Volume 4, Issue 3 Summer 2018

NATO Small Arms Ammunition Standardization David (Yi Le) Zhou Master of Strategic Studies, University of Calgary

WhilesomeacademicshavedescribedNATOammunitionstandardizationandusageproceduresgenerally,thereisalackofexaminationofthesuccessesandlimitationsofthealliance’seffortsatstandardizingammunition.ThisPolicyBrief will examine a case in which NATO ammunitionstandardizationwassub-optimal,recentimprovementsinthearea,andoffersuggestionsonhowtofurtherimproveammunition interchangeability for future NATO calibersviamorespecificammunitionspecifications.

According to NATO, interoperability means thatthe alliance’s forcesmusthave “the ability tooperate insynergyintheexecutionofassignedtasks.”1Theabsenceof interoperability among NATO forces may threatenmission success and lead to logistical problems withregardtoensuringthat“spareparts,ammunitionandfuel”areconsistentlyavailable.2Intermsofammunition,NATOsoughttoachieveinteroperabilitybydraftingstandardiza-tion agreements (STANAGs) in an attempt to enable itsforcestointerchangeammunition.AmmunitionSTANAGssetthestandardsfortheammunitiondesignsofratifyingmemberstatesbutdonotreplacenationalstandardsandallow states to design their ownNATO standard caliberammunition.

NATORifleAmmunitionStandardization:AHistoryBefore1945,manynationsfieldedtheirownuniquesmallarms ammunition calibers, at least partly for reasons ofnational pride, but this created significant issues withammunitionsupplyduringtheSecondWorldWar.Afteritscreationin1949,NATOwantedtopre-emptthepotentiallogistical and interoperability issues that would havearisenifitsmemberstateshadusedvariousproprietary

calibers, and ammunition standardization became apriority. After a meeting convened by US, British andFrench leadersin1953,NATOagreedtostandardize theUS-developed7.62x51mmcaliberasitsstandardrifleandmachinegunammunition,primarilyduetoperceptionsofthecrucialroleoftheUSinthealliance.STANAG2310setthe technical standards for7.62x51mmammunition andwasratifiedin1957.

Despite the standardization of the 7.62x51mmcartridgeby theUS andNATO, theUSContinentalArmyCommandsupported thedevelopmentofanassault riflefiring small caliber high velocity cartridges because theconcept offered a reduction in recoil and ammunitionweight.TheseeffortsledtothedevelopmentoftheM16A1assaultrifle,whichsawextensiveusewithAmericanforcesduringtheVietnamWar.

By1969theM16A1hadbecomethestandardrifleforUStroopsstationedinEurope,whichmeantthatUSandother NATO forces no longer had a common caliber forrifles. As a result, NATO held new weapons andammunitiontrialsbetween1976and1979tostandardizeanewriflecaliber.The5.56mmcartridgeusingtheSS109projectile had best met NATO’s evaluation criteria andSTANAG4172wasratifiedin1981,thusstandardizingthatstyleof5.56mmammunition forNATOassault riflesandlightsupportweapons.

NATOQualificationandtheLimitsofStandardizationSmall caliber ammunitiondesigns thathave successfullycompletedtestsinNATONominatedWeapons(NNWs)asdefined in the STANAGs and Manuals of Proof and

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Inspection(MOPI)orthesuccessorMulti-CaliberManualofProofandInspection(M-CMOPI)areconsideredNATOQualified.3CertainweaponmodelsthatareinservicewithsomeNATOstatesserveasNNWsbuttheyarenotalwaysrepresentativeofeverymajorweaponmodelinusebyallofthealliance’smilitaryforces.

NATOrecommends itsmembers touseNNWsorweaponswith similar technical characteristics to enablethem to function with all NATO Qualified ammunitiondesigns, thereby ensuring sufficient reliability duringemergencyuse.4However,foraNATOstatethatwantstouseafellowmember’sammunitionforjointlogistics,thenan interchangeability study must first be conducted todeterminewhethertheammunitionbeingconsideredhadsafetyandperformanceissuesinspecificweapons.

Accordingly,NATO’sammunitionstandardsdonotguaranteethateverymember’sammunitiondesignwillbereliableenoughforcombatuseinallNATOweaponmodelsof the same caliber. TheUSmilitary’sM4 is the carbinevariantoftheM16rifleandhasashorterbarrelandgassystem than its rifle counterpart. The M4 is a reliableweaponwhenfiringUSmilitarystandardammunitionliketheNATOQualified5.56mmM855 roundbuthad issueswiththeUK’sformerNATOQualified5.56mmround,theL2A2. Sal Fanelli of USMC Systems Command explainedthat:“theBritishSA80rifles[had]ahigherspringrateandinternal parts friction than the M4 and M16 [and] adifferent port pressure [was] require[d] to operate the[SA80] reliably. The higher port pressures of the L2A2overdrove the [M4’s operating] components, [which]caus[ed]earlier thanexpectedcomponentdamage[and]theUSMCrestricted theuseoftheBritishammunition.”5Also,theL2A2causedfailuretocyclemalfunctionsintheM4 because the carbine’s “operating components weremovingtoofastfortheejectortohaveenoughtimetoejectthespentcartridge.”6

TheM4isnotaNNWandisnottestedwithnon-USNATOQualifiedammunitionattheNATOlevel.Whilethe

USM16A4isaNNWthatachievestherequireddegreeofreliabilitywithallNATOQualifiedammunitiondesignsbymeetingthesentencingcriteriaofthe5.56mmMOPIorM-C MOPI for the function and casualty test, the M16A4achieved a lowermean rounds between stoppages withL2A2comparedtoM855ammunition.7ThisshowedthatwhileallNNWmodelsfunctionedproperlywithallNATOQualified cartridges, certain NATO Qualified rounds stillcausedmorestoppagesincertainNNWmodelsthanotherNATOQualifiedammunitiondesigns.

TheNeedfor(andshortcomingsof)StandardizationThroughouttheColdWar,interoperabilitybetweenNATOforces was important because the alliance’s variousnationalcorpswouldneedtoreinforceoneanotherinthedefense ofWestern Europe. Yet interoperability ismorecrucialduringcontemporarymissionsduetothedemandsofcoalitionwarfareinwhichNATOforcesoftenoperatedwitheachother “downto theplatoon level.”8During theGlobal War on Terror (GWOT), there were situationswhere a NATO military had to use another member’sammunition during emergencies. For example, US andother NATO forces needed to share ammunition whentheirlogisticssystemsweresometimesunabletosustain“highly mobile combat units.” 9 Also, the nature ofasymmetricwarfareoftenrequiredUS forces toconductdistributedoperations10“inorder to saturate areaswithpatrolsandprovidesustainedoperations”butthis“makesresupplymorechallenging.”11Asaresult,interoperabilityamongNATOforceswouldbeimprovedifallNATOforcesoperatinginthesamebattlespacecouldreliablyuseeachother’sammunitionduringmultinationalanddistributedoperations. Since the L2A2 was the British Army’sstandard 5.56mm round during the beginning of theGWOT,morespecificammunitionstandardsattheNATOlevel may have reduced the risks associated with usinganother member’s NATO Qualified rounds in weaponmodels that arenot NNWsand ideally allow forUS andBritishforcestohaveacommonammunitionsupply.

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A further advantage of standardization is that aNATO state which experiences ammunition shortagescouldprocureammunitionfromafellowmemberoncetheappropriatecourseofaction,suchasaninterchangeabilitystudy, had been taken. TheUS government-owned LakeCityArmyAmmunitionPlantcouldnotkeepupwiththeUS Army’s increased ammunition demands during theGWOT.12Asaresult,theUSArmyordered5.56mmL2A2ammunitionfromtheUKfortraininguse.However,notallunits had a positive experience. In 2006, 2nd Battalion,325thAirborneInfantryRegiment,82ndAirborneDivision(2-325 AIR) experienced numerous failure to extractmalfunctions and increased bolt breakage when usingL2A2 in their M4s for training. These reliability issuessignificantly hindered training tasks. Afterwards, 2-325AIRhad touseL2A2 in theirM4s sparinglyand requestM855 rounds for training. 13 As demonstrated by thisexperience, the US would have benefited from moreuniversalammunitionstandardsthroughthereductionofreliability issues caused by the use of a foreign NATOroundinanon-NNWweaponmodelthatwasseeingfairlywidespreadusewiththeUSArmy.

TheFutureofNATO’sStandardizationNevertheless, therearemorecontemporaryandongoingefforts aimed at improving NATO ammunition inter-changeability.TheNATOsubgroupforinterchangeabilityofsmallarmsammunitionhas“recentlyrequestedCanadato submit theC8 carbineas aNNW.”14This requestwasduetothetechnicaldifferencesbetweentheM16rifleanditscarbinevariantsliketheM4andC8andtheuseofthosecarbinesbyseveralNATOmilitaries.However,therehaveprobably been improvements at the national level, asdemonstratedbytheBritishArmy’snewer5.56mmNATOQualifiedround,theL17A2,nothavinganyapparentissueswiththeC8carbinesinBritishservice.15

The US military is considering adopting a newassault rifle caliber to replace the 5.56mm round forimprovedterminalperformanceinthe2020sandthiswillresult inNATO’sneed tostandardizeanewammunitioncaliber to maintain interoperability with US forces.Improving the degree of ammunition interchangeabilitythrough the creation of more universal ammunitionstandards is not practical for existing NATO standardcalibers because any significant revisions to a currentammunition STANAG will require “re-adoption of thatSTANAG by each country and this process is toocomplicatedtodoalloveragain”foranexistingSTANAG.16RegardingNATOstandardizationofafutureUSsmallarmscaliber,itisunlikelythattherewouldbemajorobstaclestoimplementingafutureammunitionSTANAGwithmorespecific technical specifications than those found inSTANAG4172.Hence,anammunitionSTANAGforafutureassault rifle caliber should include a standard for casecapacity along with a maximum gas port pressurespecificationtestedatacarbine-lengthgasportlocation.17This recommendation still provides enough freedom fornationstodesigntheirownammunitionbutmayreducepotential variables that could cause functional issues incertainweaponsandallowweaponstobedesignedarounda better defined range of ammunition specifications.Improved ammunition standards at the NATO level inconjunctionwithfunctionandcasualtytestingcanbenefitnewermember statesduring their transition to a futureNATO caliber given that several of those statesmay beunable to submit their ammunition designs for NATOQualification due to budget constraints. More specificammunition standards may also reduce potentialreliabilityissueswhenusingNATOQualifiedammunitioninnon-NNWmodelsduringemergencies.Finally,aftertheuser nation has completed an interchangeability study,improved ammunition interchangeability may increasethenumberofsuitableammunitiondesignsthatwouldbeavailableatanypointforjointlogisticsandtraining.

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Endnotes 1“Enhancinginteroperability:thefoundationforeffectiveNATOoperations,”NATOReview,https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/Also-in-2015/enhancing-interoperability-the-foundation-for-effective-nato-operations/EN/index.htm.2FlorianCiocan.“PerspectivesoninteroperabilityintegrationwithinNATOdefenseplanningprocess,”JournalofDefenseResourcesManagement2(2011).3NATOMilitaryAgencyforStandardization,AOP-6(V)Vol.I:CatalogueofAmmunition,March2007.4NATOArmyArmamentsGroup,MultiCalibreManualofProofandInspection,NATOStandardizationAgency,2013,1-5.AnexampleofamilitaryusingaweaponwithsimilartechnicalcharacteristicstoaNNWwouldbetheCanadianArmy’sC7A2rifle,whichisavariantoftheUSM16rifle.

“TherearenosignificantdesigndifferencesbetweentheC7A2andM16warrantingnomination[ofthe]C7A2[asaNNW].”SeeStevenBradley,CanadianDNDdelegatetotheNATOsubgroupforinterchangeabilityofsmallarmsammunition,emailcommunicationtoauthor,December11,2017.5SalvatoreA.Fanelli,APdM-EngineeringUSMCIWSSYSCOM,emailcommunicationtoauthor,January8,2015.6Ibid.7Ibid.

“Meanroundsbetweenstoppagesisdeterminedbydividingthetotalnumberofroundsfiredbythetotalnumberofstoppages.‘Astoppageisdefinedasanyunplannedcessationinfiringortheinabilitytocommenceorceasefiringattributabletothegun.’”SeeDanShea,“TortureTest:USOrdnanceMAG-58/M240,”SmallArmsDefenseJournal(2013):3,accessedMay20,2015,http://www.sadefensejournal.com/wp/?p=1692.8Ciocan.“PerspectivesoninteroperabilityintegrationwithinNATOdefenseplanningprocess.”

9JimSchatz,independentsmallarmsconsultant,CTTSOcontractorandformerVPMilitaryProgramsatHKUSA,emailmessagetoauthor,November25,2015.10MAJWilliamWando,“FutureWarPaperInfantrySmallArmsoftheFuture:PracticalandTacticalConsiderations”(MastersThesis,MarineCorpsUniversity,2007),4.11MAJJamesWilliamson,USMCinfantryofficer,emailmessagetoauthor,November18,2015.12MAJMarkW.Siekman,“SmallArmsAmmunitionProductionandAcquisitionStrategyfortheUSArmy”(Master’sThesis,USArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege,2009),18,22.13JasonR.Gillis,“FailureReportinRelationtoU.K.5.56mmAmmunition”(ReporttoNATO,SG-1,2010).IntermsofincreasedboltbreakagewhenusingL2A2ammunition,“BCo,2-325AIRandCCo,2-325AIRaloneexperiencednolessthansixbrokenM4boltsinoneafternoonofreflexivefiretraining.”SeeGillis,“FailureReportinRelationtoU.K.5.56mmAmmunition.”14StevenBradley,CanadianDNDdelegatetotheNATOsubgroupforinterchangeabilityofsmallarmsammunition,emailcommunicationtoauthor,December11,2017.

15StevenBradley,CanadianDNDdelegatetotheNATOsubgroupforinterchangeabilityofsmallarmsammunition,emailcommunicationtoauthor,December12,2017.16FrenchDefenceProfessional.Emailcommunicationtoauthor,December7,2015.

175.56mmNATOammunitionSTANAG4172’stechnicalperformancespecificationsforgasportpressureonlyrequires5.56mmammunitiondesignstomeetorexceedaminimumlevelofpressurebutthereisnomaximumportpressurelimit.SeeNATOMilitaryAgencyforStandardization,STANAG4172MMS(Edition2)(5May1993).

The5.56mmgasportpressurerequirementistestedinthe5.56mmtestbarrelandtheportpressureismeasured280mmfromthebreech.SeeNATOArmyArmamentsGroup,MultiCalibreManualofProofandInspection,Drawing12-(5.56mm)-3.