need for enlargement of Security Council international law

7/27/2019 need for enlargement of Security Council international law

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CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITYA Project On

Need for enlargement of

security council

Made By: Nidhi Navneet

3rd

year (5th

sem)

ROLL No.570

B.A.LL.B. (Hons)

SUBMITTED TO: - Dr. P. P. Rao

FACULTY: - Public International Law


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Need for Enlargement of Security Council

1

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am feeling highly elated to work on the case law Need for

Enlargement of Security Council under the guidance of my faculty of Public

International Law, Dr. P. P. Rao. I am very grateful to him for his exemplary guidance.

I would like to enlighten my readers regarding this topic and I hope I have tried my best

to pave the way for bringing more luminosity to this topic.

I also want to thank all of my friends, without whose cooperation this

project was not possible. Apart from all these, I want to give special thanks to the

librarian of my university who made every relevant materials regarding to my topic

available to me at the time of my busy research work and gave me assistance. And at

last I am very much obliged to the God who provided me the potential for the

rigorous research work.

At finally yet importantly I would like to thank my parents for the

financial support.

-----------

Thanking you

Nidhi Navneet

C.N.L.U.


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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research Methodology

The project is basically based on the doctrinal method of research as no field work is

done on this topic.

Aims & Objectives

To do an in depth analysis for the need to enlarge the Security Council. The aim of this

paper is to review the proposals put forward thus far and to evaluate new ones in order to

see whether a reform is desirable and/or feasible.

Sources of Data

The whole project is made with the use of secondary source. The following secondary

sources of data have been used in the project-

1. Books2. Websites

Mode of Citation

The researcher has followed a uniform mode of citation throughout the course of this

research paper.

Type of Study

For this topic, the researcher has opted for Descriptive and Explanatory type of study as

in this topic, the researcher is providing the descriptions of the existing facts.


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CONTENTS

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 4

Composition of Security Council .................................................................... 6

The Amendment of the UN Charter ................................................................ 7

First Instance of Enlargement of Security Council in 1963 ............................ 8

The Need for Enlargement of Security Council ........................................... 10

Attempts for enlargement of Security Council ............................................. 12

The content of the proposals ......................................................................... 14

1. Size of an Enlarged SC ........................................................................ 15

2. Membership categories and Regional representation .......................... 15

2.1. Membership categories ................................................................... 15

2.2. Regional representation ................................................................... 17

Is there a need for enlargement of security council ...................................... 18

Will an enlarged Council deliver the needs sought in the reform? ........ 19

Is Size of the Council on the basis of Equitable Geographical

Representation ........................................................................................ 19

Extended veto rights to new states may pose conflict in decision making

process .................................................................................................... 20

Views of the Permanent Five ................................................................. 20

Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 22

References ..................................................................................................... 23


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INTRODUCTION

Under the United Nations (UN) Charter, the Security Council has a

theoretically impressive range of powers and duties. Most significant is its primaryresponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Unlike the General

Assembly it can in principle take decisions that are binding on all members of the UN.

The Council meets throughout the year, mainly to consider armed conflicts and other

situations or disputes where international peace and security are threatened. It is

empowered to order mandatory sanctions, call for ceasefires and authorize military action

on behalf of the UN. The Council also has a role, with the General Assembly, in the

admission of new members to the UN, the appointment of the Secretary General and the

election of Judges in the International Court of Justice.

The United Nations Security Council, the principal organ responsible for

maintaining international peace and security, has been faced with criticism since its

establishment in 1946. Critics and politicians alike have criticised this Council for its

small size and exclusive nature, its relations with the General Assembly, its working

methods, and its undemocratic structure. The most criticism has been directed at the

infamous power of veto, namely the ability of the five permanent members of theCouncil (USA, Russia, France, UK, and China) to quash any non-procedural matter with

their negative vote, irrespective of its level of internationals support. All these criticisms

enhance the need for enlargement in the Security Council.

However, because of the high number of proposals on the reform of the

Council and strong disagreements among advocates of different proposals, not much has

been achieved. Analysts believe that an increase in the number of seats in the Council is

much more plausible than reforming or removing the veto. At least there is universal

agreement about the former while the latter is much more controversial. Each of the

permanent members has supported one proposal for expanding the Council. However, the

main dispute is on details and countries have not yet managed to agree on a common

denominator.

Yet despite dramatic changes in the international system over the past forty-

five years, the composition of the UNSC has remained unaltered since 1965, and there

are many who question how long its legitimacy will last without additional members that


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reflect twenty-first-century realities. This issue is further tried to be deal with in this

project work by the researcher in subsequent time phases of reforms in United Nations

Security Council.

While there is general agreement that the Security Council needs to be

enlarged, there is an extensive disagreement on how, making the issue both extremely

divisive and contentious. To many, the enlargement of the Security Council is a question

of its continuing legitimacy. Expansion of the membership could help enhance its

authority. A review of the working methods could make it more transparent, and agreeing

to limit the use of the veto power in cases ofjus cogens1crimesor at least explaining a

cast vetocould broaden its appeal. To others, reforming the Security Council is mainly

about increasing their own power; a seat at the table could potentially translate into

greatly increased influence over much of the United Nations system, including the

Bretton Woods institutions and the International Court of Justice.

An impressive body of literature has been produced on the reform of the

Security Council (SC) since the latest attempts made with the creation by the General

Assembly (GA), in 1993, of the Open-ended working group on the question of equitable

representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related

matters. These attempts are still on-going and it is not possible to predict their outcome,

notwithstanding the efforts of the former Secretary General (SG) Kofi Annan and the

High Level Panel. The reform of the SC cannot be confined to permanent membership

and the right of veto. But it is understandable that States strive to obtain a permanent seat.

Their power, prestige and influence will grow if the permanent seat is endowed with the

power of veto.

It is a goal which requires a brief explanation of the mechanisms embodied in

the UN Charter for amending its provisions. A brief reminder of the category of subjects

under international law which may become UN members is also necessary in order to

clarify the meaning of regional membership within the UN.

1Jus cogens (Latin for compelling law) is a principle in international law. In brief, jus cogens refers to

crimes generally accepted by the international community of states as unlawful, and from which no

derogation is ever permitted. Although, no clearcut definitions exist of what constitutes jus cogens, it isgenerally accepted that the term includes the prohibition of genocide, piracy, slavery, torture, and wars of

territorial aggrandizement.


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COMPOSITION OF SECURITY COUNCIL

The Dumbarton proposal emphasized the establishment of an executive

organ, whose membership might be limited and which could be entrusted the primary

responsibility for the maintenance of International peace and security. In San FranciscoConference, it was finally decided to establish such an organ in the form of the Security

Council.2 In accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the United Nations Charter,

the Security Council is one of the principal organs of the United nations. It comprises of

15 members of which 5 are permanent members and 10 are non-permanent members.

China, Russia, America, France and Britain are the permanent members of the Security

Council.3

Membership of the UN is a condicio sine qua non to become a full member of

any main UN bodies. According to Article 3 of the Charter, the original members of the

UN are those States that, having taken part in the San Francisco Conference or having

signed the 1942 Declaration on the United Nations, have signed and ratified the UN

Charter. In addition to the very small number of original members, the UN is open,

according to Article 4, to peace-loving States which accept the obligations set out in the

Charter and in the view of the UN itself are able and willing to carry out those

obligations.4 Is thus clear that only States may be parties to the Organisation, whether

original members or States that have subsequently acquired their membership through the

admission process, which is carried out through a decision by the General Assembly

(GA) at the recommendation of the SC.

As to the notion of State, we must to refer to the meaning of this word under

international law. The form of State is not relevant, for instance if the entity in question is

a unitary or a federal State. On the contrary: a confederation of States whose components

maintain a distinct legal personality is not a State under Article 4. Belarus and Ukraines

status as original members of the UN, when they were members of the Soviet Union, is

an accident of history arising from the political conditions existing at the time of the San

Francisco Conference. Switzerland, which was recently admitted to the United Nations, is

a confederation. However, its cantons are not international persons and from that

2D. W. Bowett, the Law of International Institutions (1970), p. 25.

3

Article 23 of the U.N. Charter.4Thomas D. Grant,Admission to the United Nations. Charter Article 4 and the Rise of Universal

Organization, Leyden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2009.


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perspective they are no different from the German Lnder. Entities other than States may

acquire a different status from full membership. For instance, international Organisations

or liberation movements have observer status within the GA. The SCs provisional rules

of procedure recognise that entities other than States may be invited to the meetings of

the SC.

The first Security Council came into being on 12 th January, 1946, when the

General Assembly elected its 6 members. Before 31st August, 1965, the Security Council

consisted of 11 members. On 17th December, 1963 amendment to Article 23 of the

Charter was adopted by the general assembly. It provided that the Security Council would

consist of 15 members - 5 permanent members and 10 non-permanent members. This

amendment came into force on 31st

august 1965. Before the amendment even without

exercising veto, the permanent members could prevent the Security Council from taking

decision on any matter because the Security Council then consisted of 11 members and

decision on ordinary or non-substantial matters required seven affirmative votes. If five

permanent members voted against the proposal, Security Council could not take any

decision on it. But this is no more possible because now the Security Council consists of

15 members and decision on non-substantial or procedural matters 9 affirmative votes are

required. Thus on non-substantial matter, the Security Council can take a decision on thebasis of the affirmative votes of the non-permanent members. Ten non-permanent

members are elected by the general assembly for a period of two years.

THE AMENDMENT OF THE UN CHARTER

Any modification of the United Nations Security Council membership

involves an amendment of the UN Charter being improbable to foresee a modification

operated by the practice giving origin to a kind of customary revision. The Charter sets

out two mechanisms: an amendment procedure (Art. 108) and a review procedure (Art.

109). From a formal standpoint there is no difference between the two procedures as far

as amending the Charter is concerned. Any modification must obtain two-thirds of the

votes of the GA or of the Review Conference and must be ratified by two-thirds of the

UNs members, including the permanent members of the SC. Permanent members do not

enjoy any right of veto for the adoption of the GA or Review Conference decision. They

may vote against the decision or abstain; the decision is adopted if it meets the two-thirds


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criterion. However, the permanent member must ratify the decision when it is submitted

to its national parliament. If not, the amendment or decision is not adopted.

A problem of interpretation arises as to the meaning of two-thirds of the GA,

i.e., should it be two-thirds of those present and voting or two-thirds of all GA members.

While Charter Article 18 on the vote by the GA states that Resolutions on important

questions shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting,

Article 108 on the amendment procedure does not qualify two-thirds majority. The

issue was clarified by GA Resolution 53/30 of 23 November 1998, which states that the

two-thirds majority for adopting a Resolution on amending the provisions governing the

SC refers to two-thirds of the UN members and not two-thirds of members present and

voting5

. The Review Conference was never held, even though Article 109 envisaged that

it should have been placed on the GA agenda 10 years after the UN Charter entered into

force. The Charters tenth anniversary took place in 1955, when the Cold War was at its

peak and such a Conference was inconceivable. Article 108 and 109 do not set out any

limit to the Charter amendment/review. They only regulate the procedure for amending

the Charter and thus do not take any position on the substantive reform of the SC,

whether this takes the form of an increase in the number of permanent or non-permanent

members or not.

6

FIRST INSTANCE OF ENLARGEMENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL

IN 1963

Until now, the only reform of the SC took place in 1963, when the number of

the non-permanent members was increased from 6 to 10 under Resolution 1991-XVIII.

The amendment was approved in the GA with France and the Soviet Union voting

5 The General Assembly, Mindful of Chapter XVIII of the Charter of the United Nations and of the

importance of reaching general agreement as referred to in Resolution 48/26 of 3 December 1993,

determines not to adopt any Resolution or decision on the question of equitable representation on andincrease in the membership of the Security Council and related matters, without the affirmative vote of at

least two thirds of the Members of the General Assembly. See Resolution adopted by the GeneralAssembly. Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council

and related matters, A/RES/53/30, 1 December 1998.6

See Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community,

Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2009, pp. 184-185. According to this author, the constitutional

quality of the UN Charter sets out limits to amendments of its basic principles and leaves little room for anychange via customary law: Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto. A

Constitutional Perspective, The Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp.138-147.


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against, the UK and US abstaining and China (Taiwan) voting in favour. All permanent

members eventually ratified the amendment; if they had not, it would never have entered

into force, which it did in 1965.

The reason for increasing the number of SC members was the growth in

membership numbers compared with the membership existing at the time of its

foundation. In 1945 the UN counted only 50 members, while by 1963 its membership had

risen to 115. This was due to the admission of several European States in 1955 and the

entry of Asian and African countries as a result of decolonisation. However, in 1963 the

decolonisation process was not yet complete. The birth of new countries with the

completion of the process, the split-up of the Soviet Empire and the dissolution of

Yugoslavia had dramatically increased the UNs membership, which now stands at 193States.

Also, After the Gulf war (1991) and the breaking of the Soviet Union the

need for enlargement of Security Council is being greatly felt in view of the changed

situation. Since the breaking of the Soviet Union, we were living in a Unipolar World

with the United States of America as the sole super power. In the non-aligned two day

Foreign Ministers Conference held at Larnaca (Cyprus) in the first week of February

1992, the need for democratisation of the U.N. system emerged as a recurrent theme. For

example, Indian Foreign Affairs Minister , Mr. Madhav Singh Solanki, who was the first

to address the delegates during the closed door deliberations, stressed that with a view to

reflect the increased strength of the General Assembly and the new power configuration

in the world, one way of democratising the U. N. would by reviewing the membership of

the security council.7

And this happened even though no new reform of the SC took place after the

Resolution voted in 1963. Non-permanent members are elected for two years by the GA

and cannot be immediately re-elected once their mandate expires. They are chosen taking

into account a geographical distribution initially established by Resolution 1991-XVIII

and since then unchanged: 5 members from African and Asian countries, 1 from Eastern

European countries, 2 from Latin America and 2 from the Western European and Others

Group (WEOG).

7Dr. S. K. Kapoor, International Law & Human Rights, 18th ed., 2011, Central Law Agency, at p. 528-30.


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THE NEED FOR ENLARGEMENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL

There are a number of reasons for reforming the SC causing its enlargement.

They may be enumerated as follows:

1. Admission of New States in UN.

As mentioned earlier, at San Francisco the Charter was signed by only 50

States. The UNs membership was more than double that number when the amendment

on the increase in non-permanent members of the SC entered into force. Nowadays, the

number of UN members has increased almost fourfold since its foundation. Since its

birth, the international community has completely changed. At the beginning the UN was

composed of Western and Eastern European countries plus a number of Latin America

countries. Nowadays the majority of members belong to African and Asian countries.

And thus, there is a greater need of world-wide representation in the Security Council

which urges for its enlargement.

2. Change in role of Security Council with end of Cold war.

The role of the SC has dramatically increased since the end of the Cold War.

While during the Cold War the SC was the place where the two superpowers engaged inverbal confrontation and was virtually paralyzed, but, after the fall of the Berlin wall its

policy changed. The SC started to become the place where effective decisions were taken.

This is demonstrated, for instance, by the number of peacekeeping operations put in place

and by the crises solved, such as the Timor Leste case. The SC has also taken on an

important territorial administration function, for example in Kosovo before its

independence. This factor demands that until and unless there is no fair representation of

countries, this function of SC cant be performed with diligence and thus there is a dire

need of enlargement of SC.

3. The decision making power of Security Council.

The Charter attributes to the Council the power to take decisions on measures

to be carried out by member States.8 Mandatory sanctions fall within this framework.

They are a kind of administrative regulation adopted to cope with concrete situations such

as threats to peace. Since 9/11 the SC has started to adopt legislative Resolutions, i.e.

8Art. 25 of Charter of United Nations.


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Resolutions taken to address hypothetical situations such as the threat arising from

international terrorism or WMD proliferation. Take for instance SC Resolutions 1373

(2001) and 1540 (2004). The former was adopted after the attack on the Twin Towers in

New York on 11 September 2001.

The latter defines the proliferation of WMD as a threat to peace and, like

Resolution 1373, lays down provisions that oblige States to enact legislation to address

proliferation and to ensure that they fulfil their duty to prevent the production of WMD.

The Resolution declares that States should also adopt measures to prevent WMD and

their means of delivery from falling into the hands of non-State actors. The creation of

the two ad hoc criminal tribunals should also be remembered, i.e. the International

Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal

Tribunal for Rwanda.9

4. Emerging new threats with change in time.

The international community is facing new and dangerous threats, stemming

from international terrorism, WMD proliferation and failed States. Nuclear proliferation

has required action by the SC vis--vis those States that have withdrawn from the Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or have been accused of failing to comply with the obligationto produce fissile material only for peaceful purposes. North Korea and Iran are cases in

point. North Korea and the sanctions policy show how the freedom of States to withdraw

from the NPT has been curtailed and the principle of consent to enter into international

obligations has been reduced.

5. The use of force by States.

According to the Charter, States are allowed to use armed force only in self-

defence. The principle is enshrined in Article 51 and the main moot point is whether

anticipatory self-defence is lawful or, on the contrary, may only be exercised after an

armed attack has occurred. Contemporary international law doctrine has construed

Chapter VII as giving the SC the power to authorize States to resort to armed force

whenever a threat to peace occurs. For instance, States may be authorised to use force to

9SC Resolutions: resolution 808 in 1993 and resolution 995 in 1994.


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prevent or put an end to genocide or to meet a latent threat stemming from an

accumulation of WMD. 10

ATTEMPTS FOR ENLARGEMENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL

As said before, the first (and only) reform of the SC took place in 1963, when

the Councils non-permanent members were increased from 6 to 10. Attempts to reform

the UN resumed in 1974. A special committee was created and given the task of studying

the problem and in 1975 was named the Special Committee for the United Nations

Charter and for strengthening the role of the Organisation. In the Nineties the question

of SC reform became paramount and in 1993 the GA passed Resolution 48/267, which

established the Open-ended working group on the question of equitable representation

and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other Security Council

matters.

It was immediately clear that the number of permanent members was the

more important question and a group of countries, led by Germany, pressed for a vote to

obtain a Resolution proposing an increase in the number of permanent members (so

called Quick Fix). These ambitions were temporarily defeated by those countries which

would have remained outside the Council. They were able to put a procedural Resolution

to the vote, according to which the two-thirds majority for adopting a GA Resolution on

the reform of the SC would have required two-thirds of the UNs members to vote in

favour.

The new Secretary General, Kofi Annan, had ambitions for a more general

UN reform. He appointed a panel of 16 eminent persons to study current threats to

international peace and security. The High Level Panel (HLP) on Threats, Challengesand Change, as it was named, prepared a Report11 dealing not only with the reform of

the SC but involving all important UN Chapters. As for the SC reform, the HLP did not

reach agreement and was obliged to indicate two ways to expand SC membership. The

two proposals agreed that the total number of SC members should be 24. However they

10Kara C. McDonald and Stewart M. Patrick, UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests,

Council Special Report No. 59 December 2010, Council on Foreign Relations, International Institutions

and Global Governance Program. Available at: .11UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared

Responsibility (A/59/565), 2 December 2004, available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/.


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differed in that Model A envisaged 6 new permanent seats with no power of veto and

three more two-year non-renewable seats. Model B, on the other hand, called for no

new permanent seats, but rather a new category of 8 four-year renewable seats and one

new two-year non-permanent and non-renewable seat. It was also proposed that the

situation should be reviewed in 2020.

The HLP report was followed by the Secretary GeneralsReport In Larger

FreedomTowards Development, Security and Human Rights for All 12. The Secretary

General proposed that the UN should be structured around the work of three councils: the

Security Council, ECOSOC and the newly created Human Rights Council.

The 2005 GA summit, at Heads of States and Government level, did not take

a stance on the SC reform. The three short paragraphs dedicated to the subject (152-154,

A/RES/60/1) express support for an early reform of the SC, which would make it more

broadly representative, efficient and transparent, thus enhancing its effectiveness and

legitimacy, the better to implement its decisions.

At the end of 2005 the positions were as follows. The G4 (Brazil, Germany,

India and Japan) tabled a draft Resolution aiming to increase to 25 the members of the

SC: 6 new permanent members, with the possibility of a veto right after 15 years, plus 4non-permanent members. The African Union (AU) position was that the total number

should be 26, i.e. adding 6 permanent members with a right of veto and 5 non-permanent

members. Italy and a group of other countries formulated the Uniting for Consensus

(UfC) proposal in which 10 new non-permanent members, with the possibility of

immediate reelection after the expiry of their mandate was proposed. However, no

proposal was put to the vote.

The following years marked a deadlock in the work of the Open-ended

Working Group, until its proceedings were given a renewed impetus by the decision (GA

Res. 62/557 of September 2008) to discuss the SC reform in an informal plenary of the

GA. This entrusted Ambassador Zahir Tanin (Afghanistan) to chair the intergovernmental

negotiations. The overview submitted by Ambassador Tanin (18 May 2009) covered 5

issues that had been identified as necessary for true SC reform: categories of

12UN Secretary General, In Larger Freedom. Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All

(A/59/2005), 21 March 2005, available at http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm.


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membership, veto, regional representation, size and working methods of the SC, relations

between SC and GA.

This new round of negotiations did not bring about any real change in the

positions tabled in past years. The G4, supported by France and the UK, reiterated its

proposal of having new permanent members. The AU pressed for a more equitable

representation of developing countries within the SC, with at least three African

permanent seats endowed with the right of veto. The UFC stuck with its original proposal

to have only new non-permanent seats, this time with the option of having a number of

non-permanent members with an extended duration (3 to 5 years) but with no possibility

of re-election.

It appears that the on-going work on the SC reform offers no prospect (for the

moment) of reaching a positive outcome, notwithstanding the attempts to identify new

solutions. For instance, France and the UK proposed an intermediate reform, consisting

of having a number of temporary seats that would become permanent if the members so

wished. The AU and members of the UFC rejected the proposal for a temporary solution

given the danger, as they saw it, of the category of temporary members in effect being

transformed into one of permanent membership.13

THE CONTENT OF THE PROPOSALS

The following are the five key cluster areas illustrated by the President of the

GA, Sheikha Al Khalila, in 2007. The current debate on the SC reform is centred around

these five issues: 1) size of an enlarged Council, 2) categories of membership and

regional representation, 3) the veto, 4) the amelioration of the SCs working methods, 5)

relations between the SC and the GA.

14

As this project work is only concerned withenlargement of Security Council, only size of enlarged council and categories of

membership & regional representation are dealt in this work.

13Jonas von Freiesleben, Reform of the Security Council, Article no. 1, Managing Change at the United

Nations, at pg 1. Available at: .14

See Jacob Silas Lund,Pros and Cons of Security Council Reform, Center for UN Reform Education, 19January 2010, available at http//www.centereforunreform.org. The author is grateful to Ms. Elisabetta

Martini for writing the section on the content of the latest SC reform proposals.


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1. Size of an Enlarged SCThere is a general agreement that the SC should be enlarged. The expansion

goes from a low-twenties option (five-to-seven non-permanent members or a mix of

permanent and non-permanent members), mid-twenties (six permanent members and fournon-permanent) to a high-twenties option (a wider geographical representation would

allow a better representation of African, Latin American and small island countries).

2. Membership categories and Regional representation2.1. Membership categories

The question of categories is by far the most crucial issue. An enlargement of the Councilhas been accepted by all counterparts but proposals range from low twenties to mid-

twenties, without considering Gaddafis proposal15 to open the Council to all UN

membership.

Expansion of both permanent and non-permanent categories:

African group: 2 permanent and 5 non-permanent seats to African States,selected by the African Union;

G4: 6 permanent (2 for African States, 2 for Asian States, 1 for Latin Americaand Caribbean, 1 for Western Europe and other States) and 4 non-permanent seats

(1 African, 1 Asian, 1 Eastern European, 1 Latin American or Caribbean);

France and UK:permanent seats to Brazil, Germany, India and Japan along withrepresentation of Africa;

Slovenia16: 6 permanent (2 for Africa, 2 for Asia, 1 for Latin America andCaribbean, 1 for Western Europe and other States) and 4 non-permanent. The four

new non-permanent seats, added to the existing number of non-permanent

members, would increase the number of non-permanent seats to 14. These 14

seats should be divided into 2 groups: a group of 6 seats with more frequentrotation, eligible for re-election every second two-year term over a period of

twelve years, with the other 8 seats following the existing rules.

Expansion only in the non-permanent category:

15See UN General Assembly, Statement by Libyan Arab Jamahiriya H.E. Colonel Muammar Al-Qadhafi,

Leader of the Revolution, General Debate of the 64th Session, 23 September 2009, available at

http://www.un.org/ga/64/generaldebate/LY.shtml.16

See Statement on Security Council reform, sent by Ambassador Sanja tiglic, Permanent Representativeof Slovenia to the United Nations, to Zahir Tanin on 9 February 2010, available athttp://www.reformtheun.org/index.php?module=uploads&func=download&fileId=4330.


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Italy and Colombia17: longer-term seats allocated to the regional groups (Africa,Asia, Asia/Africa on a rotating basis, Group of Latin American and Caribbean

States, Western European and Others Group/Eastern European Group on a

rotating basis). Regular non-permanent seats for a two-year term, without the

possibility of immediate re-election, for the following groups: small States(population below 1 million), medium-size States (population between 1 million

and 10 million), Africa, Asia, Group of Latin American and Caribbean States,

Eastern European Group. They proposed 2 options for the duration of longer-term

seats: a) from 3 to 5 years without the possibility of immediate re-election, or b)

2-year term with the possibility of up to 2 immediate re-elections.

The UFC re-proposed the 2005 document but declared that it backed the Italo-Colombian proposal.

The UK, France, Russia, Germany, Liechtenstein and the Republic of Koreaunderlined the need for an intermediate solution in order to bypass the stall in the

negotiations. However, different proposals were submitted within this framework:

1. UK and France18: creation of a new category of seats with a longermandate than that of currently elected members. On completion of this

intermediate period a review should take place to convert these newseats into permanent seats;

2. Russia did not specify its idea of an interim model but underlined in itsnon paperof 2 March 2010 that so far none of the existing models ofreforming the Council enjoys prevailing support in the UN; this rancounter to the commonly held idea of an overwhelming majority in

favour of the G4 proposal.3. The US took a stance in favour of a limited expansion of both permanent

and non-permanent members. New permanent members should be

identified by name (country-specific). Only the current permanent

members (P5) should have the right of veto, i.e. they should continue to

enjoy a right conferred by the Charter since its entry into force.

4. China is for increasing the number of SC members with priority fordeveloping countries, especially African ones. In its Statement of 6

October 2009, however, China did not specify the number or categories

of new members and was silent on the right of veto.5. Germany finally clarified its idea of an intermediate solution on 12

November 2009. Like the UK and France, Germany states firmly that this

kind of solution must be constructed in such a fashion as to pave the

17See UFC platform on Security Council reform, 20 April 2009, available at

http://www.italyun.esteri.it/NR/rdonlyres/C37FC89F-8132-4CA8-A2F9-

149515B37BD1/0/2009_04_17screform.pdf.18

See UK-French SummitDeclaration on Global Governance and Development, 6 July 2009, available at

This joint declaration has been reproposed as the

UK/French Position on Reform of the United Nations Security Council, sent by Mark Lyall Grant and

Gerard Araud, Permanent Representatives of United Kingdom and France, to Zahir Tanin on 1 March2010, available at:


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way for an expansion ofboth categories, allowing member States tomake the transition to a permanent expansion of both categories at the

review conference, in no less than fifteen years.

6. While the Korean proposal is closely linked to that of Italy andColombia, Liechtensteins document

19

contains some new points. Itenvisages the creation of a new category of seats with a longer mandate

of 8/10 years with the possibility of re-election (2 for Africa, 2 for Asia,

1 for Latin America and Caribbean, 1 for Western Europe and Other

States). After 16/20 years a review conference should take place, where

the member States would have the possibility of converting these seats

into permanent ones.

2.2. Regional representation

During the negotiations, when countries address the issue of regional

representation they mainly tend to refer to geographical representation, following

Article 23.1 of the Charter which endorses the criterion of equitable geographical

distribution. As a result, when additional member States are proposed in the models put

forth by negotiators, countries are divided into blocks like African States, AsianStates, Latin Americanand Caribbean States, Western European States, or Group

of Eastern European States.

These blocks reflect a mere geographical distribution of the seats and do not

imply that a given country could represent anyone other than itself. It should be noted

that the League of Arab States claims a permanent Arabrepresentation in any future

expansiona request echoed by France, and a regional definition not provided by the UN

Resolution on groupings but of undisputed importance in the XXI century.

Differing from the League of Arab States, the Organisation of the Islamic

Conferenceproposes an adequate representation of major civilisations15, including the

Islamic Ummah, in any membership categories in an expanded Security Council, so as to

improve the dialogue among civilisations.

The African Union, stressing the historical injustice suffered by the African

continent, claims two permanent seats and five non-permanent, retaining for itself the

right to appoint countries from among its members. As the African countries underline in

19

SeeLiechtenstein proposal on Security Council reform: elements for the intermediate model, 26 February2010, available at:


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almost every intervention made, these seats would not imply a regional representation

that, in their opinion, would not fit the outstanding principle of sovereign equality among

States. However, even this low-profile interpretation of regional representation is

rejected by permanent members, namely the US and Russia, which only envisage

country-specific16 admissions to the Security Council.

During these last rounds of negotiations, Italy did not present anew its

proposal for a European Union (EU) seat. However, both Italy and Portugal underlined

the great change effected by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. In the opinion of

both countries this new reality should be translated in the manner in which the EU

interacts with the Security Council20, and according to Italy must be taken into account

in any further development of the SCs reform.Germany, while campaigning for its ownpermanent seat, has stated that the final goalin an unforeseeable futurewould be the

creation of a European seat.21

IS THERE A NEED FOR ENLARGEMENT OF SECURITY

COUNCIL

There are a number of reasons for expanding the SC. First of all, expansion of

membership of UNO. The UN now counts 193 members which is a situation quite

different from the situation at its foundation time and from that existing in 1963 when the

Council was expanded from 11 to 15 members. There are several reasons for reforming

the SC. The main ones, which have often been pointed out, are its:

lack of democracy; insufficient geographical representation; lack of legitimacy for ensuring global governance; poor representation of the international community if compared with its increased

powers.

20See the Statement by Ambassador Jos Filipe Moraes Cabral, Permanent Representative of Portugal, at

the informal meeting of the plenary on the intergovernmental negotiations on "The Question of Equitable

Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and related matters, New York,8 December 2009, available at:

.21Natalino Ronzitti, The Reform of the UN Security Council, DOCUMENT IAI 10, Dated 13 July

2010, Istituto Affari Internazionali, at p. 10-13. Available at:


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Will an enlarged Council deliver the needs sought in the reform?

Reform supporters are of the view that the Security Council is not efficient in

its current state and it needs restructuring. However, the question arises whether this

inefficiency is due to its size or because of the divergence of the decision makers

security policy preferences in the Council that produces less collective action for the

promotion of international security. Also, what is the guarantee that an enlarged Council

of 20-23 members or of 23-26 members, as most reform proposals put forward the size of

a reformed Council within this range, with or without veto right, will be more effective,

cohesive in its decisions related to different world issues? Hence, to say that an enlarged

Council will better serve the purpose of maintaining world peace and security is

debatable.

Is Size of the Council on the basis of Equitable Geographical Representation

Almost all reform proposals mentioned above call for an increase in the size

of the Council on the basis of equitable geographical representation because majority of

the member states feels that the current distribution of permanent seats under-represents

some parts of the world, especially Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Eastern

Europe. It is an entirely valid demand on the part of the aspirant member states that the

Council should incorporate the broad regional composition of the organisation. The

question arises, however, as to how any country can be a representative of its region in

the Security Council. Regional representation can only work when all countries of a

particular region choose a specific country themselves to represent them as a permanent

member in the Council and that selected regional representative agrees to protect interests

of the region over its national interests. And, giving priority to regional interests over

national interests will be a hard task for any aspiring state.

At the same time, when we talk of equal geographical representation, then

Europe is already over-represented with two seats, and the addition of one more seat

would give the region the upper hand in the Council. Similarly, in the case of Asia, one

representation it already has in the form of China, but the addition of two more seats or

even one more seat could, in the eyes of some, make it over-represented. Such a potential

over-representation would render the approach of equitable geographical representation

questionable as, in this way, the inequity of regional representation would still stay. Also,


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if we talk of equitable geographical representation, then there is no mention of

permanent seat for the countries from the Caribbean and Eastern Europe in any of the

reform proposals. Hence, the notion of equitable geographical representation also first

needs to be defined in a clear manner by the countries that desire expansion of the

Council on the basis of geographical representation.22

Extended veto rights to new states may pose conflict in decision making

process

While these above dealt draft resolution represents a considerable step

towards a meaningful discussion of enlargement, it still fails to address the three key

problems that would be encountered with an expanded Council. It is curious that the veto,

an issue that has caused so much resentment among the international community, would

be retained and indeed extended to new permanent members. A Council of 25 members is

at high risk of deadlock, with new permanent members possibly eager to assert their

newfound ability to significantly influence the Councils proceedings through the use of

the veto.

Views of the Permanent Five

No discussion of enlargement of the Security Council is complete without an

overview of the opinions of the permanent five members China, France, Russia, the

United Kingdom, and the United States. As the victors of World War II, these five states

took steps to ensure that their position would be changed only with their approval.

The United Kingdom and France, for their part, are enthusiastic about the

prospect of enlarging the Council. France, through its then Permanent Representative to

the United Nations Jean-Marc de La Sablire, stated in July 2005 that it was

indispensable to enhance the effectiveness of the Security Council by ensuring that its

composition better reflects the realities of todays world.23 The statement went on to

express support for all bids of the Group of Four, as well as an endorsement of their

22Nadia Sarwar, Expansion of the United Nations Security Council, available at:

.23

Remarks by H. Exc. Mr. Jean-Marc de La Sablire to the General Assembly Plenary Meeting on theQuestion of Equitable Representation in the Security Council and Enlargement of Membership andRelated Issues, 2005.


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proposal for enlargement. Karen Pierce, then Deputy Permanent Representative of the

United Kingdom to the United Nations, expressed in July 2006 the United Kingdoms

desire to see a Council fully representative of the modern world, and of todays United

Nations.24 Pierce also voiced British support for and endorsement of the G-4 Proposal,

concurring with the French statement of 2005.

However, the other three permanent members the United States, Russia,

and China greet proposals for Council enlargement with a cool reception or outright

hostility. The position of the United States is particularly interesting, as it advocates

reform, yet avoids direct statements of support or rejection. R. Nichols Burns, the State

Departments Undersecretary for Political Affairs from 2005 to 2008, offered the most

succinct representation of American views in a July 2005 testimony to the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee.25 Stating that the United States did not think any proposal to

expand the Security Council should be voted upon at this stage, his remarks built on

an earlier statement in June 2005 by the State Departments Bureau of Public Affairs

remarking that, effectiveness remains the benchmark for any reform.26 The American

view is that reform of the Council should focus on improving efficiency and making

Council actions more effective and easily implemented.

Russia is reluctant to support the idea of Council reform, chiefly because the

government has a voice in one of the few international bodies where the country still

holds significant and unquestioned influence after the end of the Cold War. Sergei

Lavrov, the Russian representative to the United Nations, stated the Russian opinion

succinctly when he remarked that, any restriction of the status enjoyed by the current

permanent members is unacceptable.27 While Russia has reluctantly accepted the

two-plus-three proposal in theory so as not to seem obstructionist, there can be little

24Statement by H.E. Karen Pierce, the Deputy Permanent Representative of the Mission of the United

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, to the General Assembly Plenary Meeting on the

Question of Equitable Representation on the Increase in the Membership of the Security Council andFollow-up to the Outcome of the Millennium Summit, 2006.25

U.S. Views on UN Reform, Security Council Expansion. The American Journal of International Law99, no. 4 (2005): 906-908. 908. The American viewpoint is best realized in Burns statement that wecannot let discussion on expansion divert our attention from, and delay action on, other important, more

urgently needed UN reforms.26

United States Department of State. U.S. Priorities for a Stronger, More Effective United Nations.

Available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/48439.pdf.27

Statement by Sergei Lavrov to the Open-Ended Working Group of the General Assembly on Security

Council Reform, 29 May 1998. This built on an earlier statement that rejected the notion that the right of

veto is an anachronism inherited from the Cold War, but that it is rather a critically important andindispensable component in the smooth functioning of the Council. (Statement by Sergei Lavrov to theOpen-Ended Working Group of the General Assembly on Security Council Reform, 22 May 1996).


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doubt that Russia would use its coveted veto if forced into a vote for the Councils

enlargement. China, the final permanent member, has maintained anambiguous stance

and kept its cards close to the chest on the contentious veto issue.28

The conclusion must be that the reasons in favour of a SC reform outweigh

those against. Whether a real reform is feasible is quite another question. The reformshould involve not only the SC members,but also the right of veto. Other reforms may

be achieved through day-to-day practice, without amending the Charter. At most, one

may conceive of one or more amendments to the Councils rules of procedure, for

instance regarding its working methods. As Jacobs Silas Lund pointed out, allowing

things to remain as they are [] may be a much more realistic option than one might

assume. He pointsout, mentioning an insiders opinion, that even the G4 countries fearthat the non-expansion option might be a possible outcome of the current negotiating

effort. Nor is the reform of the right of veto gaining currency. On the other hand it is

almost impossible to circumvent the amendment formal procedure by having recourse to

a kind of customary amendment through practice. This would be impossible for

reforming UN organs. The conclusion is very pessimistic, since some of the P5 countries

are more than happy to see reform moving at near-zero-velocity speed.29

CONCLUSION

Expansion of the UN Security Council is an important issue, but the process would take

time. It will require many rounds of thorough discussions and negotiations. Genuine

negotiations will require compromises as well as clarity on defined positions.

The major criticism on the current composition of the SC is not so much its lack of

efficiency as the deficit of its representation and an indefinite stalemate risks of de-legitimizing the SC. The real problem is the scope and the content of the reform. A

further point is how that reform might be achieved. It seems that the majority of UN

members share the opinion that the SC should be enlarged. This opinion is also gaining

currency within the P5, in spite of their fear that an enlarged SC might diminish their

role. A better representation of the international community is requested for other forums

such as the G8 and its expansion towards G14 and G20. This is a trend that should not be

28Malik, J M. Security Council Reform: China Signals Its Veto. World Policy Journal(2005): 19-27. 20.

29See Jacob Silas Lund,Pros and Cons of Security Council Reform, op. cit.


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overlooked. As to the number of non-permanent seats, opinions vary. However, a SC

made up of 20 members (permanent and non-permanent) seems a realistic expectation.

There are still differences of opinion on the duration of non-permanent seats and whether

the reform should be for an intermediate span of time.

The UFC has succeeded in slowing down the process but we have to see how far the

group remains successful in its attempt as the G4 is getting impatient and India, one of

the G4 members, is enthusiastically pressing ahead with its campaign. Also, there is not

much unity in this group because while Pakistan is ready to give space to Africa as a

permanent member, not all the other UFC members are willing to do that.

Similarly, the G-4 is also not united. They have made compromises on the veto issue, but

the African Group has not. Brazil, Germany, and Japan are willing to go for the

intermediary model solution, but India is not. The same is the case with permanent

membership of the Council.

The Permanent five also carries difference of opinion on the issue of expansion of the

Council. There is no agreement among them about who should be allowed to become

permanent members. On the one side, France and Britain support the G-4 group, and on

the other, China and Russia support the UFC groups position. Africa stands betweenthese two divides; enjoying the support of France, Britain, China and Russia, whereas the

U.S. has adopted the policy of supporting country-specific admissions to the Council for

permanent membership. Thus, America supports the Indian and Japanese candidatures.

In a world where geopolitical rivalry is intensifying, the expansion of the UNSC will be a

tough task. It will be hard to create a win-win scenario for all groups. No progress seems

likely unless all groups agree to make compromises in their current standpoints.

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