NB-AR-0610 Anger at Goldman

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  • 8/9/2019 NB-AR-0610 Anger at Goldman

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    I N T H E N E W S

    Member FDIC | Equal Housing Lender

    Public anger at Goldman Sachs is the vehicle being usedto force through sweeping financial reform legislation.

    In the publics mind, Goldman has come to symbolizethe self-interested corruption at the heart of modernfinance. The legal discussion about Goldman seems tocenter on whether Goldman had a conflict of interest.Goldman doesnt have a conflict of interest; Goldman is aconflict of interest.

    The company is not unique among major financialinstitutions. It is in the spotlight because it is widelyrespected as the most intelligent and influential financialmarket player. Goldman creates markets, moves markets,shorts markets and participates heavily in the regulationof these markets through an influential network of past,future and wannabe employees.

    The basic facts of Hank Paulsons transition fromchairman and CEO of Goldman Sachs to U.S. secretary ofthe Treasury are mind-boggling.

    He ran Goldman during the build-up of the bubble,earning $38.5 million in 2005. In 2006, he went toTreasury as the bubble was peaking. He was forcedto redeem his ownership in Goldman before becomingTreasury secretary. He therefore sold his stock for $485million on a tax-free basis saving more than $100 millionin taxes because he was entering public service.

    We will be assessing Paulsons actions for many years,but it is very clear that he was presiding over theresolution of the financial crisis his firm played a pivotalrole in creating. There is nothing illegal about any of this,but there is a lot wrong with it.

    The regulatory reform bill passed by Congress is almost2,000 pages. I have not read it. Neither have most if notall of the congressman who voted for it. I dont have toread it to know the foundational premise is fatally flawed.I also havent read the bill because legislation that longisnt written to illuminate, simplify and solve problems.

    In this environment, what passes for a public debate isa bunch of talking points spouted by people who dontknow finance and havent read the bill. The public furyover Goldman was the vehicle used to ram through thisfinancial reform bill of flawed intent.

    The premise of the bill was that systemic risk must bemanaged by more and tougher regulators. The systemicrisk of the Too Big to Fail institutions is not a naturally-occurring market phenomenon. It is the unintended

    consequence of the conflicting goals of federal financialpolicy.

    Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Reserve andGoldman Sachs all played a role in this, but the problemis both simpler and more challenging than an angrypublic would like to believe.

    We already have a large and complex regulatoryapparatus. This is designed to:

    Protect depositors (the FDIC).

    Implement federal monetary and fiscal policy (theTreasury).

    Maintain the safety and soundness of the system(the Fed, the FDIC, the Officer of Comptroller of theCurrency and the state regulators).

    Stimulate low-income housing and communityinvestment (Fannie and Freddie and all theregulatory agencies).

    Provide funding mechanisms (the Fed and FederalHome Loan Banks).

    Protect investors (the Securities and Exchange

    Commission). Provide consumer protection (multiple agencies).

    Understanding and navigating this regulatory complexityhas displaced credit underwriting as the most importantcore competency in finance. This regulatory dynamic is

    Anger At Goldman Mustnt Drive Reform | Investors.com June 3, 2010

    Anger At Goldman Mustnt Drive ReformBob Atwell Text

    Investors.com June 3, 2010

  • 8/9/2019 NB-AR-0610 Anger at Goldman

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    I N T H E N E W S

    what drives centralization and causes systemic risk. Thiscentralizing dynamic tilts the competitive landscape

    away from community-based players using localfinancial resources to responsibly serve people in thedecentralized manner personalism requires.

    Regulatory complexity favors the large players in anyindustry. The big firms have the volume over which tospread the fixed costs of compliance, and they inevitablyprovide heavy input into the formation of regulatorypolicy and practice. They also have the resources to hirethe necessary lobbyists.

    We are all sickened by the current state of affairs. But noone is going to stop the seamless flow of people betweenthe public and private sectors. So the notion that anyoneoutside of Wall Street and Capitol Hill will be helpedand protected by more powerful financial wizards in

    Washington has no reasonable basis in practice.

    Their current proposition is if we just further centralizefinancial markets under Washingtons control, they willfix things for us. The problem is the new law does noteliminate any of the ineffective agencies currently inexistence and likely will create new ones.

    Centralized finance is too profitable for politicians to

    want the nonsense stopped. In the end, we are likely tohave a modified version of the same game with somedifferent names. Financial Disneyland will reopen

    with more and tougher security, but the fundamentaldynamic of centralized and politicized finance will beeven stronger. Security will talk tough and penalize a fewplayers, but the games will resume. The primary impactof enhanced security will be to keep small players off thefield of play.

    The financial machinations on display in thecongressional hearings caused severe economic pain.Politicians have successfully harnessed the public anger

    at New York to support a more muscular Washington.

    There is, however, a better way, and we can have a muchhealthier and more stable outcome. We just need to growup and process our anger like adults. We are currentlyallowing our anger to be used against us.

    We dont want systemic risk managed; systemic risk mustbe eliminated. The best way to eliminate systemic risk is

    to stop using the policy approaches that create it. It canbe eliminated very simply by imposing higher capitalstandards on those institutions that pose systemic risk.Taxation of systemic risk would also reverse the impliedpublic subsidy that creates it. We will solve only theproblems we sincerely intend to fix.

    Atwell is chairman of Nicolet National Bank in Green Bay, Wis.

    Member FDIC | Equal Housing Lender

    Anger At Goldman Mustnt Drive Reform | Investors.com June 3, 2010