Natural Justice - Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia

A tondo of an allegory of justice(1508) by Raphael in the Stanza dellaSegnatura (Room of the ApostolicSignatura) of the Apostolic Palace,Vatican City

Natural justiceFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In English law, natural justice is technical terminology for the ruleagainst bias (nemo iudex in causa sua) and the right to a fair hearing(audi alteram partem). While the term natural justice is often retainedas a general concept, it has largely been replaced and extended by themore general "duty to act fairly".

The basis for the rule against bias is the need to maintain publicconfidence in the legal system. Bias can take the form of actual bias,imputed bias or apparent bias. Actual bias is very difficult to prove inpractice while imputed bias, once shown, will result in a decision beingvoid without the need for any investigation into the likelihood orsuspicion of bias. Cases from different jurisdictions currently apply twotests for apparent bias: the "reasonable suspicion of bias" test and the"real likelihood of bias" test. One view that has been taken is that thedifferences between these two tests are largely semantic and that theyoperate similarly.

The right to a fair hearing requires that individuals should not be penalized by decisions affecting their rights orlegitimate expectations unless they have been given prior notice of the case, a fair opportunity to answer it, andthe opportunity to present their own case. The mere fact that a decision affects rights or interests is sufficient tosubject the decision to the procedures required by natural justice. In Europe, the right to a fair hearing isguaranteed by Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is said to complement thecommon law rather than replace it.

Contents

1 Background2 Rule against bias

2.1 In general2.2 Forms of bias

2.2.1 Actual and imputed bias2.2.2 Apparent bias

2.3 Exceptions to the rule against bias2.3.1 Necessity2.3.2 Waiver

2.4 Effect of a finding of bias3 Right to a fair hearing

3.1 In general3.2 Article 6 of the European Convention3.3 Aspects of a fair hearing

3.3.1 Prior notice of hearing3.3.2 Opportunity to be heard3.3.3 Conduct of the hearing3.3.4 Right to legal representation3.3.5 The decision and reasons for it

Natural justice - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_justice

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The courtroom of the Supreme Courtof Canada in Ottawa, Ontario. In 1999,the Court ruled in Baker v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship andImmigration) that the requirements ofnatural justice vary according to thecontext of the matter arising.

4 See also5 Notes6 References

6.1 Cases6.2 Other works

7 Further reading7.1 Articles and websites7.2 Books

Background

Natural justice is a term of art that denotes specific procedural rights inthe English legal system[1] and the systems of other nations based on it.It is similar to the American concepts of fair procedure and proceduraldue process, the latter having roots that to some degree parallel theorigins of natural justice.[2]

Although natural justice has an impressive ancestry[3] and is said toexpress the close relationship between the common law and moralprinciples,[4] the use of the term today is not to be confused with the"natural law" of the Canonists, the mediaeval philosophers' visions of an"ideal pattern of society" or the "natural rights" philosophy of the 18thcentury.[5] Whilst the term natural justice is often retained as a generalconcept, in jurisdictions such as Australia[6] and the United Kingdom[7]

it has largely been replaced and extended by the more general "duty toact fairly". Natural justice is identified with the two constituents of a fairhearing,[8] which are the rule against bias (nemo iudex in causa sua, or

"no man a judge in his own cause"), and the right to a fair hearing (audi alteram partem, or "hear the otherside").[9]

The requirements of natural justice or a duty to act fairly depend on the context.[10] In Baker v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999),[11] the Supreme Court of Canada set out a list ofnon-exhaustive factors that would influence the content of the duty of fairness, including the nature of thedecision being made and the process followed in making it, the statutory scheme under which thedecision-maker operates, the importance of the decision to the person challenging it, the person's legitimateexpectations, and the choice of procedure made by the decision-maker.[12] Earlier, in Knight v. Indian HeadSchool Division No. 19 (1990),[13] the Supreme Court held that public authorities which make decisions of alegislative and general nature do not have a duty to act fairly, while those that carry out acts of a moreadministrative and specific nature do. Furthermore, preliminary decisions will generally not trigger the duty toact fairly, but decisions of a more final nature may have such an effect.[14] In addition, whether a duty to actfairly applies depends on the relationship between the public authority and the individual. No duty exists wherethe relationship is one of master and servant, or where the individual holds office at the pleasure of theauthority. On the other hand, a duty to act fairly exists where the individual cannot be removed from officeexcept for cause.[15] Finally, a right to procedural fairness only exists when an authority's decision is significantand has an important impact on the individual.[16]


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Rule against bias

In general

A person is barred from deciding any case in which he or she may be, or may fairly be suspected to be, biased.This principle embodies the basic concept of impartiality,[17] and applies to courts of law, tribunals, arbitratorsand all those having the duty to act judicially.[18] A public authority has a duty to act judicially whenever itmakes decisions that affect people's rights or interests, and not only when it applies some judicial-typeprocedure in arriving at decisions.[19]

The basis on which impartiality operates is the need to maintain public confidence in the legal system. Theerosion of public confidence undermines the nobility of the legal system, and leads to ensuing chaos.[20] Theessence of the need for impartiality was observed by Lord Denning, the Master of the Rolls, in MetropolitanProperties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon (1968):[21] "Justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence isdestroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: 'The judge was biased.'"[22]

Public confidence as the basis for the rule against bias is also embodied in the often-quoted words of LordHewart, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, that "[i]t is not merely of some importance, but offundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly be seen to be done".[23]

Forms of bias

Actual and imputed bias

Bias may be actual, imputed or apparent. Actual bias is established where it is actually established that adecision-maker was prejudiced in favour of or against a party. However, in practice, the making of such anallegation is rare as it is very hard to prove.[24]

One form of imputed bias is based on the decision-maker being a party to a suit, or having a pecuniary orproprietary interest in the outcome of the decision. Once this fact has been established, the bias is irrebuttableand disqualification is automatic the decision-maker will be barred from adjudicating the matter without theneed for any investigation into the likelihood or suspicion of bias.[25] A classic case is Dimes v. Grand JunctionCanal Proprietors (1852),[25] which involved an action between Dimes, a local landowner, and the proprietorsof the Grand Junction Canal, in which the Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham, had affirmed decrees made to theproprietors. However, it was discovered by Dimes that Lord Cottenham in fact owned several pounds worth ofshares in the Grand Junction Canal. This eventually led to the judge being disqualified from deciding the case.There was no inquiry as to whether a reasonable person would consider Lord Cottenham to be biased, or as tothe circumstances which led Lord Cottenham to hear the case.

In certain limited situations, bias can also be imputed when the decision-maker's interest in the decision is notpecuniary but personal. This was established in the unprecedented case of R. v. Bow Street MetropolitanStipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2) (1999).[26] In an appeal to the House of Lords, theCrown Prosecution Service sought to overturn a quashing order made by the Divisional Court regardingextradition warrants made against the ex-Chilean dictator, Senator Augusto Pinochet. Amnesty International(AI) was given leave to intervene in the proceedings. However, one of the judges of the case, Lord Hoffmann,was a director and chairperson of Amnesty International Charity Ltd. (AICL), a company under the control ofAI. He was eventually disqualified from the case and the outcome of the proceedings set aside. The House of


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A portrait of the LordChancellor, Lord Cottenham(Charles Pepys, 1st Earl ofCottenham, 17811851), byCharles Robert Leslie. InDimes v. Grand JunctionCanal Proprietors (1852),his Lordship was disqualifiedfrom hearing a case as he hada pecuniary interest in theoutcome.

Lords held that the close connection between AICL and AI presented LordHoffmann with an interest in the outcome of the litigation. Even though it wasnon-pecuniary, the Law Lords took the view that the interest was sufficient towarrant Lord Hoffmann's automatic disqualification from hearing the case. InLocabail (U.K.) Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd. (1999),[27] the Court of Appealwarned against any further extension of the automatic disqualification rule,"unless plainly required to give effect to the important underlying principlesupon which the rule is based".[28]

Apparent bias

Apparent bias is present where a judge or other decision-maker is not a party toa matter and does not have an interest in its outcome, but through his or herconduct or behaviour gives rise to a suspicion that he or she is not impartial.[29]

An issue that has arisen is the degree of suspicion which would provide thegrounds on which a decision should be set aside for apparent bias. Currently,cases from various jurisdictions apply two different tests: "real likelihood ofbias" and "reasonable suspicion of bias".

The real likelihood test centres on whether the facts, as assessed by the court,give rise to a real likelihood of bias.[30] In R. v. Gough (1993),[31] the House ofLords chose to state the test in terms of a "real danger of bias", and emphasizedthat the test was concerned with the possibility, not probability, of bias. LordGoff of Chievely also stated that "the court should look at the matter through theeyes of a reasonable man, because the court in cases such as these personifiesthe reasonable man".[32] However, the test in Gough has been disapproved of insome Commonwealth jurisdictions. One criticism is that the emphasis on the court's view of the facts givesinsufficient emphasis to the perception of the public.[33] These criticisms were addressed by the House of Lordsin Porter v. Magill (2001).[34] The Court adjusted the Gough test by stating it to be "whether the fair-mindedand informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that thetribunal was biased".[35] This case therefore established the current test in the UK to be one of a "real possibilityof bias".

On the other hand, the reasonable suspicion test asks whether a reasonable and fair-minded person sitting incourt and knowing all the relevant facts would have a reasonable suspicion that a fair trial for the litigant is notpossible.[36] Although not currently adopted in the UK, this test has been endorsed by the Singapore courts.[37]

It has been suggested that the differences between the two tests are largely semantic and that the two testsoperate similarly. In Locabail, the judges stated that in a large proportion of the cases, application of the twotests would lead to the same outcome. It was also held that "[p]rovided that the court, personifying thereasonable man, takes an approach which is based on broad common sense, and without inappropriate relianceon special knowledge, the minutiae of court procedure or other matters outside the ken of the ordinary,reasonably well-informed members of the public, there should be no risk that the courts will not ensure both thatjustice is done and that it is perceived by the public to be done".[38] In the Singapore High Court decision TangKin Hwa v. Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners Board (2005),[20] Judicial Commissioner AndrewPhang observed that the real likelihood test is in reality similar to that of reasonable suspicion. First, likelihoodis in fact "possibility", as opposed to the higher standard of proof centring on "probability". Secondly, hesuggested that real in real likelihood cannot be taken to mean "actual", as this test relates to apparent and not


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actual bias. He also observed that both the court's and the public's perspectives are "integral parts of a holisticprocess" with no need to draw a sharp distinction between them.[39]

In contrast, in Re Shankar Alan s/o Anat Kulkarni (2006),[40] Judicial Commissioner Sundaresh Menon thoughtthat there was a real difference between the reasonable suspicion and real likelihood tests.[41] In his opinion,suspicion suggests a belief that something that may not be provable could still be possible. Reasonable suggeststhat the belief cannot be fanciful. Here the issue is whether it is reasonable for the one to harbour the suspicionsin the circumstances even though the suspicious behaviour could be innocent. On the other hand, likelihoodpoints towards something being likely, and real suggests that this must be substantial rather than imagined. Here,then, the inquiry is directed more towards the actor than the observer. The issue is the degree to which aparticular event is not likely or possible.[42] Menon J.C. also disagreed with both Lord Goff in Gough and PhangJ.C. in Tang Kin Hwa in that he thought the shift of the inquiry from how the matter might appear to areasonable man to whether the judge thinks there is a sufficient possibility of bias was "a very significant pointof departure".[43] The real likelihood test is met as long as the court is satisfied that there is a sufficient degreeof possibility of bias. Although this a lower standard than satisfaction on a balance of probabilities, this isactually directed at mitigating the sheer difficulty of proving actual bias, especially given its insidious and oftensubconscious nature. The reasonable suspicion test, however, is met if the court is satisfied that a reasonablemember of the public could harbour a reasonable suspicion of bias even though the court itself thought therewas no real danger of this on the facts. The difference is that the driver behind this test is the strong publicinterest in ensuring public confidence in the administration of justice.[44] As of September 2011, the Court ofAppeal of Singapore had not yet expressed a view as to whether the position taken in Tang Kin Hwa or ShankarAlan is preferable.

Exceptions to the rule against bias

Necessity

There are cases in which a disqualified adjudicator cannot be replaced, as no one else is authorized to act. It hasbeen observed that "disqualification of an adjudicator will not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal withpower to act".[45] In such cases, natural justice has to give way to necessity in order to maintain the integrity ofjudicial and administrative systems.[46]

This issue regarding necessity was raised in Dimes.[25] The Lord Chancellor had to sign an order for enrolmentin order to allow the appeal to proceed from the Vice-Chancellor to the House of Lords. It was held that hisshareholding in the canal company which barred him from sitting in the appeal did not affect his power to enroll,as no one but him had the authority to do so. It was mentioned this was allowed "for this [was] a case ofnecessity, and where that occurs the objection of interest cannot prevail".[47]

Waiver

The court normally requests that an objection be taken as soon as the prejudiced party has knowledge of thebias.[48] If an objection is not raised and proceedings are allowed to continue without disapproval, it will be heldthat the party has waived its right to do so.[49]

Effect of a finding of bias

In Dimes,[25] the judges advised the House of Lords that Lord Cottenham's pecuniary interest made his


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A hearing of the International Court ofJustice in 2006 presided over by itsPresident, Her Excellency DameRosalyn Higgins. A fundamentalaspect of natural justice is that before adecision is made, all parties should beheard on the matter.

judgment not void, but voidable. This advice is not wrong in the context of a judicial act under review, wherethe judgment will be held valid unless reversed on appeal.[50]

However, in the cases of administrative acts or decisions under judicial review, the court can only intervene onthe grounds of ultra vires,[51] hence making the judgment void. Lord Esher said in Allison v. General Councilof Medical Education and Registration (1894)[52] that the participation of a disqualified person "certainlyrendered the decision wholly void".[53]

Right to a fair hearing

In general

It has been suggested that the rule requiring a fair hearing is broadenough to include the rule against bias since a fair hearing must be anunbiased hearing. However, the rules are often treated separately. It isfundamental to fair procedure that both sides should be heard.[54] Theright to a fair hearing requires that individuals are not penalized bydecisions affecting their rights or legitimate expectations unless theyhave been given prior notice of the cases against them, a fair opportunityto answer them, and the opportunity to present their own cases.[55]

Besides promoting an individual's liberties, the right to a fair hearing hasalso been used by courts as a base on which to build up fairadministrative procedures.[54] It is now well established that it is not thecharacter of the public authority that matters but the character of thepower exercised.[56] However, in the United Kingdom prior to Ridge v.Baldwin (1963),[57] the scope of the right to a fair hearing was severelyrestricted by case law following Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works(1863).[58] In R. v. Electricity Commissioners, ex parte LondonElectricity Joint Committee Co. (1920), Ltd. (1923),[59] Lord Atkin observed that the right only applied wheredecision-makers had "the duty to act judicially".[60] In natural justice cases this dictum was generallyunderstood to mean that a duty to act judicially was not to be inferred merely from the impact of a decision onthe rights of subjects; such a duty would arise only if there was a "superadded" express obligation to follow ajudicial-type procedure in arriving at the decision.[61]

In Ridge v. Baldwin, Lord Reid reviewed the authorities extensively and attacked the problem at its root bydemonstrating how the term judicial had been misinterpreted as requiring some additional characteristic overand above the characteristic that the power affected some person's rights. In his view, the mere fact that thepower affects rights or interests is what makes it "judicial" and so subject to the procedures required by naturaljustice.[62][63] This removal of the earlier misconception as to the meaning of judicial is thought to have giventhe judiciary the flexibility it needed to intervene in cases of judicial review.[64]

The mere fact that a decision-maker is conferred wide discretion by law is not reason enough for a weakening ofthe requirements of natural justice. In the United Kingdom context, this is demonstrated by Ahmed v. H.M.Treasury (No. 1) (2010).[65] The Treasury had exercised powers to freeze the appellants' financial assets andeconomic resources on the ground that it reasonably suspected the appellants were or might be persons who hadcommitted, attempted to commit, participated in or facilitated the commission of terrorism, pursuant to the


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Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006[66] and the Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures)Order 2006[67] made under the United Nations Act 1946.[68] The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom heldthat since the Al-Qaida Order made no provision for basic procedural fairness, it effectively deprived peopledesignated under the order the fundamental right of access to a judicial remedy and hence was ultra vires thepower conferred by the United Nations Act 1946 for the making of the Order.[69]

Article 6 of the European Convention

The right to a fair hearing is also referred to in Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights andFundamental Freedoms, which states:[70]

In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him,everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent andimpartial tribunal established by law. ...

Article 6 does not, however, replace the common law duty to ensure a fair hearing. It has been suggested thatArticle 6 alone is not enough to protect procedural due process, and only with the development of a moresophisticated common law will the protection of procedural due process extend further into the administrativemachine.[56] Nonetheless, Article 6 supplements the common law. For example, the common law does notimpose a general duty to give reasons for a decision, but under Article 6(1) a decision-maker must give areasoned judgment so as to enable an affected individual to decide whether to appeal.[71]

Aspects of a fair hearing

Prior notice of hearing

Natural justice allows a person to claim the right to adequate notification of the date, time, place of the hearingas well as detailed notification of the case to be met.[55] This information allows the person adequate time toeffectively prepare his or her own case and to answer the case against him or her. In Cooper v. Wandsworth,[58]Chief Justice William Erle went so far as to state that the lack of notice and hearing afforded to Cooper could besaid to be a form of abuse, as he had been treated as if he did not matter.[72] As Lord Mustill famously held in R.v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody (1993): "Since the person affected usuallycannot make worthwhile representations without knowing what factors may weigh against his interests fairnesswill very often require that he is informed of the gist of the case which he has to answer."[73][74]

It has been suggested that the requirement of prior notice serves three important purposes:[75]

The interest in good outcomes giving prior notice increases the value of the proceedings as it is onlywhen the interested person knows the issues and the relevant information that he or she can make a usefulcontribution.The duty of respect the affected person has the right to know what is at stake, and it is not enough tosimply inform him or her that there will be a hearing.The rule of law notice of issues and disclosure of information opens up the operations of the publicauthority to public scrutiny.

The British courts have held it is not enough for an affected person to merely be informed of a hearing. He orshe must also be told what is at stake; in other words, the gist of the case.[75]


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Opportunity to be heard

Every person has the right to have a hearing and be allowed to present his or her own case.[74] Should a personnot attend the hearing, even with adequate notice given, the adjudicator has the discretion to decide if thehearing should proceed. In Ridge v. Baldwin, a chief constable succeeded in having his dismissal from servicedeclared void as he had not been given the opportunity to make a defence. In another case, Chief Constable ofthe North Wales Police v. Evans (1982),[76] a chief constable required a police probationer to resign on accountof allegations about his private life which he was given no fair opportunity to rebut. The House of Lords foundthe dismissal to be unlawful. Likewise in Surinder Singh Kanda v. Government of the Federation of Malaya(1962),[17] a public servant facing disciplinary proceedings was not supplied with a copy of a prejudicial reportby a board of inquiry which the adjudicating officer had access to before the hearing. The Privy Council heldthat the proceedings had failed to provide him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

However, this requirement does not necessarily mean the decision-maker has to meet the complainant face toface "Natural justice does not generally demand orality".[77] It has been suggested that an oral hearing willalmost be as good as useless if the affected person has no prior knowledge of the case.[78] In Lloyd v. McMahon(1987),[79] an oral hearing did not make a difference to the facts on which the case was based. Giving judgmentin the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, Lord Justice Harry Woolf held that an oral hearing may notalways be the "very pith of the administration of natural justice".[80] It has also been suggested that an oralhearing is only required if issues concerning deprivations of legal rights or legally protected interests arise.[81]

Conduct of the hearing

When deciding how the hearing should be conducted, the adjudicator has to ask whether the person charged hasa proper opportunity to consider, challenge or contradict any evidence, and whether the person is also fullyaware of the nature of the allegations against him or her so as to have a proper opportunity to present his or herown case.[82] In Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF (2009),[83] Lord Phillips of WorthMatravers said:

The best way of producing a fair trial is to ensure that a party to it has the fullest information ofboth the allegations that are made against him and the evidence relied upon in support of thoseallegations. Where the evidence is documentary, he should have access to the documents. Wherethe evidence consists of oral testimony, then he should be entitled to cross-examine the witnesseswho give that testimony, whose identities should be disclosed.[84]

However, when a hearing requires the balancing of multiple polycentric issues such as natural justice and theprotection of confidential information for national security reasons, both the concerns of public security and theright to a fair trial must be adequately met. It was held by the House of Lords in AF, applying the decision of theGrand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights A. v. United Kingdom (2009),[85] that a personaccused of terrorism against whom a control order has been issued must be given sufficient information aboutthe allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions to his special advocate. If thisrequirement is satisfied, a fair hearing can be conducted without detailed disclosure of confidential informationthat might compromise national security. On the facts of the case, a special advocate was not permitted furthercontact with an applicant or his ordinary legal representatives except with permission of the Special ImmigrationAppeals Commission (SIAC) after viewing confidential (or "closed") materials. The House of Lords recognizedthat although a special advocate's usefulness is stymied somewhat from having no further instructions afterviewing such materials, if the SIAC decides to issue a control order predominantly on the basis ofnon-confidential (or "open") materials, an applicant cannot be regarded as having been denied an opportunity to


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challenge the reasonableness of the government's beliefs and suspicions about him. If the evidence against theapplicant is largely closed but allegations contained in open material are sufficiently specific, an applicantshould be able to provide his legal representatives and special advocate with information to refute it (such as analibi, if the open material alleges he was at a certain place during a certain period) without having to know thedetail or sources of the closed evidence. However, if the evidence revealed to the person consists only ofgeneral assertions and the case against him is based solely or to a substantive extent on undisclosed adverseevidence, the fair hearing rule under natural justice will not be satisfied.[86]

In such cases, there are strong policy considerations supporting the principle that a trial procedure can never beconsidered fair if a person is kept in ignorance of the case against him or her. First, since the grounds for areasonable suspicion that a person is involved in terrorist activity can span from incontrovertible evidence to aninnocent misinterpretation of facts which can be explained away by the person, in many cases it is impossiblefor courts to be sure that the disclosure of the evidence will make no difference to the applicant. Secondly,resentment will be felt by the person and his family and friends if sanctions are imposed without any properexplanation of the grounds and when, due to the non-disclosure of information, the person is put in a positionwhere he is unable to properly defend himself. As Lord Phillips put it, "if the wider public are to haveconfidence in the justice system, they need to be able to see that justice is done rather than being asked to take iton trust".[87]

The right to be heard in answer to charges before an unbiased tribunal is illustrated in the Singapore case TanBoon Chee David v. Medical Council of Singapore (1980).[88] During a disciplinary hearing, council memberswere either not conscientious about their attendance or did not attend the whole course of proceedings. Thismeant they did not hear all the oral evidence and submissions. The High Court held that this had substantiallyprejudiced the appellant and constituted a fundamental breach of natural justice. On the other hand, mereabsence from a hearing does not necessarily lead to undue prejudice. It was held in Re Teo Choo Hong(1995)[89] that the function of a lay member of a lawyers' disciplinary committee was to observe and not cast avote or make a judgment. Thus, the appellant had not suffered undue prejudice.

On the basis of reciprocity, if one side is allowed to cross-examine his legal opponent at a hearing, the otherparty must also be given the same opportunity.[90] In addition, when a tribunal decides a case on a basis notraised or contemplated by the parties, or decides it without regarding the submissions and arguments made bythe parties on the issues, this will amount to a breach of natural justice.[91] However, a genuine bona fidemistake by an adjudicator in omitting to state reasons for not considering a submission is not enough to be abreach of natural justice.[92] This may occur when the submissions were accidentally omitted, or were sounconvincing that it was not necessary to explicitly state the adjudicator's findings.[93]

Right to legal representation

There is no inherent common law right to legal representation before a domestic tribunal. A tribunal has thediscretion to admit either a legally qualified or unqualified counsel to assist the person appearing before it, basedon the facts of the case.[94] When assessing whether a party should be offered legal assistance, the adjudicatorshould first ask whether the right to be heard applies, and, secondly, whether counsel's assistance is needed foran effective hearing given the subject matter, bearing in mind the consequences of such a denial. [95]

In R. v. Secretary of State for Home Department, ex parte Tarrant (1983),[96] Webster J. set out six factors tobe considered when deciding whether to allow representation by counsel, namely:[97]

the seriousness of the charge and the potential penalty;


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whether any points of law are likely to arise.;whether the prisoner is capable of presenting his own case;whether they are any procedural difficulties faced by prisoners in conducting their own defence;whether there is reasonable speed in making the adjudication; andwhether there is a need for fairness between prisoners or between prisoners and prison officers.

It has also been suggested that where a tribunal hearing concerns the individual's reputation or right tolivelihood, there is a greater need for allowing legal representation as this vindicates the idea of equality beforethe law.[98]

When one refuses legal representation, one cannot expect to receive a higher "standard" of natural justice. Thiswas enunciated in Singapore in Ho Paul v. Singapore Medical Council (2008).[99] Dr. Ho, who had beencharged with professional misconduct, chose to appear before the Council in person and declined to cross-examine the Council's key witness. Subsequently, he argued that he should have been warned of the legalimplications of not being legally represented. The High Court rejected this argument and held he had suffered noprejudice. Dr. Ho had been given a fair opportunity of presenting his own case and, most importantly, had notbeen deprived of his right to cross-examine the witnesses.

It is also not a court's obligation to provide assistance when a party presents his or her case without legalrepresentation. In Rajeevan Edakalavan v. Public Prosecutor (1998),[100] the accused had appeared in personbefore a magistrate and had entered a plea of guilt. He later petitioned the High Court for criminal revision,arguing that as the magistrate had not informed him of the defences available to him, his plea had beenequivocal. The Court held:[101]

The onus [of informing the accused of his defence options or what could be more advantageous tohis case] does not shift to the judge (or the Prosecution, for that matter) simply because the accusedis unrepresented. That will be placing too onerous a burden on the judge. Furthermore, the judgewill be performing two completely incompatible and irreconcilable roles one as the adjudicator,the other as the de facto defence counsel.

In Singapore, the right to legal representation is contingent on the nature of the inquiry. However, since Article12 of the Constitution of Singapore guarantees equal protection under the law, it has been suggested that greaterweightage should be accorded to this procedural right when balancing it against the competing demand ofefficiency.[102]

The decision and reasons for it

Currently, the principles of natural justice in the United Kingdom and certain other jurisdictions do not include ageneral rule that reasons should be given for decisions.[73][103] In R. v. Northumberland Compensation AppealTribunal, ex parte Shaw (1951),[104] Denning L.J. stated: "I think the record must contain at least the documentwhich initiates the proceedings; the pleadings, if any; and the adjudication; but not the evidence, nor thereasons, unless the tribunal chooses to incorporate them. If the tribunal does state its reasons, and those reasonsare wrong in law, certiorari lies to quash the decision."[105] It has been stated that "no single factor has inhibitedthe development of English administrative law as seriously as the absence of any general obligation upon publicauthorities to give reasons for their decisions".[106]

Historically, uncontrolled public decisions have led to poor outcomes and disrespect for the decision-makers.Such decisions also lacked the regularity and transparency that distinguish them from the mere say-so of publicauthorities. On such grounds, there are obvious benefits for the disclosure of reasons for decisions. First,


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procedural participation by people affected by a decision promotes the rule of law by making it more difficultfor the public authority to act arbitrarily.[107] Requiring the giving of reasons helps ensure that decisions arecarefully thought through, which in turn aids in the control of administrative discretion.[108] Secondly,accountability makes it necessary for the public authority to face up to the people affected by a decision. Whena public authority acts on all the relevant considerations, this increases the probability of better decisionoutcomes and, as such, is beneficial to public interests. Another important benefit is that respect for decision-makers is fostered, which increases their integrity in the public's eyes.[107]

See also

Doctrine of bias in Singapore lawFundamental justiceJudicial review in English law

Notes

^ Frederick F. Shauer (1976), "English NaturalJustice and American Due Process: An AnalyticalComparison" (http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss1/3), William and Mary Law Review18 (1): 4772 at 47.

1.

^ See generally Bernard Schwartz (1953),"Administrative Procedure and Natural Law"(http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/tndl28&div=11), Notre DameLawyer 28 (2): 169, cited in Shauer, "English NaturalJustice and American Due Process", p. 51, n. 24.

2.

^ Lord Woolf; Jeffrey Jowell; Andrew Le Sueur, eds.(2007), "Procedural Fairness: Introduction, Historyand Comparative Perspectives", De Smith's JudicialReview (6th ed.), London: Sweet & Maxwell,pp. 317354 at 321, ISBN 978-0-421-69030-1.

3.

^ Arthur L. Goodhart (1953), English Law and theMoral Law (http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/schoolofhumanitiesandsocialsciences/law/pdfs/English_Law_and_the_Moral_law.pdf) (PDF),London: Stevens, p. 65, OCLC 1812603(//www.worldcat.org/oclc/1812603), cited in DeSmith's Judicial Review, p. 321

4.

^ J.R.S. Forbes (2006), "Natural Justice: General",Justice in Tribunals (2nd ed.), Sydney: TheFederation Press, pp. 100118 at 103,ISBN 978-1-86287-610-1.

5.

^ See, for instance, Kioa v. West (1985) 159 C.L.R.550 (http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/159clr550.html) at 583, High Court (Australia): "[I]thas been recognized that in the context ofadministrative decision-making it is more appropriateto speak of a duty to act fairly or to accord

6.

procedural fairness. This is because the expression'natural justice' has been associated, perhaps tooclosely associated, with procedures followed bycourts of law."^ De Smith's Judicial Review, p. 320.7.^ De Smith's Judicial Review, p. 322.8.^ David Phillip Jones; Anne S. de Villars (2009),"Natural Justice and the Duty to be Fair", Principlesof Administrative Law (5th ed.), Carswell,pp. 208223 at 209, ISBN 978-0-7798-2126-6.

9.

^ Kioa, pp. 584585: "What is appropriate in termsof natural justice depends on the circumstances ofthe case and they will include, inter alia, the nature ofthe inquiry, the subject-matter, and the rules underwhich the decision-maker is acting".

10.

^ Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship andImmigration) 1999 CANLII 699(http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/canlii/doc/1999/1999canlii699/1999canlii699.html), [1999] 2 S.C.R.817, Supreme Court (Canada).

11.

^ Baker, paras. 2328.12.^ Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 191990 CANLII 138 (http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/canlii/doc/1990/1990canlii138/1990canlii138.html),[1990] 1 S.C.R. 653, S.C. (Canada).

13.

^ Knight, para. 30.14.^ Knight, para. 32.15.^ Knight, para. 39.16.^ a b Surinder Singh Kanda v. Government of theFederation of Malaya [1962] UKPC 2(http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC/1962/2.html),[1962] A.C. 322 at 337, Privy Council (on appealfrom Malaya).

17.

^ Lord Mackay of Clashfern, ed.-in-chief (2010),Halsbury's Laws of England 61 (5th ed.), London:

18.


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LexisNexis, para. 629, ISBN 978-1-4057-3424-0.^ See the "Right to a fair hearing" section below.19.^ a b Tang Kin Hwa v. Traditional Chinese MedicinePractitioners Board [2005] 4 S.L.R.(R.) [SingaporeLaw Reports (Reissue)] 604 at 610, para. 11, HighCourt (Singapore).

20.

^ Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v.Lannon [1968] EWCA Civ 5 (http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1968/5.html), [1969] 1 Q.B.577, Court of Appeal (England and Wales).

21.

^ Metropolitan Properties, p. 599.22.^ R. v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1K.B. 256 at 259, High Court (King's Bench) (England& Wales).

23.

^ Chee Siok Chin v. Attorney-General [2006]SGHC 153 (http://www.commonlii.org/sg/cases/SGHC/2006/153.html), [2006] 4 S.L.R.(R.) 541 at547548, para. 9, H.C. (Singapore).

24.

^ a b c d Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors(1852) 3 H.L. Cas. 759, 10 E.R. 301(http://www.commonlii.org/uk/cases/EngR/1852/789.pdf), House of Lords (UK).

25.

^ R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan StipendiaryMagistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2) [1999]UKHL 1 (http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1999/1.html), [2000] 1 A.C. 119 at 133, H.L. (UK).

26.

^ Locabail (U.K.) Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd.[1999] EWCA Civ 3004 (http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1999/3004.html), [2000] Q.B.451, Court of Appeal (England and Wales).

27.

^ Locabail, p. 465.28.^ Ex parte Pinochet, pp. 132133.29.^ R. v. Rand (1866) L.R. 1 Q.B. 230 at 233, H.C.(Queen's Bench) (England & Wales).

30.

^ R. v. Gough [1993] UKHL 1 (http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1993/1.html), [1993] A.C. 646,H.L. (UK).

31.

^ Gough, p. 670.32.^ Webb v. The Queen (1994) 181 C.L.R. 41(http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/181clr41.html), High Court (Australia).

33.

^ Porter v. Magill [2001] UKHL 67(http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2001/67.html),[2002] 2 A.C. 357, H.L. (UK).

34.

^ Porter v. Magill, p. 494, para. 103.35.^ R. v. Liverpool City Justices, ex parte Topping[1983] 1 W.L.R. 119 at 123, H.C. (Q.B.) (England &Wales).

36.

^ Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew[1992] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 791 at 825826, paras. 8083,C.A.; Tang Liang Hong v. Lee Kuan Yew [1997] 3S.L.R.(R.) 576 at 595596, para. 46, C.A.

37.

^ Locabail, p. 477, para. 17.38.^ Tang Kin Hwa, pp. 617618, paras. 3940.39.^ Re Shankar Alan s/o Anat Kulkarni [2007] SGHC40.

12 (http://www.commonlii.org/sg/cases/SGHC/2007/12.html), [2007] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 85, H.C. (Singapore).^ Shankar Alan, p. 101, para. 56.41.^ Shankar Alan, p. 99, paras. 4950.42.^ Shankar Alan, p. 103, para. 62.43.^ Shankar Alan, pp. 107108, paras. 74-75.44.^ Geoffrey A. Flick (1979), Natural Justice:Principles and Applications, London: Butterworths,pp. 138139, ISBN 978-0-409-35260-3.

45.

^ Great Charte v. Kennington (1795) 2 Str. 1173, 93E.R. 1107 (http://www.commonlii.org/uk/cases/EngR/1795/490.pdf).

46.

^ Dimes, 3 H.L. Cas. at 787, 10 E.R. at 313.47.^ Wakefield Local Board of Health v. West Ridingand Grimsby Rly. Co. (1865) L.R. 1 Q.B. 84, H.C.(Q.B.) (England & Wales).

48.

^ R. v. Byles, ex parte Hollidge (1912) 77 J.P. 40.49.^ H[enry] W[illiam] R[awson] Wade; C[hristopher]F. Forsyth (2009), Administrative Law (10th ed.),Oxford; New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press,p. 400, ISBN 978-0-19-921973-5 (pbk.).

50.

^ Wade & Forsyth, p. 401.51.^ Allison v. General Council of Medical Educationand Registration [1894] 1 Q.B. 750, C.A. (England& Wales).

52.

^ Allison, p. 757.53.^ a b Wade & Forsyth, p. 402.54.^ a b Thio Li-ann (1999), "Law and theAdministrative State", in Kevin Y[ew] L[ee] Tan,The Singapore Legal System (2nd ed.), Singapore:Singapore University Press, pp. 160229 at 192193,ISBN 978-9971-69-213-1 (pbk.).

55.

^ a b Wade & Forsyth, p. 405.56.^ Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] UKHL 2(http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1963/2.html),[1964] A.C. 40, H.L. (United Kingdom).

57.

^ a b Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863)14 C.B.N.S. 180, 143 E.R. 414(http://www.commonlii.org/uk/cases/EngR/1863/424.pdf), Court of Common Pleas (England). Thiswas seen in cases such as Local Government Boardv. Arlidge [1915] A.C. 120, H.L. (United Kingdom);and R. v. Leman Street Police Station Inspector, exparte Venicoff [1920] 3 K.B. 72, H.C. (K.B.)(England & Wales).

58.

^ R. v. Electricity Commissioners, ex parte LondonElectricity Joint Committee Co. (1920), Ltd. [1924]1 K.B. 171, H.C. (K.B.) (England & Wales).

59.

^ Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co.(1920), Ltd., p. 205.

60.

^ De Smith's Judicial Review, p. 330.61.^ Wade & Forsyth, pp. 413415.62.^ See also Nicholson v. Haldimand-NorfolkRegional Police Commissioners 1978 CANLII 24

63.


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(http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/canlii/doc/1978/1978canlii24/1978canlii24.html), [1979] 1 S.C.R.311, S.C. (Canada).^ M. Sornarajah (1977), "Natural Justice, Fairnessand Administrative Functions"(http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UTasLawRw/1977/1.pdf) (PDF), University of Tasmania LawReview 5 (3): 268287 at 269.

64.

^ Ahmed v. Her Majesty's Treasury [2010] UKSC 2(http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2010/2.html),[2010] 2 A.C. 534, Supreme Court (UK).

65.

^ Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006(S.I. 2006 No. 2657 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/2657/contents/made)).

66.

^ Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures)Order 2006 (S.I. 2006 No. 2952(http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/2952/contents/made)).

67.

^ United Nations Act 1946 (1946 c. 45(http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6/9-10/45/contents)), s. 12.

68.

^ See, for instance, Ahmed, p. 685, para 246, perLord Mance J.S.C.

69.

^ Art. 6(3) sets out some of the requirements of theright to a fair hearing, but only in the context ofcriminal proceedings.

70.

^ Hadjianastassiou v. Greece [1992] ECHR 78(http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1992/78.html),(1992) 16 E.H.R.R. 219, European Court of HumanRights.

71.

^ Timothy [Andrew Orville] Endicott (2009),Administrative Law, New York, N.Y.: OxfordUniversity Press, p. 110, ISBN 978-0-19-927728-5.

72.

^ a b R. v. Secretary of State for the HomeDepartment, ex parte Doody [1993] UKHL 8(http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1993/8.html),[1994] 1 A.C. 531 at 560, H.L. (United Kingdom).

73.

^ a b Kioa, p. 582: "It is a fundamental rule of thecommon law doctrine of natural justice expressed intraditional terms that, generally speaking, when anorder is to be made which will deprive a person ofsome right or interest or the legitimate expectation ofa benefit, he is entitled to know the case sought to bemade against him and to be given an opportunity ofreplying to it ... . The reference to 'right or interest' inthis formulation must be understood as relating topersonal liberty, status, preservation of livelihoodand reputation, as well as to proprietary rights andinterests."

74.

^ a b Endicott, p. 127.75.^ Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v.Evans [1982] UKHL 10 (http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1982/10.html), [1982] 1 W.L.R.1155, H.L. (United Kingdom).

76.

^ R. (Morgan Grenfell & Co. Ltd.) v. SpecialCommissioner of Income Tax [2001] EWCA Civ329 (http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/329.html), [2002] 2 W.L.R. 255 at 286, para.47, C.A. (England & Wales).

77.

^ Morgan Grenfell, p. 287, para. 50.78.^ Lloyd v. McMahon [1987] 1 A.C. 625, C.A.(England & Wales) and H.L. (United Kingdom).

79.

^ Lloyd, p. 670, citing R. v. Local GovernmentBoard, ex parte Arlidge [1914] 1 K.B. 160 at192193, H.C. (K.B.) (England & Wales).

80.

^ Endicott, p. 128.81.^ Kay Swee Pin v. Singapore Island Country Club[2008] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 802 at 806, para. 7.

82.

^ Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF[2009] UKHL 28 (http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2009/28.html), [2010] 2 A.C. 269, H.L.(United Kingdom).

83.

^ AF, p. 355, para. 64.84.^ A. v. United Kingdom [2009] ECHR 301(http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/301.html), (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 625, E.C.H.R.

85.

^ AF, pp. 350352, para. 51, citing A. v. UnitedKingdom, paras. 215220.

86.

^ AF, p. 355, para. 63.87.^ Tan Boon Chee David v. Medical Council ofSingapore [19791980] S.L.R.(R.) 523, H.C.(Singapore).

88.

^ Re Teo Choo Hong [1995] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 441, H.C.(Singapore).

89.

^ Howe Yoon Chong v Chief Assessor [19771978]S.L.R.(R.) 386, H.C. (Singapore).

90.

^ Front Row Investment Holdings (Singapore) Pte.Ltd. v. Daimler South East Asia Pte. Ltd. [2010]SGHC 80 at para. 31, H.C. (Singapore); see also R.v. Industrial Injuries Commissioner, ex parteHowarth (1968) 4 K.I.R. 621; Kay Swee Pin, p. 806,para. 7: "[I]f a tribunal, after the close of the hearing,comes into possession of further evidence, the partyaffected should be invited to comment upon it".

91.

^ SEF Construction Pte. Ltd. v. Skoy Connected Pte.Ltd. [2010] 1 S.L.R. 733 at 757, para. 58.

92.

^ SEF Construction, pp. 758759, para. 60.93.^ Kok Seng Chong v. Bukit Turf Club [1992] 3S.L.R.(R.) 772, H.C. (Singapore).

94.

^ Thio, p. 192.95.^ R. v. Secretary of State for Home Department, exparte Tarrant [1985] 1 Q.B. 251, Divisional Court(England & Wales).

96.

^ Ex parte Tarrant, pp. 285286.97.^ Doresamy v. Public Services Commission [1971]2 M.L.J. [Malayan Law Journal] 127, High Court(Malaysia).

98.

^ Ho Paul v. Singapore Medical Council [2008] 2S.L.R.(R.) 780, H.C. (Singapore).

99.


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^ Rajeevan Edakalavan v. Public Prosecutor [1998]1 S.L.R.(R.) 10, H.C. (Singapore).

100.

^ Rajeevan Edakalavan, p. 19, para. 22.101.^ Thio, pp. 193194.102.^ Re Siah Mooi Guat [1988] 2. S.L.R.(R.) 165 at178179, para. 34, H.C. (Singapore).

103.

^ R. v. Northumberland Compensation AppealTribunal, ex parte Shaw [1952] 1 K.B. 338, C.A.

104.

(England & Wales).^ Ex parte Shaw, p. 352.105.^ Keith Frank Goodfellow (1971), Administrationunder Law: A Report by JUSTICE, London: Stevens,p. 23, ISBN 978-0-420-43710-5.

106.

^ a b Endicott, p. 110.107.^ Thio, p. 194.108.

References

Cases

Kioa v. West (1985) 159 C.L.R. 550 (http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/159clr550.html) at583, High Court (Australia).Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19 1990 CANLII 138 (http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/canlii/doc/1990/1990canlii138/1990canlii138.html), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653, Supreme Court (Canada).Locabail (U.K.) Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd. [1999] EWCA Civ 3004 (http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1999/3004.html), [2000] Q.B. 451, Court of Appeal (England and Wales).Tang Kin Hwa v. Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners Board [2005] 4 S.L.R.(R.) [Singapore LawReports (Reissue)] 604, High Court (Singapore).Re Shankar Alan s/o Anat Kulkarni [2007] SGHC 12 (http://www.commonlii.org/sg/cases/SGHC/2007/12.html), [2007] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 85, H.C. (Singapore).

Other works

Endicott, Timothy [Andrew Orville] (2009), Administrative Law, New York, N.Y.: Oxford UniversityPress, ISBN 978-0-19-927728-5.Thio, Li-ann (1999), "Law and the Administrative State", in Kevin Y[ew] L[ee] Tan, The Singapore LegalSystem (2nd ed.), Singapore: Singapore University Press, pp. 160229, ISBN 978-9971-69-213-1 (pbk.).Wade, H[enry] W[illiam] R[awson]; Forsyth, C[hristopher] F. (2009), Administrative Law (10th ed.),Oxford; New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, pp. 369470, ISBN 978-0-19-921973-5 (pbk.).Lord Woolf; Jowell, Jeffrey; Le Sueur, Andrew, eds. (2007), "Procedural Fairness: Introduction, Historyand Comparative Perspectives", De Smith's Judicial Review (6th ed.), London: Sweet & Maxwell,pp. 317354, ISBN 978-0-421-69030-1.

Further reading

Articles and websites

Allan, T[revor] R.S. (1998), "Procedural Fairness and the Duty of Respect", Oxford Journal of LegalStudies 18 (3): 497515, doi:10.1093/ojls/18.3.497 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1093%2Fojls%2F18.3.497),JSTOR 764676 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/764676).Chen, Siyuan; Leo, Lionel (2008), "Natural Justice: A Case for Uniform Rigour: Ho Paul v SingaporeMedical Council [2008] 2 SLR 780; Kay Swee Pin v Singapore Island Country Club [2008] 2 SLR 802"(http://www.webcitation.org/620jUlYdP) (PDF), Singapore Academy of Law Journal 20: 820833,archived from the original (http://www.sal.org.sg/digitallibrary/Lists/SAL%20Journal/Attachments/463/2008-20-SAcLJ-820-Chen%20and%20Leo.pdf) on 27 September 2011.Craig, Paul P. (2003), "The Human Rights Act, Article 6 and Procedural Rights", Public Law: 753773.Ho, H[ock] L[ai] (2000), "The Judicial Duty to Give Reasons", Legal Studies 20 (1): 4265,


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doi:10.1111/j.1748-121X.2000.tb00132.x (http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1748-121X.2000.tb00132.x).Leo, Lionel; Chen, Siyuan (2008), "Reasonable Suspicion or Real Likelihood: A Question of Semantics?Re Shankar Alan s/o Anant Kulkani" (http://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=595112190038681;res=IELHSS), Singapore Journal of Legal Studies: 446454.Manohar, Sujata V. (November 2007), Principles of Natural Justice [speech at a programme for theorientation and training of new members, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, India, 1228November 2007] (http://web.archive.org/web/20110726195335/http://www.itatonline.org/articles_new/index.php/principles-of-natural-justice/), Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, India, archived fromthe original (http://www.itatonline.org/articles_new/index.php/principles-of-natural-justice/) on 26 July2011, retrieved 26 September 2011.Maurici, James (December 2007), "The Modern Approach to Bias", Judicial Review 12 (4): 251260.

Books

Aronson, Mark I.; Dyer, Bruce; Groves, Matthew (2009), "Procedural Fairness: The Scope of the Duty;The Hearing Rule; The Rule Against Bias [chs. 79]", Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th ed.),Sydney: Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Ltd., pp. 403711, ISBN 978-0-455-22557-9 (hbk.).Binmore, Ken[neth George] (2005), Natural Justice, New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press,ISBN 978-0-19-517811-1.Cane, Peter (2004), "Procedural Grounds of Review [ch. 7]", An Introduction to Administrative Law (4thed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 133184 at 133168, ISBN 978-0-19-926898-6.Craig, Paul [P.] (2008), "Natural Justice: Hearings; Natural Justice: Bias and Independence [chs. 1213]",Administrative Law (6th ed.), London: Sweet & Maxwell, pp. 371436, ISBN 978-1-84703-283-6 (pbk.).Jones, David Phillip; de Villars, Anne S. (2009), "Natural Justice and the Duty to be Fair: HistoricalDevelopment and General Principles; The Duty to be Fair: Audi Alteram Partem; The Duty to be Fair:The Rule against Bias [chs. 810]", Principles of Administrative Law (5th ed.), Toronto, Ont.: Carswell,pp. 210457, ISBN 978-0-7798-2126-6 (hbk.).Leyland, Peter; Anthony, Gordon (2009), "Procedural Impropriety II: The Development of the Rules ofNatural Justice/Fairness; Procedural Impropriety III: The Requirements of Natural Justice/Fairness [chs.1516]", Textbook on Administrative Law (6th ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 342391, ISBN978-0199-21-776-2 (pbk.).Maher, Gerry (1986), "Natural Justice as Fairness", in MacCormick, Neil; Birks, Peter, eds., The LegalMind: Essays for Tony Honor, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 103120, ISBN 978-0-19-876196-9.Wan Azlan Ahmad; Nik Ahmad Kamal Nik Mahmod (2006), "Procedural Ultra Vires at Common Law",Administrative Law in Malaysia, Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, pp. 119177,ISBN 978-983-2631-75-0 (hbk.).

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