NAVAL MJCLSAR PROPULSION PROGRAM—1974

HEARINGBEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENEMYCONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

NINETY-THIKD CONGEESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL H. G. RICKOVER

FEBRUARY 25, 1974

Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

34-526 O WASHINGTON : 1975

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing OfficeWashington, B.C. 20402 - Price $1.10

JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

MELVIN PRICE, Illinois, ChairmanJOHN O. PASTORE, Rhode Island, Vice Chairman

CHET HOLIFIELD, California HENRY M. JACKSON, WashingtonJOHN YOUNG, Texas STUART SYMINGTON, MissouriTENO RONCALIO, Wyoming ALAN BIBLE, NevadaMIKE McCORMACK, Washington JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, New MexicoCRAIG HOSMER, California GEORGE D. AIKEN, VermontJOHN B. ANDERSON, Illinois WALLACE F. BENNETT, UtahORVAL HANSEN, Idaho PETER H. DOMINICK, ColoradoMANUEL LUJAN, JR., New Mexico - HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee

EDWARD J. BAUSER, Executive DirectorGEORGE F. MURPHY, Jr., Deputy Director

JAMES B. GRAHAM, Assistant DirectorNORMAN P. KLUG, Technical Consultant

ALHIOX W. KNIGHT, Jr., Professional Staff MemberRANDALL C. STEPHENS, Professional Staff Member

WILLIAM J. MINSCH, Jr., Special CounselLAWRENCE F. ZENKER, GAO Consultant

CHRISTOPHER C. O'MALLEY, Printing Editor

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C O N T E N T S

TOPICAL SUBJECT LISTPage

Hearings on naval nuclear propulsion program on February 25, 1974 1Opening remarks of Chairman Price 1Committee tribute __ __ 1Opening statement 2Status of the naval nuclear program. _ 2Operational experience- _ _ _ 3Sixfold increase in core life _ __ 4Status of Los Angeles class 4Statistics of the naval nuclear propulsion program 5Nuclear ship program summary 5Lessons from the October Mideast war 5Navy attitude toward nuclear trained personnel 6Consideration of Navy's needs 7Decisions should not be questioned 7Consideration of j ob qualifications in the Navy 8Inequities in personnel evaluation 8Advantages of long-life reactor cores 9Advances in reactor technology 10Long-life cores less expensive _ 10Cores now last 10 to 13 years 11Congressional inquiry on nuclear ships _ _ - — 12Naval and commercial applications differ: 12Fewer ref uelings reduce environmental effects 13Cladding material developed in naval program 13Long-life cores help increase overhaul intervals 14Lack of fuel oil curtailed Navy operations ,. 15Legislation to obtain nuclear ships 16Nuclear powered major combatants 16A new Vinson-Trammell Act 17Retention of nuclear trained personnel 18Naval nuclear training contributes to national economy. 19Nuclear industry recruits Navy personnel 19Navy actions affect personnel retention 23New small strategic submarine 24Budget for study of small strategic submarine 24Shipbuilding capacity 25Older Polaris submarines will need replacement 26Inadequate submarine research and development 27Nuclear ship visits to foreign ports 27Use of San Diego as a home port 28Fiscal year 1975 funds for submarine R. & D 28Navy controls radioactivity 29Significance of radioactivity 29Soviet submarine threat 30Trends in shipbuilding capacity 31Approximate value of unfinished private shipyard work 32Vacillating shipbuilding program affects shipyard capacity 34Backfit of Trident missiles into Poseidon submarines 34Light water breeder reactor 35Increased fiscal year 1975 funding for naval reactors' civilian reactor

development programs 36Increased fiscal year 1975 funding for naval reactor development program- 36Unauthorized release of information 37

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IV

PageNuclear carrier and frigate deliveries 38Correspondence on nuclear-powered ships 39Comparison of fueling costs 41Aircraft carrier comparison 42Frigate comparison 43Distortion in cost comparisons 43Correspondence from a nuclear frigate commanding officer 44Cost of all weapons is increasing 46Soviet submarine construction 46U.S. submarine construction 47Summary 47

HEARING DATE

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1974

Rickover, Adm. Hyman G., Director, Division of Naval Reactors 1-48Wegner, William, Deputy Director, Division of Naval Reactors 14, 29, 30, 47Leighton, David T., Associate Director for Surface Ships and the Light

Water Breeder Reactor, Division of Naval Reactors. 16, 26, 35, 38, 41, 47

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THERECORD

Statistics of the naval nuclear propulsion program, February 1, 1974 5Nuclear ship program summary, as of February 25, 1974 5Nuclear industry advertisements for Navy nuclear personnel 20, 21, 22Charts of shipbuilding trends 32, 33Paper concerning backfit of Trident missiles into Poseidon submarines 35Paper concerning increased fiscal year 1975 funding for Naval Reactor's

civilian reactor development programs 36Chart of nuclear carrier and frigate deliveries 39Correspondence concerning nuclear-powered ships 39Paper comparing fueling costs for nuclear and conventional aircraft carriers

and frigatesLetter from commanding officer of DLGN 25Summary of Soviet submarine construction _ _ .

APPENDIXES

Appendix 1. Summary of Polaris/Poseidon submarines 49Appendix 2. Report entitled "Environmental Monitoring and Disposal of

Radioactive Wastes from U.S. Naval Nuclear-Powered Ships and TheirSupport Facilities, 1973" 51

Appendix 3. Floor speech of Representative Melvin Price, Chairman,Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, excerpted from CongressionalRecord, July 29, 1974 . 73

Index -- 79

NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM—1974

JOINT COMMITTEE ox ATOMIC) ENERGY,Washmgton^ D.O.

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy met, pursuant to call, at 2p.m., in the executive hearing room, H-405, the Capitol, Hon. MelvinPrice (chairman of the Joint Committee) presiding.

Present: Eepresentatives Price, Holifield, Roncalio, Hosmer, andHansen; Senators Pastore, Symington, Dominick, Aiken, and Baker.

Committee staff present: Edward J. Bauser, executive director;Brig. Gen. Albion Knight, Jr. (USA Ket.), professional staff member;James B. Graham, assistant director; and Lawrence F. Zenker, GAOconsultant.

OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN PRICE

Chairman PRICE. The Joint Committee resumes hearings today onAEC's proposed fiscal 1975 budget. The testimony to be presented thisafternoon encompasses the AEC's naval reactor program.

We welcome you once again, Admiral. It is always a pleasure tohave you. We look forward to your statement.

COMMITTEE TRIBUTE

STATEMENT OP ADM. H. G. RICKOVER, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OFNAVAL REACTORS, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION; ACCOM-PANIED BY WILLIAM WEGNER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR; DAVID T.LEIGHTON, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR SURFACE SHIPS ANDLWBR; AND THOMAS L. FOSTER, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOPFISCAL MATTERS

Admiral RICKOVER. Mr. Chairman, before I start my formal testi-mony, I would like to say a few words about this committee. Whatimpels me to say these words are the recent announcements of SenatorGeorge Aiken, Representatives diet Holifield, Craig Hosmer, and sev-eral other committee members that they intend to retire from the Con-gress. I feel a deep sense of sadness over this news because I have beenassociated with this commmittee since its inception.

I have a list before me of the various people who have been on thiscommittee. Many of them were my dear friends; men who gave inval-

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uable help in building the nuclear Navy. First, let me mention thosewho have.passed away. William Bates; Harry Byrd; Tom Connally;John Dempsey; Everett Dirksen; Henry Dworshak; Aime Forana ;Bourke Hickenlopper; Carl Hinshaw; Thomas Jenkins; Edwin John-son; Lyndon Johnson; Paul Kilday; Bill Knowland—who died 2days ago—Brien McMahon, who was a close friend of mine; EugeneMillikin, one of the original members of the committee; Dick Kussell;Albert Thomas; J. Parnell Thomas; and Arthur Vandenberg.

Then there are the former committee members who have left theCongress: Clint Anderson; Wayne Aspinall; John Bricker; SterlingCole; Guy Cordon; Norris Cotton; Carl Curtis; Carl Durham, whowas chairman after Brien McMahon; Edward Edmondson; CharlesElston; Albert Gore; Clare Boothe Luce; Catherine May; Willian»McCulloch, who left a short time ago; Tom Morris; Jim Patterson-Millard Tydings; James Van Zandt-, and Jack Westland.

Then there are those who are planning to retire. One of my dearfriends is sitting at your right, George Aiken. He has announced hisretirement. He has helped me over many years. Wallace Bennett did,too, and so did Alan Bible. Then I come to the last two, Chet Holifieldand Craig Hosmer, who since the Joint Committee was establishedhave taken an active part in its activities and helped me tremendously.-

Chairman PRICE. Thank you very much, Admiral, for those kind re-marks about the former distinguished members and the distinguishedmembers of the committee who are going to retire at the end of thissession.

I think all of them and all the other members will also join me incongratulations to you on a recent event.

OPENING STATEMENT

Admiral KICKOVER. Thank you very much, sir.With your permission I will present my opening remarks.Congress has authorized 130 nuclear-powered submarines, includ-

ing the first Trident missile launching type, as well as 12 nuclear-powered surface ships

Chairman PRICE. Admiral, before you get into your statement,could we ask a couple of questions while most of the members are hereso that you can give your answers to them, dealing with the avail-ability of petroleum.

Admiral KICKOVER. I would prefer, if it is satisfactory to you, toavoid reading my statement.

I think I can do better if I just answer questions.Chairman PRICE. We have such a good attendance, I would like

the members to have an opportunity to ask questions of you.Admiral KICKOVER. Yes, sir, I would be happy to answer any

questions.Chairman PRICE. The members would like to hear your statement.

So, why don't you go ahead with the statement.

STATUS OF THE NAVAL NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Admiral KICKOVER. Yes, sir. Congress has authorized 130 nuclear-powered submarines, including the first Trident missile launchingtype, as well as 12 nuclear-powered surface ships and one deep sub-mergence research vehicle.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer another suggestion. Would itbe appropriate if the members just read the statement without myrepeating it and ask questions as they read it. Would that be satis-factory, Mr. Chairman ?

Representative HOSMER. It is only four pages.Senator PASTORE. I have a suggestion to make. Eead it fast.Admiral KICKOVER. I will continue.We now have 102 nuclear submarines in operation, including the

41 Polaris/Poseidon missile launching type. By the end of this yearwe expect to have a total of 106 nuclear-powered submarines inoperation. Five nuclear-powered surface ships—the aircraft carrierEnterprise, the guided missile cruiser Long Beach, and the guidedmissile frigates Bairibridge, Truxtun, and California—are also inoperation. Construction is proceeding on the two-reactor aircraft car-riers, Nimitz and Dioight D. Eisenhower and preparations are under-way to begin construction of the Carl Vinson. Also underconstruction are four nuclear-powered guided missile frigates.

The reactors of the nuclear-powered frigate South Carolina willbe ready for initial operation this summer with ship delivery sched-uled for December this year. The keel of the Virginia was laid inAugust 1972, the keel was laid for the Texas this past summer andconstruction has started on the third ship of the Virginia class, theyet unnamed DLGN-40. These nuclear frigates will have reactor coreswhich will provide at least 10 years of normal operation before refuel-ing is required.

Advanced procurement funds for two more ships of the Virginiaclass, the DLGN's-41 and -42, were provided in the fiscal year 1970and 1971 budgets and Congress provided additional advance pro-curement funds for these two ships in fiscal year 1974. These fundshave been released to the Navy and have been placed in contracts.Funds for construction of DLGN-41 and additional long-lead fundsfor DLGN-12 are included in the fiscal year 1975 shipbuilding budgetrequest.

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Four of the five operational nuclear-powered surface ships have seenaction in Southeast Asia. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enter-prise has steamed over one-half million miles since her commissioningin 1961 and has completed six deployments to Southeast Asia. Newdesign long-life cores were installed in 1970 during Enterprise's secondoverhaul. They are expected to provide enough energy to operate formore than 10 years which represents about a fourfold increase in corelife over the original Enterprise cores. From both a military and a coststandpoint that is an important advance.

The nuclear frigate Bainbridge is presently on her 7th deploymentto Southeast Asia. The nuclear cruiser Long Beach and the nuclearfrigate Truxtun have completed five deployments to Southeast Asia.The Truxtun is now undergoing her first overhaul and refueling after7 years of operation.

The cumulative distance steamed by all of our nuclear-powered shipshas surpassed 25 million miles, including 2,087,000 miles steamed bythe five nuclear-powered surface ships. Our fleet of Polaris/Poseidon

nuclear-powered submarines has completed over 1,17(3 patrols whichamount to 70,700 days of submerged operation or over 190 years under-water. The naval nuclear propulsion program has 126 atomic reactorsin operation, which represent an accumulated total of over 1,150 yearsof operational experience. This includes reactors in prototypes andmultiple reactors in the surface ships. This is why you get a greaternumber of reactors than we have numbers of ships.

SIXFOLD INCREASE IN CORE LIFE

Development is also continuing on submarine reactor programs, in-cluding an advanced propulsion plant and improved long-life cores.With the exception of a few of our oldest submarines, all cores beinginstalled in submarines today, whether in new ones or those coming infor overhaul, are of the long-life type. These are capable of propellinga submarine for over 400,000 miles instead of the 62,000 miles pro-vided by the first core of the Nautilus. This sixfold increase has beenachieved because we have continued to stress heavily advanced reactordevelopment work. I might add that the cost of these new long-lifecores is less than the earlier types. Our goal is to develop nuclear coresthat will last the life of the ship. We are already working on some thathave several years longer life than the 13-year cores we are puttinginto the carriers.

Funds for the Trident program, including authorization and con-struction money needed to build the second and third Trident sub-marines, are included in the fiscal year 1075 budget. The Trident sub-marine and missiles are needed to increase the survivability of oursea-based deterrent in the 1980's and beyond, and to provide for re-placement of our aging Polaris/Poseidon submarines.

STATUS OF LOS ANGELES CLASS

As of today, keels for seven of the new high-speed SSN-688 classships have been laid—the lead ship, the Los Angeles; the Philadel-phia ; the Baton Rouge; the Omaha; the Memphis; the Groton; andthe New York City.

Through fiscal year 1974, funds have been appropriated for 23 ofthese high-speed submarines, with advanced procurement funds forfive more. The President's budget for fiscal year 1974 contains fundsto build three SSN-688 class submarines for which advanced procure-ment money was provided in fiscal year 1974, making a total of 26ships through fiscal year 1975.

I also have several tables which I will not read but which I wouldlike to insert with my opening statement.

That is the end of my prepared statement, sir.[The tables submitted by Admiral Rickover follow:]

Table 1.—Statistics of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program—February 1, 1974

Nuclear submarines in operation (41 SSBN's-61 SSN's); (27 additionalSSN's and 1 Trident authorized) 102

Nuclear carriers in operation (3 more building) 1Nuclear frigates in operation (4 more building plus long lead for

2 more) _ 3Nuclear cruisers in operation 1Number of million miles steamed (all nuclear ships) >25Number of reactors in operation 126Number of reactor-years of operation-.. >1,150During 1973 total radioactivity discharged within 12 miles of shore from

all nuclear ships, tenders, submarine bases and shipyards (curie) <. 002In the 20 years of the naval nuclear program since the Nautilus land

prototype first operated there has never been an accident involving areactor nor has there been any release of radioactivity which hashad a measurable effect on the environment.

Number of cores procured 409Number of refuelings conducted 124Number of shipyards doing nuclear work (6 naval; 3 private) 9Total investment in naval nuclear-powered ships including those author-

ized through fiscal year 1974 (billions of dollars) :Navy (ships, cores, and replacement core parts) 20. 2Navy (R. & D.) .9AEG (B. & D. plus labs plus prototypes) _ 2. 6

Total _ 23. 7Core cost versus endurance (millions of dollars):

1st submarine core (62,000 miles)__ 4.0Latest submarine core (400,000 miles) 3. 5

Number of officers trained to date 4,763Number of enlisted men trained to date 27,935

NUCLEAR SHIP PROGRAM SUMMARY, AS OF FEB. 25, 1974

Type

Submarines:PolarisAttackTrident

Total

Surface ships:Aircraft carrierGuided missile:

CruiserFrigate ..

Total

SubmarinesSurface ships

Total

Under Contract not TotalIn operation construction awarded authorized

41610

..... 102

1

. .. 13

5

0270

27

2

04

6

001

1

1

00

1

41 ..88 ..1 ..

130 ..

4

17

12 ..

Milessteamed

23,556,0002, 087, 000

25.643.000

LESSONS FROM THE OCTOBER MIDEIAST WAR

Chairman PRICE. Admiral, with this oil situation as it is today, whatis the Navy's problem in the future as related to the availability offuel?

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Admiral RICKOVER. The Navy has a most serious problem insofar asfossil fuel is concerned, not only now, but for the future as well.

The recent events of the October war in the Mideast should makethat amply clear. I do not think that the lessons of nuclear power haveever been hoisted aboard by the Department of Defense or the Navy.I do not think they have taken nuclear power for ships seriously unlesscompelled to by this committee, in particular, and by other committeesand Members of the Congress.

In my opinion, nuclear power is looked upon as something extrane-ous, as another part of the Navy, whether it is ships or personnel. Theydo not consider nuclear power as an inherent part of the Navy.

For example, an Admiral who was against nuclear power during hisrecent tour in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations then went toa job where he was responsible for operations during the recent Mid-east crisis.

During that period he forcefully asked for nuclear-powered sub-marines. But when he sat behind a desk in Washington, he foughtthem all the time.

Somehow or other, I and the committees and Members of Congress,are supposed to watch over this area. It is our responsibility to providenuclear-powered ships for the Navy. The Navy does not accept thatresponsibility. The Navy always says if you give them more moneythan is in the budget, then they will graciously build nuclear-poweredships.

Chairman PRICE. At times, we have given them more money and theystill wouldn't build them.

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. Nuclear ships have traditionally beenviewed as an extra part of the Navy. To get them requires authoriza-tion of money beyond the budget request. That is the traditional Navyview toward nuclear power.

NAVY ATTITUDE TOWARD NUCLEAR TRAINED PERSONNEL

The same attitude exists with respect to nuclear trained personnel.We have constant difficulty getting our people treated properly andthis is happening at a time when there are numerous firms advertisingin the ports where nuclear submarines are based, offering nuclear-trained people two to three times the salary they get in the Navy inhopes of inducing them to get out.

I have tried to get the Navy to take extra measures to keep thesepeople in. but they simply refuse to do all that is necessary. Forexample, the recent selection board for Lieutenant Commanderspassed over—that is failed to recommend for promotion—24 nucleartrained officers. This is more officers passed over in 1 year than inthe entire history of the nuclear power program. Despite the fact thatthese people are in valuable and important positions, and have gonethrough a highly competitive and difficult selection and education sys-tem, their rate of selection was no greater than that of the averageLieutenant Commander in the Navy.

In other words, the selection is being basedRepresentative HOSMER. You said there were more passed over, that

the rate of selection was the same as the rest of the Navy.

Admiral KICKOVER. The percentage of nuclear officers selected wasthe same as for the rest of the Navy, and this is wrong. No distinctionwas made for the fact that these were highly selected and motivatedpeople and that they occupied especially important billets in the Navy.Billets for which we do not have enough people and for which thereis great need—the need to man major combatant warships. And thisdespite the fact that American industry, particularly the commercialnuclear industry, badly wants them and is offering them much highersalaries than they now get.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why do you think that was ?

CONSIDERATION OF NAVY5S NEEDS

Admiral KICKOVER. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chiefof Naval Personnel have admitted it was wrong and they have sentpersonal letters to those passed over saying they will be consideredagain next time the Selection Board meets.

It seems that the Navy is operated for its officers and not for theNavy. You see examples of this in appointment of officers to billets.This does not necessarily depend on the needs of the Navy or the quali-fications of the officers, but the need of the officers to have certainbillets so they can be promoted. You can see it in the actions taken bythe Selection Boards. I have a good example where it is being proposedthat a senior officer on duty as the Commanding Offiicer of one of ourlargest industrial facilities is about to be relieved, promoted to an-other rank and given another job. This would occur after his havingbeen in his present position for only 1 year. He would be moving toanother job even though he has not even learned his present one.

When informed of this I asked this question: "Do the officers existfor the Navy or does the Navy exist for the officers?" I cannot get ananswer to that question.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the answer they give you ?Admiral KICKOVER. There is no answer.Senator SYMINGTON. Is that what they say ?

DECISIONS SHOULD NOT BE QUESTIONED

Admiral KICKOVER. The answer they give concerning this Admiral is,"This is what we have decided." Those are not the exact words, butessentially what they are saying is that since the decision has beenmade by higher authority it should not be questioned.

Representative HOSMER. Does he get promoted out of his billet?Admiral RICKOVER. They either want him to be promoted or it is his

turn to be promoted. So, the devil with the naval facility to whichhe is now assigned.

Representative HOSMER. What did he get promoted from and to ?Admiral RICKOVER. If he is promoted it will be from Rear Admiral

to Vice Admiral. Of course, that promotion could be held in abeyance.Representative HOSMER. Is that the only way you can get to be Vice

Admiral, if you follow it to a job?Admiral RICKOVER. That is it. They must shift him from this job to

another job which calls for a Vice Admiral.Representative HOSMER. They think he is more valuable in the next

job than the current one, apparently.

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Admiral KICKOVER. I think that command of the largest industrialfacility of,the Navy is a valuable position, too.

Representative HOSMER. I don't know the kind of job he is going to.It is hard to make that judgment.

CONSIDERATION OF JOB QUALIFICATION IN THE NAVY

Admiral KICKOVER. I think you will find that for most jobs in the"Navy the qualification of the man to do the job is not given much con-sideration. It is based largely on whose turn it is to get the high job.That is what it generally amounts to. I do not know how it is donein the rest of the military service, but I can certainly comment onthe Navy because I have watched this over a period of many years.

Now, the members of this committee have some interest in this too,not only from an atomic energy standpoint, but from the general stand-point of the welfare of the Navy. I do not think this is a proper wayto run any business. You could not run your clothing store that way,Mr. Holifield-. It would mean that you change management every year.

Representative HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, in that context, I would justlike to comment that where you have this dichotomy, apparently, in theNavy between the nuclear and nonnuclear people and where the nu-clear Navy is not really being backed up by the rest of the Navy, thattells me that the nuclear power part of the Navy is not being giventhe attention it deserves. Apparently this situation exists in promo-tions, and certainly it makes for a second-class division within a serv-ice. It makes it very difficult.

Now, I don't know whether the nuclear-trained officers have all theseamanship qualifications and the other things in addition to theirnuclear capability. ,

INEQUITIES IN PERSONNEL EVALUATION

Admiral RICKOVER. A Lieutenant who has been an Executive Officerof a small minesweeper can rate higher before the Selection Board thana nuclear-trained Lieutenant. Following this reasoning it is better tobe an Executive Officer of a small ship than head of a division on anaircraft carrier. A Lieutenant, just because he is Executive Officer of aminesweeper, is considered better than an experienced nuclear-trainedofficer as far as the Selection Board is concerned. Yet the man who runsa complex naval nuclear power plant can get a much higher salary incivilian life. The Executive Officer of the minesweeper could probablynot get a job with one-half or two-thirds of his salary on the outside.

Senator PASTORE. That is an old chestnut. Even before the pressure,the committee has taken a strong position in our report. You are right.It is like banging your head up against the wall. They do nothing aboutit. We keep complaining. This is absolutely ridiculous. If a man isentitled to a promotion, what difference does it make where he is orwhat his post if he is an important fellow for that post ? But that isnot the way the Navy works. I don't think we are ever going to changeit because it is a closed corporation and they run it as they darnedplease.

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Admiral RIOKOVEB. Senator Pastore, you are one of the leading andsenior Members of the Senate. Are you telling me that you are power-less to do anything about it ?

Senator PASTOBE, What do you think ?Admiral RIGKOVIB, I do not think you are powerless,Senator PASTOBB. You are supposed to be the father of th© nuclear

Navy. What have you done about it ?Admiral Ricxovm I am impotent.Senator PASTOBE. All right. Don't gay that now, whatever you do.

[Laughter].Representative HOSMEB, He becomes thi father of the nuclear Navy

and then hi gets married,Admiral Ricsovia, Do you want to hear the reason for that?Representative HOSMIB. Don't tell me you had to.Admiral RICKOVEB. I will. When you meet a very charming, gra-

cious, witty, intelligent, and beautiful woman, you must break therules.

Representative HOSMER. Congratulations.

ADVANTAGES OF LONG-LIFE REACTOR CORES

Senator PASTORE. Let me ask you this question: You say here inyour statement, and I am curious about it, that you are trying todevelop a core that will last as long as the ship itself.

Admiral RICKOVER. That is right, sir.Senator PASTORE. Why is that so important?Admiral RICKOVER. It is important because——Senator PASTORE. I mean that now in the context of whether or not

we could put our money into something better.Admiral RICKOVER. It is important to this extent—think of the vast

advantage if you had an automobile that never had to be refueled.It is the same thing with a nuclear-powered ship.

Senator PASTORE. But if it costs millions and millions of dollarsto do that, I would rather go up to the gasoline pump if the gasolinewere there. We can always have the second core, can't we ? We are notup against the same problem there.

Admiral RICKOVER. You mean you would fight another war afteryou lose the first one ? \

Senator PASTORE. No. You are talking about the core of a reactor,are you not?

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. \. • \ iSenator PASTORE. The point I am making is whether or not we are

sinking a lot of money into something that is exotic—it is desirable ifwe could do it, but what is it going to cost us ?

Admiral RICKOVER. You are not really sinking more money. In fact,the longer the core lasts, the cheaper it is per unit of energy produced.A large part of the cost of a nuclear core is the cost of manufacture.That cost is far greater than the cost of uranium.

Another thing is, that replacing a core is a lengthy and costlyproposition.

Senator PASTORE. Let me phrase my question in another way: MaybeI am out of my ball park on this.

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Admiral KICKOVER. I think you are, sir.Senator PASTORE. You are an expert. Don't rule me but too fast. I

was being gracious to myself. If you had x dollars and there wasa question of whether or not you wanted to develop a long-life coreas against another nuclear submarine, what would you do?

Admiral KICKOVER. I would be giving up military capability if Ididn't develop the new core, because the ships with shorter core lifehave to be refueled more often. Further, the overall cost is less witha longer-life core.

Senator PASTORE. You don't convince me.Admiral KICKOVER. I really do not think you need to give up

either one.Senator PASTORE. If you can do both, it is all right with me.

ADVANCES IN REACTOR TECHNOLOGY

Admiral KICKOVER. I can do both. Furthermore, in the process ofdeveloping longer-life cores, there is a great advance in all reactorcore technology which benefits not only this program but all othernuclear programs. I think you know that a great deal of the develop-ment work in water-cooled reactors is being done by Naval Reactors,and your committee has supported the naval program to the extentit has because of the dual responsibility we have.

So, when we improve naval cores, we are helping to improve thecommercial nuclear cores of the country.

Senator PASTORE. I realize that completely. You know, every year, weare in a hassle on the amount of money that you get; is that right ? Andyou do contact the members of this committee who believe in every-thing that you say in developing our nuclear Navy.

The point that I am trying to bring out is one of priority. Howmuch will the development of this core ultimately cost us?

Admiral RICKOVER. If I had to make a rough guess, I would say wewill spend about another $50 million over the next few years workingon longer-life cores. It is not as large an expense as you think it is.

Senator PASTORE. Is it as small as that ?Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. Let me give you another exampleSenator PASTORE. How far advanced are we in this direction?Admiral RICKOVER. Far advanced. We are working now on approxi-

mately 15-year cores. Then we will continue to work on increasingthe life even further.

Senator PASTORE. All this is going to cost us is $50 million ?Admiral RICKOVER. In the next 2 or 3 years that is all it will cost.

We do not spend much money on this. You have the figures. It is nota great cost. There is one point I must make that you have not con-sidered.

LONG-LIFE CORES LESS EXPENSIVE

The first Nautilus core we made cost $4 million and lasted 62,000miles. We now have cores that cost less than that, yet last six timesas long. This has not increased the cost of cores. Our developmentshave actually resulted in a reduction in cost of the cores we arepresently manufacturing.

11I think what you are getting here is one of the biggest bargains we

have. The development work has cost several million dollars but itsaves money in the long run.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Those techniques are applicable to peace-time application in power reactors ?

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir; some of them are, but not all. In theprocess of developing longer-life cores we have to develop better fuels,better structural materials, and improved design methods. This ismade available to the U.S. nuclear power industry. They get ourtechnical reports on matters applicable to them.

Senator PASTORE. I am in no position to dispute you, Admiral, butthat sounds like a pretty low figure to me. If what you say is correct,$50 million, then I won't argue with you. It was always my impressionthat this involves a lot more money.

Admiral EICKOVER. No, sir, it does not.Senator PASTORE. A lot more money.Admiral KICKOVER. No, sir, it does not.Senator PASTORE. What is the present life of a core today ?

CORES NOW LAST 10 TO 13 YEARS

Admiral RICKOVER. The lifetime of cores we are installing in nearlyall submarines now is 10 years, and in some surface ships it is 13 years.

Senator PASTORE. You can go to 15 and 20 years with $50 million?Admiral RICKOVER. I know I will be able to go to 15 years.Representative HOSMER. It is useless to go longer than a certain

point, however, isn't it, when you are going to bring a ship in for majoroverhaul ?

Admiral RICKOVER. No, sir, it is not. It costs quite a few million dol-lars to take out the old core and install the new core because of theradioactivity involved. We will be able to bring our ships in for over-haul without renewing the reactor. It costs $7.5 million per submarinefor refueling. A 10-year replacement submarine core now costs about$4 million, and it costs about $3.5 million in shipyard cost to take theold core out and install its replacement. I think that is the best answerI can give you.

Senator PASTORE. You said the life of a ship. The life of a ship is 25to 30 years. You are talking from 13 to 15.1 am not questioning you,I cannot dispute you. I merely want to put this in the context ofwhether or not we are putting our best money at the best time in thebest things. That is all I am trying to raise.

I am not disputing you. I would like to see the question completeon that.

Admiral RICKOVER. Fine. In the development of the longer-lifecores, we must necessarily develop better materials and better fuelsystems. Much of this work is also applicable to commercial nuclearpower.

For example, there have been some failures in fuel elements of com-mercial atomic powerplants because they were operating at too higha temperature. We foresaw that from the lessons we had learned in ourShippingport and LWBR programs. We advised the AEC several

12

years before these failures occurred that the fuel elements were beingdesigned without enough margin.

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY ON NUCLEAR SHIPS

Chairman PRICE. Another point on that. I wrote a letter to theSecretary of Defense in January and called attention to the energycrisis and inquired whether or not consideration was being given tothis situation, not only present prices but what could happen in thefuture in the matter of ship construction.

I wonder if any of that ever came back down to you for comment ?Admiral RICKOVER. I was asked by the Secretary of the Navy to

prepare a draft of an answer. However, I do not think my commentswere accepted. Can you tell me what answer you got, Mr. Price?

Chairman PRICE. I received 110 reply. I don't know whether or notthey were circulating it around to get opinions.

Admiral RICKOVER. I think you will get the usual reply, that it isreceiving serious consideration.

Chairman TRICE. How do you think a letter like that should beanswered ?

Admiral RICKOVER. I think that is where you get into the issue thatSenator Pastore faced a while ago. He says he knows that somethingshould be done, but Congress is up against a stone wall. I do not thinkCongress is up against a stone wall. I think if Congress is earnestenough, it can make a dent in any department of the Government.

Senator PASTORE. I didn't say that. I said our experience has beenthat we have been knocking our heads up against a stone wall. Appar-ently, there are many Members of the Congress who are disinclined todo anything about it. That is about the size of it.

I think the initiative here ou^ht to be on the part of the ArmedServices Committees of the Congress. They are the ones who are theruling power when it comes to the Defense Department.

I don't think we on the Joint Committee will ever be able to do it.Representative HOSMER. A lot of them listen to Admiral LaRocque.Representative HOLIFIELD. Let me ask a question, if I may, Mr.

Chairman.

NAVAL AND COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS DIFFER

The civilian power reactors, their fuel life is in round numbers, 2years. They have all kinds of problems, such as swelling and splinter-ing and cracking of the cladding and that sort of thing.

Now, is it possible for this application, which you have already de-veloped, going to 10-year life in these nuclear reactors; is it possiblefor that technology to be transferred over into the type of fuel rods,the fabrication of the type of fuel rods that you now have that youneed in the reactors Or in the central power station reactors, or are wetalking about something which goes to the fact that the type of fuelyou are fabricating for the 10-year life is a higher enrichment and isalso a higher quality of cladding than the cores that are being fabri-cated by Westinghouse, G.E. and the rest of these outfits ?

isAdmiral EICKOVER. We do have the two things you mention but we

also have [deleted] requirements which you do not have in civilianpower. Therefore, our fuel elements are different.

FEWER REFUELINGS REDUCE ENVIRONMENTAL, EFFECTS

Civilian power reactors and their fuel elements are designed essen-tially to run at full power all the time. Therefore, they run a muchshorter time for a core lifetime. But I do think, when you consider theenvironmental effects as well as the cost of manufacturing the core—which I do not believe has been given enough consideration so far—the civilian industry would find it desirable to go to core lives longerthan 2 years.

There is the cost of refueling, but above all, there is the effect of theadditional radiation you get by having to replace the core every 2 years.Senator Pastore, there is another point I would like to make aboutlong-life cores. Every time you refuel a core, you produce radioactivewaste. This is another reason why the longer you can make a core last,the better off you are from an ecological standpoint.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Will you explain that, please ? You pro-duce more radiation because you take out radiated elements.

Admiral RICKOVER. You take out radiated elements and you have toreprocess them. Every time you reprocess fuel elements, you create alarge amount of radioactive waste. Therefore, if a core lasted twice aslong you would only need to reprocess one core instead of two. That isthe chief reason for attempting to go up to longer life on commercialcores, but the commercial cores are designed on a strictly current eco-nomic basis. That is from a money standpoint.

Representative HOLIFIELD. That is the point. Are your cores that goin the submarines and last 10 years far more expensive than the coresthat go in a central station ?

Admiral EICKOVER. They are more expensive.Representative HOLIFIELD. They are higher enrichment, are they

not?Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir, they are also more expensive because of

the military need to [deleted] among other things.Representative HOLIFIELD. They wouldn't have to engineer them for

the [deleted] in a central power station as they would in a ship?Admiral RICKOVER. Not anywhere near as much as we need to for

naval applications.Representative HOLIFIELD. That would be to the advantage.Now, the expense, the higher enrichment and the type of cladding

and so torth that you use, what do you use——Admiral RICKOVER. They use the same basic cladding material that

we do—zirconium.Representative HOLIFIELD. Do you have it engineered to a higher

quality standard than they do ?

CLADDING MATERIAL DEVELOPED IN NAVAL PROGRAM

Admiral RICKOVER. I do not think so. Perhaps slightly. The qualityof the material is about the same. Zircaloy-4 is the trade name forwhat commercial reactors use. That cladding material was developedin the naval program and is being used in almost all present commer-cial cores.

34-526 O - 75 - 3

14

Representative HOLIFIELD. What is the difference in enrichment ?Admiral RICKOVER. They have 2^ to 3 percent. We have [deleted].Representative HOLIFIELD. [Deleted] and the 2y2 to 3 percent en-

richment. There is a tremendous difference in cost." Admiral RICKOVER. I am not so sure. I think this would have to be

studied. I do not believe that the cost goes up proportionally to theenrichment.

Representative HOSMER. You go considerably less than that.Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. I think that would need to be looked at.

I think, from the strict interest standpoint, that is as return on invest-ment as a commercial proposition, it is credible. But if the designerwere asked to design the best reactor he could from the standpoint ofconservation of energy, he might come up with a different answer—with a higher enrichment.

This is the main thought I would "leave from this discussion, ratherthan attempting to give you any exact figure. I believe you could getmore energy from the core and have less radioactive waste by going tolonger life for commercial cores—even if you had to go to 10-percentenrichment. This would also perhaps enable you to burn much more ofthe plutonium in place rather than having to recover and ref abricateit.

Representative HOLIFIELD. This downtime of a $500 million reactor,if it is down for 30 days every 2 years, or whatever the time it takes,it is very expensive.

Admiral RICKOVER. That is right. The more downtime there is, themore plants that are needed.

Representative HOSMER. If you can go up on enrichment some, youcan make the merchant ship nuclear reactors possible, too, if you scaledown the size of your plant and get your power up.

Admiral RICKOVER. Mr. Hosmer, you are getting off into anotherarea, now. I think there is little direct analogy between a commercialmaritime reactor and a warship reactor.

Representative HOSMER. I say, if you could increase the percentageof enrichment, you can decrease the size of your powerplant. Thetrouble with our merchant marine powerplants is that they are toodarned big and heavy and awkward. With greater enrichment, youcould have a smaller plant.

Admiral RICKOVER. I think the main difficulty with a commercialship atomic powerplant relates not so much to how they are designed,but the increased cost of operating them. You will find there werecases on the nuclear merchantman Savannah where the seamen werebeing paid about $25,000 a year—several years ago. Today, most mer-chant ships, particularly those under foreign registry, are operatedwith relatively cheap labor. Once you use atomic power, you will neednumbers of highly skilled people who are in great demand ashore, andtherefore will be costly to employ.

LONG-LIFE CORES HELP INCREASE OVERHAUL INTERVALS

Mr. WEGNER. Could I make a comment on the long-life cores ? Goingback to the original question concerning the effects of this develop-ment on submarines, had it not been for the increased life of these

cores, all the effort that the Navy is exerting today to increase theinterval between major submarine overhauls could never have beeninitiated.

For example, in the case of the Trident submarines, the Navy isplanning for major overhauls to occur every 10 years. Without long-life cores, that could never be done. The interval between major over-hauls of Polaris submarines is being lengthened to 6 or more years,whereas years ago, major submarine overhauls occurred every 2 or3 years. ,

This represents a tremendous savings in money. It means that youdo not have to bring those ships in as often and spend $25, $35,$50 million for an overhaul.

Chairman PRICE. , Senator Aiken?Senator AIKEN. Does your explanation mean we are getting about

eight times as much per dollar from the latest cores as you did fromthe ones you used to use that gave 62,000 miles ?

Admiral RICKOVER. I believe it works out to about six times as much.Senator AIKEN. I was figuring it out on paper. If I had figured it

in my head, I would have done better.Admiral RICKOVER. May I proceed with the original question you

asked, about the significance of the energy shortage?I believe all members of this committee know the fix we were in

during the Mideast war and we are still in because of lack of fuel oil.

The Navy has had to curtail many of its operations. There wereplaces where we could not get oil because either it was not availableor the owners would not give it to us because they were afraid theirsource of Arab oil would be cut off if they helped us.

You know what happened when we had to send emergency militarysupplies to Israel. Where we could not get approval to use foreignbases, we had to do it with ships and aircraft even though fuel sup-plies were scarce. The House Armefl Services Committee sent itsrepresentatives to the Near East and tjiey reported the following:

The Committee on Armed Services has in the past consistently urged nuclearpropulsion for naval vessels because of its operational advantages—the virtuallyunlimited range such power gives a ship. Now nuclear propulsion has beconie amust because of logistic realities. In addition to the danger of a shortage of oilfor ships, the rising cost of oil, when available, has made scrap paper out of pastcomparative cost estimates for nuclear and conventional power. The wisdom ofthe committee's past position has been borne out by time, and the committeeshould question carefully the construction of further oil-powered ships wherethe technology exists to make them nuclear powered. ' !

Qhairman PRICE, £ast year, the Nayy announced, and the Secretary,of Defense's Office indicated that the future naval building programwould be for five nuclear submarines per year for each fiscal year.That held for 1 year, last year.

Now, they have cut it down for three this year.Admiral RICKOVER. It is going to be five every 2 years, now. Three

1 year, and two the next year, and so pn. That is the current plan.Chairman PRICE. In your opinion, what ships should be nuclear

powered? > < ; L

16

LEGISLATION TO OBTAIN NUCLEAR SHIPS

Admiral KICKOVER. I have for many years expressed the belief thatwe should have at least five new attack submarines a year. Of course,the Secretary of Defense has other problems. He has fiscal problems.I don't think you are ever going to solve the nuclear ship problemin the Navy until you get the equivalent of a Vinson-Trammell Actwhich lays down a program of nuclear ships for the Navy, and takesit away from annual decisions by annually changing officials.

I think until you do that, you will never get around the situation.Representative RONCALIO. Any idea what year ?Mr. LEIGHTON. I think it was around 1936, sir. ;Admiral RICKOVER. I am not sure what year it was.Chairman PRICE. It was quite a few years ago because at the time

Carl Vinson was chairman; it was the Naval Affairs Committee. Wehave not had the Naval Affairs Committee since 1936.

Admiral RICKOVER. I will put into the record the actual year.[The following information was subsequently furnished.]

The Vinson-Trammell Act was signed into law on March 27,1934.Until Congress passes such a law, we will be subject to the foibles

of every official that gets into the Navy Department and decides toinstitute his pet transitory ideas, thus doing away with the advantageswe can get from nuclear power.

I can quote you example after example of how well the nuclear shipshave done and how they performed operations which couldn't possiblyhave been done by conventional ships.

Here we have an object lesson which reminds me of the identicalattitude of the British Navy in the late 1850's when all the leadingcountries in Europe were starting to build iron ships; the French,Italians, and Russians. When it was considered by the British Admi-ralty, they said it cost too much to build iron ships. A large numberof wooden ships were being built. They kept on building those ships.These ships were soon completely useless, and the Admiralty wasforced to go to iron ships, because foreign navies were doing so.

We are not facing that fact because outside of submarines, we haveno competition. The British did have competition with the Italians,the French, and the Russians. They knew if they didn't do somethingfast, they would lose their supremacy at sea. They were compelled bypublic opinion and by Parliament to go to the iron ships.

We don't have that sort of public opinion in the United States today,because outside of this committee and the Armed Services and Appro-priations Committees, there is no group of people who really under-stand the issue and, as Senator Pastore suggested, apparently Congressis powerless to have its way with the Navy.

I> however, don't think that is true of Congress.You asked me what types of ships should be nuclear, Mr. Chairman.Chairman PRICE. Yes.

Admiral RICKOVER. This was considered by the House Armed Serv1

ices Committee as long ago as 1961, when Mr. Vinson was chairman.

17

He said that all submarines and all combatant surface ships of 8,000tons or more—that is, ships of the line—should be nuclear powered.That includes carriers, frigates, and submarines. It does not includeships that are larger than 8,000 tons which are not classified as impor-tant combatant ships.

Representative KONCALIO. Would a Liberty ship just barely qualify ?Admiral RICKOVER. No, sir, not ships of that kind. Admiral Moorer,

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed the same sentiment.He has authorirized me to say this. If he had his druthers, he wouldbuild fewer ships, if necessary, in peacetime, but build the best wecan, because there is no time during a war to build this type of ship.They take too long.

If you don't have them when the war starts, you don't have themat all.

What can Congress do ? I certainly am not the one to suggest what,but members of this committee are experienced, and many have beenin Congress for many years. I cannot agree that Congress does nothave a means of requiring the Navy to build such ships as Congressbelieves should be built. 1 cannot agree with that viewpoint at all.

Representative HOSMER. I think, Mr. Chairman, and Admiral, thatCongress has the power to carry out the people's will. If it is notthe people's will to build these ships, then they don't get built.

Now, our greatest period of support for the Navy and the othernecessary arms of this country following World War II is an ex-ample. During that period, the people understood what the threatwas and the necessity for meeting it and they had a determinationto meet it.

We came into the 1960's, and with a college classmate of minerunning the Defense Department, he forbids all the reserve officersin the services from going out and talking to the people about the'continuing need for strong defese; where the defense problems were;and the hardware we neded to go about handling the problems.

Now, that gag, Mr. Chairman, is still on. People have forgottenwhy it was put on and who put it on, but that gag is still on. It shouldbe taken off.

Admiral RICKOVER. There is more to it than that, sir.Representative HOSMER. There is more to it than that, but you have

to have an understanding public. It is their money.Admiral RICKOVER. There are two other major points. One is the

inimical attitude of the public towards military expenditures, but Ibelieve that could change as people realize the stark issues involved.

A NEW VINSON-TRAMMELL ACT

The other, when you came to a question of atomic power versusconventional power in ships, gets to be a rather esoteric subject. It isnot just quantity, it is quality. There, the public tends to take theword of the man in charge, but the word changes with every navaladministration. This is why you need the equivalent of a Vinson-Trammell Act. In anything that is as essential to the future of thecountry as what kind of a Navy we need you should not leave it upto the foibles of an individual or his preconceived ideas based on his

18

limited naval experience and on his desire to protect other parts ofthe Navy.

I am not talking this way just because I am a protagonist of nuclearpowered ships. Certainly, if I have been able to persuade members ofthis committee—and they have had many years of experience inCongress—as well as members of other committees, that nuclearpowered ships are necessary, I cannot understand, as a citizen, howany Senator or Congressman can sit here and tell me that it is im-possible for Congress to decide on the kind of ships we should have.I do not believe it.

Eepresentative HOSMER. Admiral, you are defying the fact thatthese people came to the Congress as representatives of the peopleand there may be some of us who are defending and spending themoney on the Navy you recommend. But we are in the minority.The majority is the other way. That is why it doesn't get done.

We have to go back to the people we represent. I insist on thatpoint.

Now, your'second recommendation that you gave today is some-thing that I think the Congress can do something about. That is tomake the Navy one Navy instead of two different Navies, and makingthe opportunities for the nuclear side of the Navy of an equal nature.

There is something that the Congress can, of its own volition, asleaders, lean on the Navy Department to get some place.

Admiral EICKOVER. I hope so, sir.Eepresentative HOSMER. I certainly hope that we shall.Chairman PRICE. Mr. Eoncalio, did you finish your questions ?Kepresentative EONCALIO. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.Chairman PRICE. Senator Dominick ?

RETENTION OF NUCLEAR TRAINED PERSONNEL

Senator DOMINICK. Admiral, in your opening statement, you havethe phrase that our fleet of Polaris/Poseidon nuclear powered sub-marines has completed over 190 years underwater.

Now, if you go to a better nuclear powerplant, obviously with thesame amount of patrols you are going to be more years underwater.

My question, then, is what do you do about the personnel problemswhich this creates ?

Admiral EICKOVER. That is a good question, sir. We certainly couldhave patrols of 90 days instead of 60 days. It is merely a question ofplacing more food on board, and we can do it. We have had longerpatrols. For example, the Triton, several years ago, circumnavigatedthe Earth fully submerged in 83 days.

In wartime, I think we could go up to [deleted] day patrols, but inpeacetime we do have a personnel limitation. However, we are buildingthese ships for wartime. In wartime, if we had to, we could deploythem for extended periods of time. That is an important point.

Senator DOMINICK. But this is part of the problem, is it not ?Admiral EICKOVER. Yes, it is definitely part of the problem in peace-

time. Nuclear submarines have plenty [deleted]. They have [deleted]

19

than any other type of ship in the Navy. Food supply is not a problem.The limit would be the personnel problem in peacetime.

Senator DOMINICK. How would you recommend that we get aroundthis problem ?

Admiral KICKOVER. I do not think, in peacetime, you can get aroundthe problem of young men desiring to be with their families.

Senator DOMINICK. I hope not.Admiral RICKOVER. I do not think you can get around that problem,

but you can help solve the problem of people leaving the nuclear Navyin droves. You can, because they entered this program as volunteersin the first place.

NAVAL NUCLEAR TRAINING CONTRIBUTES TO NATIONAL ECONOMY

You should recognize that the recruitment of people for the nuclearprogram is not creating any onus on the Navy; in fact it is the oppo-site. Young men enlist specifically because of their interest in thisprogram, and those who do not make it are then assigned wherever theNavy needs them. When Dr. Schlesinger was Chairman of the AtomicEnergy Commission, he estimated that we had contributed about $3billion to the national economy because of the trained people we havesupplied to the civilian atomic power program. However, while this isaiding our Nation as a whole, the loss of experienced nuclear trainedpeople is a serious problem to the nuclear Navy. Action must be takento induce these young men to stay.

It may interest you to know that the Soviets appear to be havingsimilar problems in getting and keeping trained people for their nu-clear submarines. [Deleted.] While we dp not have the same problemsas the Soviets, it is certain that in their society they have wavs ofensuring their nuclear ships are manned. In the absence of the militarydraft we are very limited in how we can attack this problem, but payis certainly one very effective way.

Last year, Congress enacted legislation which gave a reenlistmentbonus to qualified nuclear petty officers and that had the effect of in-creasing the number reenlisting. The percentage of those who havereenlisted has increased from 14 percent prior to the bonus to 32 pe*1

cent after its enactment.

NUCLEAR INDUSTRY RECRUITS NAVY PERSONNEL

You must remember that it costs anywhere from $100,000 to $400,000for civilian electrical utilities to train their people. If they can get atrained man from our organization they can save themselves consid-erable time and money. I will pass around some of the advertisement*they use.

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write directly to:Admiral RICKOVER. It saves them a high portion of the training time

required/This would ordinarily take 2, 3, or 4 years and is worth agreat deal to them. "We must face the fact that while we train the men,industry stands ready to offer them increased salaries. I cannot beblamed for that, yet that appears to be the attitude of the Navy. Per-haps I should be blamed because I was responsible for developing thefirst civilian atomic powerplant.

Senator DOMINICK. Admiral, the fact of the matter is that the fel-lows aren't really getting out of the submarine underwater service juston account of the pay. As I understand it, they are getting out becausethey can't be around girls, and as you properly said, because they can-not be with their families. They have all kinds of morale problemswhich reflect around the fact that they don't have the ordinary, civil-lized life that everybody else does.

Admiral RICKOVER. That is correct, sir. '

NAVY ACTIONS AFFECT PERSONNEL RETENTION

Senator DOMINICK. Do you have any suggestion on how we couldchange that?

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir, I have a suggestion. I do not knowwhether you were in the hearing room when I mentioned how theseyoung officers were passed over.

Senator DOMINICK. Yes, I was.

24

Admiral BICKOVER. Some of those passed over are starting to resignon account of it. The law authorizes the Navy to spot-promote offi-cers—that is promote them temporarily ahead of time. If most of thenuclear trained officers who were passed over were spot-promoted, theymight well stay on.

But the Chief of Naval Operations is, I believe, against spot-promo-tions and will not agree to doing it, even though this is authorized bylaw. Here is a problem about as important to our national defense asthere is, and yet, I cannot solve it. I cannot do it, myself. That is why Iam coming to this committee. You should be concerned with it De-cause vou do have direct jurisdiction over atomic energy matters.Therefore, I hope that as a result of my plea the committee will takesome action. Certainly one thing that should be done is to continue thebonus.

NEW SMALL STRATEGIC SUBMARINE

Senator DOMINICK. Admiral, asking one more question, as you andI know, I was against the acceleration of the Trident and fought ithard, both in the Armed Services Committee and also on the floor.Now, this year, they are saying that they are not going to continue theTrident, and I always wanted them to continue the Trident, but theyare not going to do it as fast as they were before, which is what Ifought for last year. They are going to build the Narwhal, whateverthat is.

We then would not have 41 Polaris/Poseidon s, we would still havethose, but we would have the option of going to the Narwhal, which, asI understand it, the main difference between that and the Poseidon-type submarine is the fact that it is a little quieter, maybe a littlefaster; is that right ?

Admiral RICKOVER. May I explain at some length, because this is avery important point and may be of interest to all members of thecommittee.

At a recent session with the press, the Secretary of Defense broachedthe idea that we should develop the option to have a follow-on ship tothe Trident. I do not know his exact words, but as I gather it, hismeaning was that when it came time to replace the whole Poseidonfleet we should have the option available to do this with ships smallerthan the Trident submarines. That is a submarine missile force madeup of some Trident types supplemented by a number of smaller missilesubmarines, might perhaps be sufficient for our strategic purposes.

The Secretary of Defense wants to,explore another submarine de-sign which could replace the aging Polaris/Poseidon submarines andsupplement the Trident fleet. He suggests using a Narwhal type re-actor in a nuclear powered submarine smaller than the Trident.[Deleted.] ,.

BUDGET FOR STUDY OF SMALL STRATEGIC SUBMARINE

This year there is $16 million in the Department of Defense budgetrequest and $1̂ million in the Atomic Energy Commission's proposedbudget to study a submarine smaller than the Trident which coulclbeused as a follow-on ship. / ,

26

It would take several years to design and build these submarines. Ifwe started now, it would probably be 10 years before the first one isin the water. Does that answer your question^ sir ?

Senator DOMINICK. Yes, it does. I gather you are in favor of thisidea?

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, I think it is a good idea to explore thissubmarine option. Instead of replacing the existing Polaris/Poseidonsubmarines with identical copies using obsolete technology, it would bea far better idea to build submarines of modern design.

Senator DOMINICK. I think this a good idea, myself. I am not quitesure that I see the benefit of having just simply a larger hull [deleted]with more missiles per boat as we have in the hull around the Tridentmissile.

If we could put that in a smaller boatAdmiral KICKOVER. This would probably be a 16-missile ship which

would, of coarse, be smaller than the 24-missile Trident submarine.Senator DOMINICK. It has always seemed to me, just from a tactical

point of view, or strategic, whichever you want to call it, that it isbetter to have more boats around rather than less, which the Trident-type envisages.

However, when do you think the design of a Narwhal type subma-rine might be completed ? You said some years.

Admiral KICKOVER. I said it would take several years to get the firstone in the water. Of course, the amount of money requested for fiscalyear 1975, a total of $17̂ million, is only enough to do exploratorywork.

Senator DOMINICK. I understand that.Admiral KICKOVER. If we had completed our studies and had the go-

ahead now, I think one could be in the water in 7 to 8 years.

SHIPBUILDING CAPACITY

Senator DOMINICK. What problem would you have in your ship-building yards ?

Admiral RICKOVER. That is another good question. From the incep-tion of the nuclear submarine program, the argument has always beenthat we could not build more nuclear submarines because we did nothave shipbuilding capacity, nor could we man any more submarines.

As you know, we now have 28 nuclear submarines under construc-tion or authorized. If the Navy makes up its mind that it wants aspecific shipbuilding program, we can get the necessary shipbuildingcapacity. The trouble is that the Navy starts out with a program, de-creases it one year, then increases it the next year. This is not an in-ducement for any shipbuilding organization to get into work of thiskind. If we had, as I recommended before, a modern Vinson-TrammellAct, and if we could plan on a shipbuilding program, we could get thecapacity.

Senator DOMINICK. With present capacity, how many submarinescould you build per year?

Admiral RICKOVER. As you know, we are still converting Polarissubmarines to Poseidon. When we are finished with these, we canbuild [deleted] attack submarines a year. The 'Navy's plan is to build

26

per year. Of course, that does not include Trident submarinesor the nuclear surface warships that we are building.

OLDER POLARIS SUBMARINES WILL NEED REPLACEMENT

Senator DOMINICK. How fast are the present Polaris/Poseidon typedeteriorating so that they have to be replaced on an ordinary ship life ?

Admiral RICKOVER. Considering the vast amount of steaming theyhave done, I believe they should oe replaced after about 20 years.

Senator DOMINICK. What kind of projection is that, like the cashflow down the road?

Admiral RICKOVER. The first Polaris submarine was commissionedin 1959. Therefore, toward the end of the 1970's, we should start replac-ing them.

Senator DOMINICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.Admiral EICKOVER. Sir, have I answered your question?Senator DOMINICK. You have. I wondered how many can go out

per year from now on.Admiral RICKOVER. They will reach their replacement age in large

groups. For example, in one year, 1963, we commissioned 13 of them.Mr. LEIGHTON. We have the record for the 41 ships.Senator DOMINICK. It would help so far as our Armed Services

Committee authorization is concerned.Chairman PRICE. Will you supply that for the record?Admiral RIOKOVER. Yes, sir.[The information referred to appears in appendix 1, p. 49.]Chairman PRICE. In connection with Senator Dominick's question

about the Narwhal class, in the Secretary's testimony before theArmed Services Committee, both the House and the Senate, I thinkhe left the impression that the Narwhal class was available forconstruction.

Admiral RICKOVER. It is not, sir. The Narwhal is an existing attacktype submarine. [Deleted.] The new submarine with ballistic missiles[deleted] has not yet been designed.

Chairman PRICE. The ship he was actually talking about is not yetavailable for construction?

Admiral RICKOVER. No, sir, it is not. The funds requested for fiscalyear 1975 will be used to start the design. We will design [deleted].The submarine will be smaller than the Trident, which is the issuethat concerns the Senator.

Chairman PRICE. We are going to have a group of German Parlia-mentarians here at 9 o'clock. One of the matters they expressed inter-est in is the Trident.

Can you give some reason why ?Admiral RICKOVER. No, sir. It seems to me the person who proposed

that is not aware of the fact that we have laws which restrict dis-closure of military information.

Chairman PRICE. We are aware of it, though.Admiral RICKOVER. I think they sent a shopping list around to their

Navy and everybody added to the list. Someone thought he would askabout Trident, The United States has been known to be rather stupidin the past in giving information away and I suspect it was assumedit was at least worth a try.

27

INADEQUATE SUBMARINE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Representative HOSMER. I have three short inquiries. One has todo with the Navy budget for R. & D. I see that only about 4±/2 percentof it has anything to do at all with underwater research. It seems tome that if you are going to get the maximum value out of your sub-marines, more money is going to have to be spent.

Admiral RICKOVER. I have asked many people, average Americancitizens not familiar with the Defense Department's budget, what per-centage of the Defense R. & D. money they thought was spent on sub-marines. They generally say around 20 percent. Yet it is exactly 1.7percent for the period covering fiscal years 1972 through 1974. Of theNavy R. & D. budget, the nonstrategic submarine part accounts for4.4 percent in fiscal year 1975 and it is projected that will drop to 4.3percent in fiscal year 1976 and to 4 percent in fiscal year 1977. Thisincludes all R. & D. associated with sonars, radars, navigation equip-ment, and improving the characteristics of these submarines. Thefunding for these areas is low because of the pressures being exertedfrom all the other elements of the Navy.

You must realize, sir, that the Navy officers in submarines representless than 4 percent of all the officers in the Navy. The influence thatyou have in the Navy depends on numbers, so that the submarinesobviously are on the short end of the stick.

Representative HOSMER. Are you agreed with the proposition thatresearch is underfunded in this area ?

Admiral RICKOVER. Absolutely, sir. This is apparent as a matter ofcommon sense. Do you think this important element of our Navalstrength should get only 1.7 percent of the $7 or $8 billion a year thatthe Defense Department receives ? It is because people, with more in-fluence have a say in how it gets allocated. The submarines have neverachieved the standing that they should have. I was instrumental, afterseveral years, in getting the post of Deputy Chief of Naval Operationsfor Submarines created. But he is generally not accorded the sameprestige as the other deputy CNO's. He will probably never be untilhe represents the same number of people as the surface force, or it isrecognized in the Navy that weapons should not be judged in an orderof importance which depends on the relative numbers of peopleinvolved.

Until we get away from that situation, there will never be anyimprovement. That is why I am talking so strongly here—because Ibelieve change will only come through the actions of Congress.

NUCLEAR SHIP VISITS TO FOREIGN PORTS

Representative HOSMER. Admiral, another line of inquiry here. Iknow of your interest in getting your men ashore on liberty when theyare overseas. Yet, I understand that even now, the Japanese have madesome kind of complaint, keeping our ships out. Is that permanent or atemporary thing?

Admiral RICKOVER. The Japanese have an internal problem. It hasbeen learned that the company responsible for evaluating environ-mental monitoring samples for the Japanese Scientific and Technol-ogy Agency has falsified some records.

28

I am only quoting what is in the newspapers. Some elements haveclaimed that this company falsified the records on purpose to cover upthe fact that U.S. nuclear submarines visiting Japan are causing aradiological problem. This, of course, is not true.

As you know, the Japanese have been worked up about radiationever since Hiroshima, and this issue has now caused a good deal ofpublic concern. There have been demands that our nuclear-poweredships stop visiting Japan. That is the issue in Japan.

[Classified matter deleted.]

USE OF SAN DIEGO AS A HOME PORT

Kepresentative HOSMER. The only other thing, Admiral, and I knowyou can't comment on this, but these ships that you build at tremen-dous cost with tremendous effectiveness, but I think that when it comesdown to protecting and preserving those ships, sometimes not you,but the operational part of the Navy, is quite short-sighted. They aretaking the three ships, Bairibridge, Trwxtun and Long Beach, awayfrom a place where they can get to sea in practically no time andsticking them down in the back end of San Diego Bay where thechannel is 500 or 600 feet wide and 40 feet deep and 8 miles inland.

I don't think that is a proper kind of protection for the kind ofships that you build, particularly wrhen you realize that the Bismarkand the Tirpitz and the Graf Spee, when those ships got loose duringWorld War II, the whole focus of the war was on them, nothing elsemattered until those ships were swept from the seas by the Britishand Allies. Here we are given an opportunity to lock these similarkinds of ships of ours up in the back end of nowhere.

Chairman PRICE. Off the record.[Discussion off the record.]Admiral RICKOVER. The formal answer is that the Department of

Defense, in its wisdom and considering all aspects when making itsstudy, came to the conclusion that it was best for the Navy to base theseships at San Diego rather than Long Beach. That is the kind of officialanswer you will get.

Representative HOSMER. I have a GAO study going on that showedthat they made this determination on the basis of saving money. Itturns out they are saving practically nothing. So, that answer is notvery valid.

Admiral RICKOVER. You understand, Mr. Hosmer, I have absolutelynothing to do with this. It is not within my province.

Representative HOSMER. I understand it is not your department.Admiral RICKOVER. It is not. I refer you to the Secretary of Defense.

He has more wisdom on this subject than I have, sir.

FY 1975 FUNDS FOR SUBMARINE R. & D.

Mr. Hosmer, if I may, there is one other point I would like to makein answer to the previous question of yours concerning submarine re-search and development. I would like to give you an example of whatwe can do if we are able to get about $7 million dollars more for sub-marine development.

[Classified matter deleted.]

Mr, WKJNES, There in no money currently in the budget lor thiswork.

Admiral RIC&OVIB, There is no money lor it in this budget or infuture budgets, If initial funding of about $1 million can e>e mad©

hair recognizes you.Eepresentative HANSEN. Thank you.

Admiral, what was the volume of the radioactive material that wasdischarged in the environment from the nuclear Navy in past years ?

Admiral RICKOVUH. We now discharge a very small amount com-pared to what we used to.

We used to discharge millions of gallons of slightly radioactivewater per year. We are only discharging a few thousand gallons ofwater today.

Mr, WEGNER. Less than 26,000 gallons.Admiral RICKOVER. Less than 26,000 gallons in 1973 from 107 ships,

0 shipyards, 11 tenders and 2 shore bases.All of the radioactivity we discharged into all the rivers and har-

bors of the world last year was less than 0.002 curie. The radiation towhich people are potentially exposed from 0.002 curie is less than theradiation one person gets from 7 or 8 chest X-rays. That is all we dis-charged from the entire nuclear Navy during 1973.

We have drastically decreased the amount of water discharged tojust a few thousand gallons. We have the most advanced program inthe country in this regard. The reason for this dramatic drop is thatwe now recycle most of the reactor cooling water. We use the samewater over and over again so that we discharge less volume.

Representative HOLIFIELD. What is the value of a curie in relation toaroentgen.

Admiral RICKOVER. One curie of radioactivity is 3.7 X1010 disinte-grations per second. It is a scientific figure. One curie of radium wouldgive a dose rate of 1 roentgen per hour at a distance of 1 meter.

Representative HOSMER. A hundred curies will kill you.

SIGNIFICANCE OF RADIOACTIVITY

Admiral RICKOVER. I will give you another example. The 0.002 curieis less than the quantity of naturally occurring radioactivity in thevolume of harbor water displaced by a single one of our Polaris sub-marines. If one person drank the entire amount of radioactivity dis-charged into any harbor in 1973, he would not exceed the annual radi-ation exposure permitted by the AEG for its employees and licensees.

Representative HOLIFIELD. That is tremendously small. Is that dis-charged in harbors or is it discharged while you are at sea ?

Admiral RICKOVER. In harbors.Mr. WEGNER. Ports and harbors.Representative HOLIFIELD. Is it necessary to discharge water in the

harbor?Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. It is sometimes necessary for this

reason: When you start up a pressurized water-cooled reactor, you

34.526 O - 75 - 4

30

have to heat the water to operating temperature, and the water ex-pands. If you cannot accommodate the expansion in the ship itself youmust dispose of the extra water. [Deleted.] But that water gets dis-persed in vast amounts of sea water. Even so, the total amount ofwater that was discharged at sea in 1973 contained only 0.4 curiewhich is less than the natural radioactivity in a cube of sea waterapproximately 100 yards on a side.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Give us a memorandum on that amountin addition to what you

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. I will put our annual report into therecord which covers the entire subject. We have done that previously.I am glad you asked for that, because the Navy has an outstandingrecord.

Representative HOLIFIELD. We have the complete record of the hear-ing up to date. This would be in addition.

[The report referred to appears as appendix 2, p. 51.]Mr. WEGNER. I would like to add a note. [Deleted.]Representative HOLIFIELD. [Deleted.]Mr. WEGNER. Yes, sir. That is right.Admiral RICKOVER. But the results of our efforts are published by

the Environmental Protection Agency. The public has access to thefull record of what we do.

Representative HOLIFIELD. The accusation in Japan is that they havewillfully given false information.

Admiral RICKOVER. That is an internal problem.Representative HOLIFIELD. Do you know whether it is true or not ?Admiral RICKOVER. It appears that falsification of records has oc-

curred. As far as the nuclear submarines are concerned, we have neverhidden the facts about radioactivity from any government. Whenthere was an accusation in Japan several years ago that the TJ.S.S.Swordfish had discharged radioactivity in Sasebo, we investigatedvery thoroughly and confirmed that the ship had not caused any radio-active contamination.

Representative HOLIFIELD. There was also an incident in Scotlandwhere the sludge in the bay was exposed.

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, and that died down, too.Representative HANSEN. I have one or two other questions.

SOVIET SUBMARINE THREAT

Going to your statement about the projected plans for building newsubmarines, as I recall, you said that our rate will now be about 2^ peryear; is that correct ?

Admiral RICKOVER. That is the rate according to the Navy's currentsubmarine construction program starting with this fiscal year. Thereare three in this year's budget, two in next year's budget, and it alter-nates between three and two thereafter. The average is two and one-half per year.

Representative HANSEN. We have a capacity to build about [de-leted].

31

Admiral RICKOVER. [Deleted.] The Russians, on the other hand, arebuilding an average of 10 submarines a year. They have also put outover five new types of submarines in the last 5 years. [Deleted.]

The Soviets have an awesome submarine program. We spend lessthan 20 percent of our naval funds on submarines; they spend ap-proximately 40 percent. They acknowledge that submarines are themost important part of their Navy and they have given them thehighest priority. We cannot get that standing for our submarineprogram.

Representative HANSEN. You say they are building, now, about 10 ?Admiral RICKOVER. They are building an average of 10 a year. They

are introducing about [deleted] new classes of submarines every year.These include attack submarine designs, cruise missile firing designsand new ballistic missile designs, such as the Yankee and Delta classes.

The Delta class corresponds to pur Trident. They have 2 Deltasat sea, and 16 more under construction. It looks like they are building6 to 8 Delta's a year, so that by 1978, the year the current SALTtreaty expires, they will have reached their limit of 62 modern ballisticmissile submarines.

They will have at least 18 Delta's by 1978—before we have the firstTrident. The Yankee class started off with a missile having a range of1,300 miles. They have just increased that [deleted].

The Delta class is starting off with missiles haying a range of 4,200miles. I do not want you to think that if there is an arms race, it isbeing started by us.

Representative HANSEN. What is their capacity to build?Admiral RICKOVER. They can build about 20 nuclear submarines a

year on a single-shift basis. They have about three times as muchsubmarine building and repair capacity as we have and they are stillincreasing it.

TRENDS IN. SHIPBUILDING CAPACITY

Representative HANSEN. Will our capacity decrease as we do notuse available shipbuilding facilities to build submarines?

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir, our capacity will decrease. The basicreason for this is that until the last 2 or 3 years, about three-fourthsof shipbuilding in American vards was for the Navy. All of a sudden,with the oil crunch, it has shifted so that there is now more commercialshipbuilding in our yards than there is Navy shipbuilding. Naturally,the yards are paying attention to where there is more business.

The Navy's business is no longer as desirable as it was. We are hav-ing a hard time getting these yards to build naval ships.

Let me show you a curve that explains the situation. This curvestarts in 1963 and ends with 1973. Here is the commercial; here is theNavy. You can see that in 1973 the curves crossed.

Note the disparity in the curves 10 years ago and today.I would like to put these charts in the record, if I may, to illustrate.Representative HOLHTELD. They will be received without objection.[The charts follow:]

32

«OXI»SHIPYARD.

1007.

CA)

60

&*oW^8.M>-rr̂ s**a*sTs*t4£sMBB$J*a^m!*rtw»)

5̂ ^ 7̂ ^0 to 70 II 72 73

KCMTNAVY ™™«* PERCENT COWKC/AL

33

fADF/

ASOriJANUARY EACH YEAR

YEAR1963196419651966

19671^68

rV<>9

19701971I97Z19731974

COMMl SHIPS.369,000

387,00'0 '' 519,000

501,000543,000788,000800,000765,000765,000

1,058,0002,950,0003,600,000

.PERCENT, 22.81

24.7623.10

26.5423.6732.3332.0030.8028.4431.9351.9354.JO

NAVAL SHIPS1,249,000

1,176,0001,728,0001,387,0001,751,0001,649,000

. 1,700,0001,719,0001,925,0002,255,0002,731,0003,050,000

PERCENT77.1975.2476.9073.46.76.3367,6768.0069.2071.5668.0748.07 '45.90

TOTAL1,618,0001,564,0002,247,0001,888,0002,294,0002,437,000

. 2,500,0002,484,0002,690,0003,313,0005,681,0006,650,000

SOURCE: SHIPBUILDERS COUNCIL OF AMERICA

34

Representative HANSEN. I would like to have one about which toquestion you now, showing the trends between our shipbuilding andthe Soviet Union and then raise the question I had previously inearlier testimony.

If we were to commit what shipbuilding capacity we now have tobuild all the submarines that we could turn out and if we began toenlarge as quickly as possible pur capacity to build more submarinesand the Soviet Union utilized its capacity to the fullest extent, couldwe overtake or come even with the Soviet Union by the end of thecentury ?

VACILLATING SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM AFFECTS SHIPYARD CAPACITY

Admiral RIOKOVER. Yes, sir, we could if we had the will to do it,but let me give you a minor example of the problem in getting ade-quate shipbuilding capacity. The Trident program is one of the high-est priority programs in the Department of Defense. A year ago, Iinitiated action to get some additional facilities to build Trident sub-marines. The issue was studied many, many times in the Navy and theDepartment of Defense before approval was granted. Yet, the Tridentis one of the highest priority defense projects.

Now, after a 15-month delay the Department of Defense is goingalong with what I recommended—after all sorts of committees andgroups have studied it to death. There are so many divisions andgroups in the Navy and Defense Department that when an issuearises each group studies it in order to demonstrate the reason for itsexistence.

Every group, particularly the less knowledgeable ones, starts afresh study. Now, after a yearV delay on one of the most importantdefense projects in the United States, approval has finally beengranted to proceed with the facilities.

Representative RONCALIO. It sounds like the Democratic NationalCommittee. That is where you got your ideas.

Representative HANSEN. Let me ask one final question with refer-ence to a report some weeks ago concerning intelligence gatheringactivities of the nuclear Navy.

Do you have any comment you can make on what we have beendoing?

Admiral RICKOVER. No, sir. I suggest, sir, that you can get better in-formation from the people who are directly responsible. I know a gooddeal about what is going on. However, I respectfully suggest that Iam not the one to give you that information.

BACKFIT OF TRIDENT MISSILES INTO POSEIDON SUBMARINES

Senator DOMINICK. If the Congressman will yield at that point,Admiral, the Trident missile is supposed to be completed, which we areall in favor of, by 1978 which will give us, as I remember, Trident I,with a 4,000-mile range. How fast could that be backfitted into thePolaris or Poseidon class submarines?

Admiral RICKOVER. The Trident I missile can be backfitted in thePoseidon submarines during an extended upkeep period between pa-

36

trols. Suppose I get the full story on that. I can give it to you byphone, or put it m the record, if that is satisfactory?

Senator DOMINICK. I would like to have it because I think this is avery important option.

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir, I will get the information.[The information later supplied follows:]

Of the ten Poseidon (C-3) ships currently planned for backfit to Trident(C-4), [deleted] are to be equipped with C-4 equipment during a regularlyscheduled shipyard overhaul which will be of no greater length than if the shipsremained configured for C-3. [Deleted] SSBN's are to be backfitted to C-4alongside the tender.

The actual time alongside a tender required to backfit the submarine-installedweapon systems equipment to C-4 capability is estimated to be [deleted] days.An additional [deleted] days will be required to demonstrate and certify thereadiness of the ship and crew to operate the equipment on tactical patrol.[Deleted] days are required to load the submarine with C-4 missiles, for a totalinterpatrol period of [deleted] days. This compares with a normal refit period of[deleted] days which is currently spent alongside the tender between opera-tional patrols.

One of the ships is scheduled to conduct a C-4 missile firing after backfit. Forthis ship an additional [deleted] days are required alongside the tender to in-stall special test instrumentation for a total of [deleted] days. The Demonstra-tion and Shakedown Operation is planned to take [deleted] days, [deleted] daysare required for transit from Cape Canaveral to Charleston, and [deleted] daysfor tactical C-4 missile loadout. The total interpatrol period of this case will be[deleted] days.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Mr. Roncalio?Representative RONCALIO. Admiral, have your great experiences

ever taken you on the seas around the Kola Peninsula ?Admiral RICKOVER. No, sir, they have not.Representative RONCALIO. Thank you.Mr. LEIGHTON. May I comment on Senator Dominick's question? In

the 1975 budget as it is submitted, sir, the date for backfitting theTrident I missile into the Poseidon has been revised from last year'sdate of 1982 to a new date of 1979.

You may recall this has been questioned the last 2 years and thedate changed each year. The 1975 budget is predicated on backfittingthe Trident I missile into the Poseidon in 1979.

Admiral RICKOVER. We will get you the latest official figures.

LIGHT WATER BREEDER REACTOR

Representative HOLIFIELD. I would like to ask you a few questionsin regard to the light water breeder reactor you are working on.

We would like to be brought up to date on this program. When doyou anticipate starting the breeding demonstration ?

Admiral RICKOVER. We anticipate having the core completed in late1975. There has been some slippage because we had some technical diffi-culty which is being solved. It is a normal thing in development work.We are actually making the core; the structurals and the fuel rodsare being made right now.

We have solved these problems, which are natural in development.We have another problem caused by the continuing inflation; thecost of some of the components needed to change the Shippingportplant has gone up.

36

The cost of the K. & D. has gone up. We have taken that up with theController of the Atomic Energy Commission and he will see whatsteps will have to be taken. We will need some additional money. It isnot much considering the size of the program.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Can you, at this time, determine whetherthis overrun in cost estimate is the result of inflation or—-

Admiral RICKOVER. It is mostly inflation. It is also partly the factthat there are some additional things that we had to do in researchand development and in the work at Shippingport. They are not veryconsequential. Please don't start thinking that we are coming in for$300 million or $400 million or even $500 million. It is not that sort ofthing.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Can you give us a ball park estimate ofwhat that will be ?

Admiral RICKOVER. I think about"$25 million including some for thenaval reactors work.

Representative HOLIFIELD. How much of that do you think will beattributable to inflation ?

Admiral RIOKOVER. About one-half, I believe, would be due toinflation.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Give us some information on that.Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. I will furnish the committee with the

exact figures.[The information subsequently supplied follows:]

INCREASED FISCAL YEAR 1975 FUNDING FOR NAVAL REACTORS, CIVILIAN REACTORDEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

Subsequent to the preparation of the FY 1975 budget, a reassessment of theestimates of vendor costs for nuclear components, labor costs, and costs forupgrading the Shippingport Atomic Power Station indicated a need for addi-tional funding in FY 1975 over the budget request as follows:

CIVILIAN REACTOR DEVELOPMENT

[In millions of dollars]

Current Additional Fiscal yearfiscal year funding 1975 re-

1975 budget required quirement

Light water breeder reactor (LWBR) 14.9 7.2 22.1Shippingportatomicpowerstation. 6.2 2.0 8.2

Operating costs 21.1 9.2 30.3Capital equipment .3 4.8 5.1

The $9.2 million increase in operating costs is primarily a result of increasedcosts for the fabrication of the reactor closure head and core basket, increasedpersonnel costs associated with the fabrication of the LWBR core and upgradingof the Shippingport plant.

The $4.8 million in additional Capital Equipment funds is required in fiscalyear 1975 to provide equipment improvements to the Shipping port reactor plant.This includes replacing and providing new equipment in the following areas:backup on-site power, reactor flow equipment, automatic isolation equipment,reactor instrumentation and heat removal systems. These additional funds arerequired to support the development, fabrication and installation in Shippingportof the LWBR core.

INCREASED FY 1975 FUNDING FOR NAVAL REACTOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Subsequent to the preparation of the fiscal year 1975 Naval Reactor Develop-ment operating budget, estimates have increased by $8.8 million due primarily to

37

higher prices for subcontracted work. These higher than anticipated prices aredue largely to inflation in labor and material costs and to the increased demandfor nuclear components and services which results in a seller's market. For ex-ample, of the five qualified contractors solicited for prototype refueling work,only one was willing to undertake the work. Subsequent negotiations resultedin prices approximately 50 percent higher than originally estimated for essen-tially the same scope of work.

The projects affected are primarily those which have the most contracting ac-tivity: the Submarine Advanced Nuclear Propulsion Plant, the Small Subma-rine Nuclear Propulsion Plant and the Destroyer Type Dual Propulsion Plantprojects are incurring higher than expected refueling and plant overhaul costs.Similarly, subcontracted design, development and fabrication costs for reactorand core components in the Improved Submarine Nuclear Propulsion Plant andAttack Submarine Nuclear Propulsion Plant projects have increased.

The refuelings cannot be delayed without jeopardizing Naval Reactor's abilityto support the Navy's operating nuclear warships and those already authorizedand under construction. The additional $8.8 million is required to avoid seriousdelays in advance development work directed at achieving longer life, higherpower density reactor cores and improved, more reliable nuclear propulsionplants and to support the development of new nuclear propulsion plants.

SUMMARY OF BUDGET REQUEST

[In thousands of dollars]

Current Additional Fiscal yearfiscal year funding 1975

1975 budget required requirement

Submarine .Surface shipsSupporting R. & D

Total Naval program

103, 41046,69211,398

161,500

6,8002,000

0

8,800

110, 21048, 69211,398

170. 300

Admiral RICKOVER. It is not a significant amount compared to theoverruns you are used to.

Representative HOLIFIELD. There have been overruns in the FFTFand other reactor programs. I was wondering if it was of the samemeasure.

Admiral RICKOVER. No, sir.

UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE OF INFORMATION

Representative HOLIFIELD. An article recently appeared by SpencerRich in the Washington Post about a month ago which contained in-formation on special intelligence gathering operations of our sub-marines.

My understanding is that this was as a result of two men who wereformer employees of the CIA and they are writing a book and Iunderstand they are really spilling their guts. They have alreadyspilled it.

Spencer Rich had an article in the Post which had references toclassified material in it. Can you give us any kind of information onthat or should we go to the CIA ?

Admiral RICKOVER. No, sir, I cannot. You will have to go to theCIA. I have read the same article you did. I deplore it but, of course,that is the way our country operates. No matter what the informationis, everyone thinks it is within his many rights as a citizen to obtainor release information, no matter what harm may be done to the

country and to all of our citizens. Today everyone has inalienablerights, and no one seems to have duties.

Eepresentative HOLIFIELD. Everybody has a right to know, includ-ing the newspapers even though the information that is involved isdetrimental to the national interest.

Senator DOMINICK. Mr. Chairman, would you mind putting thatarticle in the record? I have not seen it. I would like to see it verymuch.

Representative HOLIFIELD. I won't put it in, sir, but I will furnishyou the article.

Senator DOMINICK. If you will furnish me the article, that is fine.Representative HOLIFIELD. I think in a record that may be made

public, it would give the prestige that I would not want to be respon-sible for.

Senator DOMINICK. That is fair" enough. I just want to see it.Representative HOLIFIELD. I think there were violations of security,

myself. I would not want to confirm it.Senator DOMINICK. I am on the CIA subcommittee of the Senate

Armed Services Committee. I would like to see it.Representative HOLIFIELD. I will ask the chairman to have someone

come up and give us a briefing on that.Admiral RICKOVER. I predict that when the liberation army kid-

napers, hopefully, are caught, they will be given every benefit of law.They will probably be found insane, and serve a life sentence which iscommuted after a short while to 5 years because they have inalienablerights.

The people on whom they perpetrate their acts do not have rights.Everyone who does anything wrong today has rights and our courtswill see to it that they are given these rights.

Senator DOMINICK. That is right.Representative HOLIFIELD. It is a sad situation that faces us in this

country. It is of great concern to me as an individual as well as a mem-ber of the committee. We may have some other questions.

Mr. Price didn't have time to tell me. If so, I would like to retainthe privilege of having them submitted to you, sir.

Admiral RICKOVER. May I have your permission to amplify mytestimony ?

Representative HOLIFIELD. Yes, indeed, as long as it is pertinent tothe subject matter.

NUCLEAR CARRIER AND FRIGATE DELIVERIES

Mr. LEIGHTON. Mr. Chairman, there are a few things you mightwant to have introduced in the record to help amplify the earlierdiscussion.

I have a chart which shows the nuclear carrier and nuclear escortswe presently have, those planned, and some that the Navy may requestin the future.

With your permission, I will put that in the record, sir.Representative HOLIFIELD. That is not the chart you had with the

AdmiralMr. LEIGHTON. No, sir, it is a different chart.

39

Representative HOLIFIELD. This is a classified meeting today. I thinkit would be all right.

Admiral RICKOVER. This shows that at the rate we are buildingnuclear frigates, we will not have enough nuclear frigates to accom-pany our four nuclear carriers until 9 years after delivery of theCarl Vinson.

[The chart referred to follows:]

NUCLEAR CARRIER AND FRIGATE DELIVERIES'

CVAN and escorts

Enterprise (CVAN 65), delivered 1961:DLGN-25— BainbridgeDLGN-35— TruxtunDLGN-36— California .DLGN-37— South Carolina

Nimitz (CVAN 68), delivery 1975:DLGN-38— VirginiaDLGN-39— TexasDLGN-40DLGN-41

Eisenhower (CVAN 69), delivery 1977:DLGN-42DGNDGN-DGN

Carl Vinson (CVN 70), delivery 1980:DGN... . .DGNDGN..DGN... . . . . .

Fiscal yearship

constructionauthorized

59626768

70717275

76378:?93 80

581382»83»84

Age of CVANwhen 4escorts

availableDelivery (years)

1962 .196719741974

1976 . .19761977

31978

* 1979* 19832 1984H985

31986 .a 198731988>1989

13

3

8

9

i This table is based on the conclusion of CNO studies and military judgment that a minimum of 4 nuclear escorts shouldbe provided for each nuclear carrier. The cruiser Long Beach (CGN9) is not shown since cruisers are not normally assignedas carrier escorts and no other provisions have been made for extra nuclear ships to assign to independent missions.

2 Advance procurement funds for DLGN-41 and DLGN-42 were appropriated in fiscal years 1970,1971, and 1974. Thedates shown for DLGN-41 and DLGN-42 are the current contract option delivery dates. Beyond the DLGN-42 the Navy isconsidering construction of nuclear frigates bearing the AEGIS air defense weapons systems. These frigates are referredto as DGN s. Assuming design funds are made available in fiscal year 1975 to allow the design to proceed, the earliestdelivery is in calendar year 1983. A 1 ship per year construction schedule was assumed.

Representative HOLIFIELD. That certainly is very pertinent to thisletter that the chairman sent to Dr. Schlesinger. I don't know whetheryou have a copy of that or not.

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir, I know about it.

CORRESPONDENCE ON NUCLEAR POWERED SHIPS

Representative HOLIFIELD. The January 5 letter. I will put that inthe record.

[The letter referred to and the reply received subsequent to thehearing follow:]

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENEBGY,

Washington, D.C., January 5,1974.Hon. JAMES R. SCHLESINGEB,Secretary of Defense,Washington, D.C.

DEAB JIM : The increasing severity of our energy problem should, in my view,call for an accelerated effort in the application of nuclear power for the propul-sion of naval warships. I fully appreciate your personal efforts in making addi-tions of some nuclear propelled ships to our Navy although I believe recent

40

events call for a sharply increased effort in this vital area of national defense.Accordingly, I suggest that a review of the planned shipbuilding program bemade with the objective of increasing the number of nuclear powered warships.We are indeed fortunate that we have the proven technical base to immediatelyproceed with additional applications of nuclear propulsion. It certainly wouldbe most unfortunate if we didn't take advantage of our position especially sincenuclear power provides such positive solutions to our growing and irreversibleglobal petroleum problem.

I want to emphasize that I am not suggesting the initiation of additionalstudies. From the Committee's detailed involvement in the review of the variousstudies I can assure you we need no additional effort in this area. Such compre-hensive reviews as the Committee's 1963 and 1971-72 hearings and report onnuclear propulsion clearly illustrate the military value and justification of thisapplication of nuclear energy. The growing petroleum problem has just in-creased the importance of the factors justifying nuclear power especially in thearea of foreign access to petroleum supplies. Of course, although secondary tothe primary factor of military effectiveness, the increasing costs of petroleumfuels also increase the economic justification of nuclear power.

You,can be assured of Congressional support in immediately moving aheadwith more naval nuclear propulsion projects. As you know the Congress, throughits various Committees of responsibility in the defense area, has led in bringingabout nuclear propulsion for our navy.

Sincerely yours,MELVIN PRICE,

Chairman.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,Washington, D.C., March 11,1974.

Hon. MELVIN PRICE,Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, U.S. House of Representatives,

Washington, D.C.DEAR MB. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your letter of January 5, 1974,

in which you suggested that a review of the Navy's planned shipbuilding pro-gram be made with the objective of increasing the number of nuclear poweredwarships, \ •

By mid-1974 our 107 nuclear powered combatants will constitute over one-third of the active warship fleet. These nuclear powered warships include41 strategic ballistic missile submarines, 61 attack submarines, one aircraftcarrier and four fleet air defense guided missile ships—the Navy's first lineships. Additional nuclear powered combatants authorized by Congress are, orsoon will be under construction: the first TRIDENT SSBN's, four 637 ClassSSNs, and twenty-three 688 Class SSNs, three nuclear powered aircraft carriersand four guided missile frigates. In addition to the nuclear powered ships inservice, under construction, or authorized by Congress, the FY 75 budget requestincludes funding of two TRIDENT submarines, three high-speed attack sub-marines, and one guided missile frigate. Delivery of the five nuclear poweredfrigates (DLGNs) under construction, together with cruiser and the two frigatesnow in the fleet, will give us eight nuclear powered surface combatants whichwill be adequate to form two all nuclear powered carrier task forces, when noneof the ships are in overhaul.

As you know, in fiscal year 1972 the Department of Defense continued theDLGN construction program by awarding a contract to the Newport News Ship-building and Dry dock Company for the construction of DLGN 38 Class Frigates.At that time it was decided to construct three units of this new class whileretaining a contract option for two additional units. Recently Congress addedto our fiscal year 1974 budget request $79 million for advanced procurement oflong-lead items for the two additional nuclear ships, DLGNs 41 and 42. We haveincluded DLGN-41 in the fiscal year 1975 budget and are protecting the optionfor procuring the second in fiscal year 1976. When the full scope of our currentnuclear ship program is considered, we find that the shipbuilders involved havea very large backlog ahead of them.

There are several important factors influencing the selection of nuclear ornon-nuclear propulsion systems for a warship. Three of the most significant itemsare the relative procurement and operating costs, individual ship capability re-quirements, and overall Navy force level and modernization needs.

41

To date, the use of nuclear power has been limited to surface ships of 8,000tons or more. These relatively large ships (frigates and cruisers), with highlycapable anti-air and anti-submarine systems, are at the high end of the high-lowmix of surface combatant ship types. The high-low mix concept of balancingoverall fleet capability between larger numbers of capable low-cost ships andfewer numbers of highly capable but expensive first-line ships is essential formaintaining our overall combat capabilities.

In spite of the many attractive features of nuclear ships, both their acquisitioncosts and manning costs tend to be higher than for conventional ships having thesame weapon systems. As you are aware, over the past several years there havebeen extended discussions of the degree to which indirect costs tend to offsetthese differences. The major increase in the cost of fuel oil since October 1978 hastended to add some weight to this concept. On the other hand, the introductionof significantly more efficient conventional propulsion systems will result inlower acquisition and operating costs for such ships due to reduced manningrequirements and reduced engineering plant size. As an additional consideration,the peacetime flexibility of deployments for nuclear ships is constrained by theapprehensive attitude of many countries towards port visits by nuclear ships. Inmy view, these apprehensions are largely unfounded, but progress in dispellingthis barrier to nuclear ship visits has been slow.

Requirements for overall naval combat effectiveness depend in large part onthe expected threat. In some ocean areas where our Navy is planned to operate,the threat is expected to be of relatively low intensity and to consist of prin-cipally submarine-launched torpedoes and cruise missiles with only small num-bers of ship- and aircraft-launched cruise missiles. Requirements for individualship effectiveness are less demanding in such areas than would be required inhigher threat environments, where additional threats from aircraft would beexpected. I am sure that you recognize that, in addition to the need for first-lineships capable of operations in high threat areas, there are many important mis-sions that can be effectively carried out by less complex and less expensive ships.

In this decade, we must phase out virtually all of the remaining World War IIsurface combatants because their deteriorating material condition and decliningcombat value is making them increasingly inefficient. If we are to procure thelarge number of ships needed to maintain even current force levels, the bulk ofthe new ships must be from the "low" side of the "high-low" spectrum. Thenumerical requirements alone for surface escorts needed to protect military andcommercial shipping in open ocean and lower threat areas of the world lead usto the use of less complex ships under present budgetary constraints.

Your personal efforts and the support of the Congress in attaining our presentposture in nuclear propulsion in the Navy are very much appreciated. I solicityour continued support of our shipbuilding program and assure you that nuclearpropulsion will be actively considered for all future Navy major surface warshipbuilding programs.

Sincerely,JAMES R. SCHLESINGER.

COMPARISON OF FUELING COSTS

Mr. LEIGHTON. Mr. Chairman, I have another paper here preparedby the Naval Ship Systems Command which compares the cost of thenuclear fuel in the Nimitz carriers to the cost of oil for a conventionalcarrier and compares the cost of nuclear fuel in a nuclear frigate tothe cost of oil for a conventional frigate.

I think you will find that very interesting. The cost of Navy distil-late fuel oil has gone up to $12.04 a barrel; last year, it was $5.54 abarrel. The comparative cost, at least from a fuel standpoint, of nu-clear ships is getting much more competitive to conventional. Whenwe buy a nuclear ship, we buy the nuclear core with the ship. Thatincreases the investment costs.

The conventional ship that always gets compared to it does notinclude the cost of the oil, the cost of the oiler, the cost of the escort forthe oiler, et cetera.

42

This piece of paper compares the total cost of the nuclear fuel to thetotal cost of the conventional fuel and shows at least from a fuelstandpoint that the nuclear fuel is cheaper.

[The document follows:]

NAVAL SHIP SYSTEMS COMMAND STUDY COMPARING FUELING COSTS FOB NUCLEARAND CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND FRIGATES

This study compares the cost of the nuclear fuel initially installed in nuclearcarriers and frigates to the cost of buying, storing, and delivering equivalentamounts of fuel oil to conventional carriers and frigates. The cost of deliveringfuel oil is calculated based on the procurement and operating cost of the currentinventory of Navy oilers. During wartime oilers are vulnerable to enemy attackand might not be able to deliver fuel oil to a carrier task force in a war zone.The value of nuclear propulsion under these circumstances is immeasurable.

AIRCRAFT CARRIER COMPARISON

The estimated cost for the nuclear fuel which will be initially installed in theCVN-70, including the costs of uranium and other core materials, core fabrica-tion, core installation, core removal, and fuel processing is about $90 million infiscal year 1973 dollars. This initial nuclear fuel is expected to provide for atleast 13 years of normal operation of the CVN-70.

Of the $90 million total cost of buying, installing, removing, and reprocessingthe initial nuclear cores for the CVN-70, about $70 million is included in theacquisition cost (Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy Budget) of $956 million.The cost of fuel oil and fuel oil delivery is not included in the acquisition costof conventional ships.

To carry out the same missions, a conventional aircraft carrier would consumeabout 11 million barrels of fuel oil. The Navy, as of 1 February 1974, will pay$12.04 per barrel for Navy distillate fuel oil of the type used by conventionalaircraft carriers and frigates. In addition, the Navy estimates it costs about $.25per barrel for storage costs. Thus, the estimated current average peacetime costto buy and store a barrel of distillate fuel for a conventional aircraft carrier orconventional frigate is $12.29 per barrel. This estimated cost does not includean amount for delivering the fuel oil to the ships operating on the high seas. Theaverage peacetime costs for delivery is estimated to be $11.92 per barrel. Basedon the above estimated costs:

(a) The cost to buy and store 11 million barrels of distillate fuel for a con-ventional aircraft carrier would approximate $135 million.

(6) The cost to deliver 11 million barrels of distillate fuel for a conventionalaircraft carrier would approximate $131 million.

Thus the cost to buy, store and deliver 11 million barrels of Navy distillatefuel for a conventional aircraft carrier would approximate $266 million.

However, since the cost of nuclear fuel for CVN-70 includes expendituresfrom the year of initial long lead funding (fiscal year 1973) extending beyondthe approximately 13 year core lifetime starting in fiscal year 1981 while the oilfor a conventional carrier in the same time frame would be expended over 13years starting in fiscal year 1981, DOD Instruction 7041.3 guidance would requirecalculating uniform annual cost. This instruction states: "It (uniform annualcost) is obtained by dividing the total present value cost by the sum of thepresent value factors of the years in which alternatives yield benefits." DODInstruction 7041.3 further states, "When inflation is considered important to theconclusion of a study, a second computation will be made in terms of current(inflated) dollars. Using the constant dollar estimates as a baseline, inflationshould then be included, either by using price indices, or as a last resort, by appli-cation of a uniform inflation rate."

Consequently, the nuclear and conventional aircraft carrier fuel costs alsohave been calculated using present value calculations assuming a 10 percent dis-count rate and assuming inflation rates of 6 and 3 percent and no inflation givingthe following results.

43

Approximate uniform annual fuel cost

Assumed Assumedinflation, inflation, Assumed

6 percent 3 percent no inflation

CVN-70Conventional carrier in same time frame.

$20,000,000 $18,000,000 $16,000,00052,000,000 35,000,000 24,000,000

FRIGATE COMPARISON

The estimated cost for the nuclear fuel which will be installed in a nuclearfrigate, including the costs of uranium and other core materials, core fabrica-tion, core installation, core removal and fuel processing is about $27 millionin fiscal year 1973 dollars.

This initial nuclear fuel is expected to provide at least 10 years of normaloperation for a nuclear frigate.

Of the $27 million total cost of buying, installing, removing, and reproc-essing the initial nuclear cores for a nuclear frigate, about $19 million is in-cluded in the acquisition cost (Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy Budget).

The cost of fuel oil and fuel oil delivery is not included in the acquisition costof conventional ships.

To carry out the same missions, a conventional frigate would consume about2 million barrels of fuel oil. Based on the above:

(a) The cost to buy and store 2 million barrels of distillate fuel for a con-ventional frigate would approximate $24 million.

(&) The cost to deliver 2 million barrels of distillate fuel for a conventionalfrigate would approximate $24 million.

Thus, the cost to buy, store, and deliver 2 million barrels of Navy distillatefuel for a conventional frigate would approximate $48 million.

As in the case of the carrier comparison, since the cost of nuclear fuel for anuclear frigate includes expenditures from the year of initial long lead fundingextending beyond the approximately 10 year core lifetime while the oil for aconventional frigate in the same time frame would be expended over 10 yearsstarting after ship delivery, DOD Instruction 7041.3 guidance would requirediscounting and consideration of inflation in calculating uniform annual cost.

Consequently, the nuclear and conventional frigate fuel costs also have beencalculated using present value calculations for assumed inflation rates of 6and 3 percent and no inflation giving the following results.

Assumed Assumedinflation, inflation, Assumed

Approximate uniform annual fuel cost 6 percent 3 percent no inflation

Nuclear frigateConventional frigate in same time frame .

$6,000,00011,000,000

$5,000,0008, 000, 000

$5,000,0006,000,000

DISTORTION IN COST COMPARISONS

Eepresentative HOLIFIELD. We would like to have that and have itupdated, because we ran into that very thing, as you remember, whenthe John F. Kennedy aircraft carrier was supposed to be built as anuclear warship. The Joint Committee recommendation was that it bebuilt as a nuclear warship.

Secretary McNamara submitted us the capital cost of both the con-ventional and the nuclear and one of the factors that he convenientlyleft out which brought about a distortion was the very fact you bringup, that the cost of the John F. Kennedy with a nuclear core wouldhave included severals years of fueling while the cost of the conven-

44

tional carrier did not add anything for the same amount of nauticalmiles that they would have to support with additional fueling.

Neither did it bring into consideration the escort tankers that had togo out to meet them at different places and that sort of thing.

So, this is in line. By the way, there came a time before SecretaryMcNamara left office that he was confronted with it, and I think weput out a report on that, we put out a report showing just exactlythe fault in the comparison of his experts on this thing by not includ-ing the several years of nuclear propulsion that was included in thecore.

Admiral RICKOVER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly summarizethe paper Mr. Leighton has put into the record. It shows that the totalcost of providing the initial reactor cores for the latest Nimitz classcarrier, the CarlVinson, is $90 million; whereas, the cost of providingan equivalent amount of fuel oil 'for a conventional carrier is $266million, almost three times as much.

For a frigate on the same basis, the nuclear fuel costs $27 millionand providing an equivalent amount of fuel for a conventionl frigatecosts $48 million.

Representative HOIJFIELD. That does not take into considerationthe full power operation of the nuclear which is impossible with theconventional?

Admiral RICKOVER. No, sir. It does not. I have a recent letter fromthe captain of a nuclear frigate in which he describes his own experi-ences when he had to operate with conventional ships and how hecouldn't dp all he wished to do because the conventional ships couldn'tkeep up with him.

He had to slow down his schedules. The conventional ships had tohave oilers. "With your permission, I would like to include that letterin the record, too.

[The document follows:]U.S.S. "BAINBRIDGE" DLG(N) 25,

FLEET POST OFFICE,San Francisco, Calif., February 6,1974.

Adm. H. G. RICKOVEB,Naval Ship Systems Command, Navy Department,Washington, D.C.

DEAR ADMIRAL RICKOVER: On 26 Dec 73 Bainbridge was ordered to proceedfrom Singapore to the Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea [deleted] to relieve the on-station DLG, then escorting a CVA; and subsequently to assume the role of asurveillance task unit in the Indian Ocean. A conventionally powered DEG,U.8&. Schofield (DEG-3), was assigned to escort Bainbridge. The Bainbridgctask unit, consisting of Bainbridge and Schofield, was thus formed and pro-ceeded to the Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea. The assignment of Schofield resulted ina considerable logistic problem in that fuel oil had to be prepositioned along thetrack. This resulted in the delaying of an outward bound AO for a period of36 hours. The AO was directed to hold its position East of the Malacca Straitsin order that Schofield could refuel before continuing the transit to the assignedrendezvous. Upon completion of refueling, 27 December, the task unit proceededat a maximum speed of fifteen knots. This speed restriction was necessitated bythe distance involved, [deleted] nm, and the fuel consumption rate of Schofield.Upon rendezvous, [deleted] on 3 Jan 74 with the CVA group Schofield had only

45

20% burnable fuel on board which necessitated an immediate night time refuel-ing from the OVA. Additionally, It had been necessary for the OVA to signif-icantly modify Its Intended track to accommodate the Sehoftetd refueling, Bain-bridge arrived fully ready to conduct unrestricted operations.

The glow fifteen knot average speed of the transit bythe task unit resulted inBainbrtdffo not being able to conduct a timely relief with the on station DLO.A gap of four days of the Indian Ocean BLG asset resulted and a non-contactrelief was effected. This gap had an adverse tactical impact in that it deprivedthe OVA of complete AAW defense. Throughout the Singapore to Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea transit there was no flexibility for task unit diversion for contin-gency operations. This was due to the fact that the task units' operations werestrictly governed by the fuel constraints of Schofteld.

While conducting Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea operations it was necessary tomaintain an AO class ship in the immediate vicinity. The dedication of thishighly valued service force ship was entirely for the DIG in company with Bain-bridge. Sufficient provisions and repair parts are carried on board Bainbridg® sothat logistic support was not required for the nuclear powered warship. Thus, theneed for fuel by the DEG was the only reason that an additional naval assethad to remain In the immediate vicinity.

On 11 January, a U.S. Navy ship transiting the West coast of Africa requiredemergency fueling due to lack of fuel at normal refueling ports in that area. TheAO, then In company with the Bainbridffe task unit, was diverted on 12 Januaryto rendezvous with the conventionally powered ship. Because of the projectedAO's eleven day absence for this emergency refueling and the need to refuelScliofieU frequently it was necessary that Schofleld accompany the AO. Thusthe task unit was split by the need for fuel.

Subsequently on 15 January, a change in task unit operating procedures wasordered by higher authority. This resulted In Bainbridffe proceeding at 20 kts,[deleted] to the Seychelles Islands. No positioning of logistic support forces wasnecessary to support this transit and Bainbridge arrived fully ready to con-duct unrestricted operations. Were this transit conducted by the conventionalcounterpart of a DLGN, she would have consumed about 36% of her total fuelcapacity and would have required refueling.

On 81 Jan. 1074, the Bainbridffe task unit along with an AO, conducted a1140 mile transit from Socotra to a port visit at Bandar Abbas, Iran. This transitwas conducted at an SOA of 12 kts. The slow SOA was dictated by speed limita-tions of the AO and the current fuel shortage. During the transit 8oJwfieldrequired two refuellngs In order to arrive at Bandar Abbas with a full load offuel. This slow SOA and the desire to retain task unit integrity requiredBainbridffe to depart the [deleted] station off Socotra two days earlier thanwould have been required had Bainbridffe been operating independently and beenallowed to transit at a higher SOA, at speeds more nearly approaching theoptimum economical speed of a DLGN.

The events related herein clearly demonstrate typical tactical limitationsplaced upon task forces by fossil fuel ships; and the distinct tactical superiorityoffered by a nuclear powered surface ship in achieving mission goals. In a war-time environment these limitations certainly reduce military effectiveness; andcan very well be the immediate and proximate cause for loss of a battle.

Capt. WIIXIAM R. SHEBIDAN.

Admiral RICKOVER. We have a number of letters, living testimonyfrom commanding officers of nuclear ships who have been pointingthis out for years, but no one in the Navy will read those letters. Theydon't care.

Representative HOLIFIELD. I certainly think it is pertinent for therecord that we have that because from my own knowledge, it certainlyputs a different light on the overall cost of the nuclear ship if youfactor in the performance and the advantages of more space for air-planes, for fighting planes on the nuclear carrier in place of theadditional oil.

46

COST OP ALL WEAPONS IS INCREASING

Admiral RICKOVER. The main .argument used against nuclear shipsis their higher acquisition cost. But the cost of airplanes has gone up20 to 25 times since World War II. We have more airplanes on acarrier than we had at that time. If we went entirely on a cost basis,we would only have four or five airplanes on a carrier. I can't under-stand why the same people who accept the great increase in cost willalways say that because nuclear power is more expensive we shouldn'thave it. I just don't understand the logic, if you can call it logic.

I hope, as a result of this hearing, perhaps the committee—andthere are many Members on the committee from both Houses who areexpert in the ways of Congress—will do something about it. I do notsubscribe to the theory that Congress cannot have its will if it reallywants to. If that were the case, then we would no longer have a systemof representative government. I do not believe that Congress cannotprevail over any branch of the Executive. I don't think that is so. Ithink if Congress wanted to, they could.

Senator DOMINICK. Admiral, the trouble with your argument thereis that in order for Congress to reflect your viewpoint, which I thinkthose of us on the committee do, the people as a wnole have to reflect it.The people as a whole around this country do not like the military inany way.

Admiral RICKOVER. Nor do they understand today the complex issueof the difference between nuclear and conventional power.

SOVIET SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION

Senator DOMINICK. One of the things we ought to be doing, in myopinion is to take away all classification on what potential enemiesare doing and just release those over and over and over again until thepublic understands that we have a problem. It is when the Secretary ofDefense, as he did before the Armed Services Committee, comes inand says with the Navy we now have we cannot sustain our position ina great many places in the world, then you have problems.

But the public does not understand that at all.Representative HOLIFIELD. I agree with you completely. I don't

know what the problem would be. I know sometime ago, a year or soago, we had the briefing where it showed a number of submarinesbeing built on the ways on some river there, or in a harbor in theSoviet Union. [Deleted.]

Admiral RICKOVER. [Deleted.]Representative HOLIFIELD. Can you give us that number ?Admiral RICKOVER. We can put it in the record exactly what we be-

lieve they are building. Some of that information has been released.Representative HOLIFIELD. This is a classified record.Admiral RICKOVER. We will put the story in the record and then it

can be sanitized prior to public issuance.[The information referred to follows:]

47

Soviet submarines estimated to be under construction

Nuclear ballistic missile:YANKEEDELTA

Nuclear cruise missile: CHARLIE.Nuclear attack: [Deleted.]Diesel attack: [Deleted.]Unidentified

Total

[Deleted.]

U.S. SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION

Representative HOLIFIELD. How many submarines are actually onthe United States ways right now being built ?

Mr. LEIGHTON. Seven on the ways. We have others that have beencompleted and have not been commissioned yet, but there are a totalof seven on the ways.

Representative HOLIFIELD. What is the lead time in the building ofa submarine ?

Mr. LEIGHTON. It is taking close to 5 years now.Representative HOUFIELD. How many are shown being built in the

Soviet Union ?Mr. LEIGHTON. I would say right now they may have a total on the

waysMr. WEGNER. In ballistic missile submarines, we think they have a

total of [deleted] DELTA'S on the ways right now. Just DELTA'Salone. [Deleted.]

It is estimated there are [deleted] that are being built in one yardalone.

Representative HOUFIELD. That is in one yard ?Mr. WEGNER. Yes, sir. There are [deleted].Representative HOLIFIELD. How long does it take them from keel

laying to finish to produce a submarine?Admiral RICKOVER. [Deleted.]Senator SYMINGTON. Admiral, I have to leave you. I want to con-

gratulate you.Admiral RICKOVER. Thank you, sir. I appreciate those fine thoughts.Representative HOLIFIELD. Are there any further questions ?Thank you, Admiral Rickover, for your testimony. We will adjourn

the meeting now.SUMMARY

Admiral RICKOVER. Thank you very much for your courtesy. As al-ways, I deeply appreciate coming before this committee where I havesuch a sympathetic audience. It is a great personal gratification.

On the other hand, a far deeper personal gratification for me is that,despite the fact that the public is not familiar with all the aspects ofthis program, it can depend a great deal on Congress.

If you really try to do something about the lack of a long-range nu-clear shipbuilding program and perhaps if the committee were tomake a recommendation that we create such a program with legisla-

48

tion analogous to the Vinson-Trammell Act, I think that might findfavor with the public and the Members of Congress.

That would be one way, perhaps, of solving this problem. You per-sonally have done so very much during your service on this commit-tee, Mr, Holifield. You are a charter member; you have taken much ofthe lead; you have been chairman many times.

I believe it would be most fitting if before you left Congress youcould do something to help solve mis problem. Certainly you havetaken the lead in many areas of the Atomic Energy program.

I know of no other way, with administrations changing in the NavyDepartment every few years. People with different ideas keep comingin; each man sets up his own program and the next man changes it.This has certainly been true as far as nuclear power is concerned.

I think if you were to succeed in that, it would be to your everlastingcredit. -

Kepresentative HOLIFIELD. I certainly will support it. However, Ithink you will agree with me that the Vinson-Trammell Act camefrom the-Armed Services Committee. That is where it would comefrom. Of course, we have Mr. Price on that. He is second in seniority onthe Democratic side. I don't know what their attitude toward this is.

Admiral RICKOVER. I know that you and Senator Dominick hay©influence in other places in the Congress. Perhaps you could help, sir.

[Representative HOLIFIELD. Thank you very much, Admiral.The meeting is adjourned.[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the Joint Committee adjourned, to recon-

vene subject to call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX 1

POLARIS/POSEIDON SUBMARINES

Name

George Washington.Patrick HenryTheodore Roosevelt ..Robert E. LeeAbraham LincolnEthan AllenSam Houston...,Thomas A. EdisonJohn MarshallLafayette „Alexander HamiltonThomas JeffersonAndrew Jackson....John AdamsJames Monroe ...Nathan HaleWoodrow WilsonHenry ClayDaniel WebsterJames Madison....TecumsehDaniel BooneJohn C. CalhounUlysses S. GrantVonSteubenCasimir PulaskiStonewall JacksonSam RayburnNathanael GreeneBenjamin Franklin. ...Simon BolivarKamehamehaGeorge Bancroft ".Lewis and ClarkJames K. PolkGeorge C. Marshall ..Henry L. StimsonGeorge Washington CarverFrancis Scott Key .......Mariano G. Vallejo.Will Rogers

Hull No.

SSBN-598SSBN-599SSBN-600SSBN-601SSBN-602SSBN-608SSBN-609

, SSBN-610».J SSBN-611

•_ SSBN-616SSBN-617SSBN-618SSBN-619SSBN-S20SSBN-622

, SSBN-623SSBN-624SSBN-625SSBN-626SSBN-627SSBN-628SSBN-629SSBN-630SSBN-631

;. SSBN-632SSBN-633SSBN-634SSBN-635SSBN-636SSBN-640SSBN-641SSBN-642

. SSBN-643SSBN-644SSBN-645SSBN-654SSBN-655SSBN-656SSBN-657SSBN-658SSBN-659

Shipbuildingprogram

19R81958195819591959195919591959195919611961196119611961196119611961196119611962196219621962196219621962196219621962196319631963196319631963196419641964196419641964

Commissioned

Dec. 30,1959Apr. 9,1960Feb. 13,1961Sept. 16, 1960Mar. 8,1961Aug. 8,1961Mar. 6,1962Mar. 10, 1962May 21,1962Apr. 23, 1963June 27, 1963Jan. 4, 1963July 3,1963May 12,1964Dec. 7,1963Nov. 23, 1963Dec. 27,1963Feb. 20,1964Apr. 9,1964July 28,1964May 29,1964Apr. 23, 1964Sept 15, 1964July 17,1964Sept. 30, 1964Aug. 14, 1964Aug. 26, 1964Dec. 2,1964Dec. 19,1964Oct. 22,1965Oct. 29,1965Dec. 10,1965Jan. 22,1966Dec. 22,1965Apr. 16,1966Apr. 29,1966Aug. 22, 1966June 15,1966Dec. 3,1966Dec. 16,1966Apr. 1,1967

(49)

APPENDIX 2

Report NT-7U-1March 1974

ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING ANDDISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES

FROM U. S. NAVAL NUCLEAR-POWERED SHIPSAND THEIR SUPPORT FACILITIES

1973

Prepared byM. E. Miles, G. L. Sjoblom, J. D. Eagles

Nuclear Power DirectorateNaval Ship Systems Command

Department of the Navy

Approved by

/jH. G. RICKOVER, ADM USNDeputy Commanderfor Nuclear Propulsion

(51)

52

ABSTRACT

The environmental effect of disposal of radioactivewastes originating from U.S. Naval nuclear propulsion plantsand their support facilities is assessed. The total radio-activity, less tritium discharged to all ports and harborsfrom the more than one hundred Naval nuclear-powered shipsand supporting tenders, Naval bases and shipyards was lessthan 0.002 curie in 1973. The total tritium released to allports and harbors was less than one curie in 1973. Thisreport confirms that procedures used by the Navy to controlreleases of radioactivity from U. S. Naval nuclear-poweredships and their support facilities are effective in protectingthe environment and the health and safety of the general public,

53

SUMMARY

The radioactivity in wastes-discussed in this reportoriginates in the pressurized water reactors of U. S. Navalnuclear-powered ships. As of the end of 1973, the U.S. Navy had103 nuclear-powered submarines and four nuclear-poweredsurface ships in operation. Support facilities involved inconstruction, maintenance, overhaul and refueling of thesenuclear propulsion plants include nine shipyards, eleventenders, and two submarine bases. This report describesdisposal of radioactive liquid wastes, disposal of solidwastes and monitoring of the environment to determine theeffect of radioactive releases. This report concludes thatradioactivity associated with U. S. Naval nuclear-poweredships has had no significant or discernable effect on thequality of the environment. A summary of the radio-logical environmental information supporting this conclusionfollows:

From the start of the Naval nuclear propulsion programthe policy of the U. S. N*avy has been to reduce to theminimum practicable the amounts of radioactivity releasedinto harbors. Navy procedures to accomplish this have beenreviewed with the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission and theU. S. Environmental Protection Agency. The total radioactivitydischarged within twelve miles from shore from all U. S. Navalnuclear-powered ships and their support facilities in recentyears is shown in the following table:

Number of Ships Volume Radioactivity-CuriesYear In Operation Thousand Gallons (less tritium)

1969 91 3326 0.0481970 96 2571 0.0241971 100 1089 less than 0.0021972 104 289 less than 0.0021973 107 less than 25 less than 0.002

As a measure of the significance of these data, if oneperson were able to drink the entire amount of radioactivitydischarged into any harbor in 1973, he would not exceed theannual radiation exposure permitted by the U. S. Atomic EnergyCommission for its employees and licensees.

Although of less significance than the amount of radio-activity, the table also shows that the volume of liquidsreleased within twelve miles has been reduced from millionsof gallons per year to less than twenty-five thousand gallonsin 1973. This reduction was achieved by reduction of wastegeneration and by processing and reuse of waste water.

54

Environmental monitoring is conducted by the U.S. Navy inU.S. and foreign harbors frequented by U.S. Naval nuclear-poweredships. This monitoring consists of analyzing harbor waterand sediment samples for radioactivity associated withNaval nuclear propulsion plants, radiation monitoring aroundthe perimeter of support facilities and effluent monitoring.Environmental samples from each of these harbors are alsochecked at least annually by a U.S Atomic Energy CommissionLaboratory to ensure analytical procedures are correct andstandardized. The U. S. Environmental Protection Agencyhas conducted independent surveys in U. S. harbors; resultshave been consistent with Navy results. These surveyshave confirmed that U. S.. Naval nuclear-powered ships andsupport facilities have had no significant effect on theradioactivity of the marine environment.

55

RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE DISPOSAL

Policy and Procedures Minimizing Release of Radioactivity inH a r b o r s ~ — — - _ _

The policy of the U.S. Navy is to reduce to the minimumpracticable the amounts of radioactivity released to theenvironment but particularly within twelve miles from shoreincluding into harbors. This policy is consistent with appli-cable recommendations issued by the Federal Radiation Council(incorporated in Environmental Protection Agency in 1970),U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, National Council on RadiationProtection and Measurements, International Commission onRadiological Protection, International Atomic Energy Agency,and National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council(references 1 through 7*). Keeping releases small minimizesthe radioactivity available to build up in the environment orto concentrate in marine life. To implement this policy ofminimizing releases, the Navy has issued standard instructionsdefining the radioactive waste disposal limits and proceduresto be used by U.S. Naval nuclear-powered ships and theirsupport facilities. These instructions were reviewed andconcurred in by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the U.S.Public Health Service. (The radiological surveillance organi-zation of U.S. Public Health Service has since been moved tothe U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.)

Source of Radioactivity

• In the shipboard reactors, pressurized water circulatingthrough the reactor core picks up the heat of nuclear_reaction.Reactor cooling water circulates through a closed piping systemto heat exchangers which transfer the heat to water in asecondary steam system isolated from the primary cooling water.The steam is then used as the source of power for the propulsionplant as well as for auxiliary machinery. Releases from theshipboard reactors occur primarily when reactor coolant waterexpands as a result of being heated to operating temperature;this coolant passes through a purification system ion exchangeresin bed prior to being transferred from the ship.

The principal source of radioactivity in liquid wastesis from trace amounts of corrosion and wear products fromreactor plant metal surfaces in contact with reactor coolingwater. Radionuclides with half-lives greater than one day inthese corrosion and wear products include tungsten 187,

References are listed at end of report

56

chromium 51, hafnium 181, iron 59, iron 55, zirconium 95,tantalum 182, manganese 54, cobalt 58, and cobalt 60. Thepredominant and also longest-lived of these is cobalt 60,which has a 5.3 year half-life; cobalt 60 also has the mostrestrictive concentration limit in water listed by organiza-tions which set radiological standards in references 1, 2,and 3 for these corrosion and wear radionuclides. Therefore,radioactive waste disposal is conservatively controlled byassuming that all the long-lived radioactivity is cobalt 60.

Support facilities are equipped with processing systemsto remove most of the radioactivity from liquid waste priorto release into harbors. These liquid wastes result fromtransferring water from ships as well as decontaminatingradioactively contaminated piping systems and laundering anti-contamination clothing worn by personnel.

Liquid Waste Releases in Harbors

The total amounts of long-lived radioactivity releasedinto harbors and seas within twelve miles from shore duringthe past five years are summarized in Table 1, which updatesinformation in references 8 through 15 . Included are dataon releases from U. S. Naval nuclear-powered ships and fromsupporting shipyards, tenders and submarine bases. Locationslisted in Table 1 include all operating bases and home portsin the U. S. and overseas as well as all other ports whichwere visited by Naval nuclear-powered ships. The quantitiesof radioactivity listed in this table are conservatively re-ported as if the entire radioactivity consisted of cobalt 60,which is the predominant long-lived radionuclide and alsohas the most stringent concentration limits.

• Although of less significance than the amount of radio-activity, the volume of waste has also been reduced. Theaverage volume released into all harbors in the middle nine-teen sixties was five million gallons per year. In 1973 thevolume released was less than 25,000 gallons. This reductionwas achieved by reduction of waste generation and by processingand reuse of waste water.

The table shows that the total amount of radioactivityreleased within all U. S. and foreign harbors by the morethan 100 nuclear-powered ships in the U. S. Navy has beenless than 0.002 curie per year since 1970. To put this smallquantity of radioactivity into perspective, it is less thanthe quantity of naturally occurring radioactivity (reference16) in the volume of saline harbor water occupied by a singlenuclear-powered submarine.

57

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Short Lived Radionuclides

Reactor coolant also contains'short-lived radionuclideswith half-lives of seconds to hours. Their highest concen-trations in reactor coolant are from nitrogen 16 (7 secondhalf-life), nitrogen 13 (10 minute half-life), fluorine 18,(1.8 hour half-life), argon HI (1.8 hour half-life andmanganese 56 (2.6 hour half-life). During 1973 the totalquantity of these short-lived radionuclides was less than0.001 curie in any release from any ship. For the longest-lived of these, about one day after discharge from an operatingreactor the concentration is reduced to one thousandth of theinitial concentration and in about two days the concentration isreduced to one millionth.

Most liquid releases from ships during new constructionoccur during heating up prior to extensive power operation ofthe reactor before any buildup of long-lived radionuclides inreactor coolant can occur. The total short lived radioactivityof such-releases in 1973 was less than 0.001 curie in sixteenthousand gallons of water; these releases are included inTable 1.

Fission Product Radionuclides

Fission products produced in the reactor are retainedwithin the fuel elements. The fission gases krypton andxenon are also retained within the fuel elements. However,trace quantities of naturally occurring uranium impuritiesin reactor structural materials release small amounts offission products to reactor coolant. The concentrations offission products and the volumes of reactor coolant releasedare so low, however, that the total radioactivity attributedto long-lived fission product radionuclides strontium 90and cesium 137 in releases from U. S. Naval nuclear-poweredships and their support facilities has been less than 0.001curie per year for all harbors combined. Fallout_of$thesesame fission products has often been more than this in onerainfall in a single harbor.

Tritium

Small amounts of tritium are formed in reactor coolantsystems as a result of neutron interaction with the approxi-mately 0.015 percent of naturally occurring deuterium_presentin water, and other nuclear reactions. Although tritium hasa 12 year half-life, the radiation produced is of such lowenergy that the radioactivity concentration guide issued bythe International Commission on Radiological Protection, the

59

USAEC and by other standard-setting organizations is one_hundred times higher for tritium than for cobalt 60. Thistritium is in the oxide form and chemically indistinguishablefrom water; therefore it does not concentrate significantlyin marine life or collect on sediment as do other radio-nuclides.

Tritium is naturally present in the environment becauseit is generated by cosmic radiation in the upper atomosphere.Reference 17 reports that the production rate from this sourceis about six million curies per year, which through rainfallcauses a tritium inventory in the oceans of about one hundredmillion curies. Because of this naturally occurring tritium,much larger releases of tritium than are conceivable fromNaval nuclear reactors would be required to make a measurablechange in the background tritium concentration.

The total amount of tritium released during each of thelast 5 years from all U.S. Naval nuclear-powered ships andtheir supporting tenders, bases and shipyards has been lessthan 200 curies. Most of this has been into the ocean greaterthan twelve miles from shore. This total tritium from theentire nuclear Navy is less than typical electrical generatingnuclear power stations release each year (references 18 and19). Total tritium released into harbors within twelve mileswas less than one curie in 1973. Such releases are too smallto |ncrease measurably the tritium concentration in theenvironment. Therefore tritium has not been included in thedata in other sections of this report.

Liquid Waste Releases at Sea

Radioactive liquid wastes are released at sea understrict controls. These ocean releases are consistent withrecommendations the Council on Environmental Quality made in1970 to the President in reference 20. Procedures and limitsfor ocean disposal have been consistent with recommendationsmade by the National Academy of Sciences—National ResearchCouncil in reference 5 and by the International Atomic EnergyAgency in reference 6. These releases have contained muchless radioactivity than these reports considered would beacceptable. Total long-lived radioactivity excluding tritium,released farther than twelve miles from shore by U. S. Navalnuclear-powered ships and supporting tenders is shown in Table2 for recent years. This is the total amount released fromover 100 ships at different times of the year in the open seaat long distances from land in small incremental amounts, andunder rapid dispersal conditions due to wave action. Thequantity of radioactivity released to the open ocean in 1973was O.U curie, which is less than the naturally occurringradioactivity in a cube of sea water approximately 100 yardson a side.

60

TABLE 2

TOTAL RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE RELEASED AT SEA

BY ALL U. S. NAVAL NUCLEAR-POWERED SHIPS

AND SUPPORTING TENDERS

Curies

1.70.80.80.60.4

61

SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL .

During maintenance and overhaul operations, solid low-level radioactive wastes consisting of contaminated rags,plastic bags, paper, filters, ion exchange resin and scrapmaterials are collected by nuclear-powered ships and theirsupport facilities. Expended naval~reactor fuel is trans-ferred to the U.,S. Atomic Energy Commission for reprocessingin the same manner as other expended nuclear fuel.

Solid radioactive materials from Naval nuclear-poweredships are not dumped at sea since the Navy 'procedures prohibitsea disposal of solid radioactive materials. Solid radioactivewaste materials are packaged in strong tight containers,shielded as necessary and shipped to burial sites licensed bythe USAEC or a State under agreement with USAEC. Shipyardsand other shore facilities are not permitted to dispose ofradioactive solid wastes by burial on their own sites. TheNavy procedures require all packaging and shipping of radioactivematerials to be performed in strict compliance with U. S. Depart-ment of Transportation and USAEC requirements.

Table 3 summarizes total radioactivity and volumes ofradioactive solid waste disposal for the last five years.Table 3 does not include wastes associated with expended fuelwhich is processed in special facilities by the USAEC.

Because of efforts to minimize solid waste and theutilization of compaction equipment, total volumes have remainednearly constant in spite of increasing work caused by increasingnumbers of ships. The average annual volume for the entireNaval nuclear propulsion program could be contained in a cubemeasuring fifteen yards on a side. The radioactivity does not,require excessively long time care in the licensed burial groundsince the principal radionuclides do not have half-lives longerthan five years. In one hundred years, such radioactivity willhave decayed to one' millionth the initial radioactivity. In lessthan two hundred years, the total of all radioactivity con-servatively assumed to be cobalt 60 in Table 3 will have decayedto less than one millionth of a curie and would not be detectablein the burial grounds using sensitive monitoring instruments.

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63

ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

To provide additional assurance that procedures used bythe U. S. Navy to control radioactivity are adequate to protectthe environment, the Navy conducts environmental monitor-ing in harbors frequented by its nuclear-powered ships. Environ-mental monitoring surveys for radioactivity are periodicallyperformed in harbors where U.S. Naval nuclear-powered ships arebuilt or overhauled and where these ships have home ports oroperating bases. To ensure thoroughness and objectivity, thesesurveys are made as independent as practicable from wastedisposal operations. Samples from each harbor monitored arealso_checked at least annually by a U.S. Atomic Energy Com-mission (USAEC) laboratory to ensure analytical procedures arecorrect and standardized. These USAEC laboratory results havebeen consistent with shipyard and operating base results. As afurther independent check of environmental monitoring a labora-tory of the Environmental Protection Agency has conducteddetailed surveys of selected harbors (references 21, 22, 23 and24). This laboratory has monitored the harbors at Charleston,South Carolina; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; San Diego, California;Vallejo, California; New London, Connecticut; Newport News,Virginia; and Norfolk, Virginia. Navy monitoring results havebeen consistent with these surveys.

The current Navy environmental monitoring program consistsof analyzing samples of harbor water and sediment, supplementedby shoreline surveys, posted dosimeters and effluent monitoring.

Five water samples are taken in each harbor once eachquarter year in areas where nuclear-powered ships berth andfrom upstream and downstream locations. These samples areanalyzed for gross gamma radioactivity and for cobalt 60 content.Samples are analyzed using a sodium iodide scintillationdetector with a multichannel analyzer. Procedures for analysiswill detect cobalt 60 if its concentration exceeds one threehundredth of the USAEC limit of reference 1. No cobalt 60 hasbeen detected in any of the water samples from all harborsmonitored.

A radiological laboratory now part of the EnvironmentalProtection Agency analyzed samples from harbors to identifyradionuclides present in sediment. These analyses showedcobalt 60 was the predominant radionuclide added to sedimentfrom Naval nuclear reactor operations. Therefore Navy monitoringprocedures require collecting in each harbor approximately 20to 120 sediment samples once each quarter year. Standard six

64

inch square samplers modified to collect only the top one-halfto onie inch of sediment are used. The top layer was selectedbecause it should be more mobile and more accessible to marinelife than deeper layers. The samples are analyzed for grossgamma radioactivity and for cobalt 60. Results of the 2967sediment samples from harbors monitored by the Navy in theU. S. and possessions for 1973 are summarized in Table U.

Evaluation of the data summarized in Table H shows thatlow-level cobalt 60 radioactivity in harbor bottom sediment isdetected around a few piers at operating bases and shipyardswhere nuclear-powered ship maintenance and overhauls have beenconducted over a period of several years. Cobalt 60 is notdetectable above background levels in general harbor bottomareas away from these piers. Maximum total radioactivityobserved in a U. S. harbor is less than 0.1 curie of cobalt 60.This radioactivity is small 'compared to background, since thequantity of naturally occurring radioactivity such as potassium40, radium, uranium and thorium present in the sediment of atypical harbor amounts to hundreds of curies. Comparison toprevious environmental monitoring data in references 8 through15 shows that these environmental cobalt 60 levels have beensteadily decreasing.

The first data column in Table 4 includes all sampleswith less than three picocuries of cobalt 60 per gram ofsediment. These low levels are difficult to measure becausethe levels of radioactivity in sediment from other sources aremuch higher. The value of 30 picocuries per gram was selectedfor the top of the second range of data since it corresponds tothe upper limit for exposure in references 1 and 3 even if con-sumed continuously by members of the general public. Althoughsediment cannot be consume^ by humans, it might serve as a foodsource for marine life. Data on uptake of cobalt 60 by marinelife obtained to date show that in the salt water harborbottom environments, no significant buildup of cobalt 60 occursin marine life. EPA evaluation in reference 23 shows that thecobalt 60 is in the form of metallic corrosion product particleswhich do not appear to be assimilated or transmitted in thefood chain. The third range of up to 300 picocuries per gramis selected as a range which would not cause members of thegeneral public to receive radiation exposure approaching thevalues set in references 1, 2, 3, and 4. Concentrationsof cobalt 60 up to 300 picocuries per gram are so low that theUSAEC does not require those who might possess them to belicensed. If concentrations higher than 300 picocuries pergram were to persist over substantial areas of a harbor bottom,further monitoring would be performed to determine if any of

65

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66

this radioactivity were being taken up by marine life foreventual consumption in food. Because of the low concentra-tions noted in Table 4, monitoring of radioactivity in marinelife has not been necessary as part of routine environmentalmonitoring programs in these harbors.

Estimates of the radiation exposure to members of thegeneral public from radioactivity released into river andharbor waters and sediment and in air exhausted from facilitieshave been made as discussed in references 16 and 25 byanalyzing the pathways whereby radioactivity might be trans-mitted from the marine environment to man. These analysesconsidered direct exposure, such as to sediment along shore-lines and by drinking harbor water, and indirect pathways suchas consumption of bottom feeding fish or shellfish. Theseanalyses showed that personnel exposure from this radio-activity would be far too low" to measure and could only beestimated. Based on radioactivity released including theamounts and concentrations reported in Table 1 of this report,the maximum radiation exposure in a year to any member of thegeneral public would be less than 0.01 millirem. This is lessthan one ten thousandth of the average annual exposure of 125.millirem (reference 7) to members of the general public fromnatural radioactivity or from exposure to medical diagnosticx-rays. Reference 26 contains proposed guidelines foreffluents from water-cooled nuclear power reactors includingmore restrictive exposure limits of 5 mrem per year for membersof the public outside the facility. These new guidelines donot apply to nuclear-powered ships and support facilities;however, the dose from radioactivity releases from thesefacilities as estimated above is far less than the new guide-lines.

For comparison, references 27 and 28 contain evaluations byUSAEC laboratories of the effects on the environment from theaccumulation near points of discharge of radionuclides from severalnuclear reactors. These reports conclude for these other reactorsthat radioactivity levels much greater than shown in Table 4 havecaused no significant radiation exposure to the general public.

In all monitored harbors, twice per year shoreline areasuncovered at low tide are surveyed for radiation levels withsensitive radiation detectors to determine if any radioactivityfrom bottom sediment washed ashore. All results were the sameas background radiation levels in these regions, approximately0.01 millirem per hour. Thus, there is no evidence in these portsthat radioactivity from sediment is washing ashore.

67

Sensitive dosimeters are continuously posted at locationsoutside the boundaries of areas where radioactive work is per-formed. These dosimeters showed that radiation exposure tothe general public from radioactive work on Naval nuclearpropulsion plants within these facilities was not above thatreceived from natural background radiation levels.

Naval nuclear reactors and their support facilities aredesigned to ensure there are no significant discharges ofradioactivity in airborne exhausts. Radiological controls areexercised in support facilities to preclude exposure of workingpersonnel to airborne radioactivity exceeding limits such asspecified in reference 1. Further, all air exhausted from thesefacilities is passed through high efficiency particulate airfilters and monitored during discharge. There were no dis-charges of airborne radioactivity above concentrations normallypresent in the atmosphere.

68

CONCLUSIONS

1. The total radioactivity, less tritium, released into allports and harbors from the U.S. Naval nuclear propulsionprogram was less than 0,002 curie in 1973, The totaltritium released into all ports and harbors was less thanone curie in 1973,

2. No increase of radioactivity above normal backgroundlevels has been detected in harbor water where U, S,Naval nuclear-powered ships are based, overhauled, orconstructed.

3. Liquid wastes from U. S. Naval nuclear-powered shipsand support facilities have not caused a measurableincrease in the general"background radioactivity ofthe environment.

4. Low-level cobalt 60 radioactivity in harbor bottomsediment is detectable around a few piers at operatingbases and shipyards where nuclear-powered shipmaintenance and overhauls have been conducted over aperiod of several years. Cobalt 60 is not detectableabove background levels in general harbor bottom areasaway from these piers. Maximum total radioactivityobserved in a U. S. harbor of less than 0.1 curie ofcobalt 60 is small compared to the naturally occurringradioactivity. Comparison to previous environmentaldata summarized in references 8 through 15 shows thatthese environmental cobalt 60 levels are continuingto decrease.

5. Procedures used by the Navy to control discharges ofradioactivity from U. S. Naval nuclear-powered shipsand their support facilities have been effective inprotecting the environment and the health and safetyof the general public.

69

REFERENCES

(1) Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10 (Atomic EnergyCommission), Part 20, "Standards for Protection AgainstRadiation".

(2) National Council on Radiation Protection and Measure-ments, Report No. 22, "Maximum Permissible Body Burdensand Maximum Permissible Concentrations of Radionuclidesin Air and in Water for Occupational Exposure",(Published as National Bureau of Standards Handbook 69,Issued June 1959, superseding Handbook 52).

(3) International Commission on Radiological Protection,Publication 2, "Report of Committee II on PermissibleDose for Internal Radiation (1959)", with 1962Supplement Issued in ICRP Publication 6; Publication 9,"Recommendations on Radiation Exposure (1965)"; andICRP Publication 7 (1965), amplifying specific recom-mendations of Publication 9 concerning environmentalmonitoring.

CO Federal Radiation Council Memoranda, approved by PresidentEisenhower on May 13, 1960, President Kennedy on September20, 1961, and President Johnson on July 31, 1964.

(5) National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council,Publication 658, "Radioactive Waste Disposal from Nuclear-powered Ships", 1959.

(6) International Atomic Energy Agency, "Radioactive WasteDisposal into the Sea", Safety Series No. 5, Vienna 1961.

(7) National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements,Report No. 39, "Basic Radiation Protection Criteria",January 1971.

(8) U. S. Navy Report—"Disposal of Radioactive Wastes fromU. S. Naval Nuclear-powered Ships and Their SupportFacilities, 1965", by J. W. Vaughan and M. E. Milesissued in Radiological Health Data and Reports, May 1966.

(9) U. S. Navy Report—"Disposal of Radioactive Waste fromU. S. Naval Nuclear-Powered Ships and Their SupportFacilities, 1966", by M. E. Miles and J. J. Mangeno,issued in Radiological Health Data and Reports, December1967.

70

(10) U. S. Navy Report—"Disposal of Radioactive Wastesfrom U. S. Naval Nuclear-Powered Ships and TheirSupport Facilities, 1967", by M. E. Miles andJ. J. Mangeno, issued in Radiological Health Dataand Reports, April 1969.

(11) U. S. Navy Report—"Disposal of Radioactive Wastesfrom U. S. Naval Nuclear-Powered Ships and Their SupportFacilities, 1968", by M. E. Miles and J. J. Mangeno,issued in Radiological Health Data and Reports,September 1969.

(12) U. S. Navy Report—"Disposal of Radioactive Wastesfrom U. S. Naval Nuclear-Powered Ships and TheirSupport Facilities, 1969", by J. J. Mangeno andM. E. Miles issued in Radiological Health Data andReports, August 1970.

(13) U. S. Navy Report—"Environmental Monitoring and Disposalof Radioactive Wastes from U. S. Naval Nuclear-PoweredShips and Their Support Facilities, 1970", by M. E. Miles,J. J. Mangeno and R. D. Burke, issued in RadiologicalHealth Data and Reports, May 1971.

(14) U. S. Navy Report—"Environmental Monitoring and Disposalof Radioactive Wastes from U. S. Naval Nuclear-PoweredShips and Their Support Facilities, 1971", by M. E. Miles,G. L. Sjoblom and R. D. Burke, issued in Radiation Dataand Reports, September 1972.

(15) U. S. Navy Report—"Environmental Monitoring and Disposalof Radioactive Wastes from U. S. Naval Nuclear-PoweredShips and Their Support Facilities, 1972", by M. E. Milesand G. L. Sjoblom, issued in Radiation Data and Reports,September 1973.

(16) National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council,"Radioactivity in theMarine Environment", 1971.

(17) U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Report—"Sources of Tritiumand Its Behavior Upon Release to the Environment", byD. G. Jacobs, TID-24635, 1968.

(18) U. S. Public Health Service Report—"Radioactive WasteDischarges to the Environment from Nuclear PowerFacilities", by J. E. Logsdon and R. I. Chissler,BRH/DER 70-2, March 1970.

(19) U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Report - "Radio-active Waste Discharges to the Environment from NuclearPower Facilities, Addendum 1", by J. E. Logsdon andT. L. Robinson, ORP/SID 71-1, October 1971.

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(20) Council on Environmental Quality Report to PresidentNixon—"Ocean Dumping: A National Policy", October1970.

(21) U. S. Public Health Service Report—"Radiological Surveyof Major California Nuclear Ports", by D. F. Cahill,D. C. McCurry and W. D. Breakfield, Clearinghouse forFederal Scientific and Technical Information No. PH178728,April 1968.

(22) U. S. Public Health Service Report—"Radiological Surveyof Hampton Roads (Norfolk--Newport News), Virginia", byH. D. Harvey, Jr., E. D. Toerber and J. A. Gordon,Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and TechnicalInformation No. AD683208, January 1968.

(23) U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Report—"RadiologicalSurveys of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and Environs", byD. F. Cahill, H. D. Harvey, Jr., et al., issued inRadiation Data and Reports, June 1972.

(24) U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Report—"RadiologicalSurvey of New London Harbor, Thames River Connecticut andEnvirons," by S. T. Windham and C. R. Phillips, issued inRadiation Data and Reports, November 1973.

(25) International Atomic Energy Agency Symposium, August 1970,"Environmental Aspects of Nuclear Power Station", IAEA-SM-146/55, "Review of USA Power Reactor Operating Experience",M. Eisenbud, Vienna, 1971.

(26) Proposed Appendix I to Code of Federal Regulations,Title 10 (Atomic Energy Commission) Part 50," Licensingof Production and Utilization Facilities".

(27) Oak Ridge National Laboratory Report—"Clinch River Study"ORNL-4035, April 1967.

(28) Battelle Memorial Institute, Pacific Northwest LaboratoryReport—"Evaluation of Radiological Conditions in theVicinity of Hanford for 1969" BNWL-1505, November 1970;and previous periodic reports in conjunction with reportby J. L. Nelson, R. W. Perkins, J. M. Nielsen andW. L. Haushild, page 139, IAEA Symposium on the Disposalof Radioactive Wastes into Seas, Oceans and SurfaceWaters, Vienna, 16-20 May 1966.

APPENDIX 3

[Excerpt from Congressional Record, July 29, 1974]

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, as a participant in the conference, I risein support of the conference report of the Armed Services Committee on theDepartment of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1975. I am particularlyproud that we were successful in working out with the other body the finallanguage of Title VII—Nuclear Powered Navy. This title will make it: "thepolicy of the United States of America to modernize the strike forces of the U.S.Navy by the construction of nuclear powered major combatant vessels and toprovide for an adequate industrial base for the research, development, design,construction, operation, and maintenance for such vessels."

I, as chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, would like to com-ment on some early history of the nuclear navy and the leadership the Congressprovided in the construction of nuclear-powered warships. Title VIII enunciatesand confirms the policy of the Joint Committee.

This is a policy that the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has advocated formore than a decade. Those of us on the Joint Committee, as well as manymembers of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Commit-tees, who have studied this issue for many years, have been astonished by thelack of foresight exhibited by the executive branch in failing to recognize thenecessity of providing our major warships with nuclear propulsion.

I am proud that in enacting thii legislation it is the Congress which will dem-onstrate foresight, courage, and wisdom by taking this initiative to strengthenthe defense of our Nation. I am sure that naval historians will cite this actionan a classic example of Congress exercising its power under article I, section8, of the Constitution "to provide and maintain a Navy."

Title VIII will provide by law that all future major combatant vessels builtfor the strike forces of the U.S. Navy shall be nuclear powered. The act clearlydefines this to mean all future combatant submarines, aircraft carriers, andcarrier escorts such as cruisers, frigates, and destroyers. Title VIII stipulatesthat henceforth all requests for authorization or appropriation of funds for con-struction of major combatants for the strike forces shall be for nuclear poweredships "unless and until the President of the United States has fully advised theCongress that construction of nuclear powered vessels for such purposes is notin the national interest." It says: Such reports of the President to the Congressshall include for consideration by Congress an alternate program of nuclearpowered ships with appropriate design, cost, and schedule information.

The enactment of title VIII means that the Defense Department and the Navymust now stop wasting the taxpayers funds on further studies of diesel sub-marines, non-nuclear aircraft carriers, and non-nuclear carrier escorts.

The need for nuclear propulsion in major combatant vessels for our navalstrike forces has been studied to death, despite the clearly demonstrated advan-tages of nuclear warships. The continued record of Defense Department delayin approving nuclear warships demonstrates the urgent need for this matter tobe resolved by the legislative process, so that further progress is not impededby each newly appointed civilian or military bureaucrat who is in a position tostop progress in the executive bureaucracy.

Ever since the beginning of the naval nuclear propulsion program the JointCommittee on Atomic Energy has seen to it that we get our information firsthand. We have visited the laboratories where the development work is beingdone. We visited the land prototype site where the original testing for theNautilus was being done. As soon as she was completed we held hearings on theNautilus submerged and at sea. We later held hearings aboard the Skipjack,the first of the higher speed, single-screw nuclear submarines. In 1960, prior to

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the first successful launching of a Polaris missile from a submerged nuclearsubmarine, we held a 2-day meeting of the Joint Committee at sea aboard theU.S.S. George Washington, the first Polaris submarine.

When the first nuclear carrier Enterprise was finished we flew to Guantanamoand held hearings aboard the ship during her shakedown trials off Cuba in early1962. Many of you will remember the fight that erupted the following year whenSecretary of Defense McNamara decided against providing nuclear propulsionfor the aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy. The Joint Committee held extensivehearings in the fall of 1963 on "Nuclear Propulsion for Naval Surface Vessels."We published a committee analysis which pointed out in detail the errors in theDepartment of Defense analysis. The Joint Committee 1963 report specificallyrecommended "that the United States adopt the policy of utilizing nuclear pro-pulsion in all future major surface warships." Regretfully the Kennedy through-out its life will be dependent on a train of tankers, but those of us who carriedon the fight did finally succeed in having Secretary McNamara authorize theNimitz class of nuclear aircraft carriers.

Throughout the early 19600's the Joint Committee and the House and SenateArmed Services and Appropriations Committees engaged in extensive corre-spondence with the Department of Defense over the issue of nuclear propulsionfor surface warships. For anyone interested, much of that correspondence is pub-lished on pages 245 through 318 of the Joint Committee hearing print entitled"Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program 1967-68."

In the late 1960's Congress, based on recommendations of the House ArmedServices Committee, succeeded in getting a nuclear frigate building program es-tablished, but we had to resort to mandatory language in the law to do so.

The Defense Department plan was to stop authorizing any nuclear submarinesby 1970. Some senior analysts in the Pentagon even recommended sinking 10 ofour Polaris submarines as a cost saving measure. Several committees of Congressheld special hearings in 1968 on the nuclear submarine program. As a result ofthis, Congress not only demanded that we continue building nuclear attack sub-marines but that we proceed with submarines of higher speed and greaterquietness.

Three years ago the Department of Defense suddenly terminated plans tobuild more nuclear frigates and the nuclear carrier Carl Vinson CVN-70. Theydid this even though a special subcommittee of the House and Senate ArmedServices Committees had issued an 800-page hearing record and a report whichconcluded we should go ahead with the CVN-70.

Senator Jackson immediately called for hearings of the Military ApplicationsSubcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. We reviewed the wholesubject of nuclear propulsion for naval warships, submarine, and surface. Inaddition to the testimony of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefof Naval Operations, and Admiral Rickover, we obtained the written commentsof the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The record of this investigation is includedin the Joint Committee print titled, "Hearing and Subsequent Inquiry of theSubcommittee on Military Applications on Nuclear Propulsion for Naval War-ships, May 5, 1971-September 30, 1972." That print on pages 123-277 includes a"Chronological Summary of the History of Nuclear Propulsion for SurfaceShips" in which Admiral Rickover cites in detail all of the lengthy studies thathave been made of this subject over the past quarter century. Also on pages 278to 333 of this print are published 26 items of official correspondence concerningnuclear carriers and nuclear frigates.

The perturbations in the world supplies of petroleum gave us a special concernrelative to the supply of fuel for our warships. By letter dated January 5, 1974,1 expressed these concerns to the Department of Defense. I would like to includethis exchange in the record following my remarks.

More recently the Joint Committee report dated April 3, 1974, on the fiscalyear 1975 Atomic Energy Commission appropriation authorization stated:

"The recent interruptions in the availability of foreign petroleum fuel supplieshave highlighted the vulnerability of our petroleum supply lines. It is obviousthat in time of war it may well be impossible to provide petroleum to our navalstriking forces in areas of highest threat. This increased vulnerability againaccents the importance of providing nuclear propulsion for our first-line warships.The committee, accordingly, reiterates its longstanding recommendation that allnew surface submarine first-time striking forces be provided with nuclearpropulsion."

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The need for nuclear propulsion for major combatant vessels for our first-linenaval strike forces is completely documented. In addition to the annual thoroughreview of the naval nuclear propulsion program there have been many specialcongressional hearings and reports issued on various aspects of naval nuclearpropulsion. I will include a list of some of these reports in the Record followingmy statement.

This bill also authorizes construction of our eighth nuclear frigate, the DLGN41, and contains additional long lead funding for our ninth nuclear frigate, theDLNG 42. It has been only through the strong resolve of Congress that thesenuclear frigates have been authorized to be built for the Navy—after they werecanceled by the Department of Defense 3 years ago.

Based on my past experience with the naval nuclear propulsion issue I wouldnot be surprised to learn that attempts will again be made in the Department ofDefense to cancel or delay their construction. It should be clearly understood thatit is the definite intent of Congress that these ships be built now as follow shipsof the Virginia DLGN 38 class, using existing shipbuilding contract options.

In this connection this bill also contains research and development funds for anew weapons system, a development called Aegise, which is intended to be an im-provement over existing shipboard antiair warfare weaponry, but which is yearsfrom being ready to be committed to ship construction. Although Aegis shouldbe considered for installation in nuclear frigates after it has been successfullydeveloped the DLGN 41 and DLGN 42 must not be delayed to wait for it.

All too often the desire for improved weapons which are off in the future hasbeen used as an excuse for not building ships. If a war should erupt we will haveto fight it with the ships we have, not the ones we hope to have many years in thefuture. To follow such a course could be fatal. With the investment we have in thefour nuclear carriers in commission and under construction it would be deadwrong to defer building the DLGN 41 and DLGN 42 which are vitally needed toescort these nuclear carriers for literally years to wait for this new weapons sys-tem. I hope this point is clear to all.

Mr. Speaker, my esteemed colleague from California, Chet Holifield, who alsohas been chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and I are theonly two remaining charter members of the Joint Committee. The experienceand knowledge I have gained through a quarter century on that committee has,I believe, given me a special insight into all aspects of the naval nuclear pro-pulsion programs. Based on everything I have learned from studying this issuein detail for over 25 years. I can state categorically that the need for nuclearpropulsion in naval strike force ships has been proven, needs no further studybefore a decision is made, and is of the most vital need for our country and ourNavy.

It gives me great personal pleasure to be able to cast my vote for this truly his-oric legislation. I am sure that I speak for Chet Holifield, whose final days in

this chamber will be brightened by the result which culminates the long fightmany of us have carried on for so long, and marks the turning point for a newNavy which will be second to none.

[The hearings and reports on the naval nuclear propulsion program publishedby committees of the Congress includes:]

LIST OF HEARINGS AND REPOBTS

Hearings of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Subcommittee on Researchand Development chaired by Congressman Melvin Price and the Subcommitteeon Military Applications chaired by Senator Henry M. Jackson on "Naval Re-actor Program and Shippingport Project" dated March 7 and April 12, 1957.

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy "Review of Naval Reactor Program andAdmiral Rickover Award" dated April 11, 1959, chaired by Senator Clinton P.Anderson held aboard the USS Skipjack at sea while the nuclear submarine wasestablishing new records for speed and depth of operation.

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy review of "Naval Reactor Program andPolaris Missile Systems" chaired by Senator Clinton P. Anderson held at seaon board the first Polaris submarine, the USS George Washington, onApril 9, 1960.

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy "Tour of the USS Enterprise and Reporton Joint AEC-Naval Reactor Program" dated March 31, 1962, chaired by Con-

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gressman Chet Holifleld held at sea aboard the USS Enterprise while operatingat sea off Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba.

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, June 26, 27, July 28, 1068 and July 1,1064, hearings on "Loss of the USS Thresher" chaired by Senator John 0.Pasture.

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy hearing on "Nuclear Propulsion for NavalSurface Vessels" dated October 80, 81 and November 18,1068, chaired by SenatorJohn 0. Pastore. This was followed by a special December 1068 report of theJoint Committee on Atomic Energy which recommended:

1. That the decision to install conventional propulsion in the new aircraft car-rier, OVA^6T should be set aside and plans made to install nuclear propulsion inthis ship; and

2, That the United States adopt the policy of utilising nuclear propulsion in allfuture major surface warships; and

nueltar propulsion b§ continued.Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, January 26, 1066, hearing on "Naval

Nuclear Propulsion Program 1066" chaired by Congressman Chet Holifleld.Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, March 16, 1067 and February 8, 1068,

hearings on "Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program 1067-68" chaired by SenatorJohn O. Pastore.

Senate A-rmed Services Preparedness and Investigating Subcommittee chairedby Senator John Stennis, hearings on "U.S. Submarine Program" dated March 13,15, 19, 27, 1968. This was followed by a special report of the Subcommittee on the"United States Submarine Program" dated September 23, 1968, which recom-mended that the nuclear attack submarine construction program be continuedbeyond fiscal year 1970, that the development of the high speed submarine andthe electric drive submarine proceed, and that work begin promptly on the de-velopment of a submarine of advanced design.

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy hearings on "Nuclear Submarines of Ad-vanced Design Parts I and II" dated June 21 and July 25, 1968, chaired by Con-gressman Chet Holifield.

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, April 23, 1969 hearing on "Naval NuclearPropulsion Program 1969" chaired by Congressman Chet Holifield.

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, March 19 and 20,1970, hearings on "NavalNuclear Propulsion Program 1970" chaired by Congressman Chet Holifield.

Joint Senate-House Armed Services Subcommittee hearings on "CVAN-70 Air-craft Carrier" dated April 7, 8,10,13,15 and 16,1970, co-chaired by Senator JohnStennis and Congressman Charles Bennett. This set of hearings was followed bya special report of the Joint Subcommittee dated April 22, 1970, which stated:

"The Subcommittee in consideration of the full range of carrier capabilityincluding modernity and the exceptional advantages of nuclear power is of theopinion that the long lead funds for the CVAN-70 should be approved."

House Armed Services Antisubmarine Warfare Subcommittee, October 9, 1970,report on "Trip to the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, September 28, 1970"chaired by Congressman Samuel S. Stratton.

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, March 10, 1971, hearing on "Naval Nu-clear Propulsion Program 1971" chaired by Senator John O. Pastore.

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Subcommittee on Military Applicationshearing and subsequent inquiry on "Nuclear Propulsion for Naval Warships"dated May 5, 1971—September 30, 1972, alternately chaired by Senator Jacksonand Congressman Holifield. This inquiry addressed the need for the Los AngelesClass high speed SSN's, tactical cruise missile submarines, the Trident sub-marine program, nuclear aircraft carriers and nuclear frigates.

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, February 8, 1972 and March 28, 1973,hearings on "Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program 1972-1978" chaired by Con-gressman Melvin Price.

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, February 25, 1974, hearing on "NavalNuclear Propulsion Program—1974", chaired by Congressman Melvin Price.

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JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY,Washington, D.O., January 5,1914.

Hon. JAMES B. SCHLESINCIEB,Secretary of Defense,Washington, D.C.

DEAR JIM : The increasing severity of our energy problem should, in my view,call for an accelerated effort in the application of nuclear power for the propul-sion of naval warships. I fully appreciate your personal efforts in making addi-tions of some nuclear propelled ships to our Navy although I believe recent eventscall for a sharply increased effort in this vital area of national defense. Accord-ingly, I suggest that a review of the planned shipbuilding program be made withthe objective of increasing the number of nuclear powered warships. We areindeed fortunate that we have the proven technical base to immediately proceedwith additional applications of nuclear propulsion. It certainly would be mostunfortunate if we didn't take advantage of our position especially since nuclearpower provides such positive solutions to our growing and irreversible globalpetroleum problem.

I want to emphasize that I am not suggesting the initiation of additionalstudies. From the Committee's detailed involvement in the review of the variousstudies I can assure you we need no additional effort in this area. Such compre-hensive reviews as the Committee's 1963 and 1971-72 hearings and report onnuclear propulsion clearly illustrate the military value and justification of thisapplication of nuclear energy. The growing petroleum problem has just increasedthe importance of the factors justifying nuclear power especially in the area offoreign access to petroleum supplies. Of course, although secondary to the pri-mary factor of military effectiveness, the increasing costs of petroleum fuels alsoincrease the economic justification of nuclear power.

You can be assured of Congressional support in immediately moving ahead withmore naval nuclear propulsion projects. As you know the Congress through itsvarious Committees of responsibility in the defense area, has led in bringingabout nuclear propulsion for our navy.

Sincerely yours,MELVIN PRICE,

Chairman.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,Washington, March 11,1974-

Hon. MELVIN PRICE,Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, U.S. House of Representatives,

Washington, D.C.DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : This is in response to your letter of January 5, 1974, in

which you suggested that a review of the Navy's planned shipbuilding programbe made with the objective of increasing the number of nuclear powered warships.

By mid-1974 our 107 nuclear powered combatants will constitute over one-third of the active warship fleet. These nuclear powered warships include 41strategic ballistic missile submarines, 61 attack submarines, one aircraft carrierand four fleet air defense guided missile ships—the Navy's first line ships. Ad-ditional nuclear powered combatants authorized by Congress are, or soon will be,under construction : the first TRIDENT SSBNs, four 637 Class SSNs, and twenty-three 688 Class SSNs, three nuclear powered aircraft carriers and four guidedmissile frigates. In addition to the nuclear powered ships in service, under con-struction, or authorized by Congress, the FY 75 budget request includes fundingof two TRIDENT submarines, three high-speed attack submarines, and oneguided missile frigate. Delivery of the five nuclear powered frigates (DLGN's)under construction, together with the cruiser and the two frigates now in thefleet, will give us eight nuclear powered surface combatants which will be ade-quate to form two all nuclear powered carrier task forces, when none of theships are in overhaul.

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As you know, in FY 72 the Department of Defense continued the DLGN con-struction program by awarding a contract to the Newport News Shipbuilding andDrydock Company for the construction of DLGN 38 Class Frigates. At that timeit was decided to construct three units of this new class while retaining a contractoption for two additional units. Recently Congress added to our Fiscal Year 74budget request $79 million for advanced procurement of long-lead items for thetwo additional nuclear ships, DLGNs 41 and 42. We have included DLGN-41 inthe FY 75 budget and are protecting the option for procuring the second in FY 76.When the full scope of our current nuclear ship program is considered, we findthat the shipbuilders involved have a very large backlog ahead of them.

There are several important factors influencing the selection of nuclear ornonnuclear propulsion systems for a warship. Three of the most significant itemsare the relative procurement and operating costs, individual ship capability re-quirements, and overall Navy force level and modernization needs.

To date, the use of nuclear power has been limited to surface ships of 8,000 tonsor more. These relatively large ships (frigates and cruisers), with highly capableanti-air and anti-submarine systems, are at the high end of the high-low mix ofsurface combatant ship types. The high-low mix concept of balancing overall fleetcapability between larger numbers of capable low-cost ships and fewer numbersof highly capable but expensive first-line ships is essential for maintaining ouroverall combat capabilities.

In spite of the many attractive features of nuclear ships, both their acquisitioncosts and manning costs tend to be higher than for conventional ships having thesame weapons systems. As you are aware over the past several years there havebeen extended discussions of the degree to which indirect costs tend to offset thesedifferences. The major increase in the cost of fuel oil since October 1973 hastended to add some weight to this concept. On the other hand, the introductionof significantly more efficient conventional propulsion systems will result in loweracquisition and operating costs for such ships due to reduced manning require-ments and reduced engineering plant size. As an additional consideration, thepeace time flexibility of deployments for nuclear ships is constrained by the ap-prehensive attitude of many countries towards port visits by nuclear ships. Inmy view, these apprehensions are largely unfounded but progress in dispellingthis barrier to nuclear ship visits has been slow.

Requirements for overall naval combat effectiveness depend in large part onthe expected threat. In some oceanx areas where our Navy is planned to operate,the threat is expected to be relatively low intensity and to consist of principallysubmarine-launched torpedoes and cruise missiles with only small numbers ofship- and aircraft-launched cruise missiles. Requirements for individual shipeffectiveness are less demanding in such areas than would be required in higherthreat environments, where additional threats from aircraft would be expected.I am sure that you recognize that. In addition to the need for first-line shipscapable of operations in high threat areas, there are many important missionsthat can be effectively carried out by less complex and less expensive ships.

In this decade, we must phase out virtually all of the remaining World War IIsurface combatants because their deteriorating material condition and decliningcombat value is making them increasingly inefficient. If we are to procure thelarge number of ships needed to maintain even current force level, the bulk ofthe new ships must be from the "low" side of the "high-low" spectrum. Thenumerical requirements alone for surface escorts needed to protect militaryand commercial shipping in open ocean and lower threat areas of the world leadus to the use of less complex ships under present budgetary constraints.

Your personal efforts and the support of the Congress in attaining our presentposture in nuclear propulsion in the Navy are very much appreciated. I solicityour continued support of our shipbuilding program and assure you that nuclearpropulsion will be actively considered for all future Navy major surface warshipbuilding programs.

Sincerely,JAMES R. SCHLESINGEB.

I N D E X

A new Vinson-Trammell Act 17Advances in reactor technology 10Cladding material developed in naval program 13Committee tribute '_ 1Congressional inquiry on nuclear ships 12Correspondence on nuclear powered ships 39Cost of all weapons is increasing 46Lack of fuel oil curtailed Navy operations 15Lessons from the October Mideast war 5Legislation to obtain nuclear ships 16Long-life cores:

Advantages of long-life reactor cores 9Cores now last 10 to 13 years 11Fewer refuelings reduce environmental effects 13Long-life cores help increase overhaul intervals 14Long-life cores less expensive 10Sixfold increase in core life _ 4

LWBR:Increased fiscal year 1975 funding for naval reactors' civilian reactor

development programs 36Light-water breeder reactor 35

Naval and commercial applications differ 12Nuclear powered major combatants 16Nuclear ship visits to foreign ports 27Nuclear surface ships:

Aircraft carrier comparison 42Comparison of fueling costs 41Correspondence from a nuclear frigate commanding officer 44Distortion in cost comparisons 43Frigate comparison 43Nuclear carrier and frigate deliveries 38

Nuclear trained personnel:Consideration of j ob qualifications in the Navy 8Consideration of Navy's needs 7Decisions should not be questioned 7Inequities in personnel evaluation 8Naval nuclear training contributes to national economy 19Navy actions affect personnel retention 23Navy attitude toward trained personnel 6Nuclear industry recruits Navy personnel 19Retention of nuclear trained personnel 18

Opening remarks of Chairman Price 1Opening statement. _ 2Operational experience 3Radioactivity:

Navy controls radioactivity 29Significance of radioactivity 29

Shipbuilding:Approximate value of unfinished private shipyard work 32Shipbuilding capacity 25Trends in shipbuilding capacity 31Vacillating shipbuilding program affects shipyard capacity 34

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Soviet naval threat:Soviet submarine construction 46Soviet submarine threat 30

Status of the naval nuclear program 2Nuclear ship program summary 5Statistics of the naval nuclear propulsion program 5

Submarines:Backfit of Trident missiles into Poseidon submarines _ 34Budget for study of small strategic submarine 24Fiscal year 1975 funds for submarine R. & D 28Inadequate submarine research and development 27New small strategic submarine 24Older Polaris submarines will need replacement. _ _ 26

Status of Los Angeles class 4U.S. submarine construction _ _ _ 47Summary _ 47Unauthorized release of information 37Use of San Diego as a home port 28

o