DA

War Powers

1NC

Presidential war powers are high now - surveillance capabilities are uniquely key – the plan guts executive authorities Yoo 14 (John is professor of law at the Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He has also served as general counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee; as a law clerk to Justice Clarence Thomas and Judge Laurence H. Silberman; and, from 2001 to 2003, as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice. October 3, “Surveillance and executive power”, http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/10/surveillance-and-executive-power/)//dtangAs Commander-in-Chief, the President has the constitutional power and the responsibility to wage war in response to a direct attack against the United States. In the Civil War, President Lincoln undertook several actions—raised an army, withdrew money from the treasury, launched a blockade—on his own authority in response to the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, moves that Congress and the Supreme Court later approved. During World War II, the Supreme Court similarly recognized that once war began, the President’s authority as Commander-in-

Chief and Chief Executive gave him the tools necessary to effectively wage war. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, Congress agreed that “the President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism

against the United States,” which recognizes the President’s authority to use force to respond to al Qaeda, and

any powers necessary and proper to that end. Even legal scholars who argue against this historical practice concede that once the United States has

been attacked, the President can respond immediately with force. John Yoo and Stewart Baker will debate Alex Abdo and Elizabeth Wydra at the National Constitution Center on October 7—

reserve your tickets NOW! The ability to collect intelligence is intrinsic to the use of military force . It is inconceivable that the Constitution would vest in the President the powers of Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive, give him the responsibility to protect the nation from attack, but then disable him from gathering intelligence to use the military most effectively to defeat the enemy. Every evidence of the Framers’ understanding of the Constitution is that the government would have every ability to meet a foreign danger. As James Madison wrote in The Federalist, “security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society.”

Therefore, the “powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to the federal councils.” After World War II, the Supreme Court declared, “this grant of war power includes all that is necessary and proper for carrying these powers into execution .” Covert operations and electronic surveillance are clearly part of this authority . During the writing of the Constitution, some Framers believed that the President alone should manage intelligence because only he could keep secrets. Several Supreme Court cases have recognized that the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief and the sole organ of the nation in its foreign relations must include the power to collect intelligence. These authorities agree that

intelligence rests with the President because its structure allows it to act with unity, secrecy, and speed. Presidents have long ordered electronic surveillan ce without any judicial or congressional participation. More than a year before the Pearl Harbor attacks, but with war clearly looming with the Axis powers, President Franklin Roosevelt authorized the FBI to intercept any communications, whether wholly inside the country or international, of persons “suspected of subversive activities against the Government of the United States, including suspected spies.” FDR was concerned that “fifth columns” could wreak havoc with the war effort. “It is too late to do anything about it after sabotage, assassinations and ‘fifth column’ activities are completed,”

FDR wrote in his order. FDR ordered the surveillance even though a federal law at the time prohibited electronic surveillance without a warrant. Presidents continued to monitor the communications of national security threats on their own authority, even in peacetime . If

Presidents in times of peace could order surveillance of spies and terrorists, executive authority is only the greater now , as hostilities continue against al Qaeda.

Curtailing domestic surveillance undermines the sole organ doctrine – which underpins every facet of presidential powerWood and Webb 11 – Department of Political Science at Texas A&M University, presented to the faculty at Vanderbilt University (B Dan Wood, Clayton Webb, 10/17/11, “EXPLAINING PRESIDENTIAL SABER RATTLING,” http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/events/Wood_Presidential_Saber_Rattling_112111.pdf)//twontwonThe courts affirmed early on that as sovereign leaders, presidents are the nation’s chief foreign policy

representative . Future Supreme Court Justice John Marshall stated in 1800 when he served in the U.S. House of Representatives ―The

President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations , and its sole representative with foreign nations.‖ (10

Annals of Congress 613) Relying on Marshall’s ―sole organ‖ doctrine, Supreme Court Justice George Sutherland wrote in 1937 (United States

vs. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp , 299 U.S. 319) ―In this vast external realm [foreign policy], with its important, complicated, delicate and

manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.‖

While the plenary nature of executive authority in foreign relations is not universally accepted (e.g., see the persuasive

arguments by Fisher 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e, 2008a, 2008b), ***FOOTNOTE BEGINS*** . 2007d. "Statement by

Louis Fisher appearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary, "Constitutional Limitations on Domestic Surveillance "."

ed. L. L. o. Congress.***FOOTNOTE ENDS*** the modern chief executive r elies extensively on the ― sole organ‖ doctrine to define presidential power broadly , and it is now commonly assumed that presidents are the sole representatives of the nation to the outside world.

Executive war powers key to combating a litany of transnational threats that escalate to extinction – terror, rogue states, and prolif – congressional war authority is ineffectiveYoo 7 (John is a professor of law at the Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He has also served as general counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee; as a law clerk to Justice Clarence Thomas and Judge Laurence H. Silberman; and, from 2001 to 2003, as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice. 4/18, “Exercising Wartime Powers,” http://hir.harvard.edu/archives/1369)//dtangProponents of congressional war power often argue that the executive branch is unduly prone to war. In this view, if the president and Congress have to agree on warmaking, the nation will enter fewer wars and wars that do occur will arise only after sufficient deliberation. But it is far from clear that outcomes would be better

if Congress alone had the power to begin wars. First, congress ional deliberation does not necessarily ensure consensus . Congressional authorization may represent only a bare majority of Congress or an unwillingness to challenge the President's institutional and political strengths,

regardless of the merits of the war. And even if it does represent consensus, it is no guarantee of consensus after combat begins. The Vietnam War, which was initially approved by Congress , did not meet with a consensus over the long term but

instead provoked some of the most divisive politics in US history . It is also difficult to claim that congressional

authorizations to use force in Iraq, either in 1991 or 2002, reflected a deep consensus over the merits of the wars there. The 1991 authorization barely survived the

Senate, and the 2002 authorization received significant negative votes and has become a deeply divisive issue in national politics. It is also not clear that the absence of congressional approval has led the nation into wars it should not have waged . The experience of the Cold War , which provides the best examples of military hos tilities conducted without congressional support, does not clearly come down on the side of a link between institutional deliberation and better conflict selection. Wars were fought throughout the world by the two superpowers and their proxies, such as in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, during this period. Yet the only war arguably authorized by Congress--and this

point is debatable--was the Vietnam War. Aside from bitter controversy over Vietnam, there appeared to be significant bipartisan consensus on the

overall strategy of containment, as well as the overarching goal of defeating the Soviet Union. The United States did not win the four-decade Cold War by

declarations of war; rather, it prevailed through the steady presidential application of the strategy of containment, supported by congressional funding of the necessary military forces. On the other hand, congressional action has led to undesirable outcomes.

Congress led the U nited S tates into two " bad" wars , the 1798 quasi-war with France and the War of 1812. Excessive congressional control can also prevent the United States from entering into conflicts that are in the national interest . Most would agree now that congressional isolationism before World War II harmed US interests and that the United States and the world would have been far better off if President Franklin Roosevelt could have brought the United States into the conflict much earlier . Congressional participation does not automatically or even consistently produce desirable results in war decision making. Critics of presidential war powers

exaggerate the benefits of declarations or authorizations of war. What also often goes unexamined are the potential costs of congressional participation: delay, inflexibility, and lack of secrecy . In the post-Cold War era, the

U nited S tates is confronting the growth in prolif eration of WMDs , the emergence of rogue nations ,

and the rise of international terrorism . Each of these threats may require pre-emptive action best

undertaken by the President and approved by Congress only afterward. Take the threat posed by the Al Qaeda

terrorist organization. Terrorist attacks are more difficult to detect and prevent than conventional ones. Terrorists

blend into civilian populations and use the channels of open societies to transport personnel, material, and money. Although terrorists generally have no territory or regular armed forces from which to detect signs of an impending attack, WMDs

allow them to inflict devastation that once could have been achievable only by a nation-state. To

defend itself from this threat, the United States may have to use force earlier and more ofte n than

when nation-states generated the primary threats to US national security. The executive branch

needs the flexibility to act quickly , possibly in situations wherein congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act on the intelligence. By acting earlier, the executive branch might also be able to engage in a more limited , more precisely targeted , use of force . Similarly, the least dangerous way to

prevent rogue nations from acquiring WMDs may depend on secret i ntelligence gathering and covert

action rather than open military intervention . Delay for a congressional debate could render

useless any time-critical intelligence or windows of opportunity. The Constitution creates a presidency that is uniquely

structured to act forcefully and independently to repel serious threats to the nation. Instead of specifying a legalistic process to begin war, the Framers wisely

created a fluid political process in which legislators would use their appropriations power to control war. As the United States confronts terrorism, rogue nations, and WMD proliferation, we should look skeptically at claims that radical changes in the way we make war would solve our problems, even those stemming from poor judgment, unforeseen circumstances, and bad luck.

CP

XO

1NCText: the president should issue an executive order to curtail the TSA’s authority to conduct domestic surveillance

Empirics prove that ONLY the executive can meaningfully curtail surveillanceEdgar 4/13 -- visiting fellow at the Watson Institute at Brown University, ACLU’s national security policy counsel (Timothy H. Edgar, April 13, 2015, “The Good News About Spying,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-04-13/good-news-about-spying), acui

Although rising public anger is welcome, it is misdirected. A fair examination of the Obama administration’s record over the last 18 months shows real accomplishments on surveillance reform . In sharp contrast to the inaction of Congress and U.S. courts, Obama has taken several meaningful steps to limit government surveillance and make surveillance policies more transparent.¶ Despite high hopes for a fresh start on civil liberties, during his first term in office, Obama ratified and even expanded the surveillance programs that began under former President George W. Bush.

After NSA contractor Edward Snowden began revealing the agency’s spying programs to The Guardian in 2013, however, Obama responded with a clear change of direction . Without great fanfare, his administration has made changes that open up the practices of the United States intelligence community and protect privacy in the United States and beyond. The last year and a half has been the most significant period of reform for national security surveillance since Senator Frank Church led the charge against domestic spying in the late 1970s. ¶ In 2013, at Obama’s direction , the Office of the Director of National Intelligence ( ODNI ) established a website for the intelligence community, IC on the Record, where previously secret documents are posted for all to see . These are not decades-old files about Cold War spying, but recent slides used at recent NSA training sessions, accounts of illegal wiretapping after the 9/11 attacks, and what had been highly classified opinions issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court about ongoing

surveillance programs.¶ Although many assume that all public knowledge of NSA spying programs came from Snowden’s leaks, many of the revelations in fact came from IC on the Record, including mistakes that led to the unconstitutional collection of U.S. citizens’ emails. Documents released though this portal total more than 4,500 pages—surpassing even the 3,710 pages collected and leaked by Snowden. The Obama administration has instituted other mechanisms, such as a n annual surveillance transparency report, that will continue to provide fodder for journalists, privacy activists, and researchers.¶ The transparency reforms may seem trivial to some. From the perspective of an intelligence community steeped in the need to protect sources and methods, however, they are deeply unsettling. At a Brown University forum, ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer Alexander Joel said, “The intelligence community is not designed and built for transparency. Our culture is around finding our adversaries’ secrets and keeping our own secrets secret.” Accordingly, until only a few years ago, the intelligence community resisted making even the most basic information public. The number of FISA court opinions released to the public

between 1978 and 2013 can be counted on one hand.¶ Beyond more transparency, Obama has also changed the rules for surveillance of foreigners. Until last year, privacy rules applied only to “U.S. persons.” But in January 2014, Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 28 ( PPD-28 ), ordering intelligence agencies to write

detailed rules assuring that privacy protections would apply regardless of nationality. These rules, which came out in January 2015, mark the first set of guidelines for intelligence agencies ordered by a U.S. president—or any

world leader—that explicitly protect foreign citizens’ personal information in the course of intelligence operations. Under the directive, the NSA can keep personal information in its databases for no more than five years. It must delete personal information from the intelligence reports it provides its customers unless that person’s identity is

necessary to understand foreign intelligence—a basic rule once reserved only for Americans.¶ The new rules also include restrictions on bulk collection of signals intelligence worldwide—the practice critics call “ mass surveillance .” The NSA’s bulk collection programs may no longer be used for uncovering all types of diplomatic secrets, but will now be limited to six

specific categories of serious national security threats. Finally, agencies are no longer allowed simply to “collect it all.” Under PPD-28, the NSA and other agencies may collect signals intelli gence only after weighing the benefits against the risks to privacy or civil liberties, and they must now consider the privacy of everyone, not just U.S. citizens. This is the first time any U .S. government official will be able to cite a written presidential directive to object to an intelligence program on the basis that the intelligence it produces is not worth the costs to privacy of innocent foreign citizens.

Net benefit is war powers DA – internal checks maintain presidential powerNeal Katyal 6, prof, Georgetown law, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314This Essay's proposed reforms reflect a more textured conception of the presidency than either the unitary executivists or their critics espouse. In contrast to the

unitary executivists, I believe that the simple fact that the President should be in control of the executive branch does not answer the question of how institutions should be structured to encourage the most robust flow of advice to the President. Nor does that fact weigh against modest internal checks that, while

subject to presidential override, could constrain presidential adventurism on a day-to-day basis. And in contrast to the doubters of the unitary executive, I believe a unitary executive serve s important values , particularly in times of crisis . Speed and dispatch are often virtues to be celebrated.¶ I nstead of doing

away with th e unitary executive , this Essay proposes designs that force internal checks but permit

temporary departures when the need is great . Of course, the risk of incorporating a presidential override is that its great formal power will eclipse everything else, leading agency officials to fear that the President will overrule or fire them.

But just as a filibuster does not tremendously constrain presidential action, modest internal checks ,

buoyed by reporting requirements, can create sufficient deterrent costs . ¶ [*2319] Let me offer a brief word about what this Essay does not

attempt. It does not propose a far-reaching internal checking system on all presidential power, domestic and foreign. Instead, this Essay takes a case

study, the war on terror, and uses the collapse of external checks and balances to demonstrate the

need for internal ones . In this arena, public accountability is low - not only because decisions are made in secret, but also because they routinely

impact only people who cannot vote (such as detainees). In addition to these process defects, decisions in this area often have subtle long-term consequences that short-term executivists may not fully appreciate. n9

Nietzsche

1NCThe 1AC is a futile search for a transcendental ethic – their impacts are assumed moral valuations which they haven’t defended – this betrays their flawed relation to suffering in an existence that is intrinsically tragic. Their desire to eliminate suffering is a Will to Order that seeks to master the world and inevitably fails, causing ressentimentSaurette 96 (Paul, associate professor, University of Ottawa, “I Mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them': Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory,” Millenium – Journal of International Studies 25, http://mil.sagepub.com/contentI25/1/1.citation - oliver g)

According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework . As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this

will to meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organisation of a particular community.' Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization , then,

misconceive s the origins of values which we take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests, therefore, that to understand the development of our modern conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial

influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its philosophical

justification of life on heroic myths which honoured tragedy and competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and affirmed as inescapable aspects of human existence .' However, this incarnation of the will to power as tragedy weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. 'Everywhere the instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were but five e steps from excess: the monstrum in animo

was a universal danger'.' No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek thought yielded to decadence , a search for a new social foundation which would soften the tragedy of life, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates' thought became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old Athens was coming to an end—And Socrates understood that the world had need of him —his expedient, his cure and

his personal art of self-preservation.' Socrates realised that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled

the widespread yearning for assurance and stability within society . His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to

power. An alternate foundation that promised mastery and control, not through acceptance of the tragic life, but

through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic . In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the

Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche's words, 'Nationality was divined as a saviour —it was their last

expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational....' Thus,

Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework.The Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealised Apollonian order . As life is inescap ably comprised of both order and disorder , however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possible by creating a 'Real World' of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an 'Apparent World' of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and ignored in relation to the ideal order of the Real World. Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction

between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this

dichotomised model led to the emergence of a uniquely 'modern' understanding of life which could only view

suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World . This outlook created a modern notion of

responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone , or something, is to blame . Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition ressentiment, and

argues that it signalled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution. This contradiction, however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche, ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the Apparent World as the

responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God, the Truth, and the Real World . As Nietzsche

wrote,`I suffer: someone must be to blame for it' thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: 'Quite so my sheep! someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself,- you alone are to blame for yourself—This is brazen and false enough: but one thing is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered." Faced with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, once again, 'one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational....' The genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdium the Socratic division through the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through this redirection, the Real World was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action.This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomised worlds creates the Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will

to Truth. Unable to accept the Dionysian suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately

searches for 'the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest sleep, in short absence of suffering'.` According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possible only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World. The Will to Order, then, is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts of the moral Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two interrelated reactions. First,

ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal , Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve this, however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a 'truer', more complete knowledge of the Real World must be established, creating an ever-increasing Will to Truth. This self-perpetuating movement creates an interpretative structure within which everything must be understood and

ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche suggests,[t]he ascetic ideal has a goal—this goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it, petty and narrow; it

interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goal; it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation:4 The

very structure of the Will to Truth ensures that theoretical investigation must be increasingly ordered,

comprehensive, more True, and closer to the perfection of the ideal. At the same time, this understanding of intellectual

theory ensures that it creates practices which attempt to impose increasing order in the Apparent World. With this critical transformation, the Will to Order becomes the fundamental philosophical principle of modernity

Moralities are used to justify one’s self and construct the neighbor as an immoral Other, and the aff is no exception. This moralizing logic is the root cause of war and the national security apparatus – turns caseNietzsche 1879 (Friedrich, Chair of Classical Philology at the University of Basel, Human, All Too Human, The Nietzsche Channel, The Wanderer and His Shadow, http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/was.htm, AD: 7/6/09) jl

The means to real peace.— No government admits any more that it keeps an army to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest . Rather the army is supposed to serve for defense , and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies one's own morality and the neighbor's immorality; for the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring an army imply that our neighbor , who denies the desire for conquest just as much as does our own state, and who, for his part, also keeps an army only for reasons

of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim without any fight. Thus all states are now ranged against each other: they presuppose their neighbor's bad disposition and their own good disposition. This presupposition, however, is inhumane, as bad as war and worse . At bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars, because, as I have said, it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile disposition and act. We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests. And perhaps the great day will come when people, distinguished by wars and victories and by the highest development of a military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifices for these things, will exclaim of its own free will, "We break the sword," and will smash its entire military establishment down to its lowest foundations. Rendering oneself unarmed when one had been the best-armed, out of a height of feeling—that is the means to real peace , which must always rest on a peace of mind; whereas the so-called armed peace, as it now exists in all countries, is the absence of peace of mind. One trusts neither oneself nor one's neighbor and, half from hatred, half from fear, does not lay down arms. Rather perish than hate and fear, and twice rather perish than make oneself hated and feared—this must someday become the highest maxim for every single commonwealth. Our liberal representatives, as is well known, lack the time for reflecting on the nature of man: else they would know that they work in vain when they work for a "gradual decrease of the military burden." Rather, only when this kind of need has become greatest will the kind of god be nearest who alone can help here. The tree of war-glory can only be destroyed all at once, by a stroke of lightning: but lightning, as indeed you know, comes from a cloud—and from up high.

The alt is to do nothing and embrace fate.

Embracing fate allows us to see the beauty in the chaos and pain. Redeeming and loving every moment of our lives allows us to cope with suffering and replaces morality with life-affirmation as a method of evaluationDeleuze 83, Giles Deleuze, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Lyon, Paris, and Lycees, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 25-27, 7/04/12, [AR]

The game has two moments which are those of a dicethrow — the dice that is thrown and the dice that falls back. Nietzsche presents the dicethrow as taking place on two distinct tables, the earth and the sky. The earth where the dice are thrown and the sky where the dice fall back: "if ever I have played dice with the gods at their table, the earth, so that the earth trembled and broke open and streams of fire snorted forth; for the earth is a table of the gods, and trembling with creative new words and the dice throws of the gods" (Z III "The Seven Seals" 3 p. 245). "0 sky above me, you pure and lofty sky! This is now your purity to me, that there is no eternal reason-spider and spider's web in you; that you are to me a dance floor for divine chances, that you are to me a god's table for divine dice and dicers" (Z III "Before Sunrise" p. 186). But these two tables are not two worlds. They are the two hours of a single world, the two moments of a single world, midnight and midday, the hour when the dice are thrown, the hour when the dice fall back. Nietzsche insists on the two tables of life which are also the two moments of

the player or the artist; " We temporarily abandon life , in order to then temporarily fix our gaze upon it ." The dicethrow affirms becoming and it affirms the being of becoming. It is not a matter of several dicethrows which, because of their number, finally reproduce the same combination. On the contrary , it is a matter of a single dice throw which , due to the number of the combination produced, comes to reproduce itself as such. It is not that a large number of throws produce the repetition of a combination but rather the number of the

combination which produces the repetition of the dicethrow. The dice which are thrown once are the affirmation of chance, the combination which they form on falling is the affirmation of necessity . Necessity is affirmed of chance in exactly the sense that being is affirmed of becoming and unity is affirmed of multiplicity. It will be replied, in vain, that thrown to chance, the dice do not necessarily produce the winning combination , the double six which brings back the dicethrow. This is true, but only insofar as the player did not know how to affirm chance from the outset. For, just as unity does not suppress or deny multiplicity, necessity does not suppress or abolish chance. Nietzsche identifies chance with multiplicity, with fragments, with parts, with chaos: the chaos of the dice that are shaken and then thrown. Nietzsche turns chance into an affirmation. The sky itself is called "chance-sky", "innocence-sky" (Z III "Before Sunrise"); the reign of Zarathustra is called "great chance" (Z IV "The Honey Offering" and III "Of Old and New Law Tables"; Zarathustra calls himself the "redeemer of chance"). "By chance, he is the world's oldest nobility, which I have given back to all things; I have released them from their servitude under purpose . . . I have found this happy certainty in all things: that they prefer to dance on the feet of chance" (Z III "Before Sunrise" p. 186); "My doctrine is `Let chance come to me: it is as innocent as a little

child!' " (Z III "On the Mount of Olives" p. 194). What Nietzsche calls necessity (destiny) is thus never the abolition but rather the combination of chance itself. Necessity is affirmed of chance in as much as chance itself affirmed . For there is only a single combination of chance as such, a single way of combining all the parts of chance, a way which is like the unity of multiplicity, that is to say number or necessity. There are many numbers with increasing or decreasing probabilities, but only one number of chance as such, one fatal number which reunites all the

fragments of chance, like midday gathers together the scattered parts of midnight. This is why it is sufficient for the player to affirm chance once in order to produce the number which brings back the dice- throw. To know how to affirm chance is to know how to play. But we do not know how to play, "Timid, ashamed, awkward, like a tiger whose leap has failed. But what of that you dicethrowers! You have not learned to play and mock as a man ought to play and mock!" (Z IV "Of the Higher Man" 14 p. 303). The bad player counts on several throws of the dice, on a great number of throws. In this way he makes e of causality and probability to produce a combination that he sees as desirable . He posits this combination itself as an end to be obtained, hidden behind causality. This is what Nietzsche means when he speaks of the

eternal spider, of the spider's web of reason , "A kind of spider of imperative and finality hidden behind the great web, the great

net of causality — we could say, with Charles the Bold when he opposed Louis XI, "I fight the universal spider" (GM III 9). To abolish chance by holding it in the grip of causality and finality, to count on the repetition of throws rather than affirming chance, to anticipate a result instead of affirming necessity — these are all the operations of a bad player . They have their root in reason, but what is the root of reason ? The spirit of revenge, nothing but the spirit of revenge, the spider (Z II "Of the Tarantulas"). Ressentiment in the repetition of throws, bad conscience in the belief in a purpos e. But, in this way, all that will ever be obtained are more or less probable relative numbers. That the universe has no purpose , that it has no end to hope for any more than it has causes to be known — this is the certainty necessary to play well (VP III 465). The dicethrow fails because chance has not been affirmed enough in one throw. It has not been affirmed enough in order to produce the fatal number which necessarily reunites all the fragments and brings back the dicethrow. We must therefore attach the greatest importance to the following

conclusion: for the couple causality-finality, probability-finality, for the opposition and the synthesis of these terms, for the web of these terms, Nietzsche substitutes the Dionysian correlation of chance- necessity, the Dionysian couple chance-destiny. Not a probability distributed over several throws but all chance at once; not a final, desired, willed combination, but the fatal combination , fatal and loved, amor fati ; not the return of a combination by the number of throws, but the repetition of a dicethrow by the nature of the fatally obtained

solvency

AT: Airlines Adv

TSA is reforming now – specific to operational effectiveness – their ev. doesn’t account for new developmentsMonzon 6/17/15 – News Writer at United Press International (Tomas, TSA audit reveals no terrorist ties for 73 airline workers, UPI, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2015/06/17/TSA-audit-reveals-no-terrorist-ties-for-73-airline-workers/3011434477493/)//JJ

A Transportation Security Administration audit has confirmed that 73 airline employees earlier suspected of terrorist ties have no such connections . The audit, published June 4 by the Department of Homeland Security, explained that the TSA was unable to link the 73 airline employees to terrorists, although DHS had determined they had terrorist ties. DHS used a list not available to the TSA, leading DHS to conclude that TSA "is not authorized under current interagency watchlisting policy to receive certain terrorism-related category codes". Appearing before the Homeland Security

subcommittee on transportation, TSA deputy assistant Stacey Fitzmaurice ultimately confirmed that the agency found no ties between terrorism and the workers . Committee chairman and Representative John Katko, R-N.Y. criticized the TSA for its lethargy in producing

this information. Fitzmaurice said the TSA used the FBI's watch list, which, he argued, contains more reasonable data than that of the National Counterterrorism Center, a rawer data set that DHS used to produce its report. The TSA does not have access to NCTC's data. Inspector General for Homeland Security John Roth explained that it took 18 months for the agency to clear legal obstacles and run the names of the

aviation workers against the NCTC list. NCTC carried out the comparison itself once authorization was secured. To prevent future problems , Katko

pushed House leaders Tuesday to pass his reform bill HR2750 , "Improved Security Vetting for Aviation Workers Act of 2015". Additionally, Fitzmaurice and the TSA are still working on gaining full access to NCTC's list. The news of TSA wanting access to an

intelligence database comes just as TSA chief Melvin Carraway was reassigned after an investigation revealed widespread failures with airport security. In 70 tests performed by DHS, 67 attempts at sneaking fake weapons into airports were successful.

At the time, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson called for TSA to reevaluate its screening equipment and review its operating procedures .

Alt cause – lack of federal trustFrauenfelder 6/8/15 – founder of Boing Boing and the founding editor-in-chief of MAKE, editor-in-chief of Cool Tools and co-founder of Wink Books (Mark, Federal gov't doesn't trust TSA enough to inform it of airline employees with links to terrorism, Boing Boing, http://boingboing.net/2015/06/08/federal-govt-doesnt-trust.html)//JJ

According to a recently-released Government Accountability Office report, the "TSA did not identify 73 individuals with terrorism-related category codes because TSA is not authorized to receive all terrorism-related information under current interagency watchlisting policy ." The federal government doesn't place enough trust in its own anti-terrorism administration to give it a list of people with terrorism-related category codes employed by airlines and airport vendors. "Without complete and accurate information , TSA risks credentialing and providing unescorted access to secure airport areas for workers with potential to harm the nation's air transportation system," the report found.

The issue is not the TSA – it’s interagency policyJesse 6/9/15 – associate editor of Allen B West, citing a Guardian report (Michelle, TSA hired 73 people on the terror watch list; reason why is MIND-BLOWING, Allan B West, http://allenbwest.com/2015/06/tsa-hired-73-people-on-the-terror-watch-list-reason-why-is-mind-blowing/)//JJ

The Guardian explains WHY these 73 individuals slipped through the cracks to stand watch at our nation’s security checkpoints: TSA did not identify these individuals through its vetting operations because it is not authorized to receive all terrorism-related categories under current interagency watch-listing policy ,” the DHS document stated, adding that the agency had “acknowledged that these individuals were cleared for access to secure airport areas despite representing a potential transportation security threat”. In

other words, the TSA isn’t allowed to get every bit of information available about applicants, unless the applicants report it themselves. It’s up to the applicant to report information that could likely disqualify them from TSA employment. Yeaaahh.

Got it. Turns out, even if information comes in after someone’s hired on at the TSA, the TSA doesn’t always get that info. All of this will be cold comfort to travelers lining up through security for their summer vacations. The silver lining – or the “gift” if you choose to see it that way – is this provides yet another stunning example of how increased government spending does NOT equal a better job done or necessarily help keep us

safer. Despite almost $100 billion spent since 2011, the TSA continues to bring us lapse after lapse. Indeed, it appears that some of these gaps are a result of the very bloated bureaucracy that was supposed to keep us safer.

FBI aviation surveillance solves – specifically their private warrantPerdue 2/3/15 – Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division at the FBI (Doug, Statement Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, Washington, D.C., the FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/fbis-role-in-access-control-measures-at-our-nations-airports)//JJ

In conjunction with our partners, the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division’s (CTD) Civil Aviation Security Program (CASP) is extensively involved in efforts to uncover and prevent terrorist operations to attack or exploit civil aviation in the United States. The FBI has special agents and task force officers assigned as airport liaison agents (ALAs) at each of the nation’s TSA-regulated airports in order to respond to aviation-related incidents and threats, participate in joint FBI-TSA airport vulnerability assessments, and interact with interagency and private sector stakeholders at airports around the country on exercises, threat mitigation, and other issues to protect the traveling public. The FBI’s CASP and ALA program were created in 1990 to formalize the Bureau’s investigative, intelligence, and liaison

activities at the nation’s airports. CASP is located in the F BI’s National Joint Terrorism Task Force with a focus on supporting and enhancing efforts to prevent, disrupt, and defeat acts of terrorism directed toward civil aviation , and to provide counterterrorism preparedness leadership and assistance to federal, state, and local agencies responsible for civil aviation security. One of CASP’s primary responsibilities is to provide program management and support to

the FBI’s ALAs. In addition, CASP represents the FBI on aviation security policy matters, provides guidance and training to the field, and supports national aviation security initiatives and mandates . I would like to go over briefly CASP’s efforts to mitigate the insider threat at America’s airports.

The airline industry is extremely resilient to shocksCarlisle 15 – Chief Operating Officer at Goshawk (Andy, Airport business resilience: Plan for uncertainty and prepare for change, Journal of Airport Management, Volume 9, p. 118-132, 1/1/15)//JJIn recent years, there has been sustained turbulence in markets around the world. Economies are emerging from recession, but the pace of recovery is mixed while geopolitical uncertainty and security threats appear to be increasing. In a connected world, problems rarely remain geographically isolated, which means there is

continued economic uncertainty in many major global markets. However, uncertainty is not always negative . The pace of technological change is rapid; the influence of mobile and digital platforms extends across all areas of business, including aviation. While such developments are generally positive, change itself creates uncertainty and new technology can be a disruptive influence. Airport managers and investors must balance the drive toward commercial optimisation against the inherent investment risk in realising new opportunities; these challenges are magnified in a market that has a more uncertain and variable

outlook. Airport business models are adapting to this new reality, and there is increased recognition of the need for flexibility , creativity , and vigilance in planning , building , managing , and financing airports. The

most effective counterbalance to future uncertainty is to develop business models that are resilient , but not resistant, to change. In this context, business resilience means managing risk and capitalising on opportunity. It involves preparing and organizing for change , and being ready to change direction when unexpected events occur , or the operating environment changes . It is adopting a mind-set of surprises being the ‘new normal’, and realising that it’s not a question

of ‘if ’ the unexpected will happen, but rather ‘when will it happen?’, ‘what will happen?’, and ‘are we prepared?’. Resilience,

then, is strength with flexibility, and focus with situational awareness. Many airport operators are adapting to this new normal and

recognizing the need for greater flexibility , creativity, global awareness , and social awareness in the management of airports. While there are limitations to flexibility in an infrastructure-intensive business, this paper considers some of the measures that can be taken to optimise airport financial performance in a dynamic market where rapid change has the potential to disrupt existing business models.

Increased airport security now and no terror threatRoss and Schwartz 1/13/15 – ABC news chief correspondent AND **chief investigative producer (Brian and Rhonda, US Steps Up Airport Security After Al Qaeda’s 'Hidden Bomb' Recipe, ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/International/us-steps-airport-security-al-qaedas-hidden-bomb/story?id=28194349)//JJ

American airports are increasing security measures across the country in the wake of dual terrorist attacks in Paris and the publication by al Qaeda of what counterterrorism experts say appears to be the most detailed, and

potentially lethal, bomb recipe ever to be sent to their followers. The top security chiefs for major American airlines have been briefed about the troubling publication, according to a senior U.S. law enforcement official. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Jeh

Johnson said Monday the T ransportation Security Administration has stepped up random searches of travelers and carry-on luggage in addition to enhanced screening that was ordered this summer at “certain foreign airports.” Johnson said there is “ no specific, credible threat ” of an attack on the U.S . like what happened in Paris last week, but said that incident, along with others in Canada and Australia, and “the recent public calls by terrorist organizations for attacks on Western objectives, including aircraft, military personnel, and government

installations and civilian personnel” made the need for increased security at American airports and elsewhere “self-evident.” The bomb-making recipe, published in the most recent edition of the al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) English-language magazine in December, is a detailed guide to making the explosive, getting through security and even where to sit on the plane. “We spared no effort in simplifying the idea in such we made it ‘another meal prepared in the kitchen’ so that every determined Muslim can prepare,” the magazine says, in an apparent reference to earlier versions of bomb-making instructions called “How to Build a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.” “This group, AQAP, is absolutely determined… to try and [carry] out an attack on a

U.S.-bound airplane,” said Matt Olsen, former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center and current ABC News consultant. “The prospect of AQAP trying to get a bomb on an airplane has been, for the past several years, at the top of the list for concerns of the U.S. counterterrorism community. After reviewing the recipe, explosives expert Kevin Barry said it appeared to be one of the most “sophisticated” non-metallic explosives devices he’s seen, which could especially be a problem for smaller airports that don’t employ high-tech body imaging security devices. AQAP, the al Qaeda branch based in Yemen, previously attempted to bring down an American airliner on Christmas Day 2009, but the would-be bomber couldn’t get the device to detonate. That bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmuttalab, reportedly crossed paths in Yemen with one of the men who executed the

Paris terror attack last week. Last week the State Department updated its Worldwide Caution travel alert to all Americans abroad. “Recent terrorist attacks, whether by those affiliated with terrorist entities, copycats, or individual perpetrators, serve as a reminder that U.S. citizens need to maintain a high level of vigilance and take appropriate steps to increase their security awareness,” the alert said.