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Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: [email protected] BA IPT L7:

Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: [email protected]

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Page 1: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation

Shunji CuiDepartment of Political Science

School of Public AffairsZhejiang University

Email: [email protected]

BA IPT L7:

Page 2: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

Contents:

1. Background: How Did Neoliberalism Emerge?

2. Debates: Possibility of International Cooperation

3. Security Dilemma: How to Escape?

4. Neorealism v. Neoliberalism

Page 3: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

1. How Did Neoliberal Emerge? Interwar Idealism (1920-30s) Classical Realism (1940-60s) Liberalism (1950-70s)

Economic interdependence, transnationalism

Neorelism (1970-80s) Structure

Neoliberal Institutionalism(1980s-) Interdependence, structure, states, institution

World Systems Theory (Marxist)(1980s) Structure, economic, uneven distribution of

Page 4: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

From liberalism to Neoliberalism

Pluralism/Liberalism: Challenged: realist assumption – states

as unitary, rational actors.主张:Roles of non-state actors; those processes breaking

domestic/international barriers; Int. affairs going beyond governments

importance of transnational relations

Page 5: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

From liberalism to Neoliberalism

Neoliberal Institutionalism: Challenge neorealism (structural realism), but

by utilizing realist assumptionsAccepting: anarchy, state-centric, rational,

unitary actor assumption主张 / 假设: An anarchic environment of self-

interested, egoistic actors did not necessarily impose debilitating realist constraints on cooperation == possibility of cooperation.

Page 6: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

Neoliberal Institutionalism

Stephen Krasner, International Regimes, 1983 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, 1984

Central Theme: Possibility of states cooperation, and the role of institutions

leading to debates between Neorealism and Neoliberals

The Neo-Neo Debates in 1980s

Page 7: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

Episode:

Security Dilemma

Page 8: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

Hobbes and Security Dilemma

State of Nature Absence of Common Power People are living in constant

fear of each other. Security Dilemma

Page 9: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

Dilemma Security Dilemma In an ordinary sense, refer to situations which present

governments, on matters affecting their security, with a choice between two equal and undesirable alternatives. ( 在涉及安全问题上处于一种两难境地 )

In the literature on IP = a special meaning. The label “security dilemma” = the most significant and pervasive features of relations between states.

Security dilemmas arise from a perennial problem in interstate relations —— the inherent ambiguity of some military postures and some FP intensions. Difficulty to determine unambiguously what is ‘defensive’ and what is not. ( 国家间关系中— 把握不住 另一个国家 军事行为和外交政策的意图 ) = 即 无法确定对方的行为是 “防御性” / “ 进攻性” = 不断出现的问题。

Page 10: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

Definition: “A security dilemma exists when the military

preparations of one state create an unresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether those preparations are for ‘defensive’ purposes only (to enhance its security in an uncertain world) or whther they are for offensive purposes (to change the status quo to its advantage).” Wheeler and Booth (1992: 30).

A 国的军备

B 国困扰防御性?

进攻性?

无法解决的不确定性 信任???

Page 11: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

Psychological Relations in FP Interactions

Morgenthau: political power is a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised.

Types of FP: Policy of the status quo : aims at the

maintenance of the distribution of power that exists at a particular moment in history.

Policy of imperialism: seeks to overthrow the existing distribution of power.

Page 12: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

A policy of imperialism for a policy of status quo Security Dilemma:

State A: resort to certain measures defensive in intent with respect to State B.

State B: in return, resort to countermeasures. These countermeasures strengthen the initial

misapprehension. Ultimately, either both countries correct their errors with

regard to their respective policy, or else, the ever increasing mutual suspicious, feeding upon each other, end in war.

The Peloponnesian War, the history of European diplomacy between Franco-German war 1870 and WWI 1914 illustrates this situation.

Page 13: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

Appeasement: A foreign policy that attempts to meet the

threat of imperialism with methods appropriate to a policy of the status quo. Eg., Neville Chamberlain’s policy of

appeasement towards German imperialism in 1930s was a good example. The final catastrophe, WWII, was predetermined by the initial error which responded to a policy of imperialism as though it were a policy of the status quo.

Page 14: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

Problem v. Dilemma

A problem in IP: is a situation involving two or more parties which is difficult to deal or overcome( 难以处理 ).

A dilemma: poses a different degree of difficulty: it is a situation necessitating a choice between two equal, especially equally undesirable, alternatives ( 两难境地 / 选择 ).

a dilemma = is a problem that incapable of a satisfactory solution

Page 15: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

Anarchy & Security Dilemma

Can states cooperate in the anarchical system, despite the challenge of security dilemma?

How states cope with security dilemma?

Answer: NR v. NL

Page 16: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

Neorealism (NR):The condition of Anarchy / Int. Environment:

An all-encompassing, unchanging Human beings are subject to this environment, and

unable to control outcomes and ensure survival, Thus, generates the paranoia, fear, and drive for power.

Neoliberal (NL) understanding of Anarchy: Anarchy as a vacuum that is gradually being filed

with human-created processes and institutions. These processes can lead to counteract the inability to

control outcomes and ensure survival. Thus, the paranoia, fear and drive for power induced by

anarchy can be mitigated.

Page 17: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

On the Westphalian History Record:NR:

Unchanging quality of anarchy, Ongoing warfare, military/trade competition

NL: Important change in history – prior to the 20c and after. Before 20c = confirm to realist expectations Two important developments after 20c:

1. Increasing interdependence: Participating actors obtain important interests and benefits; end relationship would be costly.

2. Hegemonic stability: Lessons from the Great Depression, free trade system, institutions, the role of US.

Page 18: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

NL: Barriers to Int. Cooperation

NLs do not assume cooperation will be easy Interdependence and common interests do

not automatically leading to cooperationEg, common interests in controlling the spread

of deadly viruses, nuclear weapons, trade protectionism, environmental pollution leading to cooperation???

Page 19: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

NL: Barriers to Int. Cooperation lack of information Others will take advantage of cooperative

arrangement by cheating Others will free-ride on the back of their

cooperative efforts Transaction costs, too high? Unknown consequences & penalties,,, Thus, even when all actors share a common

interest and would gain from the cooperative effort, significant barriers remain among those self-interested actors to cooperate.

Page 20: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

Views over Barriers to Cooperation

For NR: They are intractable (棘手的 )

For NL: They are not insurmountable The Role of Institutions

Page 21: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

NR: Barriers are Intractable International system = anarchy; self-help, competitive Un-resolveable uncertainty defensive or offensive? Even when both parties have common interests and

would gain from cooperation, they fear any relatively greater gains will be employed for completive purposes – care about relative gains.

Since they cannot trust the future intentions of their cooperative partners – future enemies??mistrust

Security Dilemma cannot be escaped Cooperation: difficult to achieve; even more difficult to

sustain.

Page 22: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

NL: Barriers are not Insurmountable Fear of relatively greater gains do not necessarily

inhabit cooperation. If their concerns over future intentions can be

mitigated, then states can be motivated to cooperate in order to

achieve absolute. Absolute gains = the total gains made regardless of the

greater gains of others. International system = anarchy any agreement

must be self-enforcing. But states are still capable of recognizing when it

is in their interest to curtail cheating or to trust in the future actions of others

Eg, cooperative difficulties in game theory

Page 23: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

The Prisoner’s Dilemma(A) (B) 持有毒品 / 贩毒者? 监禁 1 年的可能

0 y (揭发对方) ( D C) 1 y (双方都沉默)( C C) 20 y(被对方揭发)( C D) 10 y(双方都招供)( D D) DC > CC > DD > CD

Pay-off structure encourages each to turn against the other barriers to cooperation 合作的障碍

n The lack of information or transparencyn The incentive to cheat on one’s partner, or, the

fear of being cheated a basic mistrust about the actual intentions of others.

Page 24: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

Overcoming barriers to cooperation

Things would be different if one can achieve the following???:From one-shot relationship to develop expectation of future interaction.The recurrent ability to exchange information, monitor one another’s behavior can reduce concerns over actual intentions & the consequences of being cheated???

Page 25: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

What can Institutions offer? Can foster the exchange of information about one

another’s intentions, and they can reveal common concerns over cheating, free-riding and other transaction cost, which can then be addressed directly.

Transparency is enhanced, thereby reducing the apprehension that can inhibit a mutually beneficial agreement.

Foster iteration ( 重复 ) by ensuring constant and regular meetings occur between national leaders & policy-makers.

Thus, allow states to learn one other’s preferences, discover they have common interests and constrains, and consider a variety of solutions to collective problems.

Page 26: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

NL Research Agenda: Institutional Design

Since institutions play such a fundamental role in reducing these sorts of barriers to international cooperation, the following questions became their central research agendasHow they are designedWho use them for what purpose

‘Rational design of institution’ == became foundational context for NL analysis & shapes its research agendas.

Page 27: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

Study of International InstitutionsResearch focus:1.Identifying the shared self-interests that a particular cooperative effort is meant to obtain in an Int. institutional setting —— what common goal was the institution designed.

2.How/ whether particular institutional design ensures those interests are sufficiently obtained? ——eg, what aspects of the institution are more or less successful in obtaining a cooperative result.In doing so, they identified three broad difficulties in Int. institutional design, which affect the extent to which Int. cooperation can be achieved —— Bargaining, Defection, Autonomy.

Page 28: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

Some criticism Adopting the same state-centric assumptions – missing

important dynamics of WP. Unitary actor assumption -- undermine the role of

domestic politics play in determining interests and FPs. Rational actor assumption – impossible to separate the

independent causal effects of regimes from what states did or wanted.

Analytical inconsistency: epistemology = post-positivist, ontology = positivist

These criticism led to an important theoretical foundation for the development of constructivism.

Page 29: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

Neorealists – Relative Gain World systems Theory

Immanuel Wallenstein Endorses realist emphasis on fundamental clash of

interests and importance of zero-sum logic. interdependence —— is a misleading term The reality of world political economy —— is

‘dependency’ ( not interdependence ) World system —— Core v. Periphery / North v. South

Page 30: Neo-Neo Debates on States Cooperation Shunji Cui Department of Political Science School of Public Affairs Zhejiang University Email: ssjcui@zju.edu.cn

Thank You !!!