Never Expect Power Always': Electricity consumers' response to monopoly, corruption and inefficient services in Nigeria

‘NEVER EXPECT POWER ALWAYS’:ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS’ RESPONSE

TO MONOPOLY, CORRUPTION ANDINEFFICIENT SERVICES IN NIGERIA

AYODEJI OLUKOJU

ABSTRACTThe supply of electricity, undoubtedly the key energy source for indus-trial, commercial and domestic activity in the modern world, falls far shortof demand in many developing countries. In Nigeria, state monopoly hascompounded rather than resolved the energy crisis. The National ElectricPower Authority (NEPA), established by decree in 1972, epitomizes theutter failure of state monopolies in the power sector. This and other state-owned enterprises have been the target of recent attempts at reformthrough privatization, deregulation or liberalization. This article analyzesdevelopments in the Nigerian power sector, focusing on internal andexternal factors in NEPA’s crisis, reform measures by successive govern-ments, and the plight of consumers and their reactions to these circum-stances, and comments on the ongoing and proposed reforms of the powersector.

I wish . . . to bring to the notice of the Governor of Lagos State . . . that mostLagosians are still waiting for the impact of the Enron independent power project. Forover two years now, residents of some parts of Lagos have been complaining aboutthe erratic power supply by the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA). Long afterthe first quarter of 2001 has gone (when NEPA promised that the public power supplywould improve), the situation seems to have worsened and most residents of Lagosmetropolis are still complaining. The continuous blackout by NEPA has caused a lotof suffering and hardship to Lagosians. So I am using this opportunity to appeal tothe Lagos State Governor and all the authorities concerned to rescue us from the

51

African Affairs (2004), 103, 51–71 © Royal African Society 2004DOI: 10.1093/afraf/adh004

Ayodeji Olukoju is Professor and Head of the Department of History, University of Lagos,Nigeria. Earlier versions of this article were presented at a Conference on ‘The Governance ofDaily Life in Africa’ at the Afrika-Studiecentrum, Leiden, in May 2002, and at a joint seminarof the Department of History and the Centre of African Studies, Emory University, Atlanta,GA, in April 2003. He wishes to thank all the participants in these meetings (and especiallyKristin Mann for facilitating the seminar at Emory), SEDET, University of Paris VII, andIFRA, Ibadan which funded the research leading to this publication, and Lanre Davies, PaulOsifodunrin, Toyin Ilori and Richard Akhaze, as well NEPA officials and customers, forassisting in the collection of oral and documentary evidence. He alone remains responsible forthe views expressed.

03 adh004 Olukoju (JB/D) 17/12/03 12:15 pm Page 51

at Uppsala U

niversitetsbibliotek on Novem

ber 19, 2014http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/

Dow

nloaded from

http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/

hands of NEPA. We anxiously await Enron’s power supply to kick off in Lagos Stateso that our long days and nights without electricity would be a thing of the past.1

THE ABOVE QUOTATION ELOQUENTLY CAPTURES the helplessness anddesperation of electricity consumers in Lagos and typifies the misery ofinhabitants of other cities and towns in Nigeria. This urban sprawl, theformer capital of Nigeria, the industrial and commercial hub and chief portof Nigeria and West Africa, consumes up to 45 percent of the electricitygenerated in the country. As Nigeria, a major oil exporter and the mostpopulous black African nation, is heavily dependent on electricity fordomestic and industrial use, the generation and distribution of electricityhave a far-reaching impact on economic and social activities. Unfortu-nately, the power supply has been erratic since the late 1970s, and the issuehas generated intense public debate and daily comment in the print andelectronic media.

The problem of power supply in Nigeria, as epitomized by the woesof the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), merely mirrors thelarger question of the performance of state-owned enterprises in post-independence Africa.2 While Nigeria has not been able to take decisiveaction on the reform of its power and water supply sectors, other countrieshave either privatized or liberalized the supply of common services, suchas telecommunications, water and electricity. For example, the Republic ofGuinea in West Africa has made giant strides in privatizing the water supply,the welfare effects of which have been the subject of a recent study.3 Con-sequently, this study of Nigeria’s NEPA and its customers takes its cue fromsimilar studies of public utilities in Africa,while raising questions of reformstrategies, citizens’ responses and the public-private sector dialogue in theface of a global drift in the direction of the deregulation or privatization offormer state enterprises.

This article, therefore, highlights electricity consumers’ perceptions ofand responses to the seemingly intractable problem of erratic power supply,and examines official policies and reactions.Tracing developments since thelate 1980s, it sheds light on changing government policies, including the

52 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

1. Akinbode Akinjare, ‘Enron, we are still waiting’, letter to the editor, The Punch (Lagos), 2January 2002, p. 14.2. See, for example, Nasir Ahmed el-Rufai, ‘The Nigerian electric power sector: the oppor-tunities and challenges for foreign investment’, NESG Economic Indicators 6, 2 (June 2000),pp. 25–6; and Ifueko Omoigui, ‘Stakeholders’ analysis in the electricity reform’, NESGEconomic Indicators 8, 3 (July–September, 2002), pp. 53–62. For a comparative context, seeLucy Khalema-Radeby, Hailu Mariam, Abel Mbewe and Ben Ramasedi, Planning andManagement in the African Power Sector (Zed Books, London, 1998) (for studies of Zambia,Lesotho, Ethiopia and Botswana); and Anton Eberhard, The Political, Economic, Institutionaland Legal Dimensions of Electricity Supply Industry Reform in South Africa. (Working Paper,Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, Stanford University, CA, 2003.)3. George R. G. Clarke, Claude Menard and Anna Maria Zuluaga, ‘Measuring the welfareeffects of reform: urban water supply in Guinea’, World Development 30, 9 (2002), pp. 1517–31.


at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


fresh initiatives taken since the return to civil rule in 1999, to make NEPAoffer efficient services, and on the survival strategies of corporate and indi-vidual citizens of cities such as Lagos.4 For a better appreciation of thissubject, the discussion is situated within the wider national context ofattempts at reforming public sector enterprises since the closing quarter ofthe last century.5

NEPA: the making of a monopoly

During the colonial period (c.1900–60), electricity generation and supplyin Nigeria was the responsibility of the Public Works Department (PWD)and, later, the Nigerian Government Electricity Undertaking. The latterbody was superseded in 1950 by the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria(ECN). The Niger Dams Authority (NDA) was established in 1962 in thewake of the establishment of the country’s first hydroelectric power stationat Kainji in north central Nigeria.6 Power was generated by both hydro-electric power and thermal stations. While the former used water, the latteremployed gas or steam. Though the former method is cheaper, its infra-structure (dams and accompanying works) is very expensive. The thermalstations cost less to construct but are more expensive to run as the gas orcoal used to generate electricity at such stations is a wasting asset, unlikewater, which is a renewable source of energy. Up to 1972, the two bodiessupplied electricity to the entire country. Apart from the Kainji hydro-electric power station, there were thermal stations at Ijora in Lagos and atOji River and Afam in eastern Nigeria. These served particular areas orregions of the country. However, the national grid connected all thesestations for effective distribution of power across the country.

NEPA was established by decree 24 of 29 June 1972 by the militarygovernment of General Yakubu Gowon. It was a merger of the ECN and

ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS’ RESPONSE TO INEFFICIENT SERVICES IN NIGERIA 53

4. The article examines a theme that has not been covered in the literature. Two studies ofthe energy sector with a historical bias are: Ignatius I. Ukpong, ‘Social and economic infra-structure’, in F. A. Olaloku et al. (eds), Structure of the Nigerian Economy (Macmillan, London,1984), pp. 68–99; and Abubakar Siddique Mohammed, ‘Petroleum and energy’, in M. O.Kayode and Y. B. Usman (eds), Nigeria Since Independence:The first twenty-five years,Vol. II:Theeconomy (Heinemann, Ibadan, 1989), pp. 105–31. Relevant studies that provide a backgroundto this study are: Ignatius Ukpong, ‘Economic consequences of electric power failures in theGreater Lagos area’, Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies (NJESS) 15, 1 (March1973), pp. 53–74; Ukpong, ‘An analysis of causes of power shortage in Nigeria’, NJESS 18,1 (March 1976), pp. 103–20; and Ayodeji Olukoju, Infrastructure Development and Urban Facil-ities in Lagos, 1861–2000 (Institut français de recherche en Afrique, Ibadan, 2003), chap. 2.5. The literature on the reforms in the public sector enterprises is extensive. See M. Obadanand A. Ayodele, Commercialisation and Privatisation Policy in Nigeria (National Centre forEconomic Management and Administration, Ibadan, 1998); and M. Obadan, Privatisation ofPublic Enterprises in Nigeria: Issues and conditions for success in the second round (National Centrefor Economic Management and Administration, Ibadan, 2000).6. Ukpong, ‘Social and economic infrastructure’, p. 79, which is also the source for thediscussion in this paragraph.


at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


the NDA, and it was vested with the monopoly of power generation,transmission and distribution in Nigeria. By 1974, NEPA alone suppliedapproximately 98.7 percent of the total electricity consumed in Nigeria.7

The emergence of NEPA thus represented the centralizing or unitaryorientation fostered by the command structure of the armed forces. At itsinception, total electricity generated in Nigeria was 717 megawatts (MW).By 1976, the country’s electric power production had increased to a littleover 900MW distributed according to source as follows: hydro power (420MW from Kainji Dam; 30 MW by NESCO in the Jos area) and thermalpower (115 MW by steam turbine; 333.5 MW by gas turbine; and 35.3MW by diesel engine in small undertakings spread across the country).8

The amount of electric power generated had risen to about 6,000 MW in1999, consisting of 1,900 MW generated by hydroelectric power and 4,040MW generated by thermal power.9 In adition, the number of metered elec-tricity consumers increased from 93,653 in 1960 to 2,131,303 in 1989.This figure was estimated to have risen to between 2.5 and 3.5 million by1999.10 The absence of precise figures is a pointer to the chaotic nature ofthe operations of NEPA since its inception.

Although the situation has become increasingly intolerable, it must beconceded that demand has always outstripped supply and that it has beenincreasing phenomenally with the increase in population and revenue fromthe oil boom since the 1970s. The 1970s oil boom generated conspicuousconsumption reflected in the purchase of electrical and electronic appli-ances, which increased the demand for electricity, especially in urbancentres like Lagos. As the years passed, NEPA’s officially sanctionedmonopoly was to be an albatross around the necks of consumers, especiallythe inhabitants of the major cities, not least Lagos, Nigeria’s leading indus-trial, commercial and political centre.

‘Never Expect Power Always’: the travails of electricity consumers since the late1970s

No Nigerian city better illustrates or bears the brunt of NEPA’s in-efficiency, monopoly and unethical practices than Lagos.With a populationin excess of 10 million, and the largest concentration of commercial andindustrial establishments, Lagos consumes about half the total energygenerated in the country. The Lagos area is reputed to have accounted foras much as 75 percent of the profits made by the ECN between 1960 and1965.11 Its current estimated electricity consumption of 1,200 megawatts

54 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

7. Ibid.8. Ibid.9. The Guardian (Lagos), 13 October 1999, p. 23.10. Ibid.11. Ukpong, ‘Social and economic infrastructure’, p. 80.


at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


is a far cry from the 10 megawatts of the PWD (colonial) era. The risingpopulation and the concomitant demand for electricity for domestic, com-mercial and industrial use have led to a widening gap between demand andsupply. This has been reflected in the phenomenon of irregular powersupply and simple outages since the 1980s. The country then entered anera of unprecedented dependence on stand-by generators. ‘There is asense,’ notes one writer, ‘in which one can say that from 1980 to 1985NEPA became the stand-by generators’!12

Reasons for the dismal performance of NEPA are varied, but the follow-ing factors are generally agreed to have contributed in varying ways tocreating the present predicament. First, state monopoly, which is generallyregarded as stifling productivity, fostering poor accountability and pre-cluding much needed investment, is believed by many to be the major baneof NEPA. This has saddled it with indiscipline, corruption, low morale,political jobbery, nepotism and inefficiency among staff of all cadres.

Second, the energy sector, epitomized by NEPA, is said to have beenunder-funded, at least until recent times. Proponents of this view contendthat private sector participation would have injected substantial capital andcompetition into the sector. However, the claim that NEPA is under-fundedflies in the face of the substantial sums of money allocated to the state enter-prise and its revenue profile. In any case, the scale of outright embezzlementof funds and financial mismanagementwas such that the organizationwouldalways have been ‘under-funded’ in the circumstances! Given the dismalfailure of NEPA to justify such huge outlays, a traditional ruler recentlystated bluntly that the governmentwas perpetrating ‘massive corruption andNEPA is the conduit’.13 It might be noted in passing, however, that manyconsumers, especially government agencies, owe NEPA huge sums ofmoney. By March 1999, the debts had accumulated to a total of four billionnaira.14 This has compounded the financial predicament of NEPA.

Third, because it operates as a state monopoly and as a social service,NEPA’s tariffs are said to be too low.15 It is claimed that, at a time when itcost N�1.20 to generate a kilowatt of electricity, NEPA was made to chargea tariff of a mere 23 kobo per kilowatt, thus incurring a 500 percent deficiton tariffs alone. The fourth factor is the vandalization of NEPA equipment


12. Mohammed, ‘Petroleum and energy’, p. 121.13. The Punch, 14 January 2002, p. 10.14. Hamza Ibrahim, managing director of NEPA, interviewed in NEPA Review, January-March 1999, p. 10. The Authority has since intensified its debt-collection drive, particularlywith regard to government establishments, including the military and para-military organiz-ations. See Muyiwa Dare (in Ilorin), ‘NEPA plans differential treatment for customers’, ThePunch, 24 July 2002, p. 12; and The Punch, 8 August 2002, p. 27: ‘NEPA, military reachagreement on debt recovery’.15. Ayo Bankole, an engineer, interviewed in The Guardian, 13 October 1999, p. 23. I thankProfessor C. O. Awosope of the University of Lagos for clarifying this point.


at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


across the country by unscrupulous and unpatriotic elements who steal andsell its cables, transformers and other equipment for private gain. Suchsaboteurs have often included serving or former staff of the organization.As a newspaper noted: ‘the impression of many consumers is that it is infact those associated with NEPA that have the technical know-how totamper with high voltage cables, transformers or in fact simple live cables.They insist that NEPA should look inward to solve its stolen equipmentproblem.’16 Vandalization of NEPA equipment, including street lights, is asignificant, well-documented factor among its woes. This prompted NEPAto place a price tag on vandals: a reward of N�50,000 was promised to anymember of the public who could provide information leading to the appre-hension of such persons.17 This must have been prompted by the vandal-ization of the gas pipeline which supplied the Egbin Thermal Station inOgun State, which the then Minister of Power and Steel, Olu Agunloye,described as an act of sabotage worse than armed robbery.18 In addition,thunderstorms, bush fires and motor accidents have contributed to NEPA’sproblems by destroying electric poles and high-tension cables.19

Fifth, under prolonged military rule, characterized by lack of account-ability and massive corruption, NEPA equipment was not replaced and thisled to its obsolescence and the inevitable collapse of the system. Finally,NEPA officials have also highlighted the seasonal drop (which coincideswith the annual dry season from October to February) in the level of waterin Kainji Dam, the country’s major hydroelectric power station, as a majorfactor in the inability of NEPA to maintain constant power supply.20 Thisexcuse is, however, derided by Nigerians since there is no noticeable differ-ence in the performance of NEPA even at the height of the rainy season(May to August).

For any or all of the above reasons, NEPA has failed to provide a regularsupply of electricity to Nigerians and this made consumers derisively inter-pret ‘NEPA’ to mean ‘Never Expect Power Always’.21 However, each timeNEPA’s epileptic power supply is restored, children in the high density resi-dential quarters of Lagos (Ajegunle, Orile, Oshodi, Mushin, Shomolu andKetu) chorus ‘Up NEPA!’ in celebration of the temporary reprieve! Abarber’s salon operator in the up-market Opebi area of Ikeja in Lagosdeclared in August 2001 that: ‘for two years we have not been enjoying

56 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

16. Nigerian Tribune (Ibadan), 26 March 1991, p. 9, editorial: ‘NEPA and the cable thieves.’17. Michael Faloseyi, ‘NEPA places price tag on “wanted” vandals’, The Punch, 10 April2003, p. 20.18. Wale Adebayo, ‘Agunloye decries vandalisation of Egbin’, The Punch, 15 April 2003, p. 9.19. See, for example, The Punch, 14 January 2002, p. 5.20. Hamza Ibrahim, interview already cited.21. This popular refrain is as old as twenty-five years, denoting the antiquity of NEPA’scrises. See Candido, ‘Never Expect Power Always’, New Nigerian (Kaduna), 1 March 1978,p. 5, for the views of a popular columnist.


at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


electricity in our area. . . . One can say that we have light for just one hourin twenty-four hours. At times, NEPA will give us light for fifteen minutesin twenty-four hours.’22 However, consumers’ complaints were not limitedto NEPA’s inefficiency but encompassed the brazen corruption and oppres-sive actions of its officials.23

NEPA officials are not only slow in responding to distress calls, on thegrounds that their vehicles are grounded or their staff overstretched, butthey always expect and even demand a gratuity for coming round to rectifyfaults. Second, applications for meters (without which an apartment orbuilding cannot be connected to the grid) do not receive prompt attention.Such contrived delays are, however, obviated when consumers are willingto yield to demands for gratuities. The same applies to cases where defec-tive equipment, like transformers or feeder pillars, serving an entire neigh-bourhood, has to be replaced. Where such equipment is supposed to beobtained from the stock of spares in NEPA stores, officials claim that theyare not available. They always capitalize on the misery and desperation ofthe consumers, who need an electricity supply for their domestic use, andsmall-scale enterprises, to extort substantial sums of money from them.Third, NEPA officials have also been justifiably accused of fiddling with thepower supply to an area in order to blackmail its inhabitants into acquies-cence to their unethical demands.

Worse still, NEPA officials can be oppressive in the discharge of theirduties: they routinely disconnect an entire block of flats or a compoundinhabited by several families even if only one family or person has defaultedin paying its electricity bills. They simply disconnect the premises from theelectric pole serving the compound or street. Although there are cases inwhich consumers themselves have failed to settle genuine bills, owing todestitution (perhaps because of losing jobs), NEPA itself often provokessuch normally irresponsible behaviour by sending ‘crazy’ bills which do notcorrespond with the actual meter reading of the electricity consumed!NEPA officials still insist on payment of the outrageous bill and the re-connection fee before such billing faults are rectified. The occupants eitherstay without power supply or negotiate payment with the officials.

The aforementioned malpractices and irregular power supply naturallyelicit a variety of responses from electricity consumers in Lagos, rangingfrom acquiescence to various forms of resistance, which often border oncriminality.24 These vary from individual to individual, according to


22. Interview with Akeem, operator of a barber’s salon at Opebi, Ikeja, Lagos, October 2001.23. The following paragraphs are based on the author’s experience of living in Lagos since1987, and the result of fieldwork around the city.24. For a local example of criminality as a form of resistance, see Ayodeji Olukoju, ‘Self-help criminality as resistance?: Currency counterfeiting in colonial Nigeria’, InternationalReview of Social History 45, 3 (2000), pp. 385–407.


at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


financial, social and other circumstances, and geographical location. Theconsumers’ responses also involve connivance on the part of NEPA officials,who derive gain from the misery of the consumers and from the public purse.

In the event of an outage, consumers naturally make contact with thelocal NEPA office to lodge complaints, whether the outage is a result of anatural disaster (rainstorms causing trees or the roofs of buildings to fallon NEPA overhead cables) or the consequence of the malfunctioning ofequipment. The malfunctioning of equipment, such as transformers orfeeder pillars, is a major worry to any neighbourhood, given NEPA’snotoriety for delaying repairs or replacement if no inducements are forth-coming. Neighbourhood associations then step into the breach by organiz-ing a collection of funds from the households in the locality. Such leviesare remitted to NEPA officials presumably to offset the cost of new equip-ment or to effect repairs. As such transactions are never covered by officialreceipts, and are invariably denied and denounced by spokespersons of theorganization, they amount to brazen acts of official corruption, thoughhardly ever is anyone sanctioned beyond a few dismissals.25 It is significantthat some unscrupulous landlords often take advantage of this situation todefraud other victims of NEPA for their own profit. In one particularinstance, NEPA disconnected a community in reprisal when it discoveredthat some community leaders had fraudulently collected N�1,000 per house-hold ostensibly to buy a new transformer which was still functional!26 Evenso, hard-pressed consumers have come to accept the anomaly as the normin the spirit of expediency.

Second, consumers are wont to resort to various acts of self-help eitherto complement official efforts or in utter defiance. In the first instance,some make illegal (re)connections, that is, restore the cable detached byNEPA officials while disconnecting the household from the mains. This is,of course, an illegal or even criminal act, but it is rampant and done withimpunity, sometimes with the connivance of NEPA officials. In addition,consumers install meters which have multiple phases in order to be able toswitch from a phase without power supply to another which has it. They failto appreciate that switching phases defeats the purpose of load-shedding orrationing by NEPA and that the practice is thus counter-productive. Thephase that contains electricity is soon overloaded by consumers switchingover from deprived areas, and the area is then plunged into darkness.Furthermore, some unscrupulous consumers connive with either NEPAofficials or electricians (artisans) to tamper with the meters to make them

58 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

25. This is well reported in the newspapers: Onah O. Onah to editor, ‘NEPA: extortion inSaki, Idimu’, The Punch, 18 July 2002, p. 14; Sunday Aborisade (in Abeokuta), ‘NEPA warnslandlords against collecting money for transformers’, The Punch, 4 September 2002, p. 7.26. See ‘NEPA disconnects community over extortion’, The Punch, 29 August 2002, p. 25.


at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


stop recording or to do so very slowly. Either way, the consumers paynothing or far less than they should have done, given correct billing.

Third, consumers also take the extreme step of violent resistance suchas physically attacking NEPA meter readers or even vandalizing offices andassaulting staff if there is an outage before or during a crucial footballmatch involving the national football team, the Super Eagles!27 Such fansreason that NEPA staff have fiddled with the power supply to their neigh-bourhood to exploit their predictable desperation to watch such matcheslive.These are admittedly isolated occurrences which persist to date, thoughwith heavy reprisals from NEPA.28

Most Nigerians, however, make the best of the situation, rather thanresort to violence, by simply renting or purchasing power-generating plantsof various sizes and descriptions. These range from the petrol-poweredsmall sets to the huge diesel-operated units installed in high-rise buildingsand factories. The result has been a boom in the sale and service of elec-tricity generators in Lagos and other Nigerian cities, and a significantincrease in the amount of carbon dioxide discharged into the atmosphere.

While the more affluent acquire generators as a supplement to (or, even,a veritable substitute for) NEPA, the poorer people have had to make dowith rechargeable lamps, hurricane lanterns or candles. As might beexpected, this is a very poor substitute, whether in terms of illumination(particularly so for students and ordinary readers) or the operation ofhousehold appliances and conveniences. Worse still, the use of candles hasoften caused fire outbreaks when such candles were left burning overnightand accidentally ignited clothing and other combustible items in the house-hold. In the same vein, adulterated kerosene usually explodes when ahurricane lantern is lit by the unsuspecting victims. This, too, is an unfor-tunate consequence of NEPA’s inefficiency, which has led to the loss ofmany lives, the destruction of property and the maiming of many persons.Even those affluent enough to acquire generators are not immune fromsuch tragedies. During the African Nations Cup tournament in January2002, a generating set that supplied electricity during an outage explodedwhen NEPA suddenly restored power and overloaded the circuit. This ledto the death of twelve fans who had crowded around a television set in abarber’s salon to watch a match involving the Super Eagles.29

The foregoing has itemized the physical, financial and human losses


27. Ola Ogundolapo, ‘Sagamu youths beat NEPA staff over outage’, The Punch, 31 January2002, p. 6, reports that youths in Sagamu in Ogun State beat NEPA staff ‘and vandalised theauthority’s equipment in protest against an outage during the football match between Nigeriaand Mali’ at the African Nations Cup tournament in Mali.28. Funsho Aina, ‘Titbits’, The Punch, 25 January 2002, p. 33, reports a case of consumers’violence and NEPA reprisals.29. Garba Yedimakudon, ‘NEPA caused the death of soccer fans’, The Punch, 25 January2002, p. 11.


at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


occasioned by the irregularity of power supplied by NEPA. Equally greatis the incalculable economic burden borne by the inhabitants of Lagos. Inthe residential areas of Victoria Island and Ikoyi, where the richest and mostinfluential Nigerians and members of the diplomatic corps reside, owner-ship of diesel-powered generators is a fact of life. In other parts of the city,particularly the exclusive residential areas or estates (Opebi, Ikeja GRA,Omole, Dolphin, Apapa GRA and Gbagada), there is virtually no householdwithout a stand-by generator. Considering the cost of fuelling thegenerators, aggravated by perennial, contrived fuel shortages, and thegeneral cost of maintenance, reliance on generators is a heavy burden oneven the affluent in Lagos and other Nigerian cities. A 1983 survey revealedthat in 1981 N�100.5 million was spent on the purchase of portable genera-tors, while the figure had risen to N�134.1 million in 1983, at a time whenthe Naira was valued at 65 US cents. During that period, the 650 industrialestablishments in Nigeria spent N�750 million a year on the purchase andmaintenance of generators.30 Current estimates are no doubt much higher.

Industrial estates too have been hard hit by the irregularity of powersupply by NEPA. In general, industries spend a huge proportion of theiroverheads on electric power generation. Most are able to survive becausetheir profit margins can bear such costs, though this is reflected in higherprices demanded for their products, which often render them uncompeti-tive with foreign imports in the Nigerian and West African regional markets,and burdensome to consumers.

Small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) are generally worse off, andmany have simply collapsed under the weight of such costs, which run intomillions of Naira per month. Artisans such as welders, panel-beaters,barbers and hairdressers are even worse hit. Most of these cannot afford toacquire generating sets, and those who can do so have had to eat into theirprofit margins. The desperation of this group of consumers may be judgedby the step taken by an entire community to stage a demonstration at theNEPA office in Alausa, Ikeja, capital of Lagos State. A spokesman of theplacard-carrying protesters stated that ‘for the past four years, they hadbeen experiencing the outage, which had led to the premature death ofsome Small and Medium-Scale Enterprises (SMEs) in the communities.’31

The alternative of charging economic prices for their services to cushionthe impact of the high cost of the electricity supply cannot be pursued toits logical conclusion because overpricing would alienate the small busi-nesses’ clientele. Consequently, the irregular power supply by NEPA hasforced many artisans to diversify into small-scale businesses which do notrequire electricity. In addition, they could resort to manual (and, thus, less

60 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

30. Mohammed, ‘Petroleum and energy’, p. 121, citing Business Concord, 20 April 1983, p. 1.31. Babatunde Oke, ‘Residents accuse NEPA officials of extortion’, The Punch, 26 July 2002,p. 5.


at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


efficient) rather than electrical equipment, such as sewing machines andhair clippers, in the face of the uncertainty of supply by NEPA.

A sinister dimension to the erratic power supply by NEPA is the upsurgein criminal activities that it has spawned. First, regular blackouts providethe perfect cover for criminal activities. Armed robbery, burglary and van-dalization of public property are perpetrated by anti-social elements undersuch conditions. Second, unemployed artisans, particularly welders andpanel-beaters, constitute a reservoir from which criminal gangs have beenrecruiting personnel. The compromised artisans then employ their skills toaid armed robbery gangs in cutting through the network of iron gates andsecurity devices installed to protect neighbourhoods and apartment build-ings. The connection between the erratic electricity supply, unemploymentand crime is corroborated by the profiles of armed robbery suspectsarrested or killed by the police: most of these were unemployed (or under-employed) artisans of the category outlined above.32

The above summarizes the state of affairs to date but there have beensome developments since the onset of democratic rule in May 1999. Thenew government, naturally, promised to deal with the problem of theirregular power supply and the virtual paralysis of economic and social lifeacross the country. The then Minister of Power and Steel, Bola Ige (laterre-assigned to the Ministry of Justice in 2000 and assassinated in December2001) made a personal commitment to overhauling NEPA and achievinga stable and reliable power supply to the nation. This has proved to be aherculean task as the following discussion indicates.

Tackling the NEPA debacle: Federal and Lagos State government initiativessince 1999

In his inaugural policy statement in July 1999, the Minister of Powerand Steel proclaimed what he called ‘the power creed’. ‘The target for thepower sector,’ he declared, ‘is [to] . . . cut down the incidence of wantonpower failure by 50 percent in six months, by 75 percent in 12 monthsand by almost 100 percent in 24 months.’33 Pledging to ‘squeeze waterout of the rock’ in his drive to make NEPA work, Ige stated that he wouldnot accept excuses for failure to meet those targets. He set a target forNEPA of 2,500 MW within six months, up from the current power outputof 1,600 MW, and therefore told the management of NEPA to meet thetarget or be fired. Furthermore, the monopoly was to be ‘restructured and


32. For an example of the connection between unemployment and crime during an earlierperiod, see Ayodeji Olukoju, ‘The travails of migrant and wage labour in the Lagos metro-politan area in the inter-war years’, Labour History Review 61, 1 (1996), pp. 62–3.33. See Nigerian Tribune, 30 July 1999, p. 1, and the text of the minister’s press briefing, forthe discussion in this and subsequent paragraphs.


at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


decentralized to run effectively in the manner of a well-organised businessenterprise’.

A major policy thrust which was a departure from the norm was the offerof deregulation of the power sector. Foreign and local companies (includ-ing state governments) would be permitted to participate in the generation,transmission and distribution of electricity. These companies could build,own and operate such independent electricity power facilities and latertransfer them to the government after an agreement had been signed to thateffect. It was in this regard that Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited, anaffiliate of the global oil giants, and ENRON Incorporated, the then leadingUS power generating firm, expressed interest in the Nigerian energy sector.Both pledged to generate power from Nigeria’s vast reserves of natural gas,which are being wasted daily by flaring. Mobil set a target of 350 MW forBonny in the Niger Delta and 540 MW for Lagos.

Following the minister’s pledge to restructure the organization, changeswere effected in the personnel and structure.This led to the sacking of manyof the top executives and remarkably, though short-lived, some improve-ment in the power supply. By December 1999, the honeymoon was over andIge’s promise to stabilize the power supply within six months had proved tobe a mirage. There were allegations of sabotage by vested interests withinthe establishment, bent on frustrating efforts to make the organization work.Be that as it may, the truth is that the system had decayed for far too long.

As the minister admitted in his inaugural speech, the combined installedcapacity of the country’s three hydro and five thermal power stations haddropped from 5,876 MW to 5,400 MW and had steadily dropped to an all-time low of 1,600 MW at the inauguration of the post-military civiliangovernment in May 1999.This was far below the estimated national demandof 2,470 MW. Failure or inability to generate power at full or optimalcapacity was largely the result of the cumulative effect of the disrepair andneglect of the eight generating plants across the country. By 1999, 36percent of the installed capacity was over twenty years old, 48 percent overfifteen and 90 percent over twelve years old. The plants were thus overduefor rehabilitation, refurbishment and turn-around maintenance.

Consequently, the federal government proposed the following remedialaction in the short, medium and long run. In the short term, it would‘vigorously pursue’ the refurbishment and turn-around maintenance of thecountry’s hydro stations to ensure generation of an additional 670 MWwithin six months. Second, independent power producers would be permit-ted to generate electric power for sale and to build new power stations.Third,thermal stations, especially that at Egbin near Lagos, would be revamped.Fourth, the power and steel sectors of the ministry would be integrated sothat surplus power supplies in the steel projects at Ajaokuta and Aladja, andthe aluminium project at Ikot Abasi, estimated to be about 120 MW, could

62 AFRICAN AFFAIRS


at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


be injected into the national grid to augment the general power supply. Thelong-term objective was to achieve a target of 6,000 MW of electricity. Ruralelectrification was also to receive a boost in co-operation with the state andlocal governments as well as foreign and local private sector investors.

However, it was recognized that the problem of electricity supplyextended beyond the generation of power. Hence, problems of trans-mission and distribution were identified for urgent attention. The infra-structure of the national grid had become old and broken down.Transformers were operating below full capacity and these and otherequipment were prone to vandalization. Moreover, suppliers often connivedwith NEPA officials to procure substandard equipment which invariablybroke down within a short space of time. In any case, the national grid doesnot cover the geographical extremes of Nigeria in the northwest, northeastand southeast. The minister outlined plans to refurbish and replace dilapi-dated or vandalized equipment.

Distribution was another key problem which the government pledged toaddress. Deregulation of distribution and the decentralization of distri-bution by NEPA; replacement of distribution equipment such as feederpillars and transformers; and a regime of financial sanctions were some ofthe government’s proposed measures. Regarding financial sanctions, it wasproposed that the billing system would now credit consumers who hadmade capital contributions. Second, anyone not paying their bills would notget electricity supply, while anyone not supplied would not be made to pay.Consumers were to receive their meters within four weeks of application,unlike the past practice of delaying supply to consumers to make them payillegal dues before connecting their meters.

In all, the federal government has backed its support for NEPA with sub-stantial infusions of capital, especially in 2000 and 2001, when the sums ofN�50 billion and N�20 billion respectively were disbursed (see Table 1).However, this did not radically alter the parlous state of affairs, given theobsolescence of the equipment and NEPA’s huge debt portfolio. The tech-nical committee set up by the president was also faced with the dilemma ofeither building new power plants or rehabilitating the old ones, as it wasgiven a target of 10,000 MW by 2005. Under the pressure of meeting thetargets set, the committee fell victim to avaricious contractors who inflatedcontracts. Suppliers of equipment and spares often imported substandardequipment, such as transformers which invariably blew up in no time. Anadditional constraint is the margin between revenue and overheads. Theaverage income per month is N�2.4 billion, of which N�1.9 billion is spenton overheads, especially the emoluments of staff.34


34. Interview with Dr Samuel Agbogun, executive director, corporate planning and strategy,NEPA headquarters, Abuja, October 2002.


at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


As it became clear that NEPA could not satisfy consumer demand inLagos, the Lagos State government seized the initiative by entering an inde-pendent power production partnership with the US giant, ENRON.Initially, there was an inexplicable delay in the project’s take-off and NEPAwas inevitably accused of putting stumbling blocks in its way. After thetrading of accusations, the scheme eventually got started in 2001, though

64 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Table 1. Federal budgetary allocation to the electric power sector,1973–2001

Additional Peak capacityYear In Naira In US$ capacity (MW) (MW)

1973 1,392,552 – 398.101974 25,350,000 15,796,360.92 – 398.101975 115,013,000 71,083,436.34 120 518.101976 160,000,000 100,496,199.99 335.60 853.701977 207,079,989 134,223,482.63 – 853.701978 509,210,000 324,193,034.95 1,190 2,043.701979 540,000,000 326,173,621.01 – 2,043.701980 370,000,000 203,341,393.71 – 2,043.701981 222,481,000 136,726,278.27 300 2,343.701982 112,370,280 75,843.871.49 312 2,655.701983 111,530,000 8,356,706.68 – 2,655.701984 167,571,370 128,436,705.76 – 2,655.701985 110,189,433 98,931,076.46 440 3,095.701986 17,666,660 10,640,002.41 980 4,075.701987 282,303,446 69,142,875.63 440 4,515.701988 143,596,149 31,818,335.70 – 4,515.701989 14,922,058 2,005,464.27 150 4,665.701990 15,000,000 1,853,591.02 1,050 5,715.701991 26,625,513 2,678,407.47 – 5,715.701992 23,750,000 1,359,971.60 – 5,715.701993 152,203,000 6,921,873.51 – 5,715.701994 142,425,639 6,475,069.97 – 5,715.701995 1,426,276,710 18,603,698.24 – 5,715.701996 1,179,199,250 14,440,158.78 – 5,715.701997 1,000,000,000 12,191,880.70 – 5,715.701998 2,700,000,000 32,060,378.00 – 5,715.701999 2,481,000,000 26,748,576.32 – 5,715.702000 22,962,834,721 224,893,881.22 – 5,715.702001 51,045,300,000 446,981,611.21 546 6,261.70

Note:The exchange rates varied significantly during this period and this factor should be takeninto consideration when comparing the respective annual budgetary allocations to the sector.Source: Adapted from Table 2 in Dr Olusegun Agagu, Honourable Minister of Power andSteel, ‘Developments in the electric power sector,’ paper presented at the 2002 Media Summiton Power, serialised in The Punch, 12 August 2002, pp. 40–41.


at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


the ENRON independent power project was limited to supplying the indus-trial areas of Lagos. The tariffs were higher than for domestic consumers,but manufacturers were prepared to tolerate this if only the power supplycould be stabilized. However, hopes of a respite through the ENRONproject were threatened by the sudden collapse and bankruptcy of ENRONin late 2001. This raised fears that the Lagos State government’s experi-ment in independent power production would fail to achieve the goal ofsupplying ‘a significant percentage’ of the power required by consumers inthe Lagos metropolis.35 ENRON operations in Nigeria were taken over byAssociated Energy Service (AES), and it has managed to generate a limitedquantity of electric power at Egbin in Lagos State, which supplementssupplies from NEPA.36 The 270 MW of electric power generated byENRON in 2001 (see Table 2) is but a drop in the ocean of rising demandin the Lagos area alone. Hence, power supply in Lagos remains as erraticas ever as the beleaguered NEPA has had to resort to the now habitual


35. The Vanguard (Lagos), 10 December 2001, p. 14, editorial: ‘Enron bankruptcy andNigeria’s power production.’36. ‘Tinubu says power project not affected by Enron’s collapse’, The Punch, 23 July 2002,p. 8. Governor Tinubu claimed that the project had attracted investments worth $230 million.

Table 2. Growth in the generating capacity of power stations in Nigeria,1959–2001

Year Location Additional capacity (MW)

1959 Afam 20.61965 Afam 341966 Delta 301968 Kainji 3201975 Delta 1201978 Kainji 200

Sapele 720Delta 120Afam 110

1981 Sapele 3001982 Afam 4501985 Egbin 4401986 Egbin 440

Jebba 5401987 Egbin 4401989 Shiroro 1501990 Shiroro 450

Delta 6002001 Egbin (Enron) 270

Afam (Siemens) 276

Source: Adapted from Fig. 1a in Agagu, ‘Developments in the electric power sector’.


at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


‘load-shedding’ which rations supplies to consumers. The technical expla-nation proffered by the experts for the constant outages is the absence ofa ‘spinning reserve’, a strategic reserve comparable to contingency supplyby generators.37

Rationing of power supply by load-shedding has now been elevated intoan art. Adjoining streets are supplied according to a timetable which trans-lates into on and off days, usually alternate days in the week. A consumerbased in Ile-Ife, Osun State even observed a pattern of residential dis-crimination in load-shedding. According to him, it seemed that the city hadbeen divided into three segments by NEPA: the ‘high priority, low-priorityand no-priority zones’. Whereas voltage in the first two zones was steady atthe standard 220, it never exceeded 100/110volts in the ‘no-priority’ zone.38

Though this might have been an extreme case, it was certainly not aninvention on the part of the consumer, and appears to mirror developmentselsewhere in the country.

Conclusion

This article has examined electricity supply, a critical issue in the dailylife of the inhabitants of the urban centres of Nigeria. It has shown thatconsumers have been sandwiched between constant power outages, largelybecause of the inefficiency of NEPA, and the oppressive and corrupt prac-tices of its officials. Despite the onset of democratic rule and the federalgovernment’s declared commitment to ensuring a steady power supply, nosignificant change has taken place in the power sector. Even the federalgovernment has had to admit failure, as its 31 December 2001 deadline todeliver on its promise of a constant power supply turned out to be a mirage.It then sang a new song that what it was promising was the delivery of 4,000MW, which it was able to achieve without stabilizing the power supply, theearnest desire of the consumers. In any case, the average national powersupply has since fallen below this level,which remains far below the require-ments of private and public consumers.

Consequently, individual and corporate citizens of Nigerian cities havesuffered enormous economic and social losses and inconveniences from theinefficiency and corruption of NEPA. Constant outages have damagedelectrical and electronic equipment, and disrupted or bankrupted fledglingor otherwise thriving commercial and industrial enterprises. Unfortunately,

66 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

37. Interviews with Professor C. C. Okoro, head, Department of Electrical Engineering,University of Lagos, November and December 2002. For a similar view on the supply situationin Lagos, see Ukpong, ‘Economic consequences of electric power failures’ and ‘An analysis ofcauses of power shortage’.38. Adebayo A. Bakare to editor, ‘NEPA, why this discrimination in Ife?’ The Punch, 23 July2002, p. 15.


at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


the decree which established NEPA insulates it from litigation for suchdamages or breach of contract. This, in the opinion of many Nigerians,accounts for why the organization has been unresponsive and insensitive tothe feelings of its customers.39

Meanwhile, electricity consumers have yet to reap the dividends ofdemocratic rule. The anticipated impact of deregulation epitomized byENRON’s intervention initially appeared to be a mirage with the collapseof the US giant. But the firm’s Nigerian operations (taken over by AES)have managed to generate some quantity of electric power which, however,falls far short of demand. Consequently, the misery of consumers seems tohave deepened rather than abated. Speaking the minds of others, a schoolproprietress in Lagos stated that NEPA was adding insult to the consumers’injury: in addition to their shoddy services, NEPA officials were ‘rude, theybring you bills in excess of what you can ever imagine, collect money frompeople under whatever disguise, and yet expect us to be thankful shouldthey bring light to your area for a few hours in a week’.40 Unfortunately,that remark, made three years ago, remains true to date.

In the final analysis, power supply in Nigeria, particularly in the Lagosmetropolitan area, is still problematic. NEPA appears to be a part of, ratherthan a solution to, the problem. Yet, it has to be acknowledged that, thoughinternal factors (corruption, inefficiency and waste) have indeed con-tributed to NEPA’s woes, it has been argued in some quarters that theorganization should be credited with some achievement, given the widercontext in which it operates. First, the culture of misappropriation of publicfunds is not limited to NEPA but pervades the larger society.41 Hence, it iscontended, NEPA could not have been immune to it. To date, legal sanc-tions have not been inflicted on even proven culprits in NEPA or any otherpublic enterprise. Second, though funds were voted, they came rather lateand were, in any case, inadequate.

Ironically, all this is taking place when Nigeria can no longer afford toestablish new power plants because of their huge costs. For the country toacquire the necessary technology, an expert has recommended, it wouldhave to attract considerable foreign investment into the power sector.42


39. Nigerian Tribune, 12 May 1976, p. 1: editorial: ‘Inexcusable arrogance’, condemned theinsensitivity of NEPA, given its immunity from prosecution.40. The Guardian, 1 May 2000, p. 15. The persistence of such practices and the consequentreactions of consumers are conveyed in the following newspaper report: Henry Oke to editor,‘NEPA, correct this unjust billing system’, The Punch, 22 July 2002, p. 4. A columnist’s reactionto attempts by NEPA to raise tariffs in the face of its poor services is: Soni Ehi Asuelimen,‘NEPA incites rebellion’, The Punch, 17 October 2002, p. 15. The introduction of pre-paidmeters as a solution to this problem has been hindered by the high cost of supply and instal-lation (N�17,000 to N�20,000 per unit). For this and other issues, see the interview with themanaging director of NEPA, Joseph Makoju in The Punch, 29 May 2003, pp. 21–2: ‘Powersupply: Nigerians should not expect miracles.’41. Interview with Dr Samuel Agbogun, Abuja, October 2002.42. Interview with Professor C. C. Okoro, Lagos, December 2002.


at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


Unfortunately, this has not been achieved, in spite of the great promise heldout by the transition to civil rule in 1999. In any case, some experts haveargued that, by Nigerian standards, NEPA staff rate among the most dedi-cated since they work round the clock to generate and supply electricity inthe face of daunting odds. This, in their opinion, makes NEPA ‘one of themost efficient parastatals in Nigeria’.43 But such views cannot placate con-sumers who have yet to see the translation of the alleged round-the-clockexertions of NEPA engineers and technicians into adequate and regularpower supply. The position of such sympathizers of NEPA becomes unten-able when it is realized that Ghana, for instance, has been able to tackle theproblem of power supply though it is much less well endowed than Nigeria.

The solution to the seemingly intractable problem is generally believedto be the wholesale deregulation of the energy sector of the economy. Thiswould entail, on the one hand, the privatization of NEPA, and, on the other,the intervention of independent power producers. Fortunately, theENRON initiative is being emulated by other major independent producers,though the results have yet to make a significant impact on demand. InAugust 2002, an agreement was signed between the federal governmentand the Akwa Ibom State government, on the one hand, and a privatecompany, LYK Ibom Nigeria Limited, for the generation of 682 MW ofelectricity power. The power plant, to be located at Ikot Abasi, was to costwell over $375 million. The first phase of the project, expected to generate142 MW, was to be completed by February 2003, while the second phasewould be operational before the end of that year.44 However, the first phaseof the project was not completed on schedule owing to lack of funds,following a significant reduction in the state’s monthly revenue allocationconsequent upon the Supreme Court’s ruling on the celebrated onshore/offshore dichotomy.45

In addition, the federal government signed memoranda of understand-ing with the Shell Petroleum Development Company, AGIP and EagleEnergy to generate electric power using natural gas, with which the countryis blessed in abundance. These schemes were governed by three types ofprivate sector participation: the BOO (build, own, operate), the ROT(refurbish, operate and transfer) and the LOT (lease, operate and transfer).Shell emerged as the preferred bidder for the Afam power plant; AESFrontier Limited was chosen for the 1,020 MW Sapele power plant; andAGIP for the 450 MW Kwale power station, due to come on stream in June2004. Shell was to invest $ 450 million under the ROT arrangement in the

68 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

43. Interviews with Professor R. I. Salawu and Professor C. C. Okoro, Department ofElectrical Engineering, University of Lagos, November 2002.44. ‘FG seeks private sector support for power generation’, The Punch, 7 August 2002, p. 1645. Louis Iba, ‘Power supply from Akwa Ibom IPP expected in June’, The Punch, 24 April2003, p. 32.


at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


Afam-IV plant, and operate the Afam-V plant under the LOT arrangement.Eagle Energy won a BOO bid for the 500 MW Delta power station, whileMobil secured the 300 MW Bonny power station deal.46

That said, there must be a renewed effort to attract foreign investmentwith the necessary incentives. This appears to be the only way to securefunding for new power plants, the cost of which is beyond the means of thefederal government. At the same time, the privatization of NEPA itself hasto be effected with dispatch. The break-up and privatization of NEPA iscanvassed daily and the government’s apparent dithering on this is strain-ing the patience of consumers. Already there is speculation that the processis being hindered by certain vested interests in NEPA itself and in the largersociety. ‘The way out of the present frustrating crisis in the power sector,’an influential newspaper declared in 2000, ‘is . . . to swiftly break NEPA’sstrangulating monopoly.’47

Hopes that the government might finally reform NEPA were kindled withthe unfolding of strategic plans for the power sector in July 2002. TheNational Council on Privatization (NCP) announced that NEPA would bebroken up into eighteen firms, comprising six generating companies, elevendistribution companies and one transmission company, plus a specialpurpose entity ‘to take over NEPA’s liabilities that cannot be assigned tothe new business units’. The delay in effecting these and other proposalswas attributed to the power tussle between the executive and legislativearms of the federal government.48 Meanwhile, the new managing directorof NEPA, Joseph Makoju, announced plans to boost power generationbetween 2002 and 2005 by an additional 2,168 MW generated fromAjaokuta (828 MW), Okitipupa (670 MW), Papalanto (670 MW), and theaforementioned IPPS and various programmes of ROT with oil companies,which would generate 3,768 MW.49

While that is being considered, NEPA too has been making moves toameliorate the bad situation. Its management issued weekly situationreports as the 31 December 2001 presidential deadline for a stable powersupply approached. The reports informed and enlightened consumersabout the latest developments and what they were expected to achieve,especially compliance with energy saving instructions.50 Even so, NEPA’sefforts do not appear to impress anyone. Consumers, ever suspicious of the


46. Chijama Ogbu, ‘Shell, NEPA to sign MOU on power plants’, The Punch, 11 September2002, p. 16.47. The Punch, 1 September 2000, p. 8, editorial: ‘Ending NEPA’s monopoly.’48. Biodun Bayo and Chijama Ogbu, ‘NCP breaks NEPA into 18 firms’, The Punch, 17 July2002, p. 15. The transmission firm, Transcoy, took off in April 2003. See Louis Iba, ‘Trans-mission firm, carved out of NEPA, takes off ’, The Punch, 18 April 2003, p. 56.49. ‘Lagos yet to pay $6m to Enron — Makoju’, The Punch, 5 September 2002, p. 17.50. For example, The Punch, 13 August 2001, p. 38, advertorial: ‘Weekly situation report(19).’


at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


likelihood of sabotage by unscrupulous NEPA officials, often prevent themfrom carrying out repairs and even attack them while ‘on genuine main-tenance duty’ because they ‘lack confidence in some NEPA staff.’51

A recent initiative of the government, which has provoked some con-troversy, was the memorandum of understanding signed between NEPAand SNEL, its counterpart in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),to import electricity from that country. Under the agreement, a trans-mission line would be built to link Calabar in Nigeria with the Inga dam inthe DRC. The proposal was justified on the grounds of the cheapness ofimported hydroelectric power compared to power generated from thermalplants. It was argued that the Inga dam has a generating capacity of 40,000MW all year round, given the perennial high water level behind the dam.Moreover, the plan was in keeping with the primary objective of the WestAfrican Power Pool, of developing a transmission network across theregion.52 The scheme has elicited mixed reactions from Nigerians, many ofwhom consider it defeatist and escapist. A commentator opposed it because‘we have not exhausted our natural resources. It is important to focus onrestructuring the existing infrastructure of our power network.’53

In all, though much appears to have been done in revamping the electricpower sector, the situation remains as dismal as ever. The advances madein certain directions appear to have been countered by reverses in others.As regards NEPA, it has improved in a few areas but remains imperviousto change in others. On the one hand, NEPA now apologizes for outagesand seems more responsive to consumers’ complaints.54 On the other hand,its services are still as inefficient as ever, regardless of the attainment of agenerating capacity of 4,000 MW. Consumers’ responses to this state ofaffairs have been shown in this article to encompass resistance (sometimesto the point of criminality), collaboration (to defraud the state by bribingofficials to pay less for services) and resignation or acquiescence (yieldingto the unethical demands by NEPA officials or relying almost permanentlyon generators).

In the final analysis, it may be said that NEPA’s predicament is a productof a combination of human/managerial and technical/ technological inad-equacies. A solution to the former might be the deregulation of the powersector, the privatization of NEPA and the infusion of foreign capital intothe sector, but they may not solve the technological problems since Nigeriadoes not produce the spares and does not have the resources to establish

70 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

51. The Punch, 11 December 2001, p. 35.52. Chijama Ogbu, ‘Nigeria to import electricity from Congo’, The Punch, 1 May 2003,pp. 1, 11.53. Sylvester C. D. Ikejiaku to editor, ‘Re: “Electricity from Congo”’, The Punch, 19 May2003, p. 16. This was a reaction to the newspaper’s editorial on 8 May 2003.54. ‘Power interruption: NEPA apologises to consumers’, The Punch, 4 February 2002, p. 4,illustrates the new trend in NEPA-consumer relations.


at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


as many power plants as would meet her needs. In the circumstances, it isonly the top officials of NEPA, who have displayed a penchant for mis-managing funds, and lower echelon officials, who have continued to exploitthe misery of hapless consumers, as well as importers of various brands ofelectric power generating sets, who have benefited from NEPA’s failures.

The long-suffering consumers hope that when NEPA is fully privatizedand the energy sector completely deregulated, the nightmare of unstablepower supply will come to an end. It is hoped that the break-up of NEPAand the deregulation of the sector will create a better working environmentfor staff and engender a more responsive and responsible attitude to workon their part. Such hopes, however, depend on the direction and implemen-tation of power sector reforms during President Obasanjo’s second term.



at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from



at Uppsala U



Dow

nloaded from


Documents

Never Expect Power Always': Electricity consumers' response to monopoly, corruption and inefficient services in Nigeria