Neighbourhood Pol Turkey

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TURKEY S CHANGıNG NEıGHBOURHOODPOLıCY

G E N C E R Ö Z C A N

ABSTRACT

Turkey's relations with its neighbors have been steadily improving.Tense relations of the m id-nineties have been in stark contrast to goodneighborly relations that Ankara has succeeded to cultivate with itscontagiou s as well as second b elt neighbors for the last fıve years. In order tograsp the reasons that paved the way for such an overall improvement, one

has to look at two aspects of Turkish foreign policy: succe ss in putting downthe Kurdish insurgence and increasing prospects for accession to the EU. T hedynamics of Turkish politics have transformed since Turkey received a statusof candidacy in December 1999. Globalization, EU integration process andcustoms union brought about its ovvn grinding effects över the prominence oftraditional statecraft in Turkey. Vast spectrum of civic organizations isincreasingly involved in activities formerly pertinent to the security sector ona greater scale and thus becomes the agents of de-securitization process inTurkey. Their impact is becoming visible in debates as to how the nationalinterest w ill be defined.

KEYVVORDS

Turkish Foreign Policy, Relations with Iran, Syria, Russia, Israel,PKK, Pipelines Turkey's EU membership.



2 THE TURKİSH YEARBOOK [VOL. XXXV

Turkey's relations with its neighbors have been steadilyimpro ving. T ense relations of the mid-nine ties have been in s tarkcontrast to good neighborly relations that Ankara has succeeded tocultivate w ith its contag ious as well as second belt neigh bors for thelast five years . Am elioration of relations with Russia, S yria and Iran,former rivals for several reasons, are exem plary. Th e su ccessiveTurkish governments seem to have held the common policy that therelations sh ould be governed by the principles of goodneighborliness. Trust, engagement and dialogue, rather thanconfrontat ion and containment , appear to be the le i tmotivs of thepresent rhetoric. In order to grasp the reasons that paved the way forsuch an overall improvement, one has to look at two aspects ofTurkish foreign policy: Success in putting down the K urdishinsurgen ce and increasing pro spects for accessio n to the EU.

This article will take a closer look at the reaso ns of theameliorat ion of re la tions with a number of t roubled neighbors(Russia, Iran, and Syria) and to delineate the main ele me nts of thistransformation.

A Changing Environment

The end to the Cold War did not improve the securityenvironme nt of Turkey. New generat ion of threats and cha l lengesgenera ted a broader security agenda for Ankara. Des pite initiallypositive expec tations, dis integration of the Soviet and Yugo slavianfederations and, not the least, de facto partition of Iraq fueledincreased insecur i t ies in the v ic in ity of Turke y. 1 Moreover, the greatd is in tegrat ion exacerbated Turkey ' s own Kurdish separat ism andP K K ' s a rmed in su rgence ga ined momen tum a f te r Bagh dad ' sauthority failed to function in Northern Iraq. Amo ng the threats

Anka ra had to cope w ith, the Kurdish se paratism crea ted far greaterinsecur i t ies for Turkey. I t remained to be the epicenter of T urke y ' s

' Dok sanl ı Yı l larda Türkiye 'n in Değişen Güvenl ik Ortamı , in Genc er Özcan

and Şule Kut, (eds.) En Uzun Onyıl, Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve DışPolitika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar, İstanbul, Boyut, 1998, p. 13-44.



2004] TURKEY'S CHANGING NEIGHBOURHOOD POLCY 3

security concerns for the rest of the decade succeeding the ColdW a r .2

Although it has reached to its climax after the Gulf W ar, thearmed Kurdish insurgence had already begun to undermine thepremises of classical inside-outside national security dichotom y inlate 1980s. As the PKK began to operate more effectively within andoutside Turkey, the military gradually assumed greater role to engagein curbing the armed insurgence.3 Asymmetrical and non

conventional threat required the army to change its mindset, forcestructure, operational codes and even its inventory.4 In August 1989,the General Staff had delivered a landmark statement indicating thatthe threat was com ing from within as well as outside Turkey. T hedecisions taken in the National Security Council's March 1990meeting heralded new era in the struggle against the PKK.Accord ingly, a governmental degree w ent into force in April 1990taking extra measures to deal with separatist threat. In 1992 theNational Security Policy D ocument pinpointed Kurdish separatism asthe majör source of threat.5

Notwithstanding increased troop deployment in the southeastTurkey and active collaboration with the KDP to uproot the PKK inNorthern Iraq, the army had considerable difficulty to contain thearmed insurgence until it changed its overall strategy in July 1994. 6

The Area Superiority Strategy required the army to have specialtraining, different force structure and relevant equipm ent in dealingwith the insurgence. By the mid of the decade fighting PKK took

2Philip Robins, Suits and Unifornıs: Turkish Foreigıı Policy since the ColdWar, London, Hurst and Company, 2003, chapter titled Turkey andNorthern Iraq: Learning to Live with Contradictions, p.312-342.

3Ge nc er Ö zcan, Dört Köşeli Üçgen Olmaz: Irak Savaşı, Kürt Sorunu ve BirStratejik Perspektifin Kırılması, Foreign Policy, (March-June 2003) p.38-49.

4Ser hat Güvenç, Bir Dış Politika Aracı Olarak Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri:Yetenekler ve Uygulamalar, in Faruk Sönmezoğlu, ed., Türk DışPolitikasının Analizi, 3r d . Edition, İstanbul, Der Yayınları, 2004. p. 895-933.

5İsmet G. İmset, PKK Ayrılıkçı Şiddetin 20 Yılı (1973-1992), Ankara,Turkish Daily News Yayınları, 1993, p.270-272.

6 TS K Bölgede 'Alan Hakimiyeti' Konseptini Uygulamaya Başladı,Cumhuriyet, 28 July 1994.




another s tep fu r ther when the TA F increased sca le o f the opera t ionsinside Iraq and began to deploy troops in the security belt formedalong the border .

Given security me asures t ighten ed by the first half of thedecade, poli t ical issues pertinent to identity issues were rapidlyoverse curit ized. T hus, having precipitated im posit ion of extra legalmeasures, the PKK insurgence eventually contr ibuted to the further

conso l ida t ion o f secur ity sec to r in Turk ey .

7

Throughout the n ine t ies ,the mili tary had retained and expanded its central place within thesecurity sector and i ts de facto au thor i ty över SFP issues .8 Itsin f luence b ecame even more consp icuous when issues wereconcerned the armed fo rces ' opera t ional engagement . So , the moreTurkey ' s secur i ty agenda widened , the g rea ter became mil i ta ry ' sinvo lvement in SFP issues . The mi l i ta ry ' s ro le therefore b ecam e m orepercep tible, and in some cases uncomfortably coex ists with the roleof the e lec ted governm ent and fo re ign po l icy . Mo reover , th isoccurred at a t ime when the EU was becoming more sensit ive tohuman r ights issues as well as to what was called the shortcomings ofdem ocratic co ntrol of the mili tar ies in candid ate countr ie s, and did so

a t a t ime the sources and agen ts o f SFP w ere becom ing morep lura l is t ic across Europe . O versecur it iza t ion o f Tu rkey ' s po l i tica lsystem and t ransgress ions o f human r igh ts w ere therefore b i t te r lycrit icized by the EU. Against this backdrop, Ankara was not includedamong the new l i s t o f cand ida tes for even tua l m embe rsh ip a t theLuxe mbo urg summ it of 12 Decem ber 1997 .

Assertive Diplomacy: 1995-1999

By the second ha l f o f the n ine t ies , Turk ey ' s SFP seemed tohave been guided by two strategies: '2 V2 War Strategy' and less

formally, p eripheral strategy. The former st ipulated a new force

7 Ge nce r Özcan, Türkiye 'de Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Pol i t ikada AskeriYap ının Artan Etkisi , in Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, ed. En U zun Onyıl ,

Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar,

İstanbul, Boyut, 1998, p. 67-100.8 t lh an Uzg el, Ordu Dış Politikanın Ner esinde , in Ahm et İnsel and Ali

Bayramoğlu, ed., Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu İstanbul, Birikim,2004, p.315-319.



2004] TUR KEY 'S CHANGING NEIGHBOURHO OD POLİCY 5

structure to deal with two pronged conventional contingency at theGreek and Syrian fronts, and simultaneously K urdish insurgency athome. Formulated by a veteran diplomat and well known expert onFSP issues, Şükrü Elekdağ's strategy guided the establishment andshaped the mindset of the security sector for the latter part of thedecade.9 A lthough articulated less formally, the latter strategyproduced m ore palpable outcomes as far as Turkey 's relations with itsouter belt neighbors. The grovving relations with Israel, Jordan,Azerbaijan and Ukraine primarily in security related areas led some

analysts to label this active policy as the 'Turkish peripheralstrategy. '10 It aimed to contain or counter balance the contagiousneighbors with whom Turkey had troubles.

In the second half of the decade Turkey stepped up its effortson the diplomatic front to cut off the PKK's logistics. By the early1996, Ankara dropped its policy of critical dialogue with Syria callingfor end to spo nsor the P KK 's activities vvithin Syria and Leban on. Ina note delivered on 23 January 1996, Ankara bluntly warnedDamascus that its current policy would be ıetaliated in kind. Giventhe continuing Syrian indifference to continual Turkish vvarnings, thefollowing mo nths vvitnessed a great leap forvvard tovvards the

improvem ent of bilateral relations with Israel in military affairs,which had already taken off in 1993. The M ilitary TrainingCooperation Agreement of 23 February 1996, The Defense IndustryCooperation Agreement of 28 August 1996, strategic dialogu e forumsattended by the top SFP elite of respective countries, joint air andnaval exercises, and large scale modernization projects made thealignment the key stone of Ankara's peripheral strateg y.11 Althoughthe alignment, claimed Turkish authorities, had never been geared totake joint measures to check Syria, the agreements were perceived bythe Arab cou ntries as a classical alliance forged against Syria inparticular. So it became another source of irritation for Syria and Iran,

9Şü krü Elekdağ, 2Vı War Strategy, Perceptioııs (March-May 1996) Vol.l,No.l, p. 33-57.

1 0 A la n Makovsky, Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish Periphery Strategy?,in Henry J. Barkey, ed., Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle

East, Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996, p.170.Ge nce r Özcan and Ofra Bengio, Decade of the Military: The Case of the

Alignment vvith Israel, International Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 7,Nos. 1&2, (Spring 2001) p. 90-109.




whose efforts however, to form a counter alliance proved futile in therest of the deca de.1 2

Syria

Historically speaking, Turkey's relations with its MiddleEastern n eighbors were poisoned by a variety of issues. Y et, forAnkara the regionalization of the Kurdish issue after the Gulf W ar

stood out as the most burning issue for several reasons. itsregionalization caused con troversial outcomes/vvindfalls for alineighbours. While the creation of the state of Kurdistan in NorthernIraq brought these countries together in search of taking coun termeasures, they, almost with no exception, played the Kurdish cardagainst the each o ther for a variety of purposes. Providing shelter,transportation and training facilities to the PKK and hosting its leaderin Dam ascus for almost two decades, S yria's vvar by proxy ag ainstTurkey remained an excellent case.

Turkish Syrian relations remained soured particularly after1984 when the PKK intensifıed its activities within Turkey. Hovvever,

Ankara's policy was a critical dialogue with Damascus involvingcarrots rather than sticks. The protocols of July 1987 and April 1992assuring Syria of regular down flow of the Euphrates were Turkishefforts of the kind, yet with no tangible result.1 3 H owever, after 1996as a result of frustration with the Syrian indifference to Turkishdemands, Ankara changed its policy and began to pressurizeDamascus to stop its support for the PKK. Turkish policy was twofold: It stepped up its efforts to contain the Syrian policy first byforging closer diplomatic military relations with Israel, secondly byresorting to the threat of use of force more often lest Dam ascus endedits support for the PKK. In a note to Damascus delivered on 23January 1996, Ankara made it clear that it retained the right to resortto self defensive measures if Damascus failed to revise its policy as

1 2Of ra Bengio and Gencer Özcan, Old Grievances, New Fears: ArabPerceptions of Turkey and its Alignment with Israel, Middle EasternStudies, Vol. 37, No. 2, (April 2001) p.51-92.

1 3 Fo r the text of Protocol dated 17 April 1992, Türkiye-Suriye GüvenlikKomitesi Toplantı Tutanağı, Şam 17 Nisan 1992 Diplomat , Vol. I, No.l,(15 April- 1 May 1992) p.2.



2004] TURK EY'S CHANGING NEIGHBOURHOOD POLİCY 7

regards the PKK.1 4 In May 1996, both countries were reported tomass troops along the border at the heels of bomb ing shookDamascus and Latakkiya.15 In September 1996, the tension increasedfurther with Turk ey's involvement in Kurdish civil war in NorthernIraq assisting the KDP in its struggle against the PUK. In themeantime, Ankara suspended high level diplomatic contacts and themeetings of the joint security committees discontinued until the finalshowdow n in Septem ber 1998 when Turkey launched 'de ter ringpressure policy ' against Syria.1 6 It called on Syria to cease hosting

Abdu llah Öcalan in Dam ascus. After the Egyptian and Iranian goodoffices, Syria bow ed to the pressure and svviftly deported Öcalanimmediately after the conclusion of the M emorandum ofUnderstanding signed on 20 October 1998 in Adana.

After the Adana Memorandum of Understanding signed,Ankara pursued policy of cautious optimism tovvards Dam ascus.However, diplomatic contacts were gradually upgraded, and as Syriaexpressed its intent to take confidence building measu res, Turkeyreciprocated positively. In this regard, the signing of military tıainingcooperation agreement in June 2002 with Syria was a remarkableevent displaying the m ilitary's changing perception of S yr ia. 1 7 Since

then, the improvement gained further momentum and developed at anunprecedented pace.

The improvement was marked by high-level visits as well.Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül visited Damascus in April 2003, hisSyrian counterpart, Farouq al-Shara in January 2003, and SyrianPrime M inister M ohammed Mustafa Miro as the first Syrian premierto visit Turkey in 17 years came to Ankara in July 2003. 1 8 The mostimportant visit of the year, hovvever, was As ad's 6-8 January 2 004trip to Turkey, the first ever by a Syrian head of state. Although the

1 4 Suriye'ye Sert Nota, Milliyet, 1 January 1996.1 5 Sınır da Hareketlilik, Milliyet, 8 June 1996; Suriye'ye Gözdağı,

Milliyet, 12 June 1996; Yasemin Çongar, Suriye'ye Savaş Uyarısı,Milliyet, 22 June 1996.

1 6De ni z Zeyrek, Suriye ile Diplomasi Bitti, Radikal 2 October 1998.1 7Se rka n Demirtaş, Ortadoğu'da Yeni Süreç, Cumhuriyet, 21 June 2002.1 8 Turkey, Syria Open a New Page in Ties, Turkish Daily News, 30 July

2003.




Syrian leader carefully avoided addressing the controversial issuessuch as Hatay, -a province transferred by the French to Turkey in1938 but stili claimed by Syria on its official maps- he openly statedthat the PKK has no presence and activity in Sy ria . 1 9

In April 2003 and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Shara hascalled for a regional co nsultation mechanism betvveen Turkey, Syriaand Iran on Iraq. 2 0 In April 2003 Foreign Minister Abdullah Gulconferred with Syrian leaders in Damascus on bilateral relations and

past-war developm ents in neighboring Iraq, in a sign of flourishingties despite signals of unease from the United States. In Dam ascus, hesaid Turkey was determined to develop relations with the UnitedStates further but added that this should not be an obstacle tomaintaining good relations with Russia, Syria and Iran. 2 1

Most probably, the improvement went in line with the revisionof the National Security Policy Document in August 2002. Displayinga change of heart at Ankara for the neighbours, the revisionreportedly maiııtained that the bilateral relations with Iran, Iıaq andSyria would be improved bearing in mind that Turkey's policiestowards the Middle East should not be under an Arab mortgage,

obviously referring to the continuation of alignment with Israel.2 2

Iran

Throughout the decade, ideological tension and border securityissues complicated bilateral relations. During the first half of thedecade relations went through continual crises due to a number ofissues. Allegations of the Iranian involvement in politicalassassinations claiming lives of leading Turkish intellectuals have

1 9So ne r Çağaptay A Turkish Rapprochement With Middle East RogueStates?, Analysis Of Near East Policy From T he Scholars And Associatesof the Washington Institute, Policywatch No. 825, 9 January 2004.

20 Controveısial Visit Cancelled, Turkish Daily News 12 April 2003.2 1 Turkey, Syria Eye Closer Ties, Turkislı Daily News, 30 April 2003.2 2 L a le Sarıibrahimoğlu, Military Prepares New National Security Policy

Document, Turkish Daily News 8 August 2002.



2004] TUR KEY 'S CHANGING NEIGHBOURHO OD POLİCY 9

been raised throughout the decade.2 3 Ho wever, by the second half ofthe decade, Iranian support for the PKK eclipsed other thorny issues.Turke y's SFP establishment accused Iran of providing transportationfacilities and shelter for the PKK. On the Iranian side, Tu rkey 'srapprochem ent was follovved warily. However, interdependenc edictated by geography, growing trade volume and convergence ofviews över the Northern Iraq helped countries push negative aspectsinto the background.

Hovvever, the tension turned out to be a crisis in February 1997when the Iranian ambassador Muhammad Bagheri attended to addressan Islamist gathering called the Night for Jerusalem expıessingcritical views in public on Turkey's rapprochement with Israel andclose relations with the US. It caused a diplomatic disaster triggeringa crisis when both countries recalled their ambassadors mutually. 24 Itis beyond the scope of this paper to discuss d etails of motivations thatplayed decisive role in shaping foreign policy towards Iran in theperiod of 1996-1999. However, one would maintain that T urkey'spolicy of confrontation of the period vvas driven by internal factors.The relations started to show the signs of gradual improvement after1999. In 2002 revision of the NSPD, in comparison to the way it was

mentioned in 1997 NSPD, Iran vvas covertly referred as a source ofthreat given Iran's aspirations of development of nuclear power andW MD and its continued support for the PKK. Both countries realizedthat they could not effort to sustain the policy of tension during theperiod that prospec ts for U S intervention to Iraq were looming large.The rapprochement was marked by the opening of pipelineconstruction of which raised concerns and reactions from Wa shingtonto carry Iranian natural gas to Turkey.

Relations betvveen Turkey and Iran improved noticeably in2003, during which four high-level visits took place from Turkey toI ran .2 5 Throughout 2003, Iran claimed to be cracking down on PKK

2 3Mahmut Bulut, 'Türkiye'den İran'a 5 Uyarı' Yeni Yüzyıl, 26 December1996.

2 4 Tahran'a 4 Kritik Mesaj, Milliyet, 2 March 1997 and Selin Çağlayan,Dem irci'den T ahran'a 'İyi Komşu O l' Çağrısı, Hürriyet, 4 March 1997.

2 5 Turkey Renovates Border Gate with Iran Amid US Tension, TurkishDaily News 31 May 2003.




terrorists w ithin its borders. In early July 2 004, in the aftermath ofskirmishes between the Iranian security forces and the PKK in thevicinity of Urumiyye, Tehran handed över a number of militants toTurkish authorities.2 6 In early 2004, two countries also settled theissue of overpricing of the Iranian natural gas.

In April 2003, Iran's First Vice President Mohammad RezaAref w as also in Ankara for talks dominated by econom iccooperat ion.27 In the cultural sphere there were also advances. A

December 2003 treaty on educational cooperation between Turkeyand Iran stipulated m echanisms for Turkish students to study in Iran,paved the way for the two countries to share curricula and providedfor reciprocal scholarships.

Russia

By the fırst half of the decade An kara's relations w ith the ex-foe neighbo r remained soured. The transition period after the collapseof the Soviet Union was governed by contending approaches to avariety of regional issues. They were mostly articulated through a

zero-sum m entality addressed in the context of geostrategic rivalry.However, the second half of the decade saw bilateral relationsevolving into a different context, and living through a substantialtransformation of the mutual perceptions. Two issues are of relevanceto see the transformation: Firstly, in retaliation of Turk ey's stanceöver the Chechen war, which broke out in 1994, Russia vigorouslyplayed the Kurdish card. As the Chechen leaders were given highlevel reception in Ankara, Russian authorities increasingly toleratedthe PKK's activities in that country. Secondly, Turkey's will to fosterspecial relations with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Türkmenistan causeduneasiness in Moscow. The route of main energy pipeline that wouldcarry their crude oil and natural gas turned to be bone of contention

putting these two countries at loggerheads. Baku-Tbilisi-CeyhanPipeline issue therefore soon after became the symbol of Turco-Russian rivalry. Later two countries had diverged views on theTurkish Straits' security. Turkey's efforts to provide security for its

2 6 İran PKK'yı Vurdu, Milliyet 7 July 2004.2 7 Tu rke y, Syria Eye Closer Ties, Turkish Daily News 30 April 2003.



2004] TURKEY'S CHANGING NEIGHBOURHOOD POLİCY 11

largest city w ere ili perceived by Russians w ho accused of Turkishauthorities, w ho accused of gearing the 1994 regulations to closingoff the waterway to the Russian tankers for crude oil and LNG.

Hovvever, just as was the case with Iran, SFP elites in Moscowand Ankara realized that zero-sum game approaches would bringabout detrimental results for both cou ntrie s.28 The turnabout occurredin the aftermath of Russian Prime M inister Viktor Chernom yrdin'svisit to Turkey on 16-17 December 1997. The visit concluded the $30

billion natural gas deal called the Blue Stream envisaging Russia tosupply large amount of natural gas through an undervvater pipeline inthe Black Sea, and to catch the lion's share in Turkey's growingnatural gas market. It signaled new period that Turkey desired,expressed Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, to cooperate ratherthan compete with its great neighbor . In this positive atmosphere, theRussian gov ernment resisted the pressure from the nationalist circlescalling for giving asylum for Abdullah Ö calan, the PK K's leader whocame to Russia after he was extradited from Syria in October 1998,deported him.2 9

Turkey also contributed to the rapprochem ent lifting some of

the limitations imposed by the 1994 Traffıc Regulations. M oscowaccepted the new regulation that was put in effect in 1998.

Prime M inister Ece vit's visit of November 1999 bolstered theatmosph ere of cooperation and displayed the level importance thatAnkara attached to the improvement of bilateral relations. It aimed tofoster co operation against international terrorism, completion oftechnical formalities of the Blue Stream, and reinvigoration ofeconomic relations.3 0 More importantly, the visit took place at theheels of the Russian army's new offensive in Chechnya raising

2 8B ar çı n Yinanç , Dışişleri Bakanı İsmail Cem ile söyleşi, Petrol SavaşıYok, Milliyet 5 October 1997.

2 9 0ktay Pirim ve Süha Örtülü, PKK'nın 20 Yıllık Öyküsü, İstanbul, Boyut,1999, p.90.

3 0D uy gu Bazoğlu Sezer, Russia: The Challenges of ReconcilingGeopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership, in Barry Rubin andKemal Kirişçi, eds., Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging MultiRegional Power, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, London, 2001,p.157.




opposition within Turkey. On his occasion, Ankara adopted differentapproach than did it during the first Chechen war of 1994-1996underscoring its support for the territorial integrity of Russia. T worespective governmental decrees of 26 September 2000 and 3 October2000 w ere put in effect to severe the activities of the 'CaucasianChechen Solidarity Group', an umbrella organization coordinatingwide range of activities Caucasian diaspora organizations active inTurkey. Although the complaints on behalf of Russia continued sincethen, the tone and frequency of comp laints have been far lower than

were they before.31 In addition to mutual political will on both sides,diversified relations as a result of increasing trade volume,construction activities by Turkish fırms in Russia and grovvingnumber of Russian tourists visiting Turkey brought stabilizing impacton bilateral relations compelling both countries not to take harshstances över the disputed issues. Recent developments are notevvorthyin this respect. In April 2004, vvhen the Ajaria crisis broke out,Turkey and R ussia svviftly consulted each other and refrained fromany intervention that could escalate the tension. In the followingmonths both countries displayed mutual understanding and reached tocompromise över the issue of pricing the natural gas coming throughthe Blue Stream.

Amo ng these positive steps, the amelioration of relationsbetween the security establishments is the most remarkable. Turkishand Russian navies pioneered the forging of a multinational Searchand Rescue [SAR] unit called BLACKSEAFOR with the participationof ali the Black Sea riparian countries in April 2002. In the samemonth they signed the Document o f Black Sea Confidence andSecurity Building Regime. Another development was the conclusionof Turco-Russian Military T raining and Cooperation Agreement in2003. However, the signals that Moscow considers to take a moreconstructive approach for the BTC P are also notevvorthy as far as thefuture course of relations is concerned. In Decem ber 2001, the

Russian giant oil company Lukoil called for dismiss of parochialapproaches tovvards the BTCP that the Turkish straits would not besuitable for h eavy tanker traffıc and that expressed its interest to takepart in the project or connecting BTCP with the existing Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. It would be overoptimistic to assume that

3 1 For the texts of government decrees, see www.kafkas.org.tr

http://www.kafkas.org.tr/

http://www.kafkas.org.tr/



2004] TURKEY'S CHANGING NEGHBOURHOOD POLİCY 13

views of the two countries would no more diverge on such issues.Hovvever, it is a good omen that the arguments based on geostrategicrivalry have been loosing ground. 32 In this regards, the last visit paidby President Putin openly represented the changing agenda of thebilateral relations.3 3

Changing Security Perceptions: Post-Helsinki Zeitgeist

The dynam ics of Turkish politics have transformed sinceTurkey received a status of candidacy in December 1999. Increasingprospects of EU accession has been exerting tremendous impact onTurkish foreign policy. One can contend that the impact stemm edfrom different roots. First, in accordance with the EU 's inclination forvertical integration, Turkey's SFP environment has been diversifıedat an unprecedented pace. Turkish society has become more receptiveto open debate as interest groups develop and, in return, they are nowfar better organized to transmit their demands across Europe throughpeer associations accredited with the Union.

Increasing involvement of n on-state actors in the formulation

process of SFP in Turkey has become one of the novel aspects of thepolitics. As newly emerging yet strong actors begin to exert growinginfluence över SFP issues, the offıcial apparatus has been losing itsprom inence in econom ic and financial affairs. 'Foreign policy belovv'or 'grass roots statecraft'34 has its own reflections in Turkey.Globalization, EU integration process and customs union broughtabout its own grinding effects över the prominence of traditionalstatecraft in Turkey. V ast spectrum of civic organizations isincreasingly involved in activities formerly pertinent to the securitysector on a greater scale and thus becomes the agents of de-securitization process in Turkey. Their impact is becoming visible indebates as to how the national interest will be defined. W hile these

new actors put their weight behind those who propagated revisions in

3 2Se çk in Ürey, Rusya Sıcak Denizlere İniyor, Milliyet 29 August 2004.3 3 Gaz Sorunu Çözülüyor, Putin İşadamı Ordusunu da Getiriyor, Hürriyet,

25 August 2004.3 4 Pı na r Bilgin, Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security,

International Studies Review, No. 5 (2003), p. 216.




outstanding national issues, as was the case of Cyprus, the traditionalcircles fail to mobilize large sectors of society to support their ownposi t ion.3 5

It was therefore not a coincidence that debate över nationalinterest undermined state's p osition över one of the issues that wastraditionally considered as majör national cause, namely Cyprus. Toput it in a nut shell, by the second half of the nineties the debate överCyprus d ramatically shifted the focus of the main argument that TAF

was keeping its troops there for the sake of Tu ı ks living on the Island.The emphasis was rather put on that Turkey's presence there hadbeen required for the sake of Turkey 's own security needs. So thenew parad igm required the issue be over-securitized further. It isbeyond the scope of this paper to delineate the details of the AnnanPlan, yet the end result was an impressive compromise amongcontending agents of SFP in Ankara. Com promise removed stumblingblocks giving m ore freedom of maneuverability to the new AKPgovernment. Diplomatic initiative taken by the AKP government ledto what happened in April 2004 referendum redefining ali theparameters of the Cyprus imbroglio and freeing Turkey of being thescapegoat for the post 1974 stalemate in the Island.

Second ly, Ankara would definitely like to avoid any conflictwith its neighbors because such a contingency would obviously butterthe breads of those who claimed that Turkey 's accession should bedelayed on the grounds that its neighborhood was stili perilous. 3 6

Obviou sly, the way certain sections of Turkish polity stood againstUS u nilateralism as regards the Iraqi issue vvas bolstered, if notinspired by the EU's stand on the issue. 3 7 The Turkish position onIran and Syria also seems influenced by Brussels. With EU accession

3 5G en ce r Özcan, Türkiye Dış Politikasında Karar Alma ve UygulamaSüreci, in Sönmezoğlu, Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi, p. 829-894.

3 6 Ah m et Davudoğlu, Türkiye Merkez Ülke Olmalı, Radikal 26 February2004.

3 7K em al Kirişçi, Between Europe and the Middle East: Th e Transformationof Turkish Policy, Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal,Vol. 8, No. 1 (March 2004).



2004] TURKE Y'S CHANGING NEIGHBOURHOOD POLİCY 15

in mind, observed an expert, Turkey wanted to treat its MiddleEastern neighbors la Europe?

So truly, given both Iran and Syria becam e de facto neighborsof the U nited States after the occupation of Iraq, the treatment â laEurope have paid m ore dividends in return. Therefore, the possibilityof Turk ey's unilateral intervention in regional affairs will be limitedby further Europeanization of its SFP sector.

3 8Çağaptay , op. cit.

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