9.1.2 Cover Letter for Producer Survey
9.1.3 Answers to Producers' Frequently Asked Questions
9.1.4 Reminder for Producers Who Have Not Yet Responded
9.1.5 Model for Rating Producer Readiness
9.1.6 Raw Scores for Producer Survey
9.1.7 Weighted Criteria for Rating Producer Readiness
9.1.8 Readiness of New England Dairy Farms for SMS: A Snapshot, 2014
9.2 Processors
9.2.1 Processor Survey
9.2.2 Cover Letter for Processor Survey
9.3 Haulers
9.3.1 Hauler Survey
9.3.2 Cover Letter for Hauler Survey
10. Glossary of Abbreviations
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ABSTRACT
This document is a plan to support continuity of dairy operations during an animal-disease emergency in New England. It specifies ways to reduce risks to licensed dairy farms, associated commerce, consumers, taxpayers, and the environment while responding to a Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak. Strategies include a process for issuing permits to ship unpasteurized milk from producers to processors, while controlling the spread of virus.
PURPOSE
This document is intended to help secure the supply of milk in New England in the event of an outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) and to reduce attendant environmental and economic risks. It aims to promote compliance with national plans – particularly the USDA-APHIS-NCAHEM Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book and the Secure Milk Supply Project SMS Performance Standards – while accommodating distinctive features of the dairy industry in New England.1 Strategies for securing the milk supply must balance two inherently contradictory objectives:
1. Control infection. During a FMD outbreak, the best way to protect livestock and dairy production is to prevent exposure to the virus. Since every person and vehicle that enters or leaves a site in the supply chain is also a potential carrier of infection, restrict (monitor, minimize, and sanitize) traffic between sites. Restrictions in commerce during a FMD outbreak are also mandated by U.S. agricultural regulations and international trade agreements.
2. Sustain commerce. Since every person and vehicle in the supply chain also provides inputs (e.g., labor, feed and fuel for the farm, milk for the processor) and outputs (food and cash) that are essential to dairy operations, maintain farm-to-market traffic. In New England, even a short interruption in that traffic could pose grave environmental, animal welfare, nutritional, and economic challenges. Restrictions in commerce could drive a great number of dairy farms and processors out of business rapidly, once and for all.2
This plan emphasizes striking a balance between strategies for controlling infection (e.g., restrict farm traffic) and strategies for sustaining commerce (e.g., keep milk moving). That balance can be struck during an outbreak by elevating standards of sanitation in dairy operations and commerce.
1 See US DHS, FEMA, National Response Framework (NRF) and National Incident Management System (NIMS) (2014), USDA-APHIS-VS, Animal Health Emergency Management (NCAHEM), Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book (June, 2012); The Secure Milk Supply Project (2014), and especially SMS Plan Components (2014). Draft “SMS Performance Standards” are in the “SMS Plan Executive Summary with Supporting Documents” (January 2012). Comprehensive plans and guidance documents for U.S. response to Transboundary or “Foreign” Animal Diseases (TAD or FAD, such as FMD), and continuity of operations (including SMS) are appended to this plan and linked available among FAD PReP Materials and References (2014) from Animal Health Emergency Management, USDA-APHIS. 2 See Richard P. Horwitz, Foot-and-Mouth Disease as a Hazard for New England Dairies (June 30, 2011), which is an attachment to this plan.
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Balancing Response Goals:3
Striking a balance chiefly depends on effective biosecurity. Experts generally agree that, once livestock shipments are suspended, the greatest risk of contagion in a FMD outbreak is in traffic to and from farms with susceptible livestock. The single most worrisome potential carrier is the exterior – especially the undercarriage, tires, and wheel wells – of milk tankers that ply farm-to-market roads every day and that must continue if licensed dairy operations are to survive or to recover, if massive dumping of raw milk is to be avoided, and if stores are to be kept stocked. Research has shown that contagion can be significantly arrested with proper control, cleaning, and disinfection during loading, transit, and unloading of unpasteurized milk. This plan also aims to establish criteria for permitting milk movement that are uniform among the six states. Permits issued in states of origin must be recognized in states of destination or transit and vice versa. Such consistency is important because the dairy supply chain in New England is distinctly dependent on interstate movement of unpasteurized milk.4
An agreement on principles for using this plan
Memorandum of Understanding on the New England Secure Milk Supply Plan
was signed by the six Commissioners of Agriculture on June 3, 2014.
3 Center graphic is from a presentation by the Chief Veterinary Officer for USDA-APHIS, John R. Clifford, “Response to an FMD Outbreak: Challenges, Impacts and Consequences,” (May 2, 2011), slide 11. 4 See Memorandum of Understanding on the New England Secure Milk Supply Plan, signed June 3, 2014; and Richard P. Horwitz, Foot-and-Mouth Disease as a Hazard for New England Dairies (June 30, 2011), linked in Attachments.
Restrict Dairy
Traffic! Keep Milk
Moving!
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INITIAL ASSUMPTIONS
A fundamental assumption of any continuity of operations plan is that it can be an effective part of overall emergency response. In particular, Secure Milk Supply (SMS) plans like this one presume that the procedures that they designate for transport of unpasteurized milk can reduce economic, environmental, animal-health, nutrition and welfare risks for society as a whole. More specific assumptions about response conditions for this New England plan are the same as for the national Secure Milk Supply project.5 In particular, these plans are premised on the following conditions:
FMD has been diagnosed in the United States.
Control Area(s) have been established around Infected Premises.
Animal and product movement restrictions are in place for dairy farms in the Control Area.
Dairy premises with no overt symptoms of FMD infection need to continue to move raw milk to processing.
SMS biosecurity performance standards are being implemented and verified.
Milk is picked up by a tanker and transported under Permit to a processing plant.
Other product/animal/people movement (e.g., delivery of feed and supplies, manure handling) will be examined as the SMS project develops.
The permitting process is presumed to be selective. Incident Command (a.k.a. “the Incident Management Team” or IMT) must judge that the risks associated with issuing a Permit (e.g., the increase in potential for spreading infection) are more tolerable than the risks in denying one (e.g., the increase in potential damage to the environment and animal health, the supply chain, and its ability to recover). The IMT will require evidence that the best possible practices will be used to keep milk moving while preventing shipments from inadvertently carrying FMD virus onto a premises that is free of infection or carrying FMDV away from a premises that has been infected. Although the focus of this plan is the permitting of producers, all parties to milk transport – the farmer, the hauler, the coop, and the handler or processor – must also accept responsibility for meeting conditions (e.g., elevated biosecurity standards) that business continuity requires.6
This plan focuses on support of licensed dairy operations: procedures for selecting farms from which milk pickup will be Permitted for shipment to an approved processing plant.
Once Control Areas are adequately defined and premises typed, Incident Command will be better able to identify the location of farms that may be eligible for Permitted pickup. But the question remains: Precisely which of them should receive a Permit?
5 SMS Plan, “Executive Summary with Supporting Documents” (January, 2012). 6 Adapted from checklists in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA-APHIS), Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Secure Egg Supply (SES) Plan (January 7, 2011), 2-6 to 2-16.
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The answer in this case is the farms that the IMT finds “Ready,” that is, capable of measuring up to guidelines defined in the SMS Performance Standards for Dairy Premises.7
General Requirements for the Producer8
Check susceptible livestock twice daily for clinical signs of infection and
find none.
Secure pickup service from a hauler with adequate, documented truck
biosecurity and delivery to a processing plant with approved biosecurity.
Establish and document adequate premises biosecurity, including:
o Control farm access (secure the perimeter of dairy operations),
o Establish and maintain a log of all traffic to and from the farm, and
o Clean and disinfect vehicle and foot traffic to and from the premises.
Still, Incident Command will have to define Readiness more concretely and precisely. In particular, the IMT must define:
1. How “Ready” does a farm have to be? Which specific biosecruity preparations and practices are minimally required? For example, how thoroughly must a farm be prepared to control and sanitize traffic?
2. How much will Incident Command do to verify that a farm is “Ready”? Given competing demands on response resources (personnel, time, material, funds), how much can the IMT commit to verify that the best possible biosecurity practices will, in fact, be implemented?
Standards will inevitably vary with the resources and capabilities of the producer and the IMT (potentially supplemented by co-ops, handlers or processors) as well as the type and phase of outbreak. (See “Types of FMD Outbreak” and “Phases of FMD Response” charted below). For example, in a small outbreak (Type 1 or 2), especially after the first few days or in the final days of recovery (Phase 2 or 3), there may be sufficient resources (and relatively low impacts for denying Permits) to insist on strict compliance and oversight. Only after thorough, premises-specific vetting would a permit likely be issued, with a lot of response resources expended per Permit. However, in a more severe outbreak (Type 3 or higher), especially during the first days (Phase 1 or 2), Permitting standards, by necessity, may be more categorical, with relatively few response resources expended per Permit. The cost of interrupted commerce would be too high to justify the benefits of more restrictive biosecurity measures and oversight.
7 Draft “SMS Performance Standards for Dairy Premises” are in the “SMS Plan Executive Summary with Supporting Documents” (January 2012). 8 Adapted from checklists in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA-APHIS), Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Secure Egg Supply (SES) Plan (January 7, 2011), 2-6 to 2-16.
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Types of FMD Outbreak9
Confidence in the level of risk attending each decision (whether that risk be too much or too little milk movement) will be higher to the extent that the bounds of infection are well-known and well-contained. Unfortunately, since the virus can spread more quickly than overt signs of disease and confirmatory tests, such confidence is difficult to gain. Obviously, the disease-spread risk would be highest (and almost certainly unacceptable) if milk were picked up from a premises with livestock that show clinical signs of disease. The risk would be lowest (and most readily mitigated) from a farm that is confirmed to be disease-free and isolated. But beyond such extremes – for Premises Types that are neither Infected nor Free – the precise extent of contagion is apt to remain short of certain, especially in the first days of an outbreak. Nevertheless, at the first sign of an outbreak, rapid increase in biosecurity and establishment of a permitting process will be essential for both disease control and continuity of dairy operations.
9 From USDA-APHIS-VS, Animal Health Emergency Management (NCAHEM), Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book (June 2012), 4-24, and FAD PReP, Ready Reference Guide – Understanding FMD Response Strategies (August 2013), linked in Attachments.
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PERMITTING AUTHORITY10 In an emergency such as a FMD outbreak, responsibility and authority to issue Permits for movement of affected animals and animal products in the Control Area belong to unified Incident Command (a.k.a. the Incident Management Team or IMT). This plan is designed to support IMT deliberations and to help stakeholders prepare to meet and implement existing Secure Milk Supply (SMS) biosecurity performance standards for milk movement in a FMD outbreak.11 The structure and composition of Incident Command depends on the characteristics of the outbreak, especially its Type and Phase.
In a Focal FMD Outbreak (e.g., affecting just a handful of farms in a Control Area confined to one state), Incident Command may be constituted and guided by a single State plan for Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) Response. Each New England state has a FAD response plan and has used it in an exercise or incident, as in recent outbreaks of Low-Path Avian Influenza (LPAI). In such cases, movement permits have been issued by the State Veterinarian, acting as Incident Commander. This plan, however, anticipates a larger outbreak, in which the Control Area spans more than one state and the IMT exercises regional authority. Regional response will be guided by The Red Book, the SMS Performance Standards, and this regional plan, in coordination with States
implementing their own more particular plans. The IMT will include representatives of more than one New England state as well as representatives of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA-APHIS). According to current national plans, Permits for movement of affected animals and animal products will be issued in the Operations Section of the Incident Management Team. When expanded to regional proportions, Incident Command is apt to delegate permitting authority to the Animal Movement and Permits Group in the Disease Support Branch of the Operations Section of an IMT that may well be requested from USDA-APHIS.
10 See FAD PReP, Ready Reference Guide – Zones, Areas, and Premises in an FAD Outbreak (August, 2013), linked in Attachments. 11 Draft “SMS Performance Standards for Dairy Premises” are in the “SMS Plan Executive Summary with Supporting Documents” (January 2012).
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Example of Incident Command Structure with Permits Group12:
12 ICS example from USDA-APHIS-VS, National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management (NCAHEM), Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book (June 2012), B-13.
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TRIGGER FOR IMPLEMENTATION
In accepting this plan, the six New England states agree to implement the plan when the USDA-APHIS-VS Area Veterinarian in-Charge (AVIC) confirms the establishment of a FMD Control Area in one or more of the New England states.13 Note that prior to implementation (e.g., when the AVIC confirms an outbreak elsewhere in North America but not in the U.S.) dairy biosecurity enhancements as well as a public information campaign may be recommended or required by State Veterinarians. (See FAD PReP, Ready Reference Guide – Understanding FMD Response Strategies and Ready Reference Guide – Critical Activities and Tools during an FAD Response.) Phases of FMD Response14
Success in implementing controls on milk movement will depend not only on the scale of the outbreak but also the capabilities and vulnerabilities of stakeholders and priorities of Incident Command. Preparing, monitoring and verifying compliance with movement controls will be essential. Consumer confidence and effective communications between Incident Command, dairy producers, haulers, and processors will be among the keys to dairy sustainability.
13 Memorandum of Understanding on the New England Secure Milk Supply Plan, signed June 3, 2014; See: FAD PReP, Ready Reference Guide – Understanding FMD Response Strategies (August, 2013), Ready Reference Guide – Critical Activities and Tools during an FAD Response (August, 2013); and NAHEMS Guidelines: Continuity of Business (December, 2013), linked in Attachments; and USDA-APHIS-VS-CEAH, National Surveillance Unit, Draft Case Definition for Foot and Mouth Disease (February 8, 2011); 14 From USDA-APHIS-VS, National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management (NCAHEM), Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book (June 2012), 4-24, linked in Attachments.
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Critical Activities in the First 72 Hours of a U.S. FMD Outbreak15
During the Heightened Alert Phase (even when there is no Control Area in the region), the New England states have agreed to:
Intensify surveillance of the health of FMD-susceptible herds.
Temporarily stop shipments of susceptible livestock and suspend retail sales on farms with susceptible livestock (e.g., milk, meat, or cheese), at least until the extent of the outbreak can be adequately assessed and a permitting process established (1-3 days).
Increase restrictions on garbage feeding of swine.
Encourage producers, haulers and processors to increase biosecurity and to prepare to meet performance standards that will be required in Control Areas during Phase 1 of a FMD Outbreak.
Among Attachments to this Plan, see Job Aids:
How to Reduce Risks to Your Farm
How to Spot Clinical Signs of FMD
How to Conduct Active Observational Surveillance
How to Increase Farm Biosecurity – On-line Support
How to Protect Farm Employees During a FMD Outbreak
How Drivers Can Reduce the Risk of Spreading Infection
How to Wash the Exterior of a Milk Tanker
How to Clean and Disinfect FMD Virus
How to Use Boot Baths How to Communicate with Dairy Consumers about FMD
15 From USDA-APHIS-VS, Animal Health Emergency Management, Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book (June 2012), 4-4; and Ready Reference Guide – FMD Surveillance SOP (August, 2013), linked in Attachments. See also FAD PReP, NAHEMS Guidelines: Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing (September, 2011), linked in Attachments.
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Note that the region on its own does not plan to restrict milk movement in advance of Phase 1 of an outbreak. Likewise, since FMD is not a significant threat to human health, even if FMD is detected in the region, the states do not plan to issue a recall of milk in the supply chain, at
least the portion of the chain that is directed toward human (vs. livestock) consumption.16 Also in advance of Phase 1 of an outbreak, the region plans to cooperate with governmental and industry efforts to publicize the safety of pasteurized dairy products. Farmers, however, should be forewarned about the risks of feeding potentially infected milk, arguably even when pasteurized, to FMD-susceptible livestock. Likewise, haulers and processors should be advised to minimize and disinfect spilt or waste milk. (Among the first to be alerted should be the dispatchers for the major dairy cooperatives and commodity groups in the region.).17
Among Attachments to this Plan,
See the Job Aid: How to Communicate with Dairy Consumers about FMD
and pre-drafted Notifications:
Notifications for Producers Notifications for Processors
Notifications for Haulers
Since, in fact, several days or even weeks are likely to have passed between a first instance of FMD and its confirmation, and since long-distance, interstate milk movement is so frequent in New England, the states should be prepared to establish a very large Control Area, plausibly as large as the whole of the region. Waiting for just-in-time epidemiological investigations to be completed may be desirable from a disease-control point of view but unfeasible both in terms of response resources and farm viability as well as animal welfare and environmental protection. The following, more action-oriented sections of this plan focus on increasing biosecurity and establishing a permitting process quickly enough to maintain continuity of dairy operations, following notification that the AVIC has determined that there is a FMD-infected, suspect or contact premises in New England.
16 “SMS Plan Executive Summary with Supporting Documents” (January 2012). 17 See “SMS Plan Executive Summary with Supporting Documents” (January 2012) and OIE Dairy Processing Standards to Deactivate FMDV
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GET ORGANIZED
1. Establish a Permits Group within the Incident Management Team (IMT).
State or District Animal Health Officials should request that Incident Command establish a
Permits Group within its Operations Section. The Group (3-7 people) should include designee(s) of animal-health, agriculture, and/or dairy inspectors from the New England states who are familiar with local operations and the New England Secure Milk Supply Plan and liaisons with the dairy industry (e.g., co-ops).18
18 See ICS example from USDA-APHIS-VS, National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management (NCAHEM), Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book (June 2012), B-13.
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2. Request support in the Operations Section
a) State or District Animal Health Officials should recommend that Operations mandate elevated biosecurity in the Control Area. Note that its dimensions may span the entire region, at least until there are more thorough assessments of the scale of the outbreak and identification of affected premises.
Quarantine Infected, Suspect, and Contact Premises.
Stop feeding of garbage (especially waste unpasteurized milk or milk products) to swine in the Control Area.
Stop movement of all susceptible livestock (cattle, swine, sheep, goats) to and from premises in the Control Area.
Suspend agri-tourism (e.g., sleigh and hay rides, corn mazes, tours for visitors, field trips for school children) on premises with susceptible livestock in the Control Area.
Stop direct-to-consumer sales of unpasteurized (“raw”) milk and milk products.
Temporarily (only as long as necessary to assign Premises Types, no more than 3 days) stop direct-to-consumer sales (including home delivery) of milk or products made from raw milk that have been processed on-farm or in an abutting processing plant in the Control Area (e.g., Producer-Handlers). Before resuming such direct-to-consumer commerce, require strict biosecurity to minimize routes of contamination between (a) those areas, facilities, personnel, supplies, and equipment that touch susceptible livestock and (b) those that may directly or indirectly contact on-premises processing or sales operations.
Temporarily (only as long as necessary to assign Premises Types, no more than 3 days) stop all shipments of unpasteurized milk to and from premises (dairy farms and processing plants) in the Control Area. Recommendation: Movement of unpasteurized dairy products (particularly milk) from farms to off-farm processors may be resumed to and from premises in the Control Area ONLY under permits that Incident Command may authorize for specific, sufficiently biosecure premises or groups of premises.19
But do not recall pasteurized milk or products that are made from pasteurized milk or raw milk products that are adequately aged or acidified. (They pose negligible risk to human health.)
b) Request that Operations clarify a procedure for authorizing the issuance of permits to move raw milk within the Control Area. Recommendation: Request that Operations delegate authority for issuing Permits to a Permits Group (or ask Incident Command to delegate authority for such permitting
to the Operations Section, in consultation with a Permits Group or its equivalent). c) Request that Operations approve public notice – to be distributed to producers, haulers,
and processors as well as state regulatory officials by the IMT’s lead Public Information Officer (PIO) and Permits Group – of the process for permitting movement of unpasteurized milk. (See “Notifications” and “Job Aids” in Attachments to this Plan).
d) Request regular status reports (e.g., updates at least once every 24 hours from the Disease Management or Surveillance Branch) on the boundaries of the FMD Control Area and the epidemiological status of premises within it.
19 “Sufficiently biosecure” is to be assessed according to the draft “SMS Performance Standards,” as interpreted and implemented by Incident Command. See “SMS Plan Executive Summary with Supporting Documents” (January 2012).
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3. Select a decision-making schedule and time-keeper for each operational period.
a) Define and insofar as possible meet step-by-step deadlines to be sure that permitting decisions can be considered, recommended, reviewed, revised, authorized, issued, and transmitted in time for regulators, producers, coops, haulers, and processors to respond (e.g., by 3 PM on the day prior to eligible milk pickup).
b) Adjust deliberation standards and/or the schedule to achieve optimum balance between careful and decisive action.
4. Request support from State Veterinarian(s).
a) Ask the New England State Veterinarians to allow Incident Command to access data from each of their states in the NESAASA database.
b) Request state support for enforcement of permitting decisions (e.g., investigate alleged violations of quarantine orders or Permit requirements and report back to the Group).
5. Request support in the Documentation Unit
Ask the Documentation Unit (in the Planning Section) to maintain (receive and process) records of permitting action (e.g., via Permits Group postings to Activities Log, ICS Form 214 or to Activity Log and Significant Events on WebEOC).
6. Request support from the Liaison Officer.
a) Serve as point of contact for dairy industry representatives (e.g., producers, co-ops, haulers, and processors).
b) Reach out to agencies that are affected by the interruption in movement of livestock and livestock products but that may not be represented in the Permits Group (E.g., dairy regulators in Mid-Atlantic states, particularly New York, where producers ordinarily ship unpasteurized milk to New England dairy processing plants), providing access to incident updates and relaying concerns.
7. Request support from the IMT’s lead Public Information Officer (PIO).20
(Objective: Help minimize public panic – e.g., unwarranted concern about FMD as a hazard to human health or “factory farms” – and increase support for emergency response.) a) Request the assignment of a Liaison between the Permits Group and the PIO. b) Recommend to the PIO key messages for the public (See How to Communicate with Dairy
Consumers about FMD):
Foot-and-mouth disease is an extremely contagious disease of livestock.
o FMD spreads through a virus that can infect cattle and other cloven-hooved animals such as pigs, sheep, and goats.
o The virus does NOT pose a significant risk to other sorts of animals, such as cats, dogs, hamsters, horses, or humans.
FMD is not a public health concern. o No major scientific or public health organization considers FMD a significant risk
to human health. o Consumers can continue to drink pasteurized milk. Pasteurization of dairy
products effectively eliminates the FMD Virus. Despite its presence in much of the rest of world for centuries, the disease has never been transmitted from pasteurized dairy products to humans.
20 See structural and functional models for meeting this request outlined in NIMS, Basic Guidance for Public Information Officers (PIOs), FEMA 517 (November, 2007), especially pp. 16-19.
18
o FMD should not be confused with other diseases, such as “Hand, Foot, and Mouth Disease,” a human disease that it is caused by a completely different virus than FMD.
Public cooperation is important and appreciated in response to this animal-disease emergency.
o Anticipate restrictions in commerce and travel. They are necessary to reduce the risk of spreading virus among livestock.
o Avoid contact with susceptible livestock and the places where they live, whether they seem healthy or not, for the animals’ own protection.
c) Request that the PIO support dissemination of information about the permitting process.
The Permits Group should (after securing consent of the NESAASA State Veterinarians) share with the PIO contact information for dairy producers, haulers, and processors who operate in the Control Area.
Key messages for producers, haulers, and processors. (See “Notif ications” and “Job Aids” in Attachments to the New England Secure Milk Supply Plan). o Livestock owners must know how to recognize the symptoms of FMD, check
susceptible livestock, and report suspicious symptoms to the State Veterinarian. (See How to Spot Clinical Signs of FMD and How to Conduct Active Observational Surveillance: A Guide for Herd Health Monitors.)
o Increase biosecurity to minimize the risk of exposure and spreading of FMD virus (e.g., stop feeding garbage to hogs and feeding unpasteurized milk to susceptible species; stop shipments of susceptible animals and – at least temporarily – raw milk; stop agri-toursim, and suspend direct-to-consumer trade, especially raw milk). (See “Job Aids” in the New England Secure Milk Supply Plan, especially How to Reduce Risks to Your Farm and How Drivers Can Reduce the Risk of Spreading Infection.)
o Movement of products from susceptible animals (particularly milk) from farm to market may be resumed within, to, and from the control area only with sufficient biosecurity and under premises-specific Permits to be issued by Incident Command.21
d) Request that the PIO establish the capability (e.g., through the JIC, with assistance from the Communications Unit in Logistics) to field public queries about milk movement, to answer or to redirect questions in an efficient, orderly manner. Recommendation:
Questions about the content of policy (e.g., about the safety of dairy products, the targets of stop movement orders, or the permitting process) should be answered with a minimum of resources (e.g., via redirection to pre-recorded messages, press releases, and on-line postings maintained by the JIC, with support of the Communications Unit in Logistics).
Reports of violations (e.g., specific sightings of a quarantine failure, unpermitted milk movement, or other incident-relevant biosecurity breeches) should be referred to state or local officials with authority to enforce agricultural regulations.
Reports of changes in herd health, producer or processor challenges to the granting or rejection of a particular Permit, or state-enforcement findings on alleged violations should be referred to the Permits Group.
21 See the“Job Aids,” linked in the Attachments and the draft “SMS Performance Standards,” in “SMS Plan Executive Summary with Supporting Documents” (January 2012).
19
ESTABLISH AND IMPLEMENT A PROCEDURE FOR ISSUING PERMITS
8. Identify premises that require and are eligible for a Permit
a) Review the latest reports (e.g., from the Disease Management or Surveillance Branch of Operations) on the boundaries of the FMD Control Area and epidemiological status of premises within it. (See appended “Zones, Areas, and Premises Types in Animal Disease Response” and FAD PReP, Ready Reference Guide – Zones, Areas, and Premises in a FAD Outbreak.
b) When Premises Types are unknown, treat every farm in a FMD Control Area as if it were “FMD infected but undetected,” and hence not yet eligible to receive a milk-pickup permit. (This is to err on the side of disease control.)
c) When Premises Types are known, use the following decision tree to determine when a permit is required and possible.
20
d) So, limiting conditions for a permit to ship unpasteurized milk from a farm to a processing
plant should depend on the premises type and its location.
In general, Infected, Suspect, or Contact Premises (including all premises in the Infected Zone) should not be eligible for permits for milk pickup, and Free Premises outside the Control Area should not need permits.
Eligibility criteria for other premises types may be more or less restricted, depending on the scale of the incident and the associated losses to food supply and business continuity or recovery capacity vs. disease-control gains.
o In a relatively small outbreak – Type 1 (Focal) or Type 2 (Moderate Regional) – Monitored and At-Risk Premises may not be considered eligible for permits.
o In a regional or larger outbreak – Type 3 (Large Regional), Type 4 (Widespread or National), Type 5 (Catastrophic) or Type 6 (North American) – Monitored and At-Risk Premises in the Control Area should be considered eligible, for the sake of sustaining the food supply, environmental protection, farm survival and recovery.
More specific eligibility requirements should depend on biosecurity capacity (“Readiness”) and practices of the farm, the hauler, and the processor. See the draft “SMS Performance Standards,” in “SMS Plan Executive Summary with Supporting Documents” (January 2012).
When and where can unpasteurized milk be shipped from a farm during a FMD outbreak?
PREMISES TYPE PREMISES LOCATION PICK UP RAW MILK?
Free Area
Free Premises Beyond the Surveillance Zone Yes, no Permit necessary
Free Premises Surveillance Zone Yes, no Permit necessary
Protection Vaccination Zone
Free Premises Protection Vaccination Zone Yes, if premises is Ready
Vaccinated Premises (at least 14 days post)
Protection Vaccination Zone Yes, if premises is Ready
Control Area
Free Premises Containment Vaccination Zone Yes, if premises is Ready
Vaccinated Premises (at least 14 days post)
Containment Vaccination Zone Yes, if premises is Ready
Monitored Premises Infected Zone or Buffer Zone Yes, if premises is Ready and if response is Regional
At-risk Premises Infected Zone or Buffer Zone Yes, if premises is Ready and if response is Regional
Suspect Premises Infected Zone or Buffer Zone No
Contact Premises Infected Zone or Buffer Zone No
Infected Premises Infected Zone No
21
In short, in Regional FMD Response, requirement and eligibility for Permits to ship raw milk in the Control Area should be confined to Free, Vaccinated, Monitored, and At-risk Premises that are Ready.22
9. Assess and prepare a response to the reliability of data on farm Readiness
a) Review the quality of existing data (survey results and Readiness Ratings in the NESAASA database) on the biosecurity capacity of eligible dairy farms). Questions:
Are these data sufficiently complete and up-to-date to be used in timely permitting decisions?
Are there resources (time, people, biosecurity, transportation and information technology) to significantly improve the reliability of the data?
o From the Permits Group? o From Operations (e.g., as an add-on for existing surveillance efforts)? o From the private sector (e.g., co-ops or dairy promotion boards)? o From the state(s) or universities (e.g., Ag Extension, vet schools)?
In the absence of additional resources, are the benefits to continuity of operation (vs. disease protection) sufficient to justify using existing data in permitting decisions until resources are adequate to increase their reliability?
b) When feasible, develop and implement a procedure for verifying, updating, and improving data on farm Readiness, taking into account the resources required (e.g., the number of premises to be overseen), the resources available, and the importance of timely decision-making.
Select an instrument for verifying the completeness and accuracy of Readiness data on eligible premises – e.g., ranging from more to less thorough and demanding:
o On-site Inspection of the premises by an animal-health official; o Telephone call by a response official or designee to a farm manager; o Emailed or FAXed questionnaire to a farm manager; o Mandatory check-off on a Permit form; o Trust in the farm manager, plus spot checks and/or response to complaints.
Select a scope for using the instrument – e.g., ranging from more to less thorough and demanding:
o All eligible farms; o A stratified sample of farms, including premises that are in the middle and
extremes of the distribution of risk for disease transmission (e.g., number of cattle, frequency of milk pickup, and latest Readiness Rating);
o A random, grab, or opportunistic sample of “representative” farms (e.g., piggy-backing on other incident-response surveillance activity);
o Farms that come to the Group’s attention as the subjects of complaints or as sites for which data are too incomplete or outdated for a permitting decision.
22 Roughly speaking, a dairy farm is “Ready” when Incident Command determines that its biosecurity measures are adequate. See the draft “SMS Performance Standards,” in “SMS Plan Executive Summary with Supporting Documents” (January 2012).
22
10. Identify premises that meet the Readiness requirement for a Permit. Using information that the Permits Group has found reliable, identify which eligible premises can sufficiently meet SMS Biosecurity Performance Standards to qualify for a Permit to ship unpasteurized milk to an off-farm processing plant.23 a) Using the Readiness Rating in the NESAASA Database . . .
1) Access state- or region-level data in the NESAASA Farm Database, currently on a server managed by the Institute for Infectious Animal Diseases (IIAD), with passwords issued to State Veterinarians. (See Notes on Using NESAASA Data.)
2) Generate a Report, listing eligible farms (e.g., name, Premises ID, address, and contact information) with the Readiness Rating for each premises. Note: it may be necessary to generate a Report on all farms and then select eligible farms by-hand in a database application. To identify premises by proximity (e.g., to find the zip code filter for farms within X miles of a particular premises), consider on-line aids such as Zip Code Radius Finder or BatchGeo for mapping them.
3) Choose a “provisional minimum Readiness Rating,” a biosecurity threshold.
Recommendation: At least initially, a Premises should qualify for a Permit only if it is eligible and its Readiness Rating is above the adjusted minimum. In a regional event, to qualify for a Permit, a farm should have a Rating of 0.40 or higher.
A minimum of 0.50 would allow Permits to be granted to all farms that have documented capacity (at least within a day or two of notice, on their own) to secure their perimeter, provide a clean path to the bulk tank, and operate a wash station at the farm gate. In all, about 85% of farms that were surveyed as of mid-2014 claimed such capacities in the presence of a state agent.24
The choice of the required, minimum Readiness Rating is a key, inescapably contestable step. The optimal number is apt to depend on the incident type and the stage of response as well as the priorities of Incident Command in balancing inherently conflicting objectives – on the one hand to protect continuity of operations, the food supply, and prospects for recovery, and on the other to minimize risk of spreading infection that is the cause of the emergency.
The chosen minimum Readiness Rating may well vary inversely with the severity of the outbreak and the size of the Control Area. The smaller the Control Area, the greater the prospects of containing infection at relatively little cost to operations, and hence, the greater the net value of setting a high minimum Readiness Rating. Conversely, the larger the Control Area, the greater the relative cost to continuity of operations or recovery and hence the greater the net value of setting a lower minimum Readiness Rating.
23 See the brief, on-line description of a NESAASA's effort to identify the capacity of dairy farms in the region to meet biosecurity requirements for shipping milk to market during a FAD outbreak, Assessing Farm Readiness for Emergency Milk Movement in New England (2012), and step-by-step instructions on how officials can access and use this information, Notes on Using NESAASA Data (May 28, 2014). 24 As of the end of June, 2014, 1021 dairy farms were in the NESAASA database, about 60% of all licensed dairy farms in New England. Note that, in this sample, the share of production is well correlated with the number of farms, and Readiness Ratings are independent of farm size. Readiness of New England Dairy Farms for SMS: A Snapshot, 2014 (June 23, 2014), linked in Attachments.
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4) Check appropriateness of the provisional minimum Readiness Rating. E.g., access the NESAASA Farm Database to assess farms with a Rating slightly above and below that provisional minimum (and/or farms known to a member of the Permits Group) to determine if the provisional minimum Readiness Rating makes sense: Given the current status of the incident, would the provisional minimum Readiness Rating properly distinguish qualifying from disqualifying farms? Or would a higher or lower minimum be better?
5) Assuming that this minimum Readiness rating may be required, assess the likely impact on production, the sustainability of farm operations and the food supply (and therefore, conversely, the generation of waste or financial and animal-welfare distress on disqualified farms).
E.g., access the NESAASA Farm Database to generate a report, listing the output of farms that meet the provisional minimum rating (and/or refer to the appended chart, “Cumulative Frequency: Share of Farms and Production by Minimum Readiness Rating” to estimate these impacts, judging from August, 2014 data.
6) Adjust the provisional minimum Readiness Rating accordingly – to be sure the required minimum Reading Rating is reasonably allied with assessments of a grab sample of farms scoring above and below the minimum and with anticipated impacts on dairy production and sustainability.
Recommendation: As time permits, in select cases (premises where the risk of disease transmission associated with milk movement is distinctly low), allow for the resumption of sales or issue permits based on criteria that are less restrictive than the minimum Readiness Rating.
This action is designed to sustain sales of dairy products where producers and the vehicles that service them are uniquely biosecure.
Examples of when such consideration may be appropriate: o When particular biosecurity capabilities are apt to be more effective in disease
control than the full, weighted mix of practices reflected in the Readiness Rating.
E.g., farms that can load milk off-premises, with negligible risk of contaminating the exterior of the tanker during milk pickup.
E.g., farms, such as Producer-Handlers or artisan cheese makers, who can sustain operations only with direct-to-consumer sales rather than shipments to other farms or plants (congregate sites).
o When clusters of farms within the Control Area warrant different minimum Readiness Ratings (e.g., farms in areas that are, in effect, epidemiologically isolated – separated by distance, prevailing weather, service routes, and traffic patterns).
o When a specific subset of criteria warrant more or less attention than assigned in the composite Readiness Rating, such as steam/hot washers in winter vs. summer. (Note, however: such season-dependent criteria likely represent too small a share of the Readiness Rating to affect rankings).
Recommendation: Insofar and as soon as possible, allow direct-to-consumer sales (i.e., rescind the initial suspension of sales or issue special permits) on dairy farms that confirm establishment of a biosecure perimeter around livestock operations.
This policy is designed to allow certain dairy farms (e.g., Producer-Handlers or hard cheese makers) to resume direct-to-consumer sales of dairy products that are properly pasteurized, aged, or acidified on-premises, without shipping raw milk
24
to or from any other premises. See Dairy Processing Standards to Deactivate FMDV, Articles 8.7.38-39 of the 2012 OIE Terrestiral Animal Health Code (2014).
Before resuming sales, these farms should be advised and confirm that they have carefully separated livestock operations from direct or indirect contact with processing and sales operations
Recommendation: Insofar and as soon as possible, issue Permits to farms that can ship raw milk without a hauler entering the premises.
This policy is designed to resume shipments from farms that load milk onto a tanker that remains off-premises, a truck parked outside the farm perimeter, for example, by pumping raw milk through a long, properly sanitized hose. (See Using a Hose to Improve Farm Biosecurity During Milk Pickup in a FAD Emergency.)
Before being issued such a Permit, these farms should be advised and confirm that they properly secure the perimeter of the premises, sanitize the hose, and disinfect any spilled milk.
Recommended Procedure: 1) Access state-level data in the NESAASA Farm Database, currently on a server
managed by the Institute for Infectious Animal Diseases (IIAD), with passwords issued to State Veterinarians, who may authorize sharing the data with the IMT. (See Notes on Using NESAASA Data.)
2) Generate a Report, listing eligible farms (at least name, Premises ID, address, and contact information), screened by criteria that are more or less restrictive than the overall Readiness Rating.
This additional screening can be accomplished by adding filters to the Report or by sorting data from an unfiltered Report with a spreadsheet application, such as Excel.
E.g., select farms that do not ordinarily schedule a pickup or that can load milk off-premises.
3) Again, check the reasonableness of these criteria and adjust accordingly.
Does the exclusion of farms that just fail to meet these select-case criteria and the inclusion of those that just meet them make sense?
Are the anticipated impacts on dairy production and sustainability of permitting movement in these select cases acceptable?
11. Establish conditions for expiration of Permits. a) Permits may be issue for each pick-up, a certain period of time (e.g., the coming week) or
indefinitely, for all future pickups. Recommendation: A Permit qualifies a premises for milk pick up from the date of issue forward, until/unless the Permit is revoked or no longer required.
b) Among the reasons that Incident Command may revoke a Permit are:
A change in the boundaries of the Control Area;
A change in the health of the farm’s herd;
A farm’s failure to maintain adequate biosecurity.
12. Issue Permits. a) As necessary with Incident Command, verify authority to issue Permits.
25
b) Compile a list of farms (name, premises ID, address, and contact information) that have the requisite minimum Readiness Rating (plus or minus other criteria).
c) Assign a Permit number to each Permitted Premises. Recommendation: The format for the permit number should be PID.SEQ, where PID is the state Premises ID Number and SEQ is the order in which a permit was issued.
So, the first permit to be issued would be numbered StatePremises#.0001; the second would be StatePremises#.0002, then StatePremises#.0003, and so on.
Recommended procedure for the Pemits group to distribute the list of Permitted Premises. 1) In coordination with the PIO, send (post to WebEOC, FAX, or E-mail) the list of
Permitted Premises (with permit numbers) to the State Animal Health Officials (SAHOs, such as the State Veterinarian and/or Milk Regulator). Ask the SAHOs to:
Endorse the list of Permitted Premises and share it with their agencies’ enforcement officers.
Coordinate efforts of Co-Ops and the PIO to inform the farms that they regulate about their Permit status.
2) Send (FAX, E-mail, or text) the list of Permitted premises to the dispatchers in the major Co-Ops (Agri-Mark, DFA/DMS). Request that the Co-ops (in coordination with the SAHOs and PIO):
Notify members of their status: present or absent from the list of premises for which milk pickup has been Permitted.
Distribute the list of Permitted premises to affected haulers and processors, including those outside the Control Area who might otherwise traffic in the Control Area.
Remind haulers and processors with which they do business of the elevated biosecurity requirements. (See “Notifications” and “Job Aids” in Attachments to the New England Secure Milk Supply Plan).
Remind haulers to pick up unpasteurized milk only from Permitted farms, regardless of co-op membership.
3) Request that the Co-Ops (in coordination with the SAHOs and PIO) distribute Permit Forms to haulers, with instruction for the hauler to:
Fill out the forms (except for signatures) prior to milk pickup,
Obtain the farmer’s signature at the farm gate, verifying monitoring and freedom from clinical signs of FMD,
Sign the form at the farm gate, as a representative of the hauler, verifying pickup
Keep the completed forms on file and available to Incident Command, upon request. (See Attached and on-line Permit Forms.)
4) Post the list of Permitted Premises to Incident Command via Activities Log, ICS Form 214 or Activity Log and Significant Events in WebEOC.
13. Establish an investigation and service capacity
Assign a member of the Permits Group to handle queries and challenges of Permits Group actions (e.g., requests for clarification from producers, co-ops, haulers, or processors; complaints about who did or did not get a Permit, reports of biosecurity breeches on farms that have been issued Permits.)
Provide to the PIO contact information for investigation and service from the Permits Group and or state enforcement agencies.
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Appendix 1: Zones, Areas, and Premises Types in Animal Disease Response
Summary of Zones and Areas Note: The size and shape of Zones and Areas depend on the disease agent and epidemiological conditions, and they may be redefined as the outbreak continues.
Zone/Area Definition Size
Infected Zone (IZ)
Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Premises.
Perimeter should be at least 3 km (~1.86 miles) beyond perimeters of presumptive or confirmed Infected Premises.
Buffer Zone (BZ)
Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Zone or a Contact Premises.
Perimeter should be at least 7 km (~4.35 miles) beyond the perimeter of the Infected Zone. Width is generally not less than the minimum radius of the associated Infected Zone, but may be much larger..
Control Area (CA)
Consists of an Infected Zone and a Buffer Zone.
Perimeter should be at least 10 km (~6.21 miles) beyond the perimeter of the closest Infected Premises.
Surveillance Zone (SZ)
Zone outside and along the border of a Control Area.
Width should be at least 10 km (~6.21 miles), but may be much larger.
Free Area (FA)
Area not included in any Control Area.
Vaccination Zone (VZ)
Emergency Vaccination Zone classified as either a Containment Vaccination Zone (typically inside a Control Area) or a Protection Vaccination Zone (typically outside a Control Area). This may be a secondary zone designation.
27
Summary of Premises Types
Premises Definition Zone
Infected Premises
(IP)
Premises where presumptive positive case or confirmed positive case exists based on laboratory results, compatible clinical signs, FMD case definition, and international
standards.
Infected Zone
Contact Premises
(CP)
Premises with susceptible animals that may have been exposed to FMD, either directly or indirectly, including but not limited to exposure to animals, animal products, fomites, or people from Infected Premises.
Infected Zone, Buffer Zone
Suspect Premises (SP)
Premises under investigation due to the presence of susceptible animals reported to have clinical signs compatible with FMD. This is intended to be a short-term premises
designation.
Infected Zone, Buffer Zone, Surveillance Zone,
Vaccination Zone
At-Risk Premises (ARP)
Premises that have susceptible animals, but none of those susceptible animals have clinical signs compatible with FMD. Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises. At-Risk Premises seek to move susceptible animals or products within the Control Area by permit. Only At-Risk Premises are eligible to become Monitored Premises.
Infected Zone, Buffer Zone
Monitored Premises
(MP)
Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises. Only At-Risk Premises are eligible to become Monitored Premises. Monitored Premises meet a set of defined criteria in seeking to move susceptible animals
or products out of the Control Area by permit.
Infected Zone, Buffer Zone
Free Premises
(FP)
Premises outside of a Control Area and not a Contact or Suspect Premises.
Surveillance Zone, Free Area
Vaccinated Premises
(VP)
Premises where emergency vaccination has been performed. This may be a secondary
premises designation.
Containment Vaccination Zone, Protection
Vaccination Zone
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Appendix 2: Snapshot of Readiness of New England Dairy Farms, August 2014 25
Frequency Distribution: Number of Surveyed Farms by Their Readiness Rating
Mean 0.626
Median 0.635
Mode 0.701
Standard Deviation 0.125
Range 0.793
Minimum 0.156
Maximum 0.949
Count 1021
25 See also, Richard P. Horwitz, Readiness of New England Dairy Farms for SMS: A Snapshot, 2014 (June 23, 2014), pp. 4-9.
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
225
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00
Nu
mb
er
of
Farm
s
Readiness Rating
29
Cumulative Frequency: Share of Farms and Production by Minimum Readiness Rating
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0
Readiness Rating
Share of dairy farms withthis Rating or higher
Share of production withthis Rating or higher
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Appendix 3: Readiness Section of Farm Survey
READINESS
With some diseases, especially FMD, infection can spread faster than clinical signs of disease. In an infected region, livestock may seem fine long after they have begun hosting and shedding virus. For safety’s sake, then, in aiming to protect your livestock and your neighbors’, at the beginning of an outbreak we plan to treat all dairy traffic in a disease control area as if it could be carrying infection. Precautions will be required. The following questions are intended to anticipate how tough it would be for your farm to elevate its biosecurity appropriately, to reduce the risk of spreading infection as vehicles and visitors come and go. Current state plans require that such precautions be in-place before commercial traffic will be permitted.
PERIMETER
Insofar as possible, preference in permitting emergency milk movement will be granted to premises that present a physical barrier to infection, that could, in effect, wall it off.
About how far is the perimeter of dairy operations from the nearest neighboring premises with FMD-susceptible animals (cloven hoofed animals):
0 (abutting property)
0-2 miles (more than 0 but less than 2)
2-6 miles (more than 2 but less than 6)
6 miles or more
Number of employees in the dairy operation who also work on another farm with FMD-susceptible animals:
Note: Most of the following questions about biosecurity give you three possible answers:
“Yes” means that the precaution is already in-place, ready-to-go.
“Not now, but possible” means that, though the precaution isn’t yet in-place, you could
establish it with your own resources, within a day or two.
“No, impossible” means that establishing the precaution would require more resources
than you could muster on your own within a couple of days.
Yes
Not now, but possible
No, impossible
Is there a gate that could be closed to restrict access to the entire farm or to the areas where livestock are kept?
Are signs posted and plainly visible to discourage visitors from entering areas where they might come into contact with livestock or manure – where permission, check-in and biosecurity precautions are required?
Could a hauler pick up milk without the tanker entering the farm premises?
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ENTRANCE
Insofar as possible, preference in permitting emergency milk movement will be granted to premises that are best designed to monitor and control traffic and to reduce the risk of picking up or shedding contaminants on the premises.
Yes
Not now, but possible
No, impossible
Is there one entrance to the dairy operation that is clearly posted and visible from the public right-of-way – a spot that could serve as point for controlling, logging in and logging out all vehicles, visitors, and employees?
Is the lane from the entrance to the bulk tank free from agricultural run-off (e.g., from pens or pasture)?
Is the lane from the entrance to the bulk tank separate from (as opposed to shared with) other essential on-farm traffic?
Cattle crossing?
Manure hauling?
Livestock shipments?
Movement of other field equipment?
Feed delivery?
Employee parking?
Visitor parking?
Surface of the lane from the entrance to the milk bulk tank hookup:
Paved (concrete or asphalt)
Permeable (gravel or dirt)
Parking surface for a truck while loading milk from the bulk tank:
Paved (concrete or asphalt)
Permeable (gravel or dirt)
DECONTAMINATION FACILITIES
Insofar as possible, preference in permitting emergency milk movement will be granted to premises that are best equipped to clean and disinfect (C&D) traffic as it enters and leaves the farm .
Yes
Not now, but
possible
No, impossible
Are there functioning foot baths for employees and visitors at entries to areas where they may be exposed to livestock, feed, milk or manure?
Is there a functioning wash station – a facility to clean and disinfect traffic at the entrance?
Even if there is no wash station, is there a place for one near the entrance that is:
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Large enough for washing vehicles (e.g., at least as long as the largest tanker expected)?
Free of run off or other sources of re-contamination (e.g., from routine livestock movement or manure handling) between that site and the public roadway?
Pitched toward a containment area or a ditch that does NOT drain directly into a wetland or waterway?
Capable of containing waste wash water?
Whether there is a wash station or not, are there appropriate supplies and equipment near the entrance:
Water supply?
Electrical power?
A pressure washer?
A steam/hot washer?
Sanitizer (Sufficient inventory for at least 3 days of vehicle C&D?)
Types on-hand:
Acetic Acid (vinegar)
Sodium hypochlorite (household bleach)
Other EPA-approved disinfectant (e.g., Virkon-S)
Personal protective equipment (PPE) that is disposable or waterproof to withstand washing and disinfection while being worn.
Types on-hand:
Gloves
Goggles
Boots
Coveralls (e.g., Tyvex)
Roughly, the more “yes” answers that are documented in this survey and then verified, the safer it would be for authorities to permit traffic to and from your farm in an emergency. Each “no” suggests an opportunity for improving biosecurity and sustainability of your dairy operations. But note, too: In assessing risks and issuing permits, regulators will consider a larger number of factors than this one survey. Some biosecurity measures are more effective than others (e.g., answers may be assigned weights). Given unique locations, management styles, herd sizes and finances, each farm may also be unique in its ability to resist disease transmission. In an actual emergency, information from surveys will be used in combination with other characteristics of the incident.
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Appendix 4: Weighted Criteria for Rating Producer Readiness
In 2012, the members of the New England States Animal Agriculture Security Alliance – officials in each of the six states plus the Area Office of USDA/APHIS/VS – assessed the relative importance of biosecurity criteria for emergency milk movement. In 2014, four USDA/APHIS epidemiologists added their assessments, as well. Through Analytic Hierarchy Process (via Decision Lens) the “readiness” of each producer to move milk was calculated as the sum of the products of the raw scores for the answers to each question in the producer survey (e.g. Yes = 1.0 or Possible = 0.5) times the weight assigned to that question. Weights were normalized to range from 0.0 to 1.0; so, the highest possible total “Readiness Rating” for a farm would be 1.0.
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Appenidix 5: Permit Form
Initial Permit for Movement of Unpasteurized Milk
From a Farm to a Processing Plant PERMIT NUMBER: (PID.Sequence) _____________ DATE PERMIT GRANTED (mm/dd/yyyy): _____________________
This permit is to allow Milk shipped from _________________________________ (farm
name) to _______________________________________________ (dairy processing
plant) from this date forward, unless it is revoked by Incident Command.
This permit is valid only if the farm maintains biosecurity standards set by the Incident Command. At the very least, all farm traffic in the Control Area must be minimized, monitored (logged in and out), and decontaminated. The exterior of vehicles – especially tires, wheel wells and undercarriage of milk tankers – must be cleaned and disinfected when leaving the farm. While on the farm, haulers/samplers must avoid contact with livestock, equipment, and manure and disinfect any spilled milk.
I certify that susceptible livestock on this premises have been inspected and found free of clinical signs of infection and that production parameters are within normal range. I will notify the State Veterinarian immediately if I detect any clinical signs of Food-and-Mouth Disease. ________________________/_________________________ __________________ Herd Manager (Printed Name and Signature) Date (mm/dd/yyyy) ________________________/_________________________ __________________ Hauler (Printed Name and Signature) Date (mm/dd/yyyy) The Incident Command Post (ICP) may issue an Initial Permit to a farm manager when the ICP determines that the premises is eligible (e.g., when the risk of infection to or from that premises is negligible). Normally, by issuing an Initial Permit, the ICP grants authority to the farm manager to permit subsequent transport of milk from that premises. The ICP may revoke that authority at any time, especially if there is a significant change in herd health or the premises type (e.g., from Free to Contact or Suspect) or if the farm fails to maintain adequate biosecurity.
